JOHN G. KEMENY ‘22A

President, Emeritus
Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science, Emeritus

An Interview Conducted by

A. Alexander Fanelli ‘42

Hanover, NH

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I guess just for the record we should say that this is the first session of a series of interviews and tapings on your part, the thirteenth president of the college, John George Kemeny [‘22A]. I am Alex Fanelli [A. Alexander “Alex” Fanelli ‘42], formerly President Kemeny’s executive assistant. And we’re both retired from the president's office.

John, I thought this first session we could do something, as I indicated to you on the phone, in the general area of how you happened to come to Dartmouth to teach and your view of the college at that time, which was, I believe, 1954, its strengths and its weaknesses perhaps. As a background to that, I thought I might ask—although some of your personal history, your coming to the U.S. just before World War II at an early age—I think you were fourteen—and excelling in your studies in high school in New York and later at Princeton—much of this history is already known and recorded. But I wonder if you could tell me what you recall in your childhood and youth that might have had a special influence in either pushing you toward or attracting you to an academic career, especially toward the areas of mathematics and philosophy.

The questions I always find difficult to answer. On mathematics, I can only say that as far back as I remember I always was fascinated by mathematics. Certainly I have recollection, let's say of age nine, of being tremendously interested. My father had a very small import-export business, just himself and a male secretary. The male secretary I suspect with fairly substantial mathematical talent, and he was using tables of logarithms. This was before computers existed, obviously. I was asking what it was and he taught me how to use logarithms when I was nine years old. That's not as great an achievement, as a mathematician will tell you, as it sounds. It’s one of my early recollections. I must have been about nine then. I just know that even then I was fascinated by this.

I know as far back as I remember always it was sort of taken for granted that I would go into some kind of mathematical career. I actually did not know there was a profession called mathematician, so by guidance of relatives I would
usually answer that I would be an engineer because that's what they associated with mathematical talent.

In high school, I was very... Sorry, in gymnasium in Hungary, I was very fortunate of having an excellent teacher for the three and a half years of gymnasium in mathematics, who encouraged my talents a great deal. So mathematics goes way back. I think an academic career I really didn't think of until I went to college and it became clear that the two areas into which mathematicians could go were either working for industry or working as a professor at a college or university. Since my tastes in those days were very, very pure mathematics, it was almost a natural choice to go into academia.

Also, relevant to this is that I went to Princeton during the war where all the young instructors got drafted, and therefore I was asked to teach when I was eighteen years old. I loved it from the very beginning. I think I was quite successful at it. I'm sure my teaching improved but even then I seemed to be quite successful at it, and I loved it, so from then on there never was any doubt in my mind that I would one day be a college professor.

Philosophy you asked me about. I really always thought of it as a hobby. I started reading philosophy when I was a senior in high school and was quite fascinated by it, so as an undergraduate, it's what you might call a minor, except there were no minors in Princeton. I took a great deal of philosophy, and continued taking them, not for credit but took a number of graduate philosophy courses as a graduate student just for the fun of it.

It was a pure accident that in '51 it was time for me to take a job. I looked for jobs only in mathematics, but the best job offer I got was from the Princeton philosophy department. I moved a hundred yards and became a philosopher and might still be there if a call hadn't come from Dartmouth College.

FANELLI: Yes. I'm going to ask you about that. In fact, I was going to get to that right away. Let me just ask you, however, in this period at Princeton, were there specific teachers that you had that had an influence on you? Of course, later there was Einstein, but...

KEMENY: Yes, but in the early days the first one to have a significant influence on me was a quite famous mathematician by the name of Chevalier. As a matter of fact, I should say, because future historians may wonder about some of the things I'm about to say, such as having Chevalier for analytic geometry, which most people would be quite amazed at. Since all the young people had been drafted, everyone I had as an undergraduate mathematics teacher, and there are quite a few different ones, every one either was a full professor at the time or became a full professor by the time I became a graduate student in the department. So I had very senior
faculty members, including some of the most famous in a very famous mathematics department. So by a fluke I had Chevalier for analytic geometry, a subject I'm sure he never taught before or afterwards. He spotted an undeveloped talent is the only way to put it, because while my training in Hungary in what corresponds roughly to junior high school—late grade school, junior high school—was excellent, thanks to a teacher, my training in the New York City high school was dreadful. I went to one of the least good New York City high schools.

FANELLI: Should we identify it?

KEMENY: Yes. George Washington High School. I only had one teacher who really understood mathematics. It was a she, and she was stolen from George Washington within one year by a better school, so that was typical. Actually, my experience at George Washington High School would influence me in having an interest in reforming mathematics education, because I saw some of the worst of it.

So Chevalier would be the first one. I remember I started in February and had him for the spring semester. During the summer, he invited me to come to Princeton once a week from my home in Long Island and sort of gave me private lessons. He was the first person to open my eyes to what modern mathematics was about.

Then I would have a major influence by Professor Church, who was a logician for whom I would end up writing a junior paper, a senior thesis, and a Ph.D. thesis—Professor Alonzo Church of the very famous American logicians, a quite different kind of influence from Professor A. W. Tucker, later to receive an honorary degree from Dartmouth College. He really stimulated my interest in teaching and would get me involved in the reform of mathematics education right after I came to Dartmouth.

FANELLI: So there were a number of influences present.

KEMENY: There were a number of influences there, yes. If I identified just three, I would pick those three.

FANELLI: John, how did your invitation to come to Dartmouth come about, from your angle?

KEMENY: It started with a telegram. I received a telegram that said, roughly, can you have lunch with me on Friday? Signed Donald H. Morrison, dean of the faculty, Dartmouth College.
FANELLI: And this was in 1953?

KEMENY: This must have been fairly early in 1953. I was quite startled by that telegram. I was, at that point, an assistant professor of philosophy at Princeton, my second year. I confess I had to ask my wife where Dartmouth College was. She is a northern New Englander and knew it very well. We pulled out maps, and in those days there were no good roads, so it looked like an awfully long drive. I called up Dean Morrison to say that there was just no way I could drive that far and still meet my teaching obligations. He was quite startled by my phone call because what he meant to say was could I have lunch with him in Princeton. But somehow it just never occurred to me that the dean of the faculty would come all that distance just to speak to an assistant professor.

So that was rather a startling beginning. We did indeed have lunch, and after usual kinds of personal remarks, the first substantive thing he said to me was, "I have come to Princeton to persuade you to come to Dartmouth College," which startled me because, again, deans of the faculty don't open negotiations that way, particularly not with a junior faculty member. My response, I remember it vividly, was, "I'm terribly sorry you wasted your time because I'm very happy at Princeton. There's nothing you could say that would persuade me to leave here." And his response was—and of course I would later discover that he had done an enormous amount of homework, none of which I knew about—his response was that, "I've already been warned that you were going to say that, but I hope to put a proposition before you that you will, on reflection, feel you cannot refuse."

FANELLI: So he knew a great deal more about you than you knew about Dartmouth College.

KEMENY: He knew a vast amount. I knew absolutely nothing at all. Yes. As a matter of fact, to record, there were only two things I knew about Dartmouth College. One, I'd seen them play football, and of course I was at that time rooting for Princeton. But the one substantive thing I knew is I had an excellent history teacher at George Washington High School, who put particular stress on the importance of the U.S. Supreme Court, and one of the historic cases we happened to have studied was the Dartmouth College case. So the only thing really relevant I knew about Dartmouth was what one learns from a very good high school teacher about the Dartmouth College case. Otherwise, I literally did not even know exactly where Dartmouth was.

FANELLI: John, just for the record… I mean, people can figure it out, but you were how old at that time? Twenty-seven?

KEMENY: I was twenty-seven years old, and as a matter of fact, I might tell a little anecdote here. Don Morrison did not know that. He had been given incorrect information. I even know how. He got it from Professor Tucker, who knew me as well as
anyone in the department. I think Professor Tucker added up various things I did from the day I came to Princeton, my undergraduate career, my graduate career, my Army service, serving as Einstein's assistant. I think he overlooked that some of these things overlapped. Actually, several times I was extremely lucky and things ended a year earlier than they normally would have. So he somehow added all that up and told Don Morrison I was thirty-one.

The way I found that out was, much later in the final stages of negotiating my coming to Dartmouth, he described to me the retirement plan of Dartmouth College, and he said simply that it was very similar to that of Princeton and therefore I was familiar with it. I had to tell him I had no idea what Princeton's retirement plan was, and he says, "But look, I checked on it. Everyone thirty and above is part of it at Princeton." And I said, "That might explain why I was not part of it," because I was twenty-seven. He really was quite taken aback by it, but he did not change his offer as a result of it.

FANELLI: Since you mentioned Don Morrison, I did have a question here about him because I remembered that he had played a role in that. Maybe you could comment—or if you think it's appropriate to do at a later time, just say so—on the role that Don played in the history of the college, the contribution that he made, as you saw it at that time and in the years that you knew him.

KEMENY: I would get to know him, although, unfortunately, he died about five years after I came to Dartmouth. I got to know him extremely well during that period, both professionally and socially. He is one of the people I most admired in the history of the college. Of course, the credit should go equally to John Dickey ['29] and to Don Morrison. Having picked the very young Don Morrison to become dean of the faculty was an incredibly courageous act on the part of John Dickey. Don Morrison, of course, lived up to much more than anyone's expectation, a truly remarkable person.

It was at the time when Dartmouth had probably the oldest faculty in the United States, a problem that John Dickey had inherited. It was in no way of his making, and there would be a ten-year period in which 80% of the permanent faculty was retiring. So for all practical purposes, John Dickey had the task of rebuilding the faculty from scratch. He made a commitment to build an academically much stronger faculty, and his means of getting that out was Don Morrison. I can say I can think of no person I've ever met who was better qualified for that than Don Morrison.

FANELLI: Well, he played an important role in the history of the college.

KEMENY: Yes. Are you going to ask me, Alex, at some point how Don happened to pick me? Something I found out years later.
FANELLI: That's a good point.

KEMENY: It might be good to bring up here because there are a number of stories I've heard that are truly fabulous Don Morrison stories, but usually I know only little bits of it. He, several years later, told me in detail how I happened to get picked, and that's much more a story about Don Morrison than it's about me. I think that story is as good a tribute to him as any.

With 80% of the faculty retiring—of course it happens unevenly across departments, and the department in which it happened fastest, partly because of some death and partly because there was a whole group roughly the same age, it happened in mathematics. By the time I actually arrived in '54, there were three very long-time full professors left and a bunch of temporary appointments, all of these full professors within a decade of retiring. So there really was an extreme case of having to start from scratch. He realized that the remaining faculty members had been sufficiently inactive mathematically that they could not rebuild the department.

What he did first was bring in a group of consultants, which is a standard thing to do. The consultants wrote a report, which he did not show me until years later, the essence of which was that it was not possible to build a first-rate research department at Dartmouth College. Therefore, what the college should do is to pick some area, preferably a not very competitive area, such as history of mathematics, and try to make a name for itself, see, as a department very strong in the history of mathematics. Don apparently paid off the consultants, stuck the report in his drawer, and then said, "I'm not going to do that. Now what do I do?"

He asked the senior members of the department was there any one department that particularly stood out mathematically, and at that point in the history, it was Princeton that had by far the best mathematics department. So he went to call on the chairman, fortunately both the chairman and vice chairman of the Princeton mathematics department. The chairman was Professor Lefschetz, a brilliant world-famous mathematician and very difficult person. The vice chairman was Professor Tucker, who would succeed Lefschetz as chairman.

Don Morrison made the mistake of explaining the problem at Dartmouth but then saying, "So how do I build a mathematics department?" I understand Lefschetz got very irate and said, "You can't build a mathematics department, you're not a mathematician. Your job is to find a young promising mathematician and then give him an absolutely free hand." And gave him a long lecture on how not to interfere with him so he had a free hand in building a department.
Don apparently thought it over and decided that this was good advice and went back to get names. I think something like three names were proposed, and he checked all of them out. I don't know about the others, but I know in my case, amongst many other people, he talked to both Einstein and Feynman [Richard Feynman] about me. So it was really a very thorough check, and all of that had happened without my knowledge. He had all that background on me before he ever talked to me. It's a quite fascinating story. It's a field, mathematics, in which he had no particular expertise at all, and he just pulled off exactly the right combination of things.

FANELLI: He was a political scientist?

KEMENY: He was a political scientist, yes. I forget where he did his undergraduate work. His Ph.D., I believe, was from Princeton University, so he had some connections to Princeton, but obviously not to the mathematics department.

FANELLI: Since I asked you about Don Morrison, obviously someone like yourself contemplating a move that was a pretty important step in your career and in your life would have wanted to know something about the president of the institution that you were going to.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: You indicated earlier that you didn't really know a great deal about Dartmouth and, presumably, about John Dickey. Did you get a chance to meet him and talk to him in this process?

KEMENY: Yes. During the process of interviewing, I did have a chance for a quite lengthy talk with President Dickey. Don Morrison introduced me to him, and we spent a pleasant, I would guess, most of an hour in an office I would get to know well on. As a matter of fact, I even remember one subject we talked on at considerable length. Clearly, John Dickey had looked at my background and noticed in it that I had been an extremely active member of the United World Federalists. I had done a major speaking tour for them and been faculty advisor of the Princeton chapter. John Dickey had had important connections at the beginning of that movement through having attended the crucial conference in New Hampshire at Dumbarton Oaks, which really was the beginning of the whole movement, so he knew a great deal about the whole thing and that was a topic we had in common we talked about at considerable length.

FANELLI: I could ask you now, although it maybe would be better to have it come out later about your… You might want to make some observations about how you came to know John Dickey in the years that you were on the faculty.
KEMENY: I'd be perfectly happy to. Let's see. Actually, for the record, I never got to know him to the point where we became personal friends. I admired him enormously, and I think I want to say that, while I was flooded with outside offers after a certain point, my admiration for his leadership had a great deal to do with not accepting some of the offers. I believed in Dartmouth and what John Dickey was trying to do with the institution and admired what he had achieved.

I think I got to know… I met him only occasionally, was at his house maybe twice. Where I got to know him best was late in his presidency when I happened to be elected to the Committee Advisory to the President, which at Dartmouth is what most institutions call the tenure committee. That's a committee that meets every other week for very long hours in the president's office and is chaired by the president. I served a three-year term, something like '65 to '68, plus or minus a year. That's roughly right. During that period, you do see a great deal of the president and get to know a good deal about him.

Also, there would be a transition stage where, during the Third Century Fund drive, I was picked as the faculty member to be in charge of approaches to foundations, and in that connection I got to see John Dickey several times. So I really got to know him best fairly late in his career as president.

FANELLI: And I'm sure that as we talk further later about other aspects of the college you'll have occasion to perhaps refer to…

KEMENY: I certainly will. As I have said publicly a number of times, I am quite certain that John Dickey will go down into the history of the college as one of the great presidents. And I don't mean good, I mean great presidents. There are many things he is going to get credit for, but I think the one overwhelming achievement was to take what was in effect a second-rate faculty—and I mean that in a simple, factual way; it wasn't first-rate, it wasn't third-rate, it was second-rate faculty—and replacing it over a period of years with a first-rate faculty. For one single president to achieve that during his administration is a truly remarkable achievement.

FANELLI: John, I'm going to jump around a little here, but we will get back to this theme about your coming to Dartmouth. This is a question that occurred to me about Jean's [Jean Alexander Kemeny] reaction to the decision to come to Dartmouth.

KEMENY: Hers was very different from mine. She was absolutely in seventh heaven because she comes from a long line of northern New Englanders. She was born in Vermont, and both sides of her family lived there at that time, although their roots are in New Hampshire. One side of her family was in on the founding of Londonderry, New Hampshire, so it goes way back in history. By accident, her father, a Burlington Life Insurance salesman, was moved from the Burlington
office to the Portland, Maine office when Jean was one month old. So she actually grew up in Maine. All her roots were Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. The thought of being able to live in New Hampshire was just heaven to her. Although she liked many people at Princeton—she now denies this, but I claim I heard her once describe to people when they asked her about what foreign countries she had visited, amongst many others, she mentioned New Jersey as one of the foreign countries she had visited, which roughly described her attitude towards it. It was one of the, to her, very foreign countries which she least liked.

We were happily married, but as far as a place to live, she did not like New Jersey at all. And the thought of being able to come to Dartmouth and live here… You know, anyone who lives in northern New England has a very special feeling for Dartmouth. She had had relatives, not her closest relatives, but an uncle and a great uncle had come to Dartmouth. Her mother had dated Dartmouth men, although she happened to marry a Yale man. So Dartmouth meant a great deal to her. But living in northern New England, she certainly helped Dartmouth in selling me on the idea of taking the position.

FANELLI: I was going to ask you if there were some activities that she had become involved in at Princeton that she had to give up or something to come up here, but she…

KEMENY: No. Actually, we had only lived there two years, and we lived in a miserable housing project. Somewhat the same purpose as Sachem Village but much less attractive. They were wartime Quonset huts. We really did not get involved a great deal. I mean, we had made some personal friends, but she did not… It would be at Dartmouth where she would get involved in a great many activities.

FANELLI: Just for the record, at that time Rob [Robert “Rob” Kemeny ‘77] hadn't been born yet, right?

KEMENY: No. Our first child was born three weeks after we arrived in Hanover. Jenny [Jennifer “Jenny” Kemeny ‘76] is the older one, so Jenny was born three weeks after we arrived here and Rob a year later. So they both are Hanover natives.

FANELLI: How about your personal adjustment, and also Jean's adjustment, to life at Dartmouth and life in Hanover? Where did you live when you first came?

KEMENY: Let me say one more thing about Jean which is relevant to what you're asking now. Something about the attitude I had when I came. I knew I was undertaking an extremely risky job. I mean, building a department from scratch at a place that, at least in recent years, had no reputation in mathematics at all. I say in recent years because in the '20s, I understand Dartmouth had a truly distinguished mathematics department. But people remember recent history and certainly for twenty years nothing interesting had happened in mathematics at Dartmouth. It
would be a highly risky endeavor. I warned Jean that I would do everything possible to make a success of it, but in the process I would have to take a great many risks. I warned her that it was entirely possible that three years later I would say “I'm not succeeding in this,” and I would resign. So I told her not to get too well settled.

Incidentally, at one point about negotiations, I was brought in immediately in charge of recruiting, and with alternate year changes in chairmanship, a year after I arrived I was to become chairman. I was not offered tenure at Dartmouth, so I would become one non-tenured chairman at Dartmouth.

FANELLI: That was really very risky.

KEMENY: It was very risky. Don was apologetic, but he said something that's absolutely true, that if you make a senior… I was brought in as a full professor. But Don said something that I know to be true, that when you make a senior appointment from the outside, someone who had not previously had tenure, usually tenure is awarded at the end of three years. But that made the risk higher. There are all kinds of variants of what I said at that point. My recollection is only that I assured Don that I couldn't care less about tenure because either I would succeed, in which case Dartmouth would want to confer tenure on me. Or, if I did not succeed, then it didn't matter whether I had tenure or not, I would feel obligated to resign. So that was not an issue in my mind. Leonard Rieser ['44] tells an exaggerated story of what I said to Don Morrison about what you could do with tenure, which I think is exaggerated. [Chuckles]

That is the general atmosphere in which we arrived. One thing we asked Don was… Because—for a complicated reason I had a year off before coming here when we traveled in Europe—we were unable to look for our own housing, we asked him to. The one thing that meant a great deal to us was a nice house and we wanted to start a family. He did extremely well by us. He got us half of a duplex house. The address was One South Balch Street, a street that had lots of young faculty members with children on it, and owning half of a real house was just incredible for us, with a beautiful birch tree outside the house. We were terribly happy about the location and the house.

FANELLI: While we're on housing, John, when did you later decide to build your house on Balch Hill?

KEMENY: That was five years later. What happens is a house that's great for you when you've got babies, once they get old enough that they run all around the place, you want more room. Also, our financial situation had improved in the meantime so we could afford to build a house. We looked around for land and found it on Balch Hill on Hemlock Street and built a house. I've always brought up as
evidence of the fact that it was very, very late that I decided I would be seriously interested in a college presidency... In 1967 we decided that the original house we built was too small and spent a great deal of money tearing down a wall and enlarging it, which is a terrible economic investment. Less than three years after we completed that, I was president of Dartmouth College. So it was clear that at least when we started that project in early '67, still the thought of my making such a move had not occurred to me.

End of Tape 1, Side A
Beginning of Tape 1, Side B

FANELLI: John, at the time that you came here in 1954, how did you feel Dartmouth compared with Princeton academically and in other ways that may have been important to you?

KEMENY: There were two major areas in which Dartmouth in those days was way behind Princeton. One, I've already indicated that it was a second-rate faculty, a faculty typically who cared a great deal about teaching but did not have strong research qualifications. Or in some cases, more sadly, may have had it when they came to Dartmouth, but because of the general atmosphere, did not keep up with their field.

Secondly, more or less as a direct result of this, the student body was in one way significantly different from Princeton. The Dartmouth student body looked roughly like the bottom two-thirds of the Princeton student body. That is, Dartmouth did not admit any students weaker than those Princeton admitted, and that of course is a fairly high standard; but they were not attracting many of the best students in the country, and that's a problem many of us would have to work on later.

On the positive side, there is the obvious thing that anyone would prefer living in Hanover, New Hampshire over living in Princeton, New Jersey. But on the academic side, something I did not like, and Jean disliked very much, was the strong departmentalization of the Princeton faculty. In spite of having had twelve years of—not that long—but undergraduate, graduate students, faculty connection with the Princeton mathematics department, during which I was invited to all mathematics parties, when I moved over to philosophy I started being invited to all the philosophy parties and never again got invited to a single mathematics party. It's not because anybody was angry at me, but just the way things were done. Jean didn't like that. She doesn't like walls of any sort. Very early at Dartmouth, it became clear that Dartmouth was very, very different on this. We made friends in many different departments, and she liked that much more.
FANELLI: John, you mentioned before, in a sense, the enormity of your task in recruiting, changing this department. You also mentioned the fact that the college was, in a sense, behind in the sense of strength of faculty to other institutions, such as Princeton. So that must have been a difficulty in your recruitment of people to come here, of good people to come. Was there ever a time over the next few years when you said to yourself or said to Jean, "My God, we should have stayed at Princeton," or "Sorry we came?"

KEMENY: No, actually, that never happened. I, fairly early, came up with a strategy which only in retrospect did I realize how well I picked that strategy. I tried to turn the great weakness of the Dartmouth math department around into a significant strength in the following sense, that I was recruiting young mathematicians, and mathematicians tend to be at their best when they're young. But I pointed out, particularly for the first three years, that the group that was coming in there would have a chance together to build a department to their own liking. Usually, mathematicians fresh out of graduate school, or a couple of years' postdocs after graduate school, don't get that kind of opportunity. They typically become very small cogs in a large department. Of course, I had far from a 100% record. Probably more people turned us down than those that accepted. We were able to find enough adventurous young men to whom the idea of starting something absolutely from scratch and building a department according to our own desires was very appealing.

So success came pretty fast. Actually, the job market was favorable to us until Sputnik. I guess that's '55, and its repercussions are a year or two later in the United States. So for about the first three years, there was not a huge supply of good jobs in the United States, so we were recruiting in a favorable environment.

FANELLI: John, did you feel a few years later, or several years later, that you accomplished most of the objectives you had for the math department during the years of your chairmanship? How long were you chairman?

KEMENY: Twelve years. I actually resigned after ten because I thought I had accomplished my objectives. Also, I believed then, as I would later as president, as John Dickey did when he stepped down from the presidency, it's terribly important not to interfere with your successor. So I had not taken a sabbatical in a very long time. When I stepped down in 1964 I had arranged to go around the world with my family in '64-'65, and come back as an ordinary faculty member in '65. What happened was that my close friend and colleague, Laurie Snell [James Laurie Snell], who was picked to be my successor, developed a very bad case of ulcers just at the thought of becoming chairman. By the time I left, it was clear, on doctor's advice, that he was not to serve as chairman.
Incidentally, as soon as I agreed to take back the chairmanship for two more years when I came back, Laurie’s ulcers had a miraculous recovery, so the doctor correctly diagnosed it. Laurie is an excellent person who worries too much, which is what ulcers have to do with. So he accepted being acting chairman for a year, and I had to be chairman two more years when I came back. Then another successor was picked. But really, by ’64, I felt that I had achieved all the major objectives I'd had for the department.

FANELLI: With respect to your children, Jenny and Rob—and I'm sorry, I knew that Jenny was older and I shouldn't have forgotten that—but looking back, are you pleased that they spent their childhood and almost all their formal educational years, at least until their B.A. degree, in Hanover rather than somewhere else? Do you think this was the best place for them?

KEMENY: Yes. Certainly I think it was a wonderful place for them until I became president of Dartmouth College. I think the impact after that was mixed on them. It was a very mixed blessing being the president's child in a small town like this. Although neither one has ever regretted having gotten their B.A. from Dartmouth College, I know their experiences were mixed, as I suspect John Dickey's son must have had similar experiences from stories I've heard. Again, I've talked to him and I know he has never regretted going to Dartmouth, but it's a complex situation.

Also, once we became president, clearly, neither Jean nor I had the amount of time to spend with the children we'd ordinarily have. They were old enough by then to be understanding, but I'm quite sure that we spent less time with them than would have been ideal.

FANELLI: I had a question saying, “Did the fact that you were president during the time they were undergraduates pose any special problems for you or for them,” and I think you've spoken to that?

KEMENY: Sure. Rob actually suffered from that more than Jenny.

FANELLI: Jenny, of course, went to Yale first.

KEMENY: Jenny went to Yale first, was very unhappy there and came here. She was always a very good student. Didn't always work hard, but when she did… Well, she had 800 aptitude scores and that sort of thing. So things came easily to her. But Rob, I think, was more hurt by being the president's son during his education. So, at least one case where I'll never know whether a faculty member who happened to be angry at the president may have taken it out on the president's son.
What Rob most complained about was that... His aptitude scores put him in the middle of a Dartmouth class, certainly not at the top of it and he performed at about that level. Somehow they assumed that because he was my son, everybody expected greater things of him and he felt it was quite unfair not to be able to be anonymous. If he worked terribly hard to get a C+ in a course, everybody assumed he was goofing off because he could easily have gotten an A.

FANELLI: He also had some... He liked golf, wasn't it?

KEMENY: Yes. Rob's problem was, which affected his life dramatically till later he had worked his problems out, in high school he was a truly spectacular athlete. As a matter of fact, at different times... Once he got scouted by pro scouts in football and later he had a tryout in baseball with the Yankees in Yankee Stadium. He would go to golf later because he had a major injury as a freshman quarterback in high school. It's something Jean and I still resent. In college, having freshmen scrimmaging against the varsity is a perfectly sensible thing because a college freshman is physically built not very differently from a college senior. But in high school, to have seniors scrimmaging against high school freshmen always seemed to me idiotic. Rob had his spurt of growth later on. He was only ninety-nine pounds, and he was a quite spectacular freshman quarterback, may have thrown the longest pass ever completed in the high school. At least one coach thought so. But got hit by two 250-pound linemen, and they absolutely wrecked his knees.

It was one of these injuries where the doctor said they could operate, but if they operated, he could never again play sports. It was that kind of problem. But he said he might grow out of it. Then the bad luck came. He shot up from about five-nine to six-five over a relatively short period of time, which, as the doctor would later say, made it impossible for his knees to adjust. He is perfectly normal, except he can't ever play contact sports again. Although he was terribly happy later to have a tryout with the Yankees, he realized deep down that he just could not because he would almost certainly... His knees would give out on him. That's when he took up golf and became a fairly spectacular golfer, because he had to go in for that kind of sport. And he played in intramural sports, softball for example. I forget what else. That had a very deep impact on him because he had dreamed about becoming a professional athlete, and it was very clear he was never going to make it.

FANELLI: John, I'd like you to talk a little bit about your attitudes towards teaching and your own teaching skills and the response of students to that. In every quality university there are a few professors who develop reputations as outstanding teachers, and I think I'm simply stating a fact when I say that when I came here in 1967 to work for John Dickey, you were among those who were so regarded by
students and faculty. Could you talk a little bit about that? Were you always a good teacher, even in your early years at Princeton and Dartmouth?

KEMENY: Yes, even at eighteen and the Princeton math department doesn't give you any help, they just throw you into it. Even my first course was quite successful, and I got better fairly fast. One special thing happened to me quite by, not by accident but by a series of events. When the Princeton philosophy department hired me, they were interested… My specialty was logic, which is taught in both mathematics and philosophy, and they had an absolutely dreadful logic course. They had no one in philosophy of science, and I had published some papers and would eventually publish a book in philosophy of science. So those were the two main areas. Although I also was a fairly competent Plato scholar, so I had planned to teach Plato. If I ever had any regret about leaving Princeton, it was I never got to teach a Plato course because I came to Dartmouth. Although I have occasionally given guest lectures in a Plato course here. And by now I'm sure I've lost my competence in that area.

Those two courses I gave for the first time my first year. I was only required to teach those two courses because I had to develop them from scratch, which is a great deal of work. My second year, what happened, the logic course had a hundred and twenty-five students, and the philosophy of science course had a hundred and forty students in it, which was totally unheard of. All of a sudden I had two of the largest courses in the department. I discovered then that, in addition to loving to teach, that I was also very good at teaching large courses, which would have a significant influence later on, which is quite a different and specialized attribute.

I think the faculty member at Princeton most… You asked me whether faculty members influenced me, and obviously I've mentioned the mathematicians. I have to mention one philosopher because he is the one from whom I learned most about teaching. His name was W.T. Stace. He was a moral philosopher. But I had been fortunate enough to have him both in a large lecture course and more than once in a small course. He was superb in both, and I learned an enormous amount about teaching from him. By the time I was a faculty member, he must have been, say, sixty-five years old. I remember being totally worn out by a large lecture course, and I asked Professor Stace if I could talk to him about it. I said, "Look, I work very hard and I enjoy it, but I'm just absolutely dead after one of those lectures to a hundred and forty students." I didn't say the obvious, that he was superb at doing this. I said, "Professor Stace, how many years does it take to get over that?" He thought about it for a moment, and he says, "I don't know yet." [Laughter] Of course, there was a great deal of truth in that, because if you ever go into one of those large lectures and you don't come out of it that tired, you haven't given your all, and you can't hold the attention of that large a group without just giving your all in the process.
So that happened at Princeton, and my last year there, they had the student
evaluation, which was pretty nasty actually, and I got picked as one of the
outstanding teachers at Princeton in '53. As a matter of fact, if I may tell a story, I
was quite taken aback by the following. The class of '54 or '55 at Princeton put
out a twenty-five year book, as twenty-five year classes do at Dartmouth. But
they did something special. They had essays written by a random sample of the
class. But there were about a hundred of them, about what they mostly
remembered at Princeton and what they most liked and most disliked about
Princeton. They had a classmate who became a distinguished social scientist who
put it all together. He's the one who sent me a copy of the book. He said what
was fascinating was how very often in terms of what they liked and disliked,
overwhelmingly, individual faculty members came up. The fact that it was a
relatively small number of faculty members who could—it must have been '55, I
think—who were remembered, and he sent me the book because I was mentioned
a large number of times in that.

I only overlapped two years with that class, so I think… Look, it's very hard to be
objective about how good you were way back, but that's the only objective
evidence I have. That was really the first regular teaching I did in my life,
particularly large courses, and twenty-five years later, the class that only
overlapped for two years would still remember my teaching. I think I must have
been pretty good very early.

FANELLI: That must have given you a good feeling. Could you say something more about
the special satisfactions that you have had from teaching? I know that when you
became president, one of the things you insisted on was being able to continue
teaching, so it must have been very important to you.

KEMENY: It has been very important throughout my life. One gets a variety of satisfaction
out of it. I mean, besides the thing that's most often mentioned, that if you happen
to get a small number of very special students in whom you light the light and
they go on and do great things in the field, that's enormous satisfaction. But that
happens sufficiently rarely to anyone, particularly in a field like mathematics
because most of your students are not going to go on in mathematics. There isn't
room for that many mathematicians. It has happened to me a number of times,
but those are still rare occasions.

I think simply getting a class excited about a given field… For example, let me
take the opposite extreme. I've enjoyed teaching mathematics courses for students
who have no interest in the sciences at all. The department has been good at
attracting students who might have sworn they'll never again take a mathematics
course and entered the course with a strong dislike for mathematics. If you can
get them by the end of the term to the point, for the first time they appreciate why
someone else might find mathematics beautiful and exciting, there is enormous satisfaction in that.

I just plain enjoy the interaction with students. I always have. I find it tremendously stimulating. It played a special role during the presidency. Sometimes, if you have had a particularly crummy week when it looks as if all you're doing is you're solving problems and doing an awful lot of routine detail, which does happen in the presidency… Sometimes you wonder, “Why the heck am I doing this?” Walking into a classroom and having that contact with students, you come out of it and you no longer have any doubt as to why you are doing it.

FANELLI:  John, that suggests to me…You may not want to answer this. I don't know if it's inappropriate or anything. But as I've observed the discussion and thinking among the trustees over the period of whenever it was, fifteen, sixteen years that I had the chance to do that, it seems to me that, at least in this situation, it was rare when there was a sufficient appreciation for the importance of teaching and the quality of teaching as the central purpose of an institution like Dartmouth College, which is essentially a…

KEMENY:  Incidentally…

FANELLI:  I wonder what it is that makes that true. All those people went through the system, most of them went through the system, and they should know something about…

KEMENY:  Let me say one thing about answering questions. My plan is to answer all questions you ask as long as they stop on the day of my stepping down off the presidency. So certainly I'll comment about that period. At any rate, I have no knowledge of the trustees beyond that date. I think you're right. There were some trustees who had appreciation of the importance of teaching and what goes into it, but they certainly were in a relatively small minority on the board of trustees.

Part of it may have been when they went through Dartmouth. That's one of the difficult things, just by the nature of things. The trustees know an earlier Dartmouth. As a matter of fact, when I first became president, obviously none of them were from the Kemeny era. That's trivial to say, but not a single one of them was from the Dickey era. And the Dickey era, particularly after John Dickey… As John would say, he had eight years before he could start building the college because it was all tenured in. So it's really the last sixteen years of his presidency that count. And by the time it has an impact, it was really late ‘50s before you felt the impact of the Dickey buildup. Jim Sykes [James A. Sykes ‘55A] and I were his first two senior appointments. We both arrived in ‘54. I mean, two people don't change the college. It would be late ‘50s before you have a serious impact. Throughout my presidency, while there were Dickey graduates, there were almost
none who had really experienced how the college had changed as a result of John Dickey's presidency. As you know, even when younger trustees came on board, they tended to be early '50s, '40s and early '50s.

Actually, I think those trustees did not have first-hand experience of what I'm talking about. Some of the ones who had most understanding were ones who had children at Dartmouth and had experienced it, at least indirectly, through their children. Besides which, trustees are picked for special kinds of qualifications and perhaps have a somewhat different value system. Not all, but many of them.

FANELLI: But it's also the notion, which I always found difficult, that one could equate the process that goes on in a university with the processes that go on in a business venture or the corporate world. Some of them, obviously, you can. You have to buy supplies.

KEMENY: Some of the more sophisticated ones simply used analogies there without trying to translate it completely. But remember, that's where they have expertise and you try interpreting other experiences in terms of your own experiences. Sometimes they fit and very often they don't.

Incidentally, while we're on that subject, that isn't the only thing they had trouble with. They equally had trouble very often understanding the importance of research on the part of the faculty. I mean, the faculty got paid for teaching, why do they have to do research? I'm quite sure John Dickey must have gone through this any number of times with his board, and I had to go through it repeatedly to point out that the Hopkins faculty is really the object lesson here. For example, the mathematics department he recruited happens to be a very distinguished mathematics department. But because of the atmosphere and general expectations, they simply became inactive in mathematics and forty years later, thirty years later at least, they were totally out of touch with their field. And that's a disaster.

FANELLI: John, let's take the period from 1954 when you came to 1970 when you became president. What would you say, looking back, were the major ways the college changed in that period? One you've already mentioned, the strengthening of the faculty.

KEMENY: I have to mention a second important change, and actually it was one of our very happy moments while we had a year in Europe. We read in the London Times, which doesn't have that many stories on Dartmouth College, a very important statement of John Sloan Dickey. He gave an ultimatum to the fraternities that they had ten years to try to remove all discriminatory clauses from their national charters or they have to resign from their national organization. That was a
sufficiently radical step in '53 that it even made the London Times. And we were very, very proud to be coming to that institution.

FANELLI: You said ten years. I don't think you meant to say ten years.

KEMENY: Didn't he give a ten-year ultimatum?

FANELLI: Was it ten years?

KEMENY: That's what I thought, yes. Because it would be later... I remember when the ultimatum is up, and I remember one fraternity asked for six months extension and did not get it.

I mentioned that as the beginning of some very important things that John Dickey did. There was a great deal of prejudice on the Dartmouth campus, not limited to students, certainly including faculty. For example, fairly strong anti-Semitism. Of course, there were almost no minority students, so heaven only knows what kind of feelings...I mean, Dartmouth has this strange history that was actually very early in admitting blacks, and the first one was admitted somewhere in the 1820s, if my memory is correct. But they were always a handful, and it wasn't till John Dickey made the serious move in that area, and certainly worked very hard at stamping out all form of discrimination on this campus.

I do know with the previous faculty, the remnants of it that were renounced, that there were all kinds of prejudices rampant. The one I was, of course, most aware of was anti-Semitism. Wiping that out, or doing everything one human being could do to wipe it out, was one of John Dickey's many major achievements. That was a very substantial change. Your question was, I think, what type of changes occurred.

FANELLI: How about the student body?

KEMENY: The student body took a concerted effort on the parts of many people. For example, here is where I made the mistake which cost me a couple of years. Over the first three years we really turned the department around considerably to at least a highly respectable math department, though young. We sat back and expected good students to arrive. We realized all of a sudden they were still not coming. Then I started asking around and discovered that high school counselors know the way the college was ten years earlier, and it wasn't good enough to have a good department, you have to get the word out.

The opposite also happens to schools. There are schools that live off their reputation, and it hasn't gotten around yet that they [inaudible]. There's a time lag. Then I went out on the speaking trips, spoke to high school teachers groups and
visited schools, and so did several of my colleagues. In effect, we went out recruiting mathematics students.

I remember one Don Morrison incident on that. The first spectacular student I managed to attract… But there was a problem because some school that was not limited by Ivy rules had offered him a very substantial scholarship, which we could not match because he really didn't have… He came from reasonably well-to-do parents. So I was thinking around, and I offered him a research assistantship to match his scholarship. It was the very next day that I met Don Morrison on the street. Don stopped me and said, "I heard you bought us a mathematics student." [Laughter] I don't know how Don had heard about it within twenty-four hours, but he had. I said, "Why? Do you object?" And he said, "No. Actually, in your case, I don't, but if the football coach had done it, he would now be fired." [Laughter] There was nothing illegal about what I did, but it would be the beginning of any number of ways that we found that we could compete with other institutions.

We would later find that it wasn't even the money that was the biggest attraction, but getting a research assistantship meant that they would have personal contact with a distinguished member of the faculty, which meant a great deal to students.

FANELLI: Was there subsequently an increase in the number of majors that you had in math?

KEMENY: There was a spectacular increase in the number of majors, and most importantly… Actually, the department had done very well in attracting students, but not really high quality students. The total enrollment was [inaudible] because it was an excellent teaching department that cared about students. I should have said that.

End of Tape 1, Side B
Beginning of Tape 2, Side A

FANELLI: You were talking about attracting quality students.

KEMENY: It was the class of 1960 to which we first managed to attract a significant number of good students. We had ten honors majors in that group. That there is ten students who seriously thought about going to graduate school and most of them did graduate school in mathematics. Then throughout the ‘60s we would have fairly spectacular numbers of outstanding mathematics students. Later in the ‘60s, other departments, as they gained strength, also started attracting very, very good students to Dartmouth.

Then, as I remember, you asked me whether that, in turn, helped with building of the faculty. Yes. As we started sending good graduate students to the leading graduate schools, all of a sudden people realized that there was something special
going on at Dartmouth and they were more likely to recommend faculty members. Indeed, the one senior appointment I was able to make during that period, Professor Ernst Snapper, a fairly spectacular catch, was attracted, in part, from Indiana University because we could offer much better undergraduate students than Indiana could.

FANELLI: Then at that point you had mentioned something that you wanted to say later on, and I was going to write it down.

KEMENY: Shall I tell the incident of the one I failed on? You will see in later discussion it will be relevant to something I felt strongly about as president. We were trying to attract some more senior faculty members because I did not want to make the mistake President Hopkins once made and end up with everybody the same age in the department. Obviously, partly we did that by holding some positions open for the research instructorships so we'd leave room for younger people, but partly you can achieve it by hiring some older people who would retire earlier.

I had the chance for a truly spectacular one, and I had actually convinced Professor [Walter] and Professor [Mary Ellen] Rudin, a husband and wife team, both world famous mathematicians, to come to Dartmouth College and then discovered that there was an absolutely hard and fast so-called anti-nepotism rule, which in this particular case meant that a husband and wife could not both hold senior positions in the same department. The best I could offer them was a tenured full professorship for him and a part-time lectureship for her, and the University of Wisconsin offered them both tenured full professorships. We lost them. So I would have very strong feelings later on that men and women would have to be treated totally independently and each one measured on its own merit.

FANELLI: That reminds me, and probably you may have read the same article in the Valley News yesterday, I guess it was, or the day before, about Mrs. Eagleburger, the wife of the State Department undersecretary, who had the same idea that Jean….

KEMENY: I have not read it, but Jean has clipped it from the paper so it's in my reading file, because she kept pointing out… She read me a sentence here and there. It sounded as if they were plagiarized from Jean's book, but I'm sure that they were independently arrived at.

FANELLI: One of the things there was the fact that Mrs. Eagleburger was also in the Foreign Service when she married Mr. Eagleburger and that one of them… There was a rule at that time in the Foreign Service that one of the persons had to resign from the Foreign Service. They couldn't both be in the Foreign Service at the same time. That since has been changed, but it wasn't changed so long ago.
KEMENY: There is one sense in which I am in favor of anti-nepotism rules; that is where people get favorable treatment because of family relations. But here it has the opposite effect that one member gets discriminated against because he/she happens to be married to somebody else. Of course, traditionally, both in academia and in the foreign service, it was always the wife who got discriminated against.

FANELLI: John, you mentioned earlier that in this period we're talking about, the mathematics department and the increase in good students, honors students, and majors, but you mentioned also that other departments had made gains also. Would you care to tell us what those were?

KEMENY: Look, mathematics had to come first for the simple reason that the department had almost disappeared, so we had a huge number of openings, and therefore we had an opportunity of making very rapid progress. But certainly there were a number of other departments that became quite distinguished at Dartmouth. One of the ironies is that, as far as I know, John Dickey had no particular interest in the sciences and probably, taking the traditional three divisions as whole divisions, probably his greatest success was in the science division. Somewhat accidentally, but not accidentally in the sense, only accidentally in where he succeeded, because I'm sure he tried equally in the various divisions. He just had some of his greatest successes…

I mean, look, for example, attracting [Francis Weston] Sears in physics and of course Leonard Rieser and the young group he brought in in physics; attracting Walter Stockmayer ['25A], one of the truly distinguished chemists in chemistry, just turned the chemistry department around completely. There were a number of other things, so he had almost uniform success in the sciences. There would be other examples. Dartmouth has an extremely strong—just pick some at random—departments of history, departments of modern languages—and the danger with a list like that is I'm sure I'll leave some important ones out. Certainly there were any number of departments that became tremendously strong at Dartmouth.

I mention the thing with John Dickey and sciences because I remember when I became president some people were worried that, since I came from the sciences, I would discriminate in favor of the sciences. I used to tell over and over again that John Dickey, as a social scientist, had his greatest successes somewhat by accident in the sciences. I don't think my greatest successes were in the sciences at all. I mean, in a way, because the greatest needs were not there, and one tries to address the needs. John Dickey was just addressing an institution-wide problem. It's a lot of hard work and then partly a matter of luck where you manage to attract the absolutely key people.

FANELLI: John, in this session, I don't think we want to get into the presidency part.
KEMENY: No.

FANELLI: We're just doing the earlier years. But just a question that may become relevant later on. When you became president, obviously you sometimes sought to counsel other people on the faculty who had been your colleagues before.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: In doing that, you probably—I would surmise that you went to people whose respect, for whom you had developed respect over those earlier years.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Would you care to comment on that a little bit? Were there people in other departments? You mentioned Walter Stockmayer as an outstanding teacher, but were there faculty people that you felt, because of their integrity or quality of thought or interest in and dedication to the institution, or whatever, were people whose opinions you would value?

KEMENY: Yes. Of course, over the years, one develops a number of such relationships. For example, I had such a relationship with Frank Smallwood [Franklin “Frank” Smallwood ‘51]. As you know, any number of times I called on his help in any number of different positions. As a matter of fact, Frank would accuse me that he held more acting positions than anyone ever. Though I did once offer him the dean of faculty, and he did turn me down on that. So I didn't only offer him acting positions. He had so many acting positions because any number of times when I quickly needed someone I totally trusted, I would turn to Frank Smallwood.

I did, in my own department, turn to Don Kreider [Donald “Don” Kreider] at a crucial point. I had many close friends, but Don was the one I felt both had the wisdom and judgment that was necessary for that kind of position. Leonard Rieser clearly had been a long-time friend and was provost of the college when I became president. Lou Morton [Louis “Lou” Morton] in the history department, he and I served the same three years on the Committee Advisory to the President, so I got to know him very well during that period. Actually, he would recount later on that that had an impact on the picking of the next president. Fred Berthold [‘45] in the religion department was someone I both liked and admired for a long time and turned to very often. Again, the danger of that list is I'm sure I've forgotten some, but those are some of the names that very quickly came to my mind.
FANELLI: I want to ask you a question about two areas, John, in this period again between '54 and '70. One area is the area outside your department, committee work, and so forth, Committee Advisory to the President and other committees. I know the famous story about the Committee on Equal Opportunity, which was very close to your presidency. That area, if you could talk a little bit about that. Then also in the community, your service on the school board.

KEMENY: Really, in community service, my only major one was that I served a three-year term on the Hanover School Board from '61 to '64. It happened when I was up for reelection. I knew I was going on a round-the-world trip, so I did not run for reelection. I don't know if I would have otherwise. That was a fairly crucial period on the school board. It was the period during which we formed the first interstate school district, and if we had known what we would have to go through, we mightn't have done it. Also, it was a major building period, and I would end up being chairman of the budget committee or finance committee and, eventually, vice chairman of the school board. So that was an exciting… But that was my only major community service outside the college.

FANELLI: Did someone come and ask you to run for that? Because isn't that a…

KEMENY: I think it's an elective office, yes. As a matter of fact, it was an interesting experience in another way. It was an elective office, and I'm sure some people had talked to me, but Jean and I sort of made up our mind. We had kids in school, and it's the kind of service I ought to do. I asked people what one does, and the first advice I got is, the one thing one must not do is campaign. So I ran without campaigning and lost by eight votes. Actually, there were two positions, and one very well-known person in the community won by a wide margin, but I was third by eight votes to somebody called Clinton Fuller, and I was quite prejudiced because he was an officer at a local business and, you know, what would he know about the school board, and all that sort of thing. I tell that for a reason. As you know, Alex, Clint would become a very dear and close friend of mine. That's why I tell the story.

The following year I decided to run again after I had lost very narrowly. It was a field of something like six in which I had come third by eight votes. It certainly didn't look hopeless. But this time I decided not to take the advice, so I went to one Frank Smallwood and asked him, and he ran a small campaign for me. Very modest, just some personal letters to people just to urge them to come to a school district meeting, which makes a great deal of difference, and to say, if they're so inclined, would you vote for John Kemeny. These are his qualifications. That time I just won terribly easily.

I got on the school board where there were academics and spouses of academics on it, but I found that all my worst fights were with academics and spouses of
academics. There was one member of the school board, with whom on every major issue I happened to agree, so we sort of became a team of two who worked very closely together. Of course, it was the same Clint Fuller that I was furious that he had gotten on the school board. Clint and I are still good friends, and I like him very much. I lost some prejudices through that experience. Also, later on, I think it helped me with community relations. I learned a good deal about community relations on the school board.

You asked me about committees, and of course my most important committee service happened to come at the very beginning of my term at Dartmouth College. Don Morrison tried to get a major change. He felt he had to do more than just slowly recruit faculty to shake things up. He wanted to bring about some major change. He would tell over and over again his worries about people who had written out the same forty lectures and read the same lectures year after year. He wanted to bring about some fairly major change. He actually bypassed the regular decision-making processes because the Committee on Educational Policy, in his opinion, had people on it who would never agree to a major change. So he set up a special ad hoc committee of his own that came in with fairly radical recommendations, and then they were going to meet together with the Committee on Educational Policy, a sort of one merge group, to bring a recommendation to the faculty. And he somehow maneuvered to get me elected to the Committee on Educational Policy. Probably not my first year, but my second year on the faculty.

He then gave me a detailed briefing, and the first meeting was going to be to vote on the recommendation of the ad hoc committee that Dartmouth College should switch to a system that consisted of two semesters with four courses being taught in each semester. I happen to have been quite violently opposed to that for a variety of reasons I don't have to go into. First of all, I didn't think it would be a major shakeup; people would just teach less. And it looked like a watering down of quality.

As a matter of fact, it's the only fight I ever had with Don Morrison. I really told him, after having read that report, why I thought it was all wrong. He was very down the line and totally committed to this. Here's this committee of very senior faculty members, and here is—say I'm twenty-eight or twenty-nine by that time—coming in telling him that he thinks this is all wrong. So I tried on the spur of the moment to think up some alternatives, and I think I said something like, "Look. If you want to shake it up, why don't you have three terms with three courses each?" or something I had really not thought through but thought that it would at least shake them up. It would be a much bigger shakeup, and at least instead of cutting it down from forty courses to thirty-two, you'd only cut it to thirty-six. I thought up a couple of not terribly convincing arguments why that might be better. One after the other, all the members of the committee attacked me and said, "This is
crazy, and does any school have that plan." We'd eventually find out that Kalamazoo did, but nobody else did.

It's clear I was going to be shot down. Just before I was… It was going to be a I don't know how many to one vote. One member of the committee, who was totally silent till that moment was Don Morrison. At that point, Don Morrison spoke up and said that he does not think my plan is really good, but, “I think the committee's dismissing it too quickly.” He suggested that a three-member subcommittee be appointed, at least to explore my alternative plan, report back to the next meeting, so we can consider it fairly. And the rest is history.

The three-member subcommittee turned out to be myself, Hugh Morrison ['26], and I think Clark Horton [Clark W. Horton]. Do I have the name right? He used to be in charge of educational research. Hugh contributed a great deal to that. Years later he and I reminisced about this. What happened was, I really just threw that out to block the other plan. After we started thinking about it, we thought of all kinds of advantages, which, to be perfectly frank, I had not thought of. We started working out some details and really talked each other into a great deal of excitement. Though it was a two-to-one report, there were now two people quite enthusiastic about it, and we could put up many more arguments.

I remember one of the members of the committee who would tell this story later was Arthur Jensen ['46], who was violently opposed. He fought for a long time against this absolutely crazy plan. He would eventually become one of the chief advocates of it. But Don Morrison got won over fairly fast. The big difference was, Don knew all about faculty politics, which I knew nothing about then. So beyond some point, Don carried the ball. And, of course, the plan was… I mean, so many details had to be worked out, but the plan was adopted.

FANELLI: That's fascinating.

KEMENY: So there I served on the Committee on Educational Policy; that may have been my single most important committee service.

FANELLI: And that was early.

KEMENY: That was quite early. I'd say '55 to '58. And I got reelected, I think, to the committee. I think I was on that for six years because of the transition. They decided to reelect some members. Yeah, I think I served six years on that, so say '55 to '61, roughly. Then when I came back from the round-the-world trip, I got elected to the Committee Advisory to the President. I'm sure I served on some other committees in between, but none of them were major or important things.

FANELLI: Then you had the…
KEMENY: Committee on Equal Opportunity. That was an ad hoc committee. The sequence of events which would be very important to me later was that the trustees had, in principle, voted that Dartmouth College should have an equal opportunity plan. It will be important for taping later and I'll try to be consistent, that equal opportunity always referred to students and admission of students, and affirmative action referred to hiring of employees, most importantly faculty members, but all kinds of employees. I'll try to be consistent about that, because nationally they're not necessarily used that way. That's the way we used it internally.

So this was a Committee on Equal Opportunity, and the board directed that one be set up consisting of everything, faculty, students, administrators. I forget if there was an alumnus on it. The charge to the committee was to put flesh on this in-principle vote. That is, “What should Dartmouth College do to carry out this very genuine commitment of the president and board of trustees towards opening up the admissions process?” One went through the usual election process, I guess each faculty division elected one member to it, and I happened to get picked from the science division.

FANELLI: What year would this have been, approximately?

KEMENY: This was 1969.

FANELLI: So it was right after the McLane Report?

KEMENY: This is an outcome of the McLane Report, yes. You would know better, did the McLane Report get… It got accepted in principle.

FANELLI: December '68.

KEMENY: Okay. But it must have come directly out of that. For all I know, it may have been at the same meeting when they voted that such a committee should be, but it takes time to organize it. So at any rate, somewhere reasonably early in '69 this committee is formed. Somebody had made a mistake. They had not decided who would chair it. We were actually gathering for an organization meeting without a chairman.

We had a committee. It's now called the Committee on Organization and Policy—I'm not sure if that's what it was called then—that usually picked chairmen for faculty committees. So the ball was thrown to that committee to decide who would chair it. I remember we were all sitting around sort of talking freely and waiting to get a call from this committee as to who will chair the group. We had no warning whatsoever. The call came in that that committee had voted
that John Kemeny would chair the Committee on Equal Opportunity. So I said, "Okay."

We talked, and it took us quite a while to get down to business, but eventually, it was melded into a good hard-working group, where the recommendation that came out of it was that the best way to carry out an equal opportunity program was not to try to cover the waterfront, to admit five of this and ten of that, and we certainly did not vote for a quota system. We felt that Dartmouth could make its biggest impact, being a small college, in concentrating its efforts.

We selected three groups for preferential treatment. This was very carefully thought out. The first one was blacks, simply because at that time it was by far the largest and most disadvantaged minority group. There, the committee took the position that every institution had an obligation to help blacks. Secondly, and I did play a hand in this one because of the history of the college, that Native Americans, American Indians, were a natural target for it. And thirdly, one committee member persuaded the rest of us that the third group should be a group to which we have a geographic obligation, namely the particularly rural underprivileged of northern New England.

Our recommendation was that, instead of some complicated quota system which we were opposed to, or instead of just admitting random minority groups, that significant efforts should be made in all three of these areas within our support so that one could be successful on this.

That's the report. Well, here I might as well tell the famous end of it. That report was completed either the end of ’69 or, more likely, early ’70, and I signed it as chairman of the committee on behalf of the committee. It was submitted to President Dickey, and by that time, he knew he was going to be in office for a very short period of time. He decided that acting on that recommendation should be the job not of himself but of the thirteenth president. That's why my first day when I walked into the office… He did not leave a great deal, but this was one of the few examples which he felt, on principle, he should leave to his successor. I found on my desk a recommendation to the president of Dartmouth College, signed by myself as chairman of the equal opportunity committee. I'm happy to say I approved the report.

FANELLI:  John, it occurs to me that there might have been another activity that you were asked to engage in during that period, and that was in connection with fundraising.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: I believe you played a role in the campaign.
KEMENY: To some extent, what happened was, when I stepped down from the chairmanship—it was 1967 when I finally stepped down—I was getting each year a bid for other challenges. I think serving on the Committee Advisory to the President had an impact on me, and I'm quite sure it was '65 to '68, was the one time I really… That committee, although it does it very privately, has considerable impact on the quality of the institution. But, it hit me, you serve three years and you step down from that.

That's when I first started thinking about bigger responsibilities, that I wasn't quite ready to go back to just being a faculty member. I had let the word get around and actually was disappointed when a certain administrative position was filled and I wasn't even considered for it. It was associate provost, which went to Bill Davis [William “Bill” Davis Jr.]. Certainly not a criticism of Bill Davis. As you know, I would work very closely with him and had enormous respect for him. But that I wasn't even asked… The response I got back was that Leonard Rieser, it never occurred to him I would be interested in that kind of job.

Somehow, out of those discussions, when the Third Century Fund was launched, I was asked if I would like to take on, on a part-time basis, being in charge of organizing all the efforts with private foundations. I took that on, it was my first… Look, I had some fundraising experience on the departmental level and was quite successful at it, but this was very different. I had a lot to learn. We had a $7 million goal, I believe, in a $51 million campaign. Quite sizable. I was very proud of the fact that my area was the first one to go over the goal in the campaign. So we did very well on that. I had no idea how I would do in that kind of institutional fundraising, but as a result of that experience, that's one activity I was not particularly worried about when I became president.

Now, incidentally, let me say something about that. I had a very strange experience. I have a big hang-up on money. I had a father who periodically went from being reasonably well-off to being completely broke. Probably as a result of that, I have some sort of major hang-up. I can't stand a bill being unpaid. I don't play any of the games, how long can you wait to pay that bill. I can't stand an unpaid bill. Every time I've had to borrow money in my life, which my father did too often, I shudder at the thought. So asking for money from someone… I've never been good at negotiating my own salaries, I think for the same reasons. So I didn't know how I felt about it, and I found out when I was asking for Dartmouth, I just didn't have any of these hang-ups at all, not the least. I loved Dartmouth, I was convinced it was a first-rate institution, and as someone who shudders at taking a car loan out from a bank, I never had that problem in asking for money for the college.
FANELLI: John, you mentioned earlier that, during this period, you had had offers from a variety of other institutions. Some of those must have been quite tempting.

KEMENY: And one played a major role in my life. First of all, what I got were either sort of major endowed professorships of big institutions, or any number of large departments offered me the chairmanship of the mathematics department, thinking that I would want to move on from Dartmouth to a much larger department. Those never tempted me for a moment because… I mean, if I was going to be chairman of a department, I'd rather do it in a department I built myself than somewhere else.

Then I started getting feelers for sort of institution-wide decision-making, a couple of dean of faculty positions. The crucial one came from the University of Rhode Island.

End of Tape 2, Side A
Beginning of Tape 2, Side B

KEMENY: A distinguished alumnus was president of the University of Rhode Island at the time, and he offered me the position of academic vice president at the university. I thought it over and said no. The important meeting occurred after I turned him down. He came and called on me and told me that he was not trying to twist my arm, but he wanted to give me some advice, which I took quite seriously. By that time, I was forty, possibly forty-one, and he pointed out that I had to make up my mind. Did I ever want a major academic administrative position? He said, "If you never want that, that's fine; but if you want it…" He called it a rather narrow window in your life during which you're likely to get quite a number of offers. He predicted, as it turned out, correctly, that in the coming years I would get a number of these. "And if you turn down enough of them, people on the outside world decide that you really are not interested in that, the offers stop coming, and you miss the opportunity." So he strongly advised me to think over whether I ever wanted some, and, if so, at least not to do what I did with him of just turning it down without even looking into the job. At least go to the trouble of looking into that to show that I'm interested.

That forced me to go home and have long talks with Jean, and I concluded that I really had reached the stage where I wanted a major academic appointment. In a way, the position I would most have liked to have had would have been either provost or academic vice president at a distinguished institution that would have been closest to my talents and my interests. The problem with that is, that's purely a matter of luck, because the president picks the chief academic officer. And also quite obviously, the institution I most wanted to have it at was Dartmouth College. I realized there was no way of doing that without becoming president.
So I did look into a number of positions, and slowly, presidential offers started coming also. As a matter of fact, there was one very distinguished one where I had to get permission from the trustees to turn it down. Just before it was announced that I was to be president of Dartmouth. I was told then that I was the number one candidate for president of City College in New York, which is a very distinguished educational institution that was falling on very hard times. They probably have more famous academics who were undergraduates at City College. It is a truly remarkable institution. That at least had been.

So that's what led to that. It was that kind of thinking. It was after that that John Dickey announced his resignation. Once that came, I realized that Dartmouth does not change presidents that often. By the time the next vacancy came up, I would be too old. So it was then or never. I tried very hard, for example, with City College to play it so that I would express an interest in the presidency of Dartmouth, but I thought the odds were overwhelmingly against it. Therefore, keep other options open in case this did not happen. I think, in all probability, if I had then not become president of Dartmouth, I would have accepted a major position somewhere else, either as president or as chief academic officer.

FANELLI: One thing that seems relevant here is the activities that Jean had during that period, aside from the major activity of raising a family, but her activities in the community, some of the things that she did in the theatrical area. The reason I mention that, John, is that, obviously, when people are choosing a president, they also look at the spouse.

KEMENY: Well, not very carefully. Actually, to the best of my knowledge, the Dartmouth board never looked at Jean.

FANELLI: Oh. That's interesting to know.

KEMENY: At least that's what Jean would argue later on. At least not knowingly, certainly not to the point that they ever had a conversation with her. Jean persuaded the Dartmouth board, at the next search, they did look at wives. That was part of their report. That's one of Jean's reforms.

Jean. First, she was active in musical… Let me mention music and theater. I'm not sure of the order. The other is politics. I don't know which came first, but they were concurrent activities. Jean has an untrained but very beautiful singing voice, and she was active in a number of singing groups, ranging from madrigals to once having a part in an opera. Although her favorite ones were musical comedy. The most successful one that she got involved in was the Dartmouth Players.
If future historians don't remember, before my presidency, there weren't any women students who could play parts, and therefore women in the community were welcomed into the Dartmouth Players. She had by no means the lead role, but a good role in a play called *Li’l Abner*, which was one of the most successful they had put on. It ran both the normal number of times, I think, around Winter Carnival, and then went on the road. For example, they played in a big theater in Manchester, and it was brought back during the reunion time and did a number of performances there. It was a very successful play that she enjoyed enormously. She was active in the Dartmouth Players for a while.

Her other major activity was political. Jean had always been interested in politics and became quite active in Democratic politics, from being vice chairman of the town Democratic party to being a delegate to the state convention. Probably her most successful event was when once again a Democrat tried to run for Senate from New Hampshire. No Democrat had been elected senator in thirty years. This candidate had no money and no organization. And Jean ended up being county campaign chairman for him, which is a pretty big job, particularly in a heavily Republican county. This was early ‘60s, I guess. Jean came up with an idea that would later catch on nationally. I don't claim that they copied Jean, but Jean was ahead of her time. Knowing that there was no money, she went to the Young Democrats at Dartmouth, the student organization, and extremely effectively organized them to canvas and distribute publicity material and posters throughout this very sparsely populated, widely spread county.

Thomas [J.] McIntyre [Jr. ‘37] did get elected senator, fairly narrowly the first time. He was reelected by huge majorities, but fairly narrowly… The fact that, although he lost Grafton County, which is heavily Republican, he lost… They had a game plan as to how they had to do in various counties. He lost Grafton County by a significantly smaller margin than what he had counted on. He had always given Jean, years and years later, enormous credit for getting him elected U.S. senator. Tom is a Dartmouth alumnus, and my first year, although I had nothing to do with choosing the honorary degree candidates, I got enormous pleasure out of being able to write the citation for Tom McIntyre's honorary degree.

**FANELLI:** He had been helpful to us, too, in connection with the [inaudible] and getting the medal struck, I remember.

**KEMENY:** Those were Jean's major activities. She would, later on, continue in theater after Dartmouth went coed. There were much fewer opportunities for women in the community, and of course many of the community never had those opportunities. So Jean played a quite major role in helping to form the North Country Community Theater, which has flourished all of these years.
FANELLI: And still going strong.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Well, I have no other questions that are prepared. Are there things that you…?

KEMENY: Since this is the lead up to it, do you want me to talk about what happened during the selection process itself? That seems natural here. We're right up to that point.

FANELLI: Let me ask a question first that occurs to me now. At this time of the University of Rhode Island inquiry, was that about the first time that you began to think seriously about the possibility of…?

KEMENY: That was the first time I seriously thought about it. Francis Horn ['30] was the name of the president. Alex, as you know, I'm not good at remembering names. But I would see Francis many, many times, and he would remind me of this conversation. Quite rightly so because it played a major role in my mind. He was the one who really forced me to think through, do I or do I not want to realize that you cannot take a totally passive role if you're going to get this. At least to the point where you don't just automatically say no without at least showing that you would be interested in talking about a suitable job.

FANELLI: And he was a trustee at that time?

KEMENY: No, not a trustee. He was just among those… He may have been on the alumni council. I know he came up here periodically. But, no, he was president of the University of Rhode Island. I just turned him down in a rather… I got his letter, I thought about it for a day, and wrote him a polite letter saying no. Then he came to see me, and the whole point was to convince me that if I ever wanted such a position, I was at the age where I only had a few years in which people are likely to offer this, not to follow the strategy that I had followed with the University of Rhode Island. At the very least to go visit the place and talk with the trustees and show an interest.

End of Tape 2, Side B
Beginning of Tape 3, Side A

FANELLI: Today is the 10th of April 1984, and this is the second session of the oral history with the thirteenth president, John George Kemeny.

KEMENY: I would like to add a small footnote to history, and today is an appropriate day to do it. During the twelve commencements over which I had the privilege of presiding, twice we awarded degrees of doctor of humane letters to actresses. One of them was to Meryl Streep ('81 Hon.), who won the Academy Award for
best actress last year. The other one was to Shirley MacLaine ('73 Hon.) and to our great pleasure—my wife and I were watching it, just because of her—she won the best actress award last night. So I thought that would be an appropriate notation to make. That's two for two for us. [Chuckles]

FANELLI: That's wonderful. They were wise choices, I thought.

[Tape off, then resumes]

FANELLI: Okay, John, I think we can just continue with this second session. We had agreed, I believe, the last time that what you would talk about today would be the presidential selection process for your presidency, your perceptions of it, some of the good and bad features as you saw them. Perhaps I can start out with a question that would be something like this. How and when was your name included among those available for consideration? Did someone else recommend your name to the committee? Did you submit a letter to the committee? Or, what was the process there?

KEMENY: Let's see. I actually don't know the answer to that question, but I'm fairly certain that I can guess it. Perhaps it would be helpful if I said one word about something that happened in 1968, I guess. I think, yes, it had to be '68. I was then serving on the Committee Advisory to the President, as we said during the last discussion. John Dickey had announced his resignation, and the search was launched. The faculty members on the Committee Advisory to the President caucused, I believe at Lou Morton's initiative, and Lou expressed serious concern that during the previous search, which was ancient history since John Dickey served for such a long period, there was no faculty input into the search process at all. But, clearly, he did not intend that as a criticism of John Dickey. He was an admirer of John Dickey's. But simply he felt that in this day and age one should not search for a president of a major institution without faculty input.

That led to several discussions on our part, and the delegation of us in which I was included called upon the chairman of the board of trustees, Lloyd Brace ['25], who was chairman of the search committee, simply to propose that there should be faculty input into it. The board... Actually, I'm sure we proposed that there should be faculty members as members of the search committee. The board accepted a somewhat qualified version of that in which the search committee consisted entirely of trustees, but there was a faculty advisory committee. Although I don't know any of the details, my impression is that most of the most important meetings, the faculty members met jointly with the trustees so that the faculty de facto had some serious input into the selection process.

Now, I want to add one anecdote here because only very few of us know this, and it's an amusing sidelight on the whole thing. Lloyd Brace, not unreasonably,
asked how they could select some faculty members in such a way that the board couldn't be accused of stacking it, which was a very wise thing of him to ask. What we came up with was that the two most respected committees were the Committee Advisory to the President and the Committee on Organization and Policy. Clearly, since we were the ones approaching them, we disqualified ourselves so they wouldn't think that we were personally asking to serve on the committee. But we suggested that they pick them from the membership of the Committee on Organization and Policy.

It's actually the only committee directly elected by the faculty. The CAP almost, but the president has some freedom on it. Other committees are chosen by the COP, so the COP was a natural one and a highly respected committee. I believe I said, in all honesty, to Lloyd Brace that also by suggesting that, clearly we were eliminating ourselves, because by the rules of the faculty, you cannot serve on both of those committees. There are legal reasons for that. Therefore, we have suggested a method that eliminates all of us.

It turns out that we suggested a method that almost eliminated all of us, but we underestimated one of our colleagues. There was a time lag, and by the time the trustees carried this out, it was the new COP, and two of us retired from the CAP that year—myself and Lou Morton. Lou Morton promptly got himself elected—and I'm sure I mean exactly that—promptly got himself elected to the COP for the next year and then got picked by the trustees as one of the faculty members. Typical Lou Morton successful politics. So it was Lou Morton and Don Kreider, John Copenhaver ['46], and John Finch ['52], if my memory is right.

FANELLI: Your memory is absolutely correct.

KEMENY: That was one memory. I was trying on the way today to try to recollect it. There will be other places where my memory will fail, but that was a quite fascinating group for many, many reasons. All highly respected faculty members and very different in nature. I brought that up by saying that I would be terribly surprised if my name was not introduced by one or more of those faculty members into the search process, but I don't know that for a fact.

FANELLI: I was looking at the minutes of the trustee meeting of January 23rd in which the chairman of the board…

KEMENY: This is '69 or…

FANELLI: ‘70, when you were elected.

KEMENY: When I was elected.
FANELLI: The chairman… After your election both as president and trustee, there was a vote to express thanks separately to the faculty group and to the trustee group.

KEMENY: I'd heard rumors that my name was on the list. I did not become aware of the fact until I was interviewed by a member of that committee.

FANELLI: When you say "that committee," John, you mean the faculty…?

KEMENY: I mean the faculty committee. I would not get interviewed by the trustees—I don't want to get this out of order—until very, very late. The faculty committee, however, had drawn up a list of questions that they wanted to ask of candidates. They sent Don Kreider simply because he was in my own department. It could have been any member of the committee. Don did nothing but read me the pre-prepared questions I understand they asked of all candidates for the presidency and noted down my answers on that. So that was…

FANELLI: So at that time…

KEMENY: It was in '69, I would say fall of '69, but even that I'm not absolutely sure of. Maybe earlier in '69. That's the first time I became aware that I was officially a candidate for president of Dartmouth College.

FANELLI: Right. But up to that point, you had not initiated…

KEMENY: I had not initiated anything, no.

FANELLI: So someone, either on this committee, or someone in the faculty, or through some other procedure, your name had been submitted.

KEMENY: Yes. I'm quite sure. One of the questions Don asked me whether if elected I would be willing to serve, and I said yes to that. But I had not initiated anything.

FANELLI: Okay, that's essentially what I was… Just to clear up that part of it, did you eventually have to submit anything in writing saying that you would…?

KEMENY: I never submitted anything in writing, no.

FANELLI: John, how much did you know about the procedure that would be used in the selection process, and how did you know it? Was this information that was public?

KEMENY: The only thing I knew was what was publicly known, which was relatively little. I mean, the composition of the trustee committee and the faculty advisory committee, plus the fact that they'd gotten themselves a full-time staff member,
whose name at that time was Lu Sterling [Lucretia L. “Lu” Martin], and whom I
would get to know much better later on. Actually, someone I'd known socially
but with whom obviously I would be working closely later on. The committee
had a remarkable record for not leaking things. Neither Mrs. Sterling nor any of
the faculty members, to my knowledge, leaked anything, so I really had no inside
information at all. I just knew they were interviewing a number of candidates,
and one occasionally got progress reports that they had traveled to various parts of
the country and been interviewing things.

I should also say that Jean and I had thought very hard, and we were quite
convinced I would not be picked. I won't duplicate that because that portion is
absolutely accurately recounted in Jean's book, It's Different At Dartmouth. I
have nothing to add to that, except that, while some of it sounds as if she is partly
joking on it, we really were quite serious about that list. There are a couple of
funny ones on there, but basically we were very serious about the list of reasons
why I would not get picked. Also, time kept passing, and I'd certainly gotten the
impression that the committee was way down the line and they would announce a
candidate, and I had not yet been interviewed by the board of trustees, so I had
jumped to the conclusion that I had been eliminated.

FANELLI:  Okay. Some of the questions that I'll ask may duplicate what you've just said, but
we can just skip over them. Looking back on the selection procedure, you would
probably say that you were satisfied with it in an overall sense because it did
result in your selection. But were there any aspects of it that struck you as
negative, either at that time or later on? In other words, if you were to be in
charge of such a procedure today, what would you urge your committee to do
differently?

KEMENY:  My problem is I don't know where, at which point I became a serious candidate,
but the fact that I would eventually turn out to be the winner means at some point,
not the last second, I must have become a serious candidate. I think the
committee erred on the side of having spent a great deal of time with outside
candidates, and they were not getting around to the inside candidates early
enough.

FANELLI:  In other words, you were not aware of the fact that you were being seriously
considered until pretty far down the line.

KEMENY:  Yes. As a matter of fact… Let's see. I am elected president, that’s the date. I'm
glad you checked. It was January 23rd. I was not interviewed till Charter Day
weekend, which is the weekend of December 13th, okay? Certainly, the board de
facto… You know, the January 23rd meeting was an official ratification, but in
effect, the decision was made earlier than that. So I would say it was about a
month, or less than a month, before the final decision was made before I was
interviewed by the board, which strikes me as odd. As a matter of fact, so much so that that's why Jean and I had concluded I had been eliminated.

A second feature of which I would become much more conscious later on is, was that Jean was never interviewed.

FANELLI: Yes. You had mentioned that.

KEMENY: Actually, on this tape, I can say she describes examples of two institutions, neither one of which she approves, one of which grills the wife horribly and the other one of which never even interviews the wife of the president-to-be. That second institution was Dartmouth College. Jean disguised things like that in her book well, and I think very few people realized that that was Dartmouth College.

FANELLI: John, I'm just guessing at this, but it seems reasonable to suppose that one of the things that potential candidates might be thinking about with respect to the board of trustees is, are they really looking for, or do they lean toward, an inside candidate, that is someone from the faculty or administration at Dartmouth, or an outside candidate? Were you concerned about that at all? And if you felt that, if you were concerned, did you believe that there was no prejudice either way? Did you feel that your experience and your record as a Dartmouth faculty member and department chairman for fifteen or sixteen years gave you a strong position in the competition? You've just said that you felt that they were not considering an inside candidate.

KEMENY: Well, actually I was less worried about being an inside candidate, though I have to assume that Leonard Rieser was also an inside candidate, and therefore I know there was a highly respected faculty member with much longer administrative experience than myself. I was less concerned about the handicap that being an inside candidate might create. After all, it has advantages. You know the institution better than any outside candidate would be. I was more concerned about some of the big items on that famous list. First of all, that I'm not a Dartmouth alumnus. Secondly, that I was born Jewish. And thirdly, that I was foreign-born and speak with an accent. Particularly the last two qualities. No Ivy institution had ever elected a president with either of those two qualities. Those seemed to be strong reasons. Besides, what I didn't know is what kind of person they were looking for, and I did have the reputation of being a highly independent and fairly strong person with strong views on things, and I didn't know how the Dartmouth board would react to somebody like that.

FANELLI: So, in a sense, that maybe also had a criticism of the procedure, because one of the things that they do now, pretty regularly, is state fairly explicitly what kind of a person they're looking for.
KEMENY: Yes. Actually, the board drew up sort of qualifications for it. To some extent, affirmative action forces you into that. But if there were job specs, I certainly never saw one.

FANELLI: You've partly answered this. How confident did you feel about your chances at the beginning of the selection procedure, and as the procedure unfolded, did you become more or less confident of the outcome?

KEMENY: Even at the beginning I thought I would be a serious candidate, but I'm sure that Dartmouth could attract any number of truly distinguished individuals, and therefore it's like in any competition, that only one of many very able people get chosen. One has to feel the odds are against it. But I thought that at least I had a decent fighting chance. I got discouraged when I did not get interviewed by the board of trustees, so as the search went on, I thought I had been eliminated. I was somewhat upset by the fact that they would have eliminated me without ever interviewing me. I mean, if they'd interviewed me and then eliminated me, I would have felt differently about it.

This became particularly acute as Charter Day approached, which, as you recall, was a very big event. There were rumors all over the campus that they were going to announce the new president on Charter Day. As a matter of fact, when we got there, you may recall that there were these magnificent displays of the first twelve presidents. I remember one of our neighbors at the table said they noticed a blank spot there, that's where the thirteenth president's picture is going to appear. It made me… I was very nervous during Charter Day, even though, in a way, I knew that that couldn't be because it was that day that I was interviewed by the board. I knew they certainly hadn't picked me yet, but I had enough confidence in the board that that's a game they wouldn't have played, of just interviewing me after they had made a decision. Nevertheless, somehow I couldn't help feeling nervous about it.

FANELLI: I remember seeing you and Jean that night. You were sitting at the table at the Charter Day dinner, and, as you remember, I was responsible for a lot of the evening's activities. I don't remember if I was either cordial to you or what, but I…

KEMENY: You were probably busy and we were very nervous. The trustees were here that weekend for Charter Day and I believe it was the day before that I received a phone call from Lloyd Brace asking if, by any chance, it would be convenient for me to spend a couple of hours with the trustees the next day. I decided it would be convenient for me to spend time with them and that's where I had an interview.
Incidentally, another very important event happened that weekend that I think I should recount here, because it was after that event that I was sure that I was eliminated as a candidate for president of Dartmouth College.

FANELLI: Does this have to do with the alumni council?

KEMENY: It has to do with the alumni council. As you know, the alumni council normally meets in January, but because of Charter Day, they all wanted to be here. They moved up the alumni council meeting to December. By that time, I was a member of a committee, which I actually didn't mention in my committee service because I didn't serve on it very long. That being an ad hoc committee the trustees set up on coeducation. Again by the choosing process, each division of the faculty chose one member, and the science division picked me. Somebody picked me.

FANELLI: Was that Dudley Orr ['29]'s committee?

KEMENY: It was co-chaired by Dudley Orr and Leonard Rieser. There were strange titles. I think Dudley was chairman, and Leonard, instead of vice chairman, was co-chairman. I never quite understood that, but what it meant in practice was that Dudley chaired it whenever he could be here, and if not, Leonard chaired it.

FANELLI: Yes. I remember that Dudley gave a report, too, at that council meeting.

KEMENY: No.

FANELLI: Then Leonard did, I remember.

KEMENY: No, neither of them did.

FANELLI: Well, then I'm wrong.

KEMENY: What happened was that Leonard was designated by the committee to report to the… He was on the agenda to give a report to the alumni council on coeducation. That's probably what you remember. We happened to be in session. Since there were trustees on the committee, whenever the trustees were in town they took advantage of that to hold a committee meeting. Our committee was in session when Bill Timbers [William H. “Bill” Timbers ‘37], who was…

FANELLI: A judge.

KEMENY: Yes, and was on the committee. I believe he may have been president of the alumni council that year. He was somehow involved in it. At any rate, either he or the then president of the alumni council, he appeared at the committee meeting
and out of a clear blue sky informed us that their executive committee had just voted that they wanted to hear the report on coeducation from me. I have absolutely no idea how this came about. It was out of a clear blue sky. I had very little time to prepare. So instead of Leonard, there was I. I think Dudley and Leonard made brief remarks, as chairman and co-chairman, but I gave the main report on coeducation.

FANELLI: This was December 12th then.

