John Sloan Dickey '29
President Emeritus of Dartmouth College

An Interview Conducted by
Jere Daniell
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[Beginning of Tape 24, Side A]

DANIELL: ...when you have sat on the CAP or coming to the CAP in the Cirrotta case.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, this was the most difficult disciplinary matter that we had to face during all my years. And we had to wait, we felt, until the thing was out of the courts. Because if we moved right on it, we could get the individuals involved into a posture with the authorities that would have been prejudging their case. And this was very difficult because at this point a certain kind of alumnus and a certain kind of newspaper person and so forth thought you were trying to protect these individuals or to cover up.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, ultimately we decided that all...that quite aside from the distinctions that were drawn in court—nobody went to jail for it finally—that we just had no satisfactory basis for distinguishing between the individuals who had done the fighting and the individuals who had egged it on and who had been there and been involved in the drinking and so forth. So we separated them all. And much as I always regretted that kind of action, I guess I’d have to say again I have no doubt, never had the slightest doubt, that the welfare of the College and elementary justice in the sense that these fellows had taken on a concerted action that turned out tragically. They didn’t intend it to turn out tragically. But they’d taken on a concerted action that turned out tragically for them, more tragically for the victim, and more tragically for his family, very seriously for the College. And there was no miscarriage of justice in going forward with their separation from the College. Subsequently the dean wrote letters of explanation and even recommendation for some of them to other institutions. But as far as returning to Dartmouth was concerned, it was just out of the question.

Well, I don’t know how long it was after that, but it wasn’t a long time, that the dean wrote me, I remember, saying that he felt that the time had come when he would like to put the job down. And it was a friendly, straightforward letter. I forget now what was said in it about any disagreements that we might have had. But it was a mature, responsible kind of recognition that we were not fully at ease with each other’s way of doing things. And that was that.

DANIELL: Was the linkage, in your mind, the linkage between the resignation and the Cirrotta case a close one? That that was the issue which forced him...?
DICKEY: I don’t know that I’ve ever had that link. But I could be wrong about that. But at least it doesn’t loom now. To put it more concretely, I was perfectly aware that there were serious differences in approach before the Cirrotta case.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: The Cirrotta case just confirmed my determination that Dartmouth was going to tighten up this kind of thing. And in that sense it may have seemed to the dean, well, it’s going to tighten up more than I can handle. But it was not something out of the blue, the Cirrotta case. And I don’t remember how long after that it was before he did give me his resignation. Which I did not in any way ask for in any form whatsoever.

DANIELL: I’ve read the statement he made, that everything that he says and everything you’re saying seems to be quite consistent.

DICKEY: I have never had any doubt that this was a very difficult thing for him to decide. But there was no passage of unpleasantries or anything of that sort. No question of being pushed. I would have lived with this as far as I can know. But I began to move afterwards to do some really creative independent thinking about what were some of the things that had to be done here. Now of course we were still, you see, in the period of liquidating the veteran element. Two or three, maybe four of these individuals were veterans.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: At least that’s my memory.

DANIELL: I like your choice of terms.

DICKEY: The campus had begun to have that kind of, as far as I was concerned, well, what would you call it? Wide open atmosphere on weekends.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Oh, yes.

DICKEY: That was an invitation to the kind of unintentional tragedy that is always around the corner on an undergraduate campus. I was not naïve enough to believe that we were ever going to do away with that. But I felt that we just had to indicate what went and what didn’t go. And what would go and
what wouldn’t go. And it was at this point that I developed shortly thereafter the idea of an undertaking to be given by the officers of the house, would be given directly to the president of Dartmouth College, and which would require the officers of the house and the committee of the house to accept certain conditions formally stated as to what was acceptable, what was expected—not detailed rules, but the broad condition under which the houses were extended the kind of social freedom that they were. And then to require of the men who signed these undertakings not that they should peach on anybody else; but that they were, as long as their names were on that undertaking, which was posted on the house bulletin board and a copy was given to the president of Dartmouth College, they were in the position of representing to him that these conditions were being met.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: That any time to their knowledge these conditions were not being met, their obligation was to simply ask to have their names removed from the undertaking, which would flash a yellow light for us in the administration building that the leadership of that house was on the verge of being out from under control. I look back upon that as one of the most important, creative measures I took. It ran its course. I don’t know how long we used the undertakings, ten years or so, but it made its point.

DANIELL: Yes. I remember as a member of the same house you were a member of the house earlier, that that really had an impact.

DICKEY: It put the officer in the position of the house of being able to say, without being an SOB in the eyes of his fraternity brothers, Look, I don’t care what you guys do if you do it on your own. But as long as you want me to stand up and say that this house is behaving, is living up to certain principles, and say that to the president of the College formally and on this bulletin board, then I can only do it if that corresponds to the reality.

Now there were many cases where this wasn’t the reality, where we had weak leaders, and this is one of the greatest problems in the whole fraternity show. That by and large, if you get a situation in a house—I saw it happen time after time after time—where you got an unruly, immature element, a group that that were looking for juvenile sanctuary in a fraternity, they would try always to get this kind of a person into the presidency. And if they got that kind of a person into the presidency, then God help you because they had the whole thing over a barrel.
DANIELL: Had you talked over this kind of thing with Dean Neidlinger? I mean was this the kind of thing that you tried to suggest that he...?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. He had worked like a dog on this, trying to solve this with faculty advisors. And we tried in my early years to solve it with faculty advisors, with faculty committees. Fellows such as [Andrew J.] Andy Scarlett [Jr. 1910]—I don’t know whether you remember Andy; he was a professor of chemistry. And ultimately the SAE house—I don’t think it’s too dramatic to say—broke his heart. He just gave them, that house, everything he could in the way of personal attention and concern. And it was just one failure after another to meet his expectations. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: It reached the point at the Deke house where we couldn’t get anybody to be an advisor to it. Paul [S.] Sample [’20] once told me this was the most disillusioning experience he’d ever had in this life when he accepted that and found that....

DANIELL: I remember when I was head of the Judiciary Committee, that was the worst place on campus for this stuff.

DICKEY: And ultimately it destroyed the house.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Destroyed it, just that simple. It got so bad finally that they couldn’t pledge a delegation. Now you could talk your head off—and I mean literally talk your head off down there [Laughter] and meet with them. I went down and met with them and so forth. They wouldn’t take it seriously until they were beyond saving. That is, the undergraduates just decided that they couldn’t afford to sign up for that house.

DANIELL: There was one group that tried to reform it because I remember Leo [C.] McKenna [’56 TU ‘57] was there. I think it was the Class of ’56. It would have been ’53. And they just took a large group of people and said we’re going to—and they were accepted, but after that group left, that was the end of it. Then it just faded.

DICKEY: Well, it was one of the most classical examples of how something can spiral down. A bad, roughneck element in the house would get officers of
that sort in. And then the officers would…and down she would go. And it was a sad thing. Now to some extent the Deke fraternity over the country developed an image, I guess is the word that's most commonly used, of being anti-authority, anti-college, anti-university in that they were just too big for their britches. I don't believe that there's any other national fraternity, at least during my day—and I followed them fairly closely in those days. Oh, yes, I used to make it a point of trying to know what was going on on other campuses. But the Dekes had a reputation, a bad reputation, to be blunt about it, over the country that was far and away worse than any other one.

DANIELL: I was always aware of that, but didn't know to what extent that was a function of my local experience here. But you're saying….

DICKEY: I don't know. But in any event, the Dekes went the way of all sinners, I guess—I mean ultimately. You're supposed to do that way, at least.

Well, I suppose the next thing that we should say is the selection of Joe McDonald to be—we should speak of the selection of Joe McDonald to be Pudge Neidlinger’s successor. And I think I did put some of that on the record. But essentially I was looking for somebody who was himself, in his regard to his personal approach to matters, a thoughtful, exceedingly conscientious person who commanded great faculty respect. And Joe was that sort of a person. As we said earlier, he was surprised at being asked to do it, that job at that point.

DANIELL: He's still surprised at being asked to do it. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Right. In his case I went to a number of faculty people. I remember I got [Leslie Ferguson] Fergie Murch to come over to the house for luncheon one day when I was thinking about people. I asked him what he would think of Joe McDonald as a possibility, and he was very positive about it, very favorable. And others.

So those are the deans offices and the registrar’s office and the treasurer and the handling of investments. [Willard M.] Bill Gooding ['11] retired shortly, and we moved [Richard W.] Dick Olmsted ['32 TH '33] into that job. Dick fitted it like a glove. Indeed, he had already made his way even before Bill Gooding retired. Bill was relying on him. So that was a very easy appointment. Are there others that we should speak about?
DANIELL: These are the main ones I’m aware of. We’ve talked about all the changes here. One thing that has struck me as I’ve listened to you—and I had been aware of this before—is that just about every major administrative office was changed within about a five-year period.

DICKEY: Yes, we haven’t said anything about the development of new responsibilities, the major area where that took place. And maybe we should break and then come at that afresh.

DANIELL: Yes, I was going to say.

DICKEY: But that was in the development of a development office and a centralized handling of the College’s alumni magazine, news service, Alumni Fund.

DANIELL: I have that down as a category. I have Alumni Office and Development Office, something at will take….

DICKEY: Yes, now that’s a fairly large story in itself.

DANIELL: So why don’t we break now?

DICKEY: And it’s a separate one. One of the things that might be worth just adding in respect to the dean’s office is that it was at about this time we decided we were going to have to develop more of a campus police force.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: Than we’d had. Back in my day as an undergraduate, there’d been one night inspector who’d gone around ringing the night watchman’s clock. And then [George Chase] Spud Bray had worked out of Buildings & Grounds office investigating happenings in the dormitories as best one man could. But our annual sessions with the other Pentagonal colleges and our knowledge of what was going on elsewhere in the academic world and in American society convinced us that we were at the point, regrettably, as far as I was concerned, where we had to go to a uniformed campus police. Our first man was Gaudreau.

DANIELL: Yes, I remember Captain Gaudreau very well.

DICKEY: And we had problems subsequently involving the town police under Andy Ferguson that required some handling, difficulties that I don’t think are
worth recording. No reason why they shouldn’t be recorded as far as that’s concerned.

DANIELL: Herb Hill has told me quite a bit about that.

DICKEY: This had gotten quite lax and quite unsatisfactory and it was a situation in which the town fathers weren’t entirely at fault, of course. But I remember one time I had to really express myself pretty directly and critically to Gordon Gliddon, as a selectman. I just had to say that we just couldn’t run this enterprise in the way Andy Ferguson thought it should be run. And we got straightened away on that. Andy had his problems that were personal to him. And the town fathers at that time didn’t want more of an issue with their chief of police than they had to have. And Gaudreau was, to be blunt about it, not adequate to the larger responsibility of supervising a campus police force which consisted, I guess, just of himself and somebody else or two others at that time. And this is one of those areas where you’re made aware that American society has changed, for the better or for the worse, but that it’s changed to the point where the College was no longer able to assume that its dormitories were not going to be targets for criminals from the outside and things like that. So the whole level of professional staff began to be stepped up. In counseling, we brought in a professional staff. I guess I would have to say I’m intellectually convinced of the necessity of that. I, as a practical matter, have reservations.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. You and I are very much alike on that. We both come from traditions in which you made it on your own; that’s your responsibility. [Inaudible]…

DICKEY: … Not the way we… Also another thing that we went through that was related to the dean’s office…. And Stearns Morse helped us greatly on this because he acted as our liaison with Dick’s House, which was, interestingly enough, one of the very delicate…. Are you still recording?

DANIELL: What? Yes, I am still on the air.

DICKEY: It was one of the very delicate areas that most people would never have thought anything about. But Mrs. [Richard Kimball 1892 (Sally)] Hall was living then. She took a keen, close personal interest in Dick’s House, from the curtains to the policies of who could use it and under what circumstances and so forth. She was especially concerned about the relationship of the hospital. She didn’t want it to become just a sub-ward of the hospital. She thought it would become too impersonal and would move
away from the vision which she and her husband had had for it as a home away from home for sick students. But this presented increasingly all sorts of problems in dealing with the medical staff and professionals. [Laughter] Well, this was one of the areas where Pudge had problems.

DANIELL: Oh, really? I didn’t know that.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. She used to come to me very unhappy about it. Pudge and the liaison would, and Pudge would, in his rather brusque way, “Oh, Sally, you don’t know what the hell you’re talking about!” [Laughter]

DANIELL: I had a parallel circumstance down at a place called Old Deerfield in which the woman, a Mrs. Flint, who still is around, and you had to play a very careful role in her presence because she was the benefactress of the whole organization, and it’s tough at times.

DICKEY: Well, I’m not sure he would’ve said, “Sally, you don’t know what the hell you’re talking about” but “Sally, you don’t know what you’re talking about.”

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He was a gentleman at all times, but very blunt. And she was quite unhappy about this. Well, in due course I rearranged things so that Stearns Morse took over—

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: --as the liaison at Dick’s House. We got it back onto an even keel. And Stearns could handle Mrs. Hall in a way that made things much easier. But at that point—I’m reminded by what I was saying earlier about the raising of staff, the level of staff, professional staff and counseling and campus police, and right across the board…and all of these were a little hard for me because I was very conscious that once we got any one of these moves under the budget, it never got off.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: And that there was constantly, therefore, an issue with other things that I thought were things that Dartmouth had to spend its money...

DANIELL: You didn’t have to—you didn’t deal with the problems of hiring directly within these, though. Was this done—who, for example, was it the dean of
the College that went ahead and hired the individual or individuals in counseling?

DICKEY: I think so. That’s my memory. I didn’t hire the individuals in counseling, I didn’t hire the campus police and so forth. They would come to me usually because it involved putting new jobs in the budget.

DANIELL: That’s what I thought.

DICKEY: I insisted I should know about those things.

DANIELL: What we’re asking is whether the ones we’ve gone through covered the major areas in which you...

DICKEY: Well, the other area, which I was just coming to and then digressed, was this question of the level of healthcare, of our health service. And this involved very large budgetary decisions of what was going to be embraced by the health service and the compulsory fees.

DANIELL: We can handle that when we get to the whole question of finances.

DICKEY: Yes. And of course that then got us to tuition policy. And for a while this was an area in which I had to spend a lot of time—or at least I did spend a lot of time personally trying to think through.

DANIELL: We’ve gone on an hour and a half today. Now normally that is enough for both of us. It’s been a rich session.

[Break]

The interview of February 20th ended here.

[End of Tape 24, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 24, Side B]

DANIELL: The interview with President Emeritus Dickey resumed on April 1, 1976.

[Pause]

DICKEY: … and ask questions.
DANIELL: Well, the first question then has to do…. I know you’ve mentioned at several points, in talking previously about matters of student and faculty, that very early in your presidency, almost instantly, you became quite aware of the need to develop a more aggressive attitude, I think probably, toward building up the resources of the College if you were going to be able to do what you wanted to do educationally.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: And that, well, the first question that occurs to me is simply, what state did you find the fundraising capacities or facilities of the College in when you took over?

DICKEY: I first became aware of the fundraising activity through discussions with Al Dickerson and Sid Hayward, both of whom in one way or another had had some responsibilities in this area. I think Sid had earlier been in charge of the Alumni Fund. I remember when I was an undergraduate, Bob Strong had handled the Alumni Fund. Indeed, had recruited me as a senior to be a class agent our first five years out of college. And I think Sid, as secretary of the College, became active in that area. And when I came on the job, Al Dickerson, assisted as I remember by George Colton, was handling the Alumni Fund, and had done a great deal on the side of alumni relations along with Sid Hayward. Al would write the bulletin every week or every few weeks from Parkhurst Hall, keeping the principal alumni workers acquainted with what was going on in Hanover. Al had, of course, a beautiful way of telling any story, and he told the story of activity in Hanover very effectively. About every month or so he would do a bulletin and tell about the Parkhurst Elm or the Bulletin Elm, as it came to be known. The elm which he would look out his window and see and take inspiration from for the writing of his column.

But my first memory of the need to give sustained, systematic attention to the organization of our fundraising activities was I think a memorandum handed to me by Sid Hayward very early on. My recollection is that the memorandum had been prepared by Sid for Mr. Hopkins, and that Mr. Hopkins had suggested that he hold it and hand it on to his successor. This memorandum dealt with a number of large subjects which Sid felt were going to require fresh attention by the president of the College, as the College began to move out of the wartime period into the postwar. I have that memorandum somewhere, I’m sure, in my papers. It dealt with public relations. It dealt with alumni relations. And, as I recall, said that he, Sid, felt there was a great need to organize our fundraising activities more
systematically. When I looked into this, it was perfectly clear that this was just an unquestioned necessity.

The Alumni Fund had been the principal, indeed almost the sole organized fundraising activity of the College during Mr. Hopkins’s years. Mr. Hopkins made no bones about it, that he had not had occasion during his years on the job to engage in anything like constant, let alone systematic, solicitation of gifts. In some ways he didn’t have to. He was able to focus his energies and his talents on the cultivation of potential sources of support for the College without having to carry that cultivation to the point of solicitation. He kept, for example, in very close touch over the years with Mr. Tuck, who was at that point constantly referred to as Dartmouth’s greatest benefactor. He, through I believe it was Mr. Thayer, was able to get the great gift that made Baker Library possible, one of the truly strategic advances in the strength of the College. And there were a number of other things. His trusteeship in the Rockefeller Foundation, I think, helped him in his relations with Mr. John D. Rockefeller and also, I believe, through some grants. I think it may have facilitated some grants, although I’m not sure of that, from the foundation. But very fundamentally this was not something that Mr. Hopkins undertook to do in a systematic way.

Well, we started off immediately after I came on the job with the….  

DANIELL: Can I just ask a couple of questions?

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: I find what you’ve just said about President Hopkins’s role in this intriguing, especially as fairly recently I went quickly over some of the transcripts of the tapes that he did. Did you ever have occasion to talk with him specifically about this because I’m really interested in the kind of attitude, whether…? Some people have suggested his attitude toward fundraising was that the most effective way to do it was through just what you have described; namely, not so much direct solicitation except for in a very—for a large building; but through the cultivation of very, very wealthy men. And this was something that came kind of easily to him.

DICKEY: I think that’s so. I did not have occasion to talk with him in any systematic way about the subject. I did talk to him frequently about subjects of this sort on an ad hoc basis and in a general way, usually by way of telling him what I was proposing to do and wondering whether he had any reactions.
or any suggestions to make. He rarely proffered suggestions. He was always appreciative of my talking with him about these things obviously. But he was not given to, at that point in his career at least, to making many positive suggestions. I did have a…. I remember only one occasion when I talked with him very informally and very almost casually about the possibility of his assisting in a fundraising effort that we were launching. [phone ringing]

[Break]

This occasion was when we were organizing the—I think it was the second Hopkins Center effort. And I thought it would be not inappropriate—although I had a certain misgiving about it—to see whether he felt he would be the man to approach John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

DANIEL: I see.

DICKEY: Because it was clear to me he had to be approached. I wanted to be sure that the approach was as effective as it could possibly be. And I knew that his relationship with John D. Rockefeller, Jr., had been a close one. My memory of it, of the conversation, is that I told him that we were going to do this, that I wanted to be sure that as we did it we did it as well as it could be done, and did he have any suggestions about it? Was it something that he felt he would want to play a part in? I think that’s probably the way I put it. In any event, it was clear to me that he did not want to take on this solicitation in any way. That he regarded, I’m sure, his friendship and his earlier relationship with Mr. Rockefeller as something that hopefully would be useful to us in the campaign. But once again, it was clear to me that he did not regard himself as…well, as one whose assistance to the College could be rendered primarily or importantly even as a solicitor of funds. Indeed, at this time, he said, “I would have difficulty recalling ever having solicited money.”

