ONE important dimension of how we evaluate anger concerns its effects. Roughly, we often want to know if someone being angry is productive or not, relative to certain values or goals. Debate on this kind of question runs through the history of political thought up until the present moment. For example, it’s long been a key part of the debate about the role of anger in political movements against a range of forms of domination, oppression, and exploitation, from campaigns to overthrow authoritarian dictatorships to the contemporary Black Lives Matter movement.

In her recent article, “The Aptness of Anger,” Amia Srinivasan argues that focusing on the effects of anger is far from the only way we can, or should, engage in normative reflection about anger.1 In particular, Srinivasan argues that a key question about anger is whether it is apt or not. It might be apt for an agent to be angry—in the sense that her anger is warranted, given the situation—even if it is counterproductive for her to be angry, relative to certain goals. Srinivasan argues that the debate over the productivity of anger tends to obscure this dimension of the ethics and politics of anger, and that, in so doing, it prevents us from grappling with a range of normatively important questions about it.

Srinivasan develops this idea by focusing on cases of what she calls “affective injustice.” In these cases, an agent is ethically pulled in two directions. On the one hand, an agent’s being angry is counterproductive, relative to certain goals. Srinivasan focuses on the effects on one’s own well-being, wherein anger is prudentially counterproductive in particular. More specifically, much (though not all) of her discussion focuses on cases wherein anger is counterproductive relative to the goal of dismantling unjust social/political structures, which, moreover, are

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1Srinivasan 2018.
the very same structures that help make anger apt in the first place. On the other hand, an agent’s anger is apt, and having anger is thus, as Srinivasan puts it, a way of “appreciating” a situation as it is.² It can often be psychologically difficult to recognize (even just implicitly) that one is normatively pulled in these competing directions. In many cases, the fact that an agent faces such a conflict results (at least in part) from contingent social/political structures and widespread cultural attitudes about acting out of anger. The fact that an agent is pulled in these competing directions, claims Srinivasan, can constitute a kind of injustice. To remedy it, we need to change the relevant social/political structures and cultural attitudes.

In making her argument, Srinivasan briefly draws an analogy to epistemology.³ When we ask whether an agent should believe a proposition P, we don’t (and shouldn’t) just ask whether believing P will lead to good results, where those results are understood either in terms of solely “epistemic” values (for example, the promotion of true beliefs), or some broader class of values (for example, including the promotion of happiness). We also (and some would argue more importantly) ask whether believing P is warranted, given the overall balance of evidence in favor of and against that proposition (and given whatever other facts are epistemically relevant for the case at hand).⁴ Srinivasan argues that we are right to do this in epistemology with respect to beliefs (or other doxastic states, such as credences), and that we should do it too in ethics and political philosophy with respect to anger.

To appreciate the content of Srinivasan’s intervention in the debate over counterproductivity, and how it connects to this point about epistemology, consider the following. Part of the historical debate over the productivity of anger concerns which values or goals are at stake. For example, in response to the charge that anger is counterproductive to the goal of ending systemic oppression against a particular group (for example, women, or a racial underclass), many have pointed out that anger contains, as Srinivasan puts it, “salutary psychic possibilities for someone whose self-conception has been shaped by degradation and hatred.”⁵

Consider, for example, the case of Frederick Douglass, which Srinivasan brings up in this context, and which Macalester Bell discusses at length in her article, “Anger, Virtue, and Oppression,” to make a similar point. In discussing his resistance to an attack from a slave-breaker—an act that he saw as the “turning-point” in his “career as a slave”—Douglass writes:

> It rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood. It recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be free. The gratification afforded by the triumph was a full

²Ibid., p. 132.
³Ibid., p. 141.
⁴For discussion and defense of this non-consequentialist part of our epistemic practices, see Berker 2013. For a consequentialist response, see Singer 2018.
⁵Srinivasan 2018, p. 132.
compensation for whatever else might follow, even death itself. He only can understand the deep satisfaction which I experienced, who has himself repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. I felt as I never felt before. It was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the heaven of freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold defiance took its place; and I now resolved that, however long I might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact.\textsuperscript{6}

Insofar as acts of resistance such as Douglass’s can stem in part from anger (which many arguably do), Douglass’s remarks point to some of the positive psychological goods that can come from acting out of anger. The cultivation of those psychological goods might in turn be instrumentally valuable to the eventual overthrowing of unjust social institutions, including those which helped spark the anger in question.