KEMENY: December 12th, yes. I had a very bad night the night before trying to figure out what to do on this. I think I heard about it the day before. I gave a strict factual report of where the committee stood. I did my very best to summarize both the arguments pro and con in a totally unbiased way. On the other hand, I felt I could not, in good conscience, stop there because that was a cop-out. I ended my report by saying to the alumni council that so far I had spoken strictly for the committee and I think I was fair to both sides. I would like to express my own views. I then said in about five minutes why I felt that it was absolutely essential for Dartmouth College to go coeducational. I went home to Jean and said I just eliminated myself as a candidate for Dartmouth College, because if there's any recipe for knocking yourself out it's telling the entire alumni council you're dedicated to making Dartmouth coed. Surely it would eliminate you. Nevertheless, the trustees went through and interviewed me.

Actually, a strange thing happened, and I think I eventually tracked down how. On the morning of Charter Day, or the morning after Charter Day possibly, there was an incorrect leak to the New York Times that I was going to be the next president of Dartmouth. And that came out of a clear blue sky. It was the second such leak. First they claimed Dick Lyman [Richard “Dick” Lyman III ‘57], which was based simply on his having been interviewed by the trustees, and that leaked out. It was unfortunate. He actually had to withdraw publicly. Then there was one about me, and that one, I think Bob Graham [Robert B. “Bob” Graham Jr. ‘40] once tracked it down with a contact he had at the Times. What apparently happened was that, after my report, some alumni—including some alumni who did not at all like the position I took—came out of that meeting and were quite impressed by what I had done. A reporter overheard them saying, "Gee, that's the guy we ought to pick to be president." Obviously these alumni had no role in selecting the next president, so it was an irresponsible story to print by the New York Times. But apparently that was the source of that leak.

FANELLI: Did they ever figure out the source of the Lyman leak?

KEMENY: No, but the suspicion is... I asked a member of the committee, and they said it occurred fairly soon after he was interviewed. So somehow, probably a reporter. I think they met in Boston or some such place, somebody told me. That's not
unreasonable somehow for a reporter to jump to the conclusion if he came all the way to Boston to meet with the trustees, that they thought this was it.

FANELLI: So the summary of this question, the answer to the question I asked you is that at the beginning you felt that you had a reasonable chance.

KEMENY: I had a reasonable chance. I mean, less than fifty-fifty but a reasonable chance.

FANELLI: Right. And at the end you felt that you…

KEMENY: I had practically a zero chance.

FANELLI: Because of these reasons. John, was there ever a point in the process when you considered, for whatever reason, that it might be best to withdraw your name from the competition? There were some serious developments on campuses all over the country in 1969 and '70. For example, at Dartmouth, the takeover of Parkhurst Hall in May of 1969. As a potential president looked at the landscape that he might inherit, it would be quite understandable if he or she had some second thoughts about taking on the responsibilities for the personal safety of students or for his own safety, that were quite beyond the normal responsibilities of the job. Did such concerns arise in your case?

KEMENY: No, never. I never had any doubts on that. As a matter of fact, I remember a rather foolhardy statement I made fairly soon after I was elected president. A lot of people asked me about just that question. It was an obvious one to ask that year. I mean, after all, I became president, oh, about eight months after the occupation of Parkhurst, so it was a very natural question to ask. I rather foolhardily said that I was convinced I would not have problems with student protests and building occupations. At least the second part of that turned out to be true. I did manage to get through eleven and a half years without ever having a building occupation. But, no, that was… I somehow was just… I just had too many dealings with students over my whole career that that didn't worry me at all. It's a natural question to ask, but no, that did not worry me.

FANELLI: Did you—and you've answered this in a certain sense—did you know the names of other people who were applicants for the position and how did you learn about them?

KEMENY: I did not know about them till afterwards. After it was all over, some members of the committee… and I'm not even absolutely certain who first had told me who the finalists were. I believe I know who the finalists were. By the fact that I had been picked as president, whoever told me felt that I, of all people, was entitled to that.
FANELLI: As the selection process neared its conclusion, how and when were you informed that you were among the short list under consideration? Well, you've answered that. So you were really informed at the Charter Day...?

KEMENY: Well, no. I was interviewed on the second day of Charter Day. I had a two-hour interview with the board of trustees. So that was the 13th. I would then hear about the...

FANELLI: Excuse me. Was that by the whole board, or by...?

KEMENY: No, by the search committee. But just the trustee members of the search committee. And that was a very serious interview. They asked all kinds of questions, et cetera. But that was the 13th, and then the next thing I heard was...

FANELLI: And during that interview, did they tell you at all that "we're down to a very small number and you're one of them"?

KEMENY: My memory isn't good enough for that, but I suspect so. And certainly an implication... I mean, certainly I'm sure they said that I was a serious candidate for president. I mean, all of us knew that the search must be nearing its end. The reason I'm not sure is, on the one hand, I was very nervous not having been interviewed at all, but clearly, anyone they would interview that late in the proceedings must be a serious candidate. So that's when I realized that I had to be a finalist.

Then a phone call came roughly one week later. That was a period of intense nervousness on the part of the entire Kemeny family. I kept everything confidential, but I never do from my wife in those cases, neither from the children. Jean, I remember, took the phone call.

End of Tape 3, Side A
Beginning of Tape 3, Side B

FANELLI: Actually, you're answering the next question that I haven't asked yet, but that's fine. When you heard about it.

KEMENY: It's not quite hearing about it. What happened was interesting. Jean answers the telephone and comes almost shaking, which is unlike her, because she recognized Lloyd Brace's voice. This had to be shortly before Christmas. What Lloyd said was that he would like very much to call on me the following week. That clearly was a signal that I was one of a very small group. It happened by chance that Jean and I had planned to take a few days' vacation in Boston at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. I told Lloyd that I would be delighted to see him, but since he was in Boston and
we were going to be in Boston the following week, would he like to do it then. That's how it happened that the really serious discussion took place at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, which is one of two reasons why it has been our favorite hotel always, other than it's a great hotel.

FANELLI: What was the date? I missed the date, John.

KEMENY: It's between Christmas. The phone call had to come before Christmas because we were talking about the following week. The following week was somewhere between Christmas and New Year's. The fact that he called me before Christmas and I was interviewed on the 13th, you see what a very short period had elapsed there. The meeting at the Ritz-Carlton was a meeting in which... Apparently, he was essentially authorized by the board—I have to reconstruct it at the end of it—to offer me the job if I could give satisfactory answers to a number of questions. That was a quite lengthy meeting. I would guess it was two hours, though it's the kind of thing where psychologically one might remember it as being longer than it actually was. It was certainly more than an hour, and it could have been as long as two hours. We talked very seriously about everything, and, on behalf of the board, asked me a number of additional searching questions, at the end of which he did offer me the position of president of Dartmouth College. So it happened somewhere in the week between Christmas and New Year's.

There's one anecdote one has to tell with that, two perhaps. One with Jean. Jean and I had a long discussion as to what she should do. I mean, this was clearly a discussion that had to be chairman to possibly future president with nobody else present. On the other hand, she thought it would be terribly impolite if she wasn't there when he arrived. She opted for a white lie and told Lloyd that she had to do some shopping. Stayed there, was very pleasant to him, and then left. Actually, she went downstairs to the second floor of the Ritz and had tea there and was very nervous. I went down afterwards to tell her the news.

Jean's conscience was bothered that she had lied to Lloyd Brace, even though it was a totally innocent lie. Years later, when we would get to know him very well and became extremely fond of him, one day Jean confessed to him that she really had not gone shopping. Lloyd looked at her and said, "Jean, it never for one moment occurred to me that you were going shopping." [Laughs] Sort of a charming touch to that.

The other thing I remember... I don't remember all the questions he asked. They were good searching questions. I remember one thing very vividly. He explained to me the tenure of the president of Dartmouth College, which was explained as the fact that, at any regular meeting of the board of trustees, by majority vote, the board can fire the president of the college. Therefore, your tenure is till the next meeting of the board of trustees.
Then he went on to say that the board had decided… Obviously this is not because of Dartmouth history with two presidents having served twenty-five and twenty-nine years each, but because of the turmoil to which you referred. A great many presidents were quitting after very short terms in office. He said if I'm not fired, they wanted a pledge from me that I would not resign in less than ten years. I accepted that, and I said then that, on the other hand, just because there had been two very long-term presidents, I did not see the ‘70s as the kind of age where anyone could last twenty-five years. Therefore, I said that I would certainly agree not to step down in less than ten years, but I could not see myself serving more than fifteen years.

That was accepted by the board, and the agreement was that as the ten-year mark approached, we would each independently make up our minds, and if both decided we should go further, we would set some date to which I would continue. I actually announced that, that we had set a minimum and maximum time. My colleagues always referred to it as my X and Y speech. But I would not tell them what X and Y were. Ten was such a natural number, it was fairly widely guessed.

FANELLI: John, that thing about the ten years, not less than ten years, was that a condition of employment?

KEMENY: That was a condition, yes. Thank you.

FANELLI: Was there any other that you can recall, other conditions of employment?

KEMENY: Yes. Let's see. There was one, as a matter of fact. I'm sure there were some others. I mean, there must have been some obvious ones, such as making it clear that although the president is the chief executive of the institution, he has to follow policy guidelines from the board. I mean, Lloyd was very good and very clear on all such things. The reason I don't remember them in detail is because many of those things I knew very well and they did not come as surprises. I'm not criticizing Lloyd. On the contrary, it was very much his job to make these…

FANELLI: He was being very precise.

KEMENY: He was being very precise. He was excellent in that session. He was very precise. Some presidents may not have understood those things. I knew enough about the inside workings of Dartmouth, and of colleges in general, that none of those came as a surprise. One did. This was not a general rule, but for whatever rule, the board laid down a condition that although the president has the right to fire people, they put a one-year limit on not firing any of the senior officers in my initial year.
FANELLI: Were you comfortable with that?

KEMENY: No, I wasn't, but I accepted it. I did not know what a serious... It would be much later before I would realize that I'd made a serious mistake in accepting that. I wasn't given a reason for it. The only one I can imagine is that the board felt I was a somewhat unorthodox choice, and they weren't sure if I would last beyond one year, okay? On the other hand, it was not any long-term limit. It sounded to me like a minor handicap. But the reason... As we'll talk, it will turn out that this would cause me very, very serious trouble with one officer and other kinds of trouble with a second officer. The reason I think this was a terrible mistake on the board of trustees... And I know some of them later on, as things developed, realized they had made a mistake on this one because it's the opposite.

But let me contrast it with what I managed to persuade the board to do for my successor. It's important to say here, I arranged this with the board before any of us knew who my successor would be. So it was not dependent, it was nothing to do with Dave McLaughlin. This was when the search was only partway done that I wanted to give all senior officers one-year notice from the date of the president taking office. Actually, I gave them one-year notice, and the way it was set up, with the board's help, what we worked out is they were all guaranteed one year's pay but not one year's work. Their employment, therefore, was contingent on the president deciding, in effect, to reappoint them. Now, even if he had reappointed all of them—he didn't—but even if he had reappointed all of them, they would then have been there because he appointed them and not because they were lame ducks. And I have to say "lame ducks."

Unfortunately, what happens when you do the opposite is, since you haven't fired the people in the first year, it becomes vastly more difficult to fire them afterward. When you come in, you could simply have said, "Look. I know you're a splendid fellow, but I would like somebody else in that position." Or, "I have a different philosophy." It's not quite the same as firing. What I would be forced into later was a firing situation. Possibly, with some other officers—we'll talk about this later on—if I'd had a totally free choice, I might have made a different choice at the beginning. But I was not given that option.

FANELLI: So you did feel uncomfortable with that, but you accepted it as a condition.

KEMENY: But I accepted it, yes. That was the one uncomfortable position. I should say that Lloyd was admirable in the negotiation except for the omission of one topic. The best way to introduce it is how the topic came up. After the January 23rd meeting, when I was officially elected and taken out for a drink afterwards, with Jean, Lloyd and two other trustees asked if they could take me aside for five minutes. Lloyd's comment was, "In case you've wondered whether there's any remuneration connected with the job..." The one goof they made is they never
talked money, and that is wrong. I mean, what they would offer would not have made a difference in whether I would accept the job or not.

FANELLI: But it should have been stated.

KEMENY: It should have been stated. They actually goofed on that subject. They found out what my nine-month academic year salary was, but I certainly wasn't living on that. They never found out what my total income was, and the salary they offered me was substantially below the income I made. Actually, as Jean and I recounted—although somewhere later they would realize they were underpaying me, and at various times try to correct it—during the entire term of the presidency, if you take inflation into account, I never came close to making as much money as I did the year before I became president. As you know, I'm not a wealthy person. I don't have any wealthy relatives, so my only source of income is what I earn. So I lost quite a bit of money.

FANELLI: So that was really an unfairness because they should have talked about it before.

KEMENY: That was an unfairness. You see, I was actually quite shocked by the figure they offered me, but this was over champagne, people were in the other room celebrating my election as president. And there's a certain amount of euphoria. It was circumstances under which it's impossible to argue about money. If they'd just taken five minutes ahead of time, I think I could have persuaded them that it was not reasonable.

Incidentally, part of this is due to John Dickey. One reflection on John: one of the few things I know about John that I did not approve of and I did not learn until after I became president and it came out of an altruistic feeling. He turned down several raises from the board of trustees. I was told that repeatedly by trustees. I was shocked with how little he was being paid. I don't know whether he had other sources of income or whatnot. It’s not relevant. But the effect of that was, since nobody makes more than the president, it held down the whole salary scale for senior administrators, and I would have a dreadful time later on getting that back up again. What I'm criticizing here is, I think what John should have done if he felt that way is make the board pay him whatever the president of Dartmouth should have been paid, and then if he wished to contribute so much of it every year to the alumni fund, that, I think, would have been for the college a much better solution to the problem.

FANELLI: That's very interesting.

KEMENY: It's an interesting example where pure altruism can turn out to be a bad administrative decision for the whole institution.
FANELLI: John, at the January 23 meeting in Boston when the trustees welcomed you to the presidency, you were present there of course and you spoke about your wishes regarding a public ceremony marking the transfer of authority from John Dickey to yourself. Could you talk about that a little bit and how the date of March 1 was chosen and the kind of ceremony that you thought desirable?

KEMENY: Yes. Actually, some of that happens slightly later, because January 23rd I was barely present at. I was called by Lloyd Brace to say that the board had called a special meeting for January 23rd, which would convene at 2:00 p.m., and I was not to join them until after they had taken a certain action, and therefore I should join them at 2:02. I think those were his exact words. He was trying to signal to me that the decision had been made and not to be nervous about the meeting. Clearly, everybody was told of confidentiality and everybody held it except there was a newsbreak. I mean, simply, a paper did not honor the embargo. There was to be an announcement on the Dartmouth campus that afternoon. Things were embargoed till then.

Actually, what happened to me, I was waiting downstairs in the lobby of the building we were meeting in in Boston. As you wander up and down you pick up a newspaper. Particularly, you can't help it when the banner headline over the heading has your name in it. Either my name or mathematician elected president of Dartmouth, or something like that.

FANELLI: Was that the Boston Globe?

KEMENY: The Boston Globe broke it, yes. They broke it by an hour, but it happened that I actually read about my election before I knew it had legally happened. I'm sure the trustees, by telephone and such, agreed, but to make it legal they have to convene a majority in an official meeting to do that. So there it was really just to come in and officially to be offered it and officially to accept it. I think there was an executive committee meeting where I was president-elect in February. I was trying to think about… whenever, somewhere later. You can find out the date. I believe it is there that I talked seriously about the details of everything. Because this was really purely a ceremonial meeting.

FANELLI: And it didn't last very long then.

KEMENY: It lasted a very short period of time. Celebrate, yes, we all went out as a group. I remember we drove down to Boston. The Dickeys drove us down. That was very nice. I sat up front with John and talked most of the way, and Chris [Christina “Chris” Dickey] sat with Jean in the back seat. It was very pleasant. Some of the trustee wives, including Chris Dickey, took Jean somewhere to wait till this short ceremony was over and then we all joined them at some club and had drinks, champagne.
You asked about my wishes for the kind of ceremony. As a matter of fact, one of the things… Because I wasn't present at the actual vote, one of the minor slipups was, I did not know—I should have been able to figure it out—I did not know there was a date voted on which I would become president.

FANELLI: I see. Because that probably had to do with John Dickey's wishing to extend…

KEMENY: It had to do with John Dickey's wishes. As you know, John Dickey had hoped the search could be completed earlier and therefore he was very eager to step down. So he asked for an early date. During the transition, I had a number of long discussions with John Dickey, and at one of them I asked him his wishes about when he would like to step down and he was sort of taken aback on this. He did not know that I didn't know that the trustees had elected me as of March 1. He then explained to me something I should have figured out for myself. It can't be a vague vote that so-and-so becomes president, it has to be as of such date. But I just wasn't told that it was March 1.

Then, on the other hand, as to what kind of ceremony, it is customary to defer to the incoming president. I opted for what I called a family celebration. First of all, March 1 is not a very good time to have a great outdoor ceremony. And also, I was very sensitive to the kind of protest movements and whatnot. I wanted it to be very much a Dartmouth ceremony, so it was primarily faculty, administration, and students, with some distinguished alumni invited if they wished to come and just a token representation from other institutions.

I chose the tokens sort of symbolically. There were three presidents invited: the president of Princeton University because it was my alma mater. He actually could not come but did something very nice. He sent Professor Tucker who had taught me freshman calculus and who had a Dartmouth honorary degree, to represent him, which was terribly nice. The president, to symbolically… and in a way, that was to represent the Ivy League, I selected that. To represent New England, we invited the president of Middlebury College, because at that time I had only one honorary degree and that was from Middlebury College. Thirdly, our commitment to the state of New Hampshire, the president of the University of New Hampshire was invited. They were the only three sort of official delegates who were invited. At many presidential inaugurations the heads of all major institutions are invited and I did not want that.

FANELLI: So this was primarily a family kind of a thing with some little outside representation.

KEMENY: I'm happy to say, I believe I had a much larger student turnout than such inaugurations normally have. It's an occupational hazard. You have to go to the
inauguration of a lot of people and in the 70’s there were an awful lot of inaugurations. I went to two inaugurations at Brown University during my term as president. They were having a bit of a problem. But unless they're at commencement, where students are present anyway, typically the group that doesn't turn up in large numbers tend to be the students. We certainly had some huge number of students in the gymnasium.

FANELLI: Yes, I remember that. John, can you say a little bit about your activities during the period between, let's say, January 23 when you first knew for certain and the inauguration? You mentioned you had a number of sessions with John Dickey.

KEMENY: Yes. I believe we sort of had two hours every week unless he had to be out of town or something of the sort. It's not a very long period from January 23 to March 1, but I felt I had all the access I needed to John Dickey and he answered all my questions absolutely openly. A great deal of what I learned there was invaluable to me later on.

I very early realized that I would have to catch up with a great deal of material. Strangely enough, there was one major area that I really did not know about. Of course, I knew about faculty and academic affairs and academic administration. I knew about students. I knew more about alumni than most faculty members would because I had, a number of times, spoken to alumni groups or appeared before the alumni council.

I had some things to learn but that wasn't the worst of it. The area I knew absolutely nothing about was the non-academic administration of the college. There, there was a great deal to do. The other area was… I knew nothing at all about how the board of trustees functioned. I mean, I knew what their function was, but the mechanics of it, what they liked to do, or their organization and such, I had a great deal to learn about. John Dickey gave me vast amounts of stuff to read and I realized I needed help. I got permission to hire a temporary assistant to help me out during this transition stage. That turned out to be so… I had an office in the basement of Parkhurst Hall for that purpose. Actually, it's an office I had had because of the fundraising activity I did for the Campaign for Dartmouth. So it sort of became a transition office. I needed help there and John Dickey authorized hiring an assistant.

And I was trying to think… I realized I needed a high-level assistant. I really just had a typist-secretary for fundraising, only part-time. I realized I needed someone with better ability, and how can you get somebody on no notice at all in mid-January? All of a sudden it hit me that there was a really excellent person who had just lost her job, Lu Sterling. As a matter of fact, we repeated that same process for President McLaughlin when he was elected, that he used the secretary of the search committee as transition staff, which is a good arrangement. In the
case of Lu Sterling, it ended up being a much longer-term association for both you and me, Alex.

FANELLI: Yes. So you had these very useful sessions with John Dickey.

KEMENY: Extremely useful. There was an awful lot to study. But remember, during all this period, I'm teaching.

FANELLI: You're teaching. That's what I was going to say. You had other responsibilities.

KEMENY: I mean, that's one thing. They didn't pick the dean of the faculty or the vice president of something-or-other. They happened to pick a regular teacher. Fortunately, I wasn't teaching full-time because of my fundraising activity, but it happened that term I had a very time-consuming course to teach. It was the winter term. It was an experiment...

FANELLI: That must have made it rather hectic.

KEMENY: It made it rather hectic but it was also sort of fun. Maybe I ought to tell one anecdote of what happened in that particular course because it is directly...

FANELLI: Please. I was just thinking as you were speaking that these students must have known at that point.

KEMENY: Remember, the term starts very soon after January 1, so there are about three weeks before I am elected president. That was a Friday I was elected president, I think, so it was the last day of the third week. This was a course which I had organized into... I had planned individual student projects. The course was on using computers to help with social problems. What I had in mind was—I'd given it once before and had about fifteen students—that each student would do an individual project. But here I got 45 or 46 students, so I said individual projects wouldn't work. I divided them into teams, and they would do a team project.

I gave them choices, and one was to do a small information system for the college. They planned it out very nicely, and then they said how could they get some data. It's much more fun to do it on real data than on fictitious data. I suggested to them that they might like to go to the office of the dean of the faculty and talk with Mr. Durant [William B. “Bill” Durant Jr.], the executive officer. I told them (a) to be very polite, (b) to make it very clear that they're only asking for information he might have in computer-readable form or otherwise that's absolutely non-confidential, that is the kind of information they might be able to dig out of catalogs or whatnot: names, what department they're in, what the rank, or possibly age, if that was not confidential, sex, which certainly is not
confidential, and such. They got an absolutely flat no, saying that any information about faculty was automatically confidential and could not be released to students.

I remember vividly, they came to me the third week of the term asking for permission to change their topic, which in a ten-week term is a serious handicap. I said to the students, "That is a problem." Maybe it was perhaps on a Wednesday of that week. I said, "Look. Let me think about it. Why don't you come to me Monday during my office hours and let's discuss your problem." Remember, I knew that in between would happen Friday, January 23rd. On the 23rd, they came to my office to say that they got a surprise call from the dean of the faculty’s office offering them any data they wanted on the faculty of Dartmouth College.

[FANELLI:] That's very good.

[KEMENY:] I would run into that later on again and again. As you may remember, Alex, a lot of administrative offices were oversensitive about the confidentiality of information, and I would change a number of those things. My belief was that whenever you make something over-confidential, people think you're hiding something. It's not that I would release individual salaries or any truly confidential information, but I made public whatever it is that I felt people should know. So that was one of the amusing incidents in the transition.

I should mention that I held out one condition before I accepted, only one. I was thinking in terms of what Lloyd had said. I made it a condition for accepting the employment that I would be allowed to do teaching, certainly not full-time teaching but continue to teach.

[FANELLI:] What was Lloyd Brace's reaction to that?

[KEMENY:] The reaction of him and later of the board was that certainly they thought that was wonderful, but they predicted that I would, within a couple of years, decide it was not physically possible to do that. The only thing they… They left it to be my decision but urged me not out of a feeling of pride to continue when I realized that the president does not have time to continue teaching. I'm happy to say that day never came.

As a matter of fact, it would be during Charlie Zimmerman's [Charles J. "Charlie" Zimmerman '23] chairmanship, so it had to be, say, two or three years into my term as president that Charlie came to me on behalf of the board. Life was very hectic. Charlie said that the board asked him to talk to me, that they worried I was working too hard. I said yes, I was, and gave the talk that as much as they were proud that their president continued teaching, wasn’t it time to give up teaching. On the spur of the moment, what occurred to me is, I said to Charlie, "What if I
told the board that I had to take off two afternoons a week to play golf?" He happens to be a very ardent golfer, as you know, Alex. Charlie bit, and he said, "But John, we not only would permit you, we would urge you." I said, "Charlie, my problem is I don't play golf, and what golf is for you, teaching is for me." He must have recounted that to the board because I heard that a number of times. The board never again raised the issue after that.

End of Tape 3, Side B
Beginning of Tape 4, Side A

KEMENY: Well, let's see. We were in the transition stage, and I recounted some anecdotes connected with teaching, which got us off on the subject of my continuing teaching later on.

FANELLI: Yes. I was asking you about that period between the 23rd and March 1st. You said you had meetings with the president, John Dickey. Did you meet with any other people? Administrators or…?

KEMENY: Yes. I met with all senior administrators, I believe, one by one. Some of them I barely knew.

FANELLI: What was the general…?

KEMENY: Really, in a way, to find out what their job was and, in a way, interviewing them. Obviously it was not an interview to decide whether to fire them because I didn't have that power, but to find out how they were organized, what their problems were, and really to get acquainted.

FANELLI: I wonder if… Perhaps you don't know this. Did they know that they had security for another year?

KEMENY: That's a very good question. I just have no idea on that. I don't know which way it would have been worse, in a way, because, in a way, if they had known, that would have been scandalous, so they probably didn't know. On the other hand, the fact that they didn't know meant that I had had an opportunity and I would go along a year without firing them, they would have every right to assume that I was pleased with them.

FANELLI: How about faculty? Did you meet with faculty during that period?

KEMENY: I'm sure that I did, at least with some key faculty committees. Also, John Dickey had me sitting in on various kinds of meetings that he thought would be useful, one of which was an executive committee meeting of the board, obviously, as a listener. The subject of my inauguration did come up, so I did do some talking
also with some faculty groups. I was less worried about the faculty. I really knew the faculty so well and knew its committee structure and organization very well.

FANELLI: John, how did you decide about what to include in your inauguration address, and could you say a little bit about that? I think you probably saw that as an important event. I don't mean event in the sense of ceremonially, but as a statement to the community and to the faculty and the students about your vision of your presidency, in a certain sense. You must have put some time…

KEMENY: Yes. I put a good deal of time into that.

FANELLI: It was an excellent address, what you did to get people responding and excited. Talk a little bit about how you came to…

KEMENY: First of all, my decision was that I would not give… As a matter of fact, I almost never would during my presidency give one of these terribly broad philosophical discussions on the importance of liberal education. Occasionally, one has to do that, but then I did it as briefly as possible. Anyone who examined my whole career wouldn't have had any doubt that I had a very strong commitment to education, and liberal education in particular. I just have never been very good at, nor did I much enjoy, the broad philosophical speeches. I wanted it to be something quite concrete. Secondly, I realized I was following an extremely strong and able president, who had served twenty-five years and had very major achievements to his credit. Thirdly, it was a time of turmoil, when some of the basic values of the institution were being questioned. Not just at Dartmouth; this was a national phenomenon, nothing specific to Dartmouth.

Therefore, what I tried very hard… Of course, I wasn't about to disavow the major things John Dickey did because I admired them greatly, but was trying to give a signal that I, too, wanted to achieve some major things during my administration. I sat down and I wrote out sort of a list of the major areas in which I hoped I could make a contribution. The speech was aimed at outlining those areas where I thought changes were necessary and to try to indicate what kind of changes I was looking for. It was a hard speech to do because the president gives it at a time when he has not yet officially tried any of those ideas on the board of trustees.

There would be one thing that I would make a commitment to very early, and I don't remember if it was in my inaugural address or right after it. I never could find a trustee vote where they approved it. This was the commitment to Native Americans. I hope some future historian disentangles that. I know I must sometimes have discussed it informally with the board, but there's no official record of it, so as far as I can tell, I announced at some point that we were going
John Kemeny Interview

to have a major plan for Native Americans. Really, the context of approving that report of the equal opportunity committee…

FANELLI: Yes. I was going to say, wasn't it going to fall within that?

KEMENY: It was within that, but I couldn't find a specific vote on that — I once looked for it in the trustee minutes—other than a general approval on my recommendation of those plans.

I'd have to reread my inaugural address, but I know some of the things I said in it. Certainly I addressed the issue of coeducation.

FANELLI: Yes. There was a very warm response to that, I recall.

KEMENY: Yes. And I addressed some of the turmoil and some of my feelings on the role of an academic institution in such an age. I remember I spoke on some subjects people were not expecting me to speak on. I spoke out on the subject of the attitude of the institution towards those who work for the institution. I made it very clear I'm speaking not only of faculty, which probably shocked the faculty, but the administration and staff in particular. I made some rather general, but some promises that some improvements were necessary in the staff area. I had heard some rumors of that before and during the transition stage. I did pick up that there were some quite serious problems in the staff area.

It was an area that I think John Dickey did not take a personal interest in but delegated it completely to John Meck ['33]. John, as a lawyer, had sort of the typical attitude towards negotiating, particularly with a union. I know how hard he tried to avoid getting a union here. You negotiate as hard as possible and settle for whatever the smallest amount of money is you can pay them. In the process, I discovered that the minimum wage at Dartmouth College, even for union employees, was just, in my opinion, outrageously low. I had a quite different attitude. I would have much worse financial troubles than John Meck had during his term, but whatever we could afford at a given time, I felt one should be as generous as possible to the employees of the institution. Heaven only knows, no academic institution pays enormously generous wages, but particularly I wanted to make sure that there wasn't anyone working for Dartmouth College who had to live in abject poverty by working there. It led to a very interesting negotiation with the union that year. I would end up negotiating six two-year union contracts. When I say "I," I meant the college's negotiators, but I always gave them their instructions.

The first one was a very interesting one because I instructed… First of all, we figured out what the maximum was we could go for, but as part of it, I instructed them that we have to increase minimum wage significantly. I wish I could
remember the exact numbers, but without my knowledge, the union had formulated its own strategy, and their non-negotiable demand was to raise the minimum wage for union employees. And unless they raised it to a certain amount, they would strike. The college negotiator had a very difficult job because I think the figure I came up with was five or ten cents more per hour than the union was asking for. [Chuckles] He had to figure out how to slip them the extra money they were not asking for a minimum wage.

FANELLI: Was this in the very early one?

KEMENY: Well, since I had six two-year ones, this was June 1970, which meant that you start negotiating in April, so it's very early.

Sorry. You asked me how I spent my time. I am trying to think why that was such a hectic period. John Dickey, in one way very kindly and in another way unfortunately, decided that the next president should be able to formulate the next budget. As you know, the budget process normally starts in December, and you have from December till the April trustee meeting to come up with a budget.

FANELLI: So that had been delayed?

KEMENY: That had been delayed. Here you had a president who was terribly ignorant of major areas of the institution, and I had a very short period in which to try to get the '70-'71 budget ready.

FANELLI: That was another instance…

KEMENY: That was an instance when I needed staff work. I needed to talk to lots of people and get lots of input on it.

FANELLI: Probably John Dickey felt he was being kind to you by letting you decide.

KEMENY: Actually, he was kind to me, and other than the fact that it dropped an enormous time burden on my shoulder, I was very grateful to him for this decision because budget is one of the few areas where the president can have a very significant influence in setting priorities. So, no, it was a major kindness. And you have to remember that March 1 is a miserable time to change office. The busiest time of the year is April, May, June, well, really March, April, May, June. It's budget and two out of the four trustee meetings, commencement, and reunions, the entire alumni tour, year-end decisions, everything comes then.

Really, that's why I was very careful when I stepped… It was not John's doing. I'm sure he wanted to step down the previous June, but the board wasn't ready with a candidate, so it just happened to work out that way. That's why when
people say eleven, I always emphasize eleven and a third because, believe me, May through June is as much work, more work than the whole rest of the year is. It meant twelve budgets, twelve alumni tours, twelve commencements, twelve reunion periods, et cetera. So that added an enormous amount to the hecticness of that period, to March 1.

FANELLI: John, there were some things that you inherited, in a sense, because the decisions had just been taken. One of them was the situation with the ROTC, where there had been a decision by the faculty to approve disengaging from those programs. Then the sequence was that the executive committee of the board of trustees had approved that decision. Then the day after that, there was the takeover of Parkhurst Hall on May 6th. I think the executive committee meeting was May 5th.

There was a trustee, as I read the minutes, Tom Curtis [Thomas “Tom” Curtis ‘32], who was, as I'm sure you know, very much opposed to that, and, indeed, at a meeting tried to suggest to the board that it reconsider and change it, that the executive committee had done something wrong. The instance was that the full board has to confirm, as you know, the actions of the executive committee. They were about to take this vote, and he argued that they should reconsider doing that because he felt that it was not in the interest of the institution. At that point, I think John Dickey said, quite rightfully, that the educational policy of the institution was the responsibility of the faculty. The faculty had already spoken. The students had voted in the referendum earlier.

KEMENY: I think it's important to say for the record on the takeover that the faculty's final vote was in agreement with the position of the vast majority of the students. Then the executive committee of the board approved that. So the takeover was from actually an extremist group of students, who were not only protesting board and faculty action but, in effect, opposed to what the vast majority of the students wanted.

FANELLI: Yes. I'm glad you put that in. But President John Dickey said that this would have been very unrealistic to think that the board could go back on this and try to usurp, in a certain sense, the… It was still its prerogative, but it was the faculty's responsibility. I've forgotten how long a time Curtis stayed on the board there after that.

KEMENY: I did overlap with him for a couple of years.

FANELLI: I thought you did. Since he was probably one of the most conservative of the board members with regard to ROTC and…

KEMENY: And certain other issues.
FANELLI: Other issues. Was that a difficulty when you came on as president?

KEMENY: No. In a way, because those trustees who felt quite unhappy about the board action did not hold me personally responsible for that. In a way, it was too late.

FANELLI: Although, later on, alumni would do that.

KEMENY: Alumni would do that, yes. I remember once being introduced in New Haven, Connecticut, several years into my term of office—I guess that's relevant because people lose track of time—as the president who had brought in coeducation, who had abolished ROTC, and had the Parkhurst takeover. Two out of three of those were wrong. The other things did happen less than a year before I became president, so it's somewhat easy to see how time slides together.

Tom Curtis certainly was an unhappy trustee, and that would come out in various discussions. He didn't personally hold me responsible for ROTC, and fairly soon, before he steps down from the board of course he would be much more upset with me on an issue that he felt even more strongly about than ROTC, namely coeducation.

First of all, there are the events that we'll have to talk about separately sometime, the events of May 1970, and therefore that starts overshadowing earlier events. Then by the following year, coeducation is a very major issue on the campus. On both of those, Tom Curtis would be very much on the conservative side and, I'm quite sure, very unhappy with my actions in both of those cases.

FANELLI: John, that reminds me, on the debate on ROTC which occurred in the faculty at meetings, did you express an opinion there?

KEMENY: In the faculty meeting? Yes. Let's see. I was originally... I voted for what the famous faculty compromise was and spoke for it, which was neither for continuing the present program nor for abolishing ROTC. But the motion that carried by a fairly substantial majority originally in the faculty meeting was to give a three-year deadline and to ask for certain reforms in the ROTC programs, which were quite important ones. There were serious things wrong with the ROTC program and unless the armed services agreed to those reforms within three years, ROTC would be discontinued after three years. I both spoke for that compromise and voted for it.

Then the student referendum came after that. It was clear that the student position was more extreme than the faculty position. Then there was a faculty meeting early May, which lasted more than one day, where faculty members... Probably the largest faculty meeting I ever saw. The faculty members argued vigorously
that, in view of the student position, the faculty would have to go further than what had been done before, namely to discontinue ROTC, but of course to let the students who were already enrolled in it finish. It's over that that Parkhurst gets taken over, which is outrageous.

There I was present for one day of a two-day meeting, but I had a major out-of-town speaking engagement. As a matter of fact, two. One to GE in Schenectady, and then I was on my way to New York to speak to the Dartmouth Alumni Club in New York about computers, I think. So I was not present for the second day of the debate and therefore did not have a chance to vote. I was in my car just on the outskirts of New York City when I turned on the evening news. Story number one was the takeover of Parkhurst Hall at Dartmouth College. I quickly got on the phone. I had to talk to the alumni the next day. All during that horrible night and the next day, we were on the phone with Jean. So I then had to talk to alumni in New York.

Actually, unfortunately, a number of non-Dartmouth guests were invited, because my topic was of general interest, not a Dartmouth topic. The chair made an intelligent ruling that I would speak for twenty minutes on the general topic. Then the others would be excused, and then I would answer questions about what the heck is going on at Dartmouth College. I don't think many people listened to me during my early remarks, but it was a rather heated discussion about the takeover of Parkhurst Hall. All I could contribute to it was very carefully explain the sequence of events, and in particular to emphasize the point I emphasized earlier, that this was not a general student takeover but by an extremist group to whom the compromise that was worked out was not enough.

FANELLI: I'm trying to see if there were issues that had been prominent during that period immediately preceding…

KEMENY: Equal opportunity was a great deal discussed on the campus, with enormous skepticism on the part particularly of students and some faculty members that the trustees would ever do anything meaningful in the area of equal opportunity. And of course coeducation, which would grow way out of proportion.

It was a difficult issue in some way… I've never tracked it down, but the two things that were attributed publicly to John Dickey, one of which I know he said and one of which I don't know that he said, that supposedly he had taken an anti-coeducation position in some discussions with alumni. The one I know he did say, which would cause me very serious problems later on, was in some alumni meeting he said that if the male student body at Dartmouth ever dropped below 3000, we'd have to resign from the Ivy League.
That led fairly directly to that big fight. There were two fights on coeducation. The big one of course, whether to let in women at all, but a separate fight, not to let the male student body drop below 3000. For example, Bill Morton [William H. “Bill” Morton ‘32], who actually was very helpful—he was on the alumni council at the time—in an otherwise horrible debate with the alumni council, took the position… He actually said that on principle, he has favored coeducation, but then argued vigorously about not dropping below 3000. Actually, that turned out to be very helpful because it turned the discussion away from “coeducation is horrible” to the issue as to whether it is possible to bring about coeducation. Having gotten to know Bill Morton much better later on, for all I know he did that intentionally. He is quite capable of it.

ROTC. Really, by the time I took office, everybody had agreed it was to be abolished. It was on its way out, and it was just the students working their way through who were still enrolled in it. So that just wasn't a live issue, just bigger ones came on the horizon. Cambodia and Kent State and equal opportunity and coeducation overshadowed ROTC.

FANELLI: Could you talk a little bit maybe about preparations that… This may be with respect to Jean more than with you, about moving into the president's house.

KEMENY: Yes. The other unfortunate thing that happened because of the timing was that the Dickeys were still living in the president's house, and since he had no idea when it would happen—and transition happened very fast—they asked to stay there until their house was ready, which wasn't ready roughly until the end of the academic year, maybe a little earlier than that.

Secondly, the house needed renovations. It usually does when the previous occupant has lived there for twenty-five years. Therefore, as a combination of… We had no use of it until commencement weekend, and because of renovations, all we had was really use of the outside on commencement weekend. We really didn't manage to move in until considerably later. There are some inconveniences and difficulties in operating out of a private home when you're president of the college, certainly a home not big enough to do any entertaining and all such.

Again, March 1 is not a good time to change office. It's not just March 1, but if your predecessor does not know until a month and a half before then when the transition was, he couldn't plan.

FANELLI: Jean must have had some ideas about how she wanted…

KEMENY: Oh, very much so. We had been in the president's house perhaps three times in our life but didn't know it well at all. Chris Dickey gave Jean a great tour of the house. I remember, as most people when they get to see the president's house,
indeed they are amazed as to how big it is. Somehow there's something about the architecture that makes it look smaller than it is. It's a little hard to count rooms, but we'd eventually discover there are something like thirty rooms, one of which Jean did not discover until six months after we moved in. It's hard to say whether it was a large walk-in storage closet or a room, but literally, we did not find it till later on.

Yes, she wanted to… I mean, the trustees did tell us and voted an amount for renovations, actually without our asking for it. I think Dick Olmsted [Richard “Dick” Olmsted ‘32] went to them. He knew the house needed some major changes. So did the Dickeys, but again here, out of kindness, they felt they were not going to redecorate a year or two before he stepped down, but the new president and his wife should have the right there.

Jean tried some fairly exciting things, I believe, downstairs in the way she decorated it. We made only very modest changes in the living quarters. If the wallpaper peeled off, we put on new wallpaper, nothing more than that. But mainly the downstairs, which gets an enormous amount of use at the president's house—I mean, literally thousands of people troop through there—that she wanted to change.

And the kitchen she felt very strongly had to be changed. The house was built in the '20s. As a matter of fact, I would use that as a line sometimes as to how farsighted Dartmouth trustees are, that the year I was born they started building a president's house. It was built in ’26 when I was born. But ’26 was an age when people had lots of live-in servants. It's a house built for lots of live-in servants. Nobody paid very much attention about the design of the kitchen because only servants worked there, and you have a large enough staff, you don't worry about that. But as the Dickeys did, we would have a very modest staff, and Jean had to do a good deal herself. It was a hopeless kitchen. We made some changes, and I've seen the McLaughlins, for example, have significantly enlarged it since then. I mention that only to say that there really was something drastically wrong with that kitchen so that even the changes we made didn't come close, for example, to what the McLaughlins felt a kitchen should have. It was horrible.

FANELLI: Didn't an offer to air condition it… Was that something that I remember?

KEMENY: Absolutely. They voted a quite generous sum of money, which, incidentally, eventually turned out not to be enough. Nobody had any idea what these things cost or how big it was. And they voted an equally… No, I know what it was. They just voted without a specific sum to make major renovations, and then asked Dick Olmsted to make a survey and go back to the board. We were horrified when the bill came. I think it was about $75,000, which to us sounded like a fortune. I had no idea what the board would do, so I asked to excuse myself in
case the board felt it was extravagant. I asked Dick Olmsted afterward, and he said, "They not only approved it but they voted to air condition the whole house, and voted another $75,000 for air conditioning it."

That one I vetoed. First of all, there's a danger. Dartmouth does not really need air conditioning, and I would very successfully use later as arguments against air conditioning that our own house was not air conditioned and my office wasn't. But secondly, what that involved was the really terribly fancy air conditioning, which is all done inside and blown air. The big cost was tearing out walls and putting in big ducts which did not seem to me like a good expenditure. We would later buy six $1,500 window air conditioners, which solved the problem highly satisfactorily.

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Beginning of Tape 5, Side A

FANELLI: John, I thought this time we would talk about, as we mentioned last time, the general areas, the events of May 1970.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: And coeducation. I'm sure that most college presidents are tested at some point in their tenure by events or conditions that put them in situations of stress, calling for decisions that may well affect the future of their institutions, as well as their own future. In your case, however, that situation arose almost immediately, literally within weeks of your inauguration, with the incursion into Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State University. Could you talk a little bit about this early test of your leadership, touching on how you arrived at the decisions you took and with what persons, if any, you discussed alternative courses of action before making those decisions. Perhaps it would be helpful if I read the words you wrote in 1975, looking back on your first five years as president.

You said, "Campuses all over the nation erupted. We were most fortunate on the Dartmouth campus that while feelings were as deep as those at any other institution, the reaction was highly responsible and we set a national example. It is one of the ironies of that period that because our campus reacted effectively and responsibly, but without violence, Dartmouth received very little public recognition from the media. While many other campuses were deeply divided and scars were inflicted that would take years to heal, we witnessed a strong pulling together of the Dartmouth community, in which I take pride and which was most beneficial for the institution."
KEMENY: It was the first Sunday in May of 1970, following the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University, that I became aware that a major national student meeting was taking place. Out of that came a vote that the students would go back to their own campuses and call for a strike, in effect to close down their institutions as a protest to national events they felt were intolerable. The following week would be a period of major turmoil on many, many campuses throughout the country, and indeed many of them would, in effect, lose the rest of that academic year.

I called the office Monday morning. It was my first experience with Ruth LaBombard in a period of stress, because I asked her to cancel all my appointments for the day and asked her to schedule a whole series of meetings with rather large groups. She took careful notes, made sure she understood all the instructions and at no point did she ask me why. She asked me why much later when things had calmed down and I most certainly appreciated that fact. There would be many other instances in which I would learn about Ruth's ability to perform in an exemplary fashion under all kinds of stressful circumstances.

I spent the day meeting with many groups. There were groups of administrators, groups of faculty members, groups of students. I can't recall all the different groups, but as I remember, they started in the morning, and the last person left my office at 8:30 that evening, so they were very extensive meetings. During that period, we discussed all possible scenarios, and I received every possible advice that anyone could give under the circumstances. Unfortunately, there was absolutely no consensus. The advice ranged from one extreme to the other. I believe Leonard Rieser was the last one to leave the office, and he gave me one more piece of advice and then said, "But, of course, the decision is up to you," which was very clear to me.

I now have to start on another subject to explain why I had to make a decision before that evening. Soon after I became president, I started what was initially a monthly radio program while college was in session, where I would speak for twenty minutes to give me an opportunity to tell the campus at firsthand what went on, and then to give student reporters an opportunity for the rest of the hour to ask me questions. It was very successful for many years. Later, when there was less news or I was less news to the campus, we would change that to once a term. But these live radio broadcasts were a very useful invention.

It happened by one of these historic accidents that I think my second monthly news conference was due that Monday evening. Therefore, unless I canceled it, which in itself would have been saying something, possibly that I was afraid to go public or be questioned publicly under these circumstances, I had to decide before 9:00 p.m. exactly what I was going to say. I think in a very real sense, I feel that I fully assumed the duties of president of Dartmouth College in the half hour
between 8:30 p.m. that Monday and 9:00 p.m. President Truman's statement that "the buck stops here" came home to me completely. Jean would later say that it was the only time in her life where she listened to my speech and had no idea whatsoever about what I was going to say. As a matter of fact, she had an unusual experience in that halfway through my speech she somehow totally forgot that she was listening to her husband; she was listening to the president of Dartmouth College.

What I decided to do was to deviate from a conviction that I held very strongly, namely that the president of an institution like Dartmouth should not take divisive political stands. I would return to that principle and avoid taking divisive stands throughout most of my administration. Let me say a word about that. There are some college presidents who take positions on all kinds of issues, and even presidents of Ivy institutions. But it is impossible for the president of Dartmouth to speak and say I'm speaking as an individual. No matter what he says will be attributed to the institution. Since that institution represents, and should represent, the whole spectrum of political opinions, a major segment of the constituencies will resent the president taking upon himself the right to commit the institution to a particular political stand. That's very different from committing the institution to an educational stand or a moral stand; but a political stand, I think, is inexcusable.

In spite of having that strong conviction, I felt I could not say the things I wanted to say Monday evening without expressing my personal horror at the killings at Kent State, which was fairly easy, but also, at the same time, expressing my horror at the widening of the war in Vietnam by the invasion of a neutral country. I had to say those things so that those who would meet the next morning to decide whether Dartmouth College would be struck or not would know from what position I was speaking.

What I decided to do was to cancel classes for the rest of the week to provide the college with an opportunity for in-depth discussions of the issues, to allow tempers to cool, and to call a special meeting of the general faculty, that is the entire faculty, including the professional school faculties, for the following evening so that we might together discuss what position to take for the future.

The following morning, the students met, but as one of the radical leaders would say to me afterwards, I had preempted the strike. It led to a quite fascinating week. Do you want me to go on about the week?

FANELLI: I think that would be useful, yes, John.

KEMENY: During the week, there were indeed meetings all over the campus. I remember the weather was quite lovely, which helped, so that groups would sit around the
Green, groups of all kinds of persuasions, often mixed groups, arguing and debating and discussing what to do. A great many activities were formed, primarily by those who were upset by the events, but also by those who disagreed with the protesters, which included trips to Washington. Perhaps the largest activity was visiting neighboring communities in a fairly large radius around Hanover simply to talk to people to try to tell them why the students were so upset about the national and international events.

FANELLI: Excuse me, John. You mentioned groups protesting the protesters. As I recall, and you can tell me if I'm wrong, didn't the college and your decision make available to those anti–protest groups the same facilities that… Because it was an educational…?

KEMENY: Yes. Right after the events the next day, representatives of the anti–protest group came to me. They said how come I was taking the side of the protesters, and I said I was not doing that. Although, as I had said publicly, I happened to agree with them. I urged wide discussions and students taking whatever actions their conscience dictated, and I urged the anti–protest group to do the same. They said but do they have access to facilities, and I said of course, and we made available to them all the facilities that any other group had available to it.

The faculty meeting Tuesday evening was quite fascinating. After a substantial… It was a very solemn and extremely well-attended faculty meeting. After a great deal of rhetoric, it really came down to the issue as to what would happen after the week was over. Interesting enough, as best as I can remember, no one really criticized me for canceling classes. I think they recognized the extraordinary circumstances. Their major concern was how they could return to normal operations the following week, which I certainly urged them to do. And what to do with students whose conscience dictated that they had to take a very active political role. Several institutions, for example, allowed such students simply to miss all classes and get full credit and a grade based on the work they had done up to that point. That, the Dartmouth faculty was unwilling to do, and out of it came what has been referred to as the famous "asterisk compromise." The faculty agreed that students could get credit for the course if they were in good standing at what was roughly halfway through the term, but could not receive a grade since they haven't completed it. In place of a grade, an asterisk appeared and a footnote appeared on their diploma explaining the extraordinary circumstances under which this happened.

There were some rather horrendous events. A great many outside agitators came to the campus, and some of them were threatening violent events. One of the things that pleased me most about the week when it became clear that outside agitators would try… We became a target because there was a great deal of violence on several other campuses and we had had none. And outside agitators
tried to turn Dartmouth into a more violent campus also. One of the things that pleased me greatly was that, after considerable reluctance, some of the most radical leaders of the protest group decided to come to me in confidence. I was helped in this by the fact that a student I knew very well—I had had him in several mathematics classes and he was of fairly radical political persuasion—persuaded some of his fellow leaders that I could be trusted. There were two consecutive nights when we were up late into the night, Jean and I, talking to leaders of the more radical faction of the protest group.

I mention the more radical faction because a very large fraction of the student body joined the protest. Therefore, quite obviously, the opinions represented by the protestors ranged all over the place from those who are normally of a radical turn of mind and this was a natural thing for them to join, to students such as… I remember Billy King [William Haven “Billy” King Jr. ‘63], a football quarterback, who is normally of a quite conservative political outlook but was extremely upset by Cambodia and Kent State and therefore decided to join the protest and played a very active part in it. These student leaders came to us and we talked. At least one night I know we were up till 4:00 a.m. talking.

FANELLI: This was at your house?

KEMENY: At our house, yes. That was not yet the president's house because we would not move in till that summer. It was a house on Hemlock Road. We'd talk till late into the night planning things and figuring out how to avert problems. Jean would later say that probably my secret of success that week was that at 4:00 a.m. I'm in better shape than most students. At least I used to be at that age. Therefore, my mind worked better then.

Particularly the second time, I remember, they came very upset because there were some leaflets around campus, clearly not produced on campus, that people were going to teach any student who wanted to how to build a homemade bomb. There was a brief description on it, and supposedly there was a group somewhere building a bomb. We went to enormous trouble contacting both other student leaders and at least one faculty member who was close to the radical group to try to track down, and we eventually tracked down where the rumor came from. I don't know if the bomb would ever have been built, but we did manage to reach the people who allegedly were going to build it, and these student leaders succeeded in talking them out of doing that. As a matter of fact, I'm told that the following day the outside agitators left the campus.

During that week, I was helped by New Hampshire's distinguished state newspaper, the *Manchester Union Leader*. In case these tapes are listened to far in the future, the *Manchester Union Leader* either no longer exists or has changed. It should be recorded that in 1970 and for quite a while afterwards, it had the
reputation of being one of the most far extreme right wing conservative publications in the country. If my memory is correct, they once accused President Eisenhower of being a communist agent. That's simply to put into context their political views. They were very upset by my taking a public stand here, and one they disapproved of. They had the habit of writing editorials, when they were very upset, on the front page, so there was a front page editorial with the headline, "Dartmouth Buys Another Lemon," which is a short sentence which simultaneously insults two presidents of Dartmouth College.

The outcome of that was that, within twenty-four hours, there were hundreds of students on campus who were wearing new tee shirts with a lemon on it. The lemon sort of became the symbol of that week. A delegation of the faculty of arts and sciences called on me to present me with a miniature lemon tree, and lemon jokes were all over the campus.

The week ended… I should say, incidentally, when I canceled classes, Monday was over when I canceled classes. It actually happened to be Green Key weekend, which made it a shorter-than-normal week. Many of the students leaders came to me whether they should cancel Green Key, and I urged them very strongly not to cancel it. They could carry on whatever they wished to do the next week. But there had been such enormous tension on campus, I think they very badly needed the opportunity to let down. They said they would do it if I would come and speak to them in the field house where the big Friday evening event—or Saturday evening, I forget which it was—and I agreed to do so.

There I went with, I know, two or three thousand students, including their dates there, and horrible rock music that I'm not very fond of, and they interrupted all of that for me to speak. Clearly, in an event like that, the briefer the speech, the better. So I briefly thanked them for the highly responsible way they conducted themselves during the week, and I ended my very brief speech by throwing lemons out to the audience. Many of those were later brought back to me, asked that I should autograph them. I understand they turned out to be a major fundraiser. Whenever there was a fraternity auction, one of the items in it was a lemon autographed by me. I don't know if anyone else was ever asked to autograph a lemon, but that became a symbol for a while.

Then the rest of the spring, some significant minority of the students spent a time engaged in various political activities. But we got through the entire spring without a single act of violence, and the following Monday, the remaining students and faculty resumed classes as normal, which, incidentally, was the exception rather than the rule. I believe all the other Ivy schools had very serious problems that week, as did many other institutions. I know something about Harvard because my colleague, Bill Slesnick [William E. “Bill” Slesnick ‘73A] was scheduled to visit it that spring, and he was absolutely horrified at what was
going on at Harvard, where roommates had to make decisions whether to cross picket lines that were manned by their roommate. There were a number of fisticuffs, and the entire atmosphere was such it was essentially impossible to conduct education.

FANELLI: You mentioned your first day when you listened to a lot of people, including faculty and administrators; was there communication with trustees during this period? Or were events moving too fast, or what?

KEMENY: I think events really moved too fast then, and I had not yet established easy and quick communication.

FANELLI: Of course you had to make a decision that first night.

KEMENY: The point was, really, I was through with my meetings at 8:30, at which point I realized that I had not gotten any useful advice. By which I don't mean that it wasn't advice, but I was advised twelve different courses, all with about equal numbers supporting them, so there was nothing. In effect, I had to make up my own mind. The advice canceled out. What I do remember is receiving a phone call from Lloyd Brace, who was chairman of the board at that time, perhaps on Wednesday of that week, saying that he had heard everything that had happened. I believe I asked the office to notify the trustees, or at least certainly the chairman of the board, the next day what I had done. So he certainly knew what I had done, and he said he understood the circumstances and approved of it, but he wanted to know could I just tell him, is the scene on campus at least anywhere close to being peaceful. I had the habit very often, with the beautiful view out of the president's office, that when I talked on the telephone, I would often face the window and look out on the green. I looked out at the green, which was full of students and faculty members, all sitting in peaceful groups in very lively but totally peaceful discussions, and I tried very hard over the telephone to describe that scene to Lloyd Brace.

Perhaps I should tell one more story about that to give a feeling of the impression people got nationally of what was going on on campuses. Al Dickerson [Albert Inskip “Al” Dickerson '30] used to tell the story—he was then dean of freshmen—that the father of a freshman wanted to come visit his son, probably because he was worried about all the violence on campus. He called Al Dickerson to get instruction on how he might drive to the campus, and Al naturally thought he wasn't sure on what road to take. It turned out that's not at all what he asked. He wanted to know if there was some safe back route free of violence by which he could approach the campus. I think that says something about what was going on on a great many campuses, and of course they are the ones who got all the publicity.
As a matter of fact, an alumnus of ours who was editor of the *Concord Monitor* at the time—still is—was also… Since you don't make very much money on the *Concord Monitor*, the paper made money by feeding New Hampshire news to the major news media. He told me he literally tried for twenty-four hours to place a story about Dartmouth. The conversation invariably went, "Well, who got killed?" Or, "How many had their heads bashed in?" et cetera. I mean, he had to say none to all of these and they said, "Well, then you don't have a story," and they hung up. He tried to get out a story about what he considered was unusually responsible reaction by an educational institution.

FANELLI: That must have been Tom Gerber [Thomas W. “Tom” Gerber ‘43].

KEMENY: Yes, Tom Gerber, indeed.

FANELLI: John, you yourself pointed out in a previous interview that many alumni must have had some concern about a president who was foreign-born and not an alumnus and spoke with an accent. The popular view of the many disturbances on campuses all over the country, if I recall correctly, was that the student demonstrators were somehow unpatriotic because they didn't support the government during a war.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Your action at Dartmouth must have been perceived by some alumni, perhaps by many alumni, as in a sense legitimizing the actions of those protesting the war; and thus it must have confirmed their prejudices against a president seen as "liberal" or "leftist," at any rate, unlike previous Dartmouth presidents. Did you receive a lot of flak from alumni in May and June? And do you believe that these events of May, coming so early in your presidency, may have complicated your relations with alumni for several years thereafter?

KEMENY: Yes. The answer to both questions is yes. As a matter of fact, an alumnus mailed… That's when we first had to organize a system, with you, Alex, playing a key role in it, which worked somewhat as follows. You can correct me if it's not right. I would sort of write a standard letter in which I expressed the major points I wanted to make. But when letters come in by the hundreds, as they did at that time, it is impossible to write individual ones, so you came up with various variants of the same letter and would make sure that an alumnus received a letter that, on the one hand, expressed my views, and on the other hand was sufficiently individualized that he did not feel he was receiving a form letter. That's a role you would play again and again through the presidency. Though this was one of very few occasions where the mail really was huge.
In many cases, it was simply a matter of concern in trying to understand what went on, or worrying about...Actually, many of those letters accused Dartmouth of events that happened on other campuses. But there certainly was a significant residue of alumni who understood what went on and were extremely angry at me for expressing my personal political views. I'm quite certain that that seriously complicated my relationship with alumni.

FANELLI: I can't remember if that year you went on alumni swing.

KEMENY: I most certainly did, yes. Taking office on March 1 is a terrible thing, because really a significant fraction of the total responsibilities of a president's year occur between March 1 and mid-June. As I mentioned earlier, starting with the budget, which we were late with, and then two of the four trustee meetings come in April and June, commencement and reunions do, but so does, normally, the whole alumni trip. As a matter of fact, I would later try to spread it out a bit by doing some in the fall or, if there was a southern trip, doing it in the winter. But, yes, I had a very significant alumni trip that spring, some of which was behind me by that May date, but some of which was still ahead of me.

As a matter of fact, one I'll never forget is a horrible one here in the state of New Hampshire. It was the worst one of that year's alumni tour, where a very elderly group of alumni, extremely angry, just were in a totally rebellious mood. Billy King offered to come with me. Somehow he naively thought that a football hero of known conservative views expressing why he felt this way might be helpful. Actually, he was booed off the stage, and I really got very angry at that touring to the alumni for the treatment they gave to Billy King. It was a very, very unpleasant occasion.

FANELLI: John, obviously the actions you took at Dartmouth in May 1970 had an immediate salutary effect on the academic environment here and permitted the institution to continue the teaching/learning process, in contrast to what you noted happened at other places. Do you believe that, as a result of how you handled that crisis, the faculty's and students' esteem for you was strengthened, and that, at least in the case of the faculty, that strengthened regard was helpful to you for a number of years?

KEMENY: Yes, I do believe that. Though I think the big... On the other hand, a significant fraction of the faculty knew me well. Obviously all not agreed with me, but I think, therefore, the answer is yes but it was less important there. But I think that had a great deal to do with my relation with students for years to come. Also, in a way, it signaled the end of the really horrible radical events that happened on campus. We never again had a serious one after that.
I have to record one incident, though. This was the following fall when I would have my last meeting with the SDS, the Students for a Democratic Society, who sort of led nationally the big campus protests, particularly the protest against the war in Vietnam. They called on me. By that time we were at the president's house. It was raining quite badly, and I thought maybe I could make the discussion shorter if I went out to meet them, if we sort of met just outside the door. I thought the rain would make the discussion shorter. However, Jean did not know who these poor students were who were getting soaking wet, so she came out and greeted them as long-lost friends and invited them into the house. Not only that, invited them down to the room downstairs, which is a lovely room which we had used for student parties on many occasions.

It was so damp and cold, she decided it was time to build a fire, which we had actually done in some other fireplaces in the president's house. The president's house has many fireplaces, though this was the loveliest one. Wood was ready. I'm a good builder of fires, and I built it. I made one mistake. All the other fires I had built I carefully checked and the flue was open. I did not know that this fireplace was so huge that there were strict orders to the staff always to keep that one closed in between fires. It's an enormous fireplace, so a large quantity of smoke….

End of Tape 5, Side A
Beginning of Tape 5, Side B

KEMENY: All of us had tears running down our cheeks from the smoke, and the unforgettable moment is Jean yelling at the top of her voice, "No, we're not doing this intentionally. We're not trying to smoke you out of the house." Because everybody broke out madly laughing, and by the time we were through laughing and crying, it was very hard to have a confrontation. But Jean and I would never forget the time we smoked the SDS out of the house.

FANELLI: Obviously, John, that was not a planned meeting, it was something they just came to the house for that?

KEMENY: Well, it was planned on their part but not on my part. I mean, they just showed up. I think that was a typical tactic to make some demands, of I forget what nature, on the president.

FANELLI: Did you feel, having gotten through that month and the next one fairly safely, that from here on in it was all going to be fairly easy?

KEMENY: No, but I certainly felt that having handled that quite successfully, that as far as the issue that most presidents were worried about in those days, namely the student protests, that was behind us.
FANELLI: I remember you were saying in your report that you thought coeducation was going to be the…

KEMENY: The biggest issue. And by the next year, I would be right.

FANELLI: Maybe we should go into coeducation, unless you want to say some more about the May events.

KEMENY: No. I think I've said it. Perhaps the only other thing is that I would meet students who went through that ten years later, and they would still say that it was the most remarkable and unforgettable memory they had of their entire college education.

FANELLI: John, in your 1975 five-year report, you wrote, and I quote, "Coeducation was an issue on which men of good will who deeply loved the college could hold diametrically opposite views and firmly believe that they were right. They could and they did." You also said that, although the faculty was nearly ten-to-one in favor of coeducation, there was a vocal minority of students opposed to it and a rather marked division of opinion among alumni, with the majority of those in the older classes opposed. As you said in that report, in the early 1970s, coeducation was potentially, and I'm quoting, "the most divisive issue facing the college."

In our last interview, you spoke about your membership as a faculty member on the special Committee on Coeducation in 1969 and your surprise when, on a Saturday morning in mid-December, you were asked to make a report on behalf of the committee to the alumni council. You felt certain that your personal advocacy of coeducation on that occasion would surely have torpedoed any chance you might have had to be chosen as the thirteenth president of the college. Fortunately, that didn't happen, so one can perhaps conclude that there were enough members of the board of trustees who at least were willing to approach the subject with an open mind.

This is such a broad subject, John, that it's difficult for me to suggest where you should begin talking about it. You wrote quite a bit about it in your 1975 report, and it might be helpful if I quoted two short passages from that document and ask you to expand on them during the course of your remarks. The passages are these:

"After all the arguments had been mustered on both sides, and all the constituencies had been heard from, the decision was up to the board of trustees. A special meeting of the board was called for Saturday-Sunday, November 20-21, 1971. This was the most remarkable meeting of the board of trustees I have had the privilege to attend, and I deeply regret that we did not tape record the session to make it available to future Dartmouth historians."
Then another passage:

"The most fascinating part of the board's discussion at that meeting centered on the question of the role of women in future American society. Several trustees expressed the conviction that women would play an increasingly important role in leadership positions in the country. Therefore, they argued, Dartmouth, which had traditionally prided itself on the training of leaders, should train women as well as men for leadership roles."

That's the end of the quote. It would indeed have been fascinating to have a tape of that meeting of the board. Perhaps you can make up for that by recounting your recollections of that meeting and any other aspects of the question that you think would be….

KEMENY: Yes. That meeting was called at the October board of trustees meeting. Coeducation was on the agenda, and the board decided it was too big an issue to try to decide it as one of many issues at a crowded meeting. So the meeting was called on roughly one-month notice, in spite of which, every single trustee showed up. I mean, all sixteen, including the governor of the state of New Hampshire, who at that time was Walter Peterson ['47], an alumnus of the college. We met all day Saturday and the ground rule we agreed to early was that all of Saturday would be devoted to discussing issues without any votes. Then on Sunday morning we would start voting.

There were actually two issues before the board since my proposal for the implementation of coeducation was to couple it with the year-round operation. The reason for that was the following dilemma: there were… Let me just speak about the alumni. There were of course a significant number of alumni, and certainly a majority of the older classes, who were opposed to coeducation in any form of it. There was a second quite large group who, while they were not in favor of coeducation, were at least willing to accept it but were violently opposed to any significant reduction in the number of men at Dartmouth College. The board of trustees held very strongly, as did I, that a large increase in the size of the college would change it to a different kind of institution and a less good one. Therefore, we had what appeared to be an impossible dilemma. How one could add a significant number of women, not reduce the number of men by any sizable amount, and yet not increase the size of the college.

The proposed solution was a plan for year-round operation. By adding a summer quarter to the three terms we already had, you could accommodate a larger number of students on campus than before without either having to engage in a large building program or having more than the usual number on campus at any given time, a plan that would indeed work out well.
It turned out, actually, during the discussions that all the trustees liked the plan for year-round operation, even those who would end up being strongly opposed to coeducation. So the two issues were separated, and the board would eventually vote first on year-round operation and would approve that unanimously.

I mention this fact only to say that although there were two issues being debated, for all practical purposes, only one issue was being debated, namely coeducation. There, the situation was complicated. The faculty had come out overwhelmingly in favor of it. The final poll of students was 74% in favor and 26% opposed. Twenty-six % is a large minority, and many of those were violently opposed.

Incidentally, one interesting incident on that. I would be urged even by one member of the administration, of whom I'll have more to say at another time, that I was misreading the students' sentiment, that while there was some early sentiment in favor of coeducation, it had switched. And the students were insisting on an up-to-date poll of the student body, particularly a few fraternities who would come in and argue again and again that I must be wrong when I said that students favored coeducation since everybody they knew were opposed to it. I would learn a great deal more about that. I'm not at all saying that they were telling an untruth. It was probably true that everybody they knew were opposed to coeducation because they belonged to the same social group, talked it all over, and reached the same opinion jointly, just as you would find other students who would say that everybody they knew were in favor.

Emotions were running terribly high, so we had to have marshals watching polling places, and we would have a more than 90% turnout of students, which is remarkable, in that final survey. And they turned out to be 74% pro and 26% against. So this particular administrator and those fraternity groups were wrong in that it was the people they knew but they were not representative of the student body.

The most complicated issue facing the board concerns the view of alumni, and here we actually paid a quite large sum of money to retain Oliver Quayle [Oliver A. Quayle, III '42], an alumnus of the college and a distinguished expert on polling people. What he advised us was that paper ballots don't help, to pick a carefully selected stratified sample of the alumni and have in-depth personal interviews to be sure they understood the questions and were answering the same questions. They ended up being hour and a half interviews covering many topics that the board was interested in, but roughly half of the total questionnaire was on coeducation. This was eventually written up and printed and distributed, so copies of that are available.
It was a 3% stratified sample, which meant it's 3% of the alumni body picked at random, but picked to be representative both geographically and by classes. Not necessarily by every class, but by groups of classes. Because we were quite certain that the views would differ. The classes in the '20s, as we found out, would vote quite differently from the classes in the ‘40s and the classes in the ‘60s. Again and again people would accuse us later on that there was something wrong with the sample because they were not included in it, which is not surprising, it was a 3% sample. As a believer both in statistics and in Ollie Quayle, twice at large appearances in Spaulding Auditorium when there were several hundred alumni present, I said, "All right. Let's put it to a test." I asked how many of them had been in the sample, and each time the number came out remarkably close to 3% of those present.

I have every reason to believe that that survey was accurate. What it showed was, let's see, roughly 60% who would accept some form of education of women at Dartmouth, though typically they would have preferred having a women's college across the river; 40% who would accept no form of this. At least half of that 40% were absolutely violently opposed to the thought of coeducation. And certainly a large majority opposed to full coeducation. Therefore, it would be one of the issues even if we admitted women… We chose several routes to go, whether to try to start a sister institution or some other compromise of that sort, or whether to go for full coeducation. It was a very complex issue and all of these were discussed.

The chairman, who was Charlie Zimmerman then, made very, very sure that everyone had ample opportunity to speak on every issue, and all trustees participated in a very, very active way in the discussions. Just to tell you how it went, I went home that evening and told Jean that I do not have the votes necessary for coeducation.

FANELLI: So there must have been a number of trustees that had spoken up, that had made clear their opposition.

KEMENY: Their opposition, and not enough of them had made clear… The really pros and cons were discussed so well that my reading was that I would not get a majority vote in favor of coeducation. Frankly, I can say this here, it was only one of two occasions in more than eleven years where I came close to resigning from the presidency. We'll talk about the other one at another time. I never threatened to resign. That's a very bad strategy, but frankly, I had committed myself publicly as personally favoring coeducation so strongly that if the board had turned it down completely, I would really have had no option but to resign.

FANELLI: John, for my own mind to be clear, and for the listener, when you say that you didn't have the votes for coeducation, are you using coeducation in the specific
sense of both men and women at one college? Or were you thinking in the broad sense, an associated school or something?

KEMENY: Well, possibly for a completely separate women's college near here, but in any form that's at least close to what I would consider coeducation, I felt the votes were not there. I wasn't even sure of any form of it. I remember Jean then said, well, why didn't I write the names down in three columns? She said write them in two columns. I said, "Let me put it in three: yes, maybe, no." There was a short list of definite yeses, a fair list of maybes, and a quite long list of nos. I didn't see how to put together a majority out of that. Jean looked at the list and said, "Well, here is one name you're wrong on," and she pointed to the name of Lloyd Brace, whom I had in the no column.

FANELLI: How did she know that?

KEMENY: That's what I asked her, "How would you know that?" A conservative Boston Brahmin and a traditionalist from a much older class. I was just sure he would be no. Jean said, "Don't you remember when he and his wife sat in our living room and recounted to us the experiences of his daughter (who became, if my memory's right, the first woman surgeon at Mass General) and the degree of discrimination that she had gone through at every state, starting with medical school." This goes far enough back that even when she was in medical school, there were very few women in medical school. So starting from there, and then when she elected surgery and trying to become a surgeon at one of the best hospitals in the country. He told at great length the incredible amount of discrimination she had to go through. She said, "Just the way he told that story, I'm sure he's going to be in favor of coeducation." I'd even forgotten the stories till Jean reminded me. I then said, "I hope you're right on that because if Lloyd Brace should by any chance come out in favor of coeducation, he's so highly respected by the board that he would swing a great many of the maybes." Of course, Jean turned out to be absolutely right on that particular issue.

FANELLI: Were there a lot of people in the maybe column?

KEMENY: Yes, but as I remember, my no column was the longest. I sort of visually remember a short list of yeses, a longer list of maybes, and no being significantly the longest list.

The next morning, we quickly got the issue of year-round operation out of the way, and then we seriously started talking about coeducation. Some trustees just took an absolutely firm stand against coeducation on the grounds that it would fundamentally change the nature of the institution. Indeed, it was Lloyd Brace who held a key speech along the lines that I mentioned in my five-year report, that while he once favored an all-male institution, the reasons for it had disappeared.
I'm sure I don't remember his words well enough, but the essential argument was that once you could argue it was a man's world and men should train together for a man's world, but the conditions had changed. We did indeed have a long [inaudible] together, a strong stance. No, this was not temporary, that it is here and women would increasingly play leadership roles in society, and therefore he felt that the very reasons that once argued in favor of having an all-male institution now argued against having an all-male institution, because men are not being trained for the world that they would actually work in. Therefore, he felt that it was essential for Dartmouth to go coeducational. As I indicated, till that morning I just had no indication that that's how he felt on coeducation. Several other trustees did speak up there, and the next dangerous moment came when the chairman suggested… After a very long discussion, it became clear that there was going to be a majority in favor of coeducation.

Incidentally, also during that time, various sort of halfway measures, like building a woman's college here, were reasonably quickly dismissed, even with those who were opposed to it. They said, "Look. That's almost worse than going full coeducation." So the halfway measures, no one advocated the halfway measures. They felt one should make a clear decision of it.

Then the next dangerous moment was that the chairman suggested that perhaps what we should do is announce now that we are going coed, but that we're going coed two years from now. I saw a number of trustees looking sort of relieved by that possibility. I personally thought that was a disaster, and I was trying to muster my arguments when the governor spoke up. He had participated in the discussions before, though less than most trustees. The governor always felt that he was sort of an accidental trustee. Still, he was a Dartmouth alumnus and felt very deeply about it.

FANELLI: When he had spoken before, had he been generally in favor?

KEMENY: He had been generally in favor of coeducation, not violently so. I think his position was that it was a very difficult issue for him, but on balance, he would vote in favor of coeducation. On this issue, he took a terribly strong stand and, I feel, swayed the board. It was the only case that I remember where a governor played a terribly important role during my term in office, as a trustee. He said, as he had said previously, he would vote for coeducation, but he was not violently for it. However, all his political experience taught him that, if you're going to make an unpopular move, make it as quickly as possible and do not give the opposition two years to muster all their forces to try to get the decision reversed. He was so persuasive on that issue that he single-handedly changed the board's mind on that one issue. So I'm deeply grateful to Walter Peterson for that.
FANELLI: When that had been proposed, apparently, as you say, there was a number of people who would have been pushing for it.

KEMENY: But at least those who had made up their mind to vote for coeducation found it terribly tempting sort of to have a two-year delay. Finally, the time came to vote, and I want to record the vote here. All that would be announced later on, and it's a policy we followed that the votes were announced either as unanimous or by majority only or passed by an overwhelming majority. This one would be announced as by an overwhelming majority. Actually, what happened was that the vote that counted was twelve in favor and four opposed.

Then one of the ones who opposed said, well, he was opposed but it really would be better for the board if they made the vote unanimous, as long as it had to happen, and made an attempt and said he would be willing to switch his vote. And one other member was willing to switch his vote. But two of the trustees just said absolutely no, and therefore I guess the final vote is recorded as fourteen-to-two. Though, in fact, it was twelve to four with two being willing, for the sake of unanimity, to switch.

Still, twelve to four, remember it's a board that's all male; with my exception, all Dartmouth alumni; and it was a quite elderly board. The big change in the board occurs later. Then they had a quite elderly board. I think to get a twelve-to-four vote in favor of that most radical change was remarkable.

FANELLI: What happened after that, John? The meeting was on Sunday, right?

KEMENY: This was on Sunday.

FANELLI: And then did everybody go home, or what?

KEMENY: Everybody went home except Charlie Zimmerman and I, and we were left with drafting a statement. It had been agreed that I would go on radio especially to announce it to the campus. I'm told afterwards that students were furious at me because — I know, for example, it was dinnertime, and they had the loudspeakers on playing my statement in Thayer Hall, so a great many students were listening to it in Thayer Hall — that I first talked about year-round operation, which was not what they wanted to hear. I guess I built it up a bit dramatically.

One of my favorite souvenirs, which the Dartmouth presented me years later, was the front page of Monday's Dartmouth. There are two stories on it. The second story is that Dartmouth... That's after they finished an undefeated season, winning the Ivy championship, but actually in an undefeated season. At least, an Ivy championship. No, the undefeated season, I think, was a year earlier, but won the Ivy championship in an upset, I guess, the previous Saturday, which normally
would be banner headline in the *Dartmouth*. But it’s a headline on the bottom part of the page, and the whole rest of the front page deals with the coeducation decision. It's also one of the best laid-out front pages I've seen in the *Dartmouth*. So it was a story that would even put an Ivy football championship into second place.

I had arranged to have a meeting of senior administrators at Minary, subject to cancellation if the vote went the wrong way. We went over to Minary a week later and spent 48 hours straight trying to go through all the things that we needed to get ready for coeducation. And I think that was very helpful.

I might mention here, at that time, I had read earlier that fall that Ruth Adams, then president of Wellesley College, had announced that she would step down the following June. After I read that in the paper, I picked up the phone. I knew Ruth well and was very fond of her and admired her greatly. I told her more or less would she please not accept another job until after the November trustee meeting, that I was in no position to offer her a job unless the decision went that way. What my concern was, as I looked around amongst the senior administrators of the college, not a single one of us had ever been an administrator at a coeducational institution. I knew a number of horror stories at Yale and Princeton where a group of men decided what it is that women would want, the famous incident of furnishing a new dormitory at Princeton all in feminine furniture, and the women physically throwing all the furniture out the window and demanding the same furniture the men had in their rooms.

I was fortunate that Ruth did accept and would come here for five years as a vice president of Dartmouth College. During those years, quietly and without public show, she gave us invaluable advice on any number of issues, and most importantly, prevented us from making any number of mistakes we would otherwise have made.

[Pause]

**FANELLI:** John, since you mentioned about Princeton's experience, I remember that the board had a confidential report from Cresap, McCormick & Paget regarding the Princeton and Yale experiences.

**KEMENY:** Yes. Let's see, I should sometime talk about Cresap, McCormick & Paget because that's an interesting item in itself, but it doesn't fit in here. They were, at that time, working for us as consultants. That's an interesting story I would like to talk about as to how that came about. Since they were already working for the college as consultants, they were asked to do two things. First of all, to review our financial projections, and secondly, to conduct some interviews at Princeton
and Yale to find out what their experience had been with coeducation. That turned out to be a most useful and helpful report.

They concluded… Several board members were quite skeptical at the relatively low net cost I was placing on going coed, having heard the many millions that Princeton and Yale had to spend. Year-round operation made all the difference in the world. I think we would eventually report to the board that the college's net costs increased by something like $250,000 a year, which was not a negligible sum, but still, the budget even then was around $50 million. It certainly was not a huge sum. I mean, it's like half a percent of the total budget. The reason it was not higher than that… Whatever the number turned out to be, incidentally, fell well within the range that Cresap, McCormick & Paget came up with. It certainly was a very modest cost compared to what Princeton and Yale experienced.

The major factor in that was that we did not have to engage in a huge building program. We did of course have to hire additional faculty for the additional students, but we also got additional tuition revenue. Because with year-round operation, the total number of students present during the year was higher.

**FANELLI:** John, although as you say in your five-year report, most of the anticipated problems with coeducation never materialized, it is true that for a considerable period the life of many women students at Dartmouth was less than ideal, primarily because of the attitudes and behavior toward women students by a minority of male undergraduates that you had mentioned earlier. Some of those actions by men received fairly wide publicity and may have deterred some able women from coming to Dartmouth. Looking back, how would you assess that problem? And could the college have taken any action to change that situation in the early years of coeducation so that it did not become so much of a problem later?

**KEMENY:** Yes. Certainly one has to return to that 26% of male students who had voted against coeducation. Not necessarily all of them, but some non-negligible fraction of those really felt violently against coeducation, and they were centered in a small number of fraternities, perhaps five. Several of them took it on as sort of a mission to make life miserable for women students when they first arrived, in a wide variety of different ways, from verbal abuse to sort of raids on women's dormitories and just by doing everything possible that a minority of students can do to try to make the women feel unwelcome.

I don't know what the college could have done, except to clamp down on those fraternities. In this I was very greatly handicapped, and it would take me a while to realize that, in effect, my efforts were sabotaged by a member of the administration. Carroll Brewster [Carrol W. Brewster ‘75A] was then dean of the
college, which is the chief student officer at Dartmouth. He had not been pro coeducation.