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: A most remarkable statement for a college president. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes. Which suggests that perhaps these relationships, which were so productive in the end run and in the long run for the College during his presidency, relationships with people like Amos Tuck and you said Mr. Thayer and I guess Baker and others, were things that really perhaps
DICKEY: Oh, very definitely. Of course the Tuck relationship was one that began with Dr. Tucker, and Mr. Hopkins knew about that from having been Dr. Tucker's assistant in the office. And he really carried on and developed the cultivation of Tuck's interest in Dartmouth through visits to Mr. Tuck in Paris and things of that sort.

The Baker gift I believe was initiated by Mr. Thayer. And here again, I think Mr. Hopkins's principal role in that gift was to present the case, as he saw it, the Dartmouth need for a library. And to expose himself as a man to whom Mr. Baker might be attracted rather than as a person who was making a direct solicitation. And I think this was generally true...I'm sure it was true, for example, in respect to the Alumni Fund. His talks with Alumni Fund agents—and I participated in this as an agent of the Alumni Fund over a period of years—were mainly talks about the affairs of the College and very little about the financial, about specific financial needs. Very, very, really low-key forms of cultivation and solicitation of the agents. And we all felt a relationship to Mr. Hopkins which made this possible.

Well, clearly, I think, as I look back on it, the postwar period in almost all institutions of higher education was a period of financial challenge. The very opening of these institutions after the war involved picking up the sources of revenue and developing them. New programs were being instituted, new personnel, new levels of compensation. The whole picture was one of needing a more systematic, a more direct, continuing solicitation, a more effective solicitation of outside support.

My memory is that we first tried setting up something called a Public Relations Council. I may be confused here. We may have had a group which we called the Development Council, but I think it was called the Public Relations Council. And one of its principal functions was the development of systematic programs for raising money other than primarily for the Alumni Fund. This council had on it trustees, several trustees; I remember Harvey Hood after he became a trustee, Sig Larmon, Bill Minsch, and a few others from the board, as I remember. Alumni Council officers were on it, and a number of our staff people.

It was not an effective agency. It was a new venture as far as the College was concerned, and everybody was feeling their way into the field without having any specific program to do the job. I can remember a number of
meetings of that group in which I felt really quite deeply frustrated in respect to getting forward. There was an awful lot of talk and various ideas would be thrown out by one person and then by another. But there wasn’t the organized attention to the subject and the development of a program which increasingly I felt was essential.

Now, one of the critical things to get into the record and to understand is that the Alumni Fund had become, over particularly throughout Mr. Hopkins’s administration, the sacred cow of the College in its relationship with the alumni. Mr. Hopkins had done a superb job in making the alumni feel that the destiny of Dartmouth was in their hands. Yes, they were not raising a great sum of money in modern or contemporary terms. But he laid the foundation that Dr. Tucker had helped develop; he made it a much more solid thing. He laid the foundation of a sense of responsibility—indeed almost carried to the dangerous point of a sense of proprietary ownership of the place, on which the Alumni Fund was erected during this period.

Now this was in many ways invaluable because it was a situation where an institution to a considerable degree, as Dartmouth, had to raise itself by its own bootstraps. And yet it rather quickly became apparent to me—and I think also to others although they had been closer to the Alumni Fund than I had been and were a little less ready to accept it—but it became clear to me that although we had to work at the development of the Alumni Fund to higher levels of giving, we were doing exceedingly well in respect to the percentage of givers. Probably doing as well or better than any other major institution in the country. We still had a level of giving that was not realistic so far as we later came to realize, so far as our alumni body was concerned.

But my concern increasingly was that we were looking at all our fundraising possibilities in terms of making sure it did not—that we did nothing to harm the Alumni Fund. Well, God knows, nobody was more concerned than I was, that we shouldn’t do anything to harm the Alumni Fund since I believed in the Alumni Fund as one might believe in the Holy Trinity. But I also was clear that we had to begin to find ways to strengthen the capital foundations of the College, the endowment. Well, I think the first thing we took a really serious look at, along with our rather ad hoc efforts, was the establishment of a more systematic approach to giving through bequests. And I won’t attempt to go into the detail of that. But the man who gave this its organized start, I believe was Ford [H.] Whelden ’25.
DANIELL: Is he still alive?

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: He’s on my list of the people I want to talk with.

DICKEY: Of the Class of 1925.

DANIELL: He’s over in--?

DICKEY: In Norwich. He’s retired now. He, as I remember, worked at this originally on a part-time basis. He subsequently gave it full-time attention. But he had deep conviction about the potential in the alumni body in particular for capital gift giving to Dartmouth through a bequest program, and did a great deal to get it started. And I believe his first effort was focused primarily on his class, and then from that spread out to the alumni body.

But I should also want to say again that I think the man who had the larger view of what was going to be necessary was Sid Hayward. And he saw it in terms of a total program of alumni relations, public relations. The experience which bloodied me in this area, of course, was the abortive effort to raise money for the first Hopkins Center, so-called. It wasn’t called the Hopkins Center. But the first auditorium theater project which I inherited when I came to the job.

DANIELL: I haven’t heard anything about this.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, from the early thirties on there had been a project here to build a theater for the Players, specifically for Warner Bentley, in a sense.

DANIELL: Maybe I haven’t heard about this because I haven’t listened to Warner Bentley’s 16 hours of tapes yet. They’re in my desk at home. [Laughter]

DICKEY: And this was coupled with the need, as it was then perceived, for a large auditorium in the College so that it took the form of a so-called little theater and a large auditorium.

Well, when I came on the job, this project not only had been authorized by the board of trustees, but it had been given to the architect. The College’s architect at that time was [Jens Frederick] Larson, the man who did Baker Library and so on. And at that time, the College was following a policy in
respect to its buildings, its major buildings, of using a particular single architect. The center project had been authorized by the board, and its planning had been carried out by Mr. Hopkins with a committee. I don’t recall now who all served on that committee. But when it was reactivated, Cotty Larmon served on the committee and a number of other key people I’m sure: Warner Bentley and Sid and people like that.

Well, Larson went forward with the preparation of the plans. Mr. Hopkins told me at one point...I remember one night I had dinner with him and Mrs. Hopkins over at the President’s House actually before we were in the President’s House, and I asked him to tell me about this project, and he did. Mrs. Hopkins enjoyed interrupting him on one or two occasions to remind him that he had disagreed with her about the site for the project. I’m now just a little hazy which site he wanted. But one possibility was putting it down near the Tuck School and Thayer School, where the new dormitories are now, where there would be more parking. And I think this had been her preferred site. And he had agreed with others who wanted it up on the central campus and putting it over on the present site of the Hopkins Center. Well, they had a bit of fun about this, and he said that this—he spoke about this as a project which had been close to his heart. And that had been postponed by war and financial problems and so forth. But he hoped that we were now at the point where the project was authorized and then would go forward.

Well, I really took it on—told on the responsibility—as something that was handed to me by my predecessor and by the board of trustees without, as I now realize and as indeed in a few years realized, without adequate personal conviction about the project. I forget now what the estimate was, the money that was needed and so forth.

But in any event, we decided to mount a money-raising project. I’m not sure it wasn’t one of the...well, I know it was one of the very few money-raising projects Dartmouth had ever mounted. Dartmouth mounted one at the time of the burning of Dartmouth Hall and so forth. We got Jack—his name is escaping me now; the alumnus, very good friend of mine, connected with the Simmons Bed Company—to take on the chairmanship of the committee, and we began really very poorly organized, ineffective campaigning.

We put out some literature about the project which was not, I think, particularly good. We had some plans from Larson. And we did some soliciting. But the net of it was it was a failure. We simply didn’t raise the
kind of money we were going to need. Our solicitation was just not a well-organized, systematic activity. And at the same time, we were constantly being reminded that we had to be careful we did nothing that would prejudice or injure the Alumni Fund. So that our solicitation was not directed at the total alumni body.

[End of Tape 24, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 25, Side A]

DICKEY: Yes. Well, the name I wanted to remember just a moment ago was that of [John W.] Jack Hubbell, Class of ’21.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: Who took on the chairing of this theater project.

In many ways the failure of that campaign or that effort, which we postponed and really gave up on when the Korean War came along, was one of the most important learning experiences of my first five years on the job, because I learned a lot about what we had to face up to in respect to the raising of substantial sums of money. And I learned a lot about the need for—me personally—to participate in the formulation of these large undertakings and to be sure that I had genuine conviction about them.

It’s terribly easy to just…you’ve got so many other demands on you, it’s terribly easy not to feel that you have to devote yourself and to make a commitment yourself to mastering the pros and cons of a subject such as that. But I’ve always been deeply grateful for the fact that we didn’t raise that money. Because if we had raised that money, we would have built the original project, the original project would not have been right for Dartmouth’s needs at that time, and we wouldn’t have anything like the Hopkins Center today. I almost tremble to think of where we would be in respect to trying to meet our ad hoc needs in music, the fine arts, and theater without the kind of facilities which we subsequently developed. Now that’s a whole story in itself. And I don’t think it’s desirable at this point to carry it much further than to say that that effort, which I inherited so to speak, which was a failure, was one of the most useful things that happened to me during the first five years on the job.

Well, I don’t know how much further we should attempt to go with the development subject. That is the beginning of our efforts at a development program. Sid took the leading role in working with the council on these
things. But it became quite clear quickly that this was not Sid’s forte. He had the vision and he saw the need, but he was not an Ort Hicks, or someone of that sort, to go out and do the solicitation that was going to have to be done. These things came later. But I want him to have the full credit….

DANIELL: Okay. We’ll pretend he’s not here. [Speaking to a photographer who has just entered the room.]

DICKEY: What’s that?

MALE VOICE: Pretend I’m not here.

DICKEY: Pretend you’re not there.

MALE VOICE: No.

DANIELL: I was just going to ask, was it at this point that the idea was conceived of having an individual hired as the development officer for the College and charged with these fundraising responsibilities? Or was this a product of later in the decade?

DICKEY: I’m not entirely clear about that as to just when that came about. At some point we brought on…we began to build up a staff.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: I think the original effort was made under Sid Hayward, that is the building up of staff was under Sid. But then we brought on [J.] Ross Gamble.

DANIELL: That’s the name I was trying to think of, Ross Gamble. Right.

DICKEY: You want us to do something?

MALE VOICE: I’m just waiting for different poses.

DICKEY: What does he want?

DANIELL: He’s waiting for different poses.

DICKEY: Poses. Well, I don’t know if you can get anything. [Laughter] OK. You can fuss around about the pose.
I think Ross was one of the early ones who came on, worked on the—as I remember, to some extent—one the development of the Quest Program, working with Ford. George Colton was in on this end of things. [Clifford L.] Cliff Jordan [Jr. ’45] came in on the Alumni Fund quite early. And we began to build up a nucleus in Crosby Hall to take on these responsibilities. The first major appointment that I made in this area was of Justin [A.] Stanley [’33] as vice president to take charge of, in effect, our external relations. He came—and I don’t remember the year, but that can be readily ascertained.

DANIELL: Yes, that’s no problem.

DICKEY: He came to us I think somewhat later—certainly it was after the abortive project, effort to raise money for the auditorium and theater—on an understanding that he would give it a try for a year or two to see whether it was something that was really right for him. Because he was well up in the practice of law out in Chicago at the time. At the end of two years, it was pretty clear it wasn’t for him, and he went back to his law practice in Chicago. But this was the beginning of the really full development of the program with that kind of leadership. Subsequently we brought Ort Hicks in, and all of that is a little bit of a later story.

DANIELL: I talked to Charlie briefly.

DICKEY: I don’t think Charlie came on until a bit later.

DANIELL: That was later that he came on. But he knew a good deal about... Justin Stanley didn’t really work out too well, did it? At least as Charlie has said to me; he didn’t go into any details about that.

DICKEY: Well, I could go into that. But this was just clearly not the way Justin wanted to make a career. Justin was in love with Dartmouth, but not in love with that kind of activity.

DANIELL: Yes. It takes a special personality to love that kind of thing.

DICKEY: Well, it is. And I guess we learned our way into that.

DANIELL: So I think the timing on this is about in the...well, it’s in the first three or four years of the early fifties. Now how did this relate to the first $17 million
fundraising campaign, which I believe was the first large one that you engineered?

DICKEY: Well, that’s the first time, I believe, in the history of the College that Dartmouth ever undertook a full-scale capital gifts campaign. I should say that the earlier campaign was not exclusively -- the so-called Hopkins Center campaign -- [Brief aside conversation] It was not exclusively the auditorium-theater project, although that was the dominant thing. We also thought we would combine it with our need for new physics facilities.

DANIELL: Oh!

DICKEY: And we got Gerard Swope [Jr. ’29], a classmate of mine who’d been a physics major, to assume the chairmanship of that effort, which also was an abortive thing. We didn’t have it adequately staffed. The campaign was not professionally organized. So that once again, it was an abortive effort. But the campaign which came in the middle fifties was an outgrowth of the earlier abortive effort.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And more importantly, it was the result of years of fresh planning and of really formulating from scratch what we felt were the prime physical facility needs of the College in respect to program. And by this time it was clear to me that so far as the development of program was concerned at Dartmouth, the area that could not be developed further significantly, and which was really in very poor shape, was the area of the arts: theater, music, fine arts. It was just very clear that the facilities we had could not be pushed any further in the direction of the development of programs in the arts.

DANIELL: No.

DICKEY: And this led to the planning effort that was the foundation of the project which the capital gifts program that Charlie Zimmerman chaired so successfully to bring off.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And here again, I want to emphasize that we really had to go through a long process of self-education of the alumni body, of our staff, and of each one of us personally to develop the conviction that we could do this. That
Dartmouth had the potential out in the alumni body for this kind of giving. We’d gotten pretty stuck over the years with the notion that we just didn’t have that potential in our alumni body. We would make these speeches to each other in Alumni Council and elsewhere: We mustn’t kid ourselves. Dartmouth didn’t have this kind of money and the fact is we didn’t know. We didn’t know whether we had this kind of money or what our potential was. And then we would always swing back: Oh, well, for God’s sake, let’s not do anything that would jeopardize the Alumni Fund and the way the alumni feel about it.

DANIELL: When you say “we” in this, are you including the trustees, too?

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: I assume a lot of this…

DICKEY: Trustees, Alumni Council leaders. I can remember meetings of the Alumni Council where we would have some very emotional statements made by alumni about the fact that we shouldn’t do these. And then on the other hand, we had some who said, Well, for God’s sake, let’s face up to the question of whether we can do it or not, not assume that we can’t do it. It was a period of very healthy self-examination as to what Dartmouth could aspire to be, what it could aspire to do in this area of capital giving.

DANIELL: This was not something, I assume, that came very easily to you.

DICKEY: No. I wasn’t anxious to, in one sense, to push this forward because I had no doubt about it that as far as I was concerned, it was going to be a very heavy responsibility on me personally. I have never cared for solicitation of money. I did my share of it, I guess, over the years. But…. [phone ringing] [Break]

DANIELL: We were talking basically about who was involved in the process of engineering this formalization, I’d say, of fundraising activities. And I had asked you the question about how much this was discussed in the board of trustees, and whether or not this sacred cow attitude toward the Alumni Fund was almost universal among them, and you said pretty much, yes.

DICKEY: Very widespread, very widespread. There were a few strong people in there, I’m not sure now that I can pick them out in my memory, who kept coming back and back and saying, well, let’s face it. We have got to find a
way to do this or to admit that Dartmouth is just not going to be able to stay in the race to be one of these [inaudible]...

DANIELL: I can even remember at the time thinking what a tremendous effort that $17 million—the one that came in the middle of the fifties—was. And in retrospect, that’s just, as more and more people are saying what I was saying when I was in the Alumni Council, that the school now had just begun to exploit its potential there. And of course [inaudible] it seems to me that as the potential became more evident, the Alumni Fund really picked up tremendously from this.

DICKEY: Oh, there’s no question about the fact that we unearthed, namely, that there was nothing quite so good for the Alumni Fund as a well-run capital gifts campaign.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: It taught us where the money was. Taught us a little bit about pursuing it. And this is just the continuing story, that the more you raise, the more you learn about raising it. You develop your staff, you develop your procedures, you develop your records. The whole show.

During this period I began to get some experience on ad hoc projects working with the Tucker Foundation alumni—or with the alumni of the Tucker generation about setting up the Tucker Foundation. I told you I believe earlier about a little delicacy that developed there, and some of these alumni were a little concerned that the Hopkins Center project was going to overshadow their desire to have a memorial for Dr. Tucker.

DANIELL: I don’t think you did tell me that.

DICKEY: Didn’t I tell you that? Well, this was a very understandable thing, but it also involved considerable delicacy in its handling. We were seeking to get the alumni of Dr. Tucker’s time to make provision either in their wills or those who could to give lifetime gifts to establish some suitable memorial to Dr. Tucker.

I think it is fair to say that this was not a wealthy generation of Dartmouth alumni. It was not a large at that time generation either. But they were very anxious, and properly so, that they should have some memorial to Dr. Tucker that was fitting. They weren’t clear what it should be. We had originally suggested that one of the halls in the Hopkins Center, the
theater or something of that sort, should be named for Tucker. Not a very imaginative concept. And several of them were obviously uneasy that putting this kind of a memorial to Dr. Tucker inside a large complex bearing Mr. Hopkins’s name was to create an invidious comparison.

Well, somehow that word got to Mr. Hopkins. I'm not sure just how it got to him. And I remember one day he said to me, For goodness sake, don't permit this to create a problem. Because the last thing in the world that he would want would be any comparison between himself and Dr. Tucker in anything of that sort.

So we pulled off from the idea of trying to find a suitable, fitting memorial. And the money wasn't there. At least it wasn't coming forward. There was a fair amount of talk, as there frequently is, but the money wasn't coming forward. And later we developed what I think was a singularly appropriate idea: the Tucker Foundation idea, which also permitted the raising of such monies as were available without having an arbitrary sum that we had to achieve in order to have a memorial.

But there were some very fine men involved in that effort. Carl [F.] Woods ['04], who was the leader of the Boston Alumni, who was very much interested in that. Dick Lane was another person. Very, very fine leaders of the alumni body, particularly in the Boston area.

DANIELL: Okay. This is quite enough as far as I'm concerned on fundraising activities per se. Just one more question I would like to ask, and then we can decide whether we want to break or not, is: Could—because the next logical subject really is the question of the whole relationship with the board of trustees, again, in these first years—can you make any generalizations about the role that the board of trustees played in determining the shape of these fundraising efforts? Was this—I mean today I think it is assumed that the board really has a primary responsibility in that.