The psychological goods can be valuable for other reasons too, including value for the person who has them, \textit{regardless} of whether their having them helps promote the overthrow of the relevant oppressive institutions. The relevant psychological goods might, for example, make living under oppressive institutions more bearable, or contribute in other ways to one’s well-being under conditions of oppression.\textsuperscript{7} If one wants to know whether anger is “productive” or not, one needs to take into account (as Srinivasan emphasizes) \textit{all} of the different effects of anger, and \textit{all} of the different goods anger might help promote. Srinivasan’s main intervention, however, is not to make this point, or to add to the list of values that matter in the debate over the productivity of anger. It is rather that anger (like belief) can be \textit{apt} or not \textit{regardless} of whether it promotes any values whatsoever. As she puts it, “there is more to anger, normatively speaking, than its effects.”\textsuperscript{8} In turn, this fact is what helps generate cases of what she calls “affective injustice.”

In this article, I discuss a larger theoretical framework concerning the relations between reasons for action and fitting attitudes, which, I argue, lends a new line of support to Srinivasan’s core argument. First, it helps underscore an important point that Srinivasan makes briefly in a footnote: namely, that we can have the same kind of conflict involved in cases of “affective injustice” with a wide range of emotions besides anger (for example, guilt, despair, grief, and awe).\textsuperscript{9} Second, it explains how we can have a number of relevantly similar kinds of conflicts

\textsuperscript{6}Douglass [1845] 1997, p. 79; quoted in Bell 2009, p. 166; and Srinivasan 2018, p. 126, n. 16. Bell (2009, p. 165) discusses Douglass as part of her exploration of how one might best defend “a \textit{virtue} of appropriate anger,” especially as a virtue of someone living under conditions of oppression. Her proposed account draws on the idea of anger being a \textit{warranted} (or in her words “appropriate”) response to the situation at hand, and the idea of someone having the disposition to respond appropriately with anger across a range of cases that warrant it. As this brief gloss suggests, Srinivasan’s discussion connects in important ways to Bell’s. For other recent work that emphasizes (like Srinivasan’s and Bell’s) the importance of evaluating anger in terms of its warrant, rather than solely in terms of its consequences, see Callard 2017.

\textsuperscript{7}For connected discussion, see Shelby 2012.

\textsuperscript{8}Srinivasan 2018, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., p. 135, n. 45.
between (non-consequentialist) reasons for action generated by apt emotions and consequentialist reasons for action (prudential, moral, and otherwise). Third, the framework illustrates why Srinivasan need not rely on what she calls a “moderate functionalism” about anger—a thesis about what anger as such involves—to answer an important objection to her argument. The framework I put forward illustrates that one can instead appeal to a link between warranted attitudes and reasons for action. The plausibility of this kind of link (even if the particular version of it that I discuss is mistaken) makes it harder to resist accepting the existence and import of “affective injustice.”

I proceed as follows. In the first section, I explain a framework that Howard Nye, John Ku, and I have put forward for thinking about apt attitudes (or, equivalently, “warranted” attitudes) and reasons for action, in the context of thinking about the debate over consequentialism in ethics. In this article, I do not fully defend this framework (indeed, I am not convinced it is correct). But, I argue, it is one that deserves to be taken seriously, which offers a plausible story for how non-consequentialist reasons for action stemming from apt anger could be generated. Following my overview of this framework, I explain how it supports Srinivasan’s argument about affective injustice (including, importantly, by illustrating a different way of answering a core objection she considers), illuminates certain aspects of the depth and breadth of the kind of normative conflicts involved in cases of affective injustice, and underscores the way in which Srinivasan’s discussion matters for a range of emotions beyond anger.

I. FITTING ATTITUDES AND NORMATIVE REASONS FOR ACTION: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, I introduce the general framework for thinking about fitting attitudes and normative reasons for action that Nye, Ku, and I put forward. I argue that this framework, if correct, would explain the idea that warranted anger could generate non-consequentialist reasons for action, which then could conflict with prudential reasons to not act out of anger.