**End of Tape 5, Side B**
**Beginning of Tape 6, Side A**

KEMENY: He's the officer concerning whom I was most hurt by the policy the board had laid down that I could not dismiss someone during my first year in office. I would certainly have done so if it had been easier then. He had only been at Dartmouth College roughly six months. It's one of the few things I blame John Dickey for. I think John was so hurt and upset by the occupation of Parkhurst Hall that he felt very strongly he needed a strong student affairs officer. Probably one of the things that appealed to him about Carroll Brewster was that Carroll was a lawyer by training. John, I'm sure, was greatly worried about future incidents like that. I don't know this for a fact, but I assume he must have felt that someone with Carroll's training would be useful in the office.

It was clear very early that Carroll and I would not see eye-to-eye at all on what relations should be with students. I was stopped from dismissing him in the first year, but it would have been easy for me to say, "Look. I'm sorry. You were picked by a previous president. I want to pick my own dean of the college." After a whole year has passed, it was vastly more difficult to do that. Not to mention, by that time we were in the midst of the coed argument, and it made it harder. It was Carroll who came to me and claimed that the student sentiment had swung against coeducation, which is a good indication of the fact that Carroll really had good relations with a minority of the students and really did not know what the average student felt. That minority tended to be in fraternities, and not necessarily in the better fraternities. I would, unfortunately too late, find out that Carroll loved spending substantial amounts of times at very rowdy fraternity parties and would often actively participate in some of the anti-women songs and remarks that were made there. When the chief student officer lets it go by in his presence, he's sending a signal to the student body.

The worst incident was when a fraternity took a truly outrageous set of steps, raiding a woman's dormitory, waking them up in the middle of the night, and doing all kinds of outrageous acts; I forget the details of them. Carroll happened to be out of town, and therefore I went to Ralph Manuel ['58 TU '59], who was dean of freshmen, as the next highest-ranking student officer, to say that some punishment had to be taken. He heard the case—this was, let's say, in the fall—and promptly put the fraternity on social probation for the rest of the year, which is a very severe penalty, which meant for almost an entire academic year they could not have any parties. After all, that is one of the major purposes of a fraternity. And Carroll got back into town and reversed the action.
My relations, we’ll have to talk about at that point, would go downhill from there. As to what the college could have done, certainly we should have taken much stronger steps, not to change students' beliefs but to say that beliefs are one thing, outrageous actions are another thing. And we should certainly have clamped down on those outrageous actions, but it was terribly difficult to do that with the dean of the college.

Somewhere very late in his term, the Hums became a center for anti-women action. Carroll was one of the three judges. Traditionally, the dean of the college is. I think by something like a two-to-one vote, including the dean of the college, first prize was awarded to that fraternity that had composed and sung the rather notorious song whose title was "Our Cohogs" and was a vicious anti-women song.

FANELLI: That's a testimony, in a way, to the strength of the women that they endured that and survived.

KEMENY: Yes. I was expecting that for two or three years there would be this problem, though not quite the viciousness of it. But what I had hoped was that, when the students who had been here—there was a group of students here who had come to Dartmouth knowing it was an all-male school and hadn't bargained on finishing it with women present—that once they graduated, the problem would disappear. I had not yet learned enough about the self-perpetuating nature of beliefs and attitudes in fraternities, because as a new group of students came in and joined those fraternities, they were indoctrinated with some of the same beliefs. So, although time did cure the problem, it took much longer to cure it, because some of those attitudes were passed on from one generation of fraternity members to the next generation.

Still, throughout that period, I would for several years always talk to a group of women seniors to get their reading. Every time they would say that things were much better in their senior year than when they first came here, so things steadily improved. But I would say it was a good six to possibly even eight years before I would say the worst problems were over.

FANELLI: Was there also, with respect to Carroll Brewster, the fact that one of the trustees was very close to him?

KEMENY: Do you want me to get to the whole Carroll Brewster problem?

FANELLI: I think maybe that would be….

KEMENY: Since, really, it's inextricably connected with coeducation—coeducation and fraternities, where he would undercut me continually. It would be later Jean learned a great deal indirectly, partly through his wife, who was a terribly nice
person, about Carroll's general attitude towards women. I mean, a small thing that Jean happened to hear. In entertaining colleagues from other Ivy institutions, invariably his wife… She cooked the whole dinner and then was sent into the kitchen. She was not allowed to participate in the discussions, in their own home. And in the 1970s, that was somewhat not the normal attitude. I don't wish to be an amateur psychiatrist, but Jean always felt that Carroll had some sort of problems on this issue.

FANELLI: I think his wife was a psychiatric counselor, and maybe that was what enabled her to stay…

KEMENY: My relations became increasingly worse, and in particular, I started getting from some of the trustees news of what was going on from campus, which clearly must have come from Carroll Brewster, (a) because that's not what was happening on campus, as was demonstrable, and secondly, I knew that Carroll held those beliefs. It was a relatively small group of trustees, primarily three of them. Unfortunately, we had a change in the chairmanship of the board. Bill Andres [F. William “Bill” Andres ‘29] would take over as chairman, and one of the trustees Carroll was very close to was Bill Andres. Bill just thought the world of Carroll Brewster. And while Bill also thought very highly of me, he had this divided feeling and, on this issue, just absolutely did not understand why I didn't adore Carroll Brewster the same way that Bill did.

Things got to the point where… No, I'm getting a little ahead of myself. I did tell Carroll that, look, if he had complaints, he should come to me. If he feels that I'm wrong, he can also go to the full board. But to go privately to individual trustees is an unacceptable action by a senior member of the administration. I would have taken that position with respect to any administrator. I said if he wanted to raise a complaint with the board, I would step out of the room and allow him to do that. That's to the full board, and in a way, that's public and his own career is on the line then. But to speak privately to individual trustees is something no president can tolerate. Also, I was somewhat shocked that these trustees did not see anything wrong in Carroll doing this.

I forget what the final incident was. It was really a whole series of events. I'm sure it was one of several extreme things that finally was too much for me, and I called Carroll in and fired him. He was quite shocked by this and promptly went to the chairman of the board. The chairman of the board, in effect, challenged my right to fire a member of the administration.

FANELLI: At this time, this was Bill Andres.

KEMENY: This was Bill Andres, yes. A very uncomfortable period came then. Incidentally, as I mentioned earlier, there were only two occasions during my whole presidency
when there was a chance I might resign. The other one is part of this story. If the board had not supported me on this issue, again I would have had no choice. So the coeducation vote and the vote on the president's power to fire were the only two issues that came up in more than eleven years where I'd even contemplated the thought of resigning.

What happened now was extremely uncomfortable because there would be all kinds of private huddles of groups of trustees, arranged by the chairman, that I was excluded of. Some trustees who didn't like this would tell me about it, and they felt very uncomfortable about it. Normally, what one does is one goes and complains to the chairman, but the chairman was part of it, and that made it all very difficult. It stretched out for several months, possibly a year, and it was a very uncomfortable time.

FANELLI: Wasn't that the time when Ralph Lazarus ['35] played an important role? As I recall—it may have been in connection with another thing—but Ralph complained quite strongly at one meeting about rump groups of trustees, rump meetings of trustees taking place without other people being notified.

KEMENY: Yes. I believe you are right on that. I know another trustee who played a very major role in this was Bill Morton [William H. “Bill” Morton ‘32]. As a matter of fact, it was a memorable meeting. When things were coming to a head, Bill Morton asked if he could call on me privately. He was in the house for no more than five minutes. He said that he thought that what was going on on the board of trustees was totally unacceptable, and heaven only knows, Bill has served on so many different boards in his life, he knew what was acceptable by board members and what wasn't. He wanted me to know the following: He would support me on this issue because on principle he felt I was right and the board was wrong. But he wanted to warn me that he felt equally strongly about the board's right, when people are wrong, to fire them. He said he'd even support me when I made my first major mistake, and possibly the second one, but when I made my third one, he would make the motion to get me fired by the board. Would I accept or not accept? I said, "Absolutely, Bill, I accept," at which point he stood up and walked out and then played a role and I gather that Ralph….

Part of the trouble also was that even at board meetings I was being excused a great deal more than it is reasonable to excuse the president. I mean, I would later on insist—something I should have done earlier—that the president is a full member of the board of trustees, and he can only be excused from a board meeting if what the board is discussing is whether to fire the president, or to evaluate the president, or possibly the president's salary. But on any other issue, the president has to be allowed to be present as any other trustee. The only time that was violated was during this period.
So it all came down to a rather horrendous showdown. The trustees, when it came close to a showdown, did do their homework. I remember, for example, Dave Smith [David Parkhurst “Dave” Smith ‘35], who started out being strongly pro-Carroll Brewster and not understanding. Perhaps as the West Coast trustee it was hardest for him to get up-to-date news. But when the final showdown meeting came, before then he decided he really owed it to me to find out the facts. I don't know whom he talked to, but he said he conducted his own private investigation. That's a trustee's not just privilege but, in a way, responsibility. Dave said at the end of it that by the time he was through with that, he had concluded that I not only had been right for firing Carroll Brewster, but if I hadn't fired Carroll Brewster, I should have been fired. He came full circle on it and was quite shocked about whatever it is that he discovered through his own private investigations.

Carroll was sort of a charming person.

FANELLI: He was. I was going to mention that he must have fooled a great many people because I was one of the people he fooled. I think you perhaps remember, I came to you once. He had gotten me off and said that he was despondent, he was going to resign, or something, because you would not speak to him, or something. I think I asked you if you would—or suggested to you—that you call him in and do something, or mention it in a meeting or something, a public meeting. You did that, and I've never forgotten that. You knew a great deal, obviously more than I knew, about why you shouldn't have done that, but you did it anyway, which I remember very well. He could fool people. I liked him as a person, without knowing any of the stuff that was going on. I really thought very, very highly of his wife. As you said, Mary was a wonderful person.

KEMENY: His wife Mary was one of the nicest and most intelligent people in the world, so certainly none of this had anything to do with his wife.

Incidentally, there were some significant number of faculty members who came to the point where they really strongly disliked Carroll Brewster.

[Tape off, then resumes]

Several faculty members would get to the point where they were absolutely violent on the subject of Carroll Brewster because they had become aware of a number of things that he had done and then said quite other things. They felt he actually lied about a great many of his actions. Besides, some of them also visited fraternities and would see the kind of manner in which he behaved in fraternity meetings.
FANELLI:  John, just to clear up one point. Prior to this whole question coming up, obviously he was there before you became president.

KEMENY:  Yes.

FANELLI:  Wasn't it spelled out quite clearly what your powers were for firing senior administration, after the first meeting?

KEMENY:  Apparently, this had never been put into writing. At least that's what I would be told.

FANELLI:  I remember at one trustee meeting, it was then …

KEMENY:  Well, this would be an outcome of this. I'm going to mention it in a moment. That was an outcome of the Carroll Brewster case. Apparently, it had never been codified; it was just assumed. But I had taken it for granted. I knew that in some sense or other the trustees would want to have a say-so on my appointing somebody new to a senior position. I'd always assumed, other than that one-year ban they put on me, that the president had the power… It was even implicit on what Lloyd Brace said to me when I was hired, that there was a one-year limit on it, but at the end of one year, I could fire anybody I wanted to. That's what I'd always taken for granted. It's normally true in any organization, that the chief executive officer can fire members of his administration. I mean, the whole point is, it is his administration and he is the one who is going to be held responsible for that action.

It finally came down to a showdown. I think at the end, if my memory is right, only three trustees voted against the motion. But it spelled out, in the strongest possible terms, which would be a great help to future presidents of the college, that—first, it addressed hiring and that the president could hire administrators up to but not including roughly the vice presidential level. It's carefully spelled out. But even there, it is the president who would nominate, but the trustees have to approve it. In effect, the trustees couldn't pick somebody whom the president didn't want, but the trustees could turn down a nomination of the president, which is perfectly reasonable. Then there's a simple statement after it that there are no limits to the power of the president to fire an administrator. The majority of the board just persuaded the others that otherwise the president cannot function, which is absolutely true. Imagine what would happen if you had a senior administrator you couldn't get along with, you disagreed with what he was doing, he was almost openly disobeying your commands, but by being protected by the board of trustees, you can't fire him. You've got chaos.

FANELLI:  I imagine Bill Morton might have been helpful in that situation.
KEMENY: Absolutely. I mean, here is where it helped. It is sort of interesting that those who were on the other side tended to be lawyers, or certainly not the men who played major roles in business or industry, because the latter would be the ones who had served on a great many boards and understood the division of responsibilities between the chief executive officer and the board of directors. It's those who really hadn't had those experiences who didn't understand that.

It started as an issue over whether Carroll Brewster would be fired, but it really became a much more fundamental issue. At least the then chairman just could not understand the issue is the only way I can put it, that whether or not I was right on Carroll Brewster, that if an officer can be protected from being fired by the board of trustees, you've created a totally untenable situation for the chief executive.

FANELLI: John, my memory is bad now on what happened in what year.

KEMENY: I have trouble with dates also.

FANELLI: That's all right. I'm just asking this question about—I remember that Bill Andres's term as chairman was going to expire or something, and then there was an extraordinary kind of action taken by the board to extend it for another two years.

KEMENY: Yes. And the board had voted in principle... Actually, I understand, until the late '60s, the president chaired the board of trustees. I think that's a bad system, because the president has to do a great deal of the talking, and I feel very uncomfortable doing that when I'm in the chair. Besides of that, there are many occasions when you're grateful to have a spokesman for the board who is other than the president. I gather John Dickey asked that there should be a chairman primarily for the purpose of conducting a search for his successor, and that's when Lloyd Brace became chairman of the board.

I now remember, Lloyd actually asked me after I took office, would I like to assume chairmanship of the board, and I said, "Why would I want to do that?" I was quite surprised. Then he explained that that used to be the tradition. I said if the board didn't mind, I would actually prefer not chairing it because I thought it was a bad arrangement. But Lloyd stepped down from the chairmanship after the search was over, let me guess in '71, and Charlie Zimmerman, I think, was chairman. Yes, because he had served three years then, and he felt that's as long as someone should serve. The board sort of had an informal agreement that they would have rotating chairmen, with chairmen serving no more than three years. Charlie Zimmerman then became chairman, but he only had two years left on the board, so he only served two years. So that must have been '71 to '73. Bill Andres was elected for a three-year term, but this rather extraordinary action was taken of extending that by two years.
FANELLI: I raised that simply because I wondered whether it had anything to do with the Carroll Brewster thing.

KEMENY: I now don't remember my dates well enough. It may very well have.

FANELLI: John, you mentioned earlier the Dartmouth Plan and the fact that it was absolutely key to having coeducation passed. Then in later years, even though it was general consensus….

KEMENY: Yes. Incidentally, I should give credit on the Dartmouth Plan. It was really two of us. I should say something about how that came about, year-round operation, which would later be called the Dartmouth Plan. Tom Vargish [Thomas “Tom” Vargish] was representative of the humanities division on that trustee coeducation committee. When we realized we were heading for an impasse over the dilemma I had earlier described, we started trying to figure out the way of solving the problem, and it was, in effect, Tom and I who cooked up the idea of year-round operation. Though the details of it I asked the faculty committee to work out, and it was a faculty committee chaired by Hans Penner who had worked it out. Then there would be another big blowup. The faculty still wasn't happy about some of the details on it, so I had to appoint a crash committee later on that Charlie Wood [Charles T. “Charlie” Wood] chaired.

FANELLI: Right. That was CYRO [Committee on Year-Round Operations].

KEMENY: Yes, right. Which had some administrators on it also. It represented various constituencies to try to resolve some issues that were still left. That had an unfortunate ending in that they came in with an almost unanimous report with the chairman dissenting. [Chuckles] Charlie took it gracefully. But that was the plan. To give full credit, Tom Vargish and I had the key idea but no more than that. The two committees contributed an enormous amount to coming up with a really good plan.

FANELLI: There were many, many permutations.

KEMENY: There were many, many permutations you could do, and one had to come up with a plan to which many people, particularly a large number of faculty members, contributed to the eventual plan.

FANELLI: What I was going to say was that, although coeducation couldn't have come about without that really, later, year-round operation itself became a question for controversy and discussion, and there were differences among the faculty about that.
KEMENY: Yes. Late in my presidency, we had one of these periodic reviews of the entire curriculum. Really relatively little in the way of change came up because somehow very soon the big issue became the calendar, either abolishing year-round operation or keeping year-round operation but going to a semester plan rather than a term plan.

FANELLI: You played a role in advocating not abandoning it.

KEMENY: Not abandoning it, certainly. And it would come to a vote during my final year as president when you're somewhat vulnerable. Incidentally, I was influenced in part by picking my date. I did not want to step down until that issue was resolved one way or the other.

I had a very pleasant surprise there in that there were huge debates on the semester versus quarter plan, though finally the vote was not close. People really thought that after the semester idea was defeated, they could get together a coalition of people who didn't like the quarter system or didn't like year-round operation. If you listen to the debate in the faculty meeting, which went on for several meetings, it certainly sounded as if they were going to muster a majority to abolish year-round operation, until it was agreed that you would have so many meetings for discussion, and then finally a meeting was called at which the final summary arguments would be, and votes would be taken. At that meeting, there was an absolutely record turnout. As a matter of fact, people kept looking around. Who are all these people they hadn't seen before? Who they were were the people who hated attending faculty meetings but happened to feel terribly strongly on this issue. The final vote was something like two-and-a-half-to-one in favor of keeping year-round operation. It wasn't at all close, and people were stunned by it. I was very pleased years later when the issue would come up again about possibly doing away with the summer term. The faculty again voted overwhelmingly against that.

So, yes, it would always be controversial, as would the semester versus quarter thing, which is controversial on every campus. On that one, each has its advantages. Actually, I'm not that opposed to a semester system rather than a quarter system, though I like the quarter system. But no one has been successful in getting year-round operation under a semester calendar. The two just don't go hand in hand. You have to sit down with a piece of paper to work out what goes wrong. But things go wrong with it, so, unfortunately, the two were rather coupled together. So, yes, it was controversial, but the faculty twice—once in my last year and once two or three years later—would vote overwhelmingly in favor of keeping year-round operation.

FANELLI: There was some division of sentiment by divisions, wasn't there?
KEMENY: Yes, particularly on the semester or the quarter situation. That goes back to the vote in the late ‘50s that we talked about, the first important committee I would serve on. It happened that the final vote at an extremely well attended faculty meeting, turned out to be precisely two-to-one. I don't mean roughly two-to-one. Somebody commented on it. There were exactly twice as many yeas as nays. The joke I think Frank Smallwood made afterwards was that that's very simple why it's two-to-one. It was the social sciences and the sciences voting against the humanities. Of course that can't be literally true. Actually, humanities is the largest division, so if they'd all voted against it, it couldn't happen two-to-one. But in first approximation, that was correct. The major sentiment for the longer terms comes out of the humanities, and understandably so, because they feel strongly their students should have time to think about the material and feel that a quarter plan is too short.

There's a related issue that came up very heavily in my last year as president. The other big difference between humanities and the other two divisions is that, particularly the science division but also many social science departments, build sequences of courses. Therefore, they are less troubled if ideas are too hard to absorb in ten weeks. You build them into two consecutive courses, where the first is a prerequisite to the other one. Then the problem disappears. For some reason I've never fully understood, humanists don't like to have prerequisites to anything. Maybe they're highly individualistic.

I even remember getting complaints from students once and talking to the English department just off the record on this issue. There is a very popular sophomore-junior level course on Shakespeare. There's an advanced Shakespeare course. But the introductory Shakespeare course was not a prerequisite to the advanced Shakespeare course. I once had a delegation of English majors, seniors, come to me very upset because they were looking forward as sort of crowning glory taking the advanced Shakespeare course, and the professor continually had to take time out to explain to the students who hadn't had the previous course things that anybody should know before they took an advanced Shakespeare course. I did ask some members of the English department. They said yes, that was a problem, but not as bad as having to have prerequisites, which they were strongly opposed to.

Humanists tend to have a different style of teaching and different way of looking at the classroom situation. It's perfectly understandable why a calendar that would help others might hurt them.

End of Tape 6, Side A
Beginning of Tape 6, Side B
I think it would be worth making some remarks of how I came to feel so strongly about coeducation. I'd certainly not always been in favor of it. I went to an all-male school, and I would even have an embarrassing incident. There was an occasion when I was a fairly young faculty member at Dartmouth where somehow coeducation came up, and I ended up being publicly on record as not favoring it. That was a very, very long time before I became president. Basically, my reasons for changing were partly those that... I mentioned Lloyd Brace speaking at that famous trustee meeting, that the world had changed and it was just wrong for men and women to have to study separately.

But also over the years, I had become convinced that for young men to spend four years of their life, eighteen to twenty-two, which are very important formative years of their life, in an all-male environment, particularly at a place as isolated as Hanover, New Hampshire, could have a strongly distorting effect on their lives. I talked to a number of alumni who would, when they got to know you well, tell you that, while in many ways they loved Dartmouth, Dartmouth had had a very negative impact on them as far as relations with women are concerned.

Let me hasten to say here that I do not primarily mean here homosexuality, though certainly there's always some of that present at an all-male, or even coeducational, institution. But simply never having learned how to have easy, friendly relations with women and being shy with them, or over-aggressive, or whatever, but not having normal relations with women. I've heard a huge number of those.

In addition to that, what happened to this campus in the late ‘60s, they were of course crazy times in many ways, but increasingly, men would not put up with seeing women just once a month for a long weekend, and a larger and larger fraction of the students started taking off for long road trips. The standard joke was that the weekend started Thursday afternoon and ended Monday noon, which was somewhat exaggerated, but there was a good deal of that present. In a very real sense, Dartmouth was losing its status as a residential college because such a large fraction of the student body just wasn't here for extended periods. I also strongly agreed with the argument so many students brought up that what they most hoped to achieve in coeducation was to be able to sit down with a girl on a Wednesday afternoon—Wednesday being when you didn't road trip—just have a Coke and just sit down and talk. I became convinced that that was an overwhelming factor, that certainly by the 1970s, young men would not want to live without having that kind of relationship to women.

I did also feel that there was a strong danger that we'd be turning out a generation of male chauvinist pigs who would not be able to work with women as equals in the professions. So for all of those reasons, I became convinced well before I became president that coeducation was absolutely necessary.
There is an interesting aftermath to that. I do believe that if Dartmouth had not gone coed, we would now be a second-rate educational institution. I picked up some indirect evidence for that because the institution in the Northeast that held out longest was Amherst College. Actually, if there was one institution that could hold out, it would be Amherst because, although their entering class was all male, because of the exchange arrangements in what's called the five-college system, they had women present in their classes, and men had the chance to go attend classes at Smith and Holyoke, two outstanding women's colleges. Therefore, there was much more opportunity for normal social life or even for seeing members of the opposite sex in class. Therefore, if any school could hold out, it would be Amherst.

In a thirty-college group, we share information about each other, and I found a startling fact that after Princeton and Yale went coed, but much more so after Dartmouth went coed and they became the last ones, the SAT scores of entering freshmen at Amherst just took an incredible nosedive. Actually, Amherst used to have amongst the highest SAT scores because most of the applicants, in a way, didn't know how small it was. It's a tiny school, or was a tiny school. So they would get about as many good applicants as Dartmouth did and took an entering class perhaps one-third the size of Dartmouth College's. Obviously, if Dartmouth took only the top third academically of what they normally admit, they would have fabulously high aptitude scores. Maybe it would be a less interesting class, but the aptitude scores would be very high. Amherst just lost that power to attract completely when they were the last of the all-male schools in the Northeast. If that happened at Amherst, I think it would have happened doubly so at Dartmouth because it was a much more isolated environment. That's why Amherst did eventually go coed. I was surprised when they did, but I'm glad they carried out the experiment for us and not us. I think five years later Dartmouth would have been in that position that we would have dropped out from amongst the ranks of the really good institutions.

On the other side, there's a combination of many factors, but certainly coeducation was an essential ingredient in that. Dartmouth used to be fourth in the pecking order in terms of percentage of applicants that actually accepted, after Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. Before the end of my administration, we passed both Yale and Princeton in that category. Not that the difference was very great, but we used to be substantially behind them, and we actually were getting a larger what is called yield than either Yale or Princeton. And it very well [inaudible]. We tended to take away more from them than they took away from us. So it certainly did a great deal to improve the attractiveness of Dartmouth to other institutions. I'm sure it was not the only factor; there were many other factors. But what I'm saying is, if we had not gone coed, there wouldn't have been a ghost of a chance of our rising to that position.
FANELLI: Are there other instances, besides Amherst, John, of places that held out? Certainly not in the Ivy League.

KEMENY: Not in the Northeast. I believe Wabash College is one of the few left.

FANELLI: That's where Thad…

KEMENY: Thad Seymour [Thaddeus “Thad” Seymour ‘49A] went, yes, and was a very successful president there. But I have trouble thinking of what else. There are some left, because I recently had a call, and I don’t remember. Yes, Washington and Lee in Virginia is now seriously thinking. Someone called me and we had a long telephone conversation with, I think, one of their trustees who was serving on a committee on the issue of coeducation. I'm sure there are isolated pockets, but there are very few left.

Of course, there are many women's colleges left. But there are arguments in favor of women's colleges remaining single-sex. Two sorts of arguments. First of all, sometimes it's argued that on all-male campuses, women are less likely to end up in key leadership positions, even after those institutions go coed. While at a women's institution, women fill all the leadership positions. That's one kind of argument, and there's a basis for that.

The second kind of argument is that while the outstanding male institutions that went coed have no difficulty attracting equally good women students, the female institutions that went coed had very serious trouble attracting good male students. Vassar is a very sad example, where even several years after they went coed, the quality of their male students was significantly weaker than the quality of their female students.

I'm not absolutely sure of what the reason for it is. In sort of anecdotal form that I can answer it, only that it's one kind of attitude when a father describes that his daughter is going to Dartmouth. It's a quite different kind of attitude when he has to explain that his son is going to Vassar. It's probably totally unfair, but it is a very real fact. Indeed, some of the women's institutions, some of the best to have held up, have done very well, certainly Wellesley, Smith, and Holyoke, just to pick three examples, or Bryn Mawr, are in excellent shape. They all, in one form or another, have made arrangements for exchange programs so that the campus is not totally all female, but their entering classes are totally female, and they only graduate women.

FANELLI: You had mentioned I think in our first interview that Jenny had come here from Yale.
KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: When she was at Yale, was that shortly after the year it had gone coed?

KEMENY: Yes, fairly shortly. Let's see. She would come here two years later. I would say perhaps they had been coed either two or three years when she entered there. She was extremely unhappy at Yale, as always personal issues do come into it, but some of it is relevant to the issue of things that were wrong at Yale with coeducation. And in that context, it might be worth telling.

It appears that Yale's commitment to go coed on the part of the faculty was much less overwhelming than it had been at Dartmouth. She and other women had bad experiences with faculty members, the likes of which I did not hear at Dartmouth. I mean, there were some incidents. The Dartmouth faculty members, out of what they thought was kindness, did idiotic things. Women got sick and tired of being asked in an English class, “What's the woman's point of view?” English class isn't so bad, but the joke used to be, “What's the woman's point of view on nuclear physics?”

But not malicious stories, and sure, there were occasionally… Whenever there are mixed sexes, there are occasionally accusations of sexual harassment. But no incident that compares with something that actually happened to Jennifer. She had a chemistry professor in a small class. There were twenty-four students, let's say, and the professor had to distribute lab manuals. He went around the room and put down twenty of them on individual desks and then left four on his desk in front of the class for the four women to pick up after class.

FANELLI: That's incredible.

KEMENY: Less outrageous sorts of things, but Jenny came to me very upset. She was experiencing some problems. Every time she had a problem, the advice she got from a doctor when she was in the infirmary, from her faculty advisor, and from one other faculty member that if she is experiencing stress, “Why do you have to go into a field…” (She had hoped to become a biologist in those days.) “Why do you want to go to the sciences? Why don't you switch to the humanities?” Jenny asked me what she should say in a case like that, and I gave her advice which she didn't have the nerve to carry out. I suggested that she look very innocently with her big blue eyes at the faculty member and say, "Before I answer that, sir, would you mind telling me what your SAT scores were?" (if they were science professors). And when they told you, say that her math score was eight hundred and her chemistry seven-ninety. That's roughly correct. And would they still give that advice to her.
So that kind of attitude was quite prevalent at Yale and Jenny disliked it very much. There were, as always, other complications and freshman adjustment problems. She was a year younger than her classmates and first time away from home. All of those contributed to it. But there were very substantive things she strongly disliked about Yale, and those…

In addition to that, Yale had planned to build additional dormitories to accommodate women. They didn't build enough, and then later it would turn out that the town of New Haven wouldn't give them a permit for spreading further. Jenny lived in a small clump of rooms that once must have been a very nice double, two minute bedrooms with a nice living room, and I mean minute bedrooms. It must have been a very nice double. One of the two minute bedrooms was big enough that you could put a double-decker bunk in it, so it's the kind of thing when colleges are short of rooms, colleges tend to convert from a double to a triple. But there were four of them living in there, which made it impossible. And that was typical of the overcrowding of the women. So Yale really had not planned nearly as well as we did for accommodating women. So living conditions were bad, and there were some quite negative attitudes, and not just students there, but faculty members.

I urged her to go back for her sophomore year because I know freshmen often have troubles. When she came home at Thanksgiving time still very upset, I told her to take off Thanksgiving vacation, and the final day of vacation we'd talk. We talked for many hours, at the end of which I told her not to go back to Yale. She took the rest of the year off to figure out what she wanted to do, and what she decided she wanted to do was to transfer to Dartmouth. In that she was fortunate since Dartmouth normally doesn't take transfer students. But as you recall, for the first two coed classes, we took transfer students intentionally so that they wouldn't all be freshmen. That happened to be during that period. So Jenny actually transferred as a sophomore into the first class, the class of '76, the first class that had entering freshmen women. So she would have been '75 at Yale and '76 at Dartmouth, but actually '76 was her own age group since she had finished high school a year early.

I should add, just to finish the story, she was extremely happy at Dartmouth College. One of my great temptations was to send Jenny out on the road to tell the alumni how much better education is at Dartmouth, for undergraduates. And for women how much better it was at Dartmouth than at Yale. But somehow I suspected people might think she was prejudiced on the subject.

FANELLI: John, you mentioned CMP before, and you said you wanted to say something about that. Maybe this would be a good time.
KEMENY: Oh, yes. I wanted to say some things about Cresap, McCormick & Paget. One of the pleasant surprises early in my administration was to receive an anonymous gift from a donor, where it's now public knowledge that he had made enormous anonymous gifts during his lifetime. This was Harvey Hood [‘18]. Even I did not know until after his death anything like the magnitude of the gifts he had made, because he had made so many of them anonymously. This was a gift of $100,000 with the advice that I should use it to retain consultants, but to study any aspect of the college I felt needed studying. He wasn't telling me what to study, he just said he had found such consultants very useful in his profession, and he thought that the new president coming in could make good use of it.

What I decided to use it for is to study the nonacademic side of the administration, because that's what I did not know. I knew as much about the academic side of the institution as anyone. And that turned out to be a fortunate thing. We had three major firms bidding, and I called other colleges for whom they had worked to find out how they had done. The standard answer I got is that there are other firms who are better than Cresap, McCormick & Paget, unless you can get some fellow called Leo Kornfeld. If you can get him, there's none better in the county. Since CMP was very anxious to get our contract, I had them write into the contract that Leo would have to commit some significant amount of time to it. Somewhere in the process Leo Kornfeld fell in love with Dartmouth College, so I know he committed vastly more of his time than a senior partner normally would to any one case. I got an enormous amount of useful advice from them.

In some cases, simply they studied an area and found only negligible problems. I then knew that that area was in good shape and I didn't have to worry about it. There were a number of areas where they turned up very, very serious problems. During that time, I was already talking to the board about John Meck and whether he ought to be phased out from the responsibilities he had, at least some of them. That wasn't the only one, but that was one of the areas where they found very major problems. John had been a distinguished, very successful senior administrator of the college for a quarter of a century, and somehow had not faced up to the fact that life had changed over that quarter of a century. That's the only way I can describe him. As you know, incidentally, that would be one of my strange things, unlike the Carroll Brewster situation, because I had known John Meck very well. He was a personal friend, and I was, till his death, extremely fond of him personally, so it was a very different kind of situation. And also different from Carroll Brewster in that several board members were quite worried about the situation; it had gotten out of hand.

What happened is, what started out as a simple one-man office, or one man with an assistant thing, ended up being in charge of all financial matters, all business matters, and the whole investment portfolio of Dartmouth College. There is no way one person could do all of that job. Also, John had become nationally well-
known and served on a number of boards and would be called in as consultant on a lot of things, which was not irrelevant to his job. For example, he picked up all kinds of useful information in the area of investments.

FANELLI: That took him out of town quite a bit.

KEMENY: He would always claim that Cresap, McCormick & Paget had somehow done their job wrong. One of the things they did is, they took his diary, with his permission, and simply counted the number of days he had been out of town the previous year. Would you believe two hundred? That's by actual count. It was within less than five one way or the other of two hundred days out of town out of a three hundred sixty-five day year. He was never here. And while John had many strengths—he was terribly bright and deeply devoted to the college—he had one great weakness. He would not delegate. I mean, even where he delegated, he delegated in the sense that somebody else could work it out, but he couldn't do anything; final approval had to be by John. When you couple that with the enormous number of different areas that fell under him, plus the fact that he was out of town more than half the time, things just didn't get done. There were two kinds of problems. Some things just got postponed and put off too long, or some other areas just did not receive any supervision. Where by chance there was a good person in charge of the area, it worked out fine. In other areas under his supervision, things did not work out fine, and he didn't really have the time anymore to keep on top of all of that administrative hierarchy.

That was an example of a problem that I didn't fully understand until Cresap, McCormick & Paget explained it to me. Another area I know they found major weaknesses in was our whole—not alumni relations, but fundraising area, and we would work quite hard at trying to strengthen that. I don't remember, there were some less important offices where they found some serious problems. The personnel office was an area of major weakness at that time.

I had to work on that problem a great deal. My first major move was to try to split up the business problems. There are really three identifiably different areas—the investment portfolio, which is very time-consuming; the fiscal problems; and the business problems. I'm not sure those are the technical terms—

FANELLI: You didn't mention the legal problems.

KEMENY: Oh, sorry. The legal problems, yes, that was there, too. He was also the chief lawyer. As a matter of fact, we had no other in-house lawyer. David Bradley [‘58 TU ‘59] worked with an excellent lawyer in town who spent a lot of time here, but John Meck was a lawyer and had been a law professor, so he was also the chief legal officer.
FANELLI: And that became important later on.

KEMENY: That would become very important as the decade went on. That was the decade where all colleges went through all kinds of litigations. So, yes, he had all that on top of it.

When I say business problems, Dartmouth is engaged in more businesses than most—certainly most Ivy institutions. I mean, we're the only one left who owns a hotel. We own a golf course. We own a ski resort.

I will never forget when John Meck came into my office and said, "There's a vacancy on the Hanover Waterworks. Whom do you wish to name to it?" I really stared at him, and I said, "John, you're out of your mind. What does the president of Dartmouth College have to do with the Hanover Waterworks?" And although I'd lived here for sixteen years, I did not realize that the Hanover Waterworks were started not by the town of Hanover but by Dartmouth College, maybe a century earlier when we needed a reliable water supply before the town did. It's been de facto turned into a public waterworks company, except that the college retained majority control of the shares. Not that we make money out of it, but as I understand it, it's solely for the purpose to make sure that the college never gets cut off from the supply of water. As a result of it, the arrangement is that the five directors of it, three or four... One's the treasurer always, so John Meck was on it. John Meck and two others were named by the president, and the selectmen named two. It's a system that has worked fine. But there we are. We discovered we have a majority interest in a waterworks.

We own the single largest block of interest in the Dartmouth National Bank, and we have enormous land holdings here and elsewhere. It goes on and on and on. I'm sure I've forgotten...

FANELLI: At one time, we owned a software company.

KEMENY: Oh, yes. We owned a... Yes. Don't mention that. [Chuckles] One of my first moves was, with Cresap, McCormick's help, to conduct a search, and that's when I brought in Rod Morgan [Rodney A. “Rod” Morgan ’44 TH ’45 TU ’45], an alumnus who had worked twenty-five years in industry, to take over the business aspects of the thing. Also, I named him then to be our liaison with the town, because that was not one of John Meck's strengths. He had a rather nasty habit of lording it over the town that did not make him very popular. Rod was very good at that. Rod would go to Rotary Club almost every week, which is a little symbolic act but was terribly important, and I would be told ten years later that the town felt that relations between the town and the college had improved significantly. Actually, there I did have an advantage in that I had served on the
Hanover School Board, and therefore I was known to some of the big shots in town.

FANELLI:  So that was a useful…

KEMENY:  That was a useful appointment.  But I tell you, the board, on this one, helped me as much as possible.  John Meck just absolutely hated to let go of anything, so the difficulty was how… I mean, no one wanted to embarrass him publicly.  His services to the college over twenty-five years will go down as… He'll go down in history as one of the most important officers of the college.  He just would not recognize, partly for health reasons and others, that he was not at his best anymore.  And secondly, that he was trying to handle an absolutely impossible load and just wouldn't let go of it.

First, I split off the business portions of it, and secondly, later on I would name Bill Davis [William "Bill" Davis, Jr.] treasurer, so he took over some of the fiscal responsibilities, and left with John the legal and the investment responsibilities of the college.  Several trustees who tried to work as intermediaries here just were horribly frustrated in the whole process, but John just hated to let go of any power he had.  All of us felt terribly sorry about that because if he had… One does wonder if he had eased off somewhat earlier whether it would have made a difference.  It's terribly sad.  A year after his retirement he died of a heart attack and left his very lovely wife a widow.  If he had been willing to ease off some, they might have had a fruitful period of retirement.

FANELLI:  I remember those occasions when we'd be at Minary on a retreat and the phone would ring.  Everyone would say, "John, it's for you."  [Laughter]

KEMENY:  Yes.  That was typical of it.  In Minary retreats of senior administrators, which later on we would have every year for two days, one of the ground rules was no phone calls except in case of an emergency.  The result of which was that there were an order of magnitude of twenty of us there, and nineteen of us would get no phone call.  Maybe one phone call total amongst the other nineteen, and John would go to the phone every half an hour, either to receive a call or to place a call.  He was a terribly intense person who wouldn't let down.

The Cresap, McCormick study was incredibly valuable.  I'm sure I didn't fix all the problems they turned up, but at least they helped me recognize what the problem areas were and at least made some suggestions as to how improvements could be made in certain areas.  Several improvements we managed to make in the non-academic administration were with the help of Cresap, McCormick.

Oh, all right.  I was trying to think of a concrete example.  There was chaos on the whole business of job classifications.  That's a good example where I would not
even have understood the problem, let alone know the range of possibilities for solving it.

FANELLI: It's a problem common to industry.

KEMENY: To industry but not to academia. I mean, ranks are so clearly defined in the faculty and so simple. The problem was that people were hired for jobs which had job titles and may or may not have had job descriptions. Then each year a question came up whether they got a raise or not. It depended partly on their performance. More often than not it depended on how persuasive their boss was. And they just went on. There was no clear-cut notion of promotion and no clear-cut salary range for any one job. As a result of it, some terribly peculiar things happened. There were some people holding extremely responsible jobs way underpaid, and some people simply by having the same job forever, having risen to outrageously high salaries for a relatively unimportant job. That's really an unacceptable situation, at least as anyone in business would know.

End of Tape 6, Side B
Beginning of Tape 7, Side A

KEMENY: Just to finish on this example of what CMP helped us to do, they came up with organization of jobs into eight categories up to the vice presidential level, and then the vice presidential jobs, with a clear-cut notion of how high the job was and a way of measuring it in terms of qualifications needed and responsibilities. You could enter a job as a new employee and rise within it up to a reasonable level but not beyond it. Equally importantly, you would then have a clear-cut notion of what was a promotion, and we were able to lay down a rule that if a higher job opened up, an employee qualified for it was allowed to apply. That was a very important one, because we picked up a lot of complaints about department heads who had an excellent employee and threatened to fire people, or otherwise intimidated them from applying for a better job. Besides, if there was no classification of jobs, how did you know if it was a better job?

I think that system stood us in very good stead, even though the permission to apply for a higher job seemed to hit the president's office disproportionately. Wasn't it some of your people, Alex, who...?

FANELLI: Yes.

KEMENY: You kept losing secretaries because you had excellent secretaries who were qualified for more advanced jobs. But it's basically a good system, an example of something that was totally lacking at Dartmouth and I could never have pulled off without CMP. I think that's all I wanted to say on this.
FANELLI: Okay.

[Tape off, then resumes]

FANELLI: John, one subject that we didn't cover in the last interview on coeducation, and I thought about it later when I got home, was the matter of class composition, how Dartmouth changed from the original policy of admitting women to the freshman class under a quota system to a policy which was called equal access. I thought for the benefit of the future historians of that period, we should point out that the prevailing philosophy of the board of trustees in the years immediately after the coeducation decision of 1971 was one we could describe as gradualism. Under that policy, a certain number of women were admitted to the freshman class each year beginning in the fall of 1972. As I recall, this number varied between 250 and 300, but you can correct that if it's not right. So that after four years, that is about 1976, there were about 3000 men and 1000 women in the four undergraduate classes.

At this point, pressures began to build in the student body, and perhaps in the faculty as well, against what was becoming seen as an increasingly discriminatory policy against women as the number of highly qualified women applicants continued to increase. I recall that the first response by the board to these pressures was again one of gradualism when the decision was made in effect not to do anything for a year to permit a dialogue among the various constituencies—students, alumni, and faculty—on this subject. This dialogue took place, I believe, in 1975 or '76, primarily through the trustee committee on student affairs.

An extensive discussion of the subject was held at the January 1977 trustee meeting, and the board voted to establish guidelines to permit an additional 25 women in the class of 1981 and up to 15 additional women in succeeding classes, depending on the quality of applicants in the pool. It also voted to direct administration to use all appropriate means to increase enrollment in terms not then fully utilized in order to minimize the reduction in the number of men in the entering classes, which you had pointed out before was one of the concerns of the trustees.

One way of assessing that vote would be to say that the sentiment for gradualism on the board had prevailed. The pressures for a less discriminatory policy continued, however, and finally, at the April 1979 trustee meeting, the board voted for equal access and said that, "Beginning with the class of 1984, men and women will not be treated differently in the admissions process." Would you comment on this evolution in the board's thinking about this question, and especially on what occurred between the 1977 and the 1979 decisions that led the board to change its position?
KEMENY: As you pointed out, there were three phases. Roughly, for the initial four years, women were limited to 25% of the freshman class. The first class of women was actually smaller than that because with the November decision, there was only limited opportunity for women to apply and they were mostly the ones who were watching Dartmouth and had applied on the chance that we will go coed. But basically, it was the 25% quota for the first four years. I think that was certainly a reasonable thing to do. There were an awful lot of initial adjustment problems, and if we had immediately gone to something like 50-50, the adjustment problems would have been much harder.

That was not hard, the problem was what to do after that. As you said, the board went to a second phase of gradualism there. Let me say here for the record what the hope of the board was at that time, that by gradualism it would delay alumni opposition by having very small changes from one year to the other, yet it was a change that eventually had to lead to equal opportunity. Whether that meant 50% or whatever it would turn out doesn't matter, but if you change it... I guess there was an initial 2.5% change and then 1.5% per year. You could predict the number of years in which you would have to reach equal opportunity. So it was not an anti–equal opportunity vote. On the contrary, it essentially committed the board, but getting there at what seemed to the opponents to be a very slow pace.

I remember in board meetings, we even had quite frank discussions that the best of all possible things was that it looked like gradualism to the alumni, but at some point, the president would report to the board and it would be publicly announced that in this class the quotas did not apply, and therefore we can drop all quotas. As best I remember it, however, the outside pressures kept building on the board. It was not my initiative, it was some trustees kept arguing that the opponents were right and one was sending the wrong signal by having any kind of quota system at all, and somewhat to my surprise, persuaded the board in—’79 you said it was?

FANELLI: Yes.

KEMENY: In ’79 to drop all quotas.

FANELLI: Yes. I think that was the meeting, John, at which there was a COSA [Board of Trustees’ Committee on Student Affairs] meeting, either the morning of the meeting or the day before, probably the afternoon before.

KEMENY: Yes. It was probably around the time Bob Kilmarx [Robert Dudley “Bob” Kilmarx ’50] was the chairman of COSA, because I remember him speaking up on this issue strongly for dropping quotas.
FANELLI: Yes. And there had been a petition, I believe, signed by 2000 students, and it was presented to the COSA meeting at the time. Then I think COSA must have recommended to the board, or people on COSA at any rate must have argued...

KEMENY: Yes. I think it's important to point out that after the original 25% quota was over, as we started moving gradually, at no point did the quotas have any significant impact on how many women we admitted. My rough estimate was that our quotas were lacking a year, or at most sometimes two years, behind where we would normally be. Therefore, it made about a two-to-three-person difference in each class as to how many women there were in it. So it was never very far from being equal opportunity. The students apparently successfully argued with COSA that any quota system was sort of repugnant to them.

There were strange incidents at some other institutions on this subject. I remember Brown that first merged its men's and women's colleges and —Brown and Pembroke, I guess, reasonably early — worked on increasing the number of women and then started reaching classes where the women outnumbered men. I believe they were the only Ivy school at which that had happened. Then a very strange statement came out of Brown University after that to the effect that of course they were not going to discriminate against either sex, but they're going to work very hard to have the same proportion of men and women, which is a roundabout way of saying that they were imposing a quota system on women.

The percentages have kept growing. I checked last on the class that was admitted last fall, which I guess would be the class of '87, and they had reached 45% of the class was women. I'm just curious how far that is off the pace that we had once set for ourselves. Let's say it was '76, '77, '78, and '79. I guess that's where the 25%... What was the class where 25 more women were added? Was it the class of '80?

FANELLI: Well, it was at the meeting of 1977.

KEMENY: So it would be the class of '81 that would have...

FANELLI: The class of '81, right. An additional 25 women were in the class of '81.

KEMENY: So it would have gone up 2.5% for '81 and 1.5%—so it would have been up to 29% by '82, then 3% every two years, which would have been 32 for '84 and 35 for '86, about 37 for '87. So dropping the quotas did accelerate things, again not by a huge percentage, but over that many years it has amounted to about a 6% difference.

FANELLI: I think what was important there probably was the symbolic aspect.
KEMENY: The symbolic aspect, but of course it was a double-edged sword because that's what the alumni were most afraid of. Nevertheless, probably the transitional gradualism gave the alumni a longer period to adjust to the fact that we're not only going to go coed, but it was inevitable that the number of men would go down.

FANELLI: Do you recall, John, if at the time there were any particular strong objections on the part of alumni before this vote was taken?

KEMENY: Yes. The objections always were on the decrease of the number of men. I mean, they weren't re-arguing coeducation by that stage, but certainly throughout it they were greatly worried about the decrease of the number of men. Usually the public arguments were based on athletic arguments or on the nature of the institution. Privately, most of the board suspected that it's the emotional issue, that it was hard enough for alumni sons to get into Dartmouth College, and the decrease in the number of men would decrease the chances further. There's always been this lack of symmetry on the part of many alumni that, while they were also delighted if they got a daughter into Dartmouth, having a son turned down was a much more traumatic experience for them than having a daughter turned down, probably because they had hoped for that for a major portion of their life, while they didn't have any hope of getting a daughter in there until very recently. It had very different meaning for them.

FANELLI: Although I do recall your saying sometimes when you came back from alumni trips that there were alumni out there who didn't have any sons and were delighted to find that their daughters were being accepted at Dartmouth.

KEMENY: Yes. Dick Leggatt [Richard “Dick” Leggatt '48], for example, if my memory is right, has had five daughters graduate from Dartmouth College.

FANELLI: Yes. John, I thought the area we would go to next would be the one we mentioned, equal opportunity. In previous interviews, you had mentioned your role in 1969 as chairman of the faculty committee on equal opportunity, which you described as one of the results of the 1968 report of the McLane Committee. I'm sure that one of the primary concerns of the faculty committee was how to increase the number of minority applicants and matriculants at Dartmouth.

About a year before you became president, a committee on the freshman class approved the practice of the admissions office to "accept for admission those blacks and educationally deprived students whose records would not in a traditional sense be deemed acceptable but which would, nevertheless, appear to give them a reasonable chance of meeting the normal academic requirements of Dartmouth College." In other words, the policy would be to take a greater risk with minority students who previously might not have been considered because of
low SAT scores if there was other evidence of potential to do Dartmouth level academic work. Could you talk about the college's experience with this policy during your presidency and comment on any other initiatives that were taken?

KEMENY: Dartmouth, like most institutions made some serious mistakes in the process of making the transition. I believe in a policy like that, and I think I would defend it on the grounds that, for example, a student who comes from semi-illiterate parents and may have gone to a miserable inner city or southern rural school, rarely has the opportunity to acquire facility, let's say with the English language, to score decently on a verbal aptitude score. I used to use with alumni the argument that I was very grateful for the fact that Princeton must have ignored my own verbal aptitude score, which was in the low five hundreds, and my other scores were high simply because somewhere a tag said I was a foreign student, or foreign-born student, who hadn't been in the United States very long.

FANELLI: If they'd averaged them, they might not have… [Laughs]

KEMENY: Well, I did fairly well on the other, so… But if they had eliminated students who had verbal aptitude scores below a certain level, I might never have gotten into Princeton. It's the same kind of argument that's applicable to an inner city black or a southern rural black, particularly if the parents are not well educated so also does not get that kind of training in the home. Indeed, they may be speaking what's now called street English and have great difficulty with literate English.

Where one tends to make mistakes is that one does not apply the criteria in a sufficiently sophisticated way. I have a great deal of sympathy for students who come in that category. Indeed, we had a student in that category who would later become a Rhodes Scholar. What I do not approve of is an upper-middle-class black student who went to a prep school and gets in with low SAT scores because he is black, because that student had the same opportunities that whites had. Therefore, one had to use a great deal more sophistication in applying these criteria, and it took a while for the admissions office and others to learn how to apply those criteria in a sophisticated way.

It certainly is part of the record that, at least as far as black students go, once we got somewhat more sophisticated in applying the criteria, the vast majority of black students we admitted did graduate from Dartmouth College. Perhaps the lack of completion rate was somewhat higher from whites, but still much lower than what is typical of the best state universities. So basically, almost all of them graduated.

The situation was very different for American Indians. There we made all kinds of mistakes, and the problem would become very complicated. The numbers were very small. There are only about a million living Native Americans in the United
States, many of them having gone to horrible high schools where they don't even offer college preparatory courses. The pool from which you can choose was minute and scattered all over the nation, and therefore the early classes, with the best of intentions, we had very small numbers in them. We had difficulty building up enough of a group so that they felt they had a small tribe here and didn't have a support group, and we would slowly learn how terribly important that support group was to Native Americans.

Actually, the program turned around once we managed to maintain a sufficient number on campus. But even then, throughout that period, the graduation rate of Native Americans would be significantly lower than of any other group. Yet one has to contrast that with the fact that in the first 200 years some twelve Native Americans graduated from Dartmouth College, and something like five times that number graduated during my term as president. So it's a question of compared to what, and we both have to accept that we might run a forty, 50% dropout rate amongst Native Americans, and a much larger number of problems. And, per student, a great deal more support had to be provided for Native Americans than for blacks.

Coeducation had an interesting impact on both of these groups, because it would turn out that we got, relatively speaking, much larger numbers of well qualified women students amongst both blacks and Native Americans than we did amongst male students. That has something to do with the sociology of the races that I'm certainly not an expert on. Therefore, we very early dropped sort of the quota idea for women for the minority groups. I think we dropped it completely for Native Americans, the numbers were so small anyway, and at least came up with much more generous quotas for women amongst blacks because this improved the average quality of black students we got.

FANELLI: And they tended to stay longer and graduate sooner, I think, than... I mean, graduated within the four-year period.

KEMENY: Within the four-year period, yes. Apparently, something in the sociology that, for women, it was much more acceptable to work hard in school, and they're not out on the streets perhaps quite as much, or whatever it was. But they tended to come much better prepared academically.

Actually, that was the only area where we found significant differences in qualifications between women and men was amongst the minority groups. In the student body overall, the women, on the average, looked just like the men. But for minority groups, the women were better qualified.

FANELLI: John, that reminds me, there was a program... You may want to comment on this, when you said we made mistakes. Maybe it wasn't a mistake, I don't know. We
took some people who were older students, blacks, from the Chicago area, I believe. I guess it was maybe at the request of some alumni out there.

**KEMENY:** Yes. Actually, I was not in on the beginning of that program. It predates my presidency. But most of the terms of those students on campus were during my presidency.

**FANELLI:** And you were having the problems with that.

**KEMENY:** I inherited the problems of that, and I got to know two or three of those students very well. As a matter of fact, I got a letter from one of them very recently. I think that was a terrible mistake, in spite of the fact that there were two or three major successes in it. It was a romantic idea to take some older black students from Chicago gangs, actually, and bring them to campus. The small number of them who made it at Dartmouth were a positive influence in that they were somewhat older and more mature and had a good influence. But of course a significant percentage of those just were hopelessly ill-prepared, in addition to which they had had their high school training ten years earlier, so they had forgotten a lot of their training. They were very poorly prepared for Dartmouth, and when one of those students really was not making it at Dartmouth, they were capable of causing a great deal more trouble. So I think the program on the whole was a failure.

That reminds me, incidentally, I ought to speak about the academic support programs that they had for minority groups. There, too, we would learn. As a matter of fact, it would take a longer period. Our first attempt was to bring minority students to campus the summer before their freshman year, so to speak, to fill them in on things that they were weak on because of having gone to a poor high school.

Although the program helped those students, it was sociologically or psychologically wrong because it sort of stamped them as students in need of help and therefore not up to Dartmouth standard. I'm trying to separate out the educational impact of it from the sociological impact. What did we call…?

**FANELLI:** The Bridge Program.

**KEMENY:** The Bridge Program. Somehow being a Bridge student, I noted, was being used by students as a derogatory word. I don't just mean white students, but say a black student who was not in the Bridge Program might occasionally refer to him, "Of course he's a Bridge student," meaning he is a less able student.

**FANELLI:** As I recall, it also had some other effects because, for some of these students, working during that summer was important.
KEMENY: There was a financial penalty there, and because of the need to work, we never got more than about half of those students we wanted to have. There were a lot of students who should have gotten that help who didn't get it.

We struggled along with that for quite a while until a major attempt was made to change that. The interesting change was not to ask them to come early but to provide special courses once they arrived on campus that would, in effect, provide that Bridge effect. Now, the reason that took some time to achieve was that departments had to be willing to give four college credit courses that we had normally expected students to take in high school. The argument given was if these courses were really new or beyond what those particular students had had in high school, then there is nothing shameful in doing that.

FANELLI: There was one in mathematics.

KEMENY: Math and English were always the key areas, both in Bridge Program and in these remedial courses. For a while, we went with remedial courses. The third and really important phase of it was when instead of that… My colleague Dwight Lahr [C. Dwight Lahr] in the math department, I believe, pioneered the first of these. Instead of having a remedial pre-calculus course, what he designed was a two-term sequence where you did the first term of calculus in two terms. The important thing psychologically was that the student signed up for calculus, not for remedial mathematics, but in recognition of having weaknesses in algebra or trigonometry or whatever, it took two terms to do it. The main subject matter was calculus, and you taught the students the algebra when they needed it. But they were always feeling that they were taking college level mathematics with some extra help.

Then the English department followed this in that English 1 and 2 was a two-term sequence, or what was old English 1 is now English 5, and that also, I believe, has worked vastly better than having a remedial course.

FANELLI: So that was a situation where the college learned how to deal with this problem.

KEMENY: Yes, it was a learning process and really what ended up as a continuum in mathematics. We had seen nothing strange in most students starting with beginning calculus but a fair number of them skipping a semester of calculus because they had some calculus in high school, and a small number of them actually skipping a year of calculus. There's only one step in the other direction, and there were those students who had to take three terms to do the two terms of calculus.
FANELLI: John, it's important to note, I guess to the future historian also, that the program now is not just for minority students.

KEMENY: Thank you for reminding me. When I started on this topic, that's the main point I wanted to make and then I forgot it as I went along, that the big change that came about once it was no longer a remedial course was that it was simply on the basis… The testing shifted. It's standard testing that you do in freshman week. You have to do it anyway because of the varied placement in mathematics and English, everybody gets tested. And somebody who tests very poorly is advised to go into these. I guess in English it's required, in math it's advised, since there is no math requirement. The point here is that, unlike the Bridge Program, all students get tested. Therefore, although it… I believe it's true that minority students represent a disproportionate number amongst these, amongst the total number, it certainly is not an all black and Native American program.

For example, a future historian might be interested that I had an extremely bright niece at Dartmouth College with very high verbal and other aptitude scores, but she had never been any good at math. I think she just had plain fear of mathematics. She got placed into this remedial mathematics sequence. She graduated with considerable accumulation of academic honors from Dartmouth College and is currently… After having worked on Wall Street for quite a while, she is now enrolled at Tuck School. I hasten to add, my niece is neither black nor a Native American. [Laughs] She could be, but she is not, okay?

That's an example. She thought the program was terrific, and she actually took at least one mathematics course beyond the remedial sequence because it changed her attitude towards mathematics. So that's a very good example where any number of white students who otherwise would never have gotten that help, got the help.

FANELLI: John, I know that over the years from 1970 to 1981, your presidency, the board of trustees was supportive of efforts in the equal opportunity area. Were there particular trustees who stand out in your mind as especially committed to that policy?

KEMENY: Yes. Certainly one has to identify Bob Kilmarx as chairman of COSA, and because of personal beliefs, having played a truly outstanding role in this area. I think he was probably the most consistent spokesman for equal opportunity on the board, but there certainly were others. Berl Bernhard ['51], for example, was the past chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and had very strong feelings. There were many other trustees who had strong feelings, the belief that we were doing this because it was right. So there was never any shortage of support. While the board might argue about the best way of implementing something, this was not an issue on which the board split badly. It was not a divisive issue on the
board, which I understand it was on many other boards of trustees. Our board was extremely supportive of the equal opportunity program throughout.

There were occasionally questions about the Native American Program on the basis… In the early years when the failure rate… Actually, typically they didn't flunk out. The commonest thing that happened was that they were so homesick or found it such an alien environment that they dropped out.

KEMENY: May I add one thing I thought of while you were changing tape?

FANELLI: Sure.

KEMENY: We had a particular handicap in attracting black students. Anybody would have found it hard to attract Native American students, but compared to most of the other Ivy schools which were near a major urban center, and often an urban center that has a significant black population, we were not near such a center. That was a handicap, not primarily because you draw the black students from the immediate surround, or you may, but black students found it particularly difficult being very far away from the nearest black center. I don't think northern New England, at least in the beginning of this program, was terribly receptive to blacks, and therefore, for many social purposes, they felt most comfortable if they could travel to a city where there was a significant black population, and there just isn't any near here.

In spite of which, we would rise to the point where, for a while at least, we had the largest percentage of black students amongst the Ivy schools, which I thought was a major achievement. Then some of the other schools increased their recruitment efforts, so we dropped out of first place. But we were amongst the leaders amongst the larger private institutions in the country in terms of percentage of blacks in the institution. We had to work harder at this than others did. Actual numbers, I think the year I know we were number one, we had about 9% of the entering class was black. It would later settle down to a more typical number, like 7% of the freshman class.

FANELLI: John, you mentioned the supportive nature of the board on this. Were there any difficulties with college officers that stand out in your mind, about implementing the…
Yes. One certainly ran into prejudice. One… I remember an early experience of mine—in the mathematics department—had alerted me to this problem. This, I guess, predates the presidency.

We had a very able black graduate student in mathematics and discovered that one of the secretaries, who was local, an older lady… She came to me with the problem. She recognized it and told that she had grown to a mature age before she saw the first black in her life and that she knew it was wrong, but I guess she was frightened. Her parents had this stupid habit, you know, the bogey man in some parts, it's a black somebody-or-other who comes and does something to you when you do something bad. She described to me this quite irrational fear she had of blacks, which she recognized as such but there's nothing she could do about it. In that case, we decided to live with it, just urged her to do whatever she could. And there'd never been an overt act. She just asked for help on that.

That alerted me that that kind of prejudice must be fairly rampant in northern New England. Certainly on the staff level, this occurred fairly often. With officers, let me try to think if I can think of an actual example where I was sure of prejudice. One occasionally suspected it in some, but I don't know if I was ever sure of it because I would certainly have removed that officer. I guess I cannot think of a case where I was sure of it.

Yeah, there were some reported incidents, let's say, not amongst the higher level officers but amongst lower level officers. I guess we were able to deal with it. In each case, they were under the supervision of a supervisor who was not prejudiced and who was willing to take the officer in hand and make sure that no overt discrimination would take place.

Oh, but there's a very important incident. Oh, my gosh, yes. Housing, student housing, that's a very good example… This shows the kind of problems you have and some interesting thing about college administration in general, that the people on top can lay down firm policies, and it's someone three levels or four levels further down who can sabotage that policy. In this case, in a sense, unintentionally. The person thought it was well meaning, just took something for granted.

The incident came to our attention in the president's office by a letter from the father of a black freshman, who wrote and said that he was absolutely delighted that his son came to Dartmouth College, and his son is very happy at Dartmouth College, but there's something that bothered the father and wrote to me about it. When his son was asked about preferences for a roommate, he intentionally did not put down… He wanted to take a random selection of freshmen. The father was somewhat disappointed when this black student's roommate turned out to be a black student. They said it's the luck of the draw and so be it. When he visited
his son on campus, he found that all his classmates who happened to be black also had black roommates, and his father, in a really very polite letter, said that it somewhat strained his ability to believe that it was pure chance that resulted in that.

I remember you and I talked about it and were about to write off a letter saying, "Look, believe me, no such policy exists." Then just to be safe, I decided to check. I talked to the dean of the college, and he assured me that there can't be such a policy. And it worked its way down. Student housing was sort of off by itself. Actually, this resulted in moving student housing into the same building as the dean of the college or dean of freshmen, next to dean of freshmen, so that there would be sort of day-to-day supervision of the office. It turned out the person in charge of student housing just assumed that naturally a black student wouldn't want to room with anyone but a black student, and a white student wouldn't want to room with anybody but a white student.

It was a horrendously embarrassing incident. I was very lucky that the father did not make this public. I wrote a profuse letter of apology, explained it was... I don't know what I said verbatim, but it amounted to some idiot down the line, and that the policy had been changed effective the next freshman class. That's a good example. In a sense, it represented prejudice on the person's part.

FANELLI: But an innocent prejudice.

KEMENY: Yeah. He just took it for granted that that's what people would want.

FANELLI: It's a good thing that that did come up, that the father did write the letter.

KEMENY: Actually, it's very good that the father...

FANELLI: It could have gone on for...

KEMENY: Yes. And I was amazed that no student had commented on it at all. But you see, it's the kind of thing that could give some militant blacks the impression that this was a racist institution. It's one very low level administrator who made a decision that made an institutional statement.

FANELLI: That's a good lead-in to this next question, John. As the efforts to enroll blacks and Native Americans became more successful, we began to see larger and larger numbers of them in the undergraduate body. On the one hand, this was satisfying because it was the realization of a goal, but in a sense, the larger numbers created some problems because these groups came to have political self-consciousness, formed the Afro-American Society and the Native Americans at Dartmouth, and at various times brought pressure on the administration to increase the rate of
change. Would you comment on that aspect and on some of the critical moments in your relations with those groups? I don't mean to imply that the groups were bad groups in any way, but they did create…?

KEMENY: No. And here one really has to take Afro-Am and Native Americans separately because they are very fundamentally different ones. Of course, with Native Americans, mostly the relation was very positive. There was just one issue, and I think it's an issue on which we have to spend some time. Maybe I'll start with that one, and you'll remind me to go to Afro-Am afterwards, okay?

FANELLI: Okay, sure.

KEMENY: Native Americans was an extremely positive group. Their major purpose actually was peer support. They worked very closely with faculty advisors. It was the coming of Michael Dorris to Dartmouth College that really changed the entire effectiveness of our Native American program in a wide variety of ways. Michael Dorris is himself a Native American, a very able anthropologist who was instrumental in creating a Native American Studies program at Dartmouth College, while our Black Studies program never got to be first-rate, to put it mildly. Our Native American Studies program would, after a few years, be rated by Native American magazine as the best in the country. So it really became a distinguished program. Again, unlike the Black Studies program where typically they were taken just by black students, often in order to get a good grade which they needed, Native American studies was neither easy nor was it taken primarily by Native Americans.

For example, my daughter was telling me one day by far her best elective was Native American Studies 1. It was the history of Native America before the coming of white man, something that my daughter, a typical product of an American high school, knew nothing at all about. She knew the history of the United States started in 1492. [Chuckles] She was absolutely fascinated by that course and worked very hard in it and wrote a very major paper in it that would be used in the course later, and just loved it. Now, that helped give… The fact that lots of students said, "Gee, this is terrific, we didn't know this about Native Americans" helped the morale of the Native American students.

Also, Michael personally played a very important role in giving support to Native American students and was helpful. That group really was a peer support group primarily. The only major issue on which they became militant was on the subject of the Indian symbol. That's why I thought I might as well lead off with that because I would end up spending quite a bit of time in my presidency on the Indian symbol.
When we admitted Native Americans, none of us somehow associated that as having anything to do with the Indian symbol. I was not even aware as to some of the bad things that had happened with the Indian symbol over the years. It certainly was very much in my mind in launching that program that Dartmouth was founded as a school for Native Americans, and I guess I was never that conscious of symbols, though I would become so.

First of all, the history of the Indian symbol. It's absolutely not true that at any time the Indian symbol was the symbol of Dartmouth College. Periodically, some sort of Indian symbol was used for athletic teams, but not very regularly. A historian has traced it to an article in the Boston Globe that started referring to the Dartmouth football team as Indians, and that sort of caught on. Therefore, athletic teams being referred to as Indians became common.

FANELLI: That was back in the 1920s.

KEMENY: The '20s, somewhere in the 1920s. Though, apparently, having the Indian symbol on the football uniforms did not occur until Coach Blackman [Robert L. “Bob” Blackman] became coach. He had a number of psychological weapons he used, and he simply put a ferocious looking Indian on helmets for the sole purpose of firing up the team, as a Princeton team might have a ferocious tiger on the helmet. There was nothing more behind it than that.

The alumni got into the habit of using Indian symbols, and some of them were rather in very bad taste. I'll recount the worst example of it. This was after we had Native American students here, and it was the first time they'd organized a conference of Native Americans where several very distinguished Native American leaders came to the campus, and of course the college put them up in the Hanover Inn. This is one of the problems. I didn't stay at the Hanover Inn because why would one who lived locally stay in the Hanover Inn? Hotels gave out what I called favors, small souvenirs or bars of soap or whatnot, and the Hanover Inn at that time was giving out paper shoehorns that you could keep, where the portion of it that you hold onto on the shoehorn was the head of a rather horrendously ugly Indian and the tongue is the tongue of the Indian. I mean, about in as bad taste as it could possibly be. Of course, the Native Americans who came visiting here were absolutely outraged. We did our best to apologize, but you never quite wipe it out. Unfortunately, they knew that we owned the Hanover Inn, and this was a rather horrible thing to do.

Okay, we wiped that out, but there would again and again be endless disgusting caricatures of Indians used in what some alumni thought were funny...Many class newsletter had Indians on it, sometimes in perfectly good taste and sometimes in horrible taste. The naked Indian participated with the cheerleaders, almost naked Indian, always a white, painted, and sometimes go through rather crazy antics at
football games. Eventually, it got the Native American groups sufficiently riled up that they demanded the abolition of the Indian symbol on the grounds that as long as this kind of caricature was around, they did not feel welcome at Dartmouth College.

That would lead to an issue that would not die throughout my presidency. I think I would like to tell the history of what happened here because I suspect that most people do not know the full history of this. Actually, the role I played… I'm not saying the role I played was necessarily the right one. It may have been the wrong one, but it's not the one most people think they played on it. It became generally believed that I was personally responsible for abolishing the Indian symbol, and that simply isn't true. Actually, on this issue, I was one of the rather conservative members of the board of trustees. Maybe I shouldn't have been. Future historians may find I was wrong on this issue, but I wasn't…Of course, after eventually the board voted de facto abolition, naturally in all my public statements I supported the policy of the board.

Here, Bob Kilmarx plays a major role, I don't know whether individually or in his role of chairman of COSA. I realized that this could be a horribly explosive issue, and I was trying to negotiate both with the alumni council and with Native Americans here a deal that would go somewhat as follows: we would commission a distinguished Native American artist to paint or draw a suitable Indian symbol for Dartmouth athletic teams and the alumni would agree to give up all caricatures. If they wished to use an Indian symbol, it would only be the official approved symbol. I thought that I was making fairly significant progress in that, but they were working through several different channels. Bob Kilmarx, I think at COSA, made a rather public statement. Sorry, he wasn't a trustee…

FANELLI: He wasn't a trustee at that time, he was the chairman of the committee.

KEMENY: The alumni council committee, that's what it was. Thank you. That was the missing link. That's, in a way, what made it more complicated, because as chairman of COSA, to have reported privately to the board rather than publicly. The alumni council set up its own committee and chose Bob Kilmarx to be chairman of it. Thank you. I couldn't quite figure out how it got public.

While these negotiations went on, the alumni council committee made a recommendation to the board of trustees to abolish the Indian symbol. Of course, that recommendation was read out at an alumni council meeting, which makes it public property.

FANELLI: And it was approved by the alumni council.
KEMENY: It was approved then by the alumni council. Years later, alumni would not believe that the whole thing really officially started with the alumni council.

FANELLI: Actually, I don't think they used the word "abolition," John. I know you said de facto, which is correct. They said encourage the discontinuance of, or something like that, because it was never officially adopted, so they couldn't…

KEMENY: No. And the board vote would follow similar language and carefully say that of course they're not trying to dictate conscience but strongly urged everyone not to use the symbol.

FANELLI: Some people, by that time, had started to stop using the symbol. I think the athletic department had done that, and The Dartmouth had taken off the…

KEMENY: Some had done it voluntarily. On the other hand, the board would eventually have to step in. First they made it a matter of choice, but then some coaches decided to use it anyway. There the board would eventually have to step in and say, "Okay, what we meant is students, faculty, et cetera, it’s voluntarily, but certainly it's mandatory for college officers, which includes coaches." That would take quite a while, and of course that's an issue over which the alumni went up in arms. I think future historians ought to study that issue to figure out what were all the reasons why alumni would go up in arms over that issue.

Before I go to that, let me complete the sequence. Bob Kilmarx, chair of the committee of the alumni council, comes with this recommendation; the alumni council approves it. It goes to the board, and that put the board into a rather difficult situation. I have to confess I was not in favor of that vote, though the board had discussed it before then, and my position was the one I explained, to abolish all caricatures and try to come up with a version of the symbol that would be acceptable to Native Americans. Somehow, after the alumni council vote, the majority of the board felt that it was impossible to stay with that position.

FANELLI: Yes. Wasn't one of the things, John, that it was the difficulty of abolishing… You have some control over the college with respect to caricatures, but the downtown merchants who put Indians on diapers, that you can't control.

KEMENY: You can't control that. On the other hand, the trustee vote didn't stop that anyway. I mean, there's one particularly bad store downtown that I try not to shop in—it's called the Dartmouth Co-op—that has a rather annoying habit of really having some of the worst of it. I've never made a public protest, but I just don't go into that store because I think they do things in bad taste.

What I'm saying is, the arguments on whether to adopt the alumni council resolution or not, that's not a potent argument because whether the board adopted
that resolution or not, you're not going to help what people do. Any rate, there I found myself on the minority and conservative side in this particular issue. But the board did adopt the resolution, and of course it became college policy and would have to be reasserted over and over again. It would certainly end up being one of the issues on which we had to spend an enormous amount of time.

The reason I said it would be worth future historians studying this issue is because… I don't know whether the feelings were that emotional over the symbol, or whether for some alumni possibly the… None of them would publicly protest against equal opportunity or the presence of too many minorities. It is possible that the symbol issue was sort of an indirect way of letting out racial prejudice. I don't mean that that was the only one, but some of it was just plain being outraged. Why should a small group of students abolish what by that time alumni believed Eleazar Wheelock personally [brought] to Dartmouth College? We'd have to reargue the history of it over and over again and the reasons for it, and that issue never did die. It would have various ramifications. It would come with the Hovey murals, and it would come up in many other situations later on.

FANELLI: John, you were talking about NAD and being the positive group that they were. I can remember only one time, and I don't mean that this is not positive… But they did come into the office with Michael Dorris, and it was a particularly critical time because something had happened —and I've forgotten what it was now— that induced a number of them to even apply to other colleges or something. Michael Dorris was quite concerned, and you sat and talked with him for quite a while.

KEMENY: Was this the skating incident?

FANELLI: That was the skating incident, right.

KEMENY: Yeah. You reminded me of the worst individual incident that would cause problems where I was put into a no-win situation. I believe on balance I handled it right, given the options I had. Let me describe the incident and what happened.

During a Dartmouth hockey game, some skaters came out during one of the intermissions in sort of almost naked Indian costume and skated all around and created a big disturbance there. They thought they were just being funny, or maybe some of them were on the side of keeping the Indian symbol.

FANELLI: I think one of the complicating things was that they came out onto the ice just before the team skated out.

KEMENY: Just before the team skated out, so it looked as if they were sort of leading…
FANELLI: It looked like they were leading the team, and then there was applause for the team coming out on the ice and you couldn't tell who the applause was for.

KEMENY: You couldn't tell who was being applauded. That's true. And they might not have gotten applause anyway. Remember it's hockey, and frankly, hockey players tend to be amongst the most conservative students on campus, and sometimes amongst the worst troublemakers. I checked, that's true not just at Dartmouth but also at other institutions. Therefore, whatever it is, there was a combination of factors that they, in effect, staged it so that they got big applause on this, so it became a cause celebre. The students were brought up on charges before the student judiciary committee. I think it was still CCSC at that time. They were heard out, and the College Committee on Standing and Conduct had some people on it who were so mad at them, they threw the book at them. They were, I think, suspended effective immediately for a year, or whatever. I mean, it's what is considered a very major penalty at Dartmouth College. For example, it was fairly late in the term, they lost all the work they did, the tuition they had paid, and they lose a year.

Also, at that time, the rules still were that the president was the appeals officer, though I had managed to limit it to cases of suspension or separation from the institution. Of course, they appealed the case to me. We heard both sides, and we heard the whole issue and had long talks with Dean Manuel on the subject. No matter how we looked at it, we just could not... We certainly agreed that the students needed to be punished, but the punishment was out of proportion with what they did. It was a student prank in very bad taste, but it was really no more than that. They hadn't done anyone physical harm. Certainly student pranks much worse than that had drawn lesser sentences. Somehow the sentence was somewhat politically motivated, which one can't, as president of the college, defend, no matter how much I abhorred what they did.

Also, they had offered that if they were allowed to stay on at Dartmouth, they would be willing to go... They said, through the process of all the hearings, they became much more sensitized to the issue of Native Americans and why they get so upset, and they had offered that they would work very hard to talk to others on this and to talk on the subject.

So I commuted the sentence from suspension to probation for a year, which is still a major penalty, but not with the obvious losses. It certainly means if they had committed any act, no matter how small, during that year, they would have been suspended. Part of the terms of probation was that they had to go and do good works in terms of speaking at fraternity groups, particularly, about the sensitivities of Native Americans.
The problem there was, both sides felt I was unfair. Some people felt that the students shouldn't have been punished at all because it was only a prank. First of all, I did not agree with that, but secondly, even if I did, that power I did not have. My power there was, unless somehow new evidence came up or something, the jury had found them guilty, all I could do was commute the sentence to a lesser one. Of course, Native Americans and blacks jumped on the bandwagon here, felt that this was great politically. Native Americans were outraged, and blacks, I'm sure, saw this as an opportune political issue that I was being soft on the violators here. So it was a no-win situation. And you're quite right, almost all the Native Americans came to my office with Michael Dorris because they were horribly upset. I did my best for more than an hour to try to explain to them what the situation was and why I did what I did.

FANELLI: It was a good meeting, as I recall. There was a positive feeling at the end of it.

KEMENY: Absolutely. The penalty had different effects on different ones. One of those skaters actually was an outstanding freshman hockey player who later became a great star, and you can't participate in intercollegiate athletics when you're on probation, so it was by no means a trivial punishment to that one. I did meet him in his senior year and had a long talk, and I think he turned into a quite nice kid afterwards, and he regretted what he had done as a freshman.

End of Tape 7, Side B
Beginning of Tape 8, Side A

KEMENY: May I say one more thing on that subject? You asked me about college officers. This was certainly a policy on which several college officers were quite upset. I had to read them the riot act. But I had no control over ex–college officers. I must say our vice president for development and alumni affairs emeritus, Mr. Ort Hicks [Orton H. “Ort” Hicks ’21 TU ’22], was a terrible pain in the neck on this issue. Not just on this one, but this was the worst one. Sometimes, with the best of intentions, he just kept the pot boiling over and over and over again, so that was very hard.

FANELLI: You were going to comment on the Afro-American Society.

KEMENY: Yes. Afro-Am is a very different story. I mean, it was partly peer support and it did serve that purpose, but it was also sort of a political action kind of group. It had its ups and downs, depending on what the leadership was like. As a matter of fact, I remember once late in my presidency a major revolt within Afro-Am when students felt they had become too political and they were not representative of most of the membership of it, and they managed to throw out the leadership and put in still strong but more moderately oriented leadership. But it was a power base for ambitious students, both men and women. Frankly, it was a group that
would look for a political issue so that they could get maximum publicity and get out of it what they could.

They also in many areas played a very positive role. They certainly pushed the college, and rightly so, to work harder to bring in able black students. As a matter of fact, at one point, interestingly enough, they accused the college of admitting too many not well-qualified black students, and therefore making blacks look bad on campus. Although it was certainly not true that the admissions office was intentionally admitting them, this was during the stage I talked about earlier when we hadn't yet figured out how to measure students. While they pushed for a larger number of students here, they always pushed for a larger number of qualified students. They did not push, on the contrary, they pushed against any lowering of academic standards for the admissions of blacks. I think they rightly argued that if we even admitted a small number of totally unqualified blacks here, somehow people who were looking for reasons would simply say black students here are not qualified. Again, they never pushed for giving degrees to black students who didn't earn it, because, as they said over and over again, they didn't want their own diplomas to be watered down, they didn't want the rumor to be that blacks have to meet a lower standard for a Dartmouth degree than whites.

So on some quite crucial issues, they always had a positive attitude, but whether it was affirmative action or the number of blacks we had or incidents that occurred on campus, they did have a tendency of blowing incidents way out of proportion, which political activist groups tend to do to get the maximum amount of publicity out of it.

Here the issue of South Africa would become a very big issue. It was a board issue in which I did not personally play a major role, but even trustees that would be very liberal on equal opportunity, would be very conservative on the issue of South Africa. It's an issue that existed on many campuses as to whether… First of all, the issue was whether U.S. corporations ought or ought not to invest in South Africa. Of course, you could say, well, if you think a corporation shouldn't, go to the corporation and protest, but obviously they can't do that, so what students on various campuses did was…There's the highly varied portfolios Ivy-type schools have, there would invariably be in it corporations that have invested in South Africa. They would then protest on the college campus and ask for divestiture of stocks in those corporations.