DICKEY: Well, this is a learned responsibility. And I would have to say to you that the board that I had as my first board had had almost no exposure to this responsibility. They had just simply never conceived of this as being the kind of responsibility which today is the day in, day out activity of trustees. I can look over that group and really that top row had some very strong, fine, of course, men; there was nobody that regarded this as being a primary responsibility of a trustee. I think the first point at which you begin to get this is with Harvey Hood.
DICKEY: And this was one of the principal things we had in mind in bringing Sig Larmon to the board, that we should find a man whose profession was, so to speak, public relations, advertising, and so forth. And he did take the first steps in the direction of making it his primary effort as a trustee. Then the next person who did that was Charlie Zimmerman and became unquestionably the most effective trustee we had during that period on this front. But Charlie came out of the Alumni Fund tradition. And I can remember when I first talked to Charlie about giving us this kind of leadership on the board, it was a new thing to him except through the experience he’d had on the Alumni Fund. But Charlie, more than any other single person, was the man who on the board led the way by example.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: In developing this sense of responsibility in the board. So it’s no figure of speech to say this is a learned responsibility that came gradually with the board and was very closely related to the first successful capital gifts campaign which Charlie chaired.

DANIELL: I was just going down my list of trustees and when they came on the board, and when you mentioned…I took from the time that you became president, and Sig Larmon is the first one that comes on in ’48.


DANIELL: Oh, well, of course he’s [inaudible] on my list, yes.

DICKEY: And this was one of the most important initiatives I took. Dud Orr, Harvey, and Dud Orr and Nelson, you see, were on the board.

DANIELL: That’s right.

DICKEY: Nelson was not particularly active as a trustee. Indeed he had stipulated to Mr. Hopkins when he came on during the early years of the war, that he’d be glad to come on the board. He had great admiration and affection for Mr. Hopkins. But that he wouldn’t be able to give it very much personal attention. Dud gave it more. But once again, he was in the Navy during the war. Harvey was a very staunch supporter and incredibly generous benefactor, mainly anonymously, to the College.
But the more I thought about this strategy of what I wanted to have accomplished here, the clearer I became that I wanted somebody on the board who had a deep creative view of the educational purpose of the College, the educational potential of the College. I didn’t want just a journeyman educator. But I wanted us to have somebody that really was just committed to the large purposes of the College. And also if we could possibly find him, somebody that had a national or even an international reputation. Well, B. Ruml filled that bill in my eyes. I checked around quite a bit. I of course knew very quickly—knew from the outset—that he was not the sort of alumnus that the alumni would take to as one who’d been active in the alumni reunions or meetings or going to football games or things of that—not at all. But of course he had already made his national reputation as the author of the pay-as-you-go income tax proposals, and had been a dean of social sciences out at the University of Chicago. Had his Ph.D.—I seem to recall he had a Ph.D., but I may be….

DANIELL: No, I think he did.

DICKEY: I think so, in psychology. I know psychology was his field.

DANIELLL: Right.

DICKEY: And was a man of immense scope. He could be a difficult fellow on occasions, but not in a board meeting. He was the most disciplined board member I think we had. He would lay out a view. He could twit somebody kindly about a stuffed-shirt point of view if there was one. But once it was clear that his ideas did not command a majority support in the board, he’d say, Okay, let’s not get into a division about this. And he would go along with the majority view. But in the meantime, he would’ve planted an idea, he would’ve made a criticism that had to be taken into account. I could hardly overstate the role he played in helping me raise the level of concern of the board. I can hardly overstate it in respect to the large educational purposes, the problem of building a strong faculty, all the things that I really felt were the foundation of accomplishment.

DANIELLL: That’s why he and Don Morrison got along so well.

DICKEY: Oh, no question about it. He and Don got along wonderfully well. Don became very fond of him. He became very fond of Don. B. had his vulnerable side. He was a fellow that from time to time would drink much more than he should. But he was a man of goodwill and a man of, well, I
can’t say it better than a large understanding with respect to the strategies of education.

DANIELL: And his role in terms of the question, the specific question I’d asked about the role of the board, of the trustees in assuming greater responsibility toward financing, would be raising their sights educationally.

DICKEY: Yes, that’s right. And concerning the needs of the place. And he kept an optimistic view of our potential. B. was never a wealthy man himself. He at one point as treasurer of Macy’s made a good salary, but I guess he spent it. But he made a great contribution to the board. Just to say one interesting thing: When we proposed bringing him onto the board, I spoke to Mr. Hopkins about it, and he said, at that time he said, “I don’t know how Bea would fit into a board.” He said, “I’ve had no experience of that. But he said, “This just might be an inspired appointment.” Well, I could see that he was glad to have a try even though he had…. And Ned French, I’m sure, who was quite a cautious, conservative man.

DANIELL: Which one is Ned French?

DICKEY: He’s the man looking down at his hands in the middle of the top row.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: He was then president of the Boston & Maine, and probably Mr. Hopkins’s closest personal friend. He, I’m sure, was quite skeptical about whether Ruml wasn’t too radical or something. Because Ruml—I don’t know whether you remember—had been the treasurer of Adlai Stevenson’s first campaign and so forth. So that while Ned didn’t complain, he wasn’t that kind of a person, I was pretty sure that he had reservations about the wisdom of this. But it wasn’t very many years, it was just a few years, when one day he said to me, “That was probably the greatest thing we’ve done for this board.”

DANIELL: How did you get him on the board? I mean when you said….

DICKEY: Well, he came on as a term trustee. Did he come on as a term trustee? I think he did.

DANIELL: Then you didn’t go through the apparatus of the Alumni Council.

DICKEY: Well, yes, if he came on as a term trustee, he did.
DANIELL: I see, yes.

DICKEY: Alumni trustees, we used to call them. I'm strangely hazy about that.

DANIELL: That's not important.

DICKEY: But there was no difficulties about it that I'm aware of or recall.

DANIELL: Ruml is the one that came in between then…

[End of Tape 25, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 25, Side B]


[Pause]

It's been close to nine months since we talked the last time. But we'll spend today talking in general about the board of trustees and your relationship to the board of trustees over a variety of things I've noted down: the selection process to get new members of the board of trustees, politics [inaudible] position on the board of trustees, the functions, internal organization, commandeering of [inaudible]. I've got a whole range of stuff under the board of trustees.

DICKEY: Uh huh.

DANIELL: The timing on this is very good for me because I'm making a concerted effort this term to continue until it's done [inaudible] sessions. [Due to background noise and soft voices, difficult to hear.]

The first question I have was simply I think it would be useful for anyone potentially using these tapes to get a clear and [inaudible] perfectly clear to you, but [inaudible], which is the nature of the way… You have— I've seen all sorts of terms used to describe trustees. There are alumni trustees, charter trustees, term trustees. Can you just straighten that out?

DICKEY: Yes. Well, that's a fairly easy assignment. As far as the official College is concerned, as far as the official position of members of the board is
concerned, they are all simply charter trustees, trustees who hold office by reason of the authority of the charter. The charter fixes the number of trustees, it fixed the fact that a certain number were from New Hampshire originally, it fixes.... Well, that's really the—those are the two: the number and certain responsibilities in the choice of the president and treasurer and so forth. When I came on the job, the board was still at its, I believe, original size, as far as I know, 12.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And I have now forgotten precisely how many were in New Hampshire, so-called New Hampshire trustees, but I think five.

DANIELL: I think it was five. That's easy enough to check.

DICKEY: And it's also worth saying that of the 12, the president and governor had become really ex officio trustees. I say had become ex officio trustees because the president is not provided—is not designated officially by the charter as an ex officio trustee, as I recall. Here if somebody looks it up and finds he is an ex officio trustee, it's a slippage in my memory. Likewise, there was a serious question in the early years, I believe, as to whether the governor was an ex officio trustee. But the fact is that for a long period, the president and the governor have been treated as ex officio trustees who held office simply during....

DANIELL: That left ten others basically to be...

DICKEY: That left ten other vacancies. The New Hampshire requirement was also to some extent covered in practice by treating the president as one of the New Hampshire trustees, treating the governor as one of the New Hampshire trustees, and that left three others to be selected. The practice before I came and indeed while I was still on the job was to have a trustee from Hanover other than the president. During Mr. Hopkins's period, I believe—I know one of the trustees was the elder Dr. Gile. And when I came on the job, his son, Jay Gile, the physician also, Dr. Jay Gile, had come onto the board and was the so-called Hanover trustee.

DANIELL: He was quite elderly at that time. Wasn't he the one...?

DICKEY: No, he, as a matter of fact, was really ought to have been just in the prime of his life. But he's the one who had been stricken by a congenital heart
problem during the war and was retired from his surgery simply because of his heart condition.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: But I think he was only….

DANIELL: Well, I knew…isn’t he the one that went down to the house that Dr. Conant lives in now?

DICKEY: That’s right. He built that house.

DANIELL: Yes, he built that house.

DICKEY: I think he was at that point about 50 years of age when I came on the job. But he was retired from active practice because of a heart condition which I believe developed fairly early on in the war. Maybe even a little bit before.

This is a fairly important fact concerning that period of the College and then the functioning of the board because these two Hanover residents were regarded to a considerable degree as a liaison with the community as a listening post for the board and the president with respect to things in Hanover. And I doubt that there would be a much better listening post than Jay Gile who was very fond of hearing people talk, and he was a great fellow for questioning him about, What are you doing? What’s going on in town?

DANIELL: Yes. He’s the Gile Forest guy, or is that…?

DICKEY: No. Yes, he’s the Gile Forest guy. His brother was Archie Gile who ran insurance—his name is still on the insurance and real estate firm.

DANIELL: Right, right. Okay.

DICKEY: And the two of them knew what went on in Hanover about as well as anybody, particularly in respect to town affairs, clinic affairs, political affairs in the broadest sense.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: So that when I came on the board, this pattern had been pretty well established. After Jay died, we went to Dr. Ralph Hunter, who was a Hanover boy, and had much of the same knowledge of the community and the region that the Giles had had, as well as having—as well as being—a member of the Hitchcock Clinic. Of course Jay Gile had had the advantage of being brought up in the clinic, well, before the clinic, as sort of an apprentice to his father. They would ride up and down the valley when Jay was a boy, his father going out to perform operations literally on kitchen tables and whatnot clear up the Connecticut Valley. And this gave Jay a knowledge of the region, of its rural character, and a love of the place that I suppose I’m in danger of overdoing as an important ingredient of Dartmouth. But it surely is an important factor in the personality of this place, of this College. That people should—somebody should know the region physically and then the character of the people in it.

DANIELL: This fits very much. Yesterday morning I did the second of what will end up being three sessions with [Robert S.] Bob Monahan ['29], and Bob Monahan was describing to me Ike’s visit for his honorary degree in ’53. And he talked about the trip around town he took, and ending up at Jay Gile’s house, who was a very sick man then. And that must have been, as I say, in ’53.

DICKEY: Right.

DANIELL: One question I had in mind was why Jay Gile? And he explained it then, and you’re just saying exactly the same thing from a different perspective.

DICKEY: Well, there’s a whole story of course that could be related at almost any length concerning the role of the Giles. It may be worthwhile to say right now, lest we don’t forget to say it later, that Jay, because of this interest in the out-of-doors and the trips which he’d taken with his father—and I believe following on a responsibility that his father had performed on the board, although I’m a little vague about that—but Jay, in any event, was the board member who took the closest interest in the Dartmouth Grant. And he and Halsey, Halsey Edgerton, who was then treasurer, of course, of the College, these were the two people who in effect managed the grant for the College--

DANIELL: That comes through on Bob’s tapes. He always refers to Halsey and Jay.

DICKEY: --during this period. Now, Mr. Hopkins had an interest, of course, in this region and knew it intimately in many ways. But he was not a fellow that
went to the grant regularly. I happen to have been such a person. I became acquainted with the grant as an undergraduate. And actually this year, this fall, is the 50th anniversary of my first visit to the grant as a sophomore. So that during the period of Mr. Hopkins’s administration, as far as I know the whole period, I believe first with his father and then with Jay, the affairs of the grant were looked after very largely by Jay and Halsey. Arch Gile took quite an interest such things. But he was not one who participated or sought to be on the inside in respect to College affairs. He had his business interests, his out-of-door interests, his cabin out on the road to Hanover Center, and hunting and raising bird dogs, and things like that. He did undertake a timbering project up in the grant which became a cropper.

DANIELL: This is Archie Gile did?

DICKEY: Archie Gile.

DANIELL: Yes. Okay.

DICKEY: But that was back in the late thirties, I believe. Well, I was speaking of the New Hampshire trustees when I turned to Jay and his special role on the board as a resident of Hanover—a native of Hanover—in addition to the governor, the president, and the Hanover trustees so-called. When I came on the board there was John R. McLane, Judge McLane, who was the senior trustee and chairman of the Executive Committee; and Dudley Orr, who was one of the junior trustees. He and Nelson Rockefeller had been brought on during Mr. Hopkins’s period just at the beginning of the war.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, Judge was the leading figure on the board. A man of very substantial position in New Hampshire affairs. His father had been a governor, and Judge had participated in public affairs in New Hampshire all his life. He was not a judge—the word “judge” was a nickname.

DANIELL: Oh, I see.

DICKEY: But he was a lawyer and a very fine lawyer in Manchester, New Hampshire.

DANIELL: That explains it. I tried to look him up at one point, and I couldn’t find him anywhere on the superior court or the supreme court.
DICKEY: No, he got that nickname as a young boy, he told me, because he was so judicious and dignified in manner that somebody said you’re just like a judge. And that went on. He was Judge McLane. Well, he was, I think it’s fair to say, the leading figure on the board. He was very close, and had been very close, to the College for a long time.

DANIELL: Which one is he?

DICKEY: He’s the first man on the top row.

DANIELL: Oh, here.

DICKEY: That’s right. And I’ve already, I believe, told you a little bit about the role he played in my coming to the job.

DANIELL: Yes, you have.

DICKEY: When he came out to scout me without my knowing it at the San Francisco conference. I had not known him before coming to the job other than who he was. I guess I met him out there at San Francisco. I think they came to see me about getting tickets to get into the UN sessions.

DANIELL: You also said, I think, I’ve listened since the last time, I’ve listened to those last ten hours of tapes we did together last spring. I think he was the one you said who called you when to, in effect, make the job offer.

DICKEY: To offer the job. Yes, that was in July…. No. Well, he got in touch with me in July right after Dudley Orr had told me at the baseball game that he had this letter from, it was either Judge or Mr. Hopkins in which I figured prominently. And then Judge called me, and I believe this was the, aside from this very casual acquaintance when he came to see me, I guess, to get tickets out at the San Francisco conference, aside from that, he called me in July to arrange for me to meet with the board and have them look me over in Boston in August. That was the day they dropped the bomb on Hiroshima. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes, that’s a great day. I don't know if I would put myself in your position. Coming out of the State Department, this is going… You couldn’t remember whether you heard about the bomb before or after.

DICKEY: I heard about it actually up in Boston that afternoon when I got to….
DICKEY: After I came to the job, I became very close to Judge. I kept in close touch with him. He was...in effect, the chairman of the Executive Committee at that point was in effect the chairman of the board. He served as the senior trustee. He did not preside at meetings. His official position was as clerk of the board. And I don't know whether you recall, but this is the only other position specified in the charter. And Judge kept the minutes. It was really a position of no great consequence except as traditionally it had been a very responsible thing, and he was very conscientious about it. But, in effect, he was the chairman of the board except that the president, under the practice then, presided at board meetings and had the responsibility for the agenda, as well as the appointment of committees, things which are now pretty much the responsibility of the chairman of the board. Dudley Orr, of course, I knew well as a classmate and one with whom I shared several years at the Harvard law School.

Well, that was the picture of the structure of the board as of that period. I believe the man who was closest to President Hopkins personally on the board...well, the closeness that I'm speaking of varied from interest to interest. Mr. Hopkins was very close to Dr. Gile personally. But his closest intimate friend was Ned French who was then president of the Boston & Maine Railroad. And they saw a great deal of each other. They had a fishing cabin together up at the St. Bernard Club in Quebec. And they went off salmon fishing together and did many things together, as well as having common business interests and background. Well, I could go right down the list. It was quite a varied list.

DICKEY: Dudley, incidentally, took over the clerkship of the board when Judge retired. And once again, performed that responsibility.

DANIELL: Yes. I'd be interested if you'd do that because, you see, this early board under Hopkins, or at least the board in the forties, of the people that I have access to, Dudley Orr is really the only other one, and he was very junior then. So your recollections about these people are probably as rich as anyone’s.

DANIELL: Was that in '56 roughly? I see that John Sullivan, who may be the... was he sort of Judge McLane’s replacement as a New Hampshire--?

DICKEY: No, he was not Judge McLane’s replacement.
DANIELL: That was just a guess. I mean there’s nothing to back it up on.

DICKEY: I think I’m certain about that. As a matter of fact, there is a story about John’s coming on the board which perhaps we should relate. But it’s something that would have to be treated as strictly out of circulation until after the death of the [inaudible] people.

DANIELL: [Inaudible]

DICKEY: That takes me—if I start on that, it takes me into a discussion of how people came onto the board.

DANIELL: Why don’t we take the Hopkins board first.

DICKEY: Alright, the membership of it and….

DANIELL: And then we’ll get into the whole setup….

DICKEY: Well, I’d spoken to Judge, and he was, in addition to being the senior member of the board, he had the respect of all the other board members very importantly. So that while he was quiet and not a man to venture opinions quickly, he was thoughtful and had a good head on him and had been a Rhodes Scholar, had a breadth of view, outlook. He was a very knowledgeable and cultured person in the best sense of it, but also deeply a New Hampshire man. Very deeply a New Hampshire man.

DANIELL: Just let me check while we’re talking over here if you find it convenient to talk over this way. I think it’s probably picking it up from here; I can tell easily enough. I just want to go over to sort of cement these things in my own mind. I think….

DICKEY: Well, why don’t I sit right here.

DANIELL: Yes, why don’t we just sit right here.

DICKEY: I can look at the board from here.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: The second man on that line of the pictures which we’re looking at of the board…and incidentally this was presented to me as a surprise when I
came to this office by Ed Latham and [Adrian] Bouchard. They had put it together on their own.

DICKEY: And these are all members of the board that I served with in the chronological order. The second man was [William West] Will Grant [Jr. ’03], who was a Denver lawyer and had been and was at that time a leading Dartmouth figure in the Denver area, and indeed that whole Rocky Mountain area. His two sons had come to Dartmouth, Ned and Bill. Both were at this point beginning to occupy positions of business leadership, professional leadership in the Denver area. I might say, incidentally, that Denver was one of the strongholds of the Dartmouth alumni at that point; it still is. Bill Grant and some of his contemporaries, I think, played a very critical role in building up that strength. Bill Grant was not a member of the board who participated closely in College affairs. This was where you saw the distance factor operating. He was conscientious. He attended meetings unless he was prevented from doing so by illness. But he was not able, because of his location and the problems of travel at that time which were considerable, to serve on committees which would be meeting frequently here in Hanover or in Boston, that sort of thing. He was generally regarded as an exceedingly wise counselor, wise member of the board. He was one of the few members of the board who had at least formal political credentials as a Democrat, which was….

DICKEY: Which there were, mighty few. And I would guess that Will’s politics were certainly not on the—a far cry from being reactionary; they were moderate to conservative. But a gentleman whose counsel I valued. And every time I had the opportunity on an alumni trip out that way, I would call on Bill and talk with him about College affairs and get his slant on things. [N.B. Sometimes refers to him as Will, sometimes Bill] He was genuinely a wise counselor.