We begin (as Srinivasan does) with the idea of an attitude being apt or warranted. We propose that an attitude is warranted (or not) based on the balance of the normative reasons for or against it (or for withholding it). In general, normative reasons are (to use the standard gloss) considerations that “count in favor of” (or count against) something (for example, an attitude, an action, and so on). In the case of apt attitudes, however, we are concerned with only some kinds of normative reasons: namely, the “right kind” of reasons (as opposed to the “wrong kind” of reasons), or what we call “fittingness” reasons (as opposed to “non-fittingness” reasons).

See Nye et al. 2015. The framework we argue for draws extensively on solo-authored work by Nye, who develops many of the components of this framework in more detail and with more systematic argument; see Nye 2009.
To get a handle on this distinction, consider the contrast between two cases: you have good evidence in favor of the proposition that P, versus someone offers you money to believe that P. The first provides a fittingness reason for you to believe that P, whereas the second one does not. Indeed, it might not really provide you with a reason to believe P at all, as opposed to something else, such as a reason to get yourself to try to believe P, or a reason to want to believe P.\textsuperscript{11}

We then argue that a number of attitudes constitutively involve a motivational element. That is, for certain attitudes, the motivation to perform certain actions is an essential part of the relevant attitude, when it is coupled with certain beliefs, credences, or other doxastic states. For example, take the case of fear. If you are afraid of spiders, and believe that the insect in front of you is a spider, that will motivate you to take certain actions: for example, to jump away from the spider. In many cases, philosophers tend to think that all attitudes with a motivational component are fundamentally tied to wanting the world to be a certain way, or at least that they can be modeled as such for the purposes of normative theorizing. But Nye, Ku, and I argue that is wrong. Instead, we argue, we should distinguish between attitudes that essentially involve \textit{act}-directed motives and those that essentially involve \textit{state}-directed motives.\textsuperscript{12} To illustrate, consider the contrast between the following cases: wanting to exercise versus wanting the world to be one in which one exercises. The first involves a direct motivation \textit{to exercise} (perform an act) while the second involves the motivation to bring about a certain state of affairs. Both can motivate action, but the first does so by \textit{directly} motivating an \textit{act}, whereas the second does so \textit{via} motivation to bring about a certain state of affairs, which an act can help promote. We argue that a range of our attitudes—including, importantly, emotions such as anger and guilt—essentially involve \textit{act}-directed motives. Recognizing this, we argue, matters not only for psychological accuracy, but also for a range of issues in normative theory (including whether some form of consequentialism is correct in ethics).

With these distinctions in hand, Nye, Ku, and I then argue for two principles. The first principle is this:

\textit{Warrant Composition Principle} (WCP). Let P be a psychic state that involves psychic state \textit{P'} as an essential component. If R is a fittingness reason to be in P, then R is a fittingness reason to be in \textit{P'}.\textsuperscript{13}

In short, WCP states that if there is a fittingness reason to have a certain attitude, then there is a fittingness reason to have all the elements of that attitude that are essential to it. The idea behind this principle is relatively straightforward: if you

\textsuperscript{11}An important question is how to explain what makes a reason a “fittingness” one in particular. One kind of suggestion is that fittingness reasons are tied to the constitutive standards that govern the attitude in question, in a way that non-fittingness reasons are not. But, for my purposes here, I can be neutral on this explanatory question.

\textsuperscript{12}There is also the possibility, of course, of attitudes that essentially involve some mixture of the two.
didn’t have fittingness reasons to be in \( P' \), and \( P' \) is an essential component of \( P \), then how could you really have fittingness reasons to be in \( P \), as opposed to some other, nearby psychic state (e.g., \( P^* \))?  

The second principle is this:

*Motivations–Actions Principle* (MAP). Let \( \phi \)-ing be an action. If \( R \) is a fittingness reason to be motivated to \( \phi \), then \( R \) is a reason to actually \( \phi \).