That would be a difficult issue for the board then. Many of the usually liberal trustees would… As I've said before, some of the strongest trustees tended to be business leaders, and on this issue they had a quite different position. They would argue for saying that this was fundamentally wrong, that you invested in a corporation in order to maximize returns. They would even argue that choosing a portfolio on the grounds of moral reasons, they could be accused of not carrying
out their trusteeship responsibilities by not maximizing the return. When they took that extreme a position, usually enough trustees argued on the other side that certainly there would be some moral bounds of how they invested. The vast majority of the board drew the line at divestiture simply because a corporation had an investment in South Africa.

For a long time nothing terribly constructive happened until a black minister, I think on the board of directors of General Motors, had come up with a set of principles. Sullivan was his name. They call it the Sullivan Principles. They came up with a set of principles as guidelines that corporations needed to meet to be acceptable in the subject of investing in South Africa and how they did it and what positions they did. That was fairly broadly adopted, and our board did eventually take a position that they would, in the long run, invest only in corporations that did subscribe to the Sullivan Principles, and in the transition stage, wherever an opportunity arose, vote in favor of or write letters in favor of the corporation adopting the Sullivan Principles.

Divestiture was always a good political issue because it's so very complicated to explain the issues in it. A politically active group can make a lot of hay out of it.

The South Africa issue was not limited to blacks, but it had a lot of black participation in it. There were many militant whites in there, too.

FANELLI: Would you want to say a few words about the Black Alumni Association that developed, and all of the…?

KEMENY: Yes. Black alumni organized themselves. It was particularly important for them in the early days when they represented such a tiny fraction of the alumni organization. They both felt that that way they would not be an incoherent group, and some of them also said privately to me that what went on at a typical alumni affair did not interest them very much. I'd heard that from white alumni also [Laughter], so there's nothing racially separate about that, having had to sit through a great many alumni affairs myself. Other than my own brilliant speeches on those occasions, I occasionally found them deadly boring.

FANELLI: We should do…

KEMENY: We should do an alumni — and reunions. But just in case I forget, I won't identify the class because I don't even remember which class it was which, during their twenty-fifth reunion, took hundreds of pictures, and therefore my speech got later and later in the night. The one I never forgot is when we thought it was ready for me to speak, somebody got up and said, "Hey, everybody in the freshman B tennis team come out here. We want to take your pictures." So my speech was delayed another five minutes because of the freshman B tennis team.
[Laughter] Jean and I, whenever we had to go to twenty-fifth reunions, we always said, “We wonder if we'll see the freshman B tennis team at the reunion.”

Certainly it was not just an excuse, that there were activities that interested them more than the normal alumni activities. So they formed a separate organization. Partly it was… On occasion, it was a militant group to push for more blacks being admitted, or on certain other issues. But I found it an overwhelmingly positive group, and it grew more so as the years went by and the number grew. For example, they would… Not all of them, but enough of them would play a very major active role in recruiting black students. They would work together with Afro-Am here and set up a good system by which together… For example, students when they went home for vacations would visit local, say the school they graduated from, and talk up Dartmouth as a good place for black students to go to. So between the black alumni organization and Afro-Am, we got an enormous amount of help in recruiting black students. It certainly was part of what turned around our difficulty in attracting black students here.

FANELLI: I recall there was even a system set up where after blacks were admitted to the class, we asked some of the Black Alumni Association people to write letters if they were in the same area.

KEMENY: Yes. In a way, we certainly very early put as much effort into recruiting Native Americans as we did into football stars. We would eventually… The system you have just described is almost exactly analogous to an alumni network we had for accepted athletes. Some alumni organizations are very good and did this for all accepted students from the region. Occasionally, that was some of the pleasanter affairs on which I went in, if I happened to be visiting in that crucial two-week period after acceptances were out and before they had to agree to come. This would be the second half of April, which usually was alumni tour for me, so I did periodically sit in on some of those meetings and say a few words. Those are fun because all those students knew that they were coming to Dartmouth. As I said, some alumni club did a heck of a good job inviting all of those and talking up Dartmouth and trying to persuade them to come to Dartmouth. The Black Alumni Association started doing that for accepted black students, and that did make a difference in a large number of cases.

FANELLI: John, that reminds me of something that I should ask you about. I personally don't have any knowledge of it, but perhaps from your perspective you do. One of the key gates, let's say, in the admissions process is the alumni interviewing committee. Did you ever hear of cases of difficulty in connection with equal opportunity, that there was prejudice there against a black or a Native American candidate?
KEMENY: Yes. There were periodic accusations of it, and invariably what I did is I asked Eddie Chamberlain [Edward T. “Eddie” Chamberlain Jr. ‘36] to investigate it. He personally rode herd on those alumni interviewing committees. I know, of the… There were not a large number, but there were a few, and I'd say in half the cases he said he found no evidence, and in half the cases he got substantiating evidence. Eddie certainly didn't try covering it up and would make a change.

I know one where I got direct evidence because it was a New York. It happened to be not on the issue of blacks; it happened to be on women. It was not a question of prejudice in that case. Occasionally, this was not even prejudice, just the way they were treated. Some whites feel so uncomfortable with blacks that it just comes across. Here it was with women. There was a New York City interviewing group that consisted of an older alumnus—I have no recollection of who it was, I think someone I may not even have known—and two relatively younger alumni, one male and one female who were doing the interviewing. The female alumna, who happened to be my daughter, called me and said, "For God's sake, Daddy, do something about this if you want to get any women to come to Dartmouth from New York City." And I said, "What is it? Is it prejudice?" She says, "Probably, but that isn't the issue." It's sort of the "men and girls" syndrome, the language that you have to educate even trustees on, that you don't say "men and girls." You either say "boys and girls" or you say "men and women." I mean, just somehow the way that particular alumnus talked to prospective women applicants, it totally turned them off.

In that case, Eddie most certainly agreed and made… That alumnus got… The alumni interviewers would serve for many years, and then they would rotate. Then Eddie would write them a very beautiful thank you letter. I remember this particular alumnus that June got a very profuse letter of thanks from Eddie Chamberlain for his long years of service, which must have come as a surprise to him because his current term had another two years to run. [Laughs]

So, yes, there were incidents. They were isolated ones and they were not always easy to spot. The problem was that it was hard to get feedback on it, because the students who were turned off would not give you feedback. It had to be somebody else who was on the interviewing committee who picked up the bad vibes.

We were helped later on by having… It's one of the things I urged seniors. They are only limited services very young alumni can do, that one thing they should volunteer for is the alumni interviewing and recruiting. I'm very happy about the large number of young alumni who played roles in that.
FANELLI: John, in going over the trustee minutes for this interview, I was reminded that the board created a second committee on equal opportunity in 1975 under the chairmanship of Stan Smoyer [Stanley “Stan” Smoyer ‘34].

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: The committee submitted a lengthy report in 1976 with over forty recommendations for action by the college. The subcommittee of COSA was set up to monitor the responses to those recommendations, and in September 1976, Frank Smallwood issued a memo summarizing the college's response to a portion of the recommendations. Then six months later, or nine months later, they issued another statement regarding the remaining ones. Responses to the remaining recommendations were considered by the board at the January 1977 meeting. As I recall, there was some disagreement over the language regarding the college's response to recommendation number one. According to the minutes, you said you were not prepared to support it at that time, that is the language of the college's response.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Unfortunately, I couldn't find the draft memo showing what recommendation number one was. If you could remember it, could you comment on that?

KEMENY: I remember it as being a terribly confusing board action because the board never approved the Smoyer Report. Let me start there.

FANELLI: That's correct, right.

KEMENY: The trouble with it was that there were many excellent points in it, some which the board might have accepted with modification and some which frankly the board was not in favor of, neither was I. Not necessarily the same ones, but I had serious reservations about some of them also. The board passed some sort of very confusing vote in which they accepted the report and somehow directed me to implement those that were reasonable. It amounted to something like that, which is a hopeless kind of vote where, in effect, the board passed the buck to me to decide which ones to implement and which ones not to implement. There was the vote protecting the board, and I had nothing protecting me, so anything that didn't get implemented, I was the target for it.

FANELLI: I think it just came back to me, John, as you were talking. One of the recommendations had to do with, as I recall, that there should be some agreement or correlation between not the number of blacks accepted and the number of blacks in the population, but the number of blacks graduating and the number of blacks as a proportion of the population. So instead of saying that we ought to
have about 9% or 8% or whatever it was, 7% in the incoming classes, the recommendation of this group had to do with the number should be proportionate with those graduating.

KEMENY: Yes. There may have been that complication and there was a complication that goes back to the original McLane Report. The board, or I, was periodically accused of not really having implemented the McLane Report. Again, the McLane Report was accepted only in principle and led to the setting up of the first equal opportunity program to decide what the board should actually implement. The McLane Report had the unfortunate… Look, the McLane Report, on balance, had an overwhelmingly positive outcome. I have to repeat that. And I was all in favor of the principle of what they wanted to do. But they came up with the sort of naive statement that, let's say, blacks should be in the student body in proportion in which they are in the nation, which creates a quota system. Given the educational and other differences that may exist in our society, it is just not a realistic one unless you start severely discriminating in favor of blacks. I don't mean taking into account non-traditional criteria, but that was really a required discrimination. The board certainly never accepted that principle. There were tones like that, I think, in the Smoyer Report, and there may have been the further complication with putting it in terms of the percent graduating.

FANELLI: Stan Smoyer himself objected.

KEMENY: Yes. It was a split report. He wasn’t the only one. The committee came in unanimously on a number of those recommendations, but there was a minority report on some of the recommendations. So it was by no means a unanimous one.

If that clause was in that report, that's something I consistently objected to, that I would be willing to talk in terms of targets for admission because I knew how to do that, but under no circumstances would I accept any guidelines on how many had to graduate because the only way you can achieve that is by lowering graduation standards. I mean, you can work in that direction by giving students all the help they can get, which hopefully Dartmouth will do for all its students, and making the campus atmosphere such that they desire to stay here, that they won't drop out. But quotas in terms of how many graduate just do not make sense.

At any rate, in general, I tried to get away from any hard and fast quota system, because you're dealing with relatively small numbers here and it's a matter of luck. The year we had over 9% in the freshman class, just everything went in our direction. We had gotten some good publicity. Alumni and students did a good job. We had good applicants. We got a large percentage of those we admitted. The next year I know we admitted exactly the same number of black students. We were terribly happy about it. And I don't know what happened. I think a
couple of other schools launched their own major drives for blacks, and they took enough blacks from us so we would drop from one year from 9% to 7.5% the next year, through no fault of our own. Therefore, outright quotas are just not meaningful here.

FANELLI: John, so far we've talked about blacks and Native Americans and women. Obviously there are other minorities. During your presidency, were you ever asked to initiate efforts regarding equal opportunity for other minorities?

KEMENY: Yes. The major… Of course, we did have one in place for a white disadvantaged group, northern New England from poor backgrounds. We did, under that, give preferential financial aid and preferential admission. Yes. Later on, there would be considerable pressures, particularly from the Hispanic community. I kept the principle, and the board supported me, that the original equal opportunity committee—which I happened to have chaired—recommended that we were certainly to not discriminate against any minority group. Any well-qualified student should be admitted, irrespective of race, and later, irrespective of sex.

The question always is whether you will launch a special effort for a particular minority group. But I've learned enough that you do not do that without building very substantial support facilities, and I just did not feel that Dartmouth could afford one more of those. In addition to which, we were as badly situated for Hispanics as we were for blacks, maybe worse so. It would have been an incredibly large effort, and my argument was that Dartmouth is making its contribution by major efforts for blacks and for Native Americans, which most schools weren't taking. A school like the University of Chicago, let's say, or California schools, or other schools, were in a much stronger position—or New York schools—to do things for Hispanics. Periodically, there would be protests over that, but I did not change the policy of that.

FANELLI: We probably haven't exhausted the area of equal opportunity, but let's move to the affirmative action, if it's all right.

KEMENY: Sure.

FANELLI: This is a related subject obviously and there's the whole relationship of the fact that students from minorities need role models of various kinds, and those role models ought to be on the faculty and in the administration.

KEMENY: Yes. It's both the issue of role models, and particularly in the early years, they played a very important support role, both for minorities and for women. The presence of even relatively small numbers of those groups on the faculty helped students. They had places to go to for advice. So we wanted to work quite hard both on the faculty and in the administration to bring in members of minority
groups and increase the number of women. Alex, by any chance, you researched the trustee minutes, what was the date of the first trustee vote on affirmative action?

FANELLI: I have it right here. The first mention of affirmative action in the trustee minutes is at the April 1972 meeting when Marilyn [Austin] Baldwin gave a brief summary of the affirmative action plan. It was at that meeting that the board affirmed that Dartmouth College is an equal opportunity employer, that is, they actually voted that and approved in principle the draft affirmative action plan.

KEMENY: Yes. Now, let's see. The problem may be a linguistic one, because by the time it's done in that form, there are federal requirements.

FANELLI: I'm not sure when the federal requirements came in. The draft of the plan preceded the federal requirements.

KEMENY: My recollection is that the first approval, at least in principle, of something precedes any federal requirement for such a plan.

FANELLI: Well, then it was not recorded in the minutes, because this is the… Here are all the votes on affirmative action, all the minutes on affirmative action, and this one is the…

KEMENY: The problem may be also one of semantics, that affirmative action was the official wording used by the federal government, and you have to have a plan called an affirmative action plan. This could have been discussed in a board meeting under a different heading. I have no idea what it would take…

FANELLI: I can go back and look and see if we can find it.

KEMENY: I know we approved a plan, before… I mean, there was talk that the federal government was going to require it, but I remember vividly the discussion that the majority of the board supported me on the position that Dartmouth should adopt its own plan because it felt it was right and not because it was required by the federal government. What happened after the federal government put down requirements, Marilyn Baldwin, I know, worked on bringing our plan in line with federal requirements, which usually were more in form than in substance. It would be because we had such a head start and because at least a good majority of the board was committed to it, and certainly I was, that we would be the first school in New England to have its affirmative action plan approved.

Now, let's talk about the issues on affirmative action. The issue always is manyfold, and one will get opposition from all kinds of sources. For example, it certainly is not true that faculty support for affirmative action was anything as
overwhelming as it was say for the admission of women, or the admission of black students.

There are several aspects of affirmative action. First of all, the word affirmative action comes from the argument that just not discriminating is insufficient to correct for past discrimination, but you actually have to take affirmative action, that is take positive steps to correct for past discrimination. Secondly, it raises the issue as to how far you lean over backwards. If you've got two roughly equal candidates, will you, to correct for imbalances in the composition of the institution, take, let's say, the black or woman candidate over the white male candidate, because the institution needs more blacks and women?

Now, in all these, the answer is yes, but then there are all kinds of shadings. What we never did accept was a quota system. We did agree to have targets, and we set realistic targets, which we either met or often exceeded, or in all cases came very close to. I would monitor that very carefully from year to year, and periodically I'd have to do something about it. We can talk about the various categories separately.

The major impact of the federal requirements coming in is that it required an enormous amount of paperwork. Some of the opposition would come then because of the huge paperwork requirements, and in some cases, I suspected that that was an excuse from people who did not want to implement affirmative action in the first place. The admittedly excessive paperwork gave a convenient excuse for not acting under affirmative action. I'll have a great deal more to say, but maybe you'll want to change the tape.

FANELLI: Okay.

KEMENY: It's a complex issue. Let me first mention the board of trustees. While on equal opportunity the board is essentially unanimous, on affirmative action they may be essentially unanimous on principle in having something like an affirmative action plan, but on what it means and how to implement it and how hard to work at it, the board would range all over the place, from those who would have been perfectly happy with token action that satisfied the federal government to those who very strongly pushed on principle for going very far. Some might even have accepted the quota system. So you get the whole range on the board of trustees on this issue.

Let me take the faculty because it's a good example, and you're going to get enormous splits on the faculty on this issue. It's a good example of why
affirmative action is needed. I had been a departmental chairman before being president and therefore know how people tended to recruit faculty members. You might go out and visit a number of schools. You would go to the annual meetings. But basically, the most effective tool was that you called up friends who were chairmen of other departments, or influential senior members of other departments, to ask them if they had outstanding students who might be candidates, and if so, you'd like very much to meet them.

Particularly before most schools went coed, or certainly on the graduate level tended to go coed, your best friends tended to be at predominantly male institutions. In a field like mathematics, there were fewer women who went into the field than men. It just ended up that the friends of your friends tended to be men, white males, and therefore it's not that you discriminated against women. For example, the math department, though there were not that many women mathematicians, very early had an able woman mathematician, and I tried once—I told the story earlier—to attract a husband and wife team. But the normal methods of recruiting tended to lead primarily to white males, and therefore you perpetuate the system.

That's different from active discrimination. I don't think anybody in our department ever actively discriminated against either women or blacks, but we were used to a system that almost never led to a woman or a black as a candidate. So here is where affirmative action came, that you had to go looking for women and had to go looking for blacks. That's step one, which meant a great deal of extra work in establishing a new network and new connections in order to do that.

Step two then came. The first cut comes when you decide whom to invite to campus for interviews. That's what's now technically called the "short list," the ones you're really seriously considering. Part of the affirmative action plan is that your pool—that is, the overall list you come up with—including women or minorities who seem at all well qualified. You, first of all, lean over backwards to put some of them on the short list. What this amounted to is if, let's say your top ten candidates on some preliminary screening where you really don't have good information happen all to be white males, but the next group of ten has two women and one black in it, you add those two women and one black to the short list and have a short list of thirteen. It does not mean that you pick somebody who obviously is not qualified for your department. I'm quite sure if we had picked three white males from the second list, some of them might on balance have turned out to look stronger than some we had on our first list, but unless you lean over backwards, at least at this level, you never get to look at the women and black candidates.

And finally… So again this was extra work and in some places departments resented it. But the final and crucial one was that if you have roughly equally
qualified candidates, you will take the woman or minority member in preference to the white male. That a great many departments resented, and one would have continually and recurring battles with departments to force them to live up to the spirit of that requirement.

And departments would make mistakes. As a matter of fact, the mistakes in the early days on the faculty tended to be in hiring unqualified women or blacks. By unqualified I do not mean quite that, but let's say they were second-rate instead of being first-rate, and therefore they never had a chance of making tenure. Often they early recognized that they never would make tenure at Dartmouth College.

Also, for women the early years were hard because some of the student turmoil that I talked about earlier that made life unpleasant for women students also stretched out to make life unpleasant for women faculty members. Therefore, in the first three years of women faculty members we hired—I think it was three, at least two but possibly three—we had a disquietingly large number that dropped out of Dartmouth before they reached a tenure decision.

Conditions got better, our selection criteria got better, and we would do spectacularly later on. As a matter of fact, before I left office, there was some national survey, not done by Dartmouth, of a large number of private institutions, and amongst women in what's called the tenure track, the assistant professors who have a chance of getting tenure, we had a higher percentage of women than any of the other schools. It may have only been a fraction of a percent, but since those schools included schools that had long been coeducational, just being anywhere near the top was spectacular for us. I have followed that, and indeed, roughly the numbers I predicted did eventually make tenure. Not counting those first two or three years, roughly the same percentage of women made tenure that men did. So as long as we got it into a tenure track and they were well qualified, having enough tenured women was assured for the future. I think we now have twenty-five women tenured faculty members. That's a quite spectacular number, since the number… There was one when I became president and she retired, so it was zero for my second year in office. And you just don't make that many tenure appointments in any one year.

FANELLI: John, a big help to you in all this process was the affirmative action officer, and we had some particularly strong ones.

KEMENY: Yes. We had, in effect, an acting one who helped set up the system, and that was Greg Prince [Gregory S. “Greg” Prince Jr. ’63A], who did that in addition to other responsibilities. Greg was enormous help to me in many areas. I most certainly should have mentioned him in connection with minority students, and particularly the Native Americans. All through this period, but particularly before Michael Dorris came, it was Greg Prince who carried the overwhelming burden of this
problem, and he would be the one administrator that the students totally trusted and put in endless amount of time. Greg was enormous help, and he was a natural to turn to in drawing up the first affirmative action plans and being active affirmative action officer.

Then one had to go and get a real affirmative action officer, and it was symbolically very important it should not be a white male, even if the white male would be recognized as someone who leans over backwards to help minorities and women. Here I had the very good fortune of taking our most distinguished senior black faculty member, Errol Hill, and persuading him to take on affirmative action as a half-time responsibility.

FANELLI: I guess you really did have to persuade him.

KEMENY: Oh, that's the only possible description. I think for future historians I should say a few words about Errol Hill. Errol came to Dartmouth in the late '60s. He is from Trinidad. He is in the drama department, he is a playwright, a superb actor, an outstanding teacher, and a truly distinguished member of the faculty in any criterion, and certainly someone who would be recognized by the outside world as being at Dartmouth because he was outstanding. The fact that he happened to be black was a totally incidental characteristic in this case.

Incidentally, Errol has extremely high standards on all academic decisions. For example, he served a term on the tenure committee, which we'll have to talk about sometime, the Committee Advisory to the President. He tended to be amongst the toughest members of that committee and quite irrespective of race. He was a very tough member of that committee. Yet the entire black community had enormous respect for him and pride in his presence on this campus.

So I really had to persuade Errol. Being affirmative action officer was the last thing in the world he wanted to do, and he agreed to do that for a two-year period as a matter of social conscience. It was his contribution to this whole effort. The thing he enjoyed most in his life was a job that frankly couldn't possibly have given him any pleasure other than some indirect pleasure in a job well done. I remember any number of incidents of Errol coming to me horribly upset about discrimination he found or meaningless lip service being paid—that was more often—to affirmative action, asking what to do about it. Several times I remember Errol starting out horribly upset. Before we were through and we really realized what was going on in the department, we both ended up laughing almost hysterically because the situation was so ridiculous and so bad. I mean, we were not laughing out of pleasure, but, you know, "My God, what are we going to do with that hopeless situation there?" And he had these problems with several departments.
He was equally tough on recruiting of minorities and the recruiting of women. He had one additional advantage. Drama is in the humanities division, and the supply of women is much higher proportionately in the humanities than it is in the other divisions. So that was the area where we could make quickest progress. Being a fellow humanist, Errol was in an ideal position to put pressure on a department like the English department, which was somewhat slow to respond to affirmative action, to put it mildly.

FANELLI: Could you just say a few words about the duties of the affirmative action officer? He was to put pressure…

KEMENY: The affirmative action officer's job was in effect to monitor the affirmative action plan. In a sense, the affirmative action officer had very little power, but one very important thing at Dartmouth was, which was not true at most institutions, the affirmative action officer reported directly to the president. That was my decision, and that made the job a very different kind of job. The affirmative action officer could hold up the filling of a position long enough to launch a complaint. Originally, it was always to me; later on, when we got things better organized, to the appropriate dean or to the dean of the faculty or the dean of the associated schools, when he felt that an insufficient effort had been done or affirmative action was bypassed.

So there were sort of indirect powers, but really the main power was one of monitoring. Persuasion was the strongest weapon. But he did have the power to go to the president and launch a complaint. And I did, whenever that happened, react as best as we could.

In the last analysis, none of that would have worked if the campus didn't feel that I fully supported affirmative action. I don't think there were any doubts, at least amongst the faculty and administration, that affirmative action had my full support. I'm sure there were a lot of quiet complaints that I was supporting it too strongly. I happened to have had terribly strong feelings on this subject, and I probably pushed this area as hard as any area that I did.

FANELLI: Since you spoke about Errol Hill, perhaps you'd like to mention Margaret Bonz.

KEMENY: Yes. Errol Hill served with distinction for two years, got the machinery going, at least persuaded a number of departments to start taking affirmative action seriously. His last major service was he recruited his own successor. He just did a superb job. I mean, he found a woman with no previous Dartmouth connection in a strictly professional search. She was just completing her Ph.D., I believe at the University of Pennsylvania, in psychology. She was somewhat older than that would indicate. I mean, not an unusual sequence of having done undergraduate work, being married, and then going back for graduate work. I mention that only
that she was a mature person and having just gotten a Ph.D. from an outstanding graduate school, so she had her academic credentials. And she turned out to be sensational. Errol Hill was excellent in every way and made a major sacrifice, but Margaret Bonz was a first-rate professional to whom, for a certain number of years, that would be her major professional commitment, and she just did an absolutely sensational job.

I'm very happy to say for future historians that was not the end of her career. It's certainly a job you can't hold forever because it's a horribly frustrating one. There was a vacancy in the dean of freshmen about the time when Margaret really had served long enough. In a wide-ranging competition for dean of freshmen, she just easily won the competition and is, as I'm speaking, dean of freshmen at Dartmouth College, the first woman to hold that position.

I just cannot say enough good things about Margaret Bonz. For example, she had the right kind of persuasiveness, the right combination of empathy and toughness, an incredible amount of patience, and, incidentally, had very considerable quantitative skills, which are quite important, partly for federal reporting, but more importantly, the only way—in the long term, you monitor things by picking up numerical trends that are troublesome, if they are troublesome, and she did so several times.

FANELLI: She would see things in advance that when they became major problems, they were solved.

KEMENY: Yes. I had mentioned the problems with losing too many of the early echelon of women, and she wonders about that very early. We moved on that both by working harder to get better qualified people but also by attacking some of the working condition problems that we realized were serious problems. But there were things like salary equity studies, and she did not turn out the kind of two-bit studies that most institutions produce. You take the total number of people say in a department or an administrative area and compute the average salary for men and the average salary for women, and you forget to take into account that, say in a place like this, the women all tended to be younger, or the women on the faculty happened to be in the lower ranks because they were younger. She did quite sophisticated stratified studies but of comparable groups. Generally, we did all right in salary equity, but for example, she turned up a major inequity in the library area. But there were women of long standing.

Again, you see, that study would have made no sense without the job classification scheme that I mentioned that CMP helped us put in. With that, she could do fairly sophisticated things, and unfortunately it showed in the library that women, for comparable jobs and comparable seniority, were not getting comparable pay. The discrepancy wasn't huge, but it was enough that it took a
significant effort. We just plain raised the salaries of all the women in this
category by a significant amount the following year.

FANELLI: John, didn't she also create, or help create, some of the infrastructure there, like
the affirmative action review boards and those things?

KEMENY: Yes, that's correct. There was sort of, not a huge hierarchy, but I think just about
the right amount created. There was an affirmative action committee for each
major area, faculty, administration—students it was really more an equal
opportunity kind of thing—and staff. Then an overall review board which
consisted of the chair of each of the other groups, plus some additional people. It
was the job of that overall board periodically to advise her, to help monitor it, and
once a year to make recommendations to the president on where improvements
were needed. All of those reports were excellent, and I think most of the
recommendations were implemented.

FANELLI: John, do you recall if there were any faculty people or administrators other than
the affirmative action officers who were especially helpful in the affirmative
action effort?

KEMENY: Yes. I can also mention a number of faculty members who were the opposite.

FANELLI: Okay. [Laughs]

KEMENY: But certainly there was a good deal of support amongst faculty members on this.
There were some departments where there just plain wasn't any trouble, at least
after the machinery was in place. The problems, as usual, would come down to a
limited number of departments, or it would come down to someone dying to hire
so-and-so and they hadn't gone through the affirmative action procedure yet.
They would scream bloody murder that if they have to go through all of it, they're
going to lose a truly outstanding candidate they've come across. I know of no
case where they lost a truly outstanding candidate because of being forced to go
through the affirmative action process.

My recollections really are more in the direction of... Incidentally, it was an area
on which Leonard Rieser was most helpful because he was as committed to it as I
was and was quite willing to carry out the thankless job of sitting down with
departments for three-hour discussions to go over affirmative action. On the one
hand to allay their fears that this is not a quota system, and it's not that they have
to hire a second-rate person, but to explain over and over again why the process
was an important process.

FANELLI: What about the athletic area?
KEMENY: There were problems in a number of areas. Athletics was certainly one of them. The English department was one, the economics department was one. Those come to mind quickly, and I'm sure there were more isolated incidents in other departments.

Let me actually start with English rather than athletics. English would make an early lateral tenure appointment by having had a visiting professor who was then obligated to go back to a campus for a year, but then was brought back here as a full professor, which helped a great deal. It's the largest single department on campus, and that was the only way they could early get a full professor in there, which was Blanche Gelfant.

I'm almost sure it's she who told me the story, unfortunately not till sometime later, about the one activity they asked if you would mind being excluded from. She said that it was told to her, very politely of course, they want to treat her as a full colleague, but there's one activity that's sort of really an all-male kind of activity and would she mind if she did not get invited to their afternoon teas. That was an incident where I had a horrible trouble keeping a straight face because it was outrageous. But when one thinks of it, I thought they maybe once a month went down and got drunk together at some bar. Even there I'm not sure why they would want to exclude a woman colleague, but at least I would have some understanding. But afternoon tea, to this day, I don't understand that one. And of course they were told, after we found out about it, that no way could they exclude any colleague from any activity.

That's a department where there would be continual problems on this issue, where frankly there were several senior members who just did not feel comfortable with women colleagues. There would be a number of incidents where, usually, by the time you were all through, it was so confused you couldn't be absolutely sure what had happened. But again and again we would have trouble with affirmative action in the English department. I suspect that a few senior members of that department really did everything they could to undercut the affirmative action program.

Economics is notable to me because of one chairman. When Mug Clement [Meredith O. “Mug” Clement] was chairman of the department, it was the time of the first outside review of our affirmative action plan by a national committee chaired by a very bright black woman. The last part of the review process is that they talk to the president and report on the problems. She impressed me very much and gave what I thought was a very balanced report. As a matter of fact, overall, she frankly told us that they have to go home and go through all the paperwork and as far as she's concerned, we're going to get excellent marks for the efforts we've gone to for affirmative action.
But she had to call a few problems to my attention, most of which were legitimate and not major, except for one. She said she had to recount an incident. That she had met with the chairman of the economics department and they had not hired a woman. She said to him that she was fully aware of the fact that amongst Ph.D.s in economics, women are not a high percentage, and therefore she was not trying to hold him to some sort of quota, but still, they hadn't hired a single one during his term as chairman, and said, although the numbers aren't large, isn't it true that there are these days quite a few women Ph.D.s coming out in economics? His response was, "Oh, yeah, plenty of them are coming out, they're just no good."

That's how we almost did not get our affirmative action plan. Well, it was approved, but we could have had trouble with the implementation of it. It was clear to her that that attitude was so different from all the others, and also, it was one of those incidents where we both had trouble keeping a straight face, because it's so stupid in addition to everything else. In that case, we made very sure that Mug was not reappointed as chairman of the department.

FANELLI: And we now have some women economists.

KEMENY: Oh, we now certainly have some women economists. Now, athletics.

FANELLI: There was the whole thing of these women’s teams and the need to have some women, not only coaches, but in the direction of the DCAC [Dartmouth College Athletic Council].

KEMENY: Yes. The problem there was, the issues did not become very clear because actually Seaver Peters ['54] was director of athletics. I give him high marks for moving early to get women's teams started, and he recruited some good coaches. I remember our first women's coach, whose first name is Aggie and whose name at that time I do not remember because it's now Aggie Kurtz [Agnes Bixler “Aggie” Kurtz]. For future historians, being married to one of my oldest friends on the faculty. She was sensational, and she helped recruit others and sort of was in charge of building up women's athletics.

So, in a way, at the level of getting women's teams going and hiring good coaches, Seaver Peters really gets very high marks. The problem came, however, that these women couldn't work their way into the hierarchy of running athletics at Dartmouth College. There would be any number of bad incidents that would have repercussions and would have difficulties, and key decisions continually being made at meetings where only men were present. Not necessarily ignoring women's teams, or not even necessarily making decisions that were bad for women's teams, but naturally there was an enormous amount of resentment that the women weren't present, or no woman was present, and that was heard.
Eventually, we managed to get Louise O’Neal, but part of the problem there was Aggie Kurtz, although she was unhappy about this, she didn't want to spend her life fighting political battles. When Louise O'Neal came, she was quite different and she did push and would become assistant director and later associate director of athletics at Dartmouth College, but that took much too long and a great deal of blood was shed over that.

It took a long time till we managed to get a woman into… A big problem was in the area of sports news. Sports news would come out and it would consist entirely of the news of the male teams. A little tiny amount, when they happened to remember it, about women's teams. It would be ironic because over several years the women's teams, on the average, did much better than the men's teams. But eventually, Kathy Slattery [Kathleen "Kathy" Slattery Phillips] was hired there, who did a fine job there. Eventually, there too we got a woman in there. But really, in a way, that did not get corrected till there was a change in the head of the sports information section, because the previous incumbent of it seemed quite prejudiced against women's athletics.

FANELLI: John, would you like to make a quick comment about the role of the concerned women's faculty, which I think was… There were people on that that pushed for some sort of action.

KEMENY: Sure. I mean, they were very helpful in identifying problems, some of which I knew about, some of which I did not know about. Certainly any push they did in the direction of stronger enforcement of affirmative action, we were in favor of. But frankly, they weren't doing anything that Margaret and I weren't doing.

Where sometimes it became touchy with concerned women was when in effect they got upset when a particular woman faculty member did not get tenure. That's the one thing no president can discuss with any group, because, if necessary, you have to take the flak.

I remember an incident before I became president. I happened to serve on the tenure committee as a faculty member, when John Dickey got flak because a certain science professor, who was very popular with students, was let go. It was a unanimous vote, therefore clearly including mine, of the tenure committee that this faculty member should not get tenure. It's that sad example of a very able person who still hadn't published a paper, and our guess would be he'd never publish anything. Faculty members like that twenty years later become a joke, because they're totally out of touch with their field. That’s the kind of… John Dickey just took the flak, because there's very little you can do. And I would periodically have to do that. I had no case quite as celebrated as that one, but you just have to take it because you can't publicly explain the reasons as to why you let a certain faculty member go. That was an occasional problem with the
concerned women, but generally most of them realized that they couldn't argue about individual cases, they could only argue about the overall performance.

Once we started doing much better… Once we were past the first couple of years’ women, once the later women started coming up for tenure and they saw that they really were getting tenure in the same proportion as men, and their numbers in the assistant professor ranks grew, I think their concerns died down considerably.

End of Tape 8, Side B
Beginning of Tape 9, Side A

FANELLI:  John, you might want to comment briefly on the problem of the turnover among minority administrators. We had quite a period there where we would get some good minority administrators, and then they would go on to other places because they were much in demand.

KEMENY:  Yes. Let me put it in context. I think, in general, we did extremely well with women both on the faculty and in the administration. It took some time, but we had very great successes in both areas. On the faculty, with minorities, we actually did better on the senior level than on the junior level. We would sometimes go two years without… At least once we went two years without being able to attract a single young black faculty member, which is bad. Probably there was a weakness there in recruiting new black faculty members.

In the administration, we had terrific success with attracting black administrators, but unlike women where we kept most of them, we kept losing black administrators. I don't think it was work conditions, but the typical situation was that all schools wanted good black administrators, and since we had attracted some terrific ones, they were ready to hire them for a higher job, occasionally before the person may have been ready for it, but perhaps the person was ready for it and we simply didn't have an opening at a higher level to move that person into. Therefore, we kept losing a significant number of young black administrators. I talked with several of them, and of course Margaret Bonz had so-called exit interviews with all of them, and her conviction was that they were very happy at Dartmouth, typically very sorry to leave, but there was an opening at a higher level with more pay, which they simply felt they couldn't afford to turn down. They were not at all resentful to Dartmouth for not having a higher position to put them into. That's in a way an unsolvable problem.

FANELLI:  Yes. I remember, I guess it was in Leonard's office? It was Brunetta Wolfman?

KEMENY:  Yes. I have to talk about one more issue, and this is the spouse issue, which is closely related to the hiring of women. As a matter of fact, Brunetta Wolfman's
case is an interesting one, but in general, you have the problem that we lost faculty members of either sex because their spouse wanted a professional job, and we simply did not have a position. Take the simplest case when they're both faculty members. First of all, one may be first-rate and one may be second-rate. Or they may both be first-rate but we've got no opening for the other one.

That issue would be battled back and forth. In order to eliminate discrimination, you have to have a rule that you will hire spouses as individuals and not as a team. On the other hand, if you took that literally, you may never get a married person at all. Therefore, you compromise that somewhat, where you give some preferential treatment to the spouse, but only to the point where there is an opening and the spouse is amongst the top candidates. You would take that.

We literally had to... We constructed various cases on paper and argued them out. This is one of the issues I remember talking about at great length with the concerned women faculty members and also with Margaret Bonz. It's a very difficult issue. I once constructed a hypothetical case and within a couple of years we had an actual case. Department A was dying to hire a woman faculty member, but she would only come if her husband got a job in Department B. And her husband got beaten out in Department B by a woman candidate. I think the two departments were romance languages and English, but I'm not absolutely sure of it. I mean, do you lean over far enough backwards to get an outstanding woman in Department A, to hire her husband in Department B if he is not the top candidate, particularly if that eliminates a woman from Department B? I mean, there are horrendously complicated problems there.

Here is where again we had a much harder time than other institutions because those that are near large metropolitan areas, there are other institutions or other organizations that would hire them, and that made it much easier to accommodate dual careers. We had some successes, nevertheless, and there are husband and wife teams at Dartmouth.

Let me turn to the Brunetta Wolfman case. It was one of the early ones and a very sad one. Brunetta is black, and she had worked part-time for Dartmouth, not here but when we had a program in California where our students worked as interns with minority groups. She supervised that program there while she, I believe, was completing her Ph.D. When she finished, Leonard Rieser thought she would be a terrific candidate for one of the associate dean positions in his office, and his chance to bring in a woman. She happened also to be black, but he did not have any woman in his office and brought her in as a senior colleague.

The problem was, she was married to a man, actually a white man, and very able with a very high position with the California state educational system. I interviewed him at length, and he gave me a long and very noble speech that for
so many years while they were raising children his wife had accommodated his career, that it was time that he accommodate hers. Obviously he would not come unless I found him a respectable job at Dartmouth College. He knew it could be no way comparable, either in seniority or in salary, to what he had in California, and he was willing to take a cut, which indeed he did. We found him a decent position here. I think he was put in charge of educational research. He claimed he was quite happy at that. He stayed at most two years, but it may have been one, when he was offered a much higher job in Massachusetts, and he went and took the job, which was certainly not fair according to any ethical standards.

They tried for a couple of years more to accommodate their marriage by weekend commuting one way or the other, but that just does not work out. Therefore, eventually we lost her. So that's a particularly sad case. As a matter of fact, we lost her to—I met her years later— to what was clearly a much less prestigious and less interesting job than she had here. In the end she had to go and accommodate her husband or have the marriage break up.

FANELLI: She's now president of a community college somewhere in Massachusetts.

KEMENY: I'm delighted then she has a job that she deserves. But the job she actually left us for was something like dean of students at a very small college. That's probably not quite right, but a job that anyone would rate as not comparable to the one she left here.

FANELLI: This is quite an important job she has now. And her husband, I believe…

KEMENY: This of course is very many years later, because she was quite early during coeducation.

FANELLI: I believe her husband is the vice president for finance, or that same kind of position, for one of the larger institutions in Massachusetts.

KEMENY: So the spouse problem would haunt us, and it's significant. It may be just twice as hard for Dartmouth to attract women than it was for many other institutions.

FANELLI: Was LeRoy Keith another case of someone that we lost?

KEMENY: LeRoy Keith was an example of someone who was offered a much higher position. I stayed in touch with Roy and we're good friends, and I serve as one of his references. He has had trouble getting a high enough position. I think he is someone who is an example of a very talented person who moved into a high position too early. Possibly did not do as well because of that, and therefore it was not good for his eventual career that he moved that early.
John Kemeny Interview

Yes, he was here as associate dean of the college, so number two student affairs officer, and was tempted to a higher position in Massachusetts. He still thinks back, I think, to his Dartmouth days as his happiest days. Roy has been trying to get a college presidency, and I have recommended him for several. I'm afraid there are certain weaknesses in his background because of having moved too fast into high positions.

FANELLI: John, in your ten-year report, you said that the one unrealistic goal in the affirmative action plan was that 50% of new appointments for administrators should be women.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: But you also said you were proud of the proportion of women who were in the administrative ranks at the time of your ten-year report, which was close to 30%, I think.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: But that was an unrealistic goal?

KEMENY: That was an unrealistic goal in retrospect. On the other hand, we didn't have a separate goal for senior ones, and since women did stay on, I'm very pleased with the number of women who moved into quite senior administrative positions.

FANELLI: Including librarian?

KEMENY: By the time I stepped down… Because Ruth Adams was there temporarily in a very senior, in a vice presidential position, but at the echelon just below that, we sort of make the analogy that the vice presidential ranks correspond to deans of schools, and what were grades seven and eight roughly corresponded to full professor rank and the salaries were roughly comparable. So on that level, you have the librarian of the college, and Lu Martin [Lucretia L. "Lu" Martin] in charge of major gifts, and Marilyn Baldwin as associate dean of the college, and Margaret Bonz as dean of freshmen. I'm not sure whether it was that or one step below, Louise O'Neal when she became associate athletic director. I'm quite sure I'm overlooking some people. Let's see. What areas am I overlooking? And quite a large number of women at the next level, which corresponded to associate professor.

FANELLI: Yes. There was… At the career and private services level, she was very, very good, and then she left with her husband [Britta McNemar].
KEMENY: Yes. He became headmaster of Andover. [Donald McNemar] Yes, we lost both an outstanding faculty member and an outstanding woman administrator. There were a few losses like that, but basically, there we had a fairly high retention rate. Women started finding… Obviously student affairs, because we made a very conscious effort there to bring in women as we went coed, led the way. Also Ralph Manuel had a very strong commitment to affirmative action. But one found them in interesting other positions, such as librarian and one of the most senior officers in fundraising, which are not the kind of positions where you typically find women at traditionally all-male schools. I mention that because it usually takes time to move into those ranks. In Lu Martin's case, it was moving up over a period of a decade, and in the case of the librarian, it was an outside search that led to a woman candidate being chosen, and they certainly are both first-rate.

FANELLI: John, we mentioned I think in passing that affirmative action was, in a sense, a more controversial issue on the board than equal opportunity. It was also among alumni in general.

KEMENY: Also amongst alumni. Alumni tend to take a simplistic view of it. Again, they are influenced by what happens elsewhere. I'm quite sure that some colleges that were terrified of losing federal aid just went out and hired particularly minority groups, qualified or not, just to meet some preconceived quota, which was the easiest way to prove that they were in compliance. I'm quite sure that many of them made compromises, and therefore people who lived near institutions like that assumed that all affirmative action plans were like that. But also, you run into prejudices there, not just on minorities, and there are obviously prejudices about minorities, but about women, men who don't believe that women are that qualified and assume that any woman who gets a senior position gets it because there was favoritism because she is a woman. So prejudice plays a role in that.

FANELLI: Well, I think that's about all the questions I had.

KEMENY: Unlike some other areas like the Indian symbol, I think in the long run the affirmative action concerns of alumni tended to die down. I don't remember getting so many questions in later years on that subject. That certainly was not a live one, particularly when they started getting to know some of them. And there were some key women who played major roles in that. For example, one of the earliest woman administrators they got to know well was in admissions, and we lost her because she married an alumnus. Her husband is now attorney general of the state of California. Let's see. It's John… [John K. Van de Kamp ‘56]

FANELLI: I'm blanking out on the name, but I know who you mean. [Andrea Fisher]

KEMENY: She was extremely talented. She happened to get the West Coast district as an area, and she was hired… She had substantial previous admissions experience in
New York, I think for one of the graduate schools of Columbia, and was terrific. She just made an incredibly good impression on the alumni, and that helped a great deal. At any rate, the issues that have regional significance, and the whole coeducation issue, was not as hot on the West Coast as it was in the Northeast or in Chicago because all the schools there were coeducational from the beginning. So she was an early excellent ambassador, just totally professional and absolutely first-rate.

Then later, during the major fund drive Lu Martin did such a sensational job. You would think fundraising from alumni is one of these areas where you’d think a woman would have a serious handicap. It's very hard to work closely with Lu Martin and not lose any prejudices you may have had. Both you and I had that opportunity for many years. She was a terrific representative. As in athletics would Louise O'Neal be in later years.

John Van de Kamp is the alumnus. What is her first name? Gosh, and it's someone I've kept in touch with for a long time.

FANELLi: And she was a very nice person, too. Was her last name Fisher before she got married?

KEMENy: Yes, I think you're right. Now let's come up with her first name.

FANELLi: It was a nice name, too.

KEMENy: Yes. That's what it is, it's a somewhat unusual name. I've known her very well and I've stayed in touch with her over the years.

FANELLi: I'll try to remember before the next tape meeting. Incidentally, I wanted to correct something that I said before. I don't know where it came from, what corner of my mind. You said someplace in New Hampshire, and I said Dumbarton Oaks. You looked…

KEMENy: It didn't look right, no.

FANELLi: No, it wasn't. Of course Dumbarton Oaks is in Washington, D.C., and I know that very well. It must have been something… It was a conference you were talking about.

KEMENy: Yeah, and it's a famous place.

FANELLi: All I was trying to think of was conferences, and there was a Bretton Woods conference and that's not right either.
KEMENY: That's not right.

FANELLI: I'll have to try to find out what that was. I know it wasn't Dumbarton Oaks.

KEMENY: Oh, Grenville Clark played a major role in it, and he was the host. I'm trying to think. Jean would probably remember where it was.


[Tape off, then resumes]

FANELLI: This is May 22nd session of the oral history of President Emeritus John Kemeny. John, one incident we forgot to cover in the previous — last time — session we had when you were reminiscing about equal opportunity and affirmative action, was the Shockley incident. Do you recall that?

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: I guess that should be discussed under equal opportunity because it represents perhaps an extreme example of the problems that can arise for a university as a result of the political self-assertion of minority groups, which we had talked about also.

KEMENY: Yes. First of all, the Shockley incident occurred before I became president but fairly shortly before then. I happened to be personally involved in it because I was then chairman of the Committee on Equal Opportunity, and therefore some people turned to me for doing something about it.

FANELLI: I honestly didn't remember whether you had become president or it was just before.

KEMENY: It was shortly before then. There was a meeting of the National Academy of Sciences which happened to be at Dartmouth College. Professor Stockmayer, who was a member of the academy, was the local chairman for arrangements. At a meeting of the National Academy, any member of the academy can present a paper. Professor Shockley, a distinguished physical scientist, took the occasion to submit a paper that dealt with a subject having nothing whatsoever to do with his particular area of expertise. However, the rules of the academy don't say that members of the academy can only present papers on subjects in their specialty. After all, a physicist may find something important in biology, or whatever the case may be. I'm sure none of the rules of the academy had contemplated a physical scientist member of the academy using such an occasion to explain his rather far-out racial feelings.
Of course, word got around. Not only that, but he evidently alerted the press to the fact that he was going to do that, so knowledge was all over and a great many people were upset. Professor Stockmayer called me because of my chairmanship of equal opportunity, and several of us caucused to see how to handle it. It was clear that Professor Shockley could not be persuaded to withdraw the paper, nor would the academy forbid him to give a paper. Therefore, several of us prepared to respond seriously, but essentially to tear his paper apart. I mean, his paper was totally unscientific.

FANELLI: Had he circulated this before?

KEMENY: Just an abstract, but he had spoken on the subject elsewhere before, so we had some ideas from that, and just from the abstract one could judge what he was going to say.

What happened, as a matter of fact, was that everything went smoothly until it was time for him to speak, and quite a large number of black students on campus, members of Afro-Am showed up. They were very well organized and disciplined, and as soon as he started speaking, they started, I believe, clapping and just wouldn't stop clapping and in effect prevented him from speaking. No one could be heard. I attempted by writing a message on the blackboard to communicate with them, but it's a hard way of communicating, and to try to persuade them to allow him to speak and then allow the rest of us to respond to him, but did not succeed in that. The college had no choice but to impose disciplinary penalties on those students for violating free speech.

FANELLI: That's one of those instances where you get a conflict between two principles—the principle of freedom of dissent and freedom of speech—and then somehow you have to resolve it.

KEMENY: Yes. Any academic institution has to lean over backwards for freedom of speech.

FANELLI: In that connection, John, it was a previous—I think it was previous, because I'm sure it was before you were president—incident with George Wallace, when George Wallace came to speak. Do you remember that?

KEMENY: Yes, and as a matter of fact, I happened to be out of town at the time. I was attending, I think, mathematical meetings or giving a speech somewhere, so I had to get the details on that from Jean. I really only have very remote knowledge of the Wallace incident.

[Tape off, then resumes]
KEMENY: Before we get into our next topic, the last time I drew a blank on a person I both know well and like very much. I could tell you anything about her except her name. Her name when she came here was Andrea Fisher, and as I said, she's married now to John Van de Kamp. She was the first senior woman in admissions and did a superb job there. Incidentally, since I used that she is John Van de Kamp's wife for identification, I don't mean to limit her simply to the role of a housewife, because actually she has had a very distinguished career of her own. It happens by coincidence since we last met, Jean read somewhere that Andrea had won some very major public service award in California. So she went on to a quite distinguished career after she left Dartmouth.

FANELLI: John, the general area that we agreed to cover this time is the Dartmouth Medical School. This is such a complex subject that we may have to extend it over a couple of sessions. I imagine that only a few people at the college besides you and me have any idea of how much time you spent on matters relating to the medical school during the eleven years of your presidency.

That reminds me of a story. I think you used to tell this story at alumni gatherings about the university president who dies and is shocked to find himself at the gates of hell being welcomed by the devil. Satan tells him they are looking forward to having him enter because they need a new president for their university. The president begins to feel a little better, and he says to Satan that that doesn't sound so bad because he has run a university before. The devil smiles and says, "Ah, yes, but our university has two medical schools."

KEMENY: Yes. I told that story a number of times to alumni. I first heard it from President McGill of Columbia University, who also had all kinds of problems with the medical school. I don't know if it was original with him. It's the kind of joke that's really most appreciated by presidents of universities that have medical schools. It was a moderately successful joke with alumni, but alumni, particularly undergraduate alumni of an institution, have no idea how much time it takes.

Just on the time, I know there was one year when I counted it up, because it was, I think, at the time I wrote my five-year report. I know there was one year when my estimate was I spent one-third of my total time on the medical school. Given the size of it compared to the rest of the institution, that's a totally disproportionate amount of time. That was not typical, but for most of my years, some significant percentage went to it, and one year it was as high as one-third of my total time.

FANELLI: John, it's hard to know where to ask you to begin. One reason the subject seems to me to be so complex is that it is linked with a number of "outside" factors, such as the Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, the Hitchcock Clinic, the Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center, the changing tides of federal support for medical
schools, and the changing needs for doctors in the United States. I know you will want to refer to some or all of these elements as you discuss the topic.

Also, this is another one of those subjects about which there was a real division of opinion on the board of trustees, with at least one trustee holding a position that might be described as severely questioning the utility of maintaining the medical school because of its financial situation and the impact of that situation on the college.

I guess we should also point out for the record that the Dartmouth Medical School, for the first thirteen years of its existence, 1798 to 1811, awarded a bachelor of medicine degree and then awarded the M.D. degree for the next hundred and two years, 1812 to 1914, before it became a two-year school and then of course later became a four-year…

KEMENY: Yes. Thank you for filling in the dates. I wouldn't have remembered all of them. It's actually the fourth oldest medical school in the country. John Dickey, at the bicentennial commencement, had some fun since Kingman Brewster was here, and Kingman Brewster gave John Dickey a hard time that Dartmouth was founded by a Yale man, and John Dickey got back at him by pointing out that the Yale Medical School was founded by a Dartmouth Medical School faculty member.

It was a highly respectable medical school somewhere in the 18-teens. When did we go back to… You just read the dates.

FANELLI: From 1812 to 1914 it did award the M.D. degree.

KEMENY: What happened around 1910 and the early 19-teens was that there was a national study of medical schools in the United States, which would become, I think, called the Flexner Report, which was enormously influential and shaped future medical education. It made a fairly sharp distinction between the scientific and clinical training of doctors, emphasizing the importance of both while pointing out that clinical training cannot be acquired except by having actual experience with patients and criticizing a number of American medical schools for being in the M.D. granting business. [Chuckles] When, even if they were well qualified to give the scientific background of medicine, could not provide sufficient clinical experience for doctors so that you or I would want to be treated by that physician.

That criticism applied to Dartmouth as well as to many other medical schools, and Dartmouth, like many schools, decided to limit its medical training for the first two years of medical school to the basic science training. It was then till the early '70s a two-year medical school.
Several things happened that made the trustees reopen that issue in the late '60s. The key decision predates my presidency, but I've had to research it for many reasons, so I think I'm fairly familiar with the facts of it. Let me mention at least some of the factors.

One very important one was that the reason for pulling back the two-year medical school had disappeared. In the 19-teens, I'm sure there was a tiny hospital here with insufficient clinical population, but Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital had brought in a significant regional hospital, plus a Veterans Administration hospital was established across the river. And all of a sudden, the patient population was large enough for at least a small but respectable M.D. granting institution.

End of Tape 9, Side A
Beginning of Tape 9, Side B

KEMENY: Secondly, there were pressures from the hospital on the college to go back to M.D. granting status, and this fact is important to explain for what happens later on. Hospitals in the late '60s had great difficulty in attracting house staff. House staff is a collective word for interns at the residence, and in a first-rate medical center, these interns in residence provide a very important part of the healthcare. For example, typically they are the ones who are there in the middle of the night. Some of them sleep in and are there or just are on duty overnight. And they supplement, they—except the most senior residents—work under the supervision of full-fledged physicians.

I should mention, incidentally, interns and residents are M.D.s, but they are in a stage of acquiring further experience before they are fully licensed to practice on their own during their internship and are studying a specialty while they are residents. So they're a very important part of the health delivery system, but they're in the ambiguous position on the one hand of being practicing physicians and on the other hand of continuing their medical education. Clearly they are more likely to have a high quality continuing medical education if they're studying at a place that has a first-rate M.D. granting school. Indeed, the hospital, which was very good, was in danger of going downhill because they just could not fill their vacancies with highly qualified people because they were going to places that had M.D. schools. So they asked the trustees if they would consider going back to M.D. granting status for the institution.

There are also, I'm sure, some factors connected with federal aid. There was a period when there was fairly substantial federal aid and the federal government wanted to expand the supply of physicians, particularly in inner city and the rural areas, and obviously this was a natural place for training rural doctors. But those funds were tied to how many M.D.s you turned out, so as a two-year institution we would not have qualified for it, but as a four-year institution we did.
All of those factors together, and I obviously did not participate in the discussions, led the board in '68 to vote to, over a period of years, to return the M.D. granting status.

One more pre-presidential fact that's important here is, in preparing for this, Dr. Carleton Chapman [AM '68], who was then dean of the medical school, prepared a very long and extremely thorough report on all the steps that would have to be taken, including financial estimates, which, when you correct for unpredicted levels of inflation, turned out to be remarkably accurate. It showed that in order to do that there would have to be a $10 million physical construction, and he estimated slightly over $1 million additional extra expenses.

FANELLI: Some of that would come from federal?

KEMENY: Not of these expenses necessarily. No, not of these. I think that was in addition to federal monies. But some of the construction money could come from federal, yes.

FANELLI: That's what I meant.

KEMENY: Some of the construction money could, but somehow the college would have to find something like $1.2 million in additional revenues, or support for the medical school, in order to make the budget balance. What must have happened, and to some extent I'm guessing—I've asked two or three of the trustees who served on the board then; since the action they take is somewhat mysterious, I try to pull back on it—they apparently get hypnotized by the $10 million construction figure, which is enormous, and concentrate all their attention on that and give approval contingent on success in that, in which we would be successful eventually.

Actually, there were 64 federal funds available, so 60% of that came from federal funds, and 40% came from gifts that were raised in the Third Century Fund drive. When all of that happens, they say one can go ahead. I find no record of their ever having discussed as to where the $1.2 million per year would come from, and if you capitalized it on a 5% utilization formula, that's $24 million worth of endowment, so really it's a much larger item than the building. For reasons to this day I do not understand that was not addressed by the board of trustees.

I knew none of these details, other than the approval of it, when I became president. The first class to enter Dartmouth Medical School as M.D. candidates was supposed to be admitted during my first year as president, which meant the admissions process went on during the transition stage while I was president-elect. The issue came out, can the medical school send out acceptances? The problem there was, everyone still is thinking only about the building funds and final
approval on the federal funds had not come through. John Dickey felt in the transition stage, as I did in my transition stage with some key decisions, that the incoming president should make that decision. Literally, the first important decision I had to make was whether the medical school could go ahead. I did not know about the $1.2 million problem at that point. I was told only about the building problem. And I convinced myself that the chances there were good enough. We hedged it. The letter said that they would be admitted as two-year medical students, with the understanding that if sufficient funds came through, and they would know that within their first year, that they could stay here to complete their M.D. thing. The funds did come through; those students did complete their M.D. degrees here.

It would be quite a while later when all of a sudden I realized there was an enormous operating problem with monies in the medical school, and I got rather angry at Carl Chapman and said as to why he had not warned the board about that. For the first time he brought me the report which was shown to the board, and it turned out that he had shown all of that. I said, "What happened?" And he said, "Well, the board didn't say anything about it." So all of a sudden we were facing an enormous problem here on closing the gap for the medical school.

That was the beginning of the whole issue. Carl always felt that part of the solution, and indeed he would prove to be right on this, that the significant part of the solution of that problem would have to come by the hospital and the clinic assuming a larger share of the cost of running a medical school. After all, they both benefit from this.

FANELLI: And in other situations like this, at other institutions, it is the pattern that the hospital then claims the…

KEMENY: Yes, it is. Ours is historically backwards because of what happened in 1914. The normal sequence, the one that's nicest for a medical school, is that the medical school comes first or maybe with a small local hospital which they acquire, which they build up into a major teaching hospital. The medical school controls the hospital. Therefore, any profits it makes can help support medical education, and any doctor in the region who wishes to have admission privileges—or not to mention being able to treat patients in the hospital—would have to get permission from the medical school. Typically, the medical school gets reimbursed for all kinds of things from the hospital.

[Tape off, then resumes]

KEMENY: That's the ideal situation, or if the ideal situation is not met, hospitals may be there without affiliation, but they're so anxious to affiliate with a medical school that they agree to certain reimbursement practices, and it's still true that physicians
need the permission of the medical school to be able to practice at the hospital. In effect, they have to have some sort of faculty staff just to practice at the medical school. Again the medical school gets reimbursement from the hospital and free teaching out of the physicians.

Here the medical school essentially lost all control during the period it was a two-year medical school because it didn't have a clinical faculty, and out of necessity, a private group practice known as the Hitchcock Clinic grew up. While they had some loose affiliations with the medical school, it was no more than that. This medical school neither got the kind of support it could get from the hospital, nor did it get any free teaching. It got teaching out of some clinic members, but had to pay for it. That made a very substantial difference, and Carl felt that at least a major portion of the problem could be made up out of those sources.

Eventually, all of those things would happen that the combination of a fund drive for the medical school, plus renegotiating things with the hospital and clinic, would solve the medical school's problem. But that's roughly from '72 till the day I stepped down from the presidency would occupy an enormous amount of time.

FANELLI: I suppose it should be said, John, in that period when it was a two-year medical school, that actually the graduates were very highly regarded, because I think Harvard took…

KEMENY: Yes. As a matter of fact, Harvard had offered Dartmouth a deal—I'm told more than once—that they would take all the graduates automatically. Since Harvard Medical School is rated by many as the best in the country, or certainly one of the three or four best, that certainly indicated how high the caliber of the two-year Dartmouth students were. But Dartmouth never agreed to that because they didn't want to become a captive of Harvard Medical School. The students had their choice, usually their choice of several of the best medical schools. In practice, a very large number of them did go to Harvard Medical School, but some went to Columbia or other outstanding medical schools. So it was a very high quality.

There too there was some slippage in the faculty, partly because of an aging process, and that was John Dickey's problem, which he solved by bringing in Marsh Tenney [Stephen Marsh Tenney '44] and making him dean of the medical school. Marsh did a superb job of building up a really outstanding basic science faculty at the medical school.

FANELLI: I remember you telling me once that Marsh Tenney had done this more than once, actually. He had come back and—or would in the future do that.

KEMENY: Yes. I think somehow he did that twice. I don't remember. Then at the period when Carl Chapman had announced his stepping down, I asked Marsh Tenney to
be acting dean in the interim period. I talked with him, and he made it clear that under no circumstances would he return to the deanship, so I asked him as a favor whether… He would be a totally non-controversial appointment as acting dean as one of the most highly, if not the most highly respected member of the entire medical complex.

Carl Chapman resigned. That also came as a shock to me. But he said basically that he had laid all the groundwork for going to the M.D. program, and the essential thing was now reaching agreement with the hospital and clinic. In the process of getting this far, Carl felt he had to make so many enemies at the hospital and the clinic by telling them very frankly what they were not doing, that he felt that he personally would be an issue and we would never reach agreement as long as he was dean.

He stepped down, so I found myself having to search for a new dean of the medical school and having to start what would be much more extensive negotiations than anything I dreamed of, and of course being pretty ignorant about medical schools. Medical schools tend to be fairly isolated from the rest of the community, and the whole government structure is so very different from the rest of the university that even someone who has had lifelong experience with the university does not necessarily know about the medical school.

We did have a search, and the search committee, after an extensive search, selected an inside candidate, Dr. James Strickler ['50 DMS '51], a clinical faculty member. He was associate dean of the school, so in some sense he was the heir apparent. Jim did a fine job as dean. But the way the negotiations headed, it turned out that I personally had to play the major role in the negotiations.

FANELLI: There was a problem, John, I recall, with the fact that the medical school did not have much endowment at all. It had something called quasi-endowment, which were funds that had been given and could be spent, I guess.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Do you want to say something about that?

KEMENY: Yes. Quasi-endowment is an interesting subject in general and would lead to a lot of controversies at the board of trustees. I prefer the phrase that some other institutions use—the phrase is funds functioning as endowment—because the phrase makes it very clear that it is not endowment.

FANELLI: Quasi-endowment is almost a contradiction in terms, isn't it?
KEMENY: It is, yes. And is quite misleading psychologically. At Dartmouth, with new members coming, and even with old members forgetting, I would periodically have to go through this again.

FANELLI: Because they thought that the medical school was using the endowment, which was taking it from the college.

KEMENY: Yes. And we would run into the same problem with serious financial problems in the middle of the decade with other parts of the institution. Let me explain the term. Endowment is a fund that's given to an institution, or left to an institution, by bequest which very specifically says that the fund is to be held in perpetuity for such-and-such purposes, and there are strict rules, customs, and even legal precedence as to the kind of precautions trustees are supposed to take. At the very least, you're not supposed to invade the principal of it, and usually also it's expected that you take whatever precaution boards can to protect the erosion of the principal against inflation. In practice, in a period of rapid inflation, that's not really possible. At least you can't touch the principal of it.

Then there are other funds that are given to the institution—let me go to the other extreme—funds that are clearly given to be spent within that year, or spent immediately. The largest such fund Dartmouth College has is the alumni fund, which is collected each year and spent that year. There are other funds that are given that way either for a building or for say a research project which is spent over three years. That may be a foundation or government grant for a research project.

Then there are some in-between funds which someone gives to you saying, "This is to support the English department, but use it any way the trustees wish to use it." Or funds that are given to you to be spent immediately, but you find you don't need it, and therefore, in good years, you're prudent and you put them away for future use.

At Dartmouth, under John Meck's leadership, all of these were labeled quasi-endowment funds. It was even terribly hard to disentangle later on as to just… They ranged all the way from things which the board could have spent in its entirety at any moment and would not have violated the donor's intent at all to funds at the other extreme where the donor was nice enough to say that in case of dire necessity, even the principal could be invaded, but clearly the donor had hoped that the principal would not be invaded. And every possible range in between.

FANELLI: And these were all in a pot.
KEMENY: These were all in a pot, sort of. Yet very clearly, since some of this was put in there during good years just because the trustees said, "Gee, we don't have to spend all this, let's save it for when we need it," later on when we would need it, trustees would get horribly upset—so would John Meck—if we wanted to spend some of this, even though, as a good lawyer, he would admit that the board had every legal right of doing that. The most extreme case... Sometime we have to talk about the trustees and endowment management. That's a big topic we ought to discuss.

The issue was most extreme in the medical school, which had very little true endowment, quite a bit of quasi-endowment, and it became painfully clear that it was not going to make it through the transition stage. Either fundraising or the additional support from hospital and clinic would not come fast enough to see them through the transition stage. We would end up eventually spending a quite substantial portion of the quasi-endowment funds of the medical school to see it through the transition stage. As you rightly said, this would lead to repeated major upset on the part of certain members of the board of trustees.

FANELLI: John, you were mentioning raising the money. I saw in the minutes as I was reviewing them that Jean had an idea about getting wealthy donors.

KEMENY: Yes. I still think it's an excellent idea. We never quite pulled it off. The other two professional schools of Dartmouth College are named, and actually named for very distinguished individuals. Thayer School for the person who is called the "father of West Point," and Amos Tuck School for a very distinguished financier. The medical school was just the Dartmouth Medical School, so Jean had come up with the idea that maybe for a sufficiently large gift one could rename it the so-and-so medical school at Dartmouth College, an idea the board of trustees approved. But the first time Jean presented it, her word was, "Couldn't we sell the medical school," which upset some people. She clearly did not mean actually selling the school, she meant sell the name of the school. I still think at some point that's an excellent fundraising idea for Dartmouth College.

The problem was, the early fundraising went badly both because the future of the school was not assured—there would be several years when none of us could be sure—and the board would only give temporary assurances: Yes, you can go for another three years. It's not a good climate in which to raise large funds. Secondly, as I would learn, it's hard to run a fund drive like that separately from an overall Dartmouth fund drive, and therefore the medical school fund drives did not really take off till the college launched its major fund drive in '77. That was pretty late for the medical school. I mean, '72 to '77 is an awfully long transition stage.
I mention '72 as the beginning of the problem because since the first M.D. candidates were admitted in '70, they crossed the border to where the clinical training started in '72. That's when we needed extra faculty and we needed extra funds very badly. But '72 to '77, or more than to '77 till fund drive and negotiations start paying off, were very, very hard years for the medical school.

FANELLI: Yes. I recalled from the minutes when I read them that in April '73 you summarized for the board the discussion at the budget committee meeting, which had taken place I think the day before, there were three alternatives. The first one, to cut back to a two-year medical school, which you said was the least attractive of all of them. The second one was shut down the medical school, but the cost of that would have been somewhere between $9 million and $10 million for a number of reasons which you can go into. And the third was to continue with the M.D. degree, keep the three-year curriculum, and raise the needed dollars according to the Peat, Marwick & Mitchell Survey Committee recommendations. You might want to mention about the Peat, Marwick & Mitchell…

KEMENY: Yes. Let me first mention about the alternatives. Carl Chapman, in his '68 report to the board, also warned that two-year medical schools were becoming increasingly unattractive. Really by '73 they became quite unattractive because, for example, Harvard decided not to take transfer students anymore. Somehow the whole structure of medical education had changed, and therefore the chance of a really first-rate two-year school was disappearing very rapidly. Whether the decision was right or wrong to go to medical school, it certainly was right not to continue with a two-year medical school. As the '70s went on, it became absolutely clear that that was just not a viable alternative at all. It was either make a success of the M.D. program or shut down the medical school.

The trustees had asked for a careful estimate by Peat, Marwick & Mitchell as to what kind of funds it would take to make a go of the medical school, and also about the possible closing down of the school, which the trustees did consider several times. The estimates were not terribly far off from Carl Chapman's own estimates. As I said, inflation was running at a higher rate, so that increased the numbers, but after correction for inflation, Carl's estimates were very good.

There were several major costs associated with closing down the medical school. I'll mention three. Two of them were financial and the other one was intangible but very real. The first two were that six of the $10 million for the building came from the federal government with the explicit understanding that this would enable us to launch an M.D. program. Therefore, if you discontinued the M.D. program, the legal opinion we got was—but I think I could have figured that out without a lawyer—that we'd have to refund that money to the federal government. They said, "Look, if 50 years passed, it would be different, but if you shut it down
within a few years of starting, you'd have to refund that money." So there was six million right there.

Secondly, there were some significant number of tenured faculty members, and you certainly have to meet your obligation to tenured faculty members. At that point, you would have those tenured faculty members with no students, and one made some rough estimate as to which ones might take a job elsewhere and for how many years one would have to provide compensation for the remaining ones. That ran into something like a $10 million figure.

So closing it down was not financially cheap. Secondly, of course, there was an enormous intangible that the quality of medical care in this community would have gone straight downhill. Even with a two-year school, the hospital was hurting. By '73 it was very clear that the clinic, the only reason they were able to attract good, young physicians was because they wanted to be associated with the medical school. If Dartmouth Medical School ever is closed down, instead of having one of the truly remarkable rural healthcare centers here, we'll probably have a third-rate hospital. That issue would be reargued over and over again, and the intangibles had to be stressed again and again to the board. Aside from the healthcare of students, there is the healthcare of faculty members. It has often been a major talking point in attracting new faculty members, that they would have access to a first-rate medical center right here.

FANELLI: John, there was something called the Center Planning Committee that starts to pop up around the middle of 1973. It may have existed before that. There was a report by the Center Planning Committee, which the board approved in June of '73. That had to do with the plans for how the medical center and how these three elements were going to be integrated. Is that correct?

KEMENY: Yes. I've now forgotten the changes of names, but let me tell you the structure that developed and why I ended up having to play a major role. It became clear from early negotiations that these would be very difficult, and I think it was John Hennessey who suggested that instead of having chief operating officers negotiate with each other, which was getting nowhere, that it ought to be escalated to a group that included the chief policy officers of the institution, which for the hospital and the clinic meant the chairman of the board of those two institutions. It was John Hennessey for the hospital and Dick Cardozo [Richard H. “Dick” Cardozo ’42 DMS ’48] for most of that period for the clinic. They agreed that Dartmouth College chairman of the board is not quite the right analog—he's too far removed and not available enough—but that it would be elevated from the dean of the medical school to the president of the college.

The group that eventually developed out of that center planning effort consisted of myself and one other Dartmouth trustee, and in each case the chairman of their
board and one other trustee and periodically, the chief administrator of the Veterans Administration Hospital would participate when appropriate. What I don't remember is whether the center planning group originally was the larger group that also included... I think that was the larger group that also included some operating officers, more than one from each institution. So it was a larger group, which made some modest progress but never could get close to agreement on any of the really hard issues. That's when it was suggested that this smaller group, carefully structured in effect to be trustee level, that did the actual hard negotiations.

FANELLI: Was that the group that came to be known as the "gang of six"?

KEMENY: That's the gang of six, yes. I mean, there were others who would participate, but the VA, while they would participate when appropriate... Actually, that's what it was. The VA participated on the Center Planning Committee but not in the gang of six. Frankly, we didn't have any really hard issues with the Veterans Administration Hospital. If they were the only problem, we could have reached agreement in six months very easily. The only concern there was that whatever the deal was, they should not get a worse deal than the local hospital, which is perfectly understandable. But they had, from the beginning, been enormously supportive of Dartmouth Medical School because all they had to do was look around nationally at all the VA hospitals, of which there were a huge number of them, and there was a terribly simple correlation that those that were associated as medical schools were high quality, and those that weren't were not very good, to put it mildly. Fortunately, Dr. Yasinski [William A. Yasinski], who was chief administrator here, just knew this absolutely clearly and his boss in Washington understood this thoroughly, too. So they were quite willing for it to cost a certain amount of money to belong.

FANELLI: And wasn't there a link... Wasn't Howard Green [Howard H. Green '56]...?

KEMENY: That would come later. When they lost their chief of staff, they had a national search for chief of staff, and the person they attracted was a very able young clinical faculty member of Dartmouth Medical School who became their chief of staff. It certainly strengthened the ties. The ties there really were very strong, and it's an important component in terms of... Look, roughly speaking, it's half the size of Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, and that meant one-third of the total clinical mix available was at the VA hospital. Also, their mix of illnesses was somewhat different from Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, so students could get exposure to some kinds of illnesses that they would normally not get here. So they were a very, very important component of the total. If in the story I'm about to recount they're mentioned less often it's because we had practically no trouble with them at all.
FANELLI: John, it's ironic in a sense that in this period when everyone was worrying about the financial aspect, that the school itself academically, and from the standpoint of applications and the strength of the classes….

End of Tape 9, Side B
Beginning of Tape 10, Side A

KEMENY: One of the unusual features of the first new M.D. program was it was a three-year M.D. program. In effect, the medical school adopted a year-round operation system, at least approved one before the college did, though they happened to implement it at about the same time. The students attended Dartmouth for two years and three summers. They would come for a brief period at what would be the summer before they would normally start, and then for four summers between their first and second year and second and third years. So they did get the equivalent of four years of training but in three years.

It had a number of financial advantages. It made it somewhat cheaper for students, and you could spread out. You had more flexibility in the use of your faculty. It was quite crucial to us because in the beginning there were still shortages of clinical material, and in effect the clinical rotation could be spread out over four terms rather than three terms, which meant you could stretch the clinical material further. Normally, summers are useless for clinical training because your students aren't here.

That worked reasonably well, but when it was restudied a number of years later, by which time somewhat the financial pressures had let up, the decision was that while the system had a number of advantages, the disadvantages of it in terms of the enormous unbroken intensity for medical students outweighed the advantages, and therefore it was changed to a more traditional four-year M.D. program.

I should point out that this year-round operation, in one way, was very different from the undergraduate school year-round operation because while the undergraduate school was in year-round operation, no one student attends year-round, the medical school required their students to be there year-round. It was a very different kind of situation.

FANELLI: Apparently, that particular problem of that federal requirement was resolved because they eventually—I guess there was a lot of pressure from medical schools—they modified the law, and the school would have to agree to accept on a one-shot basis up to 5% of the class, but the Dartmouth Medical School would be allowed to use its own admission standards in admitting those students. So if they were good enough to get into Dartmouth, then they could. I don't think we had any…
KEMENY: Yes. And 5% of one class was a tiny number for Dartmouth Medical School.

FANELLI: John, there was something also called the Task B Study, and the key recommendation of that was to increase student enrollment by having, first of all, satellite campuses, and secondly, changing to a four-year medical school.

KEMENY: Yes. Was that the one that was chaired by Henry Harbury? I'm trying to think. I think that was Henry Harbury's…

FANELLI: I believe so, because I remember that he's the one who gave the report.

KEMENY: Yes. He would later on, when we made substantial progress and we agreed there ought to be a chief center officer whose role would be to coordinate… I guess president of the medical center. Henry Harbury would be elected as the first president of the medical center, and he still serves in that capacity.

This was a report dealing with the same issues as to what to do about it. They pulled a number of things together. The two recommendations really are quite different. I've just explained why they recommended a four-year medical school. The rest of it came out of the following, that while we were making some progress in obtaining additional funds from the other constituent institutions, specifically… Let's see, the first big break was that the clinic would agree to provide a certain amount of teaching free of charge, which helped a great deal, and the hospital at least begin making some moves in the direction of some expense reimbursements which are customary at other hospitals.

FANELLI: But that didn't come until quite late.

KEMENY: Quite late.

FANELLI: Maybe a year or so before you stepped down.

KEMENY: True, but at least some partial moves in that direction. All of this happened very slowly, and all of it was interlinked with issues I'll talk about later that held us up.

While some relief was in sight, the estimates were that it would not be enough, and the fund drive clearly was going very slowly, and therefore some additional means had to be found to relieve the financial problems. The second big recommendation of Task B amounted to the following argument, that the existing faculty of the Dartmouth Medical School was too large for the number of students they had, that that faculty could, without inconvenience, handle a larger number of students. The problem, however, was… Therefore, you can go two ways. You can reduce the faculty or increase the number of students. We were, in spite of that, the smallest medical school in the United States, and any reduction in the
size of the faculty might mean we would lose accreditation. Or whether we lost accreditation or not, we would not be a medical school of the quality that Dartmouth College would be proud to have. While that was in principle a possible solution, in practice it was a very dangerous one. The question was how could we increase the number of students.

There was no problem in the basic sciences, but now we're back with the old bottleneck of how many patients there are to be seen. There aren't enough hospitals, and therefore the suggestion was, let us try to find satellite hospitals, which unfortunately would have to be at a substantial distance. There were no others available within commuting distance at which students could do part of their clinical training. That led to all kinds of shopping around. It did lead to some rather small-scale arrangements, for example, with one or two hospitals in southern New England, some in Concord. But we were really looking for a major affiliate.

Several interesting possibilities came up. The one that looked most promising was Maine Medical Center, which had been affiliated with Tufts University. They made it publicly known that, for whatever internal reasons, they were very unhappy with their affiliation with Tufts and they were looking for a new medical school to affiliate with. Dartmouth made a bid; unfortunately, so did the University of Vermont. I'm quite sure that the fact that the president of the Maine Medical Center was president emeritus of the University of Vermont had absolutely nothing [Laughter] to do with the fact that they ended up selecting the University of Vermont.

The most romantic idea was a hospital in San Francisco. In a way that sounded crazy, but then the argument was that once you get to the point where you're not within easy commuting distance, it doesn't matter that much. The students would spend say a year of their clinical training there, so they would not be commuting. It would have meant that some Dartmouth faculty members would periodically be asked to go out there for a week or two weeks, but with airplane flight being what it is, even that wasn't so horrible. We might possibly have pulled that off, but the complications were enormous.

FANELLI: And Portland…?

KEMENY: Portland is Maine Medical Center. Those were the two most promising ones. Then there were plans, let's find three or four small hospitals. Then you really have got sort of a crazy situation.

About the time none of these looked too good, but we might possibly have tried to push San Francisco through, Jim Strickler happened, at a meeting, to have a conversation with an old friend of his who was dean of the Brown Medical
School. Of course, this was on top of his mind, so he told him our problems. His
friend at Brown said, "That's funny. Brown has the opposite problem." They
were the second smallest medical school in the United States, but actually I think
just slightly larger than we are, and each one of us much smaller than the next
smallest one. They would have liked to expand, but their medical school came
about the other way. They're located in Providence, Rhode Island, with a number
of hospitals, some very good ones, who desperately wanted to have a medical
school. Brown got into the medical business by a number of the clinicians there
urging Brown and becoming the clinical faculty of Brown Medical School.
Brown had to go and create a basic science faculty, which they did by expanding
biology and chemistry. They had a horrendous crunch, primarily a space crunch,
that they were at the very limit as to how far they could go in basic sciences. Yet
they were under pressure from local hospitals who were very happy to have the
students and the teaching faculty there, but they said, "Look, we put in all this
work and we could easily train twice as many students." They were pushing
Brown to expand.

So finally a deal was worked out which was consummated and is in effect now
that we would take an extra twenty to twenty-five students a year who would do
the first two years, that is their basic science training, at Dartmouth and who
would do their clinical training at Brown and would be admitted as students who
understood that this would happen to them. That was one of many things that
helped the financial situation of the medical school. It did not put an additional
load on the clinical situation, and basically it meant that we had that much
additional tuition money at Dartmouth College without having to increase the
faculty.