Then there’s Vic Cutter, who was a very prominent New England business figure at this time. When I came to the board, Vic was chairman of a very important committee of the board, the finance committee or—I forget what it was called. I guess it was called the investment committee of the board that handled the College’s investment policies. At that time, I should say, we did not have a professional outside investment advisor as we subsequently had. And the members of the board, in particular the
members of the board serving on the investment committee, exercised a
great deal of personal influence and responsibility in respect to specific
investments. [Donald L.] Don Barr [’18] was a junior in Halsey’s office at
that time handling investments I guess full time. And he himself had a
professional background in securities. Halsey, of course, played an
important role in that area also. But I was impressed by the fact that on
this committee the trustees really carried the ball.

DANIELL:  Yes, yes.

DICKEY:  Well, Vic Cutter was the chairman of that committee. He at that point was
the president of the United Fruit Company and quite a pooh-bah, I guess
would be the way to put it, in New England and indeed national business
affairs because the United Fruit Company had not yet come upon the
troubles that have characterized its affairs in recent years.

DANIELL:  Yes. His name…both Dudley, I think, mentioned, nowhere near as fully as
you have, but as the group of people whom Hopkins seemed to be closest
to on the board, I think he mentioned Judge McLane, Vic Cutter, and…

DICKEY:  Well, I would have no hesitation in saying Vic Cutter played a very
influential role on the board because of his chairmanship of the investment
committee. But otherwise he really was not, in my opinion, nearly as
influential or as close to Mr. Hopkins as Ned was.

DANIELL:  Ned was, yes.

DICKEY:  And then Judge, I would suppose, would have been actually in that order
with respect to the influence exercised by an intimate. Vic Cutter was a
somewhat more bluff, outspoken, blustery fellow, rather hale and hearty in
his humor. I got on well with him, enjoyed him. But he was sort of a late
nineteenth-century kind of business buccaneer type. This was about the
way I envisaged him.

DANIELL:  I know where else I’ve heard his name, too. I have a relative, some distant
relative, who’s very much like that. His name was Sullaway, the Sullaway
Mills down in Franklin.

DICKEY:  Oh, yes.
DANIELL: And at one point somebody made a comparison, I can’t remember the context, between Vic Cutter and Dick Sullaway. And I know what you mean, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I enjoyed Vic. I would have to say that I came to wonder whether the work of that investment committee was not a little too much dependent upon the personal views and experiences of the trustees. And whether we didn’t need a more organized, professional input into the work of the committee. But this was not my field. I subsequently had more exposure to it than I had at that point. So I was a member of the committee; the president was a member ex officio of all the committees. I learned a lot from it; I enjoyed it. But I guess I should say I did have that reservation with respect to it. On the other hand, they came off, so far as I can recall, pretty well so far as results were concerned. And they had several particular funds that they were interested in building up. I remember—was it E.O. Brown or A.O. Brown Fund…?

DANIELL: A.O. Brown sounds familiar.

DICKEY: Well, in any event, it was the Brown Fund. This man had left—wanted to leave the College a million dollars. By the time it got out of the estate and so forth, there wasn’t a million dollars there. And they’d known this man and had had such a high regard for his interest and generosity, that they set out to run it, get the fund up, through their investment wizardry, up over the million dollars. And I guess in due course they got it up to two million dollars, which impressed me greatly. Well then, leaving Vic for the moment…although there’s an aspect of Vic that should be mentioned: He had a place down here somewhere in southern New Hampshire, a farm, where they grew blueberries, magnificent blueberries. Sometimes they looked almost the size of strawberries. And he would invite College staff and faculty friends and others to come down for a blueberry-picking holiday, and this became quite a nice feature of the year, going down to Cutter’s place. His wife was a very intelligent, gracious person also. I had one of my first experiences with the problem of trustee sons who had academic problems with Vic. But he was absolutely straight on it. Played it right down the line. He said, “He’s got to make his way, as far as I’m concerned.” And he wasn’t pushing to know....

[End of Tape 25, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 26, Side A]
DICKEY: ...Boston & Maine board had a number of Dartmouth alumni on it. I don’t remember who all was on it. Mr. Hopkins was close to it. I don’t even remember whether he was a member of the board at that time or not. But very closely identified with its affairs. And Harvey Hood also. And they used to joke about the board of the Vermont National Life Insurance Company and the Boston & Maine board being two Dartmouth protective societies.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: One of the things that I remember is that Ned, during the early years, had a railroad president’s car—

DANIELL: Yes, that's been....

DICKEY: --which he would put on the back of the Ambassador, as the train was called, that came out of Boston in the early afternoon to the board meetings, and quite a few of the trustees would either come up from New York or around the Boston area and get on. They would have what amounted to a rump session of the board coming up.

DANIELL: Be all ready for you. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Be ready for me. Actually there was only ever one incident, so far as I know, and I think probably I'm well informed about this, that was embarrassing at all to me. And here again I think it should be identified because it was the only difficulty I ever had with a trustee, was with Sig Larmon. And one of the trustees—two of the trustees—were on one of the trips one day coming up to a board meeting, and Sig had come up to get on apparently to do a bit of lobbying. Again, since we're going to discuss these things, we'll have to get into personalities.

The issue, the specific issue, there were background issues, but the specific issue was Sig's conviction that John Meck was not the man for the treasurer's job. And this was something that I suspected, but he had never spoken to me about it. But he got going on this, on this trip. And as it was related to me by two of the trustees who were in the affair, he had said something to the effect that John Dickey would never move on John Meck and therefore it was presumably something the trustees should do.
I heard about this very shortly afterwards from Dudley Orr and from Judge McLane. Both of them came to me individually, separately, and said they were just very unhappy about having been present at this affair.

DANIELL: Dudley mentioned this a little bit in his tape.

DICKEY: Dudley said to me, “I’ve just got to—“ I remember very vividly his coming to me and saying, “I just must tell you that I regret I didn’t say I just don’t want to be present with this kind of talk.”

DANIELL: He was clearly concerned [inaudible]…

DICKEY: Yes, that’s right.

DANIELL: As soon as you get the board in there, he’s there not as a…

DICKEY: And he said that, well, something or other. I’d learned about it I guess first from Judge McLane, and I told Dud I knew about it. And Dudley said something to the effect that, Well, I certainly was a man after his own heart, or that he admired very much the fact that I hadn’t sought to make an issue of it, that this affair had been held. And I said, No, I didn’t see that that was my role or anything else. This was something the trustees had to decide themselves, how they behaved about [inaudible]. As far as I’m concerned, you should just know now I shall never participate in anything of this sort again.

Judge was quite outraged. Judge and Sig did not get along together. I’m afraid you’ve got to say, or at least from my perspective and the perspective of several other people who were on the board who had to deal with Sig subsequently, that Sig had what could be characterized as New Yorkitis. He could not believe that anybody in Boston business or, let alone New Hampshire…

DANIELL: I was going to say it wasn’t just New Yorkitis.

DICKEY: Was able to… Well, these other people were big league players. This subsequently became an issue with Jock Brace, Lloyd Brace, which was the culminating issue as far as Sig was concerned.

DANIELL: This was becoming a life trustee.
DICKEY: That’s right. When… There can be no doubt about it, Sig, very understandably, aspired to that vacancy. But…I’m not sure just how we got onto this now.

DANIELL: Well, you got onto it because we were on Ned French’s private car.

DICKEY: Oh, Ned French’s private car, yes.

DANIELL: That’s where the plot was hatched.

DICKEY: That incident took place on that private car.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And as far as I know, it’s the only time that there was ever anything else, any similar incident that took place.

DANIELL: Incidentally, I have written to Sig, and I have no idea whether he’s going to be interested in participating.

DICKEY: Well, I should think he might well be. And let me say, my relations with Sig have never been other than formally amicable. Sig has his view of these things. I think it will differ sharply probably….

DANIELL: Well, it’s the one in a sense of all the potential interviews that I look forward to, with all the connotations of looking forward to, with trepidation because first I heard of him through a man named Hathaway who was on the board of overseers of the Hanover Inn with me, Young & Rubicam. A man [inaudible] Mr. Larmon as a very austere person who may have become even more so when he retired from the company. And then having gone through his file, I get a good sense of, at least, when he was younger. I guess he was the one who led the movement not to have [Thomas] Tom Braden [‘40] become a trustee later, or at least he was a spokesman for that.

DICKEY: Yes. He had had a prospect of success on that, but I think he gave up on that—

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: --because it didn’t seem likely to get to do anything on that. But there’s more that can be said about this, about Sig’s coming onto the board, when
we come to the selection of trustees. Insofar as it was a problem for me, I should say now it was a problem which I bought, and I'm afraid I'd have to say, because of inadequate knowledge of some of Sig's vulnerabilities, one of which, I subsequently learned from everybody that had ever known him, was really an outsized ego. And I'm talking about people who were close to him, his friends and so forth. Sig just never really realized...he had no insight into how ego-ridden he was.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: This was not the kind of amusing vanity which all of us occasionally....

DANIELL: It's because of that, again, that I'm going to be very, very much aware of the circumspectness — if he, you know, if he asks me to come down and interview him—because I....

DICKEY: But at the same time let it be said, in all respects, handled himself as a gentleman. Did not get flamboyant in making his views and stating his views. And it was possible to have an amicable relationship even though there'd be some great disagreements, some very fundamental disagreements, and some of them were potentially quite serious.

I guess we've gotten into this sufficiently that I should mention that this is the kind of talk that I think is just better known to historians after the actors are off the scene than before. The other thing which I should have known but didn't know, but which Mr. Hopkins alerted me to, was that Sig had been passed over as a possible person to come onto the board earlier.

There had been some of those who thought that Sig should be brought onto the board before I came to the job. And Mr. Hopkins said to me, he said, “There are many things to be said in favor of Sig coming onto the board. He’s an active alumnus.” Cotty [Russell R. "Cotty" Larmon '19] was one of Mr. Hopkins’s closest associates. And Sig had been generous to the College with money and service. So that he had an eligibility for inclusion in the board that was very great.

The two factors that weighed most importantly with me, in addition to that eligibility, later were that we were trying to organize a development activity, which we thought we needed somebody with his professional background in advertising and so forth to do. And secondly, he was based in New York and one of the real problems in the Dartmouth alumni constituency has always been New York: How to cover it in any useful
way. And these were the two things that commended Sig. When I talked to Mr. Hopkins about this, and I’d talked to him about every one of the trustees, as I recall, that we might be thinking about to get, he said, Well, there was a very real case for bringing Sig onto the board earlier. And he said, “Maybe we should have done it.” He said, “I don’t really want to say that we were necessarily right or wrong.” But he said, “One of the things that you have to reckon with is he’s still about 100 percent Swede.” I can remember this, he said, “About 100 percent Swede.” [Laughs] He said, “If he gets an idea in his head, I don’t think you can blast it out.” Well….

DANIELL: That's two racial remarks...

DICKEY: I didn't pay very much attention to that until later.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: I didn’t pay enough attention to it perhaps. In any event, that was the background of that. But I mentioned his feeling that John Meck was not the man for the job. There are other things. He had a…well, to be a little snide about it, I’m afraid I’d have to say a big advertising man’s view of college athletics. He was very fond of saying in the board: You don’t go into it unless you’re going to be successful. And when we would have a losing football season, of which we had more than our share at that point, he would almost invariably get this line off in the board: Well, what’s wrong with Dartmouth football? It’s causing us all sorts of problems with the alumni. Well, this is the kind of thing nobody needed to tell a college president about [Laughs] who was awake at least eight hours a day. And there was this, that he didn’t think somehow or other we were paying enough attention to winning football games.

Then there was a less pleasant thing, where I had to stand up and be pretty, well, I won’t say severe, but at least inflexible in saying that we were dealing with a matter of principle that I had been very clear about. I didn’t see the opportunities for compromising and finagling that were being discussed. This was on the question of the Jewish admissions. And there was a meeting—I will never forget it—this particular session of the board was at our house in the dining room. And Sig had obviously come loaded with this issue and was going to press it.

Well, we all listened to it—with embarrassment, to be perfectly blunt about it—that this situation was getting out of hand or it was out of hand. And it was going to hurt the fundraising, it was going to hurt this, it was going to
hurt that, and so forth. Judge, I could see, was most uncomfortable. But Judge would rarely speak up when he was uncomfortable. He’d just sit quietly and didn’t say anything.

I felt finally that I had to say that I just wasn’t sure where this was heading. But if it was heading toward the establishment of some sort of a quota system of that sort, I just had to say that we had worked our way out of a problem in this respect. I was confident of our ability to handle it on a straightforward basis. But I just felt that making it an issue that involved outside interests and alumni and whatnot was the surest way to get us into a very unpromising situation in which we would be on the wrong side of a principle.

I don’t remember now just how far beyond that I went in the meeting. But as they were leaving the house, as the trustees were leaving the house, Judge came up. And he was not a man ever to show, or very rarely, to show his feelings on something. And he came up to me as he went out of the door, and he said, “I was proud of you tonight.” He said I forget what it was. “Well,” I said, “this is about as close as probably I’ll come to saying that it’s either me or...” “Well,” he said, “if you ever get to that point, don’t hesitate to come see me.”

But it was clear from that evening’s discussion that Sig had no support. Now you may have had people who were, on the board, I’m sure, who were not thoroughly enthusiastic about enlarging the Jewish constituency at the College, and who believed very strongly that this sort of thing could, as they would put it, get out of hand. But they understood that they were dealing with a very, not just delicate, but a very fundamental problem at a time when American society was changing on these matters, speedily and drastically, in a way that you probably have no memory of as a young man, as an undergraduate at that time. This was showing up in the fraternity issue.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: It was showing up, of course... I had just served on President Truman’s Civil Liberties Committee—or Civil Rights, I guess they called it. So it was showing up here, here, and here. And to, as a major college, get involved in seeing what you could do to keep this, as the euphemistic phrase goes, from getting out of hand, the board, I think, to a man realized that they’d better let the president work his way through this and not try to manage it. Well, those were some of the issues.
DANIELL: I was interested, when I went through Sig's file, I noticed—I read the speech that he gave at the 50-year class, I guess it was, when a number of the people who had been trustees had been asked to give these. And clearly there was a kind of distance. But an acceptance of his relationship to you reflected in what he congratulated you for on the accomplishments of the presidency. I don’t know if you've ever read that speech.

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: But one had to do with his favorite idea of debate, communication. I believe one had to do with not letting—with making the board of trustees less local. I think he said that at one point in the early fifties that there wasn't anybody on the board that was west of the Hudson…. But they were clearly points of congratulations which were—

DICKEY: Stayed away.

DANIELL: --stayed away from what I had known, from what Dudley said, and from what I could read between the lines, were the points of difference.

DICKEY: Well, he had a different outlook. Subsequently, the issues tended to focus over this board question, the organization of the board. He wanted an outside chairman, which was clearly directed at my position. To have somebody more independent of the president as board chairman. He wanted a larger board for various reasons; I'm not sure just what. And he had, needless to say, a very sophisticated business view of organization and boards and so forth. But I really think, without ever understanding entirely his motivation and I’m sure none of us ever entirely understand our own motivations or admit to them to ourselves even, he had many ulterior factors that were involved in his positions.

DANIELL: I get that impression.

DICKEY: I've just got to say that, that, oh, I don’t feel really that I want to go into too much of this. But there are some amusing things that came to mind the other day. One of them was while we were engaged in discussing in the board an honorary degree slate—I forget which year it was—while he was still on the board. And one of the recommendations, which had cleared the committees, and which I was very pleased about was that we should give a degree to Alfred Lunt and Lynn Fontanne together. I don’t know what got into Sig. But he said, “I don’t know that I think this is worthy of Dartmouth.”
Well, hell, here were the two most prominent stage makers in our time and none of us quite understood what it was. And he said, “Well,” he said, “I don’t know whether the stage has a reputation that we want identified with Dartmouth.”

Well, people were just flabbergasted. They didn’t know whether to laugh or keep quiet or whatnot. It was a form of, I’m afraid I’d have to say, putting on airs of a sort that were just not appropriate to the issue. Well, I was reminded of it the other day. Alfred Lunt and Lynn Fontanne have given a very valuable book to the College, saying that one of the high spots of their memories was the day they received their joint degree at Dartmouth. And I think one of our happier moments also. Well, so much for that.

DANIELL: We’re back at Ned French.

DICKEY: Come back to Ned French. I don’t think there’s much more to be said. Ned was a cautious man. He was a very prudent man. I’m not sure that you would say that Ned was a wise man in the large sense. But in respect to the affairs of business and of men, his caution, his prudence took on a quality of homespun, North Country wisdom.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I’d always liked Ned, never was intimate with Ned. But I think we had a mutual respect for each other. I had a very nice relationship with Arthur Ruggles, Dr. Arthur Ruggles [1901], who was a psychiatrist. All of these people, of course, were Dartmouth alumni. And he was a leader of the private mental hospital down in Rhode Island. What’s it called?

DANIELL: I don’t know. I know about him because when Dudley Orr mentioned the person who was head of a private mental institution and given his background, my immediate question was how did he ever get on the board? Do you have an explanation for that? I mean this is not....

DICKEY: Well, he had been a friend of Mr. Hopkins and had been connected with the College as an advisor in respect to mental health—

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: --at one point, whether before he came on the board or afterwards, I don’t know. But he was on the board when I came. I even have some feeling that he had been full time here, lived here briefly at some point. But in any
event, knew Hanover well and a person to whom Mr. Hopkins turned frequently for advice with respect to people who had psychiatric problems. And I had occasion to do the same myself. We had—I say we—the College had had a regular Oxford kind of mystery going on over in Silsby Hall in faculty affairs involving the zoology and botany departments, particularly before I came to the job, and it was still going on when I came. And people who were involved in it are mostly retired; some of them are still living. But [Carl Louis] Wilson in botany, [William Byers] Unger in zoology, [William B.] Ballard ['28] in zoology, subsequently [Leland] Griggs’s [1902] name became central in the affair. One or two others. And during Mr. Hopkins’s years apparently this got to be really not just good clean fun, but it began to be manifested in activities that were more than just pranks. They were malicious things, messing up somebody’s desk and his papers or putting his name on the bulletin board in an unpleasant way; things that looked as if they had some mental health quirk behind them.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: So Mr. Hopkins got Arthur Ruggles to look into this quietly. He knew some of these people personally from earlier association. And at the time I came to the job, it was quiet for—had been for a few months. And then it manifested itself in some way that was brought to my attention. And knowing about the fact that Arthur Ruggles had been used by Mr. Hopkins previously, I conferred with him. So he gave me quite a rundown, quite a briefing on the situation. I knew Professor Unger very well having served him as a laboratory instructor during my senior year, and I’d studied under Wilson and knew Ballard, and I just couldn’t imagine these people being involved in the kind of hassling that was going on. And Arthur Ruggles said, “Well, I’m going to shock you because I don’t think you will be able to give any credence to what I’m going to say. But nevertheless, it’s my judgment, and I should share it with you.” He said, “I don’t think this situation will go on once Doc Griggs is off the scene.”

Well, it did shock me. I thought of Doc Griggs as a, if not lovable, at least an enjoyable codger-type who was the great, honored patron of the Outing Club and all of these things. It just never occurred to me that Griggs on any basis that I could conceive of would be involved in something of this sort. Well, Arthur said, "I know just how you’re reacting and quite understandably. But I’m satisfied that Griggs is at the bottom of this." He said, “I think the others may have been drawn in, in one way or another, reacting or being played upon, thinking that somebody was doing
something to them, some other person was doing something to them, when the fact is that it was being done by Griggs.” [Laughter]

I don’t know to this day what the truth of that situation was. I do know that when Griggs retired and was no longer around Silsby Hall, it apparently stopped.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Now whether that was coincidence…

DANIELL: Yes, there’s a lot of discussion on the tapes about the feuding between those two things. But what you’ve described is an individual being maybe a perpetrator of the exaggerated forms of something that hasn’t come out before. Arthur Wilson who did all the interviews of the people involved couldn’t help but believe at the end of the interviews, ah, episodes, it was clear there was a lot of animosity left even though the extreme examples of their….