In short, the idea behind MAP is that if there is a fittingness reason to be motivated to do something, then there is also a fittingness reason to do that thing in the circumstances wherein one can realize the goal of that motivation.\(^{13}\) As with WCP, part of the argument for MAP involves appeal to what is essentially involved in motivation. Motivation essentially involves being moved to do certain things rather than others. More precisely, it involves being moved to do so in certain circumstances (for example, when one has certain beliefs about the circumstances one is in). If so, it is compelling to think that if you really have a fittingness reason to be motivated to do something, then you also have a fittingness reason to actually do that thing. We argue that one can also give further support for MAP by thinking about the explanatory role of intentions in guiding action. In short, since the role of intentions is to guide action, one might argue that reasons for action are explained by (or just are) fittingness reasons to have certain intentions.

With WCP and MAP in hand, we explain how it could be that fittingness reasons for attitudes involving act-directed motives support non-consequentialist reasons for action. The explanation is as follows. Suppose there are fittingness reasons to have an emotion which has, as an essential component of it, an act-directed motive. Then, according to WCP, there is fittingness reason to have that act-directed motive. In turn, according to MAP, there is fittingness reason to actually perform (or refrain from performing) the action those motives favor (or disfavor). The explanation makes no reference to whether those actions do or do not promote good consequences (whatever metric of goodness one uses). Instead, the explanation flows from the fact that having certain emotions is warranted, which, as I have discussed, need not have anything to do with the consequences of having those emotions.

Now take anger. Consider an agent being angry at a perceived way in which she has been wronged, for example, by being oppressed, disrespected, or exploited. We can, and often do, ask whether anger is fitting or not in such circumstances. In thinking about this kind of issue, we might, for example, ask whether the person really was wronged, whether the person correctly understood the significance of another’s actions, or whether some emotion other than anger was warranted.

\(^{13}\)Importantly, all MAP says is that there is *some* normative reason generated here. Thus, this reason might be very weak, and totally outweighed by other reasons. I return to this point later in the article.
Now also consider the claim that anger, as Nye, Ku, and I explicitly argue, essentially involves act-directed motives. For example, when an agent is angry about being brutally oppressed, this essentially involves having the motivation to do certain things to push back against that oppression: for example, to take up arms against her oppressor. If that is right, then, insofar as this agent really has fittingness reason to be angry, then it follows from WCP and MAP that she really has normative reason to perform the actions that her motives favor. Since the (by hypothesis) fitting motivation to perform the action in question need not have anything to do with the consequences of the action, we have an explanation of how the fittingness of anger can generate non-consequentialist reasons for action.

The framework that I’ve been discussing concerns the conceptual possibility of non-consequentialist reasons for action, which stem from fitting attitudes involving act-directed motives. To establish that there are in fact such normative reasons—let alone that they are very weighty or important ones—would require further substantive normative argument. But, if it’s on track, the framework puts at least initial pressure on the idea that we lack such reasons entirely. This is because, in order to establish that we have no such reasons, one would need to deny that emotions (such as anger) that essentially involve act-directed motives are ever fitting for non-consequentialist reasons. That is certainly a conceptual possibility, but also quite a hard path to take. At the very least, the idea that such emotions are never warranted for non-consequentialist reasons flies in the face of our widespread evaluative practices about emotions.

II. EXPLANATORY UNIFICATION

The core reason why the framework that Nye, Ku, and I develop matters for Srinivasan’s argument is that it provides a general account of reasons for action that explains how apt anger could generate non-consequentialist reasons for action. It does so by embedding such reasons in a more general explanatory story, and thus providing a kind of explanatory unification. In particular, given some plausible further normative assumptions (in particular, that anger is sometimes warranted), it unifies the explanation of such non-consequentialist reasons stemming from anger with the explanation of a range of our other normative reasons. Indeed, if Nye, Ku, and I are correct, the framework not only provides an explanation for how non-consequentialist reasons could be generated, but an explanation for consequentialist ones too. In short, we argue that, insofar as some states of affairs are good, we have normative reasons to promote such states because of the fittingness of certain pro attitudes that essentially involve state-directed motives.