FANELLI: John, this is one of the first instances where some real pressure from a trustee
comes up in a trustee meeting. In November of 1978, there was a two-hour
session on the Dartmouth Medical School where a number of issues had to be
resolved: moving from the three year to the four year, increasing the tuition levels
of the medical school, increasing the size of a class from 64 to 90, as you just
indicated, and then which of the three off-campus sites was preferable at that time.
The Maine Medical Center was still in the picture there. Don McKinlay [Donald
C. “Don” McKinlay ’37] asked for time to speak, and he wanted the board to
consider closing the Dartmouth Medical School or, if not that, changing it to some
other form of healthcare. I’ve never quite understood what that meant. You
responded, I believe, at the time that the board had already committed itself to
continue the Dartmouth Medical School through 1982, so there wasn't much point
in talking about closing it in 1978, since the board had…

KEMENY: Yes. That goes back further than that. As you hinted earlier, there was always a
small group within the board of trustees that was most skeptical about—not about
the desirability of a medical school so much, but about the chances that the
medical school will ever make it. And they and probably additional trustees were greatly worried that the medical school would become such a drain on the resources of the institution that it would take money away from undergraduate education, which always is the first concern of the board of trustees, and it's a legitimate concern.

Of that small group that would periodically argue for closing down the medical school, certainly the most vocal member was Don McKinlay. His participation was somewhat complicated by the fact that he joined the board of trustees... I can figure out when because he’s retiring this year.

FANELLI: He retired in June.

KEMENY: Yes, it's ten years now, so '74. From what we have said before, the decision to expand happened in '68, but more importantly, all the early discussions were '72 and '73 discussions, all of which he had missed. Therefore, he had missed some of the great soul searching on the board of trustees when they made a commitment that, if at all possible, they'll make a go of it. So he forced the board to reargue the same issues over and over and over again.

The incident you mentioned was the worst one, where after the medical school said, "Look, we now really have a chance of making it but not if the board has us on a continual warning that we may close you down at any time." The board had made something like a five-year commitment to the medical school, and one year after it happened, Don McKinlay was arguing again that we should close it down or change its nature completely.

He never accepted the argument about the impact of it on healthcare in the region or what that would do to the undergraduate school at Dartmouth. And he had a major bugaboo in his mind about the whole medical school that never could be gotten over. There are others who shared part of his concerns, but he was certainly the most extreme member of the board on that issue.

FANELLI: Now, on the other side of that, John, you might want to mention or comment on people that were very strong in support. I think Bill Morton was one who…

KEMENY: Bill Morton was the single strongest supporter of the medical school and took on the job in the campaign of being the trustee representative to help his fundraising for the medical school, and did indeed help the medical school raise funds. But there were other trustees. Certainly Dave McLaughlin consistently supported the medical school.

FANELLI: Bob Kilmarx.
KEMENY: Bob Kilmarx was a strong supporter of the medical school. Again with Bob, one has to understand that he had a second home near here; therefore, he had the advantage of knowing the local situation very well.

A very important person was... By the crucial time he was trustee emeritus... But Ralph Hunter ['31] was a trustee when I first became president. Ralph both is a Hanover native, and as a matter of fact was born in Hanover. I think [he] lived in Hanover except for the time he attended Harvard Medical School, or close to that. He lived here most of his life. His father had been a very distinguished member of the medical center. So he had a very long association, lived in Hanover all his life, was a physician himself, was head of the clinic for a period, and at a later period, John Dickey turned to him to be acting dean of the medical school. So he had very close association with hospital, clinic, and medical school. He certainly was supportive while he was on the board. And later, when the gang of six was formed, where I had to find another trustee, there really was no active trustee with any substantial background in this area at all, or who could be available frequently enough. We got the others to agree that the trustee emeritus could be, and Ralph Hunter and I were the two who attended what would be endless meetings.

I mention that because obviously a trustee emeritus who periodically appears before the board of trustees is treated very much like an active trustee, and therefore Ralph's periodic appearances before the board were very influential. So he must be identified as someone who was, although had emeritus status by then, an important supporter of the medical school.

They were not easy issues. The McKinlay position was extreme and occasionally, I have to say, irrational, but there were much larger groups that were not sure that the medical school was going to make it. Look, I wasn't sure that the medical school was going to make it.

FANELLI: I think it's important to point that out, John. It was a very iffy thing for a number of years. In June of 1979, the board voted to authorize a loan from Dartmouth College to Dartmouth Medical School up to $1.2 million for that '78-'79 period, because apparently by that time, we had run out of the...

KEMENY: We had run out of the quasi-endowment, and the other factors had not yet taken full effect.

FANELLI: Then in November of that year, Peter Whybrow was appointed the executive dean for a three-year term, which was...
KEMENY: Yes. As I said, Jim really did not have much success in the early days with fundraising, but by '79 the Campaign for Dartmouth was in full swing, and it became clear that that changed the climate very substantially.

Let me say a word why. Campaign for Dartmouth was a campaign for the entire institution. Alumni with substantial wealth who were favorably inclined to the institution almost felt obligated to make a major gift to the college, but they were given a fairly free choice as to what area they made it in. That changed the whole psychological situation because for particularly elderly people, for whatever reason, giving money to a medical center is an attractive target. Therefore, since they got full credit for a contribution to the Campaign for Dartmouth, instead of saying why give to the Dartmouth Medical School, they were solicited as part of giving for the Campaign for Dartmouth.

Indeed, when the targets were set for the Campaign for Dartmouth, up to a $160 million target, something like $25 million was earmarked for the medical school. Therefore, the medical school could now go after prospects, and we helped them identify prospects who would give to Dartmouth College's overall campaign by giving to the Dartmouth Medical School.

That would be a battle I would have to fight repeatedly because Ad Winship's [Addison L. “Ad” Winship II ‘42] heart was not in the medical school. He was one of the skeptics on this. I had to keep reminding him that his job was to make all the goals of the Campaign for Dartmouth, which included the $25 million goal for Dartmouth Medical School.

Here is where Lu Sterling Martin would play a quite crucial role. When the campaign got going, it was clear that we needed a full-time person to watch over and help solicit the major gift prospects.

FANELLI: A hundred thousand and over.

KEMENY: Yes, $100,000 gifts and over. In any campaign there are very large portions... Not a large portion of the gifts but a large portion of the money comes from these. We persuaded the board that it really needed a full-time person in the campaign to do that. A search was conducted, and Lu was selected as the ablest person to fill that job, which she filled most ably. Lu was very favorably inclined to the Dartmouth Medical School. I'm not sure if that's the right way to put it, but unlike many of her colleagues in fundraising, she was not opposed to the Dartmouth Medical School but simply recognized them as one of several areas where target had to be met, and also recognized that probably they had a harder time than anyone else did.
Let me say a word about why they had a harder time than, let's say, Tuck School. Tuck School is a two-year business school, but people who graduated from Tuck School had their Tuck M.B.A., of which they were very proud, and they were quite happy to give money there. Most of the alumni of Dartmouth Medical School, at least those who were old enough to have any serious money, were, during the early years of the two-year school when it was not only the case that it was a two-year school, but all the students were Dartmouth alumni. So most of the alumni numerically above say age forty were people who went to Dartmouth College for four years, Dartmouth Medical School two years, and then went to an M.D. school, which was madly soliciting them for money themselves. They would, on the one hand, give to the alumni fund of Dartmouth College and, on the other hand, to the medical school. The place they would not give is the place where they had what they really thought was a sort of an extension of their undergraduate experience. Many of them were so-called three-two students, where there wasn't even a sharp boundary as to whether they were at the medical school or not. They were clearly in the medical school only for one year.

Jim Strickler himself was a product of that three-two plan, so he understood the problems very, very well. And Lu Martin learned that problem very well and realized that one simply had to find some major donors who had no particular previous association with the medical school and would find it attractive, however, to earmark their Dartmouth gift to Dartmouth Medical School. By about '79, things were taking off, and then we appointed really an associate dean but with a higher title so that Jim could concentrate for his remaining years as dean fully on his fundraising efforts, with Peter Whybrow taking a great deal of the administrative duties off Jim's shoulders.

FANELLI: John, at that meeting, you reminded the board that the Dartmouth Medical School could have a balanced budget if three things happened by 1982-83, even though the college had just loaned them $1.2 million. The first of these was if the hospital and clinic made good on the promise of $500,000 a year that they were going to provide; second, that Dartmouth Medical School goes to a four-year institution with higher tuition and the proposed tie-in with Brown University Medical School; and third, that the Campaign for Dartmouth makes reasonable progress in raising the dollars. You felt fairly optimistic that all those three things could happen at that time.

KEMENY: Yes. All of them would eventually happen, though not quite on the timetable I predicted, but I believe that the medical school is in effect over its financial hurdle now.

FANELLI: In February 1980 when there was another major report on the medical school, you noted that there had been a striking deficit reduction in the budget for fiscal 1981, where the deficit was down to about $400,000, I think, at that point.
KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Jim Strickler noted that approximately $13 and a half million had been raised in the Campaign for Dartmouth towards the $25 million goal set there, so things were at least moving. And it was at that same meeting that Don McKinlay again asked the chairman if he could have ten or fifteen minutes to present the disadvantages of continuing the college's commitment to DMS. He was given the fifteen minutes, and he listed, I think, six or seven disadvantages. You responded again saying that to close the medical school would cost up to $10 million and that it seemed to you it would be much more favorable to spend $2 and a half million to ensure the financial independence of the medical school. And that $2 and a half million had to do with forgiving some...

KEMENY: Yes. As a matter of fact, the deficit was down to $400,000 a year. If the college handed them $8 million in endowment, they would have been in a break-even position. Not that I advocated that the college actually do that because that would have taken the incentives away from fundraising for the medical school, but we had really reached a point where it would have been cheaper to give enough endowment from the college's quasi-endowment funds to bring the medical school to a break-even position than to close it down.

FANELLI: Yes. John, that was the meeting prior to which you had drawn up a position paper, a financial plan. Do you recall that? Because the board did approve the financial plan as you had outlined in your position paper of February 11th, 1980, I think.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Under the provisions of that plan, subvention to the medical school was to be phased out in four installments by 1983-84, in exchange for the board writing off the outstanding loan to the medical school, plus the interim deficits, the total not to exceed $2.5 million.

KEMENY: Yes. This was really to solve what was, by that point, more a cash flow problem at the medical school than a long-range financial problem. To simplify the whole situation, let me explain the word subvention to future historians in case there isn't any by twenty years from now.

FANELLI: There had been subventions for...

KEMENY: For all three of the professional schools. Typically, they were of the order of magnitude… I know Tuck was $150,000. They were of that order of magnitude.
FANELLI: Each year.

KEMENY: Each year that the college contributed to the running of those institutions. Somewhat in recognition for the fact that they were sort of expected to live on their own, but a great deal of money Dartmouth raised, like the alumni fund, automatically went into the central coffers, so they got nothing out of it. Those would get turned around. Tuck School's financial situation became so spectacularly good that we first discontinued the subvention, and later on they started contributing a small fraction of their total budget in recognition for central administrative support. So sort of a reverse subvention. The Thayer subvention continued.

The medical school, by '80, their situation looked as if they could break even without that, except that they had hanging over them… They had the money the college had loaned them, which the college was charging interest. A deal was offered which, in the long term, was advantageous to the central college but was of enormous help to the medical school. Let's write off this loan, and let's phase out the subvention. I mean, $150,000 a year subvention is capitalized to $3 million endowment, so it's a good deal for Dartmouth College, at least a fair deal for Dartmouth College, and would be of enormous help because we had gotten to the point where you could see how we could close the gap, if they didn't have to repay that $2 and a half million.

Looking back on all of that, what did it cost the college other than an enormous amount of time on the part of many people, most notably the thirteenth president, and some substantial time, for a couple years, on the fourteenth president's part, too, from what I hear. It basically cost the college $2 and a half million total to bail out the medical school, in exchange for which they actually gave up long-term payments of $150,000 a year, so in a way it costs nothing.

FANELLI: All of this, at that meeting, was set to be contingent on the successful negotiation of a graduate medical education agreement with the hospital and clinic. That was the thing that of course dragged on and on for a while.

KEMENY: That was the real problem, and I'll have to turn to that in a moment. The board, all of its votes will have that clause in it because one thing the board always agreed on is not to take the pressure off the other parties to conclude the negotiations.

FANELLI: John, that may be important to point out here, that the clinic… One of the difficulties there was that the clinic was a for-profit….

KEMENY: Yes. Would you like me to turn as to what the issues were that the so-called gang of six wrestled with that would drag on forever?
FANELLI: Yes. Let me change the tape and we'll do that.

KEMENY: Very good.

End of Tape 10, Side A
Beginning of Tape 10, Side B

FANELLI: We're still on the medical school.

KEMENY: There's some oversimplification. Let me say that there were only two issues. One was how should the medical center be governed, and secondly, what is the role of the clinic? Underlying both of these issues were a number of financial matters, but they were not just financial matters. That's important to understand.

The role of the... No, the government issue first. The problem with the government issue is, again at an ideal medical center, the dean—often called at such an institution vice president for health affairs—is a little dictator who runs a very big show and has enormous power.

The hospital, for many purposes—I've heard this phrase used—is a hotel, an unusual kind of hotel that, in addition to room and board, provides a number of medical services. The nurses work for them, the house staff works for them, but they typically do not employ the physicians. They're employed by the medical school, and plus there are outside physicians who have got privileges there. But the medical school totally controls that, so the medical school and the clinical faculty of the medical school controls the quality of healthcare. The hospital supplies room, board, and a number of quite essential supporting services. The hospital has only two concerns. One is that the healthcare that's given there should be of very high quality, and obviously that they should not go bankrupt. Typically, hospitals are not-for-profit organizations, and they simply want to break even. They even have fundraising drives of their own to help improve things. All of that is fine.

The outside physicians had essentially nothing to say about the whole business, except insofar as they have courtesy appointments at the medical school. They can't participate at the faculty meeting at the medical school and express their opinions.

Our setup was totally different from this in every possible way in that the real control of the healthcare was in the hands of the clinic because, particularly in the early days, the vast majority of how was the physician service provided was by full-time clinic employees. Medical school faculty members provided minimal
service, and there would be a big battle about whether they could expand the role that they could play.

Let me just take that issue. That in itself is a fascinating issue because at a more normal situation, it would be the dean of the medical school who could decide who could perform how much service and usually battles his clinical faculty members to put in enough time teaching and not spend all their time earning money. But certainly their earning money helped support the medical school greatly. Here, it is people over whom the dean has no control who decide who can perform healthcare services and would be very grudging on allowing clinical faculty members…

FANELLI: To teach.

KEMENY: Well, to teach, yes, but to provide medical services. Clinical faculty members you can't support unless…. Typical rule of thumb is they put in half their time on teaching and half their time on healthcare support. Sometimes the borderline is very hard to describe, because what happens if you're performing an operation and at the same time there are either a group of medical students or there are interns and residents very likely there, and the surgeon, as he is operating, is teaching those interns and residents, which is why the interns and residents want to be there, to study under a well-known surgeon. Right there there is a huge issue on governance as to who can make the decision as to how much time various people devote to healthcare.

There are all kinds of issues, really bitter issues. The worst relation was between the hospital and the clinic. It had just deteriorated at some point during these negotiations, bitter fights back and forth with all kinds of accusations and very bad personal feelings coming out of it.

FANELLI: A little bit like a tenant being mad at his landlord, and vice versa.

KEMENY: Yes, except of course it's a much more intimate relationship. The continual problem on the whole issue that if they were going to be in any sense a unified organization, it was intolerable that one of the four components was, on paper, a for-profit organization. Now, of course the hospital and the medical school as part of Dartmouth College were non-profit institutions. The VA was a branch of the federal government, but obviously it operates essentially as a not-for-profit institution, more so they really live on federal subsidies. They provide services on all of which they lose money. I mean, that's the business they're in. I mean, it's a privilege that veterans earn for being veterans. There were certainly no problems in this way with the Veterans Administration.
The clinic however was, on paper, organized legally as a profit-making organization. Now, they have argued from the very beginning that that was only on paper, that in practice they had for many years operated as a not-for-profit organization. The facts were that their physicians were on a straight salary. As a matter of fact, for a long time, perhaps unrealistically, they had a salary scale that was quite idealistic that depended only on length of service, so a very senior surgeon made no more money than a very senior pediatrician. I mention those because they are at the opposite ends of the scale as to how much money they would normally earn, as a result of which they had no trouble attracting pediatricians but had a heck of a time attracting and holding surgeons. They would eventually modify that somewhat. There was a bonus system, but the bonus really was some incentive for productivity, and the bonuses were so small that they did not make any significance in the salary structure. At any rate, the maximum any physician got, plus the bonus that a physician got at the clinic, was significantly smaller than what the better physicians could have earned at almost any other medical center.

So certainly there was not a question here of distributing huge profits. If there were any profits left over, over and above salaries and these very modest bonuses, there was something called the Hitchcock Foundation, which was strictly a not-for-profit foundation for support of research, and they funneled their monies into the Hitchcock Foundation.

Really, one of my puzzles that I would have many long arguments is, why they fought so very hard against changing the status to not-for-profit when, in fact, they were in a stupid position that they were not operating like a for-profit organization, but if accidentally they made a profit, they had to pay substantial taxes. That actually would happen to them. I would have been helped if that had happened earlier. During part of this period the clinic went through some very lean years, which made the negotiations harder. They were much more amenable to changing their status once they returned to making honest profits. Again, not huge ones but enough that the taxes on it hurt.

My analysis is, and it has to be my analysis, there was one and only one reason why many clinic members fought for keeping their for-profit status, and this had to do with the governance of the clinic. If you are a not-for-profit organization, there are some strict rules. You can't have a totally in-house board, for example. It varies what you have to have. Some people argue the majority of your trustees have to be from the outside. It's not absolutely clear, but at least very substantial input on your board had to be from trustees who were not employees of the institution. That's what the big hang-up was. The change, when it happens, and hopefully it will happen fairly soon now, will have almost no financial impact on the members. As a matter of fact, it may have no financial impact on the members. But, yes, there would have to be a board with some significant outside
membership in it, so it's not true that the members sort of, as a collective group, make all the decisions for the clinic. And that was the big hang-up.

Also, for a while, we got off on what was probably a hopeless track, sort of idealistically could we actually make the whole center a single legal entity. Obviously, with the VA sort of as an associate member. That probably, in retrospect, was hopeless to achieve. Therefore, what we tried to head for is four different not-for-profit entities. There's a center governing board that would be a pseudo board of directors for the entire medical center. I'm saying pseudo because in fact they would have no power except those delegated to it by the constituent institutions. But as long as goodwill existed, the constituent institutions would defer to the decisions of the center governing board. Therefore, we would in practice act as if we really were a united institution with a single governing board. That was actually created and was functioning before I stepped down as president. How well it functioned…. It functioned quite well in some areas. There were always periodically bitter complaints because some member institution went and made a decision either without talking to the center governing board or even in contravention to something the center governing board decided. But still, the progress over that decade was very substantial. So that's the big governance issue.

I said there were two fundamental issues. One was the governance issue and, yes, I've talked about the other one. The other one is the status of the clinic as to whether it would go not-for-profit or would stay as it is.

Underlying all of this were money issues. All healthcare institutions have financial problems. We certainly had it throughout that decade. Both the hospital and the clinic were facing extremely expensive construction projects. The hospital case primarily because parts of the hospital were horribly old. The new part that had been built in the front was fine, but the back part of it, some of it was so bad that you just couldn't keep making renovations. They were threatened to lose accreditation in certain areas because their facilities were so dilapidated. So what the hospital hoped was…. The clinic really were tenants in a sense, in the hospital building, so they wanted to kick out the clinic, not as an unfriendly move, but for the hospital financially it was much better to take over the whole hospital and therefore minimize the amount of construction they would have to do, and have the clinic set up a separate building.

The question was where. The only organization that owned land anywhere within walking distance of the hospital was Dartmouth College. That was part of the carrot, the carrot and stick approach. The college trustees several times expressed willingness to sell land to the clinic for the purpose of constructing a modern clinical facility, but it always said, "But not until they become a not-for-profit organization and until these negotiations are successfully resolved."
That would have an ironic twist. As I understand, as of this date, which is near the end of the '83-'84 academic year, all internal substantive issues, I believe, have been resolved and everybody is ready to move. At that point, the town moved in and is not approving the plans, I guess because of the parking situation. So I don't know what will happen to that.

FANELLI: John, do you want to mention, since you've been talking about, not the pain, but the time-consuming aspect of the negotiations and everything. You've mentioned some of the people involved. What about Dick Cardozo, who was for a considerable part of this period, and maybe the whole period, the head of the clinic?

KEMENY: Yes. Let me comment on just how time-consuming it was. Besides periodic meetings of things like the center planning committee and, later, the center governing board and meeting with medical school faculty or deans at the medical school, plus the amount of time the trustees spent on it, and preparation for trustee meetings, the most time-consuming thing was the meetings of the so-called gang of six, two trustee-level people from hospital, clinic, and Dartmouth College. We would meet usually at someone's home, occasionally at a room in the hospital, for sessions that would go on say from 7:00 p.m. to midnight, perhaps every other week when things were hot. So there were horrendously time-consuming sessions, occasionally extremely emotional sessions depending on who was mad at whom.

The fact that as the longer these went on, the more bad blood developed between Dick Cardozo and John Hennessey of course made those negotiations very, very hard. Ralph Hunter and I again and again found ourselves in the role of trying to attempt to make peace. Occasionally we took the hospital side, occasionally the clinic side. We also had to fight for the medical school side, but the worst fights were between the hospital and clinic.

I could read John Hennessey very clearly. He is a highly honorable, highly intelligent, able person, and was a superb chairman of the hospital board, who fought very hard for the rights of the hospital. For at least the early part of the negotiations, all of his contributions were positive until so much bad blood came between the two of them that frankly John got totally irrational. Even when the clinic would make a very major concession, one we fought for for years, John in effect just wouldn't believe it, so that became a problem. Dick Cardozo is much harder to read. I personally had very good relations with Dick Cardozo, and I trusted him. I cannot claim that there was any case where he absolutely said he would do something that he did not do it.
What is very hard to read is, the clinic was governed by a board of five people, maybe seven people, I don't know, but a quite small group that met very much in a closed group. One of the big concessions was that clinical departmental chairmen would be allowed to sit in on clinic board meetings. The clinic board even then would, at much too high a frequency, go into executive sessions where they were excluded, not for the issues for which the chairman would certainly recognize that the clinic board had to go into executive session, but just whenever they didn't want to have the chairman hear it. Still, it would eventually happen that at most clinic board meetings, the clinical chairmen were there, and that's a huge step forward. I mean, in '72 that would have felt like an enormous breakthrough.

Because of these closed meetings, it is very hard to judge. The scuttlebutt was that the composition of that clinic board was a most unfortunate one, in part because many of the ablest physicians were too busy and not interested in politics and wouldn't serve on the clinic board. Therefore, the people who were interested to serve on the clinic board and go to weekly meetings of this board—that's ridiculous in itself, you know, that the board of directors should meet weekly—were typically not the best physicians, and also, they were the ones who had the extra time, and they were people who often had very strong views on things. So it tended to be a horribly conservative group, much more conservative than the average clinic member. The scuttlebutt was that, even in places where we managed to negotiate major changes with Dick Cardozo, he would then go back and get shot down by his own board.

FANELLI: As I recall your saying at the time, he would say to you, "I'll agree with this, but I've got to see if I can bring my board along, or educate the board, or something, to that position." So he was not in a very enviable position.

KEMENY: No. I mean, both I and John Hennessy were given substantial powers of negotiation, always subject to eventually being shot down, but within broad limits, we knew what we could negotiate. Often, even on relatively minor issues, Dick felt he had to go back to his board. That made those negotiations very lengthy, very difficult, and in the middle, one of the organizations, usually the clinic but not necessarily the clinic, would take a unilateral step that would get the other negotiators so upset that we would lose six months’ progress.

FANELLI: John, what was the tangible result...

KEMENY: Well, we signed a set of agreements.

FANELLI: There was an agreement which was actually signed by all the parties involved.

KEMENY: Yes. I must have presented those to the board at some point.
FANELLI: Yes, you did.

KEMENY: Do you know when that happened?

FANELLI: I don't have it down here. Oh, wait a minute, let's see. April 1980 you reported on a long series of meetings with the gang of six, and a degree of agreement had been put into writing and been approved by the joint council. That was April 1980, so it must have been shortly after that.

KEMENY: I'm sorry. Joint council was the sort of... Center governing board, I guess, became joint council. Well, now, the fact that it even went to the joint council meant that the six negotiators approved it before then.

FANELLI: And it was at that same meeting, John, that you reported.... Apparently, by this time, Jim Strickler had said that he wanted to step down. You reported on the research for the successor of Strickler, and you had characterized.... There were, I think, four or five finalists, and you said, "The top two of those finalists are superb candidates." And the board authorized you to make an offer to either one after Dave McLaughlin had interviewed them.

KEMENY: Yes. I want to say a word about that. Tell me again what the date was?

FANELLI: April 1980 is the meeting.

KEMENY: If the lead candidates are there, it has to be April of '81.

FANELLI: I can go back and check that.

KEMENY: If those two happened at the same meeting....

FANELLI: I think I have the actual.... This is a Xerox of the index cards, but these don't have the dates on them. It says reorganization of clinic and hospital discussion was committed to six meetings, 5/80. That's May '80.

KEMENY: See, the committee of six is still meeting there.

FANELLI: Yes, okay. The volume number of that is 19.... I think you're right, John, because the next one is 2023, so that's got to be sometime later. "Authorize president to offer position of dean of medical school to either of the top two candidates."

KEMENY: So it would probably have to be April of '81. But it shows as far as the negotiations go that during my last year I managed to get both the committee of six to reach agreement and have it approved by the joint council. The joint council is a somewhat larger group. For example, on the Dartmouth
representation, the dean of the medical school sat on it, and one additional trustee sat on it. It was Bob Kilmarx who sat on it. So therefore, in effect, all the issues had been resolved in principle. I naively thought that that would mean that my successor wouldn't have to deal with these problems, but for various complicated reasons, Dave McLaughlin would, for a couple of years more, have to deal with all of these issues. At least, we did by '81, before I stepped down, reach complete agreement in principle on how to resolve all the problems.

FANELLI: It's got to be '81, as you said, because shortly after that, or in that same meeting perhaps, they voted DMS 1981-82 budget, and that would be done in '81.

KEMENY: In April '81, yes. On the selection of the dean of the medical school, Jim Strickler was in '79 given the executive dean for three years, but as the time came nearer, Jim became tireder and tireder, so he asked to step down in '81 rather than in '82. That meant that in my last year…. That meant he served out nine years, I guess, as dean. I forget exactly when he took office.

FANELLI: He was elected July 1st, '73.

KEMENY: Okay. That's right. And my recollection is that he served eight years as the—which is fairly long for dean of medical school. So I have to search for a successor of it, but obviously the search was being completed as my successor had already been elected, so technically, since only the president could make that appointment, the board authorized me to head the appointment, but I explained to the board and to Dave McLaughlin that I'll present him and ask him to interview the finalists, and I'll appoint whomever Dave chooses.

The list was an interesting one in that those who were both very highly qualified and were seriously interested in coming to Dartmouth. We had two truly outstanding candidates. Then it was a fairly wide gap between them and the following ones. Even to the point where we might have reopened the search if we couldn't have gotten either of these two candidates.

The other thing that was fascinating was that the two finalists, if I may put it that way, were about as different as they could be. One of them, a well-established clinician at Yale Medical School, of mature age and high reputation. He was clearly a safe bet for dean of the medical school. There was no question he would make a good dean.

The other one was well under forty years old, from Johns Hopkins, one of the other truly outstanding medical schools, with an incredible publication record for someone of that age, was one of the associate or assistant deans at Johns Hopkins Medical School, with the prospect that the candidate might turn out to be a truly sensational dean, but obviously would have been a bigger gamble. The other
notable difference was that the senior candidate was male and the younger candidate was female.

I had my own preference between the two of them, but frankly it came down to a case where either one would be… If we had had only one of these candidates, we would have jumped at the candidate. The problem was really choosing amongst two outstanding candidates. To some extent, it's a matter of what you want to gamble on, which way you go. My own preference, which happened to be the woman candidate, not because I didn't think the other one would be outstanding but only because I thought that… I like to gamble on someone who might be truly outstanding or might fall on their face.

FANELLI: It was a gamble in the sense that she might reach greatness in one sense, but there was no gamble in the sense of this would be a disaster for the medical school.

KEMENY: No. Neither case would be a disaster, but with her it was much less unpredictable. She might not turn out to be as good as the other candidate, and on the other hand might turn out to be sensational. So it's a question, as Publius would say, "The mean was about the same but the variance was much greater," so are you willing to gamble on the chance of something truly outstanding? I was very pleased.

Dave McLaughlin interviewed both candidates, and I was careful not to tell him which one I preferred until after he had made his choice. And he also chose the woman candidate as his first candidate. Actually, the job was offered to her. She was married to her husband who had a more junior position at Johns Hopkins Medical School. We even for once solved the spouse problem. We were able to offer him a comparable job at Dartmouth Medical School.

In the end, she turned us down. This is not publicly known of course. She turned us down, and I'm almost certain that she turned us down because of a spouse problem. I was suspicious of the spouse problem because with both candidates of course we invited the spouses, but we had a terrible time getting him even to come for a visit here. I think he somehow could not face up to being a physician at the medical school where his own wife was dean. As I judge her future career, at some point they'll have to face up to that because she sure as heck is going to end up being dean of a major medical school. Or their marriage will break up. I know it was hard for her, but she did turn us down, so obviously we turned to the other candidate, who as I said was also outstanding and who is the current dean of the Dartmouth Medical School.

I think it's worth reading that into the history that Dave McLaughlin came very close to making his first major administrative appointment be the most senior woman officer of Dartmouth College.
FANELLI: Would that have been a first for a woman dean of a medical school?

KEMENY: No. Let's see. I looked at that. There are some, but maybe at lesser institutions.

FANELLI: It's certainly not very common.

KEMENY: No. Medical schools are in the hands of all kinds of organizations, so, yes, it would have been close to a first, for this kind of institution at least. And of course the dean of the medical school actually, with the ranking scheme that Cresap, McCormick & Paget had, is on a level with the provost of the college. So it's one of two officers under the president, for example, in a salary scale situation, so it would have been one of the most senior officers in the college. It's like certainly a vice presidential level position.

FANELLI: Incidentally, I've forgotten. Was Carl Chapman…. He was a vice president, wasn't he?

KEMENY: Yes. He had asked to have the title of vice president for medical affairs, and that was part of the thing that created bad blood between him and the hospital, because that title is customary at schools where the dean really runs the hospitals. The hospital read that as causing tension that he wanted to run the hospital, so that did not help. If I'm right, I believe Jim Strickler did not have that title.

FANELLI: No. He did not have it.

KEMENY: I mean, that was by mutual agreement between him and me because that choice of title just created such bad blood that it would have sabotaged the negotiations.

FANELLI: John, when you said before about the time-consuming nature, you recited a list of sessions. That reminded me, speaking of a search, when you were involved in the search after Carl Chapman said he was stepping down. You interviewed personally, I remember, sixteen members of the….

End of Tape 10, Side B
Beginning of Tape 11, Side A

KEMENY: Part of the problem at that time was that I knew so very little about medical schools, and that was an important learning experience for me. Also, I wanted to choose that search committee very, very carefully. Out of those discussions came… I met with what's in effect the dean's advisory committee, the governing committee of the medical school. That includes all the departmental chairmen, plus associate deans and certain other senior officers of the medical school. So I interviewed all of those. Also, I asked their advice about the forming of the search committee. That led to the forming of that search committee.

By the time of the second search… Look, I had two very time-consuming medical school searches. I had to choose two deans of the medical school, or choose one completely and go all but the last step in the other one. By the second one, I knew a great deal more about it, and I formed the committee much more expeditiously. I had the good fortune… Ted Harris [Edward Day “Ted” Harris Jr. ’58 DMS ’60] was a very highly respected member of the medical school faculty, and I asked him first if he had any interest in being dean at all, and he said no. Then I turned around and asked him if he would like being chairman of the search committee, which he fortunately accepted. The second search, he took an enormous amount of the load that I carried in the first search off my shoulders. He helped in the forming of the search committee, and he did a lot of this interviewing.

FANELLI: John, I think we’re at 5, and I think I'd better get…

KEMENY: I think, unless we think of things I forgot to cover, we really covered the medical school fairly thoroughly.

FANELLI: I think we did.

[Tape off, then resumes]

FANELLI: John, I'd like us to talk today about a number of topics that seem to fit under the general heading of money matters. Incidentally, this is July 24th, 1984. We both know that the excellence of a private institution like Dartmouth is inevitably, though not entirely, related to its financial health and stability. Since the excellence of Dartmouth was perhaps your primary concern during a decade when many educational institutions suffered a decline, it is only natural that money matters must have loomed large on your agenda during the latter years of your presidency. While most of these topics are in some way interrelated, it may be convenient for this discussion to divide them under three headings: income, that is tuition, room and board, years of endowment, the alumni fund, other kinds of gifts; outgo, the effects of inflation, size of the operation, control costs, efficiency, et cetera; and something that I call the mechanics of money management, that is
the budget process, how one determines what portion of the yield can prudently be
used, et cetera. Let’s take the last category first, and I'll ask you to think back to
the early years of your presidency and talk about your familiarity with the annual
budget process, which I think you had told me earlier was not that great when you
first came in; whether you found it was satisfactory, that is the budget process was
satisfactory; and if not, what changes you may have suggested and instituted.

KEMENY: The budget process in one sense was a tight process in that John Meck used to
review everybody's proposed budget most conscientiously, and I'm sure he was
very tough in trying to keep the expenditures under control. What troubled me
about it was that it was purely incremental budgeting in which all that was looked
at, whether a certain area’s increase from one year to next year was too high, and
there were no guidelines given out in advance that would guide people as to what
was reasonable. Perhaps in a highly stable economy, which the '60s were—
perhaps the most stable in the history of our country—that was a satisfactory
process because guidelines would not have changed very much from one year to
the other. Since the '70s will go down in history as one of the most turbulent
financial decades for higher education, particularly private higher education,
people simply had to have reasonable guidelines before they could even come up
with a preliminary budget.

Therefore, we started the budget cycle at the fall meeting of the board, typically in
late October or early November, and there the officers presented suggested
guidelines for escalation of various expense categories and income categories, and
the board had a chance to review those, criticize them, and come up with their
own guidelines. Incidentally, that was connected with something we have talked
about before. We had a good computerized process of projecting what the impact
would be over the next four years, so the board always looked at the current
budget plus four years into the future so that they could sense not only what
would happen year to year but what kind of trend we were on. It avoids two kinds of mistakes in opposite direction. One mistake is that very
often changes look all right from one year to the next year, but you're not picking
up that some category is completely out of whack, which would show up over a
several year period. The other mistake is that there are occasionally temporary
problems, major expenditure that you have to meet, or a shortfall of revenues for
one year, for example, a bad swing in the endowment. And you may overreact to
a one-year change, when if you project the budget four years into the future, it
will smooth out and you could see that there ought to be minor corrections and
things will be all right two or three years down the line.

We went through that quite rigorous process in the fall, and in December, the
officers, the department heads who plan budgets, were given guidelines as to
reasonable percentage increases, for example, for salaries or for postage, if you
knew there was a postage hike that came, and anything else. They were able to prepare their preliminary budget under those guidelines, and therefore there wasn't such a horrendous review job at the next stage.

Also, we periodically reviewed, with the help of the Council on Budgets and Priorities, four major areas to see if a whole area was out of whack, either too low or too high compared to the rest of the budget. When that was the case, we would institute measures to correct it, not in one year—that was never possible—but over a period of several years.

FANELLI: I'm glad you mentioned that, John, about the Council on Budgets and Priorities, because I think that was an innovation that you had in a sense created, wasn't it?

KEMENY: Yes. And I have to say it wasn't completely original, although ours was quite different in its composition. It was based on a small group that the president of Princeton had instituted that had worked well. As far as I know, we were the second school to have it, and ours was much more broadly representative. It consisted of some of the top officers of the college who normally would have final say-so on the budget, not including myself. It would include representatives of the professional schools, who often were left out of planning processes. It included faculty representatives and a couple of student representatives, a representative of the staff, and a representative of the alumni. So it was a quite broadly constituted body of something like fifteen individuals, with someone other than a senior administrator chairing it. That was on principle so that one person wouldn't dominate the whole process.

It was never bad, and occasionally it was exceptionally good. It depended very much on who was chair of the council. Particularly under two chairs, John Hennessey and Tom Tighe [Thomas J. “Tom” Tighe], the council functioned extremely well. Incidentally, John Hennessey was not there as a senior administrator. The Tuck faculty had elected him as their faculty representative, which came as a great surprise to other faculties. And Tom Tighe of the psychology department, who has gone on to senior administrative responsibilities. Both were excellent chairs. Under their terms, the council was extremely constructive and many good things came out of it.

I remember one major area that was getting out of whack was the library. I was aware of this. Publication costs were rising so horrendously fast, and the library just assumed that the budget should rise at the same percentage as publication costs. I remember once doing a calculation that if the differential between the rate at which library costs rose compared with the rest of the budget continued, in something like twenty years, half of the total Dartmouth budget would go to libraries, which just is not reasonable. The council came down with a quite tough decision, and the library was quite upset by it. They were quite surprised that
faculty members broadly supported it because the reasoning of the council was so convincing. They distributed the pain, if I may put it, so equitably. I mean, basically it just meant that you could not buy everything one would have bought in the past. It still remains a superb library, but they got it to the point eventually where it was growing at roughly the same rate as the college as a whole.

FANELLI: John, just out of curiosity, before the establishment of the Council on Budgets and Priorities, had there been some dissatisfaction among groups on campus about not being represented in the budget process?

KEMENY: Yes. It goes further than that. It goes back to an incident I will never forget, in a faculty meeting late in John Dickey's term when things were a little tense anyway, the Vietnam… I don't mean about John Dickey personally.

FANELLI: The times.

KEMENY: The times. It was the Vietnam War. I would guess this was '68. I could be off by a year, but certainly by that time rebellion was in the air on campuses due to outside reasons. John Meck as treasurer was asked, because we had a bad year and there were some cutbacks, if he would discuss the details of the budget with the faculty. He made an absolutely flat statement that the details of the budget are confidential and he would under no circumstances discuss the budget with the faculty. That's a terrible slap in the face of the faculty. Several individuals tried to argue about it and made it clear they were not trying to get individual salaries or anything of that detail, just in very broad outlines.

I think it was my first annual report, or soon after that, I held a special meeting where I took the faculty through the entire budget in vastly more detail than had been requested, and did that, at least updates on it, a couple of times later in my presidency. After which, there simply wasn't terribly much paranoia because they understood the problems. Sometimes administrators overlook the fact that the vast majority of the faculty members hope to have a long-range future at the institution, and they feel as strong a stake in the welfare of the institution as possible. The fights that one would have later on would be always about should this be cut rather than that, but they were totally convinced that something had to be cut because they had access to all the figures, and they were honest figures.

The demand… That's too strong a statement in this case. The request for broader input came when it became clear that the financial conditions had turned horrible, not just for us but for all private education. The argument went roughly like this: we all realize we'll have to make sacrifices, possibly in lower salaries or giving up programs. We just want to be sure that there's input into the trustees' decision that's broadly representative. That's a totally reasonable argument.
FANELLI: John, despite the degree of control over the future that good budgeting can provide, as we both know there are always some unexpected contingencies that arise to complicate matters. A major event of that kind which affected many institutions, and certainly affected disproportionately those in the colder areas in the country, was the energy crisis. I can't remember the year, whether it was '75 or '76.

KEMENY: It was earlier than that. It had to be '73.

FANELLI: '73, okay. Caused by the sudden huge increase in the cost of heating oil. Perhaps you can talk about that and what special measures the college took to meet that major negative impact on the budget.

KEMENY: That's when the oil cartel was formed. Dartmouth was hit disproportionately by this because all our heat came from oil, and the oil available in northern New England was imported oil. Later on, things happened to even this out a bit nationally, but basically, we got 100% of the impact, while in most other parts of the country, imported oil was a small percentage of the total source of heat, and therefore they only had a modest impact.

The price of a barrel of crude oil—that's the cheapest oil there is, number six crude oil—went in a single year from $3.75 to $12.00. I remember the line I would use with alumni would be to quote those two numbers and then say, "The most important thing about that statement is that a year ago not a single Ivy president knew what the cost of a barrel of oil was." [Chuckles] Now we were watching it daily.

We instituted major energy-saving measures, but I remember, in spite of the savings, just in one single year our energy cost went from $700,000 to $1,700,000. And of course it did not stop there. A barrel of oil would go over $30 a barrel before the decade was over. It was really an unbelievable increase in a scarce, and in our case not replaceable, commodity.

FANELLI: I remember you did make, in a sense, a plea to alumni to understand that this was an emergency.

KEMENY: It was an emergency, and the alumni responded most generously. That's why I like to use the line that the Dartmouth Alumni Fund had its largest percentage increase in its history right after coeducation. After people get over the shock of that statement, I do admit that there were a few other factors. That's why I know it was '73. It happened to be right after the coed decision, and the alumni responded most generously to that. I mean, just the pitch that somebody just took $1 million a year out of our pocket is a very strong pitch to increase the alumni fund.
FANELLI: Incidentally, I remember one little vignette that happened in that time. One of the women that we had turned down as a transfer when we opened it up for coeducation. There were some exchange students here?

KEMENY: Yes. There were 150, and over 100 of them applied to stay here, which was most embarrassing. We promised the other schools we'd take thirty and no more than five or six from one school. So being turned down did not mean she wasn't outstanding.

FANELLI: She was outstanding. She had written you a letter at the time saying that Dartmouth had made a great mistake but that she would still have good feelings about the college and would always treasure the time she spent here. Then when she was in graduate school a few years later… I guess when we did that was in '71 or '72, when we turned these women down, right?

KEMENY: Yes, because they would have officially matriculated in the fall of '72, yes.

FANELLI: So when she was in graduate school, let's say sometime in '73 or in '74, she read somewhere what you were telling the alumni on the alumni circuit about the great need. And she wrote you another letter, a very nice letter, and sent you a check for $10, saying that this was all she could afford because she was in graduate school, et cetera. I tracked her down on this trip, and she gave a lunch for Betty and me in Washington. She's a very successful woman in Washington, D.C. Her name is Terry Rosenblatt. She gave a lunch for us and asked us was there anyone in Washington that we wanted to meet with. We had John Dolan [John V. Dolan '79], who was an intern in the office, and Mark Brown [Mark A. Brown '78], who was also an intern in the office, and had a very good time.

One variable of the budget process is unforeseen inflation of the kind that we just discussed. Another variable of course is how well the college's investments are doing and what system one uses to determine what portion of the yield from endowment may appropriately or prudently be used for current operating costs. I recall that at one point in your tenure, you suggested and the trustees approved a new formula for determining that proportion. Without going into too much technical detail, would you talk about that, and at the same time perhaps say something about the range of trustee opinion on this question, which is in a certain sense, I guess, a philosophical question involving the bounds between future needs and present needs.

KEMENY: Yes. Let's see. First of all, one more word on inflation, which will lead into this naturally. While the increase in fuel prices was the biggest single shock, it led in turn to runaway inflation, not surprisingly. As the rest of the country started feeling the impact of oil, everything started going up and started a horrible cycle.
For the first time in ages, we had double-digit inflation, which is something none of our long-range planning had provided for, or anybody else's long-range planning.

It also, at the same time, had a horrible effect on the stock market. I'm not an expert on why; others would have to speak to it. It drove the stock market to lows that were way lower than anything experienced in recent history, particularly when you took inflation into account. The old belief that the stock market is the right way to hedge against inflation turned out to be absolutely false. Instead of stocks going up in a period of rising inflation, they went way down. That's why I said that private institutions were hit particularly hard, because not only did they have much higher expenditures, but one of their major sources of income, namely their endowment, was letting them down. So that's setting the scenario.

Incidentally, just so I don't go into details, let me just mention for any future historians I did write a two-part article for the AGB report—AGB being the Association of Governing Boards, it's an association of university trustees—which appeared in two consecutive issues in early 1983. There is where I speak technically on this particular issue, which is a complicated one. Probably I thought of it as much as any other college president, and being a mathematician, I felt I had some special contribution to make to it.

That having been said, I won't go into the technical issues. The real issues were—well, they came down to technical issues, which made it hard to discuss in a lay board—that there was a traditional rule of thumb of 5% utilization on the endowment.

FANELLI: As being prudent.

KEMENY: As being prudent. Actually, for some reason or other, the rule was 4.9% which was calculated on some horrendously complicated formula which had all kinds of assumptions in it which were true in the '60s and totally false in the '70s. Besides, how can anybody believe in a number as accurate as 4.9%? I'm saying as a mathematician, no such rough rule of thumb can possibly be correct to one-tenth of 1%. But it had been there, the board had been convinced of it, and for quite a while, many of them were unshakable on this subject.

FANELLI: I guess for many years it had worked, right? I mean, it was producing.

KEMENY: Well, for many years it had worked. As a matter of fact, as one looked back in—it wasn't adopted that long before, but it was adopted somewhere between '65 and '70. The point was of course that the late '60s were just absolutely booming, and in retrospect, the formula had the effect of being ultraconservative and actually gypping the college from some money.
This is a good place to illustrate the formula I would eventually convince the board of. There's nothing wrong in very good times when you have unusually high revenues and not spending all of them but saving them for a rainy day. The formula eventually worked out with the board also had that effect. What our later formula would do in such a case is place that portion which you didn't really need for this year's budget into a special reserve, specifically for the purpose to be used when the stock market was misbehaving itself.

What had happened in the late '60s was that all of these things that I would call surpluses—I have to say they were surpluses—were added to the endowment. Of course, as quasi-endowment funds, but they were called endowment. Therefore, using them up was not like using up a surplus saved for a rainy day, but many trustees were horribly upset that they were invading the endowment. That's one inequity. The formula went only in one side, that in bad times they let you spend little, but you didn't gain anything in good times. There was no such thing as putting aside the excess to be used in bad times to balance it out.

So that was one kind of problem. Secondly, the problem was with going on a flat percentage basis, which really does not make a very great deal of sense. Somehow you have to come up with a rule of prudence on a more sophisticated basis based both on what has happened to the principal of the endowment and what cash income the endowment is producing as to what is prudent to spend. Any single formula is very misleading. For example, the stock market in certain periods goes up and down like a yo-yo, and it would be horribly imprudent just because the stock market shot up for one year way high, therefore to be allowed to spend 5% of that. It is, on the other side, unfair if the stock market for one year only takes a big dip, if you're forced to cut the budget way back on account of this because it was a bad year.

Let me illustrate it with the second case. Suppose the stock market is at 1200 one year and drops to 700 the next year and is back to 1200 the following year. If you didn't spend principal, for example, at all, what earthly difference does it make? It was a paper loss that was regained and should have no impact at all on what you had.

John Meck's formula did try to take that into account by taking three-year averages, but as we now know, there was a big swing in the late '60s where the stock market was, in retrospect, too high for several years in a row, and as a result of the oil crisis, the stock market went low several years in a row, though it did recover afterwards. That's when the big battles came about whether the formula was fair or not.
A totally unrelated, not totally unrelated, but a completely different factor that complicated the endowment discussion was that the strategy that made John Meck one of the most successful investors in the whole country—and I want that on record—in the '60s was that he realized the potential of growth stocks very early. First of all, we were 91% in stocks, which I don't think anybody would consider prudent. Secondly, he had most of it in growth stocks that brought in very little yield, the formula that John Meck pioneered and the Ford Foundation would advocate it nationally, and did incredible financial damage to many institutions by persuading them to go onto this kind of investment policy. I mean, again, if the policy would have been put some reasonable fraction, say one-third of your endowment into this kind of stock, it would have had a very different effect. What that does is… I remember typically these stocks produced things like 2% yield, but they often grew 10% a year. That's why the formula was a so-called total return formula. What you looked at was how much did the endowment grow altogether as a combination of increasing paper value and yield. Then if you have a 5% dip, the total return is minus 3%. So it lent itself to rather horrendous fluctuation, and in a way you were spending on occasion speculative profits, which you didn't know if they were temporary or long-term ones. Or reacted, led to big budget cuts because temporarily you had paper losses.

The other thing that I argued with the board with some partial success is that the endowment should be invested in such a way that it produced a reasonable cash return large enough to cover that portion which the board was planning to utilize. That way you never get into the question as to whether you're spending capital or not. In good years, you would add to your reserve, and in bad years, you would draw from the reserve, and that would smooth out the amount of spending that you could do. That meant going into bonds or—it doesn't have to be bonds when there were very high interest rates—just putting the money into what I call cash equivalent. It is in effect lending the money out for interest. Say one-third of the endowment invested that way produced plenty of money for everything we needed as income from the endowment.

FANELLI:  Yes. Didn't the board around that time set a proportion that had to be invested in non-stock type things?

KEMENY:  Yes. They had limits that it had to stay one way or the other between 30 and 70%. It could never again go to 91%. Also, when the final fairly complicated rule was worked out, that the investment committee should try to produce the amount needed for expenditures in cash so you don't have to invade principal.
KEMENY: Let me relate one important incident and a couple of anecdotes associated with it because they are really telling, and these are '73 debates. My big pitch to the board was to switch to an investment policy that would be 50% stock and 50% bonds. Unfortunately, this was before I became really sophisticated. Not that I'm an expert, but at least had a degree of sophistication on investments. If I had known more, instead of saying bonds, I would have said bonds or other cash-producing investments. I was really just arguing for things where the principal did not fluctuate so much but produced substantial amounts of cash.

I did have support from a minority of the board on that. I remember, for example, Dave Smith was one of my supporters. I mention him because he was the only professional investment person on the board. I had some interesting support, but we never could come close to a majority of the board on this. So I lost that fight.

Two anecdotes to tell with this: I became a case history at Tuck School. I think it's Wayne Broehl. Without mentioning the name, just mentions the president of a liberal arts college, had the following thing. Of course, any such proposal depends terribly much on when you make the switch and when you read the results. So he took something like a five-year period and took each month as a possible starting point. OK? So sixty possible starting points, and took a decade later, five years with again any month as a stopping point, so that it shouldn't depend on the accident of when you start and when you stop. Of these huge number of cases, I think it showed in all but three of the combinations the college would have been better off if they had adopted my suggested policy. And in most cases, they would have been spectacularly better off.

The second anecdote I wanted to tell, which is really the funny one, was driving in a car with Jerome Wiesner, the then-president of MIT and a good personal friend. We were both bemoaning what had happened to our endowment. I forget which one of us first told the battle they had with the board. It turned out we had identical battles in '73 with our boards, made very similar suggestions, and lost. The two meetings were one month apart.

FANELLI: Oh my goodness.

KEMENY: But Jerry went one step further than I did. Unlike me, he had some money to invest. He actually had some money invested. He took all his money that he had invested in stocks, and he invested it in bonds or cash, other cash-yielding things. Five years later when the board was getting its report on total return performance, he told them what had happened to his investment. He of course had outperformed the MIT portfolio by an absolutely fantastic amount. I would have been prepared to put my money where my mouth was, too. I just didn't have any money. [Laughs]
So in that respect, I think most people admit, even though they wouldn't have
gone as far as what I originally proposed, that boards of trustees were very slow in
realizing that the underlying nature of investments had changed in the United
States, and the strategy that was incredibly successful in the ‘60s was a disaster by
mid-‘70s.

I should mention this. When Paul Paganucci [Paul D. "Pag" Paganucci ’53 TU
‘54] came on board after John Meck had retired, Pag took over as chief
investment officer. It took him a while to absorb all the information. This was
‘76, because it was the first meeting, a meeting of the Committee on Alumni
Affairs of the board, where the big item was to plan the Campaign for Dartmouth.
Pag was there for a ten-minute report on what he had learned about the
performance of the Dartmouth endowment. It was an extremely sophisticated
report delivered in Pag's Maine accent, which he puts on, so that anybody could
understand it, and in a totally calm voice. The chair of the meeting was not
paying attention because he was all excited about the coming campaign and
planning for it, so as soon as Pag finished, before there even had been a question,
he said, "Thank you very much, Pag. Now let's turn to our important item." I
couldn't let it go by with that because I sat there absolutely stunned. I said, "Mr.
Chairman, would you permit one question for Mr. Paganucci?" He said, "Sure.
What is it?" I said, "Pag, would you care to characterize qualitatively to the board
what the performance of the endowment has been say since 1970." Pag thought
for a minute, and said, "Mr. President, I believe the word disaster would be
absolutely accurate." Then he had the attention of the committee.

FANELLI: John, are there any other aspects of what we call the mechanics of money
management that you'd like to talk about? What about the advantages of
 technological innovations?

KEMENY: Well, sure. Our computerized record-keeping system—I think I did talk once
about the computerized budgeting—helped a great deal, both in arriving at the
budget and in monitoring the budget, sort of early warning when people were
going over. Eventually, people—they still do—get monthly reports where it
indicates what percentage of the year has passed and what percentage of each
budget cut your area spends. Now, you may know there was some expense items
which occurred once in the year, all of which occurred in the first half. You don't
worry about that. But for example, if your salary pool is 75% spent at mid-year,
you know there is something very wrong. The treasurer and his colleagues had
the responsibility of trying to spot things that were out of line that way.

That sort of thing does help, but the most important and difficult philosophical
issue comes down to what we talked about before: equity between the needs of
the present and protecting the future. It's a very hard issue to discuss with a board
of trustees, most of whom are lay people. I don't think I ever was totally
successful in it. In a way, my two articles that I referred to were an attempt, once I had time to sit down and think about it, to give a clearer exposition. The article even deals with the question, “What is the issue or the kind of question a board should discuss?” Because the discussions always came down to what percent we should be spending, which is the wrong way to approach the problem. The moment you were there, and the five or six board members who were actively involved in the investment committee and knew all about the mechanics of it, dominate the board meeting. Someone like Dave Weber [David R. “Dave” Weber ’65], who would have had major, or several other otherwise sophisticated trustees who were not experts on investments, could have had major input on the philosophical argument, but it somehow always got down to a numbers game instead of being a philosophical argument.

FANELLI: Perhaps that's characteristic of boards…

KEMENY: Yes. And of course to some extent you get into intangibles, which are always hard to measure. I mean, how much is the reputation of the college worth for the future? That was one line at least I used successfully. I now wish I had used a quite different form of discussion. But at least the one thing I periodically could appeal on saying is that if they save a few hundred thousand dollars for the future and by that lower the reputation of the college, just in financial terms it's going to cost the college vastly more in the long run.

FANELLI: John, let's talk about the outgo, or the expenditure part of the money equation. I seem to recall some charges by alumni or others that the administrative structure of the college had grown too large over the years, not necessarily the Kemeny years, the previous years. Perhaps you could talk briefly about the validity of that and also about the general question of the size and efficiency of the college operations and its relation to expenses. For example, if an academic department offers a wide variety of advanced courses with small enrollments, there might be an increased demand by professors for the library to subscribe to a number of specialized publications, thus building in annual cost increases for those items.

KEMENY: First, the size of the administration. It is absolutely true that starting almost, not quite from the beginning of the Dickey era, but fairly early in the Dickey era, throughout at least the first five years of my administration, there was a horrendous growth in the size of the administration. We made very careful comparative studies, and the same phenomenon took place, at least at the institutions with which we compare ourselves. I'm not therefore saying that this was right. What I'm saying, it's part of some sort of national phenomenon.

I think one of the causes for it is faculty members becoming more professional, in a sense. Certainly at Dartmouth that was a major factor. I believe that a lot of administrative work was done sort of free of charge by faculty members over and
above what they did. With faculty members expected to do a substantial amount of research and speak at professional meetings, publish, et cetera, they were simply not willing to do that. At least the better ones were not willing to do that. Or, if they did, they expected to get release time, in which case it's only a bookkeeping matter as to whether they are administrators or not.

That's one of the factors. The second factor I had to argue over and over again is that the world had become vastly more complicated. I mean, when I became president, we did not have a legal officer at the college. Let me just pick lawyers as an example. We did not have a full-time legal officer at the college. John Meck, in addition to all the other hats he wore, he was a law school professor and very well qualified, but sort of in his spare time was also a lawyer. We had a local lawyer, David Bradley, on retainer when we needed him. And he knew various outside law firms which he could call on a fee basis. By the end of my administration, we had two full-time lawyers. Maybe there are three by now, I'm not quite sure. I claim they were justified, and if there has been growth since my administration, I wouldn't be surprised at all, because everybody sued everybody in the '70s. I mean, there have been endless numbers of articles on this. The federal requirements became so horrendously complicated that everybody… It wasn't just us. Listen to the talk of major corporation heads, they will tell you how much the legal costs had escalated over the years. That's a good example where outside forces came about.

Let me tell you where I made my mistake in my administration. It wasn't the size of the increase. I made a horrible mistake with titles. Most administrators are not very visible. I have never been good at titles, and I didn't want the fine distinctions. I started using the title vice president for all the senior administrators. Except for later the temporary appointment of Ruth Adams, only one of these was new, but instead of having umpteen separate titles which were not as visible, all of a sudden it looked as if we had a huge number of vice presidents when before there had only been two. It had simply been making titles more uniform, and in retrospect, that's one mistake I wish I had not made because both on campus and off campus I got an enormous amount of bad press because of my huge number of vice presidents.

There were other outside influences. For example, a wonderful development was the significant move of the federal government into student financial aid. We got tons of money out of it, but it required staff to administer it. When we had both men and women on campus… First of all, there was an increase in the size of the college, which meant an increase in the administration. And the fact that there were no more on campus at the time did not decrease the problem. As a matter of fact, the Dartmouth Plan occasionally created extra problems because you have to worry about off-campus students. The fact that there were two sexes often meant that we had to have two of certain positions because certain types of problems,
men or women would only want to discuss with someone of the same gender. We did not previously have pregnancy counseling, just to pick a random example. Women's sports did not supplant men's sports, but they had a sizable increase in the athletics department because we did not cut men's sports, but we also instituted a significant number of women's sports. So there were a number of new activities, and the coming of coeducation and the equal opportunity program required a number of additional officers to succeed.

FANELLI: John, turning to the income side, let's talk first about the tuition, room and board ("TRB") component. I know that we both remember the annual agonizing that you and other college officers, and the trustees, went through each winter as we determined how much we were going to increase the TRB fees, what effect that would have on the financial aid budget and on the composition of the freshman class and the pool of applicants from which it was drawn. Perhaps you could talk a little bit about those areas.

KEMENY: Yes. Probably it was one area where I annually shocked a number of trustees. I was very careful never to push for more tuition increase than we needed, but I did not hesitate to push for that which I felt was necessary. I did not believe that an extra $100 a term, which is a large amount—the discussions were never over a larger figure than that—would discourage one single student from coming to Dartmouth College. I always argued that it was more important to maintain the quality than it was to worry about the tuition, as long as we did not get far out of line with our competition, and we never were. As a matter of fact, if you took the savings of the Dartmouth Plan into account, which most people didn't, but if you did, we were cheapest usually in the Ivy League.

There's a very important study that Princeton University did, which was replicated five years later again by the Consortium on Financing Higher Education with absolutely similar results. It shows that students first make a decision whether to go to college or not. Then they somehow mentally set their goals as to what kind of college they want to go to. There's admittedly a small percentage of usually very able students who decide they want to go to one of the best colleges in the country. If they decide they don't want to do that, you're not going to get the m, and cutting your tuition in half wouldn't make a difference. If you do, the decision on which college to go to doesn't seem to depend at all on how much you charge. There was no correlation at all. There always are differences amongst the leading colleges and what they charge. Their success in getting applicants did not vary with the price at all. Obviously it did depend on having enough financial aid so it was possible for students to come, but all of these schools typically do have good financial aid policies. It just was not price sensitive at all. But many trustees did not believe that, in spite of what I considered overwhelming evidence, not just the study but the fact that in years when we had to raise tuition unusually high, it had no effect on our applicant pool or how many of those we admitted
accepted Dartmouth College. In spite of all that evidence, every year there were some trustees who would try to talk the tuition down.

So that was the annual tuition battle. That's one major source of income. I have talked about endowment. Let me talk about the alumni fund.

FANELLI: I was just going to come to that. Why don't you just go ahead. I was just going to say, obviously the college during your tenure depended heavily on the alumni fund every year and you viewed as an important part of your presidential role stimulation of that annual giving. You did a great deal of traveling each year to speak to alumni groups, and I know personally that you didn't really enjoy that aspect of your job very much because travel isn't your favorite pastime. Could you talk a little bit about the general area and the problems and rewards associated with it?

KEMENY: Yes. I don't remember exactly when I woke up to the importance of the alumni fund. I think during the oil crisis when the alumni responded so generously to the oil crisis. The college tended to think of the endowment as the important source of income and the alumni fund as a nice plus. As I saw this very generous response by the alumni, and I saw what was happening to the endowment, I started putting more and more emphasis on the alumni fund.

FANELLI: I remember you talking about it in terms of the equivalent in endowment that one would have to have in order to produce that, which was very sizable.

KEMENY: Yes. I mean, just take the following. The alumni fund went under my presidency from $2 million to $7 million per year. That's annual expendable unrestricted money, and that's just for arts and sciences. That does not count monies that went to the professional schools. That's an increase of $5 million per year, which is the equivalent at 5% utilization of $100 million worth of endowment. That's more than the endowment target we had for arts and sciences in this major capital fund drive. But somehow, most trustees thought raising $100 million in endowment would have been fantastic. Raising the alumni fund by $5 million a year they somehow didn't put in the same category at all. The ratio of how much money we got from the endowment to the amount we got from the alumni fund changed dramatically during my presidency. I mean, when I started, one was vastly—several times the other one, and by the end of my presidency, it was certainly less than two-to-one. So the alumni fund was a very important part of the total income and it stayed up.

I again had to re-battle it during the capital fund drive when they wanted to freeze the alumni fund so it "wouldn't interfere" with raising of endowment. Fortunately, that battle I won with the board of trustees, though the whole board had to sit on our fundraisers because some of them had this endowment prejudice.
I know the fundraisers did not push as hard for the alumni fund and always set lower quotas. As a matter of fact, twice the committee of the alumni council that officially sets the alumni fund goal insisted on setting a higher goal than our fundraisers recommended. So it was artificially held down. President McLaughlin has been very successful in taking advantage of that. I think it's over $10 million now, just three years later. It was certainly there; if it hadn't been held down, I know I could have certainly had between $8 million and $9 million in my final year. But in spite of being held down, we had this huge increase from $2 million to $7 million and the goal was held down the last four years of my presidency.

Somehow fundraisers don't trust presidents, and they're afraid if they bring it in in the form of expendable funds, then the president will spend it. I kept pointing out that it was wonderful to get all these funds totally expendable and totally unrestricted, but the board independently set the guidelines for spending. If you got too much alumni fund... If you didn't need all the alumni fund for the spending formula, they put it into a special reserve. That actually did happen a couple of times during my presidency, so it's not just something in principle; it's something that happened in practice. The important thing was, it was then in a fund where it could, to everyone's satisfaction, be used in a bad year to make up the difference, without touching endowment.

In a way, the fight is not president versus trustees, it's a president versus chief fundraiser fight that I suspect occurs on many campuses, where the chief fundraisers want to have the say-so as to how restricted the fund will be. And obviously the president wants to get the funds as unrestricted as possible and then fight out with the board of trustees what he or she can spend.

FANELLI: What about the travel aspect of it that I mentioned?

KEMENY: Yes. I think I made this remark once, but let me say it again. Of the alumni fund trips, I enjoyed the speaking portion and the meeting of alumni and such, so it would be misleading to say that I objected to alumni tour.

FANELLI: I realize that.

KEMENY: I have said often, if for example I could travel at the beginning of the week to Chicago, spend ten days there, and alumni from all over the country came to Chicago, I would totally have enjoyed, not enjoyed all of it because it's horribly, physically tiring, but I would have had very little objection to alumni tour. It's the traveling part of it that was a killer.
I finally vetoed one-night stands. It was just too hard for me to fly into a city, go to a hotel, unpack. And remember, unlike most presidents, most of the time I had my wife with me. It's even harder on her. Unpack. You didn't have time to get the clothes hung out. You go to all the events you do and then repack the next morning and get on another plane. I just couldn't function that way. I came to the point where I could function reasonably well with two-night stands, but one-night stands I just couldn't. The other thing was that if it was more than a week, I had to have a day's break in it. Have I told the Detroit story yet, Alex?

FANELLI: I don't think so, John.

KEMENY: I learned this because the first trip... Because I knew nothing at all about it, my first alumni trip was scheduled entirely by the alumni and development office. It was a ten-day, uninterrupted trip, which in itself is a mistake. I think we went to seven cities in ten days. Particularly [with] a new president visiting, everybody scheduled in extra events. By the ninth day, we were bone tired. Ad Winship, who was then number two in the office, later would become number one, really was feeling horribly sorry for us, and we sat down at his initiative to ask what he could do so we would get through the last day, which was Detroit. We happened to notice it was the only stop where they had only scheduled the thing that you always have, a cocktail reception and then dinner and a speech. We were arriving at noon, and the whole afternoon was free. Jean desperately needed a nap, and I just needed to catch my breath. We got on the telephone and reached the president of the Detroit alumni club and explained the situation. He was most understanding, and he promised that nothing would be scheduled and we would be completely free in the afternoon.

We were met at the airport by the secretary of the Detroit alumni club, who said that he didn't get hold of our schedule till early that week and was absolutely horrified. It was the first visit of the president and his wife to Detroit, and they were not taking advantage of our coming. He very proudly announced that I had three newspaper and one television interview that afternoon, and Jean had a luncheon and something else set up for her. So that's the famous story. Detroit sort of became a horrible joke. It has nothing to do with the city, although certainly in those days it was not the pleasantest city in the whole world. It had to do with being absolutely bone tired and being greeted happily that four extra events were scheduled for me and two for my wife in what we thought was going to be our first free time in ten days. We barely got through that day, and that's when we sat down and figured out how to schedule things more intelligently.

I was perfectly willing to do all of these events if they were paced. For example, people would be horrified who saw my schedule. Occasionally, I gave five speeches in one day. I know that many people couldn't take that. That was nothing. I don't say it was nothing, but that I could easily take if I had a good
night's sleep before and could sleep in the same bed that night. It was the traveling that was the killer.

Jean used to read me a section from the book about President Hopkins about the three-month vacation he took in the summer, and I used to read her the section about how he did most of the alumni tour in a private car on a train. He had a good friend who was a big shot in railroads. A private car, we weren't aspiring to that at all. But if the whole alumni trip could have been done on the train rather than flying, it would have been vastly less wearing. Just once in all that time we managed to take one of the grand old trains, on Friday evening from Chicago, arriving Sunday afternoon in San Francisco. We arrived totally rested, relaxed. That's the only time we got a break like that.

FANELLI: John, I remember one trip we took that you, I think, enjoyed, and that was when we drove a car around five or six cities in New York state, all the way up to Buffalo, I think.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: I think we did it in about a week. But the traveling in the car was…

KEMENY: Just vastly relaxing. For example, I work very well in a car, at least on a reasonably smooth road. I mean, Doug [Douglas H. “Doug” McBain] would drive me, and I got tons of work done being driven to the airport in Boston or Hartford and back. I find it relaxing. I just cannot relax on an airplane. There's something horribly hectic about the whole airplane system. With a car, barring a very rare accident, you know you could be fifteen minutes late, but you never schedule things that tightly. But with an airplane, you don't know if you're going to arrive the same day, or you could easily be three hours late.

FANELLI: Or arrive in another city.

KEMENY: Or in another city at the expected time. That adds a great deal to the nervousness, and as I think I've said on tape before, I just get absolutely irrationally nervous when the flight is very bumpy. I remember a flight back from Hawaii on one of these huge planes. I think it was a 747 or a DC10, both wonderful planes, which I normally love. And that's usually a fairly smooth flight. But the captain just apologized to us. First he kept saying it will take us a while to get high enough, and then he said we're going higher, and then he said, "I'm terribly sorry. This is the highest turbulence I've experienced in I don't know how long, and we can't go any higher." We flew for something like three hours in a big plane in horrible turbulence. I was useless by the time we got to San Francisco. I mean, in a car if you get carsick, you get out and go to a cheap little restaurant and have a cup of
coffee, if it's drinkable, or a Coke, which is drinkable, and sit down and rest for fifteen minutes, and you can go on. But you can't do that on an airplane.

FANELLI: The time we took this trip in New York State was when we stopped in Albany and stayed overnight at Governor Rockefeller's [Nelson A. Rockefeller '30], the governor's mansion. Remember?

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: You had a bedroom with a lot of beautiful paintings in it, and I had a bedroom with a lot of beautiful paintings in it.

KEMENY: Yes. As I remember, the governor wasn't actually there.

FANELLI: He was not there, no.

KEMENY: He got called away or something.

End of Tape 11, Side B
Beginning of Tape 12, Side A

KEMENY: I mentioned that incident because… Although, as we said before, coeducation was a highly emotional issue on which reasonable people could disagree, and I often had alumni who got very excited, angry, lost their temper. That I was quite used to. This is the only incident I remember that the attack was a highly personal attack, which none of the others were.

FANELLI: John, we may have touched on the Campaign for Dartmouth before in connection with the med school, but I wonder if you want to say anything more about that rather remarkable effort. For example, how did we determine that such a campaign was needed? How was the original goal of $160 million set and later increased? And is there anything you wish to put in the record concerning the staff that conducted the campaign? Ad Winship, Sandy McCulloch [Norman E. “Sandy” McCulloch Jr. ‘50] and many volunteers participated.

KEMENY: Yes. Let's see. First, the planning of it. In a way, the decision to have one without having a date on it was made as part of the mid-'70s budget decisions. I had to come up when the… Part of these discussions on how in the long run do you run an institution… One of the things I successfully persuaded the board of was, that since it seemed to be getting to be a habit that roughly at ten-year intervals colleges conduct a major fund drive, those should somehow be taken into account into the budgeting process. My proposal to the board was—since it hadn't been done in the past, I couldn't live off the advantages of past things—that we should be allowed in budgeting to take that into account and temporarily spend
above the prudent level as long as we were spending on a line such that by the end of a successful fund drive we would be back to the prudent level. After very lengthy discussions, the board bought that. So, in effect, right then, a decision had been made.

The fund drive actually was launched earlier because the fundraisers got quite eager on this, as did Sandy McCulloch and some other trustees. The actual planning started in '76 and was launched in '77. There was a major argument about the size of the goal, because we did some very careful studies as to what the needs of the institution were and came up with a figure of $160 million. Let me explain that figure. That wasn't all additional money but included monies that would normally have come in during a five-year period from private sources. Government money is treated separately. The reason for that was we early made the decision that we didn't want to get into arguments with alumni as to which gift counted towards it and which didn't.

FANELLI: That $160 million included the alumni fund.

KEMENY: For example, it included the alumni fund, but would include all foundation gifts where they would normally have gotten it. In calculating the needs, say out of the $160 million, roughly—I forget now how much of it, but say $50 million would have come in if we had had no fund drive—so it was $110 million over what we would normally have gotten. That was carefully figured out, and the advantage of that was that, for example, some institutions make alumni very mad by having to decide how much to give to the alumni fund and how much to give to the capital fund drive. We simply counted all alumni fund gifts as gifts towards the campaign, and as a matter of fact, encouraged people that those who could not give capital gifts could help Dartmouth's campaign by giving more to the alumni fund during those years.

It's a very reasonable argument because, say in a reunion year, particularly major reunions like the twenty-fifth reunion, during the campaign, well-to-do people reached very far to make major capital gifts to the college, therefore probably did not make as large a contribution to their reunion alumni fund gift that they normally would have. But in each case, that slack was taken up by other alumni who perhaps couldn't give capital gifts or gave a token capital gift, reaching further in the alumni fund.

That certainly was an excellent decision that we reached agreement on very early, that we would have a cumulative goal. All this was honestly explained to the alumni, which included what would normally come in and what we needed in addition to bring the college back to balance and a few capital needs.
I fought very hard for keeping the buildings down because the last fund got eaten up by buildings, frankly. While the Third Century Fund drive was a very successful one, it was not that large, the endowment component was quite small, and every single building was underestimated. Nothing was put into that particular fund drive for the operating costs of the buildings, as a result of which every penny that was raised there, other than the alumni fund that came in during that time, everything else that was raised went either into buildings or into paying for the operations of the building. It really turned out to be almost an all-building campaign but it wasn't designed that way.

I mention one thing I fought for unsuccessfully: that any building we would raise, we would raise a sum of money for the operation of that building, which for a new building turned out to be 100%. That sounds very much, but if you go the endowment route, that's what it is. If you raise an extra 100%, taking the usual rule of thumb, it's 5% utilization. That means each year you have 5% of the building towards its operation, and people's figures range from 4 to 6% as to what it costs to operate. If it was a renovation, of course the figure was much smaller because we were already operating the building. So I tried to keep that portion of it down.

The big argument came that our needs, no matter… We tried to calculate it so the college would make it but tried not to inflate the figure, and we came up with $160 million we absolutely needed. The college retained, as was customary, outside consultants, who did all kinds of studies. I'm not sure what they do. I sometimes think the most important thing they do is reading tea leaves. But they did whatever studies they do, and they recommended a target of $115 million, and they said the absolute maximum they can see us raising was 125. Obviously the $115 million was ignored, but there was a big argument about $125 million versus $160 million.

FANELLI: Was that among the board?

KEMENY: This was in a full board meeting in the board room of the First National Bank in Boston. I vividly remember Dave McLaughlin, who was just a trustee at the time, being one of the people who argued very, very strongly. So did Sandy McCulloch, incidentally, who would later become campaign chairman. They are the two I remember arguing most forcefully that if what the college needs is $160 million, then we will raise $160 million. Or, if necessary, they'd rather go down fighting for what the college really needs than spending five years raising money where you know it's not going to meet the needs of the college. So that's how the $160 million target was set. With a deep sigh the board committed itself to it, but it looked horribly hard to achieve.
Between the time we planned the campaign and midway through the campaign, double digit inflation raged. The trouble was, by the time the money came in, it just wasn't worth as much. So we sat down very carefully at the retreat, I think, at the Minnary Center one summer with the board to figure out honestly what the impact of inflation was. Things had gone up about 30%, but it didn't affect everything. I mean, alumni fund that came in and we had already spent doesn't care what happened, and some things were affected more than others. We figured out that just to raise in real money the amount we had originally planned for, one had to add $25 million to the goal. The big debate there was—and the board was quite split—should one announce a new goal, which is unheard of in a campaign, before you've made the old goal? Or should we just quietly go and just try to make it?

Again Sandy and Dave were strong arguers for announcing the new goal. So was Ad Winship in this case. By that time, Ad was head of development throughout the planning and execution of the campaign. As a matter of fact, Dave McLaughlin was the one trustee who argued for raising it to $200 million. This is a funny little historical footnote. I think I once told it at some gathering. I was strongly in favor of announcing the $185 million, but I argued against going for $200 million. My argument was, I had made my plans with the board, or at least I knew privately that I would step down before the end of the campaign. What I wanted was, I wanted to be sure. I was sure we could make the 185, so I didn't want us to announce $200 million and then have a new president his first year fail to make the campaign goal. I said instead of that, if we announce 185 and the new president succeeds in hitting $200 million, he'll look wonderful to the outside world. The trustee who argued vigorously against me on this position was David McLaughlin. [Chuckles] That's the funny story. Of course, the campaign ended at something like $205 million. But it is a funny sidelight. We were each on the wrong... Somehow the argument was backwards. Neither one of us knew at that time of course that Dave would be the next president.

So we announced $185 million, and I'm very pleased at the end of four... It was really a five and a half year campaign because we started in midyear and you always finish out a year. We started with advance gifts, nucleus fund, and sort of launched it publicly in the fall, so it was five years plus. By the end of just four years, starting from the very beginning of it, two weeks before I stepped down from office we reached $160 million. So I made the goal I agreed to, and then Dave had the task to raise... He raised eventually $45 million in the year and a half that was left, which was excellent. It was a most successful campaign.

You asked about the campaign staff. I have to say that the staff of what's now Blunt Center, used to be Crosby Hall, is a very mixed bag. It's hard to make changes in it because some of the people you know from watching them close by
internally that they do not perform terribly well but can be extremely popular with the alumni. I personally had much better relations with George Colton ['35] than I did with Ad Winship, though it's quite possible that Ad Winship is as able in many ways, and perhaps more able in some, than George Colton. We just philosophically differed on a great many things.

Ad had infinite amounts of energy, worked day and night, had a very major illness to the point where I had to ask his permission to get confidential information from his doctor. The board had to know whether he'd be able to function. His physician told me that the prognosis was excellent; fortunately it turned out that way. He worked endless hours, very, very hard; did many things very, very well and did many things very badly. That's the only way to describe Ad Winship. He tended to lose sight of the forest for the trees.

Most of fundraising in normal times is in terms of alumni fund but since numbers count, all his organization was geared up for going after large numbers. I certainly did not want to kill that. I was all in favor of getting large numbers of gifts. They're important to a campaign, particularly at Dartmouth where we don't have that many horribly rich people. But he simply wasn't geared up to do anything in the major gifts area. I'll mention a secondary in a moment.

I have to say that I and some key trustees simply forced the choice of a first-rate person to head up major gifts onto Ad Winship, and that was Lu Sterling, now Lu Martin, who still is in that position. It was incredibly successful, but she had to start from scratch. I meant to check this number. Sometime it might be fun to ask Lu. I remember when she first tried to get out of that office a list of prospective major donors… I should say for the record major donor for this campaign was defined as someone who had the potential, not the inclination, just the potential of giving $100,000 or more. The list she got was discouragingly low, and everybody knows with major donors you only succeed in a certain percentage of them, certainly less than 50% typically. I mean, you might get a gift out of them, but not a major gift. I'm willing to bet that the number of major gifts we ended up with in that campaign was significantly higher than the total list that she got. That would be fun checking sometime. She really had to start from scratch. She kept finding names.

My last couple of months in office I remember her running in all excited discovering some Dartmouth alumnus nobody knew about who had tons of money and wasn't anti-Dartmouth, just nobody had cultivated him. She had visited him. He was very pleasant, and she was quite sure eventually he would come through with a major gift. The cultivation of major donors had been totally neglected. Although Ad deserves a great deal of credit for the mass effort and for infusing spirit in a great many people, Lu Martin is the one who delivered the big monies.
I knew about the foundations area. After all, I had done that portion in the previous campaign, and presidents have to play a personal role in that as they do with major donors. Lu was also excellent having been special assistant to the president, knowing how to use me best. Didn't bring me in until at least there was a serious prospect, but brought me in just at the right moment and with the right buildup. So foundations I knew about. Leonard Rieser was in charge of it, at least in principle. But I have to say that in practice, it was Greg Prince out of the dean's office and Jerry Nunnally [J. Ernest Nunnally] out of Ad Winship's staff that really delivered on foundations and corporations. Foundations did, relatively speaking, as well as I had done in the previous campaign, and corporations vastly better.

Another area that we really had done nothing about had been parents. For this purpose, parents is defined as parents of Dartmouth graduates where neither parent had been a Dartmouth graduate. Given when we went coed, that meant the father wasn't a Dartmouth graduate. Somehow it was an area where Ad had a major hang-up. Why would a non-alumnus ever want to give to a college? But I had met on alumni tour a huge number of parents who just came up to me… First of all, they showed up at an alumni meeting, which is surprising enough in itself. And secondly, they raved to me about the incredible experience their kids had.

Perhaps an extreme but not untypical example: I remember one pair of parents who came up to me and said neither one of them had ever had any contact with Dartmouth before. They had five children who had gone to five different schools—and named five of the best schools in the country—and they have to say… Well, I think a couple were not happy and a couple were happy. They said none of them had an experience comparable to the Dartmouth one, which convinced them that Dartmouth is just the greatest undergraduate institution in the country.