DICKEY: Needless to say, this was a view of the matter that was not widely disseminated. [Laughter] I think it would have been a good way to discredit your own judgment if you’d gone around town saying the fellow that was up to all this was Griggs. And I have to say emphatically at this point I don’t know to this day what the explanation of it was.

I used to have a nice, pleasant personal relationship with Griggs. I never heard him say anything, never saw anything done that would make this even remotely an explanation of the difficulties. But I do know it quieted down and disappeared later. I never talked with my other friends on the faculty about it because I was afraid that I couldn’t do that and not get my position compromised by friendship or whatnot.

DANIELL: So that's one thing that Mr. Ruggles did.

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: So that's one thing that he did in there.

DICKEY: Yes. And he was not a major influence on the Board but in a matter of this…

[End of Tape 26, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 26, Side B]

DANIELL: …and you were visiting him up there.

DICKEY: I had a very close relationship with him. I think it’s fair to say an intimate relationship. He was progressively confined to his room or brief automobile trips on the outside, but…. On several occasions I got him to go up to the grant with me. And he came up to Swanton once on one of our duck-hunting expeditions and just sat around the camp and enjoyed it greatly.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: But he was incapacitated from doing any work. It was really a sad thing to see a man who’d been such an active surgeon so completely out of his profession as a young man, relatively young man. His usefulness to me was that I felt free to talk with him about perplexities involving personnel, people in town sometimes, relationships with the clinic.

Well, for example, there was a faculty member who became I guess it’s fair to say fairly paranoid at one point. Thought we in the administration were out to do him in or something. And I was able to talk with Jay about this. And what did you do under these circumstances? And get his counsel and advice, which was useful. I talked with him frequently about town and gown relationships, the taxation problems in the town. He knew everybody from way back. Talked with him often about the grant and our policies there.

He would respond on something like the grant. Most other things, particularly academic problems, he would not venture an opinion. On a personnel matter where he knew the individual, he would say, Well, he’s a difficult person, or he won’t give you any trouble, or whatnot. We got to know his wife very well, Ted, saw a lot of her, and the boys. One of the first problems on admissions involving an alumni son was with one of Jay’s sons very early on. But that was handled satisfactorily. He was close to Mr. Hopkins. After…well, I would frequently go up to Jay’s and then go on up to Mr. Hopkins and see him at the same time, talking over the same thing, frequently, with them. He was a warm, enjoyable, interested friend.

DANIELL: Did you know him at all before?
DICKEY: Not at all. No, I think the first time I met him was at that meeting of the trustees in Boston when I came up in August before I came to the job. But we hit it off well. And I think he may have had some hesitation about opening the grant up to multiple use...as Halsey definitely did.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: And we would have talked this over, and I would accept his views as representing the views that had to be taken seriously. But I ultimately decided that I would go the other way on it.

DANIELL: He would have preferred or his inclination was to keep it mainly...?

DICKEY: Keep it under wraps. Keep it closely restricted. And to use it almost solely for investment purposes very largely because of the fire risk if it was opened up to multiple use.

Well, then you come over to Bill Minsch. He was a broker, an investment man in New York City, a very savvy fellow. Again, a rather humble person about his opinions. He would state them if you asked him, but not likely to volunteer them. Not—I'm sure you'd say—sophisticated with respect to educational, higher educational matters. A man who had been active in the Alumni Fund, and I think came onto the board primarily to help on fundraising, the Alumni Fund and on the New York alumni relationships. But Bill was not someone that exercised great influence on the board.

Governor [Robert O.] Blood, I don't believe, ever attended the board while I was on the board. Let's see. No, that isn't... I get these two governors mixed up.

DANIELL: You can see they were very important. [Laughs]

DICKEY: Well, neither one of them attended meetings.

DANIELL: Blood was one and [Hugh] Gregg was one that didn't.

DICKEY: Well, Gregg did.

DANIELL: Gregg did attend?

DICKEY: Oh, yes, Gregg and [Sherman] Adams.
DANIELL: I don’t know. I wouldn’t know.

DICKEY: Well, I’ll skip those for the moment. The first serious attention to the board on the part of the governors in my years was by Sherm Adams.

DANIELL: Sherm Adams, yes.

DICKEY: And he did pay attention to it and was very helpful, very.

DANIELL: Do you know how serious?

DICKEY: I haven’t heard.

DANIELL: Well, I just—I thought it was something….

DICKEY: So did it. I thought it was just a bump…he was operated on.

DANIELL: I saw him yesterday. They operated on a brain clot.

DICKEY: Yes. A clot, yes. They said he was coming along well, but I don’t know anything about it.

DANIELL: He was a good undergraduate friend of my father’s.

DICKEY: Is that so?

DANIELL: They were long-distance walkers.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Some question as to whether Sherm Adams holds the long-distance walking record or if Lorne Daniell does. So I hope he comes around. He and Walter Peterson and Lane Dwinell are at least three of the governors I want to get to… Quite short interviews, whether they’ll get to them.

DICKEY: Well, Harvey Hood, of course, you know a great deal about. One of the all-time great trustees, in my judgment, of the College. Wise, generous. A very fine person to work with. I enjoyed working with Harvey. Got a lot from Harvey. Frequently some extremely good advice in personnel matters.
John Sloan Dickey

Well, for example, we mentioned John Meck. Harvey knew about as much about managing securities as somebody not in the business would know. A very wealthy man, and his business, and so forth. He came to have the highest respect for John Meck in this regard. [Inaudible] that we had in this sort of thing was perfectly aware that John had his awkward moments when dealing with people. But he just said, “Sig doesn’t know what he’s talking about” when we talked about something.

DANIELL: He was able to give you confidence in your own judgment, which was not based on the business so much as the personalities...

DICKEY: And about as free, so far as one could tell, of personal smallness as I’ve ever seen in a man. He knew that Sig, from time to time, was saying fairly critical things about the Boston board...or the Dartmouth board was too Boston, too much Boston, that Boston business wasn’t in the mainstream and so on and so forth. Well, he was running quite a little business [inaudible] those things. And yet he tried as hard as anybody on the board to find ways to keep Sig happy. Ultimately failed. Such ways as stretching the meaning of emeritus to include somebody who resigned and things like that. I thought he was going a little far down the road to try to keep peace.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Dudley Orr was one of the genuinely intellectual strengths of the board. Has a very fine mind, was a top student in Dartmouth, very able student at law school. Had a year abroad on a College fellowship in France. A very sophisticated person culturally. And I would say, of all the people on the board during this period, with the possible exception of B. Ruml, was a trustee to whom you could talk educational policy, educational objectives with the certainty that he knew what you were talking about and had something to say about it.

DANIELL: I get a sense of that [inaudible].

DICKEY: Oh, yes. So that this was a very fine person. He was not somebody that sought to throw his weight around in the board. He was clerk. He would frequently make penetrating remarks that were half humorous, but only half humorous, that went to the heart of a matter Sometimes he would seem to some members of the board to be a little too puckish in this respect.
DANIELL: Yes, yes. Oh, yes.

DICKEY: Because he had this tendency not to get burdened down by things. But I always had the feeling that—such as the occasion when he came to me that I related to you about the railroad car session and so forth—that when an issue of fundamental decency was at stake, Dudley could be counted upon to stand up and take a correct position. So I rated him as one of the very strong members of the board. Harvey Hood, of course, was the man that founded the Trustees’ Planning Committee.

DANIELL: We’ll get to that.

DICKEY: Was great on planning function. I believe was our first chairman of our board of overseers of the Tuck School. Took a considerable interest in the Tuck School, everything Dartmouth. In many ways, an all-time, all-Dartmouth trustee. Nelson, of course….

DANIELL: Dudley agrees with that absolutely. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Yes. Of course Nelson I didn’t see a great deal of after I came to the job.

DANIELL: He retired in ’52 according to my notes.

DICKEY: He came up to several meetings while I was on the job…more than several perhaps. But he was terribly busy doing other things. And then toward the end went into the [Dwight D.] Eisenhower administration as undersecretary to Mrs. [Oveta Culp] Hobby in HEW. There is an aspect of his service that should be mentioned. He was, of course, generous in setting up scholarships and other things. And when one of the life trustees—

DANIELL: You might mention….

DICKEY: --retired…and I’m trying to think who it would have been. What?

DANIELL: I was going to say, when you talk about a life trustee….

DICKEY: I should get this terminology clear for you.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: As I said, everybody was legalistically—or legally—was on the same footing under the charter. But then by agreement with the Alumni Council back in Mr. Hopkins’s day, maybe it was even in Dr. Tucker’s day, they did decide that the Alumni Council should be a nominating body for half of the ten trustees. And they came to be called alumni trustees—which was a somewhat unfortunate term because there’s no requirement in the charter that they should be alumni or anything else—elected for one year [one term??], eligible for a second five-year term.

DANIELL: Yes. Okay.

DICKEY: This was the way the thing stood through most of my years on the job.

DANIELL: They’re sometimes called term trustees?

DICKEY: They’re called variously—later they came to be called term trustees more than alumni trustees. But basically they were called alumni trustees because they were nominated by the Alumni Council. This was a very important effort—back in I think it was Mr. Hopkins’s day although it may go clear back to Dr. Tucker’s day—in an effort to bring the alumni into a more active sense of responsibility and authority in regard to College policies that were under the board.

Subsequently, life trustees were, however, required, before they came on the board, to file a resignation as of age 70. So that they were not life trustees. Mr. Hopkins once told me that he wasn’t at all sure that when anybody got around to making a judgment about his contributions to Dartmouth—he said this half facetiously, I’m sure—that they wouldn’t say that having achieved a retirement of age 70 on the part of trustees wasn’t as great as anything else he achieved. They’d gotten into some very sticky situations apparently back in the earlier days.

DANIELL: I had the sense from Hopkins it was a real rough time.

DICKEY: Well, what’s-his-name—[Lewis] Parkhurst [1878]—was, I guess, the most difficult that he had, the man who gave money for Parkhurst Hall and so forth, and he stayed on and on and on and on. But finally they did get to the point where they agreed that any person who came on the board thereafter would file his resignation as of age 70. I had no problem with it because this action had been taken. The so-called alumni or term trustees had two years of eligibility—or two terms of eligibility…
DANIELL: Five years each.

DICKEY: …unless they came to age 70 in one of those terms, at which point they retired anyway.

DANIELL: Was there any restriction on people who are term or alumni trustees being made life trustees?

DICKEY: None at all. And this was a somewhat delicate question. When a life trusteeship would open up, there always were expectations. And frequently they did go to the alumni trustees for the man. But I came to believe this was a very dubious practice because it closed down your range of selection.

DANIELL: Yes. Right, right.

DICKEY: Frequently one of the most important values of the so-called life trustee was that the board was in a position to take him without any regard to alumni politics.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And if you always had to think about alumni politics, you closed in the range of qualities that you were looking for in the board. And this was—I think we brought B. Ruml on, for example, I think he would be the striking example, of this as a life trustee. B. was not a good alumnus in the sense that most alumni would characterize an individual as a good alumnus. B. couldn’t be dragged to a football game. He didn’t go to alumni dinners. He said, “The alumni are important. I honor their role in Dartmouth as much as anybody else. And the Alumni Fund is one of the greatest things in American higher education. But don’t ask me to go to these affairs. My contribution to Dartmouth has got to be different.” Well, I honored that. We needed on the board a man of national and international creative, intellectual significance. And of course, B., as you again might not remember this, but B. Ruml was a name to conjure with.

DANIELL: Oh, yes!

DICKEY: Pay-as-you-go and had been dean of the social sciences at the University of Chicago. And on and on and on.
DANIELL: So the board then selects—the existing members of the board—select the life members, the non-alumni.

DICKEY: That's right.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: And they entered into an agreement with the Alumni Council that they would elect to the board for these term positions nominees of the Alumni Council.

DANIELL: Okay. One final—since we’re getting [inaudible] I had in mind simply an hour ago when I asked, but this is as good a time to get…is there any interrelationship between this and the New Hampshire qualification? Or was this just worked out on ad hoc basis?

DICKEY: It was worked out on an ad hoc basis.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: Entirely so. Now this has subsequently been changed several times.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But still basically all are charter trustees with these various opportunities for different nominating procedures, different retirement requirements with respect to age and so forth.

DANIELL: Okay. We were back at Nelson Rockefeller. You might just—it would be useful for the names you’ve gone over now if you could, don’t name them all, but just those who were life trustees.

DICKEY: Well, Nelson never became a life trustee, and I’ve always wondered whether this was a mistake on the part of the board. And if it was, it was a mistake of judgment by Judge McLane. I forget whose life trusteeship opened up. Maybe it was Jay Gile.

DANIELL: He was a life trustee.

DICKEY: Jay was a life trustee. Ned French is a life trustee. Will Grant was and Vic Cutter and Judge. But at some point a life trusteeship, while Nelson was still an alumni trustee, opened up. Shortly after—we can of course find out
from the record whose vacancy it was—shortly after Nelson had gone into the Eisenhower administration as undersecretary in HEW. And there were long discussions among several of us about what we should do in this respect. Not going to Nelson and asking him to stay as a life trustee, because his term would have been running out in the near future, was something that I was sure was a major question because here was Dartmouth in need of large financial support. And there were darned few people on that board that could give it. Nobody could give it the way Rockefeller could. And this was an asset I’m afraid I’d have to say most other institutions would have grabbed without being too fancy about it. But the principle had been carefully cultivated that the Dartmouth board, because of its size, 12, with ten working members other than the president and the governor.

DANIELL: I was going to say…. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Ten outside members. Was a working board. This was the phrase that was constantly being used. And that it was important to keep the board small. But if you were going to keep it small, you also had to expect that every member would be able to attend meetings unless he was ill. That he would not be in a position of having to use business excuses or governmental responsibilities and not attend. Because once this began, and this is the case, and it’s a very strong case....

DANIELL: Strong case.

DICKEY: Once this began, somebody else would say, Well, my God! I’m just as much entitled to cut this meeting as Whoosy was and so forth. So that this became almost a dogma, that this was a working board, and therefore no one came onto this board and no one should stay on this board if he was unable to be a regular participant in the board meetings, which were four times a year at that time, and available for board service in some way. Even recognizing that when you lived out in Colorado, it was a handicap for this kind of service. Well, Judge was just as clear as a man could be about this, that there just couldn’t be any compromise with it.

So we agreed that Judge would go down to Washington and have a talk with Nelson to see how he felt about this. I said that I thought it would be better that Judge should do it alone rather than with me because I’d known Nelson back when I worked for him in the government and so forth. And Judge was, again, the senior member of the board, chairman of the Executive Committee, which was operating as the Nominating Committee
for life trusteeships. This is important to remember: We did have the Executive Committee operating as the Nominating Committee for life trusteeships.

Well, he went down and had a talk with Nelson. I’ve never heard from Nelson anything about that meeting. I thought I wouldn’t ask, and he never volunteered it. But when Judge came back, he said it just is not feasible for Nelson to take this. He says he’s interested in Dartmouth, and he would like to in a sense stay in touch with Dartmouth. But that he just cannot give us any assurance about his ability to be a regular person as far as board attendance is concerned. And it was perfectly clear that as far as Judge was concerned, the question was settled. I was not as clear about that as Judge was. I had a feeling that if there was any situation where we ought to allow a little leeway, it was probably with respect to Nelson.

Nelson is, as we all know, a very remarkable person, a very strong person, as well as a very wealthy person. And I would have to say that left to my own devices, I think I would’ve said, Nelson, let’s go forward with you staying on the board. And if we subsequently reach a judgment that it’s not a good thing from your point of view or from the College’s point of view, let’s talk it over then. Whether that would have been a wise thing to do, I just can’t possibly say. But I can say with certainty that it was not something that would have been acceptable to Judge unless you were prepared to really go to the mat about it.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And I wasn’t—I didn’t have that confidence, and I certainly wasn’t going to disrupt the board over something that would look like a personal solicitation of a man. And this is not a good thing either. So Nelson left the board. And I think the way it’s worked out, his interest in the College has not been nearly as close as it would’ve been otherwise.

DANIELL: I’m—this is quite apart from the substance of your experience—but I purposely assume that I’ll hold off 18 months or so disengagement from Washington before I write Nelson, and ask him if he’d like to take part in this project. I do this mainly just because I think it’s more likely after he’s disengaged with that. But it seems to me also that he may be for the first time, as he retires from intense involvement with governmental activities, be in a position where he may...possibility for a regeneration of interest in College affairs.
DICKEY: Yes. Well, I wouldn't be at all surprised he wouldn't once he's unwound a bit—I think you’re absolutely right about waiting for that—that he would accept your invitation and have something to say. He’s been deeply influenced by his experience as governor. He used to tell me, he said, “Oh, you people up there at Dartmouth, you’re putting through 3,000 or 4,000. We’re putting through 80,000.”

DANIELL: Yes, it sounds like him. I can hear him say that.

DICKEY: “And we’re going to double it, you know.” He really got swept overboard by these numbers. And he did do a great job of enlarging the New York State University system. Whether he over-enlarged it is now a very serious question in the eyes of some people. But I don’t know enough about that to say. I do know that his view of Dartmouth…. He remained what you’d call a loyal Dartmouth alumnus and all of that, as far as I knew; I never heard of any disaffection or any of that. But Nelson is a fellow with tunnel vision.

DANIELL: Yes. Well, that’s why he gets so much done.

DICKEY: He gets something to do, that he wants to do, God! He’s just like a dog in heat. [Laughter] And he doesn’t get easily diverted. So that when he was governor of New York….

DANIELL: Instead of 18 months, I’ll wait 28 months.

DICKEY: When he got to be governor of New York, that was his focus, and very properly so. This is the way he accomplishes things.

DANIELL: That’s what I mean, yes.

DICKEY: He was in New York State, and he would always be available if I wanted to see him. But I frankly felt I just could not take advantage of our Dartmouth relationship to ask to see him and this sort of thing. This… I perhaps should say a word about before we leave Nelson, and then we’ll call it off for the day.

I had to work my way through to a definite position in this regard. I didn’t anticipate that I would have to. But very shortly after he got into the governor’s job and these other positions of prominence in the federal government, I found that, not a lot, but enough alumni were approaching
me to use my Dartmouth position to introduce them, to get something
done. There was never anything improper. But to introduce them to him or
this or that. And I just, after a good bit of thought, said to myself, This is
something I just will not do. This is not fair to him. It’s not really what the
College, the president of the College, ought to be doing. And I’m going to
have to just say, no.

For example, Bill Minsch’s son wanted an appointment as commissioner
at the Atomic Energy Commission. He’d been down in the staff. Came
clear up here to Hanover one day to try to persuade me to introduce him,
write a letter or something, supporting his candidacy for appointment as
Atomic Energy commissioner and so on. I just had to say, “Bill, I’m sorry.
I’ve crossed this bridge. I just cannot do it. I know that it’s disappointed
some friends, and it seemed like a little too much starch on my part. But
that’s the way it’s going to be, and that’s the way it’s been, that’s the way
it’s going to have to be.”