III. A SHARP CUT BETWEEN APT FEELINGS AND REASONS FOR ACTION?

An important objection to Srinivasan’s discussion of affective injustice stems from the combination of the following two ideas: 1) that there is a sharp cut
between reasons to feel anger and reasons to act out of it, and 2) that issues about the aptness of the anger are solely about the former, and not the latter. In turn, because the prudential reasons that (purportedly) make acting out of anger counterproductive are about reasons for action, there is no conflict with reasons tied to apt anger. A proponent of this objection can hold the following: the idea of “apt feelings” can help us understand why people feel the way they do in relation to such things as oppression, domination, and exploitation—and, indeed, why they are in some sense rational or justified to feel those ways—but insist that this doesn’t bear on what agents should actually do.

Srinivasan argues that this objection rests on a “pure disjunctivist” view, according to which “anger is a mere feeling, and that feeling must be sharply distinguished from whatever behaviour contingently accompanies it.” Srinivasan opposes this view. She instead argues in favor of a kind of “functionalist” view about anger, according to which part of what anger is involves facts about its stereotypical physical expression (that is, beyond the “internal” state of feeling a certain way). Srinivasan argues for a “moderate” version of functionalism about anger, which emphasizes the way in which “anger’s natural expression can be altered significantly by cultural training.” This view makes room for the idea that there can be wide variation in how anger is expressed (more so than on the view that she calls “strong” functionalism about anger does), while still denying the strong separation between emotion and the physical expression of it that strong disjunctivism endorses. If moderate functionalism is correct, then the aptness of anger entails aptness of at least some aspects of physical expression of that anger, including through some behaviors.

The framework that Nye, Ku, and I develop illustrates another possible route to answering the objection at hand: namely, don’t rely on a claim about behavior itself somehow being part of anger, but instead establish a connection between apt feelings and reasons for action. If one goes this second route, and establishes a connection between apt feelings and reasons for action, a proponent of Srinivasan’s overall argument about affective injustice can be more neutral on what is involved in anger itself (for example, whether or not moderate functionalism is true of it or not). Establishing the relevant kind of connection between apt feelings and reasons for action will, no doubt, be controversial—and especially through a defense of MAP, which is a particularly strong way of making that connection. The point here, however, is just that MAP—embedded in the kind of larger framework that Nye, Ku, and I argue for—illustrates that a proponent of Srinivasan’s overall argument need not rely on functionalism about anger in particular. Instead, one could argue for a principle (such as MAP) that explains how apt feelings can generate reasons for action.

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14 Srinivasan 2018, p. 137.
15 Ibid.
Proceeding this way will be helpful, especially if one has independent reasons to be worried about functionalism about anger. It has another potential advantage as well. Srinivasan’s moderate functionalism leaves open which behaviors or other physical expressions are tied to what anger is. For all that she says, maybe only a small number of them are. With that in mind, consider some of the actions that (in some way) stem from anger that seem to give rise to the deepest conflicts of the sort that Srinivasan draws attention to: for example, taking up arms against one’s oppressor, or even just yelling in response to disrespect. On a moderate functionalist account, many of those actions might be tied to anger, but not part of what anger is (in a given cultural context). If so, we would then need some link explaining why the (purported) aptness of the emotion itself generates genuine reasons for such actions in particular (if we think such actions really are tied to the aptness of anger). Discussion of such (more intense) actions have historically been a key part of the debate over the “productivity” of anger. Thus, if issues about the aptness of anger are to significantly complicate the normative terrain around that debate, it would be good to provide a way to make that connection. Our framework provides a way to do so. For if motives to do certain things really are an essential part of anger, then, given MAP and WCP, we have a way of showing how such motives could generate genuine reasons for action.

IV. THE WEIGHTS OF REASONS AND THE PREVALENCE OF CASES OF AFFECTIVE INJUSTICE

Suppose there are some reasons for action that are non-consequentialist in character. This doesn’t settle how many such reasons there are, let alone anything about how relatively weighty these reasons are. It might be, for example, that (in many or most cases) the non-consequentialist reasons generated by apt anger are massively outweighed by reasons of prudence (or reasons concerning the promotion of social justice, and so on), even if the latter reasons are the “wrong kind” of reasons for assessing anger.