I felt that these parents would come through, and they did. But again we have to start from scratch. For example, instead of just accidentally a parent going out of their way to get themselves invited to alumni events, during the campaign—I hope that tradition has continued—parents, at least parents of current Dartmouth students, were automatically invited to alumni events. At least major alumni events, for example where the president spoke.

I think the three major areas where huge breakthroughs happened in this campaign were major gifts first of all, and corporations, and parents, all of which people were terribly hesitant on the goals, were sure we would not make the goals, and we went over the top on all of those.

FANELLI: John, while we're on this subject, perhaps you could recall an anecdote or two about some major gift donors. I'm thinking now of Charles Collis [Charles A.
"Charlie" Collis ‘37] or something of that order, where a large amount of money came in that wasn't entirely expected at the time, or before.

KEMENY: Yes. Let me start with Ken Montgomery [Kenneth F. “Ken” Montgomery ‘25] then. I had known him from early in my presidency because, since I had to finish off the previous campaign—I did the last nine months of the Third Century Fund—he was identified as a potential major donor, who for complicated reasons which I don't even understand, had gotten very angry at the college. We felt the new president could start. I did manage to hit it off fairly well with him though, and he came through with a modest gift. More importantly, he had had a very unhappy marriage which led to personal problems. His remarrying extremely happily a charming, intelligent, and delightful woman made all the difference in his life and he was just a different person after that. That contributed to the whole thing. Fortunately, by that time, he had been won back to Dartmouth, and I was soliciting him for a major gift.

Ken likes to do unusual things, and he was only willing to come through with a major gift if we could think up something that wasn't on our shopping list and something I personally believed was very important. I remember troubles we had had in the math department, and knew others had had, with accommodating very distinguished visitors because of the housing problem in Hanover. So we put together a package and Leonard Rieser… Incidentally, Leonard, who doesn't do very much fundraising himself, is excellent at talking to donors and explaining projects or thinking up projects or thinking how they should be presented. I mean, a dean of the faculty who is willing to work on fundraising is a very major asset, so I should have mentioned Leonard in that context. Certainly here it was two of us. Plus Ed Lathem [Edward Connery Lathem ‘51] of course played a major role because he was closest to Ken Montgomery amongst the people at the college.

We came up with $1 million proposition and we hesitated. We had no idea whether Ken would even think of anything like $1 million, but we desperately needed funds to buy a house which would be a house for distinguished visitors and which could, if not otherwise used, be used for occasional visitors, but where you might have somebody here from anywhere from a term to a year, and set up an endowment to pay their salary and their expenses for the upkeep of the house.

Ken and Harle [Harle Montgomery] got really quite excited about the project but they wanted much more detail. Then Harle got into the act and she has the most superb taste of almost any person I've ever met. If you visit their house in Chicago… I don't want to call it a museum because a museum sounds like something you wouldn't want to live in. It's a combination of the most exotic superb things and totally comfortable to live in. Or the way she dresses. I mean, she really has superb taste but very expensive taste. She escalated everything on the house—we had a modest thing that really would just be a nice apartment kind
of thing—into a really nice house and providing this and providing that for the
visitors.

We had a final meeting set at the Century Club in New York. Ed Lathem and I
and Leonard, all three of us are members of the Century. We had invited the
Montgomerys to have drinks and dinner with us. Not untypical, Leonard was late.
Actually, it was his plane couldn't land but it's typical of Leonard to have planned
it so close that the plane circling for half an hour made him an hour late or
something like that. By the time Leonard got there, it was all over.

What we had figured out is, there was no way of doing it with $1 million. We
were getting our nerve up to say it had to be at least 1.3 and we were going to try
to push him up to $1 and a half million. We outlined all the plans, and then I said,
"Ken, there's one thing I have to say to you." And Ken says, "You're going to tell
me it can't be done for $1 million." I said, "Ken, that's exactly what I'm going to
tell you. As you know, we had more modest plans. You have much more
ambitious plans and frankly plans that would be much better for Dartmouth
College but it can't be done for $1 million." And Ken said, "Harle and I have
already realized that and therefore what we want to ask you is, can you do it for
$2 million?" We were about to ask him for a maximum of one and a half, and he
offered us two. I said, "Ken, that would do very, very nicely." That's one of the
very nice fundraising stories.

Charlie Collis. I wasn't that heavily involved in the Charlie Collis solicitation
except near the end. I have since gotten to know Charlie Collis much better since
he is on the board of directors of the small corporation I have formed. That's not
public information but neither is this tape. Charlie is someone who… I asked
when he came to the directors' meeting to tell the three young men how he got
started in business. So he starts telling the story. I forget what the business was
in which he and his brother went bankrupt in one year, which is not quite the story
I thought. He says, "Oh, you mean the second business." [laughs] He knew
very well what we meant but he insisted on telling what had happened there.
They were in the shoe business and the war broke out and they couldn't get any
government contracts. He said actually some government purchasing agency
around three months after their company had gone bankrupt offered him a huge
contract but it didn't do him much good.

He got into wholesale sales of certain kinds of small manufactured items. But his
success story is that he was the first one who, of all kinds of things, came up with
the idea of having housewives sell the wares through parties they give in their
home. Of course, Tupperware became much better known later on. His idea
predates it. In effect, he says, "Look, we're sort of the Cadillac version of
Tupperware." By Cadillac it doesn't mean only the very rich, but Tupperware is
sort of everyday use kind of things. I mean, he dealt with items that might be
your good china, let me put it that way. It wasn't just china; there were all kinds of things. They were extremely successful. I think at some point, I forget, about 25,000 ladies were working for him. He was a great organizer and great inspirer.

Somewhere in his sixties he had remarried very happily and decided to take it easy. He started being approached by some companies who wanted to take him over and he got absolutely flabbergasted as to what he sold his company for. He never thought of himself as rich. It's a very lovely story. But he sold out for many millions. I don't know the figure. Out of that, he ended up giving a $5 million gift for Collis Center and for the professorship. That was a very unexpected one. That was the first largest gift we had ever gotten. But an interesting story, that he became the largest donor in Dartmouth history at that moment.

The previous larger donor, except for one we didn't know, had been Mr. Tuck [Edward Tuck 1862], who had given approximately $4 million, if I remember, during his lifetime. One has to remember that Mr. Tuck was a classmate of President Tucker's [William Jewett Tucker 1861], which meant he was in college somewhere in the 1860s. He lived into his nineties, but still, $4 million when Mr. Tuck gave it is vastly more. I mean, if you take the real of value of money at the time, Mr. Tuck still is the all-time greatest donor to Dartmouth.

The one who had become the greatest donor but it was not known until after his death was Harvey Hood because most of his gifts were anonymous. Then that was surpassed narrowly by Charlie Collis's gift. Then we got a totally unexpected gift—not unexpected in the sense that—it's a man we had known well and cultivated, Bob Maxwell [Robert “Bob” Maxwell '23], but no one had ever dreamed that he would give us $10 million. So we also got some breaks. But you don't get them without hard work. I don't want to bore you with the endless number of stories of people we cultivated for three years for $5 million gifts and got $50,000.

The importance of cultivation is shown and here is where we're really hurt in this campaign because the major gifts portion was slow in going. Montgomery paid off in this campaign because I had cultivated him and then Ed Lathem did much more cultivating from the previous fund drive. There was a small group of people, usually active alumni, who did get cultivated but a great many who didn't. Take for example John Berry ['44]. We managed to get the very first major gift out of him, an endowed chair in memory of his father during his lifetime. I have heard that now he has given $5 million towards the athletic facility.

Now, I'm not saying that isn't a great achievement for whoever pulled it off. What I'm saying, the groundwork had been laid. Those were the easy ones to collect, where the groundwork had been laid, but until Lu Martin got into that office, just
not enough people had been cultivated. Somehow the focus tended to be—and this was a great weakness of that whole Crosby operation—they tended to concentrate on alumni who were active alumni, and there's not necessarily a correlation between being an active alumnus and certainly not your potential for giving, but possibly even your willingness to give.

FANELLI: Right. Charlie Collis had not been an active alumnus, I don't think, for most of his...

KEMENY: Absolutely not. Take Peter Kiewit ['22], who only went here for one year.

End of Tape 12, Side A
Beginning of Tape 12, Side B

KEMENY: … Ort Hicks's success story, where he became aware of this alumnus. I guess he was aware of it because they were one class apart at Dartmouth. He slowly got him interested again, not terribly interested, but at least interested enough to look at the college and see it was a fine place—hadn’t been here thirty or forty years—and persuaded him to give a major gift. Kiewit really didn't care what it was to be used for. It happened to be the time they were looking for money for the building for the new computer, the new time-sharing system so he happily earmarked it for that. Through that I got to know him, and we would then in the major campaign get a lot of endowment for Kiewit. Kiewit actually died in the process but it was honored by the Kiewit Foundation. I mention that as an example that was an easy one for me, and a pleasant one, where really Ort Hicks had laid the groundwork.

I don't know how long Lu plans to stay in that job, but whatever length that time is, I predict that for two generations to come the college is going to profit from the groundwork that was laid by Lu and her colleagues.

FANELLI: John, this may be a little off the subject, but I recall at one point you became interested in a suggestion by an alumnus that Dartmouth…

KEMENY: Alex, sorry to interrupt you. I was trying to think of the questions you asked me, and I forgot to mention one thing. You asked me about Sandy McCulloch, and it would be very wrong of me not to mention him. I was quite worried about Sandy in the beginning because he had a serious personal problem, for which he got help. It's not a secret because he has talked about it publicly any number of times. There were horrible tragedies in his family, and as a result of it he became an alcoholic. It took him, as usual in such cases, a long time to realize he didn't just drink much but was an alcoholic, and he really wasn't functioning. But he got help and got cured, and after he got cured, Sandy just gave absolutely everything he had, either financially or in time or in enthusiasm. I don't know whether he was any good as a fundraiser. Certainly he was lousy as an organizer, but he just
added enormous enthusiasm to the campaign. So I think Sandy should get a great deal of credit for the success of it.

FANELLI: I was going to say that at one point you became interested in a suggestion by an alumnus that Dartmouth consider establishing a law school. One of the arguments made by the proponent was that almost all law schools are substantial moneymakers for their institutions. Would you want to comment briefly on that? I think it was Bob Reich [Robert “Bob” Reich ‘68] who made the suggestion.

KEMENY: Yes, Bob Reich, who was at that time a quite young alumnus, and I made the terrible mistake of trying to dismiss him with a fairly simple letter. If I had known then as much… I had known he was a great undergraduate leader, but I didn't quite know what a forceful personality he is. Of course, he has risen to be a major national figure since that time. You don't dismiss Bob Reich that easily, and he countered all my arguments successfully. I thought I finally had him because I heard law libraries were horribly expensive. He actually came up here and with Ed Lathem's help they went through the law. He had taken a list, randomly, of so many books that every law library should have and found that 83% of them were already in our library, because it was a great library. I lost all my arguments with him so then I went to the board with it.

It was a long drawn out argument, partly from people who didn't believe that it would make money. What it really came down to is, by the time it really went seriously to the board, we were beginning to plan the campaign. The argument that defeated the law school, which I believe was correct for the time—I'm not saying it's correct for all times, but correct for that time, though I argued on the other side—was that most alumni would not believe that it would make money, or wouldn't listen long enough to hear that. All they would say is, "My God, if you're rich enough to start the law school, then you don't really need money from us." That was an argument that would not be answered. I don't know if there are any plans now, but if ever the college wanted to, now would be the time to plan it, not as you are about to go into a major fund drive.

FANELLI: I remember his letter. He was very eloquent. But I do remember the moneymaking aspect of it.

John, I'm sure there are some things I've neglected to ask you. One area that you've touched on is the area of investments and the role of such people as John Meck, Paul Paganucci, such trustees as Bill Morton and Dick Hill [Richard D. “Dick” Hill ‘41] and Dave Smith and others in providing guidance in that area. Also I know that at one point some years ago the college became dissatisfied with the performance of its investment counseling firm, Colonial Associates. Was that the name of it?
KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: And switched to a different system under which we had three or four different managers.

KEMENY: Four actually, yes.

FANELLI: Chunks of the investment pie. Would you want to comment on any of those people I mentioned?

KEMENY: Yes. I certainly mentioned John Meck. And Paul Paganucci did a superb job once he took over. He really is a genius and turned us around very, very rapidly. I have nothing but good things to say about his performance as investment manager. I know several trustees played key roles. I actually can't judge who played the most important roles. Going back earlier, certainly Lloyd Brace played a very major role in it. All the trustees you mentioned played very important roles.

My problem with that committee always was that they had some difficulty differentiating in their minds how you invest for your own good and how you invest for a not for profit institution. I'd always felt that the [inaudible] prejudice was somewhat influenced by the fact that for a private individual it makes an enormous difference if you get your profit in the form of capital gains rather than as dividends. That of course is irrelevant for an institution that doesn't have to pay taxes in either case on their income. I am not sure they ever completely divorced that but basically they were very shrewd on investments and did as well as they could.

Going to multiple managers was Paul Paganucci's innovation, and in a way it was his way of carrying out the kind of thing I argued for in '73. Obviously Pag knows vastly more about investments than I will ever know or want to know. There are four. One is for bonds and cash equivalent. That's a separate manager because that's a highly specialized thing. Then even for stocks there are three different ones, and they set down… Different investors have different philosophies. The whole point was, they had competitions among people with similar philosophies and pick one of each, and they were promised that, depending on how well they performed, they would get more to invest, or some would be taken away from them. Not to mention that they could be fired. The whole point of this multiple management system is it achieves in a very practical way what I was vaguely arguing in '73, that you do not get stuck with one single investment philosophy which may work terrifically for three years and then could be horrible in the next three years.
FANELLI: John, just as you were talking, one thing occurred to me. Sometimes in these money matters one of the difficulties is that there's an area of the college where there's a drain. Money keeps going out that.

KEMENY: Do you mean the medical school?

FANELLI: No. Besides the medical school. [Laughs] The Hanover Inn occurred to me. Maybe you'd want to say something about that.

KEMENY: Yes. I have a topic to finish on when you're finished. I looked at my little list and I have one left.

The Hanover Inn is a very interesting success story. I've not followed what happened since after my presidency. When I took over the Hanover Inn, I actually became aware of problems at the Hanover Inn because there were some image problems and some bad incidents. I know the faculty hated the Hanover Inn. They haven't fully recovered from that in some way. I had this horrible incident which I think I mentioned—the dress code. I mentioned it in connection with equal opportunity.

So there were a number of things that bothered me about the Hanover Inn. I went a couple of times to meetings of their overseers. I was absolutely shocked a couple of years in a row when the manager presented the budget that it was getting worse and worse every year, and the overseers were just happily rubber stamping it. By the end of his term in office, he was losing $175,000 a year, which is… It looked less than that on paper in case a historian checks it, but there were some hidden subsidies to the inn which were cleared up during my administration. We were fair with the new managers, which gave us a starting point, the $175,000 figure, which is what the true figure was, so he would be compared to that. That's an awful lot of money to lose on one enterprise. Some trustees even talked about closing down the inn or selling it. But we decided to try once more.

I don't know whether he was ready to retire or because I had very bad relations with him, the manager of it resigned. That's how I became the only Ivy president, certainly of my generation, to have to hire a hotel manager, which I knew nothing… On the one hand, I had the help of Rodney Morgan, who although he didn't know necessarily about hotels, at least had had twenty-five years of business experience. And secondly, I looked around amongst the overseers and found there a man who had a lifetime of hotel experience. The two of them formed a search committee. They advertised and they interviewed candidates and did very well except they did a horrible thing.
They came down to two. I said I would just interview the finalists, and I thought pro forma, in part that maybe if the president met them it would help getting them. What they did to me is they came up with two finalists. They both agreed that they were far better than any other candidates, and they refused to rank one ahead of the other one. They were quite incomparable. The choice was between someone very experienced with a good record and an up and coming young man who looked extremely promising. So I interviewed both of them and I did the usual that I do. I gambled on the up and coming young man. He just did a sensational job.

The Hanover Inn would turn in a minimum profit of $50,000 a year. Now, that means going from minus $175,000 to plus $50,000. That's a turnaround of $225,000 a year. And he did it not by cutting corners but by significantly improving the quality of the inn, both in building and services and quality of the food, had a decent wine cellar. There were actually wine lists on the table though Jean had a hand in that. That was her one complaint to the new manager, that plus that you couldn't get a cup of coffee in your room. They now have some modest room service.

He had the same sort of philosophy I had towards Dartmouth, that if you make the quality high enough the money will come in and he totally succeeded in it. So that somehow doesn't show up on fundraising or whatnot, but that's $225,000 per year we were to the good. I think he was manager for about a decade, so that's over $2 million that he produced for the college. And incidentally, at least with outsiders, vastly improved the reputation of the inn.

FANELLI: And I think leveled off the use of it.

KEMENY: Yes. That was one of his crucial things. We started a conference bureau, used Minary and got some income, at least to meet the expenses on Minary, and particularly tried booking conferences during the very dead periods in Hanover, to the point where he persuaded the board to build a huge new room to be used for conferences and used for many other things, the Wheelock Room. He was charged full costs and a high rate of interest on it, and at least while I was president, he every year delivered the payments on that and still produced $50,000 or better in profits for the inn. So that's a success story.

Okay. I have a final item going back to the overall budget. A topic that I have very strong feelings on, and I don't know if I can do justice to it, is the question of what is a balanced budget. I'm trying not to get into technical things, but it's one of the things I'm trying to hit in this pair of articles. The trustees somehow… Most trustees believe that there's a clear-cut meaning to a balanced budget. Now, there is for an ordinary individual. You know what your income is, and you know what your expenses are, and the question is, is one higher than the other?
There's nothing that simple in an institution and particularly not in an institution that has endowment, not to mention unusual windfalls or unusual bad years. There's no simple unsophisticated definition to a balanced budget. For example, what the trustees vote and how much you can spend from endowment income has an enormous impact on the budget. There is nothing absolute on it. It's complicated. I don't claim to have said the last word. I'm sure that argument will go on forever. The budget that looks hopelessly unbalanced at a 5% spending rate could be showing a surplus at the 6% spending rate, or whatever. Similarly as to what you do with windfall income, whether you use it currently or use a small portion of it and put the rest of it in reserve has an enormous amount to do with a balanced budget.

I have become convinced that… Let's take faculty as an obvious example, but it would apply to alumni, too. You should totally ignore any statement that an institution makes that they're running a deficit, or running a surplus, either one, unless they know exactly what spending formula that institution is using and can decide whether it's spendthrift, prudent, or overly conservative. I mean, take the two extremes. If you're willing to spend, let's say consensus would be you're spending in a spendthrift way where you're compromising the future of the institution, then it's no great trick to show a surplus. The other is the much commoner. That is that either the investment officer or a small group of trustees persuade the board to be extremely conservative in using either windfall or using revenues from endowment, in which case you're always showing a deficit and you're crying poor and that can be terribly unfair to the current constituencies.

I've already talked about my attitude toward tuition. I was quite willing to fight for a larger tuition increase if I knew that the trustees were spending what they should be spending from endowment income, were not pocketing away hidden monies, then I had no trouble raising tuition. But to raise tuition because some trustee feels that you should not spend more than 4% from endowment income is to me totally unconscionable.

I brought it up because that's a subject that presidents and trustees have to study and constituencies someday have to get much more sophisticated about.

FANELLI: In a way, that's related also to the question of the medical school, because there's always the question there of the balanced budget, or rather the amount of deficit.

KEMENY: Yes. Particularly during that period where it took a long time to tool up the medical school fund drive, as I mentioned when we talked about the medical school. It really didn't get going till Lu Martin managed to get going. It was a trustee decision, which got reargued annually, at least by Don McKinlay, that we would use up the modest amount of quasi-endowment that was there, which is
legally spendable, until enough real endowment and current revenues could be raised for the medical school to go. The goal was achieved, so it was not a crazy strategy, though it would take several years and some faith to believe that you would get there.

As I've already said, I'm sure all the budgets in the late '60s were reported by Dartmouth College as balanced budgets. I have to tell you that all of them ran at a hefty surplus. Because every time more money came in than the college really needed, John Meck had some ingenious way of stashing the money away. Unfortunately, he stashed it in places where it was hard to use later when bad times came. Nothing wrong with stashing it away. Colleges hate to report that they're running on a surplus anyway.

FANELLI: Yes. Seems indecent in a way.

KEMENY: Yeah. I got hit by the board. I think I had two years where I reported a surplus. I think once it was $3,000, which is a joke. I tried to report it each year and the trustees gave me a hard time. They wanted me to give enormously long qualifications. Yes, but by drawing down this and by drawing down that. I said, "No. Following the spending rules and the funds utilization rules voted by this board of trustees, we finished the year $3,000..." One year it was $75,000 to the good; sometimes we were low.

One thing I was proud of... I now have forgotten the figure. I probably misquoted. I had very few years—once we got a serious budget process going—where the final figure differed by more than one-tenth of 1% from the original budget. In years with crazy things going on when institutions had enormous swings and would have multimillion dollar deficits, or one year...

A worst case of course is Yale. Kingman Brewster just publicly chewed out his treasurer, so it made all the papers. Whatever it was... All I know is that they announced that before the year started they were going to be in horrendous financial problems, and with the year starting they made $2 million worth of cutbacks, which I don't know how you do once the year starts, but it's horribly painful, and then finished the year with a $4 million surplus. Of course, the Yale faculty, absolutely justly, was totally up in arms. And so was Kingman Brewster. He was just totally misled by his treasurer.

[Tape off, then resumes]

FANELLI: This is an oral history session, August 7, 1984, with President Emeritus John G. Kemeny and Alex Fanelli. The general areas in this session are going to be athletics at Dartmouth and in the Ivy League and the Three Mile Island incident.
John, I've done some research in the trustee minutes, and here are some of the topics I'll ask you to comment on: the Ivy League philosophy regarding intercollegiate athletics and the pressures forcing some schools to depart from that philosophy; the question of freshman eligibility, that is the policy of allowing freshmen to play on varsity teams; the charter of the DCAC and why it seemed desirable to revise that charter to reaffirm the original intentions of the trustees that the DCAC function as an advisory body; the question of compulsory physical education; budget problems related to the athletic program; Ralph Manuel's role as chair of the Ivy League Policy Committee on Athletics and the impact of that committee on Ivy athletics; women's athletics at Dartmouth and title nine regulations; problems with scheduling, for example, the 1977 case of the tenth football game between Dartmouth College and Grambling to be played in Tokyo; athletic recruiting and the related question of the size of the coaching staff. Those aren't in any necessary order. They're just as they came to me.

Would you like to start with the broad question of Ivy League philosophy? For the record, let me quote from your ten-year report in 1980. This is just a short paragraph, but I think it sets the stage for it. You said, "At the same time, I must express a concern about Ivy athletics. I have fought for ten years within the group of Ivy presidents to maintain the spirit that makes Ivy athletics unique. Our philosophy is built on the conviction that one can have competition of the very highest quality without professionalizing the sport. As long as competition is against other schools who share this philosophy, and as long as winning the Ivy championship is the highest possible goal, we can maintain the important role that physical activities deserve on a college campus without hiring professional gladiators."

John, I might just ask, were there some schools in the league who paid lip service to that philosophy but departed from it in practice?

KEMENY: That is probably too strong a statement, but I think deep down all of them believed in the philosophy, but in practice they would compromise their principles. Certainly no one advocated a change in the fundamental philosophy, and I do believe that all of them deep down shared that philosophy. It's not an uncommon problem with high principles as to how far you're willing to compromise them in a less than perfect real world. The compromises came to a head in the general areas of recruiting, of freshman eligibility, and various questions concerning financial aid for athletes that have come up at various times.

To set the stage, the Ivy League was formed in the mid-'50s. John Dickey played a prominent role in making it an official league and in pulling off a very unusual arrangement in which the Ivy presidents set policy for the league. Most leagues have some policy-making body, but in this case, it is the presidents, and that was interpreted literally. It did not mean presidents or their designated representatives;
it meant the presidents. If a president didn't attend a meeting, that school lost its vote. The only exception was if for some reason the institution had an acting president. Of course if the person was acting president, he could exercise the powers of the president. Policy could only be set or changed by an affirmative vote of six presidents, so it was quite hard to change policy.

The second thing I have to do to set the stage is to say that I was convinced fairly early that, nationally speaking, collegiate athletics went mad in the '70s. Perhaps it started earlier than that, but I became aware of it after I became president, in that a number of otherwise distinguished schools in effect ended up hiring professional athletes, and there is no other way of describing it. I describe it that way for at least two reasons. One, that they were students who would otherwise never have been admitted to the institution, and secondly, they were directly or indirectly paid fees of a quite large size that certainly went way beyond anything you could consider as student aid. Some schools even went so far as to arrange special programs for these students so that they would not be in danger of flunking out of the institution. There were several really horrible cases in the '70s which led both to suspensions of schools and to firing of coaches, where coaches actively participated either in helping students to cheat or took active steps that they knew to be in clear violation of their own institution's policies, such as Pac Ten schools where students attended some not very reputable junior college and took courses that were jokes, or where others took the courses or exams for them with the collusion of the coaches.

I think the combination of those things, it is not too strong a statement to make that nationally we went mad over the subject of sports. By the late '70s, there was a significant movement on the part of many college presidents, not limited to the Ivies, to try to bring some sanity back to intercollegiate athletics.

Not that the Ivy League ever came close to these abuses, but the existence of these abuses, particularly when they occurred in otherwise quite reputable schools and therefore schools that might take students away from us, put pressures on the Ivy League. The pressures ranged from compromising on the quality of students you admit to pointing to other institutions where a given student might get a much more substantial amount of financial aid than at an Ivy institution, to allowing students to compete on the varsity team as freshman. That's a big topic we have to take up by itself.

Let me mention the financial aid pressure because it is fairly simple to explain. Many podunk, or even one of the big southern universities that has never been a serious competitor of ours, paid athletes that did not create any conflict. Stanford, for example, is a member of Pac Ten and certainly one of the outstanding educational institutions in the country. Although the president of Stanford repeatedly advocated reform, he happened to be in a league where athletes could
be given full financial aid even if they had no need for it. And all of us got complaints from our alumni when there was an outstanding athlete who might have applied to two or three Ivy League schools and to Stanford. If the athlete happened to come from an upper-middle-class family, he might get only token financial aid, or perhaps only a loan offer from an Ivy institution, while he would get a full scholarship plus from Stanford.

End of Tape 12, Side B
Beginning of Tape 13, Side A

KEMENY: I feel the three biggest abuses were in admissions, financial aid, and freshman eligibility, although [inaudible] the other topics you mentioned are at least indirectly relevant to this topic. I mentioned financial aid, where it was simply a matter of sticking to the policies laid down by the Ivy League. Fortunately, that's one area where the battle was always won. Although there may have been individual abuses, we very carefully monitored each other, and those institutions very quickly received complaints about any abuses. I think all in all that was reasonably well under control.

Admissions is a very different story. First of all, one has to face the fact that although the Ivy Leagues as a group are amongst the strongest institutions in the country, there were significant differences in admissions standards amongst the Ivy League. Let me pick the University of Pennsylvania as an example. Pennsylvania has some of the truly outstanding graduate schools in the United States. Its graduate school of business is the best, or one of the three best, depending on whose rating you take. And many other professional schools are outstanding. But frankly it had a huge undergraduate body, and it wasn't quite up to the competitive advantage of the other Ivy Leagues. Therefore, even not talking about athletes, they have to admit some students who are not as good as the students at other Ivy institutions. Therefore, there was a problem of comparing standards to start with. Pennsylvania was not alone. This may be shocking, certainly it was shocking to me, but Columbia reached a stage where they had terrible trouble attracting first-rate undergraduates. Here geographic location had a great deal to do with it. It's not just New York City but in an area that had become way rundown in New York City. So there were schools that just for general students had to have lower standards. Then it was much easier for them to argue, "Look, we have to stretch this far anyway to admit students, or we admit a much broader range of students. Why not just lean a little bit more for athletes?" The result in some cases was students who simply did not belong in an Ivy institution at all.

To give the listener some idea of why the problem was so complex, do you judge it on absolute standard, which would be quite unfair to Penn and to Columbia because that would mean that students who would easily get admitted as non-
athletes couldn't be admitted as athletes, which also does not seem fair? Or do you judge it on relative standards, because on relative standards frankly one of the institutions that reached furthest was Harvard? Now, Harvard had the opposite problem. Even amongst the Ivies, they had the strongest competitive advantage, and therefore the average SAT scores at Harvard were higher than at any other Ivy institution. Therefore, if they would only admit students as athletes who were near the average of Harvard undergraduates, they would have had a horrible time recruiting any athletic team.

Every time we had a battle on acceptable standards there were these two extremes, and just from this description it's clear that there is no ideal solution. We did work out some sort of formula which was adopted in the late '70s by the Ivy League. Up till then it was mostly monitoring and voluntary actions, but we worked out some formula as to how far the average athlete could differ from the average student, or how many of them could, and there was an annual reporting system which flagged what appeared to be abuses. I believe some progress was made as a result of that system. But necessarily the formula had to be complicated if it was going to do justice to all of these difficulties.

Needless to say, the alumni put enormous pressures on all institutions. They couldn't understand why a student who had marvelous scores, both scores over five hundred, and was an outstanding athlete would not be admitted say to Dartmouth College. We have to point out that almost never did we admit any students whose scores were that low. It may look good nationally, but it looked terrible compared to the Ivy League.

Then there was the problem with minority students in general and minority athletes that clouded the issue. Each of our institutions, as part of our equal opportunity program, which I have previously discussed, tried to take into account students who came from horrible high schools and possibly very poor family backgrounds which would have resulted in SAT scores much lower than their talents would have deserved. We reached for them, and nobody criticized if one also reached similarly for an athlete who came from that kind of background. But frankly, most schools try to hide some of their "cheating" by recruiting an outstanding black athlete from an upper-middle-class family and who went to a prep school, but report him together with all the other minority grades, and then his grade didn't look so bad.

One more thing I have to mention because it's in a way a marvelous story and led to a great anecdote. Just to tell you how complicated it was, I mentioned two of the three schools that had different admission standards for undergraduates. The third one is Cornell. I left it last because they had a different problem. The liberal arts college at Cornell University had as high standards as any of us. But Cornell
as an undergraduate institution has a number of different schools, including agriculture and hotel management.

FANELLI: Which have different standards.

KEMENY: Yes, and as a matter of fact, they're not even private. I believe it's a state agricultural institution, or a state supported agricultural institution. And hotel management, I don't know what are reasonable standards for hotel management, nobody knows. One couldn't very well tell Cornell that only their liberal arts students could participate in sports, and obviously the admission standards were different here and that led to all kinds of complications and abuses.

The anecdote I wanted to tell was, when Bob Blackman [Robert L. "Bob" Blackman], to our sorrow, went to Cornell University for the last part of his career, I was interviewed by someone and asked what I thought Bob Blackman would do at Cornell where the athletic program had gone way down. In particular, I think I got a rather pointed question as to whether Bob Blackman would cheat. I said, "In my experience, Bob Blackman always operated within the rules." He was just a genius at making the most out of those rules. But I did predict that Cornell University was going to recruit the most spectacular collection of six-foot-nine, 280-pound hotel managers. [Laughs]

FANELLI: The question of freshman eligibility seems to be a case where Dartmouth found itself in a minority trying to hold out for the maintenance of freshman teams instead of allowing freshmen to play on varsity teams. I know this came up early in your tenure as president. Early in 1971 you reported to the board that the Ivy League had voted five-to-three for a policy change that would permit freshmen to play on certain teams. That wasn't enough majority, as you mentioned earlier, to make the change since six votes were needed. At Dartmouth, coaches favored the change because they felt it would aid in recruiting good athletes and would strengthen some varsity teams. But the faculty committee on the freshman class opposed it because they didn't believe freshmen were mature enough to compete on the varsity level and to take that pressure that would accompany that. At the March 1971 meeting of Ivy presidents, there was a unanimous vote to accept your compromise proposal, and I quote, "to permit freshmen to compete on varsity teams except in football, basketball, baseball, hockey, soccer, lacrosse, and crew." Did that compromise last or were the pressures too great?

KEMENY: It did not last. You mentioned one of the major issues, one of the major arguments against freshman eligibility, the question of pressure, and that's very real. After the changes, there was ample evidence that that was a legitimate argument.
There was a second, to me, equally important argument against broad freshman eligibility. We recruit and admit many more students who are promising athletes than can ever make a varsity team. I know from testimony of alumni, including board members—and we had some excellent athletes on the board and some who had played as freshmen but never made varsity teams—who said that even though they were disappointed they didn't make the varsity team, being able to play on a freshman team, much less pressure and much more chance to participate, meant a great deal to them in terms of adjusting to Dartmouth College. One of the things that worried me and at least two of the other Ivy presidents was that once one made freshmen eligible for varsity teams, freshman teams would rapidly disappear. And they did, in spite of what some presidents claimed would happen. Therefore, many fewer students altogether would get a chance ever to play at the institution.

In a way, the tradeoff here was to get a better chance to attract some super athletes. It's only for them that it would make a difference whether they've got three years or four years varsity eligibility versus giving a much larger number of students a chance to compete, at least as freshmen.

FANELLI: John, were there also some financial benefits as perceived by the coaches who could take the money that would go to its freshman teams and maybe put it towards…

KEMENY: Not really, because I think what happened in each of those sports is that sort of a combined freshman-junior varsity team was formed. If there was any saving, I think it would have been only in football. It was the only sport, if my memory is right, where there were three teams—varsity, junior varsity, and freshman—since that would end up as the only sport where freshmen were not eligible in the Ivy League, even at the end. There really were no financial savings, so money was not the issue. It was really a better chance of getting a few outstanding athletes versus giving more students an opportunity and a more relaxed opportunity to participate in sports.

The blocking coalition for most of the '70s was Dartmouth, Yale, and Harvard. We would lose the fight later on when Derek Bok at Harvard gave in on some of the issues. He was the swing vote, although I never quite understood why he gave in because on principle he was always with presidents of Yale and me. I say presidents in the plural because it happened that two consecutive presidents of Yale, Kingman Brewster and Bart Giamatti, both felt very, very strongly. I recently got called by a newspaper that had just interviewed Bart Giamatti, and apparently Bart Giamatti made the statement… First of all, he spoke about how long and hard he fought for amateurism in Ivy sports, which is absolutely true. He said that the only person who gave him full support was I, so I got called.
That's quite true, although we had Derek Bok with us at least for a while, and he only gave in in stages. So there were five teams pushing quite hard in what I feel is the wrong direction, three of us holding out, and then the walls came tumbling down as Derek Bok would slowly give in on issues.

That famous compromise came out because the three no votes were quite firm, but the other five teams were so upset by this that some of them claimed they might have to consider withdrawing from [the] Ivy League. So some compromise was necessary. It was probably at the time I was chairman of the Ivy group. It's a rotating chairmanship. I felt I had to come up with some compromise, and although it's listed in terms of the spelling of the sports, what the essence of the compromise is, that those are the events where teams really participate very much as teams. In other sports, it's primarily individual sports. A tennis team is a team, but they play one at a time, or maybe a pair at a time. Where we felt the giving up freshman teams was worst was in those places where they would need to get experience playing on a team and needed coaching on a team, so that compromise eventually carried unanimously. That one I never regretted. I did not hear any bad effects of say letting a freshman tennis player, if he or she was good enough, play on the varsity team.

It was with the team sports that the big fights were, and it went in two stages. There was a big fight to come back and limit the freshman eligibility ban to the most competitive team sports, which were defined as football, hockey, and basketball. And it is true, they are sort of the most visible sports. The motion was to allow freshman eligibility in the other sports. After a very long argument—perhaps it took more than a year—Derek Bok gave in on that, and therefore they got their six affirmative votes.

There's an interesting sidelight to that motion. The motion actually was formed excluding only basketball and hockey. When I asked why football wasn't included, someone pointed out that there was a national ban. NCAA rules prohibited freshmen from participating in varsity football. Therefore, they said that there was no need to include football. I turned the argument around and said, "But truly you would agree in that case there would be no harm in including football." They thought that was a harmless enough thing to say, and it was included. And thank God, because two years later NCAA dropped its ban. If I had not made that very slight amendment to the motion, all of a sudden Ivy freshmen would have been eligible for football.

Then it took many more years and fights, and a rather bitter fight on which Derek Bok sort of kept… He was philosophically opposed but finally got talked into casting the sixth vote for letting freshmen participate in hockey and basketball. And I think that was a very serious mistake.
FANELLI: John, I recall something in the trustee minutes which I could find if we have to, but it was about soccer. Soccer is a fall sport, is that correct?

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: And there was a feeling on the board, as I recall—maybe there were some soccer players on the board, I don't know—there was the feeling that no matter what the Ivy League did, that our freshmen should not be allowed to play because it was the first term that they would be here.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: And no matter what the Ivy League does, we…

KEMENY: I have to think for a moment, but I think it was the only fairly high pressure team sport for which freshmen were eligible under these rules and which came in the fall, since in football they were not eligible, lacrosse is spring, and… Well, crew is sort of different. It's sort of all year-round. So they had quite strong feelings about that, but I couldn't carry the day in the Ivy League on it.

So Yale and Dartmouth ended up being a minority of two on that issue, but I think historians will judge that we were right and the majority was wrong on that, because as I look back on it, I know of no beneficial effect that came out of it at all, and certainly it has, both through the disappearance of most freshman teams and to much fewer students being able to participate in sports. So I think that was a very bad decision.

You brought up the Ivy Policy Committee. That came about as follows. While it was clear that the presidents should remain the policymakers, we also faced up to the fact as a group that in between presidents' meetings, which occurred twice a year, we just did not have the time to do day-to-day monitoring. Therefore, we agreed to have a committee set up with one member from each institution, plus we had a full-time sort of executive secretary for the Ivy League who would sit on the group. Their job would be to monitor things and periodically to make policy recommendations to the presidents. Nobody came up with a very good name. I had suggested Ralph Manuel, and after he had served for a year, he was so incredibly successful at that that future chairmen of the Ivy presidents kept asking Ralph to continue, and they kept him on as long as he was willing to stay. He played a dominant role in that committee.

FANELLI: That committee was formed, John, I believe, when you were chairing the Ivy League.
KEMENY: When I was chair, yes. This was part of all of this. One of the things I did do when I was chair of the Ivy League was to try to establish some standards by which our institutions have to live. So this idea of a policy committee was accepted. The rules were that the officer named by an institution had to be someone who reported to the president of the institution. This was partly sort of to define how high up the individual was, but equally important, it had to be someone who had easy access to the president because the procedure was, if he or she became aware of an abuse at that institution, to go to the local president first. That was in the early days fairly well kept, but later on sort of some institutions passed it up to people lower down, who would at least privately tell Ralph Manuel that they had terrible trouble ever getting hold of their president.

FANELLI: Was Ralph our representative?

KEMENY: Yes. That was the point. As a matter of fact, I think what happened was that we went around the table everyone naming whom they would name. It was one of the other presidents who happened to know Ralph Manuel and said, "Gee, he would be a terrific person to chair." I said, "Look, I didn't want to suggest that, but certainly I think he would be an excellent chair for it." And he was reelected by the presidents as chair for several years, until finally Ralph said, "Look, I've done it so many years, I've got to step down from it." The fact that the whole monitoring program, in spite of all kinds of foot dragging, did work and did contribute at least to maintain a reasonable degree of sanity in admissions and financial aid is primarily due to the efforts of Ralph Manuel.

FANELLI: Then there were occasions probably when some policy issues arose that then had to go to the presidents.

KEMENY: Yes. This committee, it was called the policy committee, but it was really a policy monitoring committee and a policy recommending committee. For example, they had a quite complicated arrangement on monitoring admission standards. The presidents can't work it out in a one-day meeting. It's this policy committee that came in with a recommendation. I think the first time they came there were objections, we sent it back, they came back with a modified one, and we adopted it.

Before anything formal happened, Ralph was very successful in just getting... He got the presidents' vote that the presidents want to see the data, and just presenting the data without any editorial comment shook some of the presidents because for the first time they saw on paper how far out of line they were. This included in some sports institutions as distinguished as Harvard. I forget, let's say Harvard, either in basketball or hockey just clearly was admitting students who did not belong, even if you took into account Harvard's extra high standards, just did not belong to Harvard.
FANELLI: So part of Ralph’s skill, really, was doing some things that had to be done in a non-hostile way.

KEMENY: Non-hostile way. Or a non-bombastic way. I mean, he just brought the facts that spoke for themselves.

FANELLI: You had mentioned before about the recruiting and some of the transgressions of other schools. I just thought I might ask, what about Dartmouth? Were there any instances that came to your attention where Dartmouth coaches or alumni might have violated the letter or the spirit of the Ivy recruiting regulations?

KEMENY: Yes. I actually have no complaint about the actions of the coaches. I would get terribly tired of their bitching, which is a different situation. The violations I became aware of were alumni violations, and at least in one case I stepped in personally, which is probably not a good idea. In others I had coaches or admissions officers go and talk to the alumnus in question. It's over-enthusiasm coupled with ignorance on the part of alumni as to what was permitted and what was not permitted.

My impression with the coaches was that they lobbied madly for what I consider were the wrong things. They lived at least reasonably well within the rules once they realized that the rules were the rules.

Seaver Peters was very good on that. He would get to be a terrible pain in the neck in continually advocating and occasionally trying to use alumni pressure to try to change my mind on some of these subjects. But he could turn around and be very tough on his coaches to make sure that they did not violate Ivy policy.

I can't say the same about other schools. There are a number of instances of violations. Let me mention some examples of it. The most horrible one was University of Pennsylvania admissions. One of the things we do so that there isn't any cutthroat competition is all Ivy schools mail their admissions letters on the same day. As a matter of fact, I'm sure everyone mails it at 12:01 a.m. on a certain Saturday so the students get it the next Monday. There's nothing wrong in 12:01 a.m., but sending it the previous afternoon would be a very serious violation. University of Pennsylvania one year mailed out its acceptances ten days early. And when everybody was shocked by this and they were called on it, they claimed it was an error in the mailroom, that they had turned over the acceptance letters with a clear statement that they're not to be mailed until 12:01 on such-and-such date, and some clerk accidentally sent all these letters out.

Now, as all the other admissions officers said, every single admissions office works till midnight the day before making last minute decisions. Nobody ever has the stuff ready ten days early, so there's no way that that was an accident.
Obviously we threatened Pennsylvania with serious sanctions, and it never happened again.

The other thing that was an interesting example, both an example of a violation and feedback to the presidents which had an interesting effect on something I would do at Dartmouth, was still when I was chairman. I was very worried about financial aid policies. I heard of various abuses. The abuses turned out to be much less than people claimed, but you only have to hear of one case to think there are hundreds of them. We agreed that each financial aid office would have to put down on paper their general rules, just in a paragraph. That wasn't the important thing. The important thing is where there were exceptions, either in the amounts given out or in how it was packaged. What we were looking for here is whether there was anything covertly in these that favored athletes. The then president of Cornell, who actually quite strongly supported reforms, happened to be overseas while all this study went on. This was our first Minary retreat. I remember I invited the Ivy presidents there when I was chairman. And we would go on and have annual retreats, though usually somewhere else. He did not see the report till he had arrived at Minary, and we all had copies by then. The Cornell list had on it the categories where they give exceptional financial aid. The last category was outstanding athletes, which of course is an absolute violation of Ivy rules. It's not just that they were violating it, but suppose they were. Is that financial aid office so uninformed that they don't realize that they were reporting themselves for a clear violation of Ivy rules? I thought the poor president of Cornell was going into apoplexy. Incidentally, he within six months wrote us a letter assuring us that he had not been aware of that abuse and he did stop it.

The interesting thing that came out, which has nothing to do with athletics, I noticed that several schools had a category in which some of their top students, while not getting more money necessarily but were either given a better package—more scholarship, less loan—or if they were not in financial need were given a token scholarship. We talked about it, and all of us agreed that as long as this really is top students on some absolute criteria of which athletics was not one of them, there was nothing wrong with this.

So here I had the opposite reaction, namely, why isn't Dartmouth doing this? I discovered that we used to do it, with John Dickey's approval. There were the Daniel Webster scholarships, which are our richer scholarships. But it used to be that they were awarded to the top so many students, irrespective of financial need, and if they had financial need they got what they deserved but with more of it in scholarship, less in loan. But if not, they got a $100 token scholarship. I was curious how that was stopped. I had to track it down, and it turned out that the then admissions director, just on his own, decided this wasn't worth it. I asked him, and he had never checked with President Dickey and just stopped that policy.
So I reinstituted that policy, which I now knew was legal under Ivy rules, and there were hardly ever any athletes in it, and if they were, they were there quite accidentally. What worried me was that these schools had a quite unfair advantage over the academically top students. So we reinstituted it. If we had taken inflation into account, I suggested that what used to be $100 was now $200. We compromised at $150, I don't know how. So we reinstituted the so-called honorary Daniel Websters. They were very effective, because it was a way of telling a student that we really wanted the student very badly. And it cost negligible amounts of money.

FANELLI: And the student was advised at the time the acceptance went out, right?

KEMENY: Yes. I think it was the hundred students, not the hundred coming but the hundred students admitted who were highest on our complicated rating scale. It was a combination of academic and personal qualities, so you're talking about students every school in the country wanted. That's the group in which we're lucky if we got forty out of the group. Of those forty, just on the average 60% would be financial aid students anyway, so we're talking about maybe fifteen honorary Daniel Websters at $150. But if even five of those students might otherwise have gone elsewhere, it meant a great deal to the institution. We're now talking about students where every one of them is a great treasure to have at an institution.

End of Tape 13, Side A
Beginning of Tape 13, Side B

FANELLI: John, in October of 1977, Ralph Manuel, who was then dean of the college as well as chair of the Ivy League Policy Committee on Athletics, wrote a paper on athletic policy that was distributed to the board of trustees. One of the topics Ralph raised in that paper was the question of scheduling, that is, what level of opponents should Dartmouth play and with what level of frequency or intensity. In that paper, he used as an example of the existing confusion regarding the wishes of the trustees the Grambling College incident, in which apparently both the DCAC Executive Committee and the faculty Committee on Athletics had approved the scheduling of the tenth football game in Tokyo, only to find the project rejected by the trustees. Can you talk about that incident and the general question of scheduling?

KEMENY: Yes. That particular incident shocked the entire board and certainly shocked me, for two separate reasons. First of all, a tenth football game held in Tokyo, obviously Tokyo would have required being away from campus for at least a week, if not longer, and would have meant that football players would miss a substantial part of the fall term. That kind of time demand showed insensitivity on the academic needs of those students.
It was equally shocking that the opponent would be Grambling, which has been famous for quite a long time as in effect… I don't know anything about their academic standards, I'm not commenting on that, but it's one of a handful of schools that's famous for having produced a totally disproportionate number of pro athletes, really outstanding pro athletes, and therefore our students would have found themselves on the field against a football team that was almost of pro caliber. It would have been a total mismatch, it could have caused serious physical damage to our students, and it was about as far away from the philosophy of playing schools of similar philosophy, similar academic standings, and similar sports ability as it could possibly be.

FANELLI: Would it be like the Dartmouth baseball team playing Pawtucket maybe, or a farm club…?

KEMENY: Yes. Really it's like playing a farm club for the pros. Now, that was our worst incident, but there were a number of examples of Ivy schools scheduling opponents that were out of their league. I think Brown scheduled Penn State, and someone at least tentatively had lined up Notre Dame. The arguments always were on the parts of coaches, that having one very famous football power on your schedule helps attract players. Some alumni found this a very popular thing, too, though I don't quite see why the alumni would be so happy if a major football power beats the heck out of you. Secondly, what they overlook is that some of these teams are much bigger, much heavier and just could have physically ruined our teams.

FANELLI: John, perhaps this is a good place to comment on the question of the role of the DCAC in Dartmouth athletics and why it was necessary to revise the DCAC charter. Incidentally, for the record, revision of the DCAC charter was suggested in 1963 by John Dickey and actually accomplished in 1964. The intent of the 1964 revision was to make clear the advisory role of the DCAC, but apparently it did not accomplish that in practice because there continued to be confusion on the part of the director of athletics as to whether he took direction from the DCAC or the president. And the DCAC in practice often found itself in an operational mode. Could you talk about that?

KEMENY: Yes. I looked at DCAC as being analogous for athletics to the boards of overseers of the professional schools or the board of the Hanover Inn. They have clear-cut mandates on the one hand to look over and evaluate the activities in that particular area, to advise the chief officer, whether it's the dean of a professional school or the manager of the Hanover Inn, and at the same time to serve to give advice to the board of trustees as to whether the activity is well carried out, and to make recommendations for improvement of it. There are obvious analogs of this in the athletic area where the board that looks over athletics advises the director and also advises the board of trustees about athletics. Both Ralph Manuel and I, in reading
the '64 charter, we were quite clear that we were reading the intention of John Dickey and the then board of trustees correctly that this was the intention. It became clear that over a period of years, practice had deviated from what the charter specified it to be, and on many key issues, the director of athletics thought that the DCAC had final say-so, which is of course unacceptable. The board can never delegate final authority on any policy issue to anyone else, though they may take advice from people.

It also was being misused in a second way, namely as a lobby with the alumni body, which—I don't know if it occurred in the '60s but became bad at some point in the '70s, where if the director of athletics did not get what he thought was appropriate, he would use DCAC and then the athletics committee of the alumni council as a kind of public lobby to try to put pressure on the board of trustees, again an unacceptable role.

I don't think we fundamentally changed the charter, though we did some clarification in wording. It was more trying to go back to carry out what was the intent of the '64 charter.

**FANELLI:** John, it seems evident that some of the issues surrounding athletics at Dartmouth were related to budget problems, that is there wasn't always enough money to do all the things the DCAC and coaches and alumni felt ought to be done. On a few occasions, solution of budget problems required actual termination of some team sports, for example, wrestling, with a predictable reaction by those affected and by alumni. Could you comment on that, and perhaps on the related budget problems regarding Davis Rink?

**KEMENY:** Yes. As we have said in earlier discussions, the mid-'70s were very difficult financially for us and other Ivy League institutions. Therefore, programmatic cuts had to be made in many areas. It's not that athletics was singled out for this, it was simply that athletics was not exempt from this. In athletics it's very hard to save any significant sum of money except by cutting a sport out completely. Indeed, the general philosophy of the board was that it's better to do somewhat fewer sports and do them well. The last thing you want is to have students in a sport where they're insufficiently coached. Not just that they would lose, but it can be bad for their health, dangerous as well.

One looked around, and we identified two sports to cut out, and this was one of the examples where enormous alumni pressures of all kinds were brought up. Eventually wrestling was cut out as a sport that at least in recent years we had not done well in it. It was attracting, perhaps as a result of this, increasingly fewer students. And the cost of the sport per student participant was extraordinarily high. So that was cut out over considerable protest.
I want to recount a second example to show you the kind of problems you get into. Periodically, somebody gives you money, both in the academic area and in sports, to fund a program for a period of years. Very often foundations do that, and institutions try very hard to make no commitment that they would continue it beyond those years, unless the activity becomes so successful that the institution would want to continue it anyway. In sports it was fencing where this happened. I was terribly careful here to accept a parent's gift in fencing, a parent who had a child who was great in fencing and wanted fencing available and offered to pay a part-time fencing coach for the period of three years. I made it very, very clear that we would accept that but would not guarantee the continuation beyond that. Indeed, we did discontinue fencing afterwards, but there were enormous howls because in three years it becomes a tradition and people tend to forget the conditions under which the gift was accepted.

The worst problems of course were in athletic physical facilities, which are very expensive. I did at the beginning of my administration make a crucial decision to go ahead with the completion of Thompson Arena, which helped a great deal in many areas. It's again a good example of how hard it is to discontinue something. The thought had been that once we had that superb ice arena, one could discontinue the use of Davis Rink and use it for other athletic purposes. There were many other areas hurting for space.

FANELLI: I remember there was a question about squash courts or something.

KEMENY: Squash courts or an alternate basketball court. There were several different plans, none of which had been pinned down. Of course all kinds of pressures came up, which ranged from extra practice time for the B team, to eventually women's hockey would come, and to simply community skating. It was a good example where, after one built a superb new facility to replace the old one, the old one was also kept on. That of course meant that some of the problems Davis Rink was supposed to solve for other sports were not solved.

I think one of the best decisions we made was when the capital fund drive came, it became increasingly clear that the kind of monies we could afford to put into the fund drive for athletic facilities would not take care of their needs, nor were the targets attractive enough to attract big gifts, so at some point, with the agreement of Seaver Peters and DCAC, we decided to pull that out and convert the sums into added endowment for athletics, which helped them a great deal. Beyond that, we didn't have to cut out any more sports, even during bad times, and that they would wait until after the campaign was over to launch a separate drive for physical facilities. Since recently they got a $5 million lead gift towards athletic facilities, I think history will prove that that was a fortunate decision.
FANELLI: John, complicating the budget problems during this period of course was the spectacular increase in women's athletics and the need for more coaches and facilities as the number of women's teams increased. Could you comment a little bit on that and the question of title nine in the requirements?

KEMENY: Yes. In retrospect, I feel that our predictions for the marginal cost of implementing coeducation were remarkably accurate, except in one area, and that was women's athletics. Not because we hadn't budgeted for it. As a matter of fact, our budget turned out to be quite accurate for the early years of the coming of women. What we had underestimated was the large number of different sports that women would wish to participate in. This was part of a national change. For example, I mentioned women's ice hockey, something no college had had, as far as I know, when we first went coed.

FANELLI: Which became enormously popular.

KEMENY: Which became enormously popular. Nor did we anticipate the huge number of women that would want to participate in intercollegiate athletics of one form or another. Somehow we thought, particularly in the transition stages, that the number of sports could be in proportion to the number of women compared to the number of men, and that estimate turned out to be quite wrong. It was really a matter of how many popular women's sports there were, rather than how many women students we had. That was one area where we had to increase things substantially. Indeed, some of our women's teams turned out to be spectacularly successful.

On title nine, I wanted to say that most schools in the country scream bloody murder on title nine, the federal law that requires that we do not discriminate on the basis of sex, which had its most immediate impact in sports. For a major school that made enormous sums of money on football, maybe basketball, to try to give comparable facilities to women in whatever sports there were, which tended to make no money or be considerable money losers, seemed to them like an awful waste of money. That issue never really came up in our board, other than being advised as to whether we were living up to title nine. We instituted additional women's sports because the women wanted it and we felt that justice was on their side, and not because of federal law.

Alex, the incident about the dinner at the president's house, was that on the piece of paper you lost?

FANELLI: I think that was, yes.

KEMENY: I think I may have told it in this connection.
FANELLI: Yes, I think you did.

KEMENY: It's an anecdote I'd like to include because people would not remember it in the future, and it's one that Jean and I got a great kick out of.

Very early in my presidency, actually fall of '70, Bob Blackman had an undefeated season and won the Lambert trophy, perhaps for the last time that an Ivy team will win it. That means supremacy in the East. He asked whether we would invite the football team to dinner to our house, which we agreed to with pleasure. The first amusing thing that happened was that Jean cooked quantities of food greater than she could imagine even such a large number of young men could possibly eat. It's not only that they ate every bite she cooked, but in addition to that, she later found out that about half the football team had first come to Thayer Hall to have a regular dinner so they wouldn't embarrass themselves by how much they ate at our house.

The second thing that happened is, we got flooded by inquiries from coaches as to what it takes to invite a team to the president's house, and I had to set policy and decided that winning an Ivy championship was too generous because with the large number of sports, there would be in a typical year several of those, and that would be too great a tradition to leave, both for myself and for future presidents. So we decided to settle on undefeated teams as the criterion. This decision was in '70, remember, or '71 perhaps by the time the dinner took place. The amusing thing was that we paid off on this promise three more times, but all three times it was for women's teams and not for men's teams. Women's field hockey and women's tennis, one of them twice and the other one once.

FANELLI: John, on the question of compulsory physical education, as you know, at one point the Council on Budgets and Priorities recommended that the college could save $10,000 in the 1976-'77 budget, when I guess we were really hurting for money, by eliminating the requirements for compulsory physical education. You opposed that recommendation, and the board supported you in a vote specifically restoring $10,000 for that purpose and asking you to make up the $10,000 by cutting elsewhere in the budget. Could you comment on that briefly?

KEMENY: Yes. Incidentally, that's a good incident to indicate how tight things were during the '70s, and $10,000 is a relatively small sum in a budget that was approaching $100 million by that time. But there were trustee guidelines, and one really had to look very hard to find places where any even modest sum of money could be cut.

That one I decided would have been a very foolish one. The number of students who participated in the compulsory physical education of course was the entire student body, and I'd heard from a great many students that they had gotten a good deal out of it. Some years earlier it was changed from the usual dull kind of so-
called gym to encouraging students to engage in what I called lifetime sports, that is sports that they could continue beyond graduation. Many students learned a new sport and one they enjoyed very much as part of physical education. Certainly students were not opposed to... I haven't heard a single complaint about compulsory physical education. What the cutting out of the $10,000 would really have meant is hundreds of students each year failing to have an opportunity to engage in a sport of their own choice. I thought this was healthy and good, particularly for freshmen it was letting off steam. And it was a very popular program.

FANELLI: There's another thing we talked about, John, briefly was getting Harvard and Yale to change their policies regarding the frequency of playing football in Hanover.

KEMENY: That also goes back to the very beginning of my presidency. As a matter of fact, I was president-elect, not yet president, when there was a football banquet after the very successful '69 football season. There were several amusing incidents there, and it happened to lead to a change in our schedule.

The first thing that happened is that they had of course invited President Dickey to come, and they realized they had a president-elect on their hands and they quickly wanted to send me two free tickets to come to the dinner, only to discover that Jean and I had bought tickets because we were both football fans and very fond of Bob Blackman. I remember DCAC did not refund the tickets, but they decided to move me to the head table.

By the time I got there, Seaver Peters had to take me aside to say that it's traditional at these banquets to award the game balls. The players themselves vote as to whom they consider the most valuable player for that game, and he is given the game ball appropriately inscribed. I said that would be lovely. He said that somehow it had gotten traditional that the president tossed the balls out into the audience. I said I was looking forward to John Dickey throwing out all these balls. Then they say yeah, John Dickey had planned to throw it out, but he developed bursitis, a problem he had had that would get worse later on, and simply couldn't lift his arm sufficiently, and therefore they wondered if I would throw them out. I had never played football in my life. I did throw the balls out, though I think never in the history of Dartmouth football were that many spectacular catches made, which is the only way I avoided breaking crockery. The next year when we had the undefeated season, I had my son practice with me for a while, so I was a little better by that time in throwing out footballs.

It was at that memorable banquet that I sat next to Bob Blackman. He had an incoming president next to him, and he strongly lobbied with me on the psychological disadvantage that we always played Yale in the Yale Bowl, and most of the time played Harvard in Harvard Stadium. I asked Seaver Peters what
the reason for that was, and it was not that there was any legal requirement. By Ivy rules it's an alternating home–away schedule, except that you may waive this right if you wish. We had waived it for financial reasons, particularly at Yale that had a 75,000 seat stadium, and even at Harvard because we thought we'd get a lot more money out of it. Bob tried to argue that that psychologically outweighed by both the sort of intimidating factor that the students knew they always had to go there, and the Yale Bowl, if it's full can be rather frightening to an opponent. Plus the fact that the alumni of those institutions never got to see Dartmouth.

I went and thought about it, and I decided initially to implement a compromise, with the board's approval, that instead of always waiving our turn, we would waive only half of them, which meant that Yale would play here once every four years and Harvard once every four years, instead of about once every twenty years when they had played here, which meant that Yale played here for the first time since the nineteenth century. Later on, the irony was that as pro football cut into attendance at these games, and since the home team gets a sixty-forty cut, there wasn't any great financial advantage in going to Yale or to Harvard, and we later changed that to a straight home and away alternating schedule, which is the way it is now. So that was my only dramatic impact on sports scheduling at Dartmouth.

FANELLI: There was one other item we mentioned, and I think you commented briefly on it, was the question of the change in the reporting of the director of athletics. I think it was June 1975 when you told the board of trustees it would help you out as far as your schedule was concerned if the director of athletics could report to a person who was at that time the vice president of student affairs in matters of personnel and facilities. Just to illustrate what your time schedule was at that time, I found that in the spring term you were out of town thirty-six of eighty-three days, you made thirty-nine speeches, and had a total of four free days during that entire period. That was effected, wasn't it?

KEMENY: Yes. It was '75, both the height of the budget crunch and we were beginning to talk about the campaign. By '76 we are very actively planning the campaign, and I had to figure out where I could save some time. Although in the beginning the director of athletics was quite unhappy about this, I put through a change by which he directly reported to the chief student officer. For most of the remaining time this would be Ralph Manuel, and the title was changed back to dean of the college. And would report to him for all administrative decisions but would report to me still for questions of Ivy policy. After all, the Ivy presidents were the policy committee. So in practice, what it meant was instead of meeting with him weekly, he would meet say with Ralph Manuel weekly, and we would meet once a month. As time went on I think he found that it really was quite a good arrangement. It worked out all right. Any president has to protect himself from how many officers he tries to supervise directly.
FANELLI: Yes. John, in that connection, was there a similar situation with the director of admissions when you came? Ed Chamberlain reported directly to you, didn’t he?

KEMENY: I am trying to remember that. I think so.

FANELLI: I don't remember, but I know that he came over to the office on a fairly regular basis.

KEMENY: I think I made similar changes in the whole student affairs area, and again the dean of the Tucker Foundation fell into this position. He was quite unhappy about it. Actually, there were too many that were reporting sort of directly, and in each of these cases, the rule was that for administrative purposes, this means personnel questions or budget, they would report to the chief student affairs officer but had access to the president on questions of policy. So again I would meet with the director of admissions, usually together with the dean of the college, once a month or more often if needed, but that I didn't have to authorize the hiring of a new admissions officer.

FANELLI: I think that about covers it.

KEMENY: Okay.

FANELLI: Do you want to say anything about your own athletic…

KEMENY: Not particularly. I've never been a highly athletic person.

FANELLI: I remember you playing baseball once, softball.

KEMENY: Actually, I did more when I was in Hungary. I did play soccer there and played a bit of tennis. Probably swimming was my best sport in sort of junior high school level. I don't mean that I was outstanding, but I was on the school team in junior high school, whatever that means, which is not very much. I'm mentioning just that it wasn't zero. I really sort of got out of athletics in high school. I had a very hard time having come to high school and not being able to speak English, and I simply couldn't spare the time. Also, this very big and poor New York City high school had very limited sports facilities, and what they had were in sports that I simply didn't know. They didn't even have a football team. Baseball was the big sport, and basketball, neither one of which did I know. Also, I did not have the time. So that was the period when I sort of got out of athletics.

FANELLI: What about at Princeton?

KEMENY: At Princeton I had an amusing incident in that I thought that would be a good time to go back to soccer. Soccer was not yet that popular in the United States, and
even average European players sometimes could make college teams. I went out the first week of my freshman year. Showed up for practice and said that I'd like to try out for the freshman team, and the coach said, "Welcome." I said, "When do you practice?" He said, "We practice from three to six," and I said, "Fine, which day?" And he said, "Every day," at which point I said, "Goodbye." I simply could not see myself being able to afford five days a week, three hours of practice, in addition to the games.

I looked around and found that fencing only practiced two days a week. I'd never fenced before in my whole life, but my father had won medals in saber in Hungary, so I did for a couple of years fence. As a matter of fact, maybe we ought to say for the record the very traumatic experience I had with fencing. My second year… This was during the war when there were few civilians left, which probably contributed to the fact that my second year I finally qualified for the saber team by beating the person ahead of me on the ladder. That Saturday we were going to play Columbia, which [inaudible] at least a small pea at Princeton. Thursday before we were to play, Princeton announced that they were discontinuing fencing for the duration of the war. I've always had a feeling that they decided if Kemeny can make the fencing team, it's time to discontinue it. [Laughter] So that was my not very illustrious athletic career at Princeton.

End of Tape 13, Side B
Beginning of Tape 14, Side A

KEMENY: I guess we're going to talk about Three Mile Island next.

FANELLI: Yes. An extraordinary event occurred on March 28th, 1979, when an accident happened at a nuclear reactor on Three Mile Island in Middletown, Pennsylvania. Although radioactive gases were vented into the atmosphere, the reactor cooled and the state of crisis was declared over on Monday, April 9. That was the same day that you received a call from the White House, I believe at 10:00 p.m., asking if you would be willing to chair a presidential commission on the accident at Three Mile Island that would report to President Carter within six months of its first meeting. For the record, I should insert the fact that on Sunday, April 8th, I had received a call at home from the assistant to HEW Secretary Califano. I think his name was Dick Beattie [Richard I. "Dick" Beattie, Jr. '61].

KEMENY: A Dartmouth alumnus.

FANELLI: Yes. He said he was about to go into a meeting with Califano and other government officials, during which nominations for a presidential commission would be discussed and especially possible prospects for the chair of the commission that would be recommended to the president. He said your name was among those that had been suggested for the chair and asked me to comment at
some length on you as an administrator and also to suggest other people that he might get in touch with. I talked with him for about thirty or forty minutes, I guess, on those subjects, and you were called the following day. I'm not sure where to start on this, John. You wrote a very... You didn't write the paper, but you reported to the board of trustees on it.

KEMENY: Yes. And someone who would like to have more details than we're going to cover in this discussion, I gave a talk which actually exists in the college collection on videotape. I now own a copy of it, so I played it recently to some friends. At the end of the whole matter, I gave an hour's address to the college community, which happens to be on videotape because they couldn't fit everybody into Spaulding Auditorium, so they had to show it via television in Alumni Hall as well, so they videotaped it. Even then everybody didn't fit in. That's why they videotaped it. For technical details, as well as many details I won't be covering now, I would recommend looking at that videotape.

We were called that Monday night at 10:00 p.m. and told that I was on the short list of candidates they're thinking of recommending to the president to chair the presidential commission. Before they went to the president of course, they wanted the assurance of each of the candidates that they would serve if asked to serve. I asked for permission to sleep on it, although that turned out to be the wrong expression because sleep is the one thing Jean and I did not do that night. We talked all night, and next morning I called David McLaughlin, who was then chairman of the board of trustees, to tell him what had happened. In the meantime, Berl Bernhard, who was in on helping to form the commission, knew about this and he had called Dave, so it fortunately for me did not come as a surprise to Dave. I described to Dave very carefully the pros and cons, which I'll mention in a moment, of the whole thing and asked for his advice. His advice was that he agreed with my assessment of pros and cons, including the many cons, but he said, "My prediction is we don't know if you're going to get picked. But if you get picked and that famous call comes from the White House saying that you are the man in the country to do this very important job, you're going to forget all the cons and you're going to say, 'Yes, Mr. President.'" And of course that's what would eventually happen.

Later that day, there were further calls, and I believe you and Jean talked to them. They wanted some scientific references, and I wasn't available. The impression was later given that I was probably out because they sort of had me ranked as number three for chair, and I was not a candidate for a regular commission seat. It was chairman or nothing. So I was quite surprised, my very late... But they told me to stand by. I guess this must have been in the evening. The next morning we received a call, to our great surprise, saying that they had, after getting all the references, made me the number one candidate, and the president had picked me, and could I be in the White House at 4:00 p.m.
FANELLI: This was on Wednesday, I believe.

KEMENY: This was on Wednesday, it's the 11th. Here is where, if it had been Ernest Martin Hopkins, he would have said something that people would have quoted for generations to come, but I'm afraid what I said was, "But is it possible to get there from Hanover by 4:00 p.m.?" The answer to which was, "Yes, but barely." Because they didn't know... They had me all booked on one of these tiny flights out of Lebanon, which I don't take. And secondly, they had only booked one seat, and I insisted on having Jean with me. So we worked out that Doug drove us to Hartford, Connecticut, and we flew from there, and we were in the White House about eight minutes to four. So it was possible but barely.

That's the picking process. Let me describe what our job was. First of all, about presidential commissions—and I would later give various people advice on what to do and what not to do with presidential commissions—the president officially appointed me at 4:00 p.m. after a brief conversation and then announced me to the national press corps, which had been gathered for 4:15 p.m. I was handed a charter of the presidential commission, which gives the chairman incredible powers. Actually, for a period of roughly seven months I had all the powers of a department head, that is, like the secretary of HEW; a budget which was initially reasonably modest, I think a million and a half, with assurances that they didn't know what we needed and just to come back. We twice went back for additional funds, never had any trouble with getting it. We would spend $3 million, which—we have compared it to other organizations—was very much on the modest end of what such organizations spend.

The commission consisted of twelve members including the chairman, all of whom were picked by the president. On the other hand, the chairman and the chairman alone had the power to hire staff. I mean, the chairman was chief executive officer of the whole agency. Where a serious mistake was made, what they should have done is lend us some temporary staff knowledgeable about Washington to get started, but they didn't. I remember waking up Thursday morning in an elegant Washington hotel where the White House had put us up overwhelmed by the whole business and reviewing everything and realized I had all these powers and what looked like lots of money to me and nobody working for me. I asked Berl Bernhard's help temporarily. I remember I offered to make him a dollar-a-year man. He said, "If you do, I won't do it." He had been in Washington too long, and he knew how many pieces of paper he'd have to fill out for that one dollar. He was willing to do it free but not if I paid him even one dollar.

I knew only one of the other commissioners because he happened to have been a law partner of Berl Bernhard's and one who had represented Dartmouth College
occasionally, Harry McPherson. I should identify him by background that's more relevant to his work on the commission. He was executive assistant and personal counsel to President Johnson during his years as president. So he was highly knowledgeable. He was the expert on the executive branch on the commission. The commission was picked so each commissioner, other than myself, represented some special area that had to be on the commission. Very strong, able-minded, and highly independent commission.

Staffing was a quite different matter. The trouble was, none of us knew at the beginning just how far-reaching the investigation would become. We guessed totally wrong on how many people we would need. We sort of made back of the envelope calculations and asked the appropriate government agency to find us an office for twenty-five people to work in, plus a room for the commissioners to meet in. Since at the peak of the investigation our staff was sixty-five, not counting the commissioners, we were continually short on space and all kinds of support facilities. To gather together sixty-five people, and to disassemble them at the other end, and to produce what would be a report of some huge number of volumes, all within a seven-month period, is almost a physical impossibility.

The charge was to report to the president six months after our first meeting. Obviously the president was eager for us to get going, so I managed to gather the commissioners on two week's notice. We met exactly two weeks after the charter was issued, on April 25th, so the report was due on October 25th. For the record, I'd like to say I did not make it. I signed off on the final version of the report at 1:30 a.m. on the 26th, so I missed the deadline by an hour and a half. In between is a very long story, only some of which we can get into here.

In a way, as to what we investigated, how it went, what the big problems were, I would refer the listener to the videotape. Let me just say that there were six different areas we had to investigate, and the charge was so far-reaching and some of the things we turned up were so surprising that the investigation took us way beyond anything we had expected.

FANELLI: John, I should say that when Dick Beattie called me that Sunday and asked me to comment, I said I thought you would be fantastic for the job of chairing but that I doubted seriously that you would do it because, I said, "Running Dartmouth College was a full-time job, and I don't know how he could do both at the same time." You did do both at the same time. You might comment a little bit about how you did that, how that was accomplished.

KEMENY: That of course was one of the many negatives. Let me just mention the biggest negative that worried me was that it was such a horribly controversial and emotional issue that what I predicted was that no matter how good a job the commission did—and of course at that time I had no idea of the quality of the
other commissioners—no matter how good a job we did, the extreme pro-nuclear and the extreme anti-nuclear people would attack us. Although I would try to do everything possible to make it clear that I was doing this as a private citizen, not as president of Dartmouth College, any bad publicity would reflect on the college. Dave argued on the other hand that just my willingness to do such major national service could reflect well. On balance, it turned out he was right, and fortunately, my fear did not materialize because the report was so very broadly accepted as fair and just.

How to do both jobs, I tried to make a decision that I would divide my time half and half between Dartmouth College and the commission, something I managed to do for five and a half of the seven months. I say seven months because we had six months from meeting to final report, but there were two weeks to get us started, and then at the end it took two weeks to wind up things. We had to testify before Congress, talk to reporters, make sure the reports all got out. It was a seven-month job. I did for the first about five and a half months split my time fifty-fifty, but when we were a month away from the deadline, it was clear that unless I moved into Washington full-time, we would never come close to meeting the deadline. So for a month and a half I did this on a full-time basis.

Secondly, as anyone who has listened to these tapes knows, traveling is not my favorite occupation. What I tried to do is not what most presidents would have done, sort of spend two days here and two days there, but to minimize the amount of traveling by spending a week with the commission and a week working for Dartmouth. Even that got complicated fairly soon after I took the commission because spring is alumni tour. So there was a four-week period, five-week really, where it was a week in Washington, then a week out on alumni tour, then a week in Washington, a week out on alumni tour, a week in Washington before I got back to Hanover. That was quite deadly as far as physical exhaustion went.

One fortunate thing that helped us with the whole business was, someone at the White House was asking where we could… I explained what I wanted to do. They wanted me to do it full-time, incidentally. I mean, they looked at it as… Not the commissioners. The commissioners were told they would put in so many days, but the chairman normally is a full-time position. I said I would only accept it on a half-time basis. What they did urge me was to take an apartment in Washington. I used what little expense money and honoraria one got just to pay some of the expenses. It didn't even cover my expenses, but it saved my life. We found a nice apartment hotel very near where our offices were, within easy walking distance. Just the fact that we didn't continually have to carry everything with us. We could carry clothes, some kitchen equipment. There was a nice restaurant next door that could send up stuff occasionally, but occasionally you just like to have scrambled eggs. I mean, you can't go out every night, at least I can't. Just being there and having a place you get used to really saved our sanity.
Jean was with me when I was in Washington for most of the time, except her deadline came before mine. Her first book appeared, and then she was in enormous demand for publicity for her book. So at the end, I had to do it without her.

Why did I do it half and half? First of all, one thing I learned is that most presidents, even Ivy presidents, just didn't have that much to do with running their institution. I did. Most of them had sort of a clear second-in-charge to whom they could turn over things in their absence. I didn't. I had a small group, and I did gather that small group of vice presidents, and each of them very generously stepped in and carried much more responsibility during this period. But there was no clear second-in-charge. In a sense, the provost is the second officer, but the provost knows about academic affairs, and I'm sure could substitute on student affairs, but frankly just couldn't on financial matters or athletics, just to mention one issue. The provost had no interest in athletics. There were fairly large areas where the provost was not effective, one of which was incidentally alumni relations. Let's see. This was '79, so we were right in the middle of a huge fundraising campaign. So to some extent, there just was no one person to whom I could turn it over. I did ask five key senior officers each to assume more responsibility during that period.

FANELLI: Also, you took Ruth LaBombard halftime with you and half-time…

KEMENY: Yeah. Thank you for reminding me of that. That was an early decision which turned out to be vital. There was no question that I was going to get a full-time secretary, but my problem was who could hold the two halves of my life together. With the board's agreement, Ruth went on halftime with Dartmouth College; the other halftime was paid for by the commission. Doing it that way, it was agreed that nobody would keep book which half was the bigger half or what she was doing from which end of it. Her job was, when I was in Washington, she may have to remind me, "The following six requests came in from Hanover. I think you should turn down these four, but if you possibly can, you ought to do these two." To when she was in Hanover telling people when I would next be available, why I'm not available, cover all kinds of things. Ruth did a wonderful job coordinating the two halves of my life. We did hire an excellent full-time secretary. Ruth actually hired her. Elizabeth Dycus, who later on would become secretary to the search committee.

That made a very big difference, because although as chairman I would end up recruiting some really superb individuals to serve on the staff… Actually, the more senior the position, the less trouble I had recruiting somebody because many quite distinguished and well-established people, out of a sense of idealism, would drop whatever they were doing and work for the pittance they would get paid in
Washington for national service. But that did not apply to secretaries or clerks, so we were always very poorly off in that area. Having Ruth halftime plus Elizabeth Dycus full-time made all the difference in the world.

FANELLI: Maybe, John, I should just read a little portion of the minutes here having to do with what happened to the president, because it may jog your memory about some things.

I'll just mention first what Bill Morton said. [Reading] "He was thrilled when he learned that the president had been offered this opportunity to serve the country, and he was thrilled when the president accepted. He felt that the honor accorded to the president in this appointment and the broad exposure of the president in this new role would be very beneficial to the college. Several trustees said the president should feel free to lean heavily on the trustees for help during this period when he will have to cut back on his commitments to the alumni and especially to the Campaign for Dartmouth.

"In connection with the president's new assignment, the board discussed a variety of problems related to possible conflicts of interest, especially in relation to the college's investment. Mr. Bernhard advised that the president should step down from his position as an alternate on the Investment Committee and that he should keep himself entirely aloof from and have no access to the portfolio of the college. Mr. Bernhard agreed with Mr. Morton that the appointment was a very positive development for the college but said that it was an enormous undertaking for the president, and he stressed the importance of all trustees being willing to step in to help the president whenever possible during this period.

"The president commented that the conflict of interest considerations are really of two kinds: one, those concerning him and his need to remain entirely aloof from and ignorant of the college's investments, and two, those relating to the board itself and the restriction that the trustees should play no special role with respect to the commission."

KEMENY: As a matter of fact, they would pass a rule that no one, with the exception of myself and Ruth LaBombard, Ruth for obvious reasons, would have access to any information concerning the commission until the report was made public, a rule that was strictly obeyed. No trustee ever pumped me and we leaked no information. Incidentally, that must have been done very well because, as you know, anything slightly shady, or even that gives the appearance of being slightly shady, is the perfect excuse for all kinds of campus protests, and there never was any about anything having happened with investments because of my serving on the commission.
FANELLI: [Reading] "At the June meeting, the chairman reported that he had appointed an ad hoc subcommittee consisting of Walter Burke ['44], chairman, Richard Hill, and Richard Lombard ['53 TU '54] to establish and implement policies and guidelines for areas of the college, including the associated schools, which might be affected by the activities and recommendations of the commission to investigate the accident at Three Mile Island, which President Kemeny is presently chairing. The personnel in the college's office for investment and legal affairs serve as administrative staff for the subcommittee. Mr. Burke distributed to the board minutes of the April 27 meeting of the subcommittee, along with the set of guidelines for Dartmouth investment advisors and all college officers and other employees during the term of the Three Mile Island presidential commission. These guidelines had been adopted at the May 24th, 1979, meeting of the subcommittee.

"In calling the attention of the trustees to the guidelines, Mr. Burke noted that the subcommittee had divided the problem into two components: one, those involving investment activities, and two, those involving development activities. With respect to investments, the approach of the committee is to isolate President Kemeny from all matters involving investment. With respect to development activities, the guidelines spell out certain prohibitions regarding submission of gift proposals to corporations that are engaged to a material extent in the business of designing, constructing, supplying, operating, or providing fuel for nuclear electrical generating equipment and facilities.

"Mr. Burke also called attention to a letter dated June 5, 1979, from President Kemeny to Messrs. McLaughlin and Hill clearly separating his two roles during the life of the commission, with a view to eliminating any possible liability the college might incur."

KEMENY: As a matter of fact, I remember there was a solicitation into a major corporation that fell into this category, which had been submitted way before anybody heard of Three Mile Island, and it was suspended for seven to nine months just so there shouldn't be any appearance that somehow the college…even though the application had been submitted way before the Three Mile Island.