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I never talked with him about it. But I think he must have known that—and
in turn I think he played the game pretty well with me. Once in a while I
would get letters that clearly were written by his secretary that he had
signed about an admissions case of a prominent New York State politician
that he wanted to tell me what a fine man the father was, one of those
letters.

DANIELL: Nothing about the kid, but...

DICKEY: And I suppose over the years I might’ve gotten, well, conceivably I got six
of those over the whole period. But by and large, he played the same
game, which I appreciated and...

[End of Tape 26, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 27, Side A]

DANIELL: …another session the following Friday, January 21, 1977.

[Break]

… done is to first get straight, in at least the formal pattern, in the ways—the
difference between the life trustee, between the alumni or a term
trustee. And then you’ve gone down through your list on the board here of
those who were in Hopkins’s board of trustees; so basically the board of trustees that you inherited when you became president. And we’ve really gone in sequence there. The last one we talked about was Nelson Rockefeller, though earlier we had pushed ahead and talked about someone who I guess came on the board after you became president—Mr. Larmon. Is Nelson Rockefeller the last of those up there?

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: So that was the nature of the board…. So why don’t we—before we go on with the sort of individual profile, give me general observations about the way that Mr. Hopkins—well, his relationship basically to his board of trustees. I get a sense from, well, from Dudley Orr in particular, that it wasn’t a relationship in which…well, let’s put it this way, in the sense that Hopkins pretty much dominated the board of trustees in a way in which, I suspect, later when there was much more activity on the part of the board of trustees—I’m guessing at that, and I don’t really know.

DICKEY: I don’t really know. I can only surmise from what was said to me by individual members of the board occasionally, and what little I knew about their ongoing relationship to the College, which reflected, to some extent, their experience on the board.

I think it’s probably fair to say that the board was a much more New England-centered board. Bill Minsch, of course, was New York, but not a major influence in the board. Arthur Ruggles was New England, and the others there, with the exception of Will Grant who was out in Denver and really not close to the board, all of the others, again with Nelson being New York, the strong influences in the board were dominantly and unquestionably New England. And they were also dominantly and unquestionably close personal friends, business associates of Mr. Hopkins. Very close, as I’ve indicated. Ned and Judge and Vic and Harvey, Arthur Ruggles, Jay Gile, these people were really intimates.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: They were not only intimates, but they were, of course, very—not merely respectful and sympathetic with Mr. Hopkins’s leadership, they were deeply admiring of it. And there was, I would guess, very little contention, very little contention. I would suspect, from what little I know of the members, very little debate.
DANIELL: That's exactly what Dudley...

DICKEY: Or, if you want to say deliberation—

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: --of issues within the board. This reflected, I gather, a confidence that these men had in Mr. Hopkins, but also the way he did business, and they way they were accustomed in their businesses to doing business. Very few, none of these men, really, had had experience with an academic board in modern times, except several of them were Mr. Hopkins’s contemporaries. But people such as Dudley and Nelson were—and indeed Harvey or Jay—these were much younger people than Mr. Hop.

So I think it is almost a certain thing that in this respect it was a very different operation from the operation which I thought was appropriate to the kind of leadership I wanted to try to establish in the institution. And the best evidence I have of this I suppose was that many members were constantly saying, as I’m sure they say to John Kemeny today, we’re being worked much harder. Well, the problems become more complicated. The institution becomes more a national institution. And on and on and on. But this was constantly being observed by Harvey Hood, for example, who couldn’t have been a greater admirer of any leadership than he was of Mr. Hopkins’s. He wanted Mr. Hopkins’s advice in his business affairs and otherwise. He had, I would suppose, as close as any man comes to utter confidence in another man’s judgment and leadership. So that it was a board that reflected the situation, reflected the times, reflected their age and their relationship to Mr. Hopkins. And most importantly, I guess, it was a board that essentially reflected the business, professional background.

DANIELL: This is…. Do you—? You may not have any comments on this at all. I can’t remember whether I—again, Dudley Orr used the phrase in his interview—or whether it comes out of the Hopkins’s tape. But somewhere there’s a suggestion that Hopkins had a much rougher time with his board of trustees in the initial years of his presidency. And the statement that I’m referring to is the one that, Well, things were fine after we got rid of the ministers and the judges.

DICKEY: [Laughs] Well, again, I have even less knowledge of that. On occasion, Mr. Hopkins would half humorously refer back to his very first days on the job. And I’m sure from what vague impressions I have of those days, that there was a good bit more, well, a good bit more of a gap between his
background, his experience, his way of doing things and some of the old-timers who had been here before he came on the board. And then, as you may or may not know, there was a difficult period in respect to Mr. Hopkins’s coming into the presidency. There were some of the alumni who thought they knew better than the board did about those things. And I guess some of that was reflected in one or two members on the board. But this was a kind of difficulty which I think passed with certain individuals. Whether they were ministers and whatnot, I really don’t know. But there were some very strong-minded people during that period. And I would guess that this was probably true.

But the board that I knew, that came from Mr. Hopkins’s day, was a board that he had obviously had a major influence in shaping to his view of what would best serve the interests of the College and in particular be compatible with his leadership. So that I have no knowledge whatsoever of any internal difficulties in the board. I do know that at the end of Mr. Hop’s administration, the so-called Jewish controversy created some—not only in the minds of people who were involved in it here, but in the minds of some of the trustees—a very considerable concern as to what this might lead to in respect to the loyalty of Jewish alumni and things of that sort. But here again, I have no knowledge that this subject was ever discussed in the board. If it was, I don’t know. It was certainly a subject which was very much on my mind, as I’ve indicated to you in earlier tapes, when I came to the job.

DANIELL: Well, the next question I’m getting to—I don’t know whether you’ve got more observations here—but is there... How did you see the potential of this same group of men serving as your board of trustees, which gets us in, fundamentally, to the process of the selection of subsequent men on the board we have over here.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, I can identify this not merely in generalized comments, but also in terms of the specific individuals that we brought to the board.

I think the first concern that I had was that there should be someone on the board who took a sophisticated, continuing, really serious interest in the objective of developing our faculty, developing the educational side of the institution. We were coming in, as I believe we’ve had occasion to say before, to a postwar era when a very high proportion of that faculty were approaching retirement. We were coming into a period when it seemed to me from what I knew of other institutions the competition for first-rate faculty was going to be very acute. And in which we were going to have to
reexamine very straightforwardly the question of whether we did not need to seek the teacher-scholar with strong emphasis on the scholar as well as prime emphasis on the teacher.

Previously, for various reasons, some understandable and some quite subjective and personal, there had grown up a view, which I think was not wholly warranted but sufficiently warranted to be a problem, that the administration of the College frowned upon serious scholarship on the grounds that it tended generally to detract from classroom teaching and weakness. Well, anybody who’s been around one of these enterprises at all, as you and I have, knows that this is a concern that is not without some validity. But one also doesn’t have to be around very long, especially in today’s world—and by that I mean the postwar world which I came to here at the College—without being keenly aware that if you really want teachers who can cut the mustard today, they’ve got to be what I characterize as ongoing learners. I don’t know care whether you call it research or whatnot, scholarship, they’ve got to be active in their fields so they’re not simply retailers of other people’s work.

Well, to do this obviously, if you were serious about it, involved movement on a number of fronts. This was not just simply something that the president could decide and that would accomplish it. I referred earlier to the fact that it involved a whole new strategy of financial resources because it was clear from the outset that to move in this direction of competing with the best for the best among young prospects as teacher-scholars, one had to be able to compete so far as compensation and other things were concerned. Maybe not on an even Steven basis, but at least you had to be in the game, or you didn’t improve anything.

DANIELL: So you aren’t [inaudible]…

DICKEY: Secondly you had to—you had a very, very deep leadership problem which I cannot overstate, but I’ve rarely talked about it; namely, the need to accomplish this development without correspondingly destroying the morale of a very dedicated teaching faculty by seeming to reject them, seeking to downgrade them, seeking to make them feel that their service was not appreciated. This has been one of the really cruel and, in my view, unnecessary problems that new leadership in some of our institutions of higher education has from time to time brought to the enterprise: new leadership was seeking to lead. Amherst got caught in a difficulty of this sort back in its earlier history. And this has happened with, well, more and more people than you can imagine who’ve come in with a
very understandable enthusiasm for what they wanted to accomplish, but with corresponding insensitivity to the fact that there are a lot of people around the place who maybe spent, oh, in some instances 50 years, 25 to 50 years, of thinking that they were doing something that was worthwhile, and that they were appreciated; and then finding the new man comes in and seems to have no feel for, no respect for, no understanding of what they’ve been up against, what they’ve been trying to do, however imperfect.

DANIELL: Yes, You would think that that would be particularly…the danger would be almost particularly acute here.

DICKEY: Well, it was real. I won’t say whether it was particularly acute or not. I’m privy to many—most—other situations elsewhere. But I do know that it was an attitude that caused trouble to many very strong men who went on to college presidencies and very quickly wanted to have things reflect their emphasis and so forth. I could name names, but that wouldn’t prove anything. I can just say to you that I fortunately was prepared to understand—or I think fortunately—was prepared to understand that this was something I, as a matter of instinct and as a matter of knowing about situations elsewhere, did not want to happen during my leadership.

Now, there was an inevitable number—I don’t know whether it was inevitable; I shouldn’t say that—but there were a number of cases where we weren’t sufficiently skillful or at least where there was a feeling that this young upstart doesn’t really understand what we’ve been doing or doesn’t honor it sufficiently.

At the same time, it’s only fair to say that in my opinion the great majority of faculty, whether they were teacher-scholars themselves or simply very fine classroom teachers, period, accepted the view that the faculty needed and could stand a lot of strengthening in this respect as the opportunity came for recruitment.

DANIELL: Yes. Certainly the tapes indicate a general just almost complete approval of the process of change that occurred, with maybe a half dozen at the most...

DICKEY: Well, this would be about where I would put the figure. And of course this was deeply reassuring to me. But with that, with the need for a new financial strategy, with the need to carry the understanding of the alumni along with us—and that’s something that needs emphasizing in this kind
of an institution—there was the need to have some leadership of
conviction right within the board itself on this because it got down to the
question of dollars, it got down to recruitment, it got down to standing the
gaff from the few people who were unhappy that this young fellow didn’t
really know what he was up to.

Well, somebody within the board who carried weight because of his
experience and confidence in his judgment was somebody that I thought
was essential. And it was not simply internal—internally—that I felt this
need. I felt it very greatly externally because very quickly, for one reason
or another, from my governmental experience and otherwise, I was out
circulating in the foundation world, raising money, or seeking to raise
money, seeking to become acquainted, and going on to several boards
myself.

I went onto the Rockefeller Foundation board I guess it was in—I believe it
was, well, it certainly was in the first, between the first and second year on
the job. I quickly ran into this view: Well, Dartmouth is a fine
undergraduate college. But it doesn’t go much beyond that. And the
faculty is not encouraged to engage in research or scholarship, etc., etc.,
etc.

Well, you would also be asked, when you would go into some of these
foundations that weren’t around Dartmouth every much: Well, who’s on
your board? People don’t realize how often you’re asked that. But when
you go into some of the places that I was determined to get into if I could,
they would ask, Who’s on your board? Well, there were some wonderful,
great men, as human beings and as northern New England people on the
board. But very few of them—and none of them in the area of educational
affairs—whose name carried really any great weight.

So that I—I guess there’s nothing for it but to say—I, because this was
something that was for me to do if it was going to be done, I decided that
this was one of the highest priorities insofar as the membership on the
board was concerned. We had to strengthen this side of the board in order
to do some of these other things. And looking over the alumni body, there
were people in education, and I didn’t see very many—and of course there
wouldn’t be very many—who had really had significant academic
experience, who were recognized as, well, even original thinkers, and who
had some significant exposure to affairs: business, government, or
whatnot.
Well, the man that stood out in this respect was Beardsley Ruml. And I was not a close friend at that point of Ruml’s. I think I had met him through State Department conferences. And, of course, I knew about him. Well, I began to think seriously about the possibility of recommending Ruml for….

DANIELL: Just a question which logically comes in here: You said there weren’t very many people whom you could—you’d drawn up your short list of potential candidates to fill this kind of a role that you’ve described. Were there others under top consideration, or was Beardsley the only one?

DICKEY: It came down in my mind that if we could get him, and if there weren’t objections that were insurmountable. And this was something I wasn’t sure about.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Because I knew that he had not been close to Dartmouth affairs. That he was the number one prospect in my eyes. I don’t at the moment recall who some of the others were in this field. But there were one or two who’d been on academic presidencies and so forth. I was leery of this and had been leery of it. I had a feeling that there was always a potential there for unrecognized conflicts of interest of a kind that you really can’t quite put your finger on. But I felt reasonably certain that I could go to those people and get everything that I wanted. But that if I had them on the board, it just might not work out too well.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: I had seen this elsewhere and was fairly, well, let’s say, very dubious about the desirability of going that route to get what I wanted. It shows up in the solicitation of money at foundations and in other ways. You can’t help but at least wonder, is this a completely 100 percent concern of his as you would hope for.

DANIELL: Sure.

DICKEY: Well, I talked with Mr. Hopkins about B. As I said, I had a practice of going to Mr. Hopkins and exposing him to some of these things. And I knew, of course, that some of this, with a smaller person, with a lesser person, could be a matter of some delicacy. But I think I can say both on his behalf and maybe on mine, I don’t remember a single subject in all the years that I either shied from being prepared to discuss with him or in which he
showed a petty kind of sensitivity. Now maybe I’m forgetting something…maybe. But I should want to pay this tribute to him. I did not ask him to solve problems, but on something like this, searching for a trustee or something of that sort. And I didn’t go to him and say, What would you think of hunting primarily for teacher-scholars rather than for teachers? or something like that. But I did talk with him about B. in terms of what I felt the board needed and what I needed at this stage in my leadership. And I found that he had a very high regard for B. He said, as I recall, “He’s one of the remarkable men unquestionably.” He said, “I don’t know whether he’d take an interest in the board. And also there will be some who will think he would be too captious.” B. was a great fellow for giving you a pretty rough time on occasion with the kind of humor that if you didn’t know B., could seem to be pretty difficult to accept. Well, this was as far as he went. But I said, “You, in other words, don’t have any knowledge of him that would veto going forward with these aspirations.” He said, “Decidedly not. If you can attract Ruml to this board, I think it might be a very fine thing.” Well, I’m sure that he talked with Ned French on this. Neither one of them ever told me this, but I do know that Ned at first thought that this was evidence of dubious judgment on my part.

[Laughs] To bring a fellow of B.’s position….

DANIELL: Well, he might not fit into the parties in the back end of that train coming up.

DICKEY: No, I don’t know, it may have. But if so, I never heard of it.

But in any event, I know what I’m saying about Ned to be true. Because he took the initiative one day in saying to me—you know this is almost verbatim—he said, “When B. first came on the board, I was pretty skeptical as to whether it was going to be a disruptive…” See, this was his view of what kind of a… whether this was going to be a disruptive influence on the board. But he said, "I wanted to say that in that respect I was as wrong as I’ve ever been about anything." He said, "He said many things that I didn't agree with on the board but I've never seen…"

[End of Tape 27, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 27, Side B]

DICKEY: … I know that Ned French came to me some years after he was on the board. I don't know what the occasion was and said to me that when he first came onto the board, he, Ned, had been apprehensive that he might bring a disruptive, smart-alecky kind of attitude to the board. And this had
been a matter of concern to Ned. But he went on to say that, “I have never been more mistaken, more pleasantly mistaken,” as I recall he said, “about a man.” And he went on also to say that he had disagreed with things that Ruml had urged or said from time to time. But he had never known Ruml to carry his personal views and his disagreements to the point of being disruptive. That he had always ended up by saying, “Well, I've had my say. I haven’t convinced the rest of you. Let’s get on with the business.” And this from Ned was really very, very high praise.

So this was the first big change as far as I was concerned to be achieved in the board. It was a change that also signaled—gave a signal to people on the staff and the faculty that was very, very important. Here was a man who was known as a national figure, indeed, to a degree, as an international figure. His pay-as-you-go work was highly respected. He and Don Morrison, the new dean of faculty, quickly made common cause.

DANIELL: Yes. They hadn’t known each other before Ruml came on the board, had they?

DICKEY: No, no, not at all. As a matter of fact, one of the things I think that commended me to Ruml very quickly was when he got to know Don, [Laughter] he said, I remember he said, “How in the hell did you ever spot this fellow?” And he continued to regard it as something of a minor miracle that….

DANIELL: There weren’t an awful lot of Don Morrisons around in the faculty then.

DICKEY: That he had been pulled into the dean of faculty’s job at such an early age and so forth. They worked hand in glove. Both admired and enjoyed the other’s abilities. They put out the little book together on the trusteeship, what constituted the responsibilities and opportunities of a trustee. I forget what was the name of it. You’re probably acquainted with the little book.

DANIELL: Yes, I know the book. Yes.

DICKEY: And they palled around together. B. got Don to come over to a villa that he had in Italy once, and they had a lot of fun.

Now that we’re on to B. Ruml, I should say, that as is true with most men, B. had his problems. B could be cavalier about things. He was a fellow that enjoyed spending money. And when he had it, it’s my impression he spent it, whether it was acquiring a villa in Italy, which I don’t think he had
really great need for, or other things. So I had the impression that B. was
sometimes in fairly tight quarters. At one point while he was with us he
was, in the very early period, he was treasurier of Macy’s, and I suppose
was getting a good salary for that. That relationship came apart. I don’t
know what was behind it. But I would suspect that there was an element of
B.’s being somewhat cavalier about business was all right but not the most
important thing in the world.

I’ll never forget: At one point I was doing, of course, a lot of traveling to
New York, and I would get the late sleeper going down. And I guess it was
part of my background as a youth and my family’s background that I used
to always get either a lower berth, sometimes an upper berth, [Laughter]
but never a bedroom, let alone one of these what they called drawing
rooms. And one day I got down to—or one night I got down to the train,
and took out my tickets, and handed it to the conductor, and he said,
“You’re in Drawing Room A.” And I said, “No, there must be some mistake.
I’m not in Drawing Room A.” Well, he said, “Here it is.” I said, “Well, sure
enough.”

Well, B. Ruml had learned that I always went on a lower or an upper berth,
and he just felt this was not what I ought to be doing, that I should be
getting as much rest as I could, as much relaxation. This quite literally was
what he had his eye on. It wasn’t that I should be living in the eyes of other
people in a different way. But that this was something that was important
to doing the job. And I saw him shortly afterwards. I guess I saw him in
New York when I was on that trip. And I said, “I learned that you had my
tickets swapped.” He joked about this, thought it was a great joke. He said,
“Well, you rested better, didn’t you?” I said, “No, I don’t really think I did.”
[Laughter]

DANIELL: I was going to ask you.

DICKEY: I don’t really think I did. But I said, “I just don’t think....” I said, “I think one
of the problems is I don’t feel comfortable about spending that kind of
money as a college officer.” He said, “John! It’s only money! It’s only
money!” I’ll never forget this phrase because it represented a rather deep
philosophy of this man. Okay, it’s only money. There are many more
important things. If you can have a little more comfort for a little more
money, for God’s sake, don’t fuss about it. This was his message.