However, once we start thinking about the relevant reasons using a) the framework that Nye, Ku, and I put forward, in connection with b) cases of anger that we think are apt in our actual world (for example, someone angry about the deep racial injustices in American society), it is hard to think that the non-consequentialist reasons generated by such anger will generate merely trivial reasons, which in turn could generate only “mild” cases of affective injustice. Some people in our society get angry too quickly, about too many things, and mistakenly let reasons generated by anger outweigh other, more important reasons in guiding their actions. But others fail to get angry about many things that warrant it, ranging from issues about racism to issues about factory farming. At the same time, it’s hard to deny that, in a wide range of cases for actual agents

16Ibid., pp. 138–9.
in our world (for example, for many women and racial minorities throughout the world, who are often subject to problematic interpretations of their anger), there are weighty prudential reasons (or other weighty reasons involving the consequences of their actions) which often weigh against acting out of anger, even if it is warranted. If that thinking is on the right track, then there’s good reason to think agents will often be pulled in competing directions, in the basic way that Srinivasan describes.

V. THE PANOPLY OF NORMATIVE REASONS AND THE CATEGORY OF “AFFECTIVE INJUSTICE”

I now turn to a point about the range of normative reasons for action that we are likely to have, if the framework that Nye, Ku, and I put forward is correct, and explore some of the consequences of this for thinking about the category of “affective injustice.”

We are agents capable of having many different attitudes, including a wide range of emotions. Assume, for the sake of argument, that many of these are ones that are sometimes fitting for us to have. If so, we will have normative reasons generated by a range of different fitting attitudes. Some of these attitudes—such as anger and guilt—will involve act-directed motives that generate non-consequentialist reasons. And other ones—such as certain desires about the way we want the world to be—will involve state-directed motives whose fittingness (Nye, Ku, and I argue) can generate consequentialist reasons to promote certain states of affairs. Those consequentialist reasons will not only be ones tied to the promotion of our prudential interest, but also ones tied to the promotion of other goals (for example, the promotion of a more just society).

In many cases, these reasons will pull in different directions, especially in cases where multiple different attitudes are fitting in a given situation. We as agents will thus likely face a panoply of different normative reasons for action, generated by a wide range of different kinds of attitudes. There very well might be a unified normative story about how all of these normative reasons weigh against each other. For example, it might be that consequentialist reasons about the promotion of good states of affairs always trump our non-consequentialist reasons stemming from fitting attitudes involving act-directed motives. But, even if so, it is hardly the case that the normative truth of that or other weighing principles is going to be obvious to most agents. Thus, agents are likely to often feel pulled in different normative directions based on a range of fitting emotions they have, with conflicts between not only prudence and the reasons generated by anger, but also between the promotion of causes they believe in and reasons generated by the fittingness of awe, shame, and many other emotions. The framework I’ve outlined thus suggests that the basic kind of conflict involved in cases of affective injustice—a conflict between different kinds of normative reasons for action, generating from different sources—might be a ubiquitous feature of our lives.
One interesting question concerns the boundaries of the category of “affective injustice” given the (purported) ubiquity of this kind of conflict. To approach that question, let me first say something about the terminology I’ve been using here to discuss the particular cases that Srinivasan draws our attention to. Out of deference to Srinivasan, I’ve followed her practice of using the label “affective injustice.” I have some reservations about her use of this label, however. First, I am not sure that justice, in particular, really is the value at stake in the core cases she describes. This is tied to questions about the nature of justice about which I am unsure (for example, whether it is a value specifically tied to evaluating the “basic structure” of society in Rawls’s sense, and, if so, how we should think about what the “basic structure” is). Second, I have connected concerns about the widespread contemporary practice of labeling many moral/political issues ones about “justice,” especially without much argument for why that label in particular is the one to use. This practice can make it hard for philosophers to advance important normative views about what we should do, all-things-considered, and to have those views taken as seriously as they should be.

For example, in recent work, I argue that the way philosophers talk about “justice” makes it hard to advance important normative arguments about the way in which non-human animals directly matter in determining how we should set up and run our social/political institutions. Indeed, I argue that widespread ways of talking about “justice” help tilt the field in favor of mistaken views on that topic. Because of such concerns, I’m not convinced that Srinivasan has chosen the optimal terminology with the label of “affective injustice.” But I’m with Srinivasan in thinking the following, which I take to be her main points in using that label: many of the cases she describes involve an agent being wronged in some way—or at least unfairly disadvantaged—by the social world, or perhaps more accurately by certain agents in that social world, and that the distribution of those wrongings (both their intensity and their frequency) is unfairly distributed among different agents.