FANELLI: There's one more here that maybe we ought to read into the record. This is December of 1979. [Reading] "Mr. Burke reported that the trustees' special subcommittee on Three Mile Island, which he chairs, had at its meeting held immediately prior to that of the Executive Committee, unanimously decided to recommend to the Executive Committee that, subject to final approval by the chairman of the board, the restrictions imposed by the guidelines adopted by the board of trustees on June 9, 1979, be discontinued." This was at the end of the… "Burke noted that the guidelines state the restrictions imposed on the college’s investment and development activities would be effective for the term of
President Carter's commission on the accident at Three Mile Island, and that, with all of the work of the commission completed, it would cease to operate after expiration of its term on December 22nd, 1979."

KEMENY: For the record, we really completed all our work by about mid-November; however, we needed the extra month that our charter gave us, or five weeks, because of outstanding bills and matters of that sort of thing. We had an absolute minimal skeleton staff by that time just to make sure that the printing got completed and bills got paid, et cetera.

I had one more pleasant duty during that period. One of my administrative aides pointed out to me that as head of a department I had the right to issue awards for exceptional service. He said he had never served in any group where there were more deserving people, and I issued a group of citations.

I'm wondering which aspects—should we talk about what it did to the Dartmouth end of it, or some of the sort of color stories about what happened in Washington? Which do you think would be more appropriate for this?

FANELLI: Well, the Dartmouth end, I think we got a tremendous... I mean, you have to say something, I believe, about the extraordinary amount of positive publicity that the college received, because you were on television, you were very much in the news at various times throughout that period, and especially at the end after the report. Because the report, as you indicated earlier, was received so well.

KEMENY: After it was all over, I was on public television twice, two like the ones I'm about to describe, where I was bracketed by one very violently pro-nuclear and one very violently anti-nuclear person. I always was given the chance to speak first just to summarize our main findings and recommendations briefly. Then they would turn to the two antagonists, and each one, in each of the two appearances on public television, ended up praising the report, possibly one saying it is excellent but perhaps went a little too far, and the other one said excellent but perhaps didn't quite go far enough. Then I could hardly get a word in edgewise for the rest of the hour because then they disagreed on everything else from then on. But therefore, on at least two major public occasions by very prominent spokesmen for the two sides, the report was highly praised, and that was typically the reaction to it, which is almost miraculous with that kind of highly emotional issue.

There was enormous publicity during the investigation because we held our hearings in public, and National Public Radio carried every word of it for hours. Public television carried major portions of it, but the networks also gave quite substantial coverage to our hearings. Some newspapers—I think the one that did the best job was the Washington Post—would give very extensive coverage. New York Times, they happened to have unfortunately assigned a reporter with rather
extreme views, so the coverage there wasn't quite as good. As I remember, say the *Los Angeles Times*, for example, would have quite good coverage of the presidential commission report.

Certainly at each day of public hearing, during the luncheon break I would conduct a press conference, where all the major national media, not just from the United States but from a large number of foreign countries, would be present. After a while I established a considerable rapport with them, plus the fact that we weren't terribly long into the whole investigation when the terribly skeptical Washington press board decided that we were on the level. They kept probing because they didn't quite believe that anything like this would be on the level, but we did a certain number of things that persuaded them of that. So I think we got highly sympathetic coverage from them.

There was an interesting incident on the press that Jean actually knew about. A group of reporters, including a couple of nationally known people, went up as a delegation to Jean and said that they had a message they wanted her to give to me. She said, "Well, look, you see him every day in these hearings, why did you come?" They said, "Whenever he's there, we grill him, but this is something we wanted to say privately to him." They were deeply grateful to me for one thing, that I was the first person on this whole subject of nuclear power who explained things to them in terms that they could understand. Of course I make a living teaching subjects that are technical and hard to understand.

End of Tape 14, Side A
Beginning of Tape 14, Side B

**FANELLI:** John, you had talked at length about the Dartmouth Medical School in an earlier session. Now I would like you to talk a little bit about the other two associated schools, Tuck and Thayer, and the relationship between them and between each of them and the undergraduate college. First of all, let's look at Tuck School. When you became president, I think John Hennessey was the dean, and he served until July 1976 when Dick West [Richard R. “Dick” West] became dean. I note that in April 1972 the Tuck board of overseers and John Hennessey recommended to the trustees that Tuck be placed on subvention beginning in fiscal '72-'73, and that was approved by the board. Why hadn't Tuck been on subvention prior to that time?

**KEMENY:** I really don't remember the historical reasons for it. Subvention was a relatively modest help that the other two professional schools received. It used to be at $150,000 a year. I just don't remember why Tuck wasn't on it. Of course, that would have great ironies because later Tuck would do exceedingly well, not just academically but financially, to the point where at some point the subvention was discontinued. Later on, not only that, but Tuck made a contribution of some
percentage of their budget as their share of the central costs of the institution. In effect, I went from subvention to, if you like, reverse subvention in the case of Tuck School, which Tuck could easily afford because they were in excellent financial shape by the end of my administration.

FANELLI: I was just curious. I remember that it was the one that was not on subvention, and then it was placed on it, maybe to make it look more like the other schools.

KEMENY: It may very well have been. I remember more first stopping it and then arguing for a reverse subvention.

FANELLI: John, I recall that on several occasions trustees suggested that there ought to be greater interaction between Tuck and Thayer schools. Indeed, I believe the construction of Murdough was seen in part as a physical means of symbolizing and facilitating that interaction. Could you talk about that and perhaps comment on why the expected degree of interaction took a long time to develop? Or did it ever develop?

KEMENY: In a way, it's one of several stories where I came in near the end of it. Just as in the medical school I had the responsibility to implement going back to a full M.D. program but did not participate in the decision-making process, the same was true here. Murdough Center was built during my administration, but all the planning for it was done previously to it. There was sort of a romantic dream that with more and more companies getting involved in high technology that there would be mutually beneficial interaction between a business school and an engineering school. Certainly building the Murdough Center, which was a facility not only shared by them but it more or less physically connected the two building complexes, seemed like a good way of tying them together.

Let me jump to the end of it just to say that this idea never really succeeded. There were some modest levels of interactions, occasional joint appointments, but no serious level of cooperation ever developed between them. I'm not sure I can answer the question of why, except that professional schools tend to have a high degree of independence, and I guess professors in business school and professors in graduate engineering schools think very differently, and they found it very, very hard to collaborate. Various attempts to let students take courses at the other school always had just modest success. The style was different, the terminology was different, and it just did not materialize. I think John Dickey and the previous board had a good idea there, but for whatever reason, neither he nor I could ever pull it off. And there were several trustees who personally worked on it, trustees who were graduates both of Dartmouth and of Tuck, who served on boards of overseers, or even chaired boards of overseers, tried very hard to get more collaboration, but I have to say there were only miniscule results.
Strangely enough, better collaboration would develop between the engineering school and the medical school in one area, that which is called biomedical engineering, which became a hot field. I think the reason that succeeded was because it was a hot field for engineers to go into, but they had no chance of succeeding without getting the collaboration of doctors. And there were many doctors who were interested in prostheses and other kinds of engineering developments that medicine needed, so there was more of a felt mutual need there. I do not mean to suggest that the two schools collaborated on a large scale, but there were a number of extremely interesting one-on-one collaborations between professors of the two institutions, to the point where we had a small but quite impressive biomedical engineering program at Dartmouth.

There was also some modest success, in which John Hennessey himself played a role, between Tuck School and the medical school in the whole area of medical administration. Strangely, it's the two schools that were very far from each other geographically that brought about the collaboration, and physical proximity does not seem to be a good factor. That much at least I knew beforehand because psychology and mathematics were built in adjoining buildings and sharing a lecture hall, and the thought that it might lead to collaboration between those two departments. While various members of my department did collaborate with some social scientists, it never seemed to be any member of the psychology department.

FANELLI: John, let's talk for a moment about the size of Tuck School. As I recall, for most of your tenure as president, Tuck chose to remain at approximately the same level in numbers of students and faculty. During that whole period, however, there had been a discussion by the Tuck overseers and the Tuck faculty regarding a possible modest expansion. Early in 1979 I recall that Dean West and Professor…

KEMENY: Before we go to '79, Alex, I think there's an earlier incident that has to be recounted. Then we can come to '79.

FANELLI: Sure.

KEMENY: Early in the '70s, a study by Tuck faculty lead to a tentative recommendation that Tuck should be authorized to grant a doctor's degree.

FANELLI: That doesn't appear in the trustee records.

KEMENY: No. I can believe it does not appear in the trustee records, and I think I can reconstruct why. The problem of Tuck School was that business became more and more complex, and the size of the faculty simply wasn't large enough to cover what a modern business school could cover. It's an argument with which I am highly sympathetic. It was one of four arguments I used for starting a Ph.D.
program in mathematics. I think the argument has validity. I think it's important to say that from the beginning the motivation was to find a means of having a larger faculty. Even if they could cover all areas, many key areas were covered by one single faculty member, which meant when that faculty member went on sabbatical or was ill, they had to go outside and scrounge around for a visitor. And it's not very good… Visitors can be very useful for enriching the curriculum, but to turn over one of your key bread and butter courses to a visitor just isn't a terribly good idea, so it was an uncomfortable situation. Let me say in summary, I think Tuck School was absolutely right, that they had to find a means of increasing the size of their faculty.

FANELLI: But this happened early, like in '72…

KEMENY: The first proposal, which was a committee proposal, was that they go to a doctor's degree. I said, "Fine. Work out the details and when you're ready, I'll take it to the board of trustees." The longer they studied it, the more they decided it was the wrong route. I did not remember if it ever reached the board or not. I'm sure I occasionally informed the board that this thinking was going on. Because it's Tuck itself that turned it down. They decided that, while their M.B.A. program even then was ranked as one of the best in the country, they would be a third-rate doctor of business administration school, and they thought it would in a sense water down their reputation and it was the wrong route to go. Therefore, it certainly never came to a board vote because the Tuck faculty as a whole never recommended it.

It was after that was turned down and a new dean came in that the thinking was turned around to say, "Okay. The arguments are just as strong for expanding the faculty." You can't afford to have a much larger faculty with the size student body they had, and Dean West may have played a role in saying, "Okay. Why don't we expand the M.B.A. program?" They proportionately, I think, had as many applicants for the M.B.A. program as the undergraduate school had, so they could easily take 50% more M.B.A. candidates without in any way watering down the quality of it. He suggested, "Let's increase the size of the student body by 50% and use our extra income to expand the faculty."

That led into endless arguments and eventually some bad fights because the faculty was all in favor of expanding the faculty but had great hang-ups about expanding the number of students. And I'll comment in a moment. There are some real and some amusing not-so-valid reasons that went into that. Then the Tuck overseers got into the act, and they fully backed the dean. As a matter of fact, became over-eager perhaps in backing the dean, so that there would be bitter head-on confrontations between members of the overseers and members of the top faculty over this one issue.
Why did the faculty not want to expand? Of course, they wanted to maintain the close contact between faculty and students that they had, but we were talking about at least a proportional, or possibly more than proportional, expansion of the faculty, so that in itself was not valid. I think the key issue came down to the large introductory courses which all Tuck students were given. The size of Tuck School was set at the size where you could divide them in half and comfortably fit them into one of the nice—not huge but nice size lecture rooms. Tuck has three lovely seventy-five seat lecture halls, very popular, and with a student body of about a hundred and thirty, you could divide it in half and still get them comfortably into one of those lecture rooms. Typically, both sections would be taught by the same faculty member who was the expert, or the senior expert, in that field, so all students got it from the same person.

Then the argument was that if you went up 50%, first of all, the issue would come down to would you have three sections or four sections. Even if you have three, certainly no one person could psychologically teach the same course three times at the same time. It would mean that two different faculty members would have to teach the same course, and almost necessarily one of them would be better than the other one, and there would be bad feelings. These are standard problems one faces in most academic institutions. But to Tuck this became a very big issue. I want to say on this argument there was some justice on their side because they really had some truly outstanding faculty members who were absolutely superb in teaching lecture courses to a sizeable number of students. They would have had to be terribly lucky to be able to hire someone else who could come close in quality to that.

That was the real issue. The other one that at the beginning I thought was terribly amusing, but it became not amusing after it reappeared every six months, was that you can't go from two sections to three, you have to go to four, because if you prepare one of these big lecture sessions, you might as well teach two sections of it. All kinds of proposals such as, okay, if there are three sections, one person could teach two of it one year and one the other year, and vice versa, and make up the excess by teaching a small advanced course in his specialty. I mean, there are all kinds of obvious solutions. Just for some reason they absolutely dug their heel in on that, and I believe when the system finally went in they went from two to four sections for the kind of reasons that you cannot defend logically, but it just became a big political issue.

You were going to mention what happened in '79.

FANELLI:  In '79 Dean West and Professor Brian Quinn [James Brian Quinn] brought to the trustees a preliminary plan for a slight expansion in faculty to strengthen certain areas, as you already indicated, to be followed later by a slight increase in the number of students. In April of that year, 1979, the board had an in-depth
discussion of that topic, the session which incidentally included the chairman of the Tuck overseers, David Dance [W. David Dance '40 TU '41], who said he hoped that in the future there would be a much closer relationship between Tuck and the college. You strongly supported and urged the adoption of an expansion plan called Scenario Three. I just wondered whether you wanted to talk about that.

KEMENY: Yes. I don't remember what all the scenarios were, but I know what the essence of the one was, which in a sense was finally a compromise worked out between the dean and the overseers on the one hand and the faculty on the other, which was that they would expand both the faculty and the student body, but that the faculty expansion would come earlier than the student expansion, that is you would not start expanding the student body until you have built up a sufficient backlog of new faculty members, including some senior faculty members recruited for this purpose so that you could give first-rate instruction from the beginning. Tuck was in good enough financial shape that they could absorb the difference financially. That plan was accepted and seemed to me a reasonable compromise. It just took years to get there, and had quite a bit of bitterness.

FANELLI: John, what about the role of Tuck School in fundraising? I noted, for instance, that in 1974 there was a gift of $1 million by Paul Jones to honor his father and the Charles Henry Jones [1873] Third Century Professorship of Management was established. Later in 1976 the trustees voted to establish the William E. [“Bill” “Buck” Buchanan ‘24] and Josephine Buchanan Professor of Management Chair.

KEMENY: Tuck School is an extremely attractive target for gifts in that so many Dartmouth alumni, particularly those who become wealthy, went on to become major corporate leaders or played other important roles in the private sector. There are only so many chairs of economics you can accept, and if anything, there were too many alumni who wanted to earmark their gifts for a business school. So one had to come up with some reasonable plan, by which Tuck School does indeed get its share of endowment, but the president and senior fundraisers can play a role in trying to direct some gifts in one direction and some in the other.

It turned out actually that Tuck's major financial bonanza came not so much from gifts, although they did fine during the Third Century Fund drive, as it did in an executives program that they started, which they were in the beginning only trying to run to break even on and hoped that this would strengthen their relations to many corporations, which indeed it did. So the program would be highly worthwhile if it never made a penny. But it became so successful that they had to give it in two sections in parallel, with really only marginal increases in costs and huge increases in revenues, so that this was a big money raiser for Tuck School. This was the primary factor that led eventually, first to abolition of the subvention and then to reverse subvention. That executives program just did superbly. In a
way, that period when the faculty was too big for the students, because the faculty was expanded before the students, was covered by reserves from the Tuck executives program.

Dean West was a very good fundraiser, as was John Hennessey before him. As I said, a graduate business school is just a very attractive opportunity for gifts.

FANELLI: John, since you mentioned Dick West and John Hennessey, is there anything else you'd like to say about them? I always felt that John Hennessey, whom I knew better than Dick West, was a superb dean, and I don't know whether he had shortcomings or what.

KEMENY: They were both outstanding deans. Probably, John Hennessey, I think the description of being a superb dean is just right. I cannot think of any shortcoming of him as dean while he was dean. He really was outstanding and did a great deal to strengthen Tuck School. Of course, I would get to know him extremely well during the medical negotiations since he was chairman of the hospital board of trustees during that period. And he happens to be a very dear and personal friend—he and his wife both—of my wife and me.

The only critical thing I can say was not during his period as dean. It is, as I know very well, not easy to step down from a senior administrative position and remain at the same institution. I have opted absolutely to stay out of all college-wide affairs and participate in departmental affairs just as any math professor would. John Hennessey…I mean, the analog there should have been since he was dean of a school rather than of the whole institution, that he should have stayed neutral on highly controversial issues affecting the new dean, and he didn't. The very unfortunate thing during those fights—and for this purpose, it doesn't matter who was right—but he was with the faction that opposed the dean on his plans to expand the student body. Of course, he was a very much beloved dean, and the faculty kept bringing up again and again, "But John Hennessey disagrees."

There's nothing worse than finding your predecessor, who had been a superb dean and very much beloved by the faculty opposing you on a policy issue. I do fault John in letting that happen. Again let me say for that, I'm not saying whether he was right or wrong. I think it's irrelevant. The price you pay for staying at the same institution is that you have to stay out of controversial policy issues and certainly not find yourself in public opposition to your successor.

FANELLI: Because your weight is disproportionate.

KEMENY: Your weight is disproportionate. Incidentally, there was an interesting incident in his stepping down. When we were given, I believe it was the Jones professorship, a search committee was appointed by John Hennessy to search. We wanted to
make an outside appointment to that chair. They conducted a year long search and then asked to speak to me privately, and I said, "Well, certainly you mean with Dean Hennessey present." And they said, "No. We have reasons, and please take our word for it that the reasons are good, that we'd like to speak to you without our dean." With some reluctance, I agreed to this, fully expecting to kick them out after five minutes, until I heard what the subject was. They had searched nationally and showed me the list of people they came up with. It was an honest and very hard national search, and they'd gotten far enough to rank all the candidates they had found outside. Then one of them said, "You know, there isn't a single one of them on that list who is as good as John Hennessey," as a professor, not as dean. John was also an absolutely superb, is an absolutely superb teacher. So they said they find themselves in the embarrassing position, having been appointed by the dean and knowing that he had announced he would step down a year later from the deanship, that they feel they would be irresponsible in not recommending that their own dean should be appointed to that. John obviously hadn't foreseen that at all and was very much embarrassed by it, so I did my best to come to the rescue, and he indeed was awarded that chair. In a way, besides being an amusing incident, it shows how much he was liked and respected by his own faculty, which would create these problems later on.

Dick West was, in my opinion, a very good dean. He was thirty-eight years old when he became dean, and most of his faculty was a lot older, so he had some age problems. And he had a bit of brashness about him. As a result of that, even when he was right—and my personal opinion is that he was right in the famous fight—his personal style was a handicap to him in getting that opinion across. Nevertheless, he was dean for something like eight years. During that period, Tuck School prospered and extremely strong appointments were made, so I think he'll go down in history as a very good dean of Tuck School.

FANELLI: Is there anything else you'd like to say about Tuck School?

KEMENY: No. I think not. Except one thing I use very often, it's not really a part of the history of my administration. When I first became president, I did a good deal of reading on the history of the college, and as I think I mentioned before, the president in the Wheelock succession I admire most is William Jewett Tucker. One really should not mention Tuck School without mentioning William Jewett Tucker's role in it. I mention it here because I would often use this story in speaking to alumni and to students, incidentally, that he tends to be remembered for so many things that people overlook what he did for the world of business. He, as far as I can tell, single-handedly just said that there was something wrong in having professional training for doctors, lawyers, ministers, teachers, and in his opinion business management was very much a profession but there were no professional schools to train them. There certainly were schools that offered
business courses, but as anyone who knows these areas knows, undergraduate
business courses are really sort of junky courses, like a little bit of accounting and
something they call business math, which is math for people who don't know how
to do math. It really is not a very high level thing.

He was the first person to propose that there ought to be professional schools for
managers of business and managed to persuade Edward Tuck to give the money,
first to endow the school and later for the building, which was named in honor of
his father Amos Tuck. So Tuck School became the first professional school of
business in the United States. It still comes as a shock to people that it's seven
years older than Harvard Business School.

**FANELLI:** I was looking to see when it celebrated its...

**KEMENY:** It's 1900. It's such an easy number to remember.

**FANELLI:** Yes. So it was the seventy-fifth anniversary.

**KEMENY:** Seventy-fifth anniversary we celebrated.

**FANELLI:** It was used as a theme for the 1975 college convocation.

**KEMENY:** Yes. We agreed to have various celebrations, including that the college
convocation was in part dedicated to Tuck School's seventy-fifth anniversary. It
was 1900 that the school was founded. The Wharton School, for example, is a
good deal older, but it used to be simply an undergraduate business school. It
took on a professional arm after Tuck School. I think Harvard Business School
was second, but it's 1907.

**FANELLI:** Turning to Thayer School. Wasn't it true, John— and here my memory's really
bad and I couldn't find any record on it—wasn't it true that when you became
president, Dean Myron Tribus ['42] was on a leave of absence and Bill Davis was
serving as acting dean of Thayer?

**KEMENY:** No. Tribus was not still here. Let's see. Let me reconstruct the chronology on
that. First of all, I knew Myron Tribus extremely well and admired him. In my
opinion, he was by far the greatest dean in modern history of Thayer School, and
we should be deeply grateful to him. A quite remarkable person. He did take a
leave of absence because he was named assistant secretary for science and
technology in Washington, but he never did come back from that. At some point
he made it clear… The date I don't know is when he informed Dartmouth College
that he was not coming back. Bill Davis, who had a role in, was associate provost
and a physicist, was an interim dean there. Whenever Myron Tribus informed us
that he was not coming back, and that's what I don't remember, whether it happened before I took office as president or after. It doesn't matter very much.

FANELLI: Then Dave [David] Ragone came in.

KEMENY: Then a search was conducted, and after a long national search, an extremely able person named David Ragone was recruited to be dean of Thayer School, and he turned out to be a major disaster for Thayer School, didn't last very long. The combination turned out to be unfortunate. He was also young, extremely bright, very able, and very brash, so there were problems there. Most importantly, I think he had a philosophical disagreement with all the things Myron tried to set down and tried to change it. I think in this case what he tried to change Thayer School to would have been very bad at a school of our size. It couldn't possibly have worked without the vast expansion of the engineering school. So there was a good deal of infighting and bitterness there. He was offered a very major deanship at the University of Michigan, dean of the engineering school there, so he resigned after just two years in office. So a fairly lengthy search, two years' turmoil, and the dean quitting after just two years was a terrible blow for Thayer School.

End of Tape 14, Side B
Beginning of Tape 15, Side A

KEMENY: I decided to be very careful in the next search. We had a very long meeting—Bill Davis, Provost Rieser, and I—with the entire Thayer School faculty. It went on for some hours. I asked them to do the talking and tell me what they thought was good, what was not so good, and what they were looking for in a dean. A lot of it ended up being complaints about the previous dean, but I tried to get them to focus more constructively on the future. I don't remember all the details, but I remember what I said to them at the end. I said, "If I listen to you correctly, what you'd like to have is either Myron Tribus back here or have someone who will carry out the basic philosophy that Myron Tribus had established for the school." They in effect confirmed that that was the case. It's one of those situations, while Myron was here, there were lots of complaints about him, but his overall impact was so thoroughly positive that the school just wanted to go back to the same track.

That strongly indicated to me that the most likely person to do that was an insider. Although we didn't limit the search to an insider, we conducted a briefer search looking primarily whether there was someone inside who could take the leadership. Carl Long was chosen, and he turned out to be a very popular dean. Perhaps there weren't any huge dramatic changes, but he consolidated the advantages of Myron Tribus and certainly had a quite happy faculty that prospered.
He prospered in all areas except fundraising. For whatever reasons, our engineering school has never done as well in fundraising as the business school would. It suffered partly from the problems that the medical school did because their engineering graduates, the vast majority of them, were Dartmouth undergraduates who took one or two years extra to get either a bachelor of engineering or a master of engineering degree here, and therefore their primary loyalty was to the undergraduate college, or they’re graduates and they really didn't start doctoral programs till relatively late, so they just did not have a large alumni base.

The other place where engineering schools get lots of money are from local industry. This we talked about before. There just isn't any local industry to speak of. Or they get large sums of money from industry that want to farm out certain research projects that may have a short-term payoff for the industry. Our school wasn't really large enough, or possibly distinguished enough, to attract a great deal of that money. There was a great deal more of attracting government and industry contracts during the ’70s, but I think compared to most engineering schools it was still relatively modest.

**FANELLI:** John, wasn't there a difference between—one difference at least—between Thayer and Tuck School was that Tuck professors taught a much larger number of undergraduates…

**[Technical difficulties]**

**FANELLI:** I was saying that the professors at Thayer School taught, had undergraduates in their classes as well. They taught undergraduate courses.

**KEMENY:** Perhaps I should have started with that. This is something that Myron Tribus really worked out all the details of and clarified it enormously, to the advantage of Thayer School. Thayer School plays a dual role. Most of the Thayer faculty constitutes the undergraduate department of engineering science for the faculty of arts and sciences. As such, students major in engineering science to get a B.A. degree in engineering science. I emphasize B.A. and not B.S. They have to go an extra year to get a professional or technical degree. Therefore, in a way, their largest load is teaching undergraduate students.

They are also one of the older professional schools of engineering. They go back to sometime in the 1870s, and as such they provide professional training for our own undergraduates who want to go on to that, and took originally master’s students and later also doctoral students in engineering. They grant both a doctor of engineering degree and a Ph.D. in engineering, which is a research degree. So there is this complicated dual arrangement which was somewhat hazy, and Myron
Tribus managed to persuade the faculty of arts and sciences of an arrangement which for the faculty is ideal because whenever it's convenient, they put on their arts and sciences hats, and whenever it's convenient, they put on their professional school hats. This helps Thayer School a great deal. As far as I know, it has not hurt any other part of the institution. It's just a clever scheme that works out very well.

In practice, what happens is there may be a small number of faculty members, either visitors or research professors, who have a position in the Thayer School but are not members of the faculty of arts and sciences. I think all regular members have dual appointments and serve on faculty committees. For example, I often had representatives from the Thayer School, two in particular from the engineering school, on the Committee Advisory to the President, the tenure committee, which is one of the most coveted areas, simply showing that arts and sciences faculty members thought extremely highly of Thayer faculty members.

FANELLI: One of the reasons I mentioned that, John, is that in 1972 I noted that Thayer proposed the use of a formula to determine the amount of its subvention, which as you indicated earlier, had been $150,000 a year, to take into account the number of undergraduate students in courses taught by Thayer faculty. That was approved and the subvention was raised to $220,000.

KEMENY: What they argued in effect was that they ought to get some share of the tuition that undergraduate students were paying, and perhaps a reduced overall subvention, because their overall subvention was supposed to take both into account. I don't remember the exact formula, but let's say there was a flat subvention, which might have been half of the $150,000, plus some percentage of the tuition that went to them because of the number of undergraduate students they taught. It made some difference but not that big a difference in the beginning, but eventually, as enrollments in engineering courses increased with the increased popularity of engineering in the country and their share of the tuition dollars increased fairly dramatically, it helped them a great deal. It also gave them a strong incentive for becoming more heavily involved in the teaching of undergraduate students and led to the creation of the so-called technology courses, which were engineering courses taught for liberal arts students.

FANELLI: You've already mentioned that Thayer had a more difficult time in fundraising and it had more financial problems than Tuck School did certainly. I noticed that in 1977 the trustees authorized the college to lend Thayer up to $750,000 over a three-year period at an appropriate rate of interest. As I recall, they didn't actually borrow it, or they didn't need to borrow it, but did you want to comment on that?

KEMENY: Yes. That was somewhat similar to what we talked about in the medical school, that they had great expectations in the fund drive, but they couldn't wait till the
money came in. Also, we were worried, both here and the medical school, that they were sufficiently desperate for money that they would go out and twist people's arms to earmark things for Thayer School or for the medical school, so we said, "Let's solve the temporary problem during the fund drive." So Thayer School was authorized in effect as drawing account, but with increased enrollments and they are doing better than they had hoped in fundraising, I think they only drew on a very small portion of that total ever. It was there, it was enough to assure them that they would get through the fund drive all right, but unlike the medical school which had to use up everything we were able to provide for them, the Thayer School needed only a small portion of the total.

FANELLI: In 1978 you noted in speaking to the trustees that Thayer was one of the two areas of the college that depended heavily on federal support funds. I think the figures were 35% for Thayer and 49% for the medical school.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: In June of that year, the board voted to endorse the establishment of a center for engineering design at Thayer, which I believe was later called INVENTE, to see if support could be generated among technology companies for the ongoing support of Thayer programs. Would you want to say anything about that?

KEMENY: Yes. First on federal support since I think this is the first time it came up. I wish I could think of a better word, but all I can say is there were a small number of trustees who were paranoid on the subject of any federal support and would have been happy to vote not to accept any federal support at all.

FANELLI: Why was that, John?

KEMENY: Because the fear that there would be strings attached to it. There are a small number of extreme schools in the country that actually refused federal aid, usually because they wished to practice some form of rather obnoxious discrimination, which the federal government did not allow. In our case, it wasn't the case. Certainly by far the largest, sort of annually the most important federal support for us was for undergraduate financial aid. I fought very hard against giving that up, and that was one in which there were relatively few strings attached to it, certainly none that we couldn't live with.

In the case of the two professional schools, the monies primarily came in in the form of research funds. Professional schools heavily depend on research funds, and while for Tuck School most of it would come from industry, for any engineering school and any medical school, particularly medical school, most of it comes from the federal government, from the National Institutes of Health. There was also sort of a per capita subvention when the federal government was trying
to increase the number of doctors, which really in a sense had no strings to it at all, just some incentive to increase the number of doctors you're turning out. We were just returning to the M.D. degree. It was a natural for us.

Back to Thayer School. At most engineering schools, I believe the figure is well over 50%. Actually, over 50% of their total budget tends to be that. Since we were not that successful, what Dean Long and some of his colleagues hoped was we might attract more industry funds. They also, with their graduate programs, needed student projects. They wanted to work on realistic projects, so they formed sort of a quasi-independent corporation that could pay people and could write contracts with industry for doing industry-related research and both be a source of income, possibly be a source for patents—I don't know if any ever came out of it—and be a means of interesting problems coming into the engineering school that the faculty and students could work on. That was created, it did get off the ground, it was doing some fairly interesting things, but at the time I stepped down from the presidency, it was too early to read whether it was successful or not successful.

FANELLI: I noticed in the minutes that in 1979 you praised Carl Long's efforts during the Campaign for Dartmouth, which had resulted in the increase of externally funded work at Thayer from $450,000 to $1.2 million in a very short period of time.

KEMENY: I had forgotten it was that large, and I'm sure it was that kind of effort that helped cut down on the use of this famous fund.

[Tape off, then resumes]

KEMENY: As we were changing locations, we were talking that there's one aspect of Thayer School I should really comment on. Frankly, on the graduate level, I'm sure that it's the weakest of our professional schools, but their undergraduate program I'm a great believer in. Most schools run, or used to run, separate programs for engineers. Engineers have to learn so much math, physics, and chemistry besides engineering that it's impossible in four years to give them a reasonable liberal arts education in general, which may be the reason why many people believe that engineers tend to be rather narrow people. I know at many schools, there are separate math for engineers courses, English for engineers courses, et cetera. At Princeton when I was an undergraduate, engineers were separately admitted. You were admitted not to Princeton University but in effect to the engineering school of Princeton University, and you essentially couldn't switch. I don't know whether they made exceptions to that, but that's where you were admitted to. I know the liberal arts undergraduates tended to look at engineering students as second-class citizens.
Dartmouth had decided a long time ago—certainly not just before my presidency but before I came to Dartmouth, and therefore I don't know how far back it goes—that you could not in four years give both first-rate engineering training and a reasonable liberal arts education. Therefore, in effect, the engineering undergraduate program is five years long. In five years you can do both. This is why, as I mentioned, students who wish to go into this major, choose engineering as a major, but their load there is not heavier than any other science major, so it's an ordinary undergraduate major allowing them to take liberal arts courses. I mean, they fulfill the same distributive requirements and have ample choice amongst liberal arts courses, but at the end of four years, they're not trained as engineers. They either go somewhere else to graduate school in engineering, or what most of them do is they come for a fifth year. The fifth year is entirely devoted to engineering training, and they end up with two bachelor's degrees, a B.A. and a bachelor of engineering degree, what I believe is the best of both worlds, having had good liberal arts training and a good undergraduate engineering training. It does cost you one year more, which is why Dartmouth attracts proportionately fewer engineers than the other Ivy schools. On the other hand, the ones who come here and have gone through this training almost invariably say that they're very happy to have gone through this rather than to, say, Princeton's engineering program.

FANELLI: Did I remember your saying, John, when you were talking about Cornell in connection with the athletic question, that they also have an engineering school and a hotel management school?

KEMENY: Yes. They have all kinds of separate schools.

FANELLI: So it would be the same situation there.

KEMENY: It would be the same situation there, and I think to some degree at any of the Ivy schools that offer engineering. Engineers are somewhat separately treated.

FANELLI: And they would get a B.S.

KEMENY: Yes. At Princeton, for example, the only B.S. that was granted was in engineering.

FANELLI: Those people who graduate from there don't have a B.A.?

KEMENY: They do not have a B.A. These things may have changed, but I'm saying as I knew it.

FANELLI: John, just to close this question, in November 1980 the board approved a plan to reduce the Thayer subvention. I know we spoke earlier about increasing it, but
this was to reduce the Thayer subvention to $97,500 in 1981-'82 and to zero thereafter, in return for which Thayer would receive $600,000 unrestricted funds for funds for the '80s, and its CFD—Campaign for Dartmouth—endowment goal would be increased by $1 million.

KEMENY: In effect, what all of that amounted to was to try to put Thayer entirely on its own feet. Of course, remember here that Thayer would still continue to get some share of undergraduate tuition in recognition of the undergraduate students they taught. This was the intent with all three of the professional schools, that by the end of the campaign, to try to have each one self-supporting.

FANELLI: Is there anything else that you'd like to say about Thayer?

KEMENY: I don't think so.

FANELLI: How about the question of what you feel it meant when you were president to Dartmouth the undergraduate college to have these three professional schools?

KEMENY: I believe Dartmouth undergraduates get the best of all worlds in that they go to an institution where undergraduate education is the number one priority, and the faculty of arts and sciences only has a negligible amount of graduate obligations. Therefore, you get your best professors in freshman courses and all the things that go with that. At the same time, we can offer a great deal more than a purely undergraduate college because the presence of the professional schools and the presence of those professors can make a substantial amount of difference. Actually, here I suspect it's engineering and medicine that make the biggest difference. We made some modest progress in having more of an impact from the business school on undergraduates, but that never worked out very well, mostly because the economics department and the business school never could get along together. But understand, it's typical at all universities. It's not a unique Dartmouth problem. It meant that undergraduates could get both a good liberal arts education and first-rate undergraduate engineering training, and that's the most obvious one. And the technology courses for non-engineering undergraduates were valuable. With the medical school, there were a great many ways that they helped out in our biological sciences program, the most important one of which was the forming of a major in biochemistry, where really the bulk of its staffing came from medical school faculty rather than from arts and sciences faculty.

It has other effects also, namely that if students wish to go to graduate schools in these areas—and a large number of Dartmouth undergraduates do want to become doctors, businessmen, or engineers—there are faculty members who could give them first-rate advice. It was the lack of that that was one of the arguments for funding a law school at Dartmouth that we have talked about. Because, of all the
major professions that Dartmouth undergraduates tend to go into, law is the only one not represented on our campus.

FANELLI: And a fairly substantial number of Dartmouth graduates go into law.

KEMENY: But with the other schools, I'm a strong supporter of having them and fought very hard to help rescue the two that got into serious financial problems, because I think Dartmouth would be a much poorer school if these professional schools were not here. Poorer, I mean, educationally in terms of the richness we offer to our undergraduates. Again, the board split on that. Many trustees understood that fully, and some kept trying to feel why don't you just go into the undergraduate education business. You again and again had to replay the argument that the presence of the professional schools makes a major contribution to the quality of undergraduate education.

FANELLI: John, I think we might switch now to the continuing education area. I've found, I must confess, surprisingly few entries in the trustee records concerning continuing education. I'm not sure of the reason for that, unless it means that most of the decisions in that area tended to be largely administrative decisions that were not brought to the board for action.

KEMENY: A good example of that is the Tuck executives program, which was basically an internal Tuck School decision. I mean, certainly it came up to the level of the president, but I don't think that ever went to the board.

FANELLI: I will say as background, I noted that the only entry prior to your becoming president had to do with a trustee committee headed by Jack Dodd [John D. “Jack” Dodd ‘22], which apparently had been looking into the area of possible Tuck-Thayer collaboration, and it had concluded that the most promising area for such interaction was that of "continuing education."

KEMENY: And that never materialized.

FANELLI: Well, by that they meant primarily executive seminars for the business community. It materialized in Tuck, but…

KEMENY: In Tuck, but not with any Thayer participation as far as I know.

FANELLI: In April 1971 you reported to the trustees on plans for a program to be called the Dartmouth Institute to begin in the summer of 1972, and you indicated that Gil Tanis [Gilbert “Gil” Tanis ’38] would serve as director of continuing education. Shortly thereafter, Harry Bond [Harold “Harry” Bond ‘42] was named academic director. I know that this was not an especially good period for that kind of venture, which depended heavily on the willingness of corporations to finance a
learning experience for their executives. Eventually, the institute did reach a breakeven point, as I recall. Could you talk about this area and what you felt its appropriate role was and should be in the life of the college?

KEMENY: One has to date the Dartmouth Institute's birth to the one public address I gave to alumni as president-elect. The Boston alumni club had its annual meeting in February of 1970, and it is traditional for the president of the college to speak there. It's the only club that you speak at every year, for many reasons. It was the original alumni club, and it's a large size, very active. Of course, John Dickey was scheduled to give the major address, but he very kindly opted instead to use the occasion to introduce me and to let me give the major address. I happily accepted that invitation, but the choice of topic was not easy because speaking as president-elect is not that easy. Your first public appearance before the most important alumni club, you want to say something very meaty. On the other hand, you don't… Before you've even met with the board of trustees as president, you can't announce that I'm just abolishing undergraduate education at Dartmouth College, or something of the sort. I intentionally picked an example that would be the last thing I would have proposed.

It was during this period I was doing a great deal of historical reading, and I knew from conversations that John Dickey had an interest in the subject of continuing education. I happened to come across a speech of Ernest Martin Hopkins going back very early in his administration, where he speaks of a lifelong relation and it should be a two-way street. And he did not just mean alumni contributing money to the college, although I'm quite sure he had that very much in mind. In effect, he described in what were somewhat archaic terms but very eloquently the concept of lifelong education and that he felt that the college had played that role for alumni. I picked up that theme. It gave me an opportunity to bring in Hopkins and Dickey and express my own belief that this was going to become an increasingly important area and felt that Dartmouth should play an increasing role in this.

I was quite overwhelmed by the positive reaction I got to that speech. People kept saying, "Okay, now what are you going to do about it?" I really didn't have time to get that far in it. I talked to a number of people and was trying to look where something could be done.

The major continuing education program we had at the time was Alumni College, which has continued to be immensely successful, to the point where very often enrollments had to be limited, which was an interesting concept of alumni coming back for a combination vacation and educational experience somewhat similar to going to a big city and taking in a number of museums and theaters, except here you would be exposed to Dartmouth faculty members in a short and reasonably intense experience. That was very good, but it really was not a serious
educational experience. I was strongly for it, supported it, it continued and prospered during my presidency. But I thought what was lacking was a much more serious educational experience, longer and more intense.

I also was looking at the area of training of executives, but both executives and professionals. For example, some doctor friends of mine said that they don't ever get a chance to go back and think about big issues. What was clear was that nationally there were endless opportunities for things like what the Tuck executives program would become, that is for professional refresher and bringing-up-to-date courses. What I decided to put the priority on was a later in life in-depth liberal arts education for professionals.

End of Tape 15, Side A
Beginning of Tape 15, Side B

KEMENY: As it turned out, this was a more radical suggestion than I realized, that while businesses were willing to give time of even six months off to go say to Harvard Business School and get a major updating in modern business methods, businesses needed a great deal of persuasion to give time off for an in-depth liberal arts experience. Even the individuals who would come were terrified that somehow somebody else would take their job or they would miss a promotion by being away. Similar things applied to doctors and lawyers, and we would have very little success in attracting doctors and lawyers. Many said they would love to do it, but in practice almost none did.

I had hoped for a two-month summer institute. When Gil Tanis had a chance to go and visit a great many institutions, he discovered that two months was out of the question. Businesses kept saying, "Well, two weeks maybe we could spare people for." We finally compromised on a month. I was just not willing to go down to less than a month, because Alumni College, which is not quite but almost two weeks long—it's twelve days long—I knew couldn't achieve this purpose. Certainly, the experience later on bore out that this was right because typically it took students a week just to get into the spirit of it, and one heard again and again that it was the last week or the last two weeks when they got most out of the institute, so a shorter institute would not have worked.

Because of that, one had continuing problems in attracting enough students. It did not help that a significant depression occurred right after we started the institute. Then corporations always cut down on marginal expenditures, and this was very marginal for them. Eventually, it would come back. We did get some gifts from alumni who believed in it that helped us over the rough periods, and it reached a self-sustaining level.
I think in a way the best measure of the impact of the institute is the rave reports we got from most of the participants, the point where there now is an alumni organization of the Dartmouth Institute that holds a reunion once a year where they spend a couple of days talking about issues, and large numbers of past participants participate in it.

It also turned out to be useful to the college in other ways, as did the Tuck executives program. Many of these fell in love with Dartmouth, and even though they had no previous Dartmouth connection, would become strong supporters of the college. I don't mean financial supporters, but someone one could turn to for advice or service for the institution.

FANELLI: John, looking back, do you feel that that was certainly one of the things you are kind of proud of…

KEMENY: Yes. I'm very proud of it. The only thing I'm sad about is I was hoping it would start similar programs at other institutions. I think only one was started. I think it is a very sad commentary on American business or the profession of law or medicine that people feel they simply can't afford to take a month of their life. It was never the cost, it was the time that they could not afford to take off a month of their life; or if they did, it had to be additional professional training.

FANELLI: Perhaps we could talk about another organization that was your brainchild.

KEMENY: Wait, I just thought of a couple of minor things to mention on continuing education. Some of our continuing education programs ended up having offshoots. One was Alumni College on the Road, the alumni seminar where an abbreviated version of Alumni College was taken once or twice a year to more remote places where people found it hard to come here. Those turned out to be highly popular.

Perhaps the most interesting impact was—and it's an interesting change in our whole alumni organization—was at reunion times. One of the things I had nothing to do with but was very pleased to see developing. Obviously a reunion's primary purpose is to see old friends or to see the college if you haven't been back for a while, and possibly have a great deal of fun and nonsense at reunions. That's all part of reunions. Slowly, reunion classes, particularly some of the younger ones, decided if they came back they wanted to have some more serious element in it. It's becoming quite standard to have seminars on serious subjects as part of reunions. I didn't get too much chance to participate in them as president, though I heard very good things about them as I would visit reunion classes. Go to a picnic lunch at Storrs Pond and all they would talk about is the seminar they had heard this morning, and they were still arguing about the issues, which is very good. I did participate in one last year. One of the reunion classes, '58 I guess,
John Kemeny Interview

asked me to participate in such a seminar. It was extremely well attended and led to a very lively discussion.

FANELLI: John, you might also note that in Alumni College, for example, a fairly high proportion of the participants are not alumni. They are either parents of former students…

KEMENY: Yes. And of course it has an incredible return rate, which is one of the problems. They had to think up a new theme every year, because we would give a reception in our garden each year for Alumni College, and we would meet people who were back for the ninth time. I think one was back for the fifteenth time. Many people sort of made an annual event or came any time they could work it into their schedule.

FANELLI: I know a doctor and his wife who were just here for this past Alumni College—I became friendly with them many years ago when I was a discussion leader in the Alumni College—and this was their fourteenth time.

KEMENY: Other offshoots are still coming off the program. Of the early editions of the Alumni College, the problem always was what do you do with the children, since it's a combination vacation and learning experience. They used to have sort of obvious children's programs, and one year they decided how about teaching how to use a computer to the children. My daughter actually taught it for the first two years. She is a very good teacher and of course went on to become a computer professional. That was very successful and has continued. I note that this year, as a matter of fact this week, they have a whole week special Alumni College just on computers. I'm giving a guest lecture to it Thursday evening. I'll find out then how it's going, but I think this is the first one, so it was too early to get any feedback. It's just a five-day one. And the Computer and Information Science Program has started one. It's like Tuck executives program but in the computer area. This was the first year it was given. We were too late advertising it, so it was a very modest attendance, but again that could be useful in the long run.

FANELLI: John, I was going to say that one of the things that you really played the major role and was your brainchild was the Council on Financing Higher Education. Perhaps you could talk about that. I don't have any questions on it because it's so much your creation.

KEMENY: I'm going to refer to it by the name all of us call it. Since the initials are COFHE, everybody just called it "coffee," like the drink, and I'll refer to it that way. It started early in my presidency when we were all worried about the coming of federal aid and the coming of a great deal of legislation with it. I felt that schools—I originally thought just of the Ivies—ought to work more closely together in order to exchange information.
The second thing that happened independently of this, I thought that we ought to make a rather major study of some of the issues involved in the whole financial aid and student aid question, and some questions about quality of life for students. I applied to the Sloan Foundation for some money for a Dartmouth study. The answer I got was it's a heck of a good idea, but they did not see how they could give it to one school. Every other school would want to have it. They made a counter-proposal that they would give me a larger sum of money if I would put together a coalition of schools that would do that. They wanted sort of a national cross-section, but originally we only had a small number of schools. I think it started with nine. What I made as a counter-proposal is, could we stick to the Northeast, where after all you find all kinds of schools? You would cut down travel time, which would make cooperation easier, but that I promised they would not be a homogeneous group but sort of a cross-section at least of good private schools in the Northeast. I argued private only because the problems of the public institutions in this area are completely different from private schools. I did manage to put together a coalition of nine. I think we invited a slightly larger number, but nine is what we ended up with.

It was a fairly modest effort to start with, ranging from trying to understand ourselves and each other better to informing ourselves about pending federal legislation, how best to take advantage of it, and would later grow an arm of how to try to influence the form of this legislation. It very soon became too successful to limit it to the number we had.

FANELLI: John, could I ask you just—because I really don't remember this. I know that later the executive director of it became a very key person.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: In the study part of it, was there an executive director?

KEMENY: No, not in the early part. Actually, the decision that we needed an executive director led to a more formal organization. It was really a very loose organization held together voluntarily, and held together by a Sloan Foundation grant, perhaps a three-year grant. I don't remember it exactly.

FANELLI: So it looked like it was going to phase out.

KEMENY: Actually, what happened is that everybody said, "Gee, we've got to continue this." Other schools heard about it, and we found exchange of information very useful. We also found how it was a lot of work. I think what we did is we borrowed staff from each of our institutions to help on this.
Let me tell you, even before any lobbying occurred, why just collection of information was very hard. We discovered a problem that should have been obvious, that even at fairly similar institutions, data is kept in an entirely different form, and therefore everybody was very good at turning their data in, but you were comparing, if not apples and oranges, at least two very different kinds of apples. Therefore, it was very hard to draw conclusions. We decided we needed a full-time person. There were several other schools that said, "Can we get in on the act?"

The Sloan money ran out, but really the cost for the institution was so modest. Each of our institutions said that we would happily, even in hard budget times, spend the money out of our own budget because the joint collection of information actually was cheaper than any one of us doing this on our own, and we got vastly more out of it. Then a much more formal organization was created. Its structure, which slowly grew… We eventually had to put a limit on membership.

FANELLI: I think it got to thirty.

KEMENY: Yes. That's the legal limit, legal meaning it's in our charter. When we set it, we thought, gee, we may never get there. But actually, before the end of my presidency, we would get there and have a waiting list, and even instituted a plan that we would periodically ask for the resignation of one or two schools that had become inactive to make room for schools that would get in. By the time we were up to thirty, we were nationally representative of the best private schools. I would say that if anyone wrote down what they considered the fifty best private schools, these thirty names would be on it. Even we, the members, could argue why X was on it and Y wasn't, but we did put this arbitrary limit.

The second important thing on it is, it really was formed to look at undergraduate students. When the organization got large, we also looked at one or two graduate problems, but that was always voluntarily by those institutions that were interested in it. The focus always was undergraduate education and student-related problems primarily.

The decision-making body consisted of… The ultimate policy committee were the presidents. I remember the last presidents' meeting I went to. I think of the thirty institutions, let's say twenty-six presidents were actually present, which is quite remarkable. So they were taking it quite seriously. There was a board of directors that consisted of six of the presidents, nominated by nominating committee and elected by the annual meeting of presidents.

There was also a policy committee. I think that's what it was called, which is somewhat of a misnomer. It was sort of the operating committee, recognizing the
presidents didn't have enough time, which had to have people knowledgeable in these areas at the institutions.

FANELLI: For example, I think Bill Davis was the representative for Dartmouth on it.

KEMENY: Yes, because certainly in the early days before he became treasurer, in his role as associate provost, Leonard turned over to him most of the problems in the student affairs area, so he was very knowledgeable in this area. And a great deal of the issues dealt with money matters, not all of them by any means, but Bill was very knowledgeable in this area. Ralph Manuel would have been another obvious person later, but he was so involved with the Ivy policy in athletics that it was Bill who represented us and was always a very active and able member of it.

One of the six directors was the service chairman of the organization, and not unnaturally, the first time around I was elected chairman. It was a rotating chairmanship. I forget if it's a one- or two-year term. I think a one-year term. I don't remember, maybe a two-year term. The funny thing that happened was, when we were authorized to hire a full-time executive director, it was agreed that the executive director could set up office on the campus of any member institution. After an intense search, we found a truly outstanding Brown alumnus, who had a strong financial background and also was very knowledgeable academically. As a matter of fact, he would later be stolen from us by Brown to become their chief financial officer. He accepted the job, and then I said, "I assume you want to settle on the Brown campus." He said no, he and his family had always wanted to live in this part of the country. [Chuckles] He settled on the Dartmouth campus, and there were many nasty remarks about my having made that a condition for acceptance. As a matter of fact, the opposite was true. It came as a great surprise to me that he settled here. He was excellent. He really built up the institution.

FANELLI: Dick Ramsden [Richard J. “Dick” Ramsden].

KEMENY: Dick Ramsden, yes. And as I said, he went on to become financial vice president later at Brown.

Then when he stepped down, we hired an extremely able woman executive director, and she opted, because of a dual career situation—her husband worked in the Boston area—she opted to settle on the MIT campus, which did not work out quite as well, but it worked out all right. As far as I know, our office still is in Cambridge.

I know most about it for the first few years, and then near the end of it. It turned out to be near the end of my presidency, I was reelected first to the board of
directors and then as chairman. So I also finished my presidency being chairman of COFHE again.

We did also establish an arm with a representative in Washington to do some lobbying for us. We very early decided we would not lobby for the special interest just of our institutions. We knew that was hopeless since we represented too small a constituency. But as financial aid legislation was written, we discovered that the staff members just did not understand education very well, and there were position papers being written by major educational lobbies, if I may put it that way, that usually argued a very narrow special interest. We managed to have disproportionate impact on financial aid education, not because we represented a large political constituency, which we certainly didn't, but simply by having the best thought out position papers and by arguing a moderate position. I mean, we came up with papers that they recognized as being good for all colleges in the country, rather than... We of course were careful also to try to get out of the legislation things that would disproportionately hurt our own institutions. But we did manage to have a good deal of impact on that. A young Dartmouth alumnus who had gone into this field was our Washington representative.

I considered that one of my successes. I still find it pleasant when… For example, I visited Washington University of St. Louis earlier this year, which is one of the members, and the president came to a final evening banquet. I spent two and a half days there. The subject he brought up immediately was COFHE and what a great organization it was. I know he served on the board of directors, which means he was a very active member of it, and he just said, "It's sort of the single organization where, per cost, I've gotten most out of it."

We came up with an interesting formula for costs, which shows how simply one can solve things. There were big arguments as to whether it ought to be per undergraduate student—remember it's always undergraduate because that's where we're limited—or flat fee per institutions. That was to be a big fight, could have been a fight that broke us up, until one of us, and I don't remember who it was, suggested a compromise: How about taking the total budget, splitting it in half, and half of it is apportioned according to undergraduate enrollment and half equally amongst all participating institutions. Particularly when we worked out what it came out to for each institution, the formula just easily carried. I think Dartmouth, which was about in the middle in size, I think our cost late in my presidency was the order of magnitude of $5,000 a year, which you get a small fraction of one full-time person, and we just got invaluable information out of it.

They turned out every other year something they called the Red Book, which had the summary of information on a confidential basis. I always read it extremely carefully, and several trustees were asking when would the Red Book come out because it was an invaluable source of information.
I'll give you an example of what I learned from that institution. I had always wondered why Amherst decided to go coed, because I thought it was the one school that could afford to hold out because of their—I think I mentioned this before—because of their location, both close proximity with Mount Holyoke and Smith, and also that they joined classes and the students could take classes at any of those institutions. I was very surprised when they made the decision to go coed. Actually, they had serious trouble later attracting women students for a while, so it wasn't an all happy one. It still is a very controversial one.

It was when there was sort of a ten-year overview in the Red Book that came out for the first time. I understood the reason, which I know was never made public. Amherst used to have College Board scores that were much higher than the Ivies even. I think even including Harvard. The lowest Amherst student was much higher than the lowest we would admit, because they got a comparable applicant pool, and they're a tiny school. They used to have a total student body of about twelve hundred students. So it's as if we took only the top 30% of our applicants. As a matter of fact, the Amherst class looked exactly like the top 30%. I don't mean it was better than that; it looked like the top 30%. So they were an institution that had great riches of good applicants and attracted a ridiculous number of truly outstanding students. If you follow this through the Red Book, you see after Princeton and Yale went coed, it starts going down, and after we also go coed, they take a nosedive, and in a very rapid period they stop attracting the truly outstanding students, or attract them in much smaller numbers. And after they went coed, it started climbing up again.

So I have this absolute proof, which I could never quite use publicly because I didn't want to embarrass Amherst, but I did use it in some private conversations, that my prediction that if Dartmouth had stayed all male, we would have gone downhill as an educational institution. That experiment was actually carried out, very fortunately not by Dartmouth but by Amherst. The only thing I was wrong on is, they take the nosedive much faster than I thought it could happen to any institution.

This is an extreme example, but there were many smaller things that we learned. We would occasionally have cost comparisons in certain areas and find out where we were spending much too much or not spending enough, and so did other institutions. So I think it's an invaluable institution.

FANELLI: John, one thing you haven't mentioned and I haven't asked you about is the area of publications, The Dartmouth Review and things like that.

KEMENY: First of all, let me say that since The Dartmouth Review is so overwhelming, unfortunately for most of my administration, The Dartmouth Review did not exist.
It really started a year before I stepped down from the presidency. I understand they would even claim that their coming forced me out of office, or accelerated my stepping down.

FANELLI: I've never heard that.

KEMENY: I've heard that a couple of times indirectly, which of course is ludicrous since a) I had told the board a year and a half before The Dartmouth Review appeared when I was stepping down, and I'd actually made a public announcement of when I was stepping down before anyone had heard that there was going to be a—well, three months before The Dartmouth Review even announced that there was going to be such a thing. It's just one of these amusing, or not so amusing, distortions that extremists try to do.

For most of my period, it was The Dartmouth that was the major publication. Of course, there used to be any number of anecdotes about presidents in The Dartmouth. I remember one Hopkins and one John Dickey one. The John Dickey one—you correct me if I'm not right on this—he was arguing with an editor, and the editor in the process discovered that John Dickey hadn't read The Dartmouth. The editor was outraged that the president didn't read The Dartmouth, and John Dickey said, "Well, I can easily read your paper or defend it, but I cannot do both, and I would like to defend The Dartmouth." I think I have that roughly right.

Jean somewhere read that President Hopkins would always go out… There are two ways of going out of the president's house. He'd always go out through the door that we think of as the back door so he wouldn't have to step over The Dartmouth, which was at the front door. So I think presidents having trouble with The Dartmouth, or student papers, go way back.

Actually, mine varied all over the place. I think The Dartmouth varied in quality and varied in its attitude towards me. I had some editors who were very supportive of what I did. I'd say about half the time it was a very high quality paper and half the time it wasn't, which is what you would expect.

FANELLI: The Dartmouth also, during your eleven years, went through financial difficulties of its own, as you recall.

KEMENY: Yes, and we had to work very hard to rescue The Dartmouth.

FANELLI: We did. We had to lend them some money at one time.

KEMENY: Yes. WDCR of course in a sense is a publication also, which was even more complicated than that because it was owned by the trustees and they wanted desperately to go into an FM station and we loaned them money there.
With *The Dartmouth*, the big fight was they were always worried that we would try to exercise editorial control over them, which is the last thing in the world any college president wants to do. I mean he's out of his mind. He wants to be able to say, "Look, it's an independent student paper and I have nothing to do with it."

We reestablished in effect and put some teeth into—they have something like a board of overseers—and put some teeth into it, not for the purpose of editorial control at all, but there was some financial irresponsibility and mismanagement there. We felt, as we did with WDCR later on, that the price for the money was that they would listen to the older and more experienced people, simply in terms of how not to go bankrupt.

**FANELLI:** Yes. In fact, I think Paul Paganucci had played an important role with *The Dartmouth*.

**KEMENY:** With *The Dartmouth*, and Bob Graham [Robert B. "Bob" Graham, Jr. '40], I believe… Was that with *The Dartmouth* or with DCR? Who played a major role in DCR? I'm trying to remember.

**FANELLI:** I think Paganucci did also.

**KEMENY:** Paganucci, certainly on the financial end of it.

**FANELLI:** On the financial end. Bob Graham was on *The Dartmouth*.

**KEMENY:** All right. Because I associate one with one and one with the other. Bob obviously was on *The Dartmouth* board earlier than Pag came back, and then Pag helped him a great deal on the financial end in WDCR and WFRD.

Probably the editor who was nastiest to me during my entire administration was very early a young man by the name of Bill Aydelott [William E. “Bill” Aydelott ’72]. His father was a very loyal Dartmouth alumnus who would periodically come and apologize for what his son was writing and I would defend his son. Of course, he attacked me primarily because he was violently pro-coeducation and was absolutely sure Dartmouth would never go coed.

**KEMENY:** Really, the ending of the Bill Aydelott story is that late as an alumnus he would become one of my very strong supporters and a good friend. One has to take with a considerable grain of salt what undergraduates feel. They have to write what they have to be outrageous about in order to sell their papers.
However, *The Dartmouth Review* is a quite different story. That did not happen until the final year of my presidency and is unfortunately continuing. The trouble with *The Dartmouth Review* is that it is highly financed by outsiders. It's really not aimed at the campus. They don't sell it on campus; they distribute it freely on campus. There have [been] very large subventions, some from alumni sources but I understand a substantial amount from non-alumni sources, simply to spread an ultraconservative view. They seem to be willing to go to almost any extreme for sensationalism.

Two faculty members stormed into my office about being totally misquoted in the paper, and when they called in the editor in charge, they said, "But look, you talked to us. You know this isn't true, this isn't true, this isn't true." And the answer he is supposed to have given to them was, "We don't care what the truth is. We're trying to propagate a certain position and we'll make any statement that will help advance that cause." They were just absolutely outrageous students. They thought maybe they had gotten it wrong, but they didn't see how. But this admission of what amounted to intentional lying shocked them.

That was a new element. The major issue I was concerned about was that they should not be allowed to use the Dartmouth name. That was probably as badly mishandled during my term as president as any issue whatsoever. I had before and afterwards had occasion to know that dealing with lawyers is not easy. One would get totally contradictory advice.

For a while Ralph Manuel tried. He thought he was dealing with reasonable people and tried to work out some sort of compromise, but I think Ralph would say that it became clear before the end of it, they had absolutely no intention whatsoever of reaching a reasonable deal. As a matter of fact, there's nothing they would have loved more than the college suing them because of all the publicity it would get them.

We did manage to stop one thing. They incorporated as a not for profit organization under the name *Dartmouth Review* in the state of New Hampshire. We forced them to change that because to raise funds under a name that has Dartmouth in it would give people the impression that somehow they are connected with the college. We also forced them to have in some letters on the front page saying that they had no official connection with Dartmouth College. But I really wanted to have them sued simply to take the word Dartmouth out of the title of it. I made it clear to them if they wanted to be called The College Review or The Hanover Review or any other name that they wished that didn't have Dartmouth in it, they would have every right and I would never again… never hear a word from me. But it didn't happen, and lawyers took forever.
What happened, it finally, after what seemed to me much too long preparation and waiting too long—and here is an issue where the longer you wait, the harder it is—a case was prepared for the board for a suit. Cary Clark ['62], our chief legal officer at the meeting, made his presentation, and then a trustee asked, "What do you think our chances are of success," and he said, "Sixty-forty against it," at which point the board sort of lost interest in suing. I personally believe that was a mistake, that the suit should have been made whether we won it or not, at least to make a public statement that the college disassociated itself from what The Dartmouth Review was doing.

These things happened when I was a lame duck president. I think that in no other area did the lame duckness affect me, but this was probably one area where it did.

FANELLI: I think the argument at that time, John, was that suing them would give them the publicity which they were desperately trying to get, but they managed to get the publicity anyway in all the different ways that you've mentioned.

KEMENY: They did, by just doing enough of their outrageous ways. It was not a good argument. I think we got bad legal advice in that case.

FANELLI: I recall when you first sat down with the editor…

KEMENY: I remember I asked you to be present because I heard that he had a tendency if there were no witnesses to claim that something other than the facts had happened, so I asked you to be present just so that I had a witness as to what I had said and what he had said.

FANELLI: I remember your saying to him that it wasn't the fact that they were conservative that bothered anybody. Actually, there was plenty of room for a conservative newspaper at Dartmouth College, and we would have welcomed that. It was the manner in which they practiced their journalism that left much to be desired. That was unfortunate and I think will continue to be unfortunate. The name, as you pointed out, has fooled a lot of people into thinking that that is the paper at Dartmouth College, that it's the undergraduate paper at Dartmouth.

KEMENY: Yes. Or at least one of the official papers. It was a terrible mistake to give in on the fight of the name.

Let's see. I think the students' radio station was a success. I don't know how they're doing these days, but they did for quite a long time, to my amazement, make a success of having both an AM and an FM station, which really required enormous dedication on the part of their staff. It should be mentioned it's the only student run commercial radio station, so it's operated as a commercial radio station under rules that apply to commercial radio stations. Of course, the
students either get no money or get token sums of money. Basically they have to raise advertising revenue in order to survive, so it's a very difficult way to live.

FANELLI: I understood that many of them are grateful for the experience that they've gotten from what is essentially, as you say, a commercial enterprise, while they were in college.

KEMENY: If one runs into alumni… I had a young colleague in the small company. Our marketing manager worked on the radio station and considers it one of his great experiences at Dartmouth. That's just the most recent one over the years. Again and again I heard from alumni, some of whom have gone on to the world of broadcasting, and many of whom didn't, who considered it an extremely valuable experience.

FANELLI: I went, I guess a couple of years ago, to what they call their Silver Anniversary, twenty-fifth anniversary celebration, and many of the people who did go into broadcasting came back, and some who had not gone into broadcasting came back to help them celebrate. It was quite an event.

KEMENY: My main recollection with WDCR are things I have talked about before. I would have what started out as monthly and then would become once a term live news conferences at WDCR, which were very good and helped me a great deal in communicating with the campus. I couldn't very well ask for a column in The Dartmouth, but this was a chance for me to express my views and to be cross-examined by student reporters, including a reporter from The Dartmouth, and answer questions there, which I think was a very, very good thing.

FANELLI: Then also you, I think fairly early on in your presidency, instituted the practice of having a press conference after trustee meetings.

KEMENY: After trustee meetings, yes. I think I started originally just to have them when I had something major to say, but then it simply turned out to be easier just to schedule one in advance after every trustee meeting. It was mostly the student press that turned up, but also some local press. The Valley News or, since WDCR was invited, I certainly couldn't exclude the other two local radio stations. Sometimes they came and sometimes they didn't. Later, our local TV station would occasionally show up. It was a good means of their feeling that they were not excluded from college news.

On WDCR my funniest experience was… For a couple of years they had something called Celebrity Night. I forget what it was for. It may have been some sort of charitable fundraising thing. Not Celebrity Night, Celebrity Day. For a whole day, college professors, well-known people in the community…
FANELLI: Oh, would go over and be disk jockeys?

KEMENY: Would be whatever, or read the news, or do everything.

FANELLI: Yes. I remember that.

KEMENY: They asked me if I would do it, and I wasn't here the first year but the second year I said yes. The problem was that I said, "Look, I only have time in the evening," and the only thing they had in the evening was the rock disk jockey slot, which was not the ideal slot for me, but I said, "What the heck." I had something like an hour and a half slot. I told them that, first of all, I am a non-musician, the only non-musician in the math department. But even the music I like is more big band or that sort of thing, and I knew absolutely nothing about rock music. They assured me that one of their regular disk jockeys would pick all the records and simply give me a list of what he was going to play. I just had to do the chatter the disk jockeys did. I understand I murdered the names of all kinds of well-known rock stars, not intentionally. But I did prepare my chatter ahead of time. I think some of the worst jokes ever heard from a college president were cracked that night.

I remember two of them. One when I said, "We have just received a telephone call. Would Sigma Nu please turn down its radio. Your neighbors are trying to go to sleep." In case by the time someone listens to this, Sigma Nu is no longer where it is today, it was the fraternity immediately next to the president's house. It was my one chance to get back at them for playing impossibly loud records.

The one where all of WDCR, all their top people kept running in and yelled at me that I just... First of all, they were furious at me, and secondly, one even claimed I had violated an FCC regulation. The weekend before, there was an away game at Columbia which for some reason was important to us. It had some major-to-do with the Ivy standings. It was a close game. WDCR lost its telephone line several times during the game and eventually completely. I remember I did what many others did, I went out to the car radio to see if I could pick up a further away radio station to get the game. They were most apologetic about it, but it was sort of a wipeout. They kept saying, "We hope to resume broadcasting the Columbia game in five minutes," and they never did. So I'm on say five days later in the evening, and at one of the breaks I said, "We're very happy to announce that in five minutes we're going to resume broadcasting the Columbia football game." [laughs]

FANELLI: [laughs] Wonderful! And that hurt them.

KEMENY: That hurt them. And the quality of my jokes achieved a purpose. I was never again asked back. [laughs]
FANELLI: I remember at one point you had asked me to jot down something that you wanted to comment on later was, why the presidency of Dartmouth is particularly...

KEMENY: Okay. That might be a nice subject to finish on today. I occasionally talked about that with other presidents or with small alumni groups, but I don't believe I ever wrote about it, and therefore it might be nice to have it on record.

FANELLI: Of course.

KEMENY: I thought about it very hard. I'm not necessarily saying that it is the hardest presidency, but I think I can make the case that it must be one of a very small group of schools whose presidency is hardest, both in its complexity and in its time demands, and possibly it's the hardest but I don't know that for sure.

Most institutions fall into one of two categories. They're either enormous institutions, say the University of Michigan, where I'm sure the president of the University of Michigan has all kinds of problems he has to deal with, but it's so large that he is isolated from most of the constituencies. You certainly wouldn't expect an undergraduate to have access to the president of the University of Michigan or an average faculty member to have access to the president of the University of Michigan. I'm quite sure it's only very influential alumni that have access to him, other than a large speech he might give to a thousand alumni.

At the other extreme you have institutions that are small liberal arts colleges that really are just undergraduate colleges, where the president is expected to be highly accessible and involved in everything, but it just does not have complexity approaching the complexity of a great university. So the job in another way is much simpler.

Dartmouth, first of all, finds itself as part of a very small middle group that has most of the complexities of large universities. We have professional schools, including a medical school, which as everyone knows demands more time than three undergraduate colleges, and is good sized, though not 20,000 students. I mean, it's large compared to the average liberal arts college. Yet they do everything possible to give the illusion that it's like a liberal arts college, and therefore the president has to be available to all students, to all faculty members, and all alumni who wish to see him. Certainly that has been the tradition at Dartmouth, and I continued it.

Thirdly, even amongst these institutions, I don't know any other one that owns a hotel, a golf course, a ski resort, the public waterworks, et cetera, et cetera. So we're engaged in an unusually large number of activities on top of all of that. It's really the first two reasons that are the overwhelming reasons of both trying to run a university of a complexity where normally the president is expected to be
isolated from constituencies, and yet act like the president of a small liberal arts college who's got the time to be easily accessible. These extra things do contribute to the complexity, both of the administrative problems and simply take up a great deal of time.

Dartmouth is in an almost unique position. I can't believe that there are more than five presidents who can say all of these things in the whole country. Offhand, I don't know a single other one, at least not since Princeton turned the Princeton Inn into a dormitory. And even then, Princeton never had a medical school. Just talking to other presidents, I would invariably find them to fall into one of the other two categories where we shared a great deal, but within each category there were a large number of issues I had to deal with personally that they would never deal with.

FANELLI: You once told me, John, I think, that some of these other presidents of large institutions played quite different roles than yours since they were gone from the institution a good deal of the time and were in Washington, let's say.

KEMENY: Served on lots of boards and all kinds of things. It's not that I was opposed to doing some of those things, but with the exception of once when I took a board membership and Three Mile Island of course and I did serve on some foundation boards and such which were directly related, but I did much less of that than other presidents simply because I just could not find the time to do it. Not to mention that I had trouble with the amount of traveling I already had to do.

There’s that marvelous anecdote. Did we ever mention my student office hours?

FANELLI: No.

KEMENY: It's one of the things that I am proud of, and I'm telling it now because it's relevant to a Harvard story that says a great deal about what we're now talking about. Early in my presidency, I started out by simply asking what John Dickey used to do in various situations, and there were very few of these I just disagreed with it or I had a different temperament or different style. I started out doing what he did and then changed it if it needed to be changed, much of which never got changed and many things in our office worked exactly the way it did under John Dickey. I asked, for example, about students asking for appointments, and I was told that John Dickey's policy was that if a student wanted to see him, he should get the next available slot. I said, "That's terrific. I want to continue that policy." In less than three months I realized that the next available slot would often be two months later. I knew enough about students that that wasn't going to work.

So I did something I'd done all my life as a faculty member, I had office hours for students. It would become institutionalized, Tuesday afternoon from 1:30 to 3:00
p.m. It was printed in the student handbook. It was understood if I happened to be out of town on a Tuesday they were canceled, but every week when I was in town, that time was reserved for students. The important thing was, the student could come in without asking for an appointment or without stating his or her business. I think that was a very successful institution. It would happen no more than once or twice a year that nobody came and no more than once or twice that I would run out of time in an hour and a half, so it was about right.

Typically, there would be three to five either individuals or small groups of students who wanted to talk to me. They varied all over the place from a problem they were having—I remember a student who came in and said, "Sir, I'm having all kinds of trouble with your administration." And I startled him by saying, "So am I." [Chuckles] I tried to help him. He had gotten the runaround where one office sent him to the second office who sent him to the third office which sent him back to the first office. I did manage to break through that. Those were some of the easier ones to solve.

Some students simply having a very bright idea about how to improve the college. Nine out of ten times of course they were impractical, and I tried very kindly without hurting their feelings to explain why people had thought of that but why it wouldn't work. Once in a while, a damn good idea came, and I'll bet you about twice a year I implemented a student's suggestion that came out of office hours, which over an eleven-year period is quite a few ideas.

Of course, they might be my own students, or students who wanted to know something about philosophy or science or some other area I knew about, or just wanted to understand something about the college. Not unimportantly, students who simply hadn't met me and wanted to meet me, not in a large group but individually. Sometimes they came with a very weak excuse as to why they were in there, and I never pointed it out to them because I knew why they were coming in. Some of them would just very frankly say, "Sir, I just wanted to meet you personally," and I said, "That would be fine."

That was, I think, one of my very good inventions and something I'm glad I did because that, plus teaching, is what gave me my closest contact with students.

The reason I'm bringing it up and comparing it with other college presidents, we had an intern in the office by the name—it was Rob Saltzman [Robert M. Saltzman ‘76], who went on to Harvard Law School after having been an intern in the office. He was a great believer in my office hours, and he decided that he wanted to go meet the president of Harvard. He would eventually write one of the funniest articles I ever read for The Dartmouth, which went on and on. I remember he went in, and first he was taken aback, given a rather crowded and hectic outside office. He first got into a reception room which had one single desk
in it with one lady sitting behind it, and the entire room was occupied by her. First you had to get past her. He very politely introduced himself as a first-year law student at Harvard University and said that he would like to meet the president. She was absolutely bewildered and asked something like, "Whatever for?" He just tried to do the best he could, including mentioning that he had worked in my office so had a chance to get to know the president of his undergraduate college. He really knows President Bok is very busy, and he certainly wouldn't imagine he would give him more than five minutes, but if President Bok could spare him five minutes, at President Bok's convenience, he'd like to meet him. He got the longest runaround you ever heard of, being sent from assistant to assistant and coming back, and nothing would ever happen.

To make a long story short, he never did get a five-minute appointment. He did once at some huge reception run into President Bok, who actually somehow recognized his name and said, "Aren't you the guy who's been trying to get to see me?" or something to that effect. He ended his article in The Dartmouth saying, "Students at Dartmouth, take advantage of the president's office hours while you're an undergraduate because once you get to graduate school, forget it."

Besides this being a very funny story and a somewhat sad story in other ways, and showing the usefulness of office hours, it tells you something about the organization of Harvard University. Harvard is about twice the size of Dartmouth. I mention that it's not ten times the size of Dartmouth. It has more professional schools than we do, and their medical school is much bigger, so I'm sure Bok has a lot of problems. I was the only president who sort of automatically made room each week for students, but to be so isolated from students that one terribly polite student who obviously could be checked up on as being totally legitimate and a law student in good standing couldn't get five minutes of the president's time, no matter how hard he tried, tells you that those presidents live a very different life.

I also know from Ivy presidents meetings that there were huge areas about their institution about which the president simply didn't know. Again, it varied a great deal from president to president, but they just get isolated from very large areas. All in all, I think that's my case for saying that the Dartmouth presidency must be one of the five most time-consuming and most complex presidencies in the country, and possibly the single one that's most extreme.

[Tape off, then resumes]

KEMENY: Alex, perhaps I could make one remark before we start today's session, namely that this week marks the thirtieth anniversary of my arrival in Hanover, New Hampshire.
FANELLI: Oh. That's great.

KEMENY: I was reminded of that, my daughter was up here visiting us, and she's going to have her thirtieth birthday later this month, and she was born very shortly after we arrived, so that reminded me it's also our thirtieth anniversary of arriving in Hanover.

FANELLI: I had forgotten that '54 was... Okay. We wanted to have your comments on the record, John, about some of your senior administrators that you worked with. You've mentioned some of these people along the previous sessions, but I thought this might be a good opportunity to complete what you want to say about each of them. I'll just take them in the order I've got them on the list here.

KEMENY: Why don't you mention a name, because I know you've compiled a list, so I won't forget somebody.

FANELLI: Don Kreider is the first one, and that's a person you've known for a long time of course.

KEMENY: Don Kreider is someone I recruited for the mathematics department I believe in 1960, and he is one of the truly outstanding teachers at Dartmouth College. His name often appears on students' lists when they're comparing faculty members as amongst the best in the entire institution. During a fairly crucial transition stage, I was trying to work my way out of the problems caused by Carroll Brewster, of which we talked before, and also trying to get some reasonable coordination of all the student related activities, I created a vice presidency for student affairs. First I had Frank Smallwood in that role in an acting basis, and then Don Kreider took the job for a four-year appointment. He did a superb job in it but absolutely hated administration and asked at the end of three years to be relieved of it so he could return to full-time teaching at the college, which he did, and incidentally, currently heads up—he is vice chairman for computer science within the now department of mathematics and computer science.

There are many things he accomplished while he was vice president, most importantly of course pulling together all the student-related activities and bringing some order and coordination into the activities. I should also mention that this happened to coincide with the time when I tried building the Dartmouth database management information system, Project FIND, of which I talked before. Since Don was in the administration and knew computers very well, Don was actually in charge of creating Project FIND, which still serves Dartmouth excellently. It's a system that was about a decade ahead of its time compared with what other institutions had.
Let me mention what happened afterwards, and we'll come to that, but when Don stepped down, in the meantime I had worked my way through the Carroll Brewster matter and Carroll went elsewhere. Ralph Manuel succeeded Carroll Brewster as dean of the college, and he was the natural choice to succeed Don as vice president for student affairs. We also went back then to a more natural choice of titles. The tradition at Dartmouth College is that the chief student affairs officer is called the dean of the college. The reason I couldn't use that title was because Carroll Brewster had that title, and part of the purpose of bringing Don in was to bring in someone over Carroll Brewster's head. Once these problems had disappeared, the new structure was kept, except the top person, namely…

End of Tape 16, Side A
Beginning of Tape 16, Side B

KEMENY: Ralph kept his title as dean of the college but in effect was vice president for student affairs, and a dean of students was brought in under him to manage the day-to-day discussions with students.

Let's see. I think that's basically all I have to say about Don Kreider, except that he helped me enormously during one of the most difficult periods of my presidency with one of my bad problems, and although he had a very rough time of it, he made a major contribution to the college.

FANELLI: John, let me ask you a question suggested by this selection of Don, and it may have happened in other cases. When you had occasion to ask people who were essentially faculty people to step into administrative roles, how was that received in general? There must have been other cases, with the dean of the faculty for instance.

KEMENY: The dean of the faculty choice is special, and we'll talk about that, but in other cases certainly the faculty very much appreciated bringing in one of their own numbers into an administrative position that was normally not held by faculty members. I think the alumni didn't care one way or the other, they just wanted to know that somebody very good was there. Don was an example of someone who was not a Dartmouth graduate, and periodically the alumni would worry that I had too many senior officers who were not Dartmouth graduates. Of course, it started with their worrying about my not being a Dartmouth graduate. I just had to keep repeating the line I use with myself that someone who would spend most of his professional life at Dartmouth College has at least as deep an attachment to the institution as did the alumni.

I think I told this story before, but it really is striking that I would have to keep reminding the alumni that they had only spent four years at an institution and fell
in love with it for the rest of their life, how do they think people would feel who…
By that time I had spent twenty years of my life at Dartmouth College, and plan to
spend the rest of my life here. Certainly Don Kreider by the time he took this
position had spent perhaps twelve years at Dartmouth, and this is now twelve
years later and he's still here and has every intention of spending the rest of his life
here.

FANELLI: And he was willing to take an administrative role?

KEMENY: Yes. Under the same conditions under which I took the presidency, namely that
he would not give up teaching. He carried something like a one-third teaching
load in addition to an administrative role.

I should say one more thing about the position. It's equally applicable to Don and
to Ralph Manuel who succeeded him. To tell you how complicated that area is, if
you count up how many officers of the college—this is officers as opposed to
staff—fall under the jurisdiction of a given vice president, by far the largest
number of officers fall under the vice president for student affairs, or now dean of
the college, because Dartmouth is so very heavily committed to doing a great deal
for its students. All residential colleges tend to have a fairly large crew here, and
Dartmouth probably does more than most institutions. Besides the office of the
dean of the college in the narrow sense that deals with problems of upper-class
students and the dean of freshmen's office, there's the admissions office, financial
aid, student housing, student health care, the Tucker Foundation, and I've
probably forgotten three or four other areas, all of which report—

FANELLI: Do coaches come under there, too?