Well, he had a good relationship—better than a good relationship—had an
intimate relationship with Don. The only problem that I ever had with B.
was he was an excessive drinker. And this was sometimes not an easy thing to handle. He was not a person who got mean, one of these mean drunks, but he would just get like a child. Sometimes after trustee meetings he’d come up to the house and want to talk endlessly about things. Darn good conversation it usually was. But then he would lie down on the floor in my study just flat, and he’d say this is the only way to relax. Well, somebody else would come in the house, [laughter] they’d see this elephant of a man.

DANIELL: He was big. [Laughter]

DICKEY: A trustee, out on the floor, relaxing. Sometimes it created a problem of explanation I wasn’t quite prepared for.

DANIELL: How did he get along with the other members of the board with a different background and orientation?

DICKEY: They came to, as far as I know, to have not only respect for him, they came to have admiration and, indeed, affection. This was a warm person. Childlike almost in his warmth. He could be cutting. But basically a good-humored man. As he approached the end—I guess his drinking probably shortened his life, his heart and I don’t know what else—he became a little querulous. And he said on several occasions when I would press him with my disagreements, “Well, I don’t know,” he’d say. “John, I’m not going to live much longer. I don’t have time to argue about it.”

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I never saw this earlier, but toward the end.

DANIELL: When did he die?

DICKEY: When?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, I don’t remember exactly. I remember going to see him in the New York Hospital. I could look it up, of course.

DANIELL: No, listen, I can…
DICKEY: He died in New York Hospital. A heart condition, I guess. It must have been related to his drinking.

There was only one issue in respect to the College and College policies that he and I ever had occasion to have serious discussions about. And our disagreements were never a problem for us because they were very few and even this one.... And this was something that I believe is in the little book. But in any event, it was something that he became fervently attached to. And that was the notion that somehow we would be better off if we could earmark tuition for faculty compensation. I think the case for it was that it was the historic use of tuition back in the earliest days of universities that students would pay the teacher to be their tutor. And also that it made it a little clearer what tuition was being used for today and would make it possible to arrange tuition perhaps a little bit more readily.

At the time I remember talking about this on several occasions quite seriously in an effort to understand it and analyze its pros and cons, discussing it with both B. and Don. And Don was not as gung-ho about this by any means as B. but was content to let me carry the ball of raising the serious questions about it. My concern about it was that it seemed to me to invite any contrived kind of inflexibility that might cut the other way, too. That people would say, well, I’m interested in faculty salaries and so forth, but they’re earmarked for tuition. But it might introduce a rigidity into your ability to shift your resources from one area to another, depending upon your perception of the needs in the institution. And I didn’t think it had as much rational validity as B. seemed to think.

Well, it was one of these ideas that B. had, which he never pushed beyond discussion. And we did have some discussion about it on two or three occasions. He, I think, was a little disappointed that I didn’t see it the way he saw it. But this was the only matter that I remember having any continuing disagreement with him about. I don’t believe it ever came up for discussion in the board.

DANIELL: Yes. Pretty radical idea.

DICKEY: Well, it was the sort of thing that B. enjoyed thinking up and then playing with and turning over, and he would try it out on you pretty hard.

DANIELL: Yes. It’s radical in the sense that it really restricts income of the College basically. It’s almost like pay-as-you-go.
DICKEY: Yes. Well now, the other thing that came up just about the same time, and of course in the same generation of alumni, was bringing Sig Larmon to the board. He was Class of ’14, B. was Class of ’15. In respect to their qualifications.…

DANIELL: Mr. Larmon is this one here?

DICKEY: That one. B. Ruml is the first one, yes.

DANIELL: Who is this?

DICKEY: Governor Blood.

DANIELL: Ah, that’s why I didn’t think of that. I thought that was Mr. Larmon. I didn’t think…okay, that’s Governor Blood and….

DICKEY: B. Ruml.

DANIELL: Yes, that’s Ruml.

DICKEY: And that’s Larmon.

DANIELL: Right. Okay.

DICKEY: Now, they were, as I say, close in the matter of College generation. B. was ’15, and Larmon was ’14. Larmon had been very active in alumni affairs and a leader of alumni affairs and Alumni Fund. Had been active in New York City with the alumni groups. Was a generous contributor at times. And was interested in the College also, very importantly, because of Cotty’s continued service here under Mr. Hopkins and then on the faculty.

Well, I turned to Larmon as a person who seemed to me one of our best bets, and probably our best bet, to meet the other strategic need which I felt was necessary, namely to develop our ability to raise money. I was certain that while the Alumni Fund was an essential aspect of Dartmouth’s resources, there was no prospect that it could carry the whole load. And you see this was before we had the Quest program, before we had a capital gifts giving. Really nothing but the Alumni Fund is about what it amounted to. And then some happy gifts such as Mr. Hopkins got for Baker Library and things like that.
So that I went over the alumni list pretty carefully in this respect. And here, it’s my memory, that there was nobody that seemed to me at that point to have the qualifications. Sig had achieved distinction in the business world as a salesman in the advertising industry and had a position of distinction in his business. He had no background in academic affairs comparable to B. Ruml’s deanship in the social sciences at Chicago and his work in foundations and so forth.

I remember when I talked with Mr. Hopkins about Sig—and I believe I mentioned this earlier and without repeating that at length—this was a case where Mr. Hopkins, as I look back on it, obviously had some questions. And put his reservations very nicely. No reason why I shouldn’t have understood them, and I think I did understand them. I probably didn’t give them as much weight as I should have. I’m not so sure about that.

But in any event, Mr. Hopkins indicated that Sig had a reputation among business people for being an exceedingly able advertising executive. But also an exceedingly difficult person in respect to what Mr. Hopkins called his Swedishness, which he had never gotten over, according to Mr. Hopkins. I hadn’t known anything about that. And also there was some slight indication that Sig had an ego which complicated his stubbornness.

But at the same time, I don’t believe there was anybody that had a firmer devotion to the College, maybe as much as anybody that we worked with. I’m sure that he was not comfortable with B. B. was the kind of iconoclastic fellow that didn’t care for this kind of business importance and self-importance, or whatever you want to call it. And also B. had the kind of intellect that sometimes people weren’t comfortable with because they didn’t know when he was going to cut their head off or when he wasn’t and think it was a good clean joke.

DANIELL: You certainly livened up the board with those two.

DICKEY: Yes. But B. never got into wrangles with Sig. But they were totally different. My relations with Sig, while there were disagreements such as I’ve related, were always kept at a level of at least polite disagreement, friendship. There were never any manifest hostilities.

There was one occasion in which I made very clear that I was not happy with his position or attitude on a matter, but we have continued and all that. And I did my best to get him not to resign from the board; I would want to say my very best with correspondence and trying to accommodate
ourselves and so forth. It came to a head over—I don’t think there’s any question in anybody’s mind, except undoubtedly Sig’s, over what the issue was. But he had been pushing for board reform and board enlargement and changing the chairmanship and so forth, all of which were legitimate issues that you could agree or disagree on without any great difficulty. But the thing came to a head when Jock Brace, who had come on as an alumni trustee also, was made a life trustee. And this meant Sig would be retiring from the board before another life trusteeship opened up so far as we could know.

DICKEY: And this, without ever becoming acknowledged by anybody openly to be the crux of the matter, was the crux of the matter. Harvey, Charlie Zimmerman, and I wrote letters, talked with him, and said, “Do you really want to do this, to resign?” But he did. And he was the only member who did resign from the board during my 25 years and something that I regretted at the time. At the same time, I think it was pretty clear to him that he was not going to be happy on that board.

DICKEY: By this time it was clear that he wasn’t carrying—I don’t think he was carrying anybody with him, to be blunt about it. I’m not sure. Maybe there were people; but if there were, I don’t know who they were. And Lloyd Brace was quite prepared to go in as life trustee. And up to that time Sig had not established a position of unquestioned strength in regard to the development, the development program. He had been willing….

[Pause]

DANIELL: At this point the initial interview on this tape becomes unintelligible because the interviewer allowed the battery pack to die down.

Immediately following this, Mr. Dickey went in to discussing the nature of the problems at the time of Mr. Larmon’s resignation. And emphasizes that at the point of resignation, the issue or the discussion was not so much on personality but really in the attempt by the board to—those involved in the decision—to assess the long-term needs of the board of trustees. And the decision to make Mr. Brace a life trustee was rooted in what was felt his essential skills in the area of investment.
The interview went on for another ten minutes. The main subjects of the interview at this point were the reasons for the appointment of Mr. Brace as a term trustee initially, emphasizing again his skills in banking and his place in the Boston business community; and the reasons for the selection of Mr. Zimmerman, Charlie Zimmerman, in 1952, emphasizing especially his skills as an organizational leader and as a fundraiser.

In addition to this, there was some discussion of the reasons for—or the role that Governor Gregg played. Mr. Dickey emphasized here that Governor Gregg, despite the fact he was not a Dartmouth alumnus, was a strong contributor to the affairs of the board. And then the interview ended with a brief discussion of Mr. Bradley’s appointment. I will make an attempt to get Mr. Dickey to go over some of the same material when the interview resumes next Monday.

[End of Tape 27, Side B]  
[Beginning of Tape 28, Side A]


DICKEY: Right, Zimmerman.

DANIELL: Zimmerman. Could you just explain the… You had mentioned before, in talking about Lloyd Brace, the fundamental need for somebody with his background on the board and the importance of maintaining that as you get more and more into the building of capital funds. And then you went right into….

DICKEY: Yes. Charlie Zimmerman became the lead horse very quickly on the board in the area of the development program. He played, I think it’s fair to say, a critical role in bringing the Alumni Council and leaders in the alumni body to see the possibilities for developing Dartmouth’s capital strength, over and above the central strength of the Alumni Fund, to help meet the operating budget. This was, I think I’ve said previously, a major, truly major step.

It’s very hard for anybody today to realize that back in the early fifties, after we’d had the abortive first effort to build a Hopkins Center, although it was not then called the Hopkins Center, there was a very widespread feeling among the alumni that anything that seemed to them to compete with the Alumni Fund was a very, very dangerous undertaking for the College. We had almost innumerable discussions in the Alumni Council and a good
many in the staff and a number of similar discussions in the board of trustees, concerning the possibility that Dartmouth would follow suit as some of the other institutions had done and launch a capital gifts campaign. But I think it’s fair to say that the single individual who brought the greatest confidence—and along with confidence a willingness to test his confidence—behind this effort was Charlie Zimmerman.

I originally approached Charlie about coming to the College as a vice president in charge of developing the development program. This was before he, of course, was a principal officer of the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company. I believe at that time he was a general agent or something of that sort. But shortly thereafter he started up the ladder of principal officers. We were not able to attract him, of course, at that point.

But very shortly thereafter he did come to the board as a member of the board, and performed, well, as close to a unique service as anybody ever comes to being unique in a situation of that sort. He was the chairman of the first capital gifts campaign and put it across. He remained—and has remained—one of the most devoted, useful members of the alumni body even since his retirement from the board. Albert Bradley….

DANIELL: You mentioned that—one thing I wanted to, one episode I was sorry to have lost from my mistake— Won't you describe how he got the commitment of the members of the board to personal participation.

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: For this first capital gifts campaign.

DICKEY: Well, we had cleared the question of going forward in a general way, we felt, with the Alumni Council. And we had talked about it enough in the board to be pretty sure we were ready to take the decision to go ahead with the capital gifts campaign. We had a meeting of the board—I forget just exactly when—in which….

Well, before the meeting, Charlie came to me and said he thought we were at the point where we should wrap it up and launch a campaign. He had agreed with me that he would serve as leader of the campaign, as chairman of the campaign. But he said to me, “Before I take this on, in view of all the misgivings that so many people have had about Dartmouth trying to have a capital gifts campaign,” he said, “I would like to be sure that I can count upon the support of each individual member of the board.
And to that end, what would you think of my polling the board when they’re all together, one by one.”

DANIELL: It’s a greater story the second time even than it was the first. [Laughter]

DICKEY: So I said I didn’t see any harm in it at all. And he did. And we came to a discussion of the question, since it had been before the board before, there was no real discussion of it but general agreement that we would go ahead. Well, Charlie said, “Before we do, I want to make sure that each one of you feels that he is personally committed to putting his shoulder behind this effort. And so,” he said, “I’m going to start with each one of you and ask you whether we can count on you.” He went around the board, man by man and they enjoyed it and he enjoyed it. And I think it was a very useful exercise to perform.

In any event, we went forward with the capital gifts campaign. We learned many things from it, not the least of which was it was the best thing we could have done from the point of view of the Alumni Fund. Because it raised the sights of many people who had previously gotten into the habit of giving ten or twenty-five dollars when they were really well able to give in the thousands of dollars; certainly on an annual giving basis in the hundreds of dollars.

We discovered other things, but I think that was the central experience that came out of the capital gifts campaign in addition to the money we raised. So that I came away from the campaign feeling it was a very significant step in the building of the strength of the College.

DANIELL: Albert Bradley was the other one. And we talked a little about him.

DICKEY: I guess I mentioned a little bit about Albert. Albert came to the board by way of first helping us get the Tuck School strengthened. He was very much interested in the Tuck School. And I saw quite a bit of him.

I don’t remember just how it was that I first met him because I had not known him before I came on the job. But I got him to come onto the board of overseers of the Tuck School. He was very helpful on that board. He gave us some money and got us a little money to launch a program of research for those members of the faculty who wanted to participate in the research. And he at every point manifested a very positive interest on that side of the institution.
I cannot say the same thing for his interest in the Thayer School. He had a rather deep-seated feeling that the Thayer School was the weakest aspect of the institution. And he never thought of the Thayer School as anything other than the civil engineering school that he’d known, although it came out of the war with programs in electrical engineering and in mechanical engineering. But still, the Thayer School was not a portion of the College that was setting a very fast-paced example in respect to scholarly work or general strength. It, in this respect, was probably about on a par with the two-year medical school. We had two men who kept the two schools going, the Thayer School under [William P.] Bill Kimball ['28], and the medical school under Dean [Rolf C.] Syvertson ['18]. But both were going to have to be brought into a much more rigorous program than they had been following.

DANIELL: Apparently there’s a period in the early sixties—I’m guessing here in terms of the timing—in which the matter of the fate of the associated schools becomes a central concern...

DICKEY: Well, this was earlier than the sixties. Actually this came as one of the first things that we paid attention to in the early fifties, in the middle fifties.

DANIELL: Okay. Well, my point was I’d like to deal with that systematically apart from the introduction of the board members.

DICKEY: But the Thayer School was not one of Albert Bradley’s enthusiasms.


DICKEY: I never tried to convince him against his own judgment about it. But neither was he difficult about it. He just said, “I just don’t think you’re going to get anywhere with that show.” And that was about it.

Well, we can sweep over the rest of the board with whom I served. The governors I’ve mentioned. Hugh Gregg followed Sherm Adams. And Hugh Gregg, although a Yale graduate and with no Dartmouth connections, took a very active and constructive part as a participant in the meetings of the board of trustees. Lane Dwinell did the same. He, of course, had a Dartmouth background.

After Jay Gile died, we faced the question of whether we—how we met the New Hampshire requirement and whether we should continue with a person in Hanover, who had a Hanover background. And decided that we
would and brought Dr. Ralph Hunter of the clinic to the board. Ralph served on the board until he recently retired for age. And was a very useful member of the board, not particularly in board meetings, but as an individual who followed in the footsteps of the elder Dr. Gile and the younger Dr. Gile in knowing the Hanover scene.

DANIELL: This is going to be very useful to me, the comments you’re making now...not only on him but on the Giles earlier because I’m going to be interviewing him quite soon. And seeing him in that framework will just help me shape the interview.

DICKEY: Well, this was his main contribution. Later, during the controversy involving the medical school, which comes much later, we turned to him to hold the fort for a few months while we decided what to do next about that affair. But his principal contribution was not—and was not intended to be—as a physician or medical man, but as a man who had grown up as a boy in Hanover, had a feel for the place, and stayed. And also had very high standards with respect to what was desirable to Dartmouth.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I think it would be fair to say in this respect he had a...perhaps you would characterize him as a more modern view of what was necessary in respect to the development of the faculty and in respect to such developments as Hopkins Center than Dr. Gile would have had. I learned in the course of my years on the job that each man to some extent is a reflection of his time and the experience of his time. Dr. Hunter had had a different experience. He had been an Exeter graduate. He had an awareness that these efforts had to be made if Dartmouth was going to continue to be and indeed to be more in the area of educational quality than it had been.

DANIELL: It makes quite a bit of sense in the...

DICKEY: But he was a very substantial element of strength here in town on such matters in a very low-key way.

The next man was one of the finest acquisitions we made and tragically died before he had an opportunity to fulfill his potential. That’s Orvil [E.] Dryfoos ['34], the publisher of the New York Times. Dartmouth graduate. And we became fast friends. I enjoyed the privilege of being able to be in close touch with him, both by calling on him individually at his office,
through board affairs. He would frequently have me down as a guest at the luncheons of the *Times* editorial board, which was an interesting and valuable exposure for me. He was married to a daughter of the previous publisher of the board, [Arthur Ochs] Sulzberger, and was a warm, sensitive person.

He, I guess, was a victim of exhaustion that came from a long, bitter strike that he had to lead the *Times* through. And I can recall being in Canada when I got the word of his death, and was just stricken by it. He did not have a long enough period on the board to make a full contribution, especially the kind of contribution that the publisher of the *New York Times* could make to the Dartmouth board.

The next is John [L.] Sullivan ['21], former secretary of the Navy and Washington lawyer, who came from New Hampshire, and who had retained his residence in New Hampshire, and therefore qualified to meet the New Hampshire requirement. He also had the Washington experience which we increasingly felt the need of, somebody who knew his way around Washington. He had credentials as a Democrat, although I would have to say that in some ways they were more...these credentials were more traditional and nominal than they were partisan. John's social life and most of his practice was with the establishment side of Washington life, and he would not, I think, hesitate to say that on the spectrum of liberal and conservative, he would certainly be over toward the moderate conservative side of the spectrum.

**DANIELL:** Lot's of New Hampshire Democrats...

**DICKEY:** But he had been in New Hampshire politics, had run unsuccessfully for governor.

**DANIELL:** Was that a controversial appointment to the board at all?

**DICKEY:** Well, do you know about this? Has somebody told you?

**DANIELL:** Ah, not specifically…

**DICKEY:** The reason I ask is that I've hesitated in the past about speaking of it, but I don't mind going this far about it: It was the only case where there was a danger of a serious split between the Alumni Council nominating committee and the board.
DANIELL: That's why I...

DICKEY: Between the leadership of the board.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: [E.] Spencer Miller ['31], a very fine man and good friend of mine, son of the Miller down in the machine tool business in Springfield, Vermont, and at this time president, I believe, of the Maine Central Railroad, was convinced that John met the criteria which we had had to meet—or wanted to meet if we could—better than anybody else. And he and John had a close relationship, the nature of which I have forgotten, whether it was something professional in the relationship in it or not. John had apparently, way back, not had a falling out, but at least had not won the respect and friendship of Judge McLane.

DANIELL: I see. Well, that's why I asked the question, not knowing anything about it except that from just looking through his vita over in the alumni office, he's not part of the McLane or sort of Concord...