In Srinivasan’s cases of affective injustice, the agent in question has been wronged (or at least unfairly disadvantaged) because the relevant societies have been set up and run in such a way that the agent faces the normative conflicts she does, pulled between reasons of prudence (including reasons of prudence tied to the goal of dismantling social/political institutions that one is oppressed by) and reasons stemming from apt anger. A more just society would mitigate the frequency

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17See Rawls 1999.
18See Plunkett 2016. Roughly, I argue there that this issue stems from two important trends in recent political philosophy. The first is to hold that non-human animals don’t directly place demands of justice on us. The second is to give considerations of justice normative priority in our general normative theorizing about social/political institutions. I argue that this situation is problematic, given the actual ethical standing of non-human animals. See Gardner (2011) for connected worries about using the term “justice” to cover a wide range of different evaluative and normative issues. I should also note that, because of these issues, my reservations about Srinivasan’s choice of label extend to Miranda Fricker’s choice of her label “epistemic injustice” for the class of cases she is interested in (Fricker 2007), which is part of what Srinivasan draws on in her choice of label.
and intensity of those conflicts, as well as more fairly distribute the burdens of those conflicts (for example, more equally distribute which people face them, and why). It could do that by decreasing the number of things that warrant anger, including institutions that the agent is oppressed by. Or it could (as Srinivasan underscores) change the cultural norms surrounding political engagement (thus mitigating the tradeoffs between acting out of anger and prudential reasons).

Putting aside the question of the label “affective injustice” itself, how should we think about the boundaries of the category of cases that Srinivasan, using that label, draws our attention to? In thinking about this question, it is important to recall that many of the core cases of affective injustice that Srinivasan discusses are ones where anger is apt, and yet acting out of anger is counterproductive relative to a specific goal: namely, eradicating those unjust social/political institutions that the agent herself is oppressed by, which warrant anger in the first place. That kind of specific goal is often invoked in important parts of the tradition of the “counterproductivity” critique that Srinivasan discusses. So one might want to reserve the term “affective injustice” for only those that fit this pattern. I have significant reservations about this particular way of defining the category.19 But it illustrates a general point, which I want to discuss in what follows: cases of “affective injustice” are likely some kind of species (even if not this particular one) of a broader genus. The broader genus is this: those involving a conflict between consequentialist reasons (of whatever kind) and non-consequentialist reasons for action generated out of apt emotions (whether anger or not).

Once we see this, we can then see that many cases of the broader genus would raise importantly similar (even if not identical) psychological phenomena and correlated normative issues to the ones Srinivasan highlights, even if they are not strictly categorized as cases of “affective injustice.” For example, even if we think that climate change and factory farming are horrible things, it’s not clear that we

19Here are some of my reservations. To start with, it is not fully supported by Srinivasan’s own writing in Srinivasan 2018. To see this, consider that the proposed account does not obviously cover all of the examples that Srinivasan discusses to illustrate the phenomenon of affective injustice. For example, consider her case of the unfaithful lover pulled in two directions, and how this ties into misogynist and racist ways of thinking about anger (p. 128). Furthermore, it is not built into Srinivasan’s explicit discussion of the category of affective injustice, such as on pp. 127 or 131–6. For example, consider her statement that affective injustice is “the injustice of having to negotiate between one’s apt emotional response to the injustice of one’s situation and one’s desire to better one’s situation” (p. 135). Note that “bettering one’s situation here” is not tied specifically to bettering it via successfully eradicating (or mitigating the effects of, etc.) the unjust social/political institutions or practices that are the object of the apt emotion. Just as importantly, the proposed definition I floated has important disadvantages as a substantive proposal, given the kinds of epistemic and moral/political work Srinivasan wants the category of “affective injustice” to do. For example, consider a woman who experiences sexual harassment at her workplace, who is torn between a) considerations of acting out of apt anger at such harassment and b) prudential considerations having to do with how so acting might damage certain friendships she has with co-workers or the possibility of promotion. We might well want to count this as a case of “affective injustice,” given how we can (following the way the real world actually operates) stipulate the case to have it tie into sexist social/political institutions, practices, and attitudes.
ourselves are all oppressed or even wronged by them. Yet, if the framework I’ve been operating with in this article is on track, we likely will face conflicts between apt feelings about those things and questions about how to most productively respond to them (for example, by helping to mitigate the effects of climate change, or lessen the amount of factory farming).