KEMENY: Well, later on I also had the director of athletics report, as we talked last time, at
least part way to the dean of the college. They would also fall in there. There's no
absolutely natural place for athletics to report, but it certainly wouldn't belong
under the dean of the faculty, and I had a dean of the faculty with no interest in
athletics at all. It certainly shouldn't come under financial administration or
business administration. And they do after all deal with students.

FANELLI: The next slot I have is that of provost, and I've got Lou Morton and Leonard
Rieser. Those were two that—Leonard wore two hats there as well.

KEMENY: This was an area where I had serious difficulties in the beginning. It took time to
work it out, and perhaps I never did come up with a totally satisfactory solution,
though I set it up so my successor could start off right.

I need to go back into history. Don Morrison was an outstanding dean of the
faculty for most of the '50s. At some point it was decided that one person could
no longer handle the job. In particular, my understanding is that the need to reorganize the medical school played a major role in this. Of course, dean of the faculty is actually shorthand for dean of the faculty of arts and sciences. John Dickey wished to have someone who could also deal with the professional schools, again most importantly the medical school, which went through its first major reorganization in the late '50s. He then promoted Don Morrison to the new position of provost, and Arthur Jensen ['46] came in as dean of the faculty reporting to Don Morrison. Therefore, one job was split into two. After Don Morrison's death, John Masland [John W. Masland, Jr.] became provost and Arthur Jensen continued as dean of the faculty.

The organization became more complex as the institution became more complex. There were associate deans. Leonard Rieser would hold a variety of titles, in some of which he would report to the provost and some of which to the dean of the faculty. First, sciences were split up with a separate associate dean, then as graduate studies expanded, that came under Leonard's jurisdiction. I don't remember all the titles Leonard went through, but he held a number of them. When John Masland resigned, Leonard was a natural choice to come in as provost. And when Arthur Jensen stepped down, Leonard ended up being both provost and dean of the faculty. That is not an ideal solution. As a matter of fact, it has many shortcomings. Yet there is no ideal solution for an institution the size of Dartmouth. Let me turn to…

FANELLI: Can you explain why you think it's not an ideal solution? Does it have conflicts of interest?

KEMENY: It has some conflicts of interest in it. I mean, to some extent Leonard is reporting to himself, or the dean is reporting to himself. The faculty of arts and sciences would argue very hard later on to split the two jobs, because they would feel that the provost was spending too much time as provost and not enough time as dean of the faculty. And indeed, Leonard would have time problems as things go along. I might mention here Leonard's single greatest weakness. When he makes a decision, he makes a good one, but he agonizes over decisions for a long time. If he can't reach a good one, he has a tendency of putting off the decision as long as possible, which could be months. He never did learn that there are occasions where any decision made promptly is better than a decision that drags on for six months.

FANELLI: He once told me that he believed somewhat in the policy of benign neglect, that some of the things go away, but there are some that never go away.

KEMENY: There are some that never do, and there are some issues which, if he had announced a decision within a week, the problem would have gone away, but by six months later, there was so much pressure from all sides that the issue had
grown way out of proportion. That was his weakness, and that contributed to the complaint that he's trying to hold both roles and neither job got done as well as he himself would have been capable of carrying out the other job.

Let me now say why there is no simple solution at Dartmouth. In the typical provost/dean of the faculty pattern, you're in an institution with quite large graduate or professional schools, and there it's a natural job to have a provost who is the chief academic officer under the president. Sometimes the position is called academic vice president. What this person does is oversee the deans of the many different schools. Columbia, for example, has something like seventeen schools, so provost of Columbia is a very clear-cut job. Yet each of the deans has a very clear-cut job.

At Dartmouth College, we only have three professional schools, two of which, Tuck and Thayer, are each the size of a department. Furthermore, the problem got complicated when Carl Chapman came in as dean of the medical school because one of his conditions for coming in was that he would report directly to the president and not to the provost. As a matter of fact, even at institutions where they have academic vice presidents, the medical school is often an exception, because the medical school dean is considered as being on the same rank, overlooking a huge and very costly empire, and therefore would report directly to the president. That's a change, I want to emphasize, that John Dickey made, not I, though I concur with it. I think the dean of the medical school should report to the president. So all of a sudden you have a somewhat strange job where you have a provost who overlooks three areas, namely two tiny professional schools and the huge area of arts and sciences. He has a 90% overlap as the areas that the dean of the faculty overlooks. Therefore, the two jobs were combined and Leonard would always strongly argue for keeping it that way.

Now here I have to remind future historians of a problem I mentioned early in our discussions, what I consider the board's single greatest mistake in the way they set up my presidency, namely that senior officers did not have to hand in their resignations. The area where this caused me most complications... Well, there were two. One was Carroll Brewster and the other one was Leonard Rieser. I mean, Carroll Brewster's case, if I had the choice, I just wouldn't have kept him. In Leonard Rieser's case, I could have started from scratch and rethink the solution. Since that wasn't the situation, and since for one year I wasn't supposed to remove senior officers, by a year later it would have been a public firing if I had made any change at all. That's a very different situation. Leonard Rieser was and is a good personal friend of mine, who has an enormous number of admirable qualities. In most things I trusted him and relied on him very heavily.

The setup, however, was horrible, so I tried working my way out after a year by strongly urging that Leonard should return to... I told him he can't have both, and
he should choose which job he really wanted. Of course, his heart is in arts and sciences, and therefore that he should be full-time dean of the faculty. I was also being urged by senior members of the faculty of arts and sciences to have a full-time dean of the faculty. I went with an acting provost arrangement to try working through what that would be. I turned to one of the most respected members of the faculty, Lou Morton of the history department. I needed to make a choice where it was clear that it was temporary one, and Lou would accept the job only on the condition that it would be temporary.

As I remember, for that year with Lou Morton being acting provost, I also had the temporary solution of having student affairs report to Lou Morton. That was before I went to the setting up of a vice president for student affairs. Indeed, I took that year to try to study the whole structure. The solution that came up was that as long as Leonard was dean of the faculty, no provost could succeed in his job. So either it was a matter of firing Leonard completely from both jobs or of letting Leonard hold both positions. Somewhat reluctantly, I went back to letting Leonard be both provost and dean of the faculty. But it is very much less than an ideal solution and would be the basis for a great number of complaints, not because of what Leonard did but because of what he didn't do.

FANELLI: And indeed later that was changed, right?

KEMENY: I tried very hard to work my way out of that, first of all by building up the provost job, which was easy to do as the complexity of the institution increased. I moved under the provost jurisdiction several institution-wide facilities, which had no natural reporting place. Hopkins Center, the Dartmouth library system, the computing center, and also I think the office of instructional services, though much less important than the other three, this way had a natural place to report. With that and with the professional schools and coordination of institution-wide planning, the provost's office became an important office.

At the same time I announced my resignation, I made an announcement that I was going to go back to separate provost/dean of the faculty and do it in such a way that my successor would have a free choice, which included Leonard announcing that he was stepping down from the provostship. I think, although the transition stage... Hans Penner came in as dean of the faculty and did an excellent job, except he and Leonard never could work out what their relationship could be. It was a somewhat trying period for everyone, but it did achieve my main purpose, that when Dave McLaughlin came in, Leonard overlapped with him only one year, at the end of which he could choose his own provost. Of course, the dean of the faculty was told that he, like everyone else, would have to hand in his resignation. Dave opted to keep Hans on for a while, then Hans chose to step down, and by now Dave has both a provost and a dean of the faculty whom he has picked himself.
I think I have more things to say. So far I've really talked about the job rather than about Leonard himself. Let's see. Throughout the period, our personal relations remained excellent. Sometimes we would have very serious professional disagreements, which in a way is good for the institution. Our style of working was, first that we met weekly since he was the single most important officer reporting to me, and those meetings tended to take very long, again this is due to Leonard's personality. He had to talk everything out from every possible angle. We years later looked back on our decision-making process, and in most cases we talked until we reached a consensus, a consensus that, to be fair, was as often the proposal Leonard had made as the one I had made. Neither one of us had a particular pride of authorship. We were most interested in getting the best possible solution. The one understanding was, if you could not reach agreement, then obviously my decision stood. That did happen a few times, but I'm happy to say very few times in all the years we worked together. So from this point of view, our working relation was excellent.

Leonard is extremely intelligent, very bright, respected both inside the institution and outside the institution. It's in that context I want to talk of some of his weaknesses. The worst one is not making decisions or postponing decisions painfully long. There are long series of incidents where those led to major campus academic issues that could have been avoided earlier. He has a second fault of which I became increasingly aware later on, namely that he was not terribly good at defending a decision if he didn't agree with it 100%. Anyone in either the presidency or a provostship occasionally has to make a decision. Sometimes it may be two alternatives that are roughly equally good, but a decision has to be made, and you almost toss a coin to decide which one. Nevertheless, you have to defend that decision.

**FANELLI:** When you say defend, you mean to the faculty…?

**KEMENY:** Publicly, to the faculty or to whomever. I would get more and more feedback that Leonard had let me down on a number of instances in this area, but although we made the decision jointly perhaps knowing that the alternative would have been just as good, he would in his usual style argue just as strongly for the alternative and give the impression that somehow he disagreed with the president on what the decision had been. That's something I tried talking out with him, but he never really changed on that subject, so I think that was the second area where I had difficulties with him. He also was not terribly good at delegating. He would delegate low-level things, but he would have a tendency of first delegating something and then going in and overruling the decision. That of course added to the time problem.
Let me mention an interesting system the faculty proposed which I accepted. The faculty wanted very much to have a voice in the choice of the dean of the faculty. They therefore set up an interesting and complicated system of having a committee of six chosen from the two faculty committees that are directly elected by the faculty—the Committee Advisory to the President, or CAP, and the Committee on Organization and Policy, the COP—that both proposed policy changes for the faculty and was the committee of committees, that is they filled the other committee slots. It's an interesting system, but the CAP picked three members of the COP, and the COP picked three members of the CAP. It worked quite well. We went through that process twice during that period that it maybe came early enough—I guess perhaps even three times, because it may have been created when I was working my way through the provost, dean of the faculty.

FANELLI: And the purpose of this was?

KEMENY: The purpose was for the committee to interview candidates or come up with names of their own, and it was understood that the president has to have a free hand in choosing a senior academic officer, but to put input. Input was to be strictly confidential. It was not a purely temporary committee. It served to advise the presidents in confidence.

FANELLI: John, would this have been the same group that would later periodically evaluate that person?

KEMENY: Yes. The purpose was when a new dean was to be chosen, they would be a choosing committee, every four years. We work on a four-year cycle of appointments for senior officers. Every four years when a question of reappointment came up, it would be understood that the president would not reappoint the person without evaluation. I think the first time when I was working through this they advised me to choose Leonard as dean of the faculty, and in effect that led me to continue the dual role.

The second time they evaluated it they gave him high marks in some areas but very clearly outlined the major shortcomings that I had mentioned. By that time it was bothering the faculty a great deal. Let's say that happened in '72, then in '76. I'm at most off by one year on that. That led me to have a long talk with Leonard on the subject, which I'm afraid didn't do much good. By '80 I guess it was when another four-year period was up, they strongly advised me that Leonard had been in as dean of the faculty too long. They advised me to choose a new dean, but they were chicken also in just saying Leonard ought to go back to teaching, and therefore they recommended, which was none of their business, that he should be allowed to continue as provost. That made the disentanglement just that much more complicated.
FANELLI: That was in a confidential report to you.

KEMENY: Yes, but certainly Leonard... I mean, I couldn't not share it with Leonard. They came up with a very good slate of candidates, of whom I chose Hans Penner to be the next dean of the faculty. I did allow Leonard to continue but only one year into the presidency of the next president.

Those were the complications of the choosing process. The same committee is still in existence and I believe advised Dave McLaughlin in his choice that led to his choosing an extremely able mathematician, who happens to be black, to become dean of the faculty of Dartmouth College [C. Dwight Lahr].

FANELLI: The next two names I had were John Hennessey and Dick West.

KEMENY: I think we really have talked... While we were talking about Tuck School, I had a chance to comment on both of them.

FANELLI: Also Carl Chapman and Jim Strickler. I think you probably have covered Carl Chapman earlier.

KEMENY: Yes. Just to sum up before I turn to Jim Strickler, Carl Chapman was a truly outstanding dean of the medical school, who really laid down the basis for what will I hope be a very strong four-year medical school at Dartmouth College. But also, as he himself said, in the process he made so many enemies that he felt it best to step down and let somebody new take over.

With all those changes, it was clear that we should make an internal choice of dean. First of all, someone from the outside could have come in and tried to change everything we were working for. Besides, who would take a chance on a four-year medical school that had not yet established any reputation and that was in horrible financial troubles? With the help of a good search committee, we chose the then associate dean of the medical school, Jim Strickler, who did a remarkable job under absolutely impossible circumstances.

FANELLI: Yes. I think I'm right in remembering your relationship with Carl Chapman was always a very good one?

KEMENY: Yes. That's the interesting one. I believe, and only from hints Carl gave me, that my relations with him were much better than his had been with John Dickey. I think it may have been as simple as John Dickey having no particular interest in the medical school, and by necessity I had to acquire one. Besides, Carl is a very scientifically inclined medical person, so somehow we had better rapport and somewhat more similar style. I hope I'm not quite as abrasive as Carl, but I think I share many personal properties with him. We got along extremely well, to the
point where although I only see him perhaps once every two or three years, a personal friendship has continued since then. So my relations were excellent.

Of course, my relations with Jim Strickler would be superb. Jim has a very easy-going style, a management style the opposite of Carl Chapman's in a way. I think the ideal dean would be some sort of fifty-fifty mixture of Carl Chapman and Jim Strickler. Jim's one weakness probably was that he occasionally was lacking in toughness when a dean has to be tough. But he was an excellent diplomat, very highly liked, and really saw the medical school through tremendously difficult circumstances.

FANELLI: He must have had a good deal of respect from his colleagues in the medical school, too.

KEMENY: Yes. They were extremely supportive of him. Incidentally, talking about non-Dartmouth alumni, Jim happens to be an alumnus both of Dartmouth and of the old two-year medical school. He got his M.D. from Cornell.

End of Tape 16, Side B
Beginning of Tape 17, Side A

FANELLI: The next names I have are Carl Long, Myron Tribus, and David Ragone.

KEMENY: And I guess we covered those when we talked about Thayer School.

FANELLI: Incidentally, I was doing some research this morning on a fraternity question, and I noticed on the same page that in September of 1969, which was before you became president of course, John Dickey told the board that it now seemed certain Myron Tribus would not be returning to Thayer School and that a search for a new dean had already begun. So that settled that question that we had.

KEMENY: Yes. Right. I did say that I thought it had actually started just before I became president.

FANELLI: The next name I had was Frank Smallwood.

KEMENY: Frank Smallwood would once remark that he has held the largest number of acting positions in the history of Dartmouth College. The reason for that is that there is probably no faculty member I both like and respect more than Frank Smallwood. In several times when there was a difficult slot, I turned to Frank and he was kind enough to help me out, partly out of personal friendship, partly out of his enormous devotion to Dartmouth College. He is a Dartmouth alumnus, used to be assistant to John Dickey, and became professor of government and also one of the truly outstanding teachers at Dartmouth College. Once when Leonard had a
sabbatical, Frank was the acting dean. He would be acting vice president for student affairs. I had him in at least one other acting role; I can't quickly think of which one.

More broadly than that, I should say that any number of times I turned to Frank for help when I needed help with the faculty. He was a good faculty diplomat, and if I needed advice I would very often turn to Frank. As a matter of fact, I'd like to say for the record that when finally I had a free choice of dean of the faculty, the person I first offered the job to was Frank Smallwood. Frank absolutely turned me down. It was of course an awkward time. He would still for two years have to report to Leonard Rieser, although I assured him that that was temporary. He did not know who the new president would be. Also, professionally it came at a bad time in his career, so he turned it down. I mention this only to say that I did in '80 offer the job of dean of the faculty to Frank Smallwood.

FANELLI: He must have been a very special person. I imagine though that Frank, in the circumstances, liked administrative work. He was a person who was also a great teacher.

KEMENY: He was a great teacher, so he had sort of an ambivalent relation. I think deep down Frank liked administrative work very much, though he would miss his teaching, and of course administration has a great deal of frustration.

[Tape off, then resumes]

KEMENY: So Frank would always have an ambivalent feeling about administration. Nobody would complain more loudly—Frank is able to do that—than Frank, but he would do a superb job with it and I think enjoy it very much.

FANELLI: I've got Bill Davis down here, and of course you've referred to him several times.

KEMENY: Yes.

FANELLI: Would you like to say something…?

KEMENY: That had to do with a complicated unraveling of the John Meck situation. I now forget, how much have I talked about John Meck? It was way at the beginning.

FANELLI: You did tell quite a bit about John.

KEMENY: Quite a bit. Therefore, to recount—I'll do that just very briefly—I guess I should put Paul Young ['43] and Bill Davis into context here.
As I'm sure I said at the beginning, John Meck is someone I liked enormously personally, but he ended up holding so many different positions that no one person could possibly hold all of those jobs, and he was the worst delegator in the whole world. Therefore, it became crucial to cut the job up. As a matter of fact, several trustees talked to me privately about that. They had realized this problem and thought that the new president would have an opportunity to do something about this. On the other hand, there was no person who fought harder to keep all the power he could.

So in that context, trying to unravel it, I first tried to have John remain the chief legal officer and the chief investment officer but take the financial and business matters away from that area. I decided even those areas were too big for one man to handle. More importantly, I felt that it took two different kinds of people, one with a business background for business matters and I'm sure you've got Rod Morgan somewhere on the list, so we'll talk about that later.

The other area was the strictly financial area, and the natural choice there was the very long time associate treasurer, Paul Young. First Paul Young was named treasurer, and that is to me a terribly sad story. I like Paul Young very much. No one loves Dartmouth more than Paul Young. He had been a superb associate treasurer, but I have to say his biggest problem was that he had served as associate treasurer under John Meck for too many years and therefore had gotten into the habit of having to run to John Meck for all serious decisions. He could never quite get out of that style, so it became clear in a couple of years that that just wasn't going to work out.

Here is one of many areas where John Hennessey came to the rescue. I think he was aware of the problems. He was on the board of the Dartmouth Savings Bank at the time. They desperately needed somebody very able to take over the presidency of that bank, and he said that he could certainly get Paul Young elected there and was he reading it right that I would not be unhappy if that happened. I said, "No, I would be absolutely delighted." So it was a great relief that Paul Young could take that job. He did well there, and then he retired. It was a job much more in the style that he could handle. Frankly, a vastly less complex job than that of treasurer of Dartmouth College, and I'm sure a much better paid job at the same time.

Then the question was where to choose a treasurer from, and I made an unusual choice. Bill Davis was and is professor of physics at Dartmouth College, though he hasn't taught in many years. Leonard Rieser brought him in as associate provost and turned over a number of different areas to him, including in effect all sorts of budget things having to do with the provost's office. I gathered that Bill had gotten to like administration very much. Any physical scientist would not have a problem dealing with numbers. I approached Bill with the unorthodox idea
of his becoming treasurer. It turns out, as Bill says, it may have been in his blood because his father had been treasurer of Oberlin. As a matter of fact, I've heard from others, the famous treasurer for a very long period of time. So Bill Davis stepped into the job and carried it out with quite considerable enthusiasm.

The question is how to evaluate Bill Davis, and one had to do that in two parts: Bill Davis when he was healthy and Bill Davis when he was not healthy. When Bill Davis was healthy, which fortunately was for most of the remaining part of my presidency, he was superb at straightening out a terribly messy situation. He brought order to that. I had complete confidence in him. I was sure that he would carry out both my dictates and of course those of the board of trustees. He would run an extremely efficient system.

His great weakness was as an administrator of people. He did not have the toughness to tell people clearly enough when they weren't doing a good enough job, and he had terrible trouble firing second-rate people. I mean, any administrator finds it easy to fire third-rate people, and with first-rate people you don't have that problem. The real problem is when you've got someone who is not really terrible but not living up to the job, and if that person in addition to that has been in the same job for a very long time, you ought to get rid of them. In a couple of very keen senses, Bill just could not bring himself to do that. I think some of the negative review that the board gave him stemmed out of the fact that he did not get rid of and replace weak people who were working for him. Still, as I bragged in earlier discussions that no comparable school that I know of did as well in predicting how we would come out at the end of a given year. The fact that we had superb long-range financial planning tools and that the whole financial side of the institution ran very smoothly is to Bill Davis's credit.

I said I have to make some remarks about Bill when he is ill. He would develop a quite serious heart problem which would lead to a fairly early triple bypass operation. But before that operation, Bill's conditions were affecting him. His energy level was very low, and quite frankly he was frightened for his life, which is perfectly understandable. In my opinion, although the operation was successful, he never totally recovered from it, and therefore in the later years he simply was not the same Bill Davis as in the earlier years. That's the only way I could tell it. That operation happened very late in my presidency, and I had to tell my successor quite frankly that this is an area where he ought to consider making some sort of change. I know Dave McLaughlin has worked his way out of that problem. That's a different kind of very difficult problem where a truly first-rate person, because of health reasons, is no longer able to function.

Incidentally, let me contrast the Don Kreider and Frank Smallwood situation with the Leonard Rieser and Bill Davis situations from a different point of view. This has to do with the ability to return to another job. There are problems in getting
rid of people who work very long for an institution unless there's a clear alternative for them. Don Kreider insisted on teaching, and of course Frank Smallwood was never away from teaching more than one year. If I may add myself to the list, I never stopped teaching. Therefore, we had a clear alternative career path and did not create a problem for the board or for the president in what to do with someone who had served the institution loyally for so many years and there was nothing obvious for him to do but he was too early to retire fully. Leonard Rieser and Bill Davis both, after a certain number of years, gave up trying to teach. They had gotten too far away from their field. Therefore, although they still had tenure appointments, both of them as professors of physics, they couldn't realistically return to a full-time teaching research position, and therefore that led to considerable complications. It would be solved by my successor, in Bill Davis's case I believe by some sort of early retirement scheme, and in Leonard Rieser's case, some sort of frankly purely non-existent position with a reasonable title was created to see Leonard through till retirement.

FANELLI: John, I had written down Dick Olmsted [Richard "Dick" Olmsted '32] for some reason, but I don't know that he was still…

KEMENY: Oh, yes. I overlapped with Dick Olmsted. Dick Olmsted was in charge of all facilities.

FANELLI: A very important position.

KEMENY: Very important position, particularly early in the presidency because I inherited a commitment to a huge number of buildings. Dick always did his job superbly, but it was one of many areas where I felt it really should not be run out of the president's office. This would lead into one of several reasons why I created a vice president for administration position. I just don't think that the president has got the time, or unless he has a particular interest in building things, which I didn't, would have the expertise to supervise directly the person who was in charge of huge construction projects.

FANELLI: I'm trying to think of what Dick's title was. Was he the business manager of the college?

KEMENY: Let's see. I'm trying to think also. He may very well have been business manager of the college. I think you're right. Because he also in effect however was in charge of all construction. He spent a great deal of his time worrying about new buildings, because he happened to have personally both background… I think he had an engineering background.

FANELLI: Yes, he did.
And was superb in this area. So it's not that a business manager would naturally carry that, but a business manager with that background, he also played the role of being senior person in charge of new constructions. So after his normal retirement, what we did was, we split those two jobs in a way. Jack Skewes [John G. “Jack” Skewes ’51 TU ‘56] succeeded him as business manager of the college and had reporting to him the person who was number two under Dick Olmsted for construction, namely Gordie DeWitt [Gordon V. “Gordie” DeWitt ‘60]. In a way, there were no more positions there, and it's just that since we had a business manager who didn't have special expertise for new buildings, he delegated that to one of his senior associates.

That's perhaps a natural lead-in to my worrying about areas. Let me describe the areas I consider as the business parts of the college. One tends to overlook, as I think I mentioned before, that whatever else Dartmouth College is, it's a large and very complicated business. By the time I would finish the presidency, it was a $100 million a year gross business, which is pretty big business.

This involves, first of all, the business affairs of the college in the narrow sense, things like dormitories, dining halls, purchasing for the entire institution, maintaining the buildings and the grounds, minor and major repairs, building new buildings. All of that is pretty much business stuff rather than educational affairs. We're also involved, as I mentioned before, in a bewildering array of outside businesses: owning a hotel, a golf course, a ski resort, parts of the waterworks, and who knows what else. Therefore, there are huge activities which you would think of as, for lack of a better word, they're business activities. I felt that this did not naturally belong under the treasurer, although John Meck had combined all of this.

On occasion, there are conflicts of interest here that I was worried about, because one of the main jobs of the treasurer, the treasurer runs the controller's office, and the controller's office is the financial watchdog over all other parts of the institution. Enormous sums of money are spent, whether it's on buildings and grounds or on construction of new buildings, and it shouldn't be the same person who is both spending it and being the watchdog over it, a distinction with which the board incidentally agreed. I decided to create a new vice presidency, and for lack of a better title, it was vice president for administration. It really meant vice president for the business affairs of the college. Cresap, McCormick & Paget helped me conduct an outside search, and I managed to recruit an alumnus of Dartmouth College who had had 25 years business experience, namely Rod Morgan. Rod oversaw all of these areas.

I just remembered this chart that you had here which showed that that was one of the new… You were trying to show the difference between '69 and '75. Then some of these would disappear.
KEMENY: Then some of those would disappear, yes. Perhaps it would be interesting to do the comparison.

FANELLI: This was from your five-year report.

KEMENY: From my five-year report, so let me update it as it would be slightly later. President is still one president. In place of provost and dean of the faculty, I would end up with Leonard, who would have either provost and dean of the faculty or vice president and dean of the faculty title and had a parallel position created in the student affairs area, which would first be vice presidential title and later would be dean of the college title but with a much expanded responsibility. The three professional schools would still have just one dean. So, so far it's a one-to-one exchange. There's been no increase at all. The vice president and treasurer position would be replaced by a treasurer and the vice president for administration, which we just spoke of. So here there is a major splitting of the jobs. That is where there is an increase of one. Then vice president for development is still there. The two extra positions, one was a vice president for women's affairs. Ruth Adams was a five-year temporary appointment, three years full-time, two years part-time, so that was a transitional thing for coeducation. John Meck was allowed to continue the title so we could keep a vice presidential title. While he was in charge of investments and legal affairs he kept that title. Later on when Paul Paganucci came in, I was trying to get rid of one vice presidential title, but the board insisted that Pag should have a vice presidential title. Therefore, the net increase, not counting the temporary position that Ruth Adams held, really occurred in the John Meck area where John Meck got replaced by three people—Rod Morgan for administration, Bill Davis as treasurer, and Paul Paganucci for investments and legal affairs. So it's that one huge area splitting into three where the real increase came.

The reason I mention that is because, as I said earlier, I did make the mistake… I tried to make the titles uniform, namely vice president, and therefore had high visibility and people had the impression that I had doubled the number of senior officers, which is simply not true. As we count through here, the net increase was two, coming from one impossible job being split into three.

FANELLI: I think Seaver Peters you talked about.

KEMENY: Let's see. I haven't really talked much about Rod Morgan. I should go back to that. I have introduced how he came and what he came for. Now I would like to speak awhile about Rod Morgan because of all my senior officers, the one many board members did not like and had a low opinion for was Rod Morgan, and he would not be kept after my presidency. I think this had entirely to do with one very visible fault that Rod Morgan had, namely he was terrible in making
presentations in public meetings and was a lousy public speaker. That's a handicap in any administrator. In my opinion, he was truly outstanding in every other area, and I had to keep repeating that to the board of trustees. As a matter of fact, I may say so since he stepped down, there are some areas he overlooked that are not running nearly as well as they used to before he was there because I think his presence is missed. I don't want to get into that.

FANELLI: You mentioned one of the things earlier, the Hanover Inn situation.

KEMENY: The Hanover Inn situation was one. The fact that the parking problem is still not solved. And I think in general, relations to the town, if rumor has it right. I picked Rod Morgan… This could have been the role of any of the vice presidents, but I asked Rod Morgan in addition to other business affairs to be my liaison with the town because I just felt he had the right temperament. For example, he joined the Hanover Rotary Club and was a regular attendee to that, which may sound unimportant but actually it's a very important public relations thing.

I am happy to report that during my presidency I did not once have a serious problem with the town, and I think Rod Morgan had an enormous amount to do with that. I hope I had something to do with it, too. I gave strict instructions that the town should be kept totally informed of things and we wouldn't pull any surprises on them, and under no circumstances would we threaten the town with something. So I think we had perhaps one of the best periods of town-gown relations, which are always hard in any community where the academic institution is a major portion of the town. For example, Yale's relation to New Haven just deteriorated to the almost impossible stage. So Rod played a very important role there.

He was a soft-spoken manager who had the ability of recruiting very good people and of delegating to them. Unlike Bill Davis he would call them in and tell them very softly and gently where they needed improvement. He instituted a whole review procedure for administrators which we tried to use throughout the institution. He was most conscientious about it. I think he was well liked and well respected by the people who reported to him. I give him very high grades for the fact that I just had no problems with the business affairs of the college.

One notable example of this was the search for a new manager of the Hanover Inn, and Rod worked extremely close with the Inn in bringing about what may turn out to be the golden years of the Hanover Inn. I think Rod never got as much credit because of his lack of public visibility. He did not seek publicity. He did his job quietly and, as I said, would make a terrible impression to the board where he only had fifteen minutes to present something. Rod couldn't present anything in fifteen minutes. I admit that's a fault, but some board members were very
impatient and wouldn't really give him a chance to show them what a good job he was doing and would not take into account that the problem was not with what he was doing but with how he was able to present it publicly.

FANELLI: Primarily a question of form and substance there.

KEMENY: It's a question of form and substance. Let me contrast it with John Meck's style. I mean, John Meck was a superb public speaker and would be enormously impressive, almost overpowering, in a board meeting. Yet he could be making horrendous mistakes all over the place and get away with it.

FANELLI: I had mentioned Seaver Peters. You talked about him earlier.

KEMENY: I think we talked about him in connection with athletics. Again, in my opinion, he was a superb director of athletics, with the one weakness that he wouldn't take no as an answer even if it came from the board of trustees, and would on occasion attempt to go behind the back of the president and board of trustees. Aside from that, I give him the very highest marks for what he did with Dartmouth athletics. I have to give him special praise for the fact that he was certainly one of the officers not in favor of coeducation, but I think Dartmouth College's record in making a transition to coeducational athletics is truly outstanding.

FANELLI: Yes, once the decision was made.

KEMENY: Once the decision was made, just like Eddie Chamberlain. Have I told the Eddie Chamberlain story?

FANELLI: Not yet, but we're kind of getting into that.

KEMENY: Okay. It'll be a similar story with Eddie, he did a superb job on it. It would take… Occasionally, one had to sit on him to make clear that there were discriminations in title handling, but basically he did a superb job to build up women's athletics and recruited truly first-rate women coaches and later a woman who is now associate director of athletics at Dartmouth.

FANELLI: George Colton and Ad Winship, and I should remind you that you wanted to comment on how Ad was chosen.

KEMENY: Yes. Thank you. When I became president, the position that had the title just vice president because people didn't quite want to admit what he was vice president of… It's really vice president for development and alumni affairs. I don't know why you're not supposed to admit that his main job is raising money. At any rate, the traditional title was there just vice president, a vice president with two areas that at Dartmouth intentionally kept separate under him, which makes
the job interesting and complicated. There is alumni affairs, and many presidents have commented that no college has better alumni affairs than Dartmouth, and I believe that to be true. Of course, Mike McGea[n] deserves a great deal of credit for that.

The other area, which is an area that would grow enormously as our fundraising capabilities increased and we ran a capital fund drive was development, which is a word for fundraising. The two are kept separately because part of the success of Dartmouth in alumni relations is that most of what we do for alumni has nothing to do with fundraising. For example, Mike McGea[n], as secretary of the college, a traditional title meaning in charge of alumni relations, would have no role in direct fundraising whatsoever. His job, on the contrary, was in a way to protect the fundraising arm of the same building from interfering too heavily with alumni relations so that the alumni would never feel that the only reason Dartmouth was cultivating them was money. But they know perfectly well that one of the reasons we cultivate them is money, so you have a development office. If there was a weakness of the development office under George Colton, and there was, it was that it concentrated almost exclusively on alumni. As a matter of fact, not just on alumni, but…

End of Tape 17, Side A
Beginning of Tape 17, Side B

KEMENY: It's not just that they concentrated on alumni, but the overwhelming priority was on the alumni fund, the annual giving program of Dartmouth College. While that is vital, as I've said before, to the college, it is no substitute for occasional raising of very major gifts. As I said, that was George's weakness. There were few officers with whom my personal relations were better. I thought very highly of him, but he had this one very major weakness.

I should mention incidentally that in my opinion the Third Century Fund drive was not a successful one.

FANELLI: Your part of it was.

KEMENY: Well, it achieved its goal, but there were several things wrong with it. First of all, the target really was too modest, and there was some funny counting in it. As I said earlier, they made the great mistake of raising a great deal of money for buildings and no money to endow the operations or simply maintenance of those buildings, and therefore much of the endowment that was raised went into that area. So it was a campaign whose result was almost exclusively buildings. Also, every single building that was planned for that campaign was way under-priced, as I became painfully aware as I had the commitment to build those buildings, usually with plans already in place. I think all of the Third Century Fund drive
money, one way or the other, went into building those buildings. Now that includes several buildings that are terribly important to Dartmouth College today, so I don't mean to criticize that, but it really was a campaign for buildings that hadn't been terribly well thought out and took an enormous final push even to make it on paper. I don't know if we ever made it really. When the time came to plan the next campaign, emotionally I think George Colton didn't want to face up to one more campaign, nor was his heart in it. It was a friendly mutual agreement that that was the right time for him to step down and someone to take over from him.

Here is where one of my very bad experiences with the board of trustees occurred. It had to be mid-'70s, so it's also the time—yes, it had to be—it's either '74—by '75 I think Ad Winship is on board, so let me guess roughly '74. Remember that's also the period when I'm having troubles with the chairman of the board of trustees, which may have contributed to this. Somehow the board decided, without saying it in so many words, that they didn't trust me to pick this particular person, and therefore the board set up its own committee to select the next vice president. It was to be understood that it was going to be a presidential appointment, et cetera, but this whole business had not yet been straightened out.

They chose a committee with some very able people on it. If my memory is right, Charlie Zimmerman, who was then chairman of the board, chaired it, and Sandy McCulloch was on it, and I forgot who the third person was on the committee. It was a committee that was in effect stacked. There always is in a case like this an internal candidate who is the obvious internal candidate, namely the number two person in the operation. Look, it either had to be Mike McGeany, who was… Remember, the vice president has under him two large areas, alumni affairs and development. Mike McGeany was the senior person for alumni affairs and Ad Winship for development. Since Mike McGeany had absolutely no interest in fundraising, he did not even wish to be a candidate for the combined job. So that's the sense in which there was only one internal candidate. Although the committee went through what I consider a token national search, they unanimously recommended that Ad Winship should be given the job.

By that time, there was a personnel committee of the board of trustees, and three of us on the personnel committee were extremely upset about the nature of this search. The names are interesting. I of course was one of them. One was Ralph Lazarus, the senior trustee, and the third one was a gentleman by the name of David McLaughlin. We were mad enough that the three of us went to meet with the search committee to try to persuade them to conduct a serious search, but they were absolutely unshakable to the point where the other two trustees decided that without turning this into an incredible blowup in the board, they would reluctantly go along with the recommendations.
The problem here was a clear-cut one. It's not that Ad Winship was bad, but it was just not clear that he was good enough. Later, history will prove out both halves of that statement, that Ad was in many ways first-rate and in other ways second-rate, and some areas he just had no understanding of at all. Although he worked his heart out and in terms of diligence and enthusiasm, in spite of a major illness, I just have to give him the very highest marks, one always wonders what that campaign would have been like if one could have chosen somebody who overall had better qualifications.

I wanted to mention the incident of the search because it's the only case where the board took the search away from me, and I wanted to point out that boards are not very good at this. They never really conducted a true national search and just came up with the obvious candidate, when in the opinion of at least three of us they could have done better.

FANELLI: John, do you think that was in part because they felt so strongly about the thing that you've mentioned before, that this was a person who should be an alumnus of the college?

KEMENY: Yes. At that time I would have had no objection if it had been a search criterion that the person had to be an alumnus. I would have accepted that. That still did not limit it. Certainly there are very distinguished alumni out there, some of whom were brought in in other positions during the campaign. It's not that I had some other one person in mind. What I'm complaining about is I never got to see the choice was. I don't know what the alternative might have been. If even they had just canvassed alumni who might have had special interests or abilities in this area.

FANELLI: It's my recollection that at the time… You may have done it in an executive session of the board of trustees, but it's my recollection that at the time the search committee came in with that recommendation that you expressed your negative feeling about it and your feeling to open up the national search again and try to get a different person.

KEMENY: I certainly did have some support in it but just not enough. That was before the board voted the rules that no one would be appointed unless nominated by the president, so that in a way I think contributed to some of the later reform of the procedures.

Let's see. What should I say then about Ad Winship later on? I think possibly my personal relations were least good with Ad Winship amongst the senior officers I had to work with. Simply, we're very different kind of people, and this is why I went out of my way to say that my personal relations with his predecessor, George Colton, were superb. Secondly, I never could quite forget the fact that
when I was going for my first speech, that speech to the Boston alumni club that I mentioned, speaking there as president-elect, Ad Winship was our driver and spent most of the trip lobbying violently against coeducation. It's not that I couldn't work with a person who had been that violently opposed to coeducation, but I was greatly worried to what extent that would influence him as to whether he could sell the college of the mid-'70s as enthusiastically as he sold the college pre-coeducation. Indeed, I don't think he could have if we hadn't brought in some help there.

FANELLI: You've already mentioned Lu Sterling and her role in the campaign.

KEMENY: I think bringing her in in a very senior position, as I mentioned before, made the difference between success and failure of that campaign.

Ad also shared the prejudices that came before that only alumni would give to the college and still tended to think in terms of large participation. When we wrote down what possible gifts we could get, he couldn't conceive of anyone giving more than say $2 million to Dartmouth College because his whole thinking was in terms of the alumni fund. Of course, the actual results even exceeded what I had ever hoped for with the $5 million and the $10 million gifts and several gifts at the $2 million and higher level. What worried me is, if we had someone in charge of the whole affair who wouldn't even ask for something bigger than that, then we were certainly not going to get anything bigger. That's why one of the areas where I had to insist on his taking on someone to help, and I and the board almost forced him to hire Lu Sterling, now Lu Martin, in the major gifts area. She filled an enormously important void there.

The other one was… Ad himself recruited the person, but as I looked down the whole thing, they were overlooking non-alumni gifts, most importantly gifts by non-alumni who had had children go through Dartmouth College, an area that had been an important source of income to other major institutions but almost none to us, and therefore a separate parents’ fund office was formed, which started out very slowly but by the end of the campaign had done spectacularly and is providing continuing support from very well-to-do parents.

Ad just argued… Each of these changes, and several others that would become very important, led to enormously long arguments where on some occasions I would just have to put my foot down and say, "Look, Ad, we have talked it all out. You'll just have to do it this way." Anything that wasn't the way it was done in the '60s, Ad fought. But once it was in place, he worked with it, and as I said, he had enormous enthusiasm. He worked incredibly hard; he was out on the road endlessly; he is a good public speaker; certainly was extremely effective with alumni at all levels; ran a tight shop. I mean, in terms of an administrator in the narrow sense he was first-rate.
I think it was an acceptable solution, but as I would talk later on with some key members of the personnel committee near the end of my administration, we all wondered whether the campaign might have been more successful, and in particular, whether we could have gotten it with much less tearing of hair if we didn't have to fight Ad Winship on a great many key issues throughout the campaign.

FANELLI: Now I've got Eddie Chamberlain and Al Quirk [Alfred T. “Al” Quirk ’49].

KEMENY: I didn't overlap with Al Quirk long enough to speak on the subject other than saying that there was a case where we conducted a broad search, but we concluded that the number two person in the office was the right successor.

Eddie Chamberlain. Eddie is, in my opinion, one of the most fascinating people Dartmouth College ever hired. I hope someday one writes a book on Eddie Chamberlain.

FANELLI: He spent much of his life at Dartmouth College.

KEMENY: He spent much of his life… He was an undergraduate at Dartmouth, he was a football player of apparently high ability, and I think his first job after graduation was as an assistant football coach under Red Blaik [Earl Henry “Red” Blaik], I think. At least he knew Red Blaik very well. He would come into the admissions office, become director of admissions, I don't remember after how many years, and would serve as director of admissions for I believe exactly twenty-five years, a very long time to hold that position.

He was one of the most colorful people I ever worked with, and I liked him enormously. Not that we didn't fight. Eddie loved to fight. But there was no officer with whom you had less trouble knowing exactly where you stood. I much preferred that. I've already mentioned I couldn't live with the Carroll Brewster thing. Even with John Meck sometimes I had a feeling that I was not hearing the whole story and occasionally I had evidence that I hadn't heard the full story. Nothing of the sort ever happened with Eddie.

It's also very important to understand with Eddie that he had been a captain in the Navy somewhere in between. I assume this was World War II and perhaps the reserve afterwards. As such, he both exercised authority like a captain in the Navy but also knew how to take orders.

It was very different from the Seaver Peters situation here in that the fights were much more vocal, and Eddie would express himself in very colorful language as to what he thought. But if I overruled him, he never came back and reargued the
issue. An order was an order. And he had no doubts at all about that the president could give him orders.

FANELLI: Or never went around the end.

KEMENY: Never went around the end. There was no such thing. The only time he would express any... I forget what the issue was where I myself had some serious doubts on some admissions questions and I encouraged him in a presentation before the board to express those worries because I wanted board guidance. That was the only occasion on which he did that and I made it very clear to the board that this was not just with my permission but at my request.

What I was going to say is, the day after the board voted in favor of coeducation, or the week after, Eddie asked to see me. He came in, and he said that it was no secret that he was one of the people violently opposed to coeducation. Violently and vocally opposed to coeducation at Dartmouth College. He wanted to assure me, however, and he did remind me of his background as a Navy captain, that he knew how to take orders and his next purpose in life was to run the best coeducational admissions office that Dartmouth College could ever have. And he fully lived up to that promise.

I had some very colorful fights. The biggest problems came between him and Seaver Peters over the whole issue of athletic recruiting and who got admitted. Eddie of course wouldn't give in very quickly to Seaver Peters because Eddie had been an outstanding athlete and a football coach himself. He just very firmly believed in the Ivy philosophy in athletics and wouldn't compromise on that a bit. Some of those fights would be just horrible.

I'll never forget late in my administration, by the time Ralph Manuel plays a major supervisory role, because I had to have a peace conference, which lasted some two hours with Ralph and myself trying to negotiate a peace between Eddie Chamberlain and Seaver Peters, where relations between them had become impossible. We did the usual things, making them talk things out, help negotiate settlements, and where they couldn't agree on something, simply impose a settlement. As they left the office—unfortunately they left together—as they left the office, Ralph and I said, "Boy, that was difficult, but I think we finally achieved peace." They had apparently stopped in that big hallway in Parkhurst Hall outside because within two minutes we heard them yelling at each other at the tops of their voices, which told Ralph Manuel and me how successful we were in achieving peace. Well, we had achieved... They both lived up to what we laid down as an agreement, but as far as making things better between them personally, it was a total disaster. No one will forget working with Eddie Chamberlain.
I should recount his stepping down which was messy and I want to emphasize through no fault of his own. At that time, 65 was the mandatory retirement age. Eddie was not reluctant to step down at all and he strongly recommended his number two but understood a search would have to go on. We went through normal procedures. We selected Al Quirk as his successor. Eddie was very happy with the choice and had every intention of stepping down at which point Congress changed the retirement age and forced institutions that they had to keep people on till age 70 if they wished to.

Now, there was a special factor here, namely that Eddie had remarried reasonably late in life a younger lady who would become and is now a secretary to the president and very able in that position. But in effect he had a second family with children still in school and about to enter college and the retirement pay he had accumulated was nowhere nearly enough, even with what his wife earned, to be able to put several children through college.

So he came to me and said—and I think he was quite embarrassed at the time since he had definitely resigned—that he's got to invoke that law and explained the financial circumstances. I asked him did that mean he wanted to go back to being director of admissions and he said that that would be all wrong. His successor had been chosen, he had been there 25 years, and he felt it was time that the younger people who had worked so long and so loyally, they had a chance themselves at leadership position, so no. I was glad to hear that but that created a horrible problem. There just was no position for Eddie Chamberlain at that point in Dartmouth College, so I for several years had sort of to keep inventing positions that Eddie could fill. So that was a somewhat sad ending to a spectacular and good career. Again let me emphasize, I never really blamed Eddie for this. He did everything, as he always does, above the board and in good faith, and he did need that money to put his second family through college.

FANELLI: John, I know that you've spoken about Margaret Bonz earlier in connection with affirmative action. She later became dean of freshmen and is now dean of freshmen. Did you want to say anything about her in that role?

KEMENY: Yes. Of course, I didn't really overlap with her as dean of freshmen. Margaret was one of the miraculous finds, and again it was Errol Hill who had recruited her. She's an excellent example of where an honestly conducted national search—and of course if there's one office that would be very careful about a national search, it would be the affirmative action office—an honestly conducted national search turns up a person you would otherwise never have found. She had had no Dartmouth connection. She was just finishing a Ph.D. in psychology, though with a number of years work experience. She had raised a family in between. She's just a true first-rate professional, and it shows how narrow the typical pre-affirmative action searches were, where they almost always went to the insider, or
if they went outside, they almost always went to an alumnus. We had to break
that when we went coed because we didn't have any coed alumni at all at the time,
and it would be a long time before our coed alumni would be old enough to fill
more senior positions. But this is a good example where someone who we would
never have heard of otherwise and had had no Dartmouth connection at all is
going to play a very major role in the administration of Dartmouth. She was
superb as affirmative action officer and superb is not too strong a word. Although
I have no first-hand way of knowing it, I'll bet you she's going to be superb as
dean of freshmen.

FANELLI: It occurred to me that before we were mentioning about form and substance with
respect to Rod Morgan. Margaret was a person who not only had substance but
could make a presentation to the board.

KEMENY: Oh, yes. She was just tremendous at presenting things to the board.

FANELLI: And she could do it in fifteen minutes.

KEMENY: And she could do it in fifteen minutes and would have pre-prepared the written
material in advance, which was totally readable and convincing. She is a good
example... She is obviously someone the board had a very high opinion of. But
again, that's the trouble. The board had to judge people with what presenta-
tions they made.

FANELLI: John, I know she doesn't appear on a table of organizations as one of your senior
administrators, but Jean Kemeny. I've got down here Jean Kemeny's role.

KEMENY: Then at some point I'd like to talk about the president's office too.

FANELLI: Okay. Jean's written about her role, but maybe you'd like to say something about
it.

KEMENY: I said in my ten-year report that when I make the statement that I could not have
done the job without Jean, I was making a simple factual statement. It was not
one of these empty phrases, but I was making a simple factual statement. That's
absolutely true and I think it's terribly important for future historians to
understand. Of course, I think anyone who reads Jean's book will be able to get at
least a great deal of what it is that Jean did in the job.

My impression is that in my generation she was the most active president's wife.
By most active, I don't mean necessarily putting in the most time, though she put
in enormous amounts of time, but active in the largest number of different roles.
She did serve as hostess in the president's house, which is a traditional role for a
president's wife, but that was only one of many roles that she played. She traveled
with me I would say on two-thirds of alumni tours and when she did she was not there as an ornament but a very active participant.

I would once say that between Jean and myself we made one very good president because she had many talents that I totally lacked. For example, presidents are supposed to have an excellent memory for names and faces. I have one of the worst. I know it's not senility because when I was twenty I had the same trouble. It may be connected with a weakness of mine. I can't visualize things at all and I'm sure that has to do with inability to recognize people. Jean will play a game with me that I may have met someone in my office for two hours and ask me to describe the person. It could be a beautiful woman, where I'm sure I looked at her face very hard, and I couldn't even vaguely—wouldn't know how to begin describing the person. So I just had terrible trouble recognizing people, or even if I recognized them, I could not pull a name out of my memory fast enough. It might come five minutes later. So at all these large receptions, Jean played the key role of recognizing people and making sure I knew who they were. More importantly, if the receptions were really large, we would even split up and I would try to talk to half the people and she to half the people, and she had to be thoroughly briefed and briefed herself, because after a while she started getting questions not about what meals she served in the president's house, but would get exactly the same kind of questions I would get: How is coeducation going? What is this current ruckus about so-and-so? She would be absolutely able to answer any question that the president could answer.

She played a terribly important… Some of the part that she gave in the home served many extra purposes. She helped set a style there. First of all, unless there was a special occasion, such as the football team for dinner, she never invited people by categories but mixed them. That became extremely popular on campus: many people who had been here for some time but never had the chance to meet would meet at our parties. It would be a mixture of senior and junior faculty, members of the administration, some key members of the staff, people from the town, and faculty from different schools all mixed together in one party.

She would also… She had an extra talent. She's the only person I personally know who could talk to an expert in almost any field, and it would turn out that Jean knew something about that field. Perhaps Don Morrison was like that, but that's the one other person I can think of. I would be totally astounded as we were sitting at dinner with some very famous person, and he starts talking or she starts talking about some area. I'm lost within two minutes, and Jean starts making intelligent conversation and quotes a book. I would ask her afterwards, "How in heaven’s name did you know anything about that highly esoteric field at all?" Of course, until she got tired later on, I swear Jean averaged reading about one book a day. She's an incredibly fast reader. She says her head is totally jammed up with trivia, but it's more than trivia. She has a terribly broad interest and broad
knowledge and she contributed through those incidents a great deal to somehow people giving me credit for things when actually it was Jean they were praising.

Above all, the single most important role she played was, she was the only person with whom I could talk over all my problems. It really came home to me in a three-way conversation we had after Ruth Adams came here. We were sitting… We had some drinks together so we started talking. I don't mean that we got drunk but just mellow enough that we talked very frankly about presidencies. Ruth made a remark that one of the hardest things for her was having to be both president and president's wife. She had nobody to go to. First of all, she would have to leave board meetings to prepare dinner for the board, which I of course never had to do. But finally she said that wasn't the hardest thing. She said, "The hardest thing was that there was no one person with whom I could talk everything over." She said, "My academic vice president came closest to that, but suppose the issue was, Has the time come to fire the academic vice president? Whom do you talk to?" Jean played that role. I think it was quite true when she said in her book that at night I would tell Jean all my troubles, and then I went to sleep like a baby and she stayed awake all night worrying about the problems.

End of Tape 17, Side B
Beginning of Tape 18, Side A

KEMENY: One more thing on Jean. She had sometimes… In the beginning she did not question her dual role at all. Later in the presidency, she would become aware of it more. Some of it came out of discussions with other Ivy presidents' wives, and I'm sure she was influenced by the fact that she would write a book and therefore start a career of her own, a career that's taken on very serious dimensions. This is the month her first novel will appear. What bothered her at Ivy presidents' meetings was the great diversity in the roles that presidents' wives played. I think somewhere, of eight Ivy presidents, four were reasonably active and four were not active. The outstanding example was Derek Bok's wife, who is a professional in her own right. I believe she has a Ph.D. in philosophy if my memory is right. She went out of her way, even to the point of not showing up at any affair where she could be mistaken for the president's wife, which I thought was going to ludicrous extremes. But there were other wives who had been professionals, for example, the wife of the president of Brown, who had been a highly successful I think commercial artist is the right description there, who had to give that all up.

She and Jean and a couple of other wives who had been active talked about the fact that it was somehow wrong that the roles they played were in no way taken into account in the presidency. Even to the point where some of them suggested that, although it might not be quite right, at least they would feel better about it if it were taken into account in their husbands' salaries, but it was obvious that that's not the way presidents' salaries were set and that boards were paying no attention
to this at all. Jean wrote about this in her book, the "Two for the Price of One" chapter. She mentioned this title because of something the wife of one of the Ivy presidents had said. Incidentally, she is not identified, but it is the wife of the president of Brown who had given up a career for this. The incident is that the senior trustee after the inauguration calls them both up with his arms around them and says, "Look, we got two for the price of one," which was a most unfortunate remark to make.

Jean, during the search, tried very hard to influence the board to take this into account, wrote a very good letter to the board of trustees, and was actually interviewed by the search committee, not as to whom to choose for president, but on her views on presidents' wives. Although she never did convince the board of trustees about the possibility of paying or otherwise recognizing presidents' wives—and Jean emphasized only if wives wished to play this role. That was her whole point, that there should be some distinction between those who played a major role and those who played little or no role. At least she had partial success, because at the meeting where the candidates were reviewed, the search committee went out of its way to report in detail on what they thought of the qualifications of the wives of each of the finalists. Therefore, at least they did take that into account in making their choice.

May I turn to the president's office for a few moments?

**FANELLI:** Sure.

**KEMENY:** Let me go back to the beginning, and I want to recount a difficult time I had with someone I like very much personally and continue to like very much, and this was Gil Tanis. I think it's a good example of something I've not talked about before. That Gil is extremely able and that no one loves Dartmouth more than Gil, or that nobody would be more loyal to a president than Gil, is obvious. Yet I had to face the fact fairly early... I should mention he was the senior assistant to John Dickey. It became very clear to me that I had to get rid of him, by which I did not mean get rid of him from Dartmouth College but from the president's office, because of the following problem. Gil just thought about matters very differently from I. He is an extremely conservative person and particularly on certain personal issues, very, very conservative and just outraged at some of the things that went on in the late '60s and early '70s. I simply disagreed with him on some of these issues. While the last thing Gil would ever want to do would be consciously disloyal to the president, there were several incidents where he couldn't help expressing his own opinions, which were at least different and possibly the opposite of what I would have expressed myself. As a result of that, it looked as if I as president were laying down those policies.

**FANELLI:** Gave the wrong signals.
KEMENY: It just gave the wrong signals. Yet I thought the world of Gil, and here I managed to come up with a happy solution. We have talked about the Dartmouth Institute before. I approached Gil with the possibility of heading up the Dartmouth Institute. He just jumped at the opportunity. He loved the idea. There were things in his background. I think he had done some of the fundraising with industry before, so he had background in dealings with industry.

FANELLI: The Third Century Fund and the capital gifts fund before.

KEMENY: Yes, before then. So he had known how to approach major corporations, and he was a strong believer in continuing education. So I came up with a very happy solution of promoting Gil out of a job where he may have been the right person for John Dickey but was just the wrong person for me. Personal assistants are very personal business. I was very lucky that John Dickey had hired a special assistant during the bicentennial celebrations, I believe if my memory is right, Alex, to coordinate the quite magnificent bicentennial celebration first, though you did a number of other things in the office. Since you and I thought very much alike on a great many issues, I think that's fair to say I was terribly lucky to be able simply to move you into Gil Tanis's position. I would have an assistant who already knew the president's office and with whom none of these problems existed. I'll come back to you when I'll talk about the division of labor.

Since the one advice I got from Johnny Toll, who was then president at Stony Brook and a very old friend of mine from graduate school, when he wrote a letter of congratulations, he said in it, "Let me give you one piece of advice. Whatever number of personal assistants you have, double it." I didn't quite do that, but I did go for awhile from two to three, which helped enormously in the transition stage. There was Gil, yourself, and Lu, of whom we've talked before, Lu Sterling Martin, who had been secretary of the search committee and then my assistant during the transition stage I brought in as a number three assistant. Later, when Gil moved over to continuing education and we were having budget crunches, we experimented for a while with having you as number one, Lu as number two, and having a young alumnus in the office. We happened to have one who was very good who had been a writer for the New York Times and worked out very well for a couple of years. By that time, the transitional problems had settled down, and I had invented the system of having student interns in office, that’s something that I'm very proud of having started. We decided that we could do with two assistants and the student intern. Later it would be… It would sometimes be one student intern and sometimes two student interns.

The person I did keep on was John Dickey's secretary, or under the new classification scheme had the title of executive secretary. So really the three key people in the office for most of my presidency were yourself, Alex, and Lu and
Ruth LaBombard. I think we had a team that worked out an incredibly good working relationship. That was one of the secrets of my success, which is really why I wanted to bring it up. I have paid public tribute to each of you in my ten-year report. What I really wanted to speak of here is the unusually good working relationship that we worked out.

First of all, we each liked each other personally. I think that made a great difference. Secondly, none of you were worried about whether somebody stepped on somebody's foot. The question was a certain job had to be done, it's normally done by A, but if A is busy B will do it. So none of the office tensions existed. There was always more work to do than all of us together could do, under which one of two things happens. Either the whole system breaks down or simply you fall so naturally into a working relationship where everybody helps everybody else. Fortunately, it was the latter situation.

Let me try to identify, insofar as one can, who did what, although again let me emphasize that everybody did everything when necessary. First of all, Alex, you had as one of your major responsibilities worrying about all trustee matters. That would range from something as routine as arranging their transportation—maybe I shouldn't call it routine; it would have been routine if it had been anyone but the board of trustees. I remember you making a crack once. I asked if you had the travel plans of the board, and you made some remark, "I have it as of today, but it will change tomorrow and it will change day after tomorrow and then they will arrive differently from what they told us." You had a full-time secretary, one of whose major jobs was to help you keep track of all trustee matters. But it's not just the routine matters of trustee travel and care and feeding and keeping trustees informed but of the legally terribly important role of being a recorder for the board of trustees. One of the trustees is officially secretary of the board, who has to sign the minutes, but you took the minutes, and out of the voluminous notes you took in longhand you had to extract a reasonable length set of minutes for the board.

That was one of your most important responsibilities, though only you can say if that was more or less time-consuming than drafting letters. Certainly that was another huge job. Here I wanted to say that, while I always wrote my own speeches, there just wasn’t time… There's no way of answering the huge volume of mail in the president's office. We came up with a very good system by which routine things you would simply draft. I would look through a whole bunch of drafts you made, and most of them went out simply with my signature with no change. Once in a while I would change a couple of words here and there. Usually, when you had gotten so mad—and everybody gets mad in that job—I would say, "Okay, let's tear this one up. I'll dictate this one." I did dictate a certain number of letters myself, and in other cases where there was a huge issue, I would write one letter and then you would use that as a basis for individualized
letters so people did not get form letters. I want to say that as the years went on… You write much better than I do, so therefore you did something very difficult, Alex, of which I was conscious. You managed to imitate my style when you drafted letters for me, which I'm sure wasn't easy for you when you could have expressed the same ideas more eloquently. I have a very simple style in my writing, lacking in eloquence, and your letters sounded like me as the years went on, which I very much appreciated.

As everybody carried everything, you carried other responsibilities, for example, with the Council on Honorary Degrees that made recommendations for honorary degree candidates. I sat in for one year of that and it was very time-consuming—I did that because I just had never served on that and I didn't know how it worked. After that you took over as so-called secretary, which really meant you ran that council and had to brief them each year on the procedure and bring all the materials to the board. I'm sure you had a whole list of assignments like that, of which that's an outstanding example. Then at the other end on honorary degrees, I wrote all the honorary degree citations myself, as I believe John Dickey wrote his. But it's one thing to write the citation and another thing to do all the research. It was your responsibility to farm that out to appropriate people, and as I know in a large number of cases where the people you happened to pick to farm it out to either didn't do the job or did it miserably, you yourself had to do the research for me. So I would go off on a retreat, take all this research material, with your notes on it, with me and from that write the actual citations.

Let me turn to Lu. Actually, in a way you and Ruth had the more clearly defined jobs, and Lu was sort of everything else. So let me turn to Ruth. Ruth of course, as executive secretary, had the job of making sure that all the mail that came to the president's office, something reasonable happened to it, including a very complicated logging system, which I never did find out about. I quickly discovered it worked superbly and therefore was not an area I had to look at. Something happened to it meant either that it really was intended for another office and was sent there, or that first of all the key people in the office saw it and others got copies of it, and that at least an acknowledgement went out and, where needed, an answer went out. Plus the incredibly complicated filing system in the president's office, both for correspondence and for trustee minutes.

Ruth took over, fairly early, my travel schedule when I discovered that I could not rely on alumni relations to do that because they simply would not listen to what my preferences were in travel. So Ruth took that over. And although I used to and I do now carry a calendar where all my engagements are, I discovered in the president's office that was useless. It took me about six months to realize how useless it was, because the office had to have the freedom of scheduling appointments for me. Therefore, whatever I had in my pocket was hopelessly out of date, and I would give away slots which the office had already given away. I
did not want to become the kind of president where, if I was out of town, people have to wait till I get back till they could even set up an appointment. So I simply reversed that whole system, and the only calendar that counted was the one that Ruth maintained. She would, before I went home each day, give me a folder which had in it a card that I could carry in my pocket with my daily schedule on it and all the backup material I needed to look at for next day's meetings. Or if I went on a trip, she would put together my trip folder. Obviously, coordinating telephone calls was a crucial part of it. She also took my dictation. She got to know it. We had a superb working relationship. And she ran the office.

FANELLI: On the scheduling, one thing that was very useful was the weekly meeting where everyone...

KEMENY: Right. The weekly meeting of you, Lu, Ruth, and I where we would try to look ten days ahead. Somehow a week was not enough because one tended to miss something just off that list. And where we talked everything over and tried to figure out what problems we were running into, including occasionally I would find I would get boxed in so I didn't have any time to think. Then we tried to figure out where I could find myself half a day free to do some thinking.

Lu in a way did everything that you and Ruth didn't do, which varied all over the place. Having been a faculty spouse and having many close friends in the faculty, she very often was my liaison to various faculty committees or faculty groups. Somehow this is a peculiar kind of snobbery on the part of the faculty. She wasn't quite thought of as an administrator because they still thought of her as a faculty wife, and that helped her in relations there. She maintained liaison with some other administrative offices. She would first serve as my liaison in all fundraising activities when it became clear that somebody from my office had to sit in on all those meetings because otherwise alumni relations or development would plan all kinds of things that were inconsistent with my plans. It was in a way the superb role she played there that led us to the idea of moving her over to major gifts later on.

FANELLI: One of those great talents—characteristics—was that she had a great deal of common sense, which helped I think in many, many situations.

KEMENY: Yes. She would very often walk into some of the messiest situations, like this liaison, either liaison with a difficult faculty group or liaison with alumni and fundraising, which could have been horrendously complicated. Very often she was the only woman in the group, particularly in alumni and fundraising. Yet she had to speak for the president, and she could do it extremely tactfully and in a way where people would not resent it and yet make sure that my interests were protected in that. She would occasionally do certain kinds of research for me.
Both of you helped the student interns when we had interns. And the two of you picked them in the sense that you narrowed it down to two or three of the best candidates, who I then interviewed. In a way, Lu was the wild card. If a special problem came up and I needed to assign it to someone, neither you nor Ruth had any extra time. So whenever something special came up, I would ask Lu to take that on.

Afterwards, when we promoted Lu to director of major gifts, it was great for the college but a loss for us. I wanted to promote Ruth to the number two assistantship, which was a rather fundamental change in the office in the sense that she was one of the highest ranking staff people, but this would make her an officer of the college. I'm sure all of us have many hang-ups, but Ruth has one big hang-up on the subject that she graduated from high school but never went to college. Therefore, she tended to underestimate her own talents. She is one of the brightest people I know. If she had gone to college, she would have been a superb college student. She just never did. She got married very young and never did go to college and that gave her somewhat of an inferiority feeling in dealing with faculty or even the senior administration. The hardest job I had was persuading Ruth that she was up to that job. But I did persuade her and of course she did an equally outstanding job there.

Then Mona Chamberlain [Ramona H. “Mona” Chamberlain] moved in as executive secretary to the president, and again for a shorter period, I think we had very good relations with yourself and Ruth and Mona as the team of the president's office.

**FANELLI:** Lu Sterling never went to college but it didn't bother her at all.

**KEMENY:** Let's see. That's not quite true. She never graduated from college. I think she had three years in one place and I think even did some miscellaneous studying at the Sorbonne, so I think she had roughly the equivalent of a B.A. but never got her degree. Her problem was I think her father was in foreign service and they moved around so much that she never was anywhere long enough. I think she had an equivalent—I should mention for the record, obviously you had the strongest academic background. Besides having an advanced degree, you also had taught on the college level. But Lu had at least roughly the equivalent of—I think she went to Vassar. Is that right? Where did she go? Why do I not remember it? She went to some very good school. I think it's Vassar but I'm not sure. And had done some work I think from the Sorbonne, somewhere in Europe, but moved around so much she did not get a college degree. And of course had lived a major part of her life as a faculty wife, so she had a strong background in academia.
I just want to say for the record, one of the things that made the job bearable was that I was most fortunate throughout the presidency in having a team that was so closely knit and that I could rely on so completely. I was very lucky in that area.

FANELLI: What do you like on this menu here?

KEMENY: What do I like on that menu. Okay. You wanted me to comment on the chairmen of the board of trustees.

FANELLI: Right. I guess starting with Lloyd Brace?

KEMENY: Yes. I have talked a bit before about my relations with the board of trustees, but clearly the chairmen play a key role in this. My best relations were with the first and last one, though I had a very good relation with the second one, and my only serious problems were with the third one, though he was chairman for a long time.

Lloyd Brace was chairman during the search; that's why a chairmanship was established. We became very good friends. My only regret with Lloyd was that first he felt he ought to step down from the chairmanship because three years was long enough, and not very much afterwards he retired from the board of trustees. But my relations with him were superb. He was incredibly supportive during the very difficult month of Cambodia and Kent State and through all the other problems while he was on the board. He was most supportive. I think I mentioned the key role he played during the coeducation decision. So I'm grateful to Lloyd for very many things.

The second chairman, of whom I have not talked much, was Charlie Zimmerman. He became chairman then as the senior trustee, but it also meant with the changes in retirement and how many years you could serve that he only had two years left on the board, so he only served as chairman for two years.

Charlie had some enormous strengths. He is one of the best-organized people and head of a very large life insurance company. He must have had both a great file system and superb secretarial help because he never forgot anything. Years later he still hasn't forgotten either my birthday or my wedding anniversary or Christmas. You'd never get a routine note from Charlie. It's an obviously highly personally written note to remember it. Absolutely fabulous memory. I once wrote a letter to Charlie when I first found out about something major that happened at Dartmouth College from a carbon copy of a letter he wrote to someone. Certainly that was typical of him. He would not, as board chairman, write to anyone without sending us a copy of it, something that another chairman would not follow.
Really, my relations I think were excellent with Charlie Zimmerman. I simply wasn't as close to him as I was to Loyd Brace or would later be to Dave McLaughlin. He thought differently about a number of issues and we would somewhat disagree, but I don't think it ever caused any problem other than obviously his expressing his own views in board meetings. He did an enormous amount of good in public relations by writing all those letters, and he was absolutely thoroughly informed of everything. He never did one act, even where he disagreed thoroughly with what I or what the board of trustees may have voted, that would have been inappropriate for a board chairman, even to the point of publicly defending decisions which he had fought against madly in board meetings.

That covered roughly the first three years of my presidency. Then comes a five-year period when Bill Andres was chairman. Above all, it shows the wisdom that five years is too long for anyone to be in a position like chairman of the board. I've recounted in detail Bill's role in making the Carroll Brewster situation worse and blowing it out of proportion, but Bill had many other weaknesses as chairman. First of all, he does not know how to chair a meeting, and while that's not necessarily—that should not be the most important role of a board chairman, he really was terrible at it. I mean, he would just let people talk forever, would never shut anyone up, and let the board get off at great length. Dave McLaughlin was his successor, so it's easiest to compare Charlie to the person who followed him. Dave would politely but firmly say, "I think we've gone on this long enough. We'll now go on to something else." And no board member, with one exception that I've talked about, would ever resent that. Bill didn't. I continually had to remind Bill of what the agenda was, even though an agenda was sitting in front of him. Or remind him that somebody who had to make a presentation had been waiting two hours outside to get a five-minute slot to make a presentation. He was very weak at running meetings.

Extremely emotional. I mean, he really loves Dartmouth more than anything in the whole world. He wanted very badly to be a superb chairman and frankly just wasn't. So to some extent, others on the board had to assume the leadership roles on the board while Bill Andres was chairman. There were also occasional problems, since I mentioned how good Charlie Zimmerman was in always expressing as chairman the official board view. Bill Andres sometimes did not. He was so emotional, he sometimes couldn't help letting his own personal opinions come out, even if they represented a very small minority view on the board, as they occasionally did.

I should mention here one other trustee with whom I had trouble in that relation, and that was Bob Kilmarx, someone very intelligent with very strong views. Here there would be problems. Bob also occasionally would, in a meeting where he was there as a trustee, express his personal opinions, which may not necessarily
have been those of the board, or expressed them on a point that the board was still debating. That just is bad trusteeship.

The final chairman was Dave McLaughlin and I have nothing but good things to say about his chairmanship.

End of Tape 18, Side A
Beginning of Tape 18, Side B

KEMENY: I think of all the chairmen, there were a number of aspects in which Dave was the best. He and Charlie Zimmerman were the best at running a meeting. Charlie was excellent at running a meeting; David possibly even better. He never lost track of where we were. When he skipped something, it always turned out there was a reason for it. He would, on horribly crowded things, even arrange to have five items which he said, "My feeling is this really does not require discussion, and if any one trustee insists on discussing one of these, we'll set it aside. If not, can we by unanimous agreement consent to this?" The result was not to cut down trustee discussions; the meeting lasted just as long. What it really gave us was more time to discuss the important issues and not spend so much time on trivia. That was one of the bad byproducts of Bill Andres's way of running a meeting was that we might spend an hour and a half on trivia and then not have enough time to discuss a really important issue.

[Tape off, then resumes]

I heard someone very recently refer to a board of a business he had been associated with that used to be described as one that would spend an hour and a half discussing whether to give a raise to the janitor and then pass the annual budget in five minutes. [Chuckles] We never quite got that bad, but sometimes priorities got misplaced. Dave's priorities were never misplaced. He is tremendously organized.

He had another talent perhaps better than any of the chairmen I went with, namely sensing when a consensus had been reached. Knowing when to terminate the meeting is quite important. If you try to do it too early, there'll be an explosion. He sensed when let's say two-thirds of the board had made up its mind in one direction and then brought things to a vote. One never had the feeling that Dave imposed his own views on the board of trustees but did a superb job in bringing out a consensus from the board. When he had to speak to issues, he was terrific at it.

I think throughout my presidency… I should mention his role as a trustee. Very early, though he was one of the youngest ones, I considered him one of the most valuable members of the board in that category with people like Lloyd Brace
while he stayed on the board and Dick Hill and Bill Morton and of course Ralph Lazarus as the senior trustee, whose views just would weigh overwhelmingly and would be very influential, and what they said would always be relevant and very important. There were others who would play that role on individual issues. Berl Bernhard never spoke as much as I wished he would, but when he did it was either to crack a totally outrageous joke or to make a very, very deep remark. Or Dave Webber, by far the youngest trustee we had, when he spoke up he was listened to because in certain areas he had more expertise as a teacher than members, and he was an extremely thoughtful person.

FANELLI: In some instances, I think Bob Oelman [Robert S. "Bob" Oelman ’31] was…

KEMENY: Oh, sorry. I'm not thinking far enough back. I want to mention two people there. In the board I started with and unfortunately did not overlap with long enough, both Bill Buchanan [William E. "Bill" Buchanan ’24] and Bob Oelman played terribly important roles. Bob also was chairman of the finance committee of the board during my early years when I had to make a lot of changes, so I have a deep debt of gratitude to Bob Oelman. I'm sorry, except for Lloyd Brace, I was thinking of the names before the changeover. I think I mentioned earlier that due to the changes in the retirement age and in how many years trustees could serve, there was a very large turnover in my first four years as president. Certainly before that changeover, Bob Oelman was an absolutely key trustee, and I think became the first chairman of the personnel committee of the board and there also played a very important role.

In a way, one could say that the roles that Lloyd Brace and Bob Oelman and Bill Buchanan played, and Charlie Zimmerman, in place of them we would get Bill Morton and Dick Hill and Dave McLaughlin, with Ralph Lazarus continuing. He's the only trustee who was there when I was elected president and was still there after I stepped down.

What else can I say about Dave's chairmanship? Just that he did a really superb job and played a very active role in the campaign, was totally briefed on everything. And again, would never speak on any… I can't even say here how he would have acted if he found himself in a small minority on the board because he never did as chairman, nor did he and I ever have any major disagreement on questions of principle. But he just was a scrupulously fair chairman and a scrupulously fair public spokesman, though nowhere nearly as spectacular… Perhaps if he had a weakness, it was as a public speaker. I mean, Charlie Zimmerman is just a superb orator. I made it a rule… The president always spoke last and I tried very hard to change the rule unless the next to last speaker was Charlie Zimmerman because nobody could follow Charlie Zimmerman on the platform. That's not a fair comparison. I mean, he was better than Bill Andres but not a really good public spokesman, and very much aware of this and therefore
tended not to give great public speeches as chairman. But in all other ways, I have to say, if one weighs everything, he was the best chairman I served with.

FANELLI: And he was very easy, in my relations with him, to get along with. He knew what he wanted to know about the meeting and what arrangements had to be made. You always knew where you stood with Dave.

KEMENY: Yes. Even I remember he helped you and the whole office out and increasingly—particularly a couple of trustees—Bob Kilmarx was one, but of course Don McKinlay was the worst one—who tried in effect interfering with the running of the president's office and making requests for incredible amounts of material. We went to Dave with the problem, and Dave got the board to lay down the rule that of course trustees could ask for routine things, but if it was not routine, we could come to the chairman and he could simply say no, that's an unreasonable request. Although the whole board voted that, Don McKinlay I believe in particular never accepted that ruling of the board.

FANELLI: You don't have to do any of these, John.

KEMENY: Let's see how we're doing on time. We have really only fifteen minutes left. I don't need very much for the last one. I think I'll try doing things very briefly.

You had suggested saying a few words on fraternities, and I think that's all I would want to say. Mainly what I wanted to say was that when I became president I made a list which I did not share with anyone, other than I probably shared it with Jean, as to the things I most wanted to accomplish as president. At the time I stepped down, I went back to that list, and I felt I had accomplished all of them except one. I would even publicly say that that, I felt, was where I had failed. This was the general problem of student conduct on campus, particularly of fraternities. And really, it always came down to about three to five fraternities. It was no more than five. I had always felt if one could just by waving a magic wand dispense with five fraternities—that's five out of something like twenty-one or twenty-two, so it's not a large percentage—the whole image of the fraternity system would be fundamentally different at Dartmouth College.

During my presidency, the faculty would even vote to ask the abolition of the fraternities. This interacted… What brought it to a head was the miserable behavior of some fraternities. They led the anti-coed move and led the move afterwards to make life miserable for the early women students at Dartmouth College. We made major attempts at reform, but—I have talked about this before—not terribly successful ones. So that's an area I'm afraid I had to leave to my successor to deal with.
FANELLI: I remember at one meeting, John, I guess when they proposed the fraternity constitution, the fraternity system, you said that you felt there was some reason to be optimistic about changing the fraternity system within two years if everything went well, but that it would take much longer to solve the problems of the quality of student life on campus. That was a separate issue, and of course they're still working on it.

KEMENY: They're still working on that, and it's going to be a continuing problem I suspect for some time.

You suggested I might like to make some observations on other Ivy presidents. I don't know if I've already said this, but in general one of my big disappointments as president was, I'd always had a very high respect for all of college and university presidents until I met a large number of them. That was a bitter disappointment to me, that a very large percentage of—not that they're not normal human beings. I wasn't naive enough to think that they were sort of a breed by themselves, but I just did not think that most of them were truly exceptional, either as human beings—well, more so as human beings than in their role as presidents. Maybe it was a matter of the age. It was a difficult and confusing age, but it certainly did not breed giants in college presidencies. Also, the early '70s was a period when huge numbers stepped down or could only last two or three years as presidents, which may have contributed to the problem.

Let me now narrow it to Ivy presidents. I can only say it was a very mixed bag. I liked them personally. I got along with them all personally. But there were few of them of whom I really thought very highly. When I started out, Nate Pusey was president of Harvard, and I just don't understand him at all. I just could never admire him. There just were very few I considered to be truly outstanding college presidents. They tended not to know details about their institution, they loved to give big speeches even in small meetings, they tend to be pompous. If I had to grade them on the scale of grades, the grades would run mostly from C to B+ with very few A's or A−'s given out, either in the Ivy presidents or in presidents I got to know nationally. That was very disappointing to me. Certainly they did not seem to be the source of any great innovative ideas. Many of them seemed to use the occasion of being president to get themselves on big boards and build national personal reputations, but not necessarily institutional reputations. They spent an awful lot of time traveling and away from their campus. I did not have evidence with most of the presidents I got to know well, both in the Ivy League and outside, that they had a significant measurable impact on their own campuses. And that was very disappointing to me.

We have so little time that I don't have to talk about the adjustment to stepping down. Actually, the alumni magazine will have an article on that. Jean and I got interviewed.
There's one topic I'd like to finish on. It won't take terribly long. Something I have not talked about before, at least not publicly. I tried very hard during my presidency to establish a certain style. I was painfully aware of the fact that although many of my predecessors were distinguished preacher presidents, that preaching was not one of my strong points. Yet presidents should provide a certain degree of moral leadership. What I tried to do is to do it by example and deeds rather than by words. I simply don't have the words. I never learned how to speak eloquently or not so eloquently on that subject.

I set myself one goal, which I managed to achieve, though I neither announced the goal publicly nor publicly acknowledged that I had achieved it. I made up my mind that I was going to get through the presidency without ever telling a lie. It may be a small thing, but it seemed to be not so small. Here I really mean not even telling a small what is called white lie, because once you start doing that, there's no stopping. And I certainly don't claim that I never lied before in my life or afterwards, but I never did in the presidency. I think if one speaks of telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, only two of those options exist to any president. I spoke the truth and nothing but the truth. You can't always tell the whole truth as to why a faculty member is let go, or when Carroll Brewster got fired I did not publicly admit that he was fired, and I was very glad when he got a job somewhere else. But I did not tell lies. That was occasionally terribly hard to do. Life would have been much easier with it.

I tried to set a moral tone by how the college treated its employees, for example, and that meant not just the most visible ones but every union member here on campus. Or what recognition staff members get or what the promotion system was. I know there may have been alumni and students who felt I should have given bigger public lectures on morality, and occasionally the board urged me to do that. I tried instead of that to do that both through the example I set with the way I conducted myself and occasionally by talking to students in small private groups. I tried to see to it that people were fairly treated even if that was costly to the institution. I tried to have a president's office that I hope was one of the most open and accessible president's offices ever run. That is very costly to any president. I tried very hard when there was a major mistake to be the first one to admit it publicly, and that's part of what I mean by style here.

We tried to send a signal, Jean and I together, when the annual Christmas affair that used to be one for officers and one for staff was combined into an annual Dartmouth College Christmas affair, for which we got a certain amount of criticism from snobs. But you're sending a certain signal that the college values equally everyone who works for the institution.
These are the things I never talked about publicly, but I hope very much and from some responses I've gotten from people that I think this got across. If there's any single thing… Obviously, I hope people will remember things like coeducation and a few other things that I managed to achieve during my presidency, but I hope that if future historians single something out, they will try to do independent checking on how people felt about the style of my presidency, because I think that's the single thing I'd most like to be remembered for.

FANELLI: I didn't say anything before when you were talking about the office, but I think for the future historians I might say that it was one of the most enjoyable offices that I've ever worked in. I know that when you said we were a team, part of that is because you created the atmosphere to enable that to happen.

KEMENY: Thank you.

FANELLI: And also very much your sense of humor which kept us on our toes and laughing.

End of Interview