Consider, for example, the following quotation from Edward Hoagland, in his obituary of the environmentalist author Edward Abbey, whose work is full of expressions of anger at the way human beings relate to the natural environment. He writes:

Emerson would be roaring with heartbreak and Thoreau would be raging with grief in these 1980’s. Where were you when the world burned? Get mad, for a change, for heaven’s sake! I believe they would say to compatriots of Abbey’s like Annie Dillard, Barry Lopez and John McPhee.

Hoagland’s point, I take it, isn’t that Emerson or Thoreau would urge this on Abbey’s contemporaries because they would think this was the best tactic for promoting environmentalist political goals. Rather, the core point, I take it, is that being mad (as Abbey often was) about the destruction of the environment in the 1980s was an apt response, and the kind of response environmentalist writers should be having and giving voice to as a way of correctly “appreciating” the world as it is. At the same time, it’s not at all clear that Abbey’s writing was optimally productive for the environmentalist cause. Indeed, one might argue that it was in fact counterproductive. If that kind of counterproductivity critique was on the mark, then we would have a case of conflicting reasons for action that is structurally parallel to the core cases of “affective injustice” that Srinivasan describes, at least up until the point where we consider whether Abbey himself was oppressed by or wronged by the environmental destruction he wrote about.

We can mark out the broad kind of conflict I’ve just been discussing as follows: it is one between consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasons for action, where the relevant non-consequentialist reasons for action are generated from the fittingness of certain emotions. Srinivasan’s cases of affective injustice are, I have argued, some kind of species of this kind of conflict. Many cases in the broader genus raise importantly similar (even if not identical) psychological phenomena and correlated normative issues to the ones Srinivasan highlights.

20For example, with the category of “wronging,” one important issue concerns how wronging is tied to the violation of rights. If one thinks that one is wronged if and only if one has a right that is being violated, it is not clear which right of an American citizen is being violated by the factory farming of chickens. For discussion and critique of the widespread idea of tying wrongs to rights in this way, see Cornell 2015.


22We can also think here of related cases involving climate change and other emotions, such as fear. For example, there is now a body of literature discussing whether encouraging others to fear the effects of climate change is productive or not; for overview and critical discussion, see McQueen forthcoming. Here, as elsewhere, we can ask not only whether fear is productive or not, but whether it is apt.
By thinking about what explains the existence of cases in that broader genus (namely, by using the framework that Nye, Ku, and I defend), we can get a new line of defense for the reality and import of Srinivasan’s category of cases of affective injustice, as cases of a species within that genus. And then, by thinking about Srinivasan’s discussion of affective injustice, we can gain insight into a range of psychological and normative features of cases in the that genus beyond the particular species she focuses on.

VI. CONCLUSION

I want to conclude with a brief remark about the significance of the broader genus of conflicts between kinds of normative reasons for action I’ve been discussing. If the broad kind of conflict I’ve just glossed is very widespread in our lives, it’s not at all clear (and I think Srinivasan would fully agree), that all such conflicts (including many involving anger) involve an agent being wronged, or that they involve her being wronged in a serious way (which the label of “injustice” might be thought to suggest). Some of these conflicts (for example, perhaps some involving environmental destruction of the kind I discussed above) will stem from the fact that certain emotions are called for as ways of appreciating political injustice in the world, or other vices of social/political institutions, even if one is oneself not being wronged in any serious way. Other conflicts stem from the fact that we are complicated agents capable of a range of emotions, and that the world we live in (even if we were inhabiting a fully just society) will inevitably present us with situations where different emotions are called for simultaneously, thus normatively pulling us in different directions about how to act. Figuring out which such conflicts are ones that the state should be involved in mitigating, and figuring out what impact such tradeoffs between kinds of normative reasons for action have on thinking about the norms of political engagement, are two key questions in social/political philosophy, which I hope will receive increased attention in the coming years.

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