DICKEY: Well, this is true. But Judge was the senior member of the board. I didn't know John well except as I'd seen...he'd been a very active member of the Alumni Council and a very active alumnus in Washington circles, and really devoted to the College and not in a superficial but serious way. All I can say is that he subsequently served the board well, in my opinion, and served long after Judge died. But the matter of his coming onto the board was a very...a very difficult thing for Judge. I don't know what the details of the background were or what it was, but back in the... Whether it was the politics of the situation.... See, Judge's father had been a governor on the Republican side. I would doubt that. But in any event, whatever it was, I found myself really in between both...these very strong feelings of Spencer Miller, and I went out of my way to avoid having Spence aware that there was this problem.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But finally I was able to work it around with Judge so that he said, “Well, if the nominating committee of the Alumni Council wants him and so forth, why of course, we've got to do that. But I don't....”

DANIELL: It's funny... A Sullivan from Manchester is... My input in this is a very different kind of New Hampshire.
DICKEY: The reason I ask is I had about decided that I was going to say to you, as far as this record is concerned, that there was just one case of where we had a potential serious disagreement between what a chairman of the nominating committee wanted and what this leader of the board felt was desirable. I'm sure there were many cases where, and I'll come to those, where the chairman of the nominating committee might have preferred somebody else, this sort of thing. But this was the only one where I felt we had a really critical problem to get around.

DANIELL: It would be surprising if such disagreements didn’t exist. They exist in every institution, large and small.

DICKEY: Actually, let me say this on Judge’s behalf: After John came on the board, there was, to my knowledge, there was no manifestation of anything except a normal friendly relationship. I never saw anything other than an amicable relationship between the two. But it was just that Judge didn’t think this was the best New Hampshire representation that we could get. Well, we got by that. And as I said, John served. I have had a close, continued friendship with him. Not an intimate friendship at all, but a close one.

DANIELL: Do you happen to know whether he spends of his time in Manchester or Washington?

DICKEY: Oh, definitely in Washington. He’s not been well. He’s had a series of things. He comes up here to the clinic for attention about once every few months.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I don’t know whether you know, he’s married to a Manning. Her mother and father were the great New Hampshire figures. Totally on the other side of the tracks [laughter] from the Irish Democratic….

DANIELL: Oh, really! That fits with what… I didn’t know that.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. They were a very well-to-do family. Very austere almost in their bearing.

DANIELL: Interesting. [Inaudible]
DICKEY: She’s still quite a person, but very, not inhibited, but very restrained in what she says. But we’ve had a very nice relationship with them. Each year they come up and bring us flowers from the Manning’s gardens in Manchester. I think this was something that Judge and some of his friends really never understood. [Laughter] But I never had occasion to pry into that.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. It’s an intriguing story. I’m speaking now as a historian of New Hampshire who….

DICKEY: Well, John’s story….

DANIELL: The wonderful mobility that John Sullivan had.

DICKEY: John’s story is a—I don’t know it well, but it’s something that would interest you.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Because of his experience running for governor. He used to tell me about his problems in trying to keep the French Canadians happy.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: And John has a wonderful sense of humor. He’s a delightful person to be around. He’s sharp. There’s nothing slow or dull about John. [Laughter] He had a success, a very fine success as a lawyer and as a member of various boards. I would have to say that John held his own without any worries as far as I was concerned.

The only time I ever had occasion to really talk serious politics with John was when he decided to resign as assistant secretary of the Navy—as secretary of the Navy. See, he’d been also—was it undersecretary or assistant secretary?—of Treasury. One or the other. But he had a very fine background for our purposes. But he did decide to resign as secretary of the Navy because Truman wouldn’t approve an aircraft carrier that John wanted. And I remember I was due to speak at a Dartmouth alumni dinner in Washington that night. And John got a hold of… buttonholed me before I went in to the dinner, and said, “I just want you to know I’m going to resign as secretary of the Navy.” And I said, “Well, John, I don’t think I know anything about those things. But I wonder whether you really want to resign.” I was sort of sorry to see him pull out at that stage, but he did.
The next fellow is [Wesley] Powell, the governor. He was a strange….

DANIELL: Still is.

DICKEY: A strange fellow. I in many ways would never have met him. I think he attended one board meeting, I'm not sure; not more than one or two possibly. Maybe he didn't attend any. But in any event, I was brought into touch with him mainly through the awful tragedy of the loss of Doctors [Ralph English] Miller ['24] and [Robert E.] Quinn in the airplane which went down.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I remember that very vividly…. was a good friend of Ralph.

DICKEY: I was inevitably very close to that search and had to intervene with the governor and Army people to make sure that we got the help that we needed from the helicopters and things of that sort for as long as we could hope that there was any possibility of their being found alive.

I would have to say he was a difficult fellow for me to figure out. Of course some people regarded him as a charlatan, a real, well, political maverick that you didn't know where he was going to be from one month to the next. Others regarded him as a brilliant person who would respond to cultivation. We invited him scrupulously to board meetings, but he obviously didn't think he'd feel comfortable in a board meeting and I'm sure had occasion to be critical of Dartmouth's radicalism.

DANIELL: OK, let me turn...

[End of Tape 28, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 28, Side B]

DICKEY: He was not one who was likely to be in the front line trenches on academic freedom or any of the issues that we needed support on in the board. But my personal relations with him were amicable. I went down to his office and took the honorary master's… [telephone ringing]

[Break]

DICKEY: We were on Governor Powell, weren't we?

DANIELL: You were just finishing your remarks…
DICKEY: Yes. Well, I don't think there's much to say there. I went down to his office and delivered personally the master's of arts degree, the diploma that is given to all trustees as a matter of form. We had suggested to him that this might be granted at a commencement, but I think it's fair to say that most members of the board thought it was just as well if we didn't have to do it that way. So we didn't. And he played no important part in the affairs of the College as far as I know. If he played any part, it was on the critical side with some of his political friends.

John Woodhouse came to the board as an alumni trustee to give us a little more strength on the science, scholarly side. Ph.D. in chemistry. He had done a little teaching here very early in his career.

DANIELL: He gave me some good detail on L.B. Richardson because he was in Richardson’s office when he was doing that teaching.

DICKEY: Was he? I didn’t know that.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He had a very good career, as I understand it, as a research chemist at the Du Pont Company. And after he came on the board, and indeed before, but especially after he came on the board, he devoted himself primarily to an interest in the Thayer School and its service. He was very valuable in that respect because he was a respected figure from science and industry. He was able to see the plus side of many.... [ringing phone]

[Break]

I've said about as much as needs to be said about John. He was a very useful, conscientious trustee. And there was one incident that probably in the long run of the historian's interest that maybe you'd like me to relate: John, I guess, was a classmate of Ort Hicks.

DANIELL: Very close friend of Ort Hicks.

DICKEY: Close friend of Ort Hicks. And someday I'll make a tape about all we owe to Ort Hicks, which is a great deal.

DANIELL: I'm doing an interview with Ort Hicks right now.
DICKEY: But as Ort would be the first to tell you, every now and then Ort runs through an open switch.

DANIELL: ...already told me that.

DICKEY: And sometimes getting that situation—a situation—corrected would land on my desk, not infrequently by Ort coming to tell me that something [Laughter] needed attention.

But in this particular instance, Ort didn’t come to me. But Ort was the guy that opened the switch. I was down at the annual meeting of the Rockefeller Foundation trustees in Williamsburg where we held our annual meetings. And I was called from a meeting by a message that a trustee of the College was on the telephone and wanted to speak to me. So I went out. I was a little afraid something had happened. But I got out there, and it was John Woodhouse, which quite surprised me because normally John wouldn’t call me. He said, “I’m sorry of course to call you out of the meeting and so forth, but I think this may be very urgent. At least Ort Hicks tell me it is.” And he said, “Of course none of us want to lose Bob Blackman as football coach.” This was when he was offered the job out at Iowa which he didn’t—

DANIELL: The one he didn’t take.

DICKEY: --didn’t take. And he said, “Ort and of course many of our friends are quite concerned about this. And Ort has talked with Blackman and tells me—“ That is, tells John. “—that he’s pretty sure we can hold Blackman if we’ll offer him the director of athletics-ship as well as being head football coach.”

Well, I’m not given to spontaneous combustion frequently. But if there was one thing that I had been clear about from the very beginning—and became clearer about the further I went—it was that I did not want the combination at Dartmouth of an athletic director and a football coach.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: For reasons which I’m sure I don’t need to enlarge upon with you. And generally in the Ivy group, among the presidents when we have had occasion to be candid with each other, this was a generally shared view. That this was an invitation to trouble in the Ivy in every possible way involving the relationship of the institutions and their athletic programs. It
likewise at Dartmouth, and I knew this, was an invitation to really serious internal trouble with the various coaches who, under the best of circumstances in the other sports, feel that football has been treated as a special case, and that they get the short end of the stick. Making a football coach director of athletics was all—

DANIELL: A formula for disaster.

DICKEY: --a formula for disaster. That’s just exactly.

Well, I said to John when I calmed down a little, I said, “John, I just have got to say that this is just an outrageous thing. I am involved in the most delicate negotiations—“ And I was. “—with Bob Blackman.” And I said, “To have Ort talking with him in these terms is just something that’s almost unbelievable. And to have you now as a trustee come at me—“ And obviously Ort knew better than to bother me himself. “—is something that,” I said, “I’ve just got to tell you there’s nothing doing. And whether I can put this thing back together again now, I don’t know. Because if we’ve got this in Blackman’s sights, heaven knows whether we can put it back together again.” Well, I was really very…I had subsequently the most abject apology that I’ve ever had from anybody.

DANIELL: From John or from Ort?

DICKEY: Ort never mentioned it. [Laughter] I’m sure that John conveyed my compliments to Ort. [Laughter] But John, bless his heart, realized that he’d been just completely out of line on this.

DANIELL: That fits with my reading of his personality. [Inaudible]

DICKEY: Oh, no.

DANIELL: …on tape [inaudible] sounds excitable…

DICKEY: But it was the sort of thing that he really wasn’t sophisticated about.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. I mean the parallel is that one of the first things that happened when I got over to Ossipee and started talking with him, is he immediately started – I wouldn’t say this if it weren’t in the privacy of your tape, too – he started to feel out the possibilities of having some of his retired faculty friends over in Ossipee become visiting professors over at Dartmouth, particularly you’re talking about a Charles Barker who’s a
colonial historian retired from, I guess, the University of Maryland. So that’s why the episodes seem parallel to me.

DICKEY: Well, that was the only time there was ever…indeed that was the only time I’ve ever had, so far as I know, a problem of that sort during all the years in working with the board. There may be some slight incident that I’m forgetting. But this was a very serious one, and it took a bit of undoing.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But it we got it undone.

[William E.] Bill Buchanan ['24], a marvelous, wise, sensitive person, who was a wonderful servant on the board. Comes from Wisconsin and is not given to generating a great many ideas on the board. But you could count on Bill to come down on the right side of most issues that mattered. He had been close to Lawrence College, and he had a feel for higher education which was immensely valuable, immensely valuable.

[John Doty] Jack Dodd ['22] came to the board from a successful chairmanship of the Alumni Fund. If there was any route onto the board that you could see a pattern in, it would be successful leadership of the Alumni Fund. Of course this is not quite as cut and dried as you might think because what you’re looking for is someone who through his chairmanship of the Alumni Fund had become knowledgeable about the alumni body, the alumni leadership, the alumni trouble spots because this is where you hear it when you go out to ask people for money. And Jack had been a very good chairman of the Alumni Fund. But more especially, he was the man in New York that we looked to to try to hold things together. And he was very helpful in that respect. The New York alumni had their problems going clear back into Bartlett’s administration and so forth.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: But during Jack’s years on the board and just before that, the big problem was whether Dartmouth could mount an alumni club in New York City, anything comparable to, on a smaller scale, the Harvard Club, the Yale Club, and so forth. And they had had a joint tenancy with Princeton of a building. And then Princeton decided to build their own club, a new club, and this put the Dartmouth Club out of that building, and they had to find other quarters. And there were all sorts of practical, difficult questions, and
Jack rendered very important service to the College in keeping that thing on track, even though they never have been able to work out a club of their own. He was New York Telephone Company vice president, and a very thoughtful, responsible business type.

[Robert S.] Bob Oelman ['31] came onto the board from his vice presidency at that time I guess it was of the National Cash Register Company, living in Dayton, Ohio. A very congenial trustee. He took on the job of being chairman of the budget committee which we wanted to strengthen, and did a good job there.

Frank Harrington ['24] came on from Worcester, Massachusetts, a family that had long Dartmouth or had important Dartmouth heritage. They had been a very well-to-do family. I forget the name of the business they were in. I think it was an insurance company.

DANIELL: Yes, I looked it up in…

DICKEY: But a man who brought to the board one of the very great, unique qualities, namely a sensitive, informed knowledge of art, and particularly the art of colonial silver. He’s one of the principal collectors of silver of the so-called Revere period.

DANIELL: One thing that stuck out as I went through his file was he’s an important individual in one of my old haunts, the American Antiquarian Society.

DICKEY: I wouldn’t be…. I didn’t know that, but this would be right. But a very sensitive, shy person, quite unlike most of your tycoons. Not a hard-nosed fellow. In his quiet way made a very nice contribution to the board.

DANIELL: Are all these people you’ve mentioned, because they’re all people that are on my list, are they all in good health as far as you know, except for John Sullivan?

DICKEY: Yes. Well, Bill Buchanan is not. He almost went last year with heart. He’s had now two or three heart attacks. And he’s down in Florida now trying to build back his health. But he’s been very precarious. Gil Tanis has been in touch with him recently by telephone. He could tell you. But it would be very doubtful whether he’d be able to sustain an—

DANIELL: Well, that’s what I don’t want to...
DICKEY: --interview. But he may get back from that. He expects to get back from it.

DANIELL: I'll just make a note that Gil is the one who's been in close contact.

DICKEY: Albert hasn't been very well, but I would suppose he would be available, from anything I know. Well, [Roswell F.] Ros Magill ['16], of course, died very shortly after he came on the board. I don't think he attended more than one or two meetings.

DANIELL: No wonder I didn't recognize him.

DICKEY: He was one of the nation's principal tax authorities, tax lawyer in New York. Been an officer or one of the secretaries, undersecretary, I guess, of Treasury. But really had no opportunity to play any role in the board at all.

[John W.] King as governor took an interest in the board. Came to meetings, was a very pleasant fellow who frequently would make a very useful, practical suggestion for dealing with something. The principal question that we had up during King's period with the state was the sale of Mount Washington to the state by the College. He and I had a lot of fun with each other, although under the fun there was no doubt both of us were trading. He would keep saying, "Gee, the state can't afford to buy the top of that mountain." I was equally clear we couldn't afford to give it away. And we finally worked out an amicable arrangement. [Laughter] He used to tell stories out on the circuit about our negotiations. He said, "John Dickey once said that on the question of whether the state ought to support the College and historically had had a long history." But he said that, "John Dickey tells me that this is the first time he's ever heard the proposition that the College ought to support the state." [Laughter] And he would get as much mileage out of that as he could.

Bill Andres, of course, you don't need any briefing on. Bill came to the board, and has rendered yeoman service triple over in all ways. He retires, of course, this year.

[Thomas Wardell] Tom Braden ['40] is I think the one case on that whole list where I would say has been a substantial disappointment in his service. Tom—I don't know. Did you know Tom?

DANIELL: I didn't know him.
DICKEY: Well, Tom came back to Dartmouth after the.... Well, first, Tom had had really a distinguished or at least big-man-on-campus experience.

DANIELL: Visible anyway.

DICKEY: Very visible, experienced, and probably you could say distinguished as a campus leader as an undergraduate. And went over with [John G.] Gil Winant—got Gil Winant to get Tom and [William P.] Durkee [Ill '41] and [Charles G.] Chuck Bolté ['41] and one other fellow whose name is escaping me∗—into the King’s Royal Rifles, a pretty drastic turnaround from the early position that The Dartmouth had taken, opposed to America in the war. And these individuals went over before America was in the war and went into the British forces. Chuck lost a leg, as you must know, at Alamein. One of them was killed. And Tom subsequently transferred into the American forces and was in the OSS doing intelligence work, I believe, in Yugoslavia behind the lines during the war. Oh, almost a minor sort of Laurence of Arabia kind of adventuresome, devil-may-care attitude.

I met him first when I came on the job. He was in the English department as an instructor, and had come back from the war and was taken on. Had a good enough reputation that they took him right on in the English department.

DANIELL: Lousy grades, though.

DICKEY: Did he?

DANIELL: For some reason they have his grades in that file over at the alumni office. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Yes. Well, I wouldn’t be surprised about that, but I never had occasion to see them. But had already begun to make some little reputation as a writer and so forth. Then when we set up the Great Issues steering committee—how I met Tom I don’t recall.

DANIELL: He was working for that? He was, as part of the....

DICKEY: Well, at that point I’d got him to come into that.

DANIELL: Oh, I see.

∗ John F. Brister '41
DICKEY: Into that. And he came in to help us in the president's office as assistant to the president. And I'm not sure now whether that was primarily as secretary of the Great Issues steering committee, or whether it was the other way around that as an assistant in the president’s office, he became secretary of the Great Issues committee. You can check that out very quickly. But in any event, he was around the president’s office a lot. And then he was the executive secretary for a while of the Great Issues committee.

He’d been well known to Arthur Wilson before apparently he went to war. Arthur had once said that Tom’s a wonderful fellow. He’s always believed in starting at the top. [Laughs] And there is some truth in that. But he was a very useful person here on the campus. Was a great friend—this is coming back to me now—was a great friend of John [M.] Clark ['32], Judge McLane’s nephew.

You remember John Clark, know about him? Well, he became the publisher of the Claremont Eagle, and he’s the fellow who had the tragic drowning accident on Thanksgiving Day with his family. They were out canoeing in a flooded pasture and overturned, and he was lost. One of the most remarkable, fine young fellows. I knew him in Nelson Rockefeller’s office during the war.

DANIELL: That’s where the name has come from.

DICKEY: But Tom Braden and John Clark became disciples almost, it’s fair to say, of Gil Winant, Ambassador Winant, in London. And on at least one occasion, maybe more often, I met Tom and John over at the McLanes’. Of course Judge McLane and Ambassador Winant were intimate friends. Judge had helped Winant in many, many ways and tried to arrange, after Winant’s death, for somebody to write the life of Winant. And I think both Bolté and Tom were approached on it, but both decided it wasn't for them. And then maybe John Clark was involved; I’m not sure. But I think John was dead by this time.

In any event, there was this relationship. There was the McLane relationship, the discipleship—worship almost—of Winant. And then Tom…I’m not sure how he got the opportunity. But in any event, through his OSS friends, he was approached to become the executive of some committee to aid the Allies or something in the postwar period. I forget….
[William Joseph] Bill Donovan, who’d been in the OSS, Wild Bill Donovan you remember?

DANIELL: Mmmm hmmm.

DICKEY: Was heading this up. There was some such public committee. Tom went down to become the director of that at, I believe it was, Donovan’s request. Maybe it was somebody else.

DANIELL: The details of this are in a story on him which appeared in one of the news medias...

DICKEY: Well, you can get all of that. But in any event, he went down to do that. Left the College. And very quickly—or very shortly—when that job was finished or folded, he was taken on by the Museum of Modern Art to be—I forget what the title was; it was not curator. But executive director or business manager or something that had to do with running the museum, as distinguished from its curator activities.

Before all of this, back shortly after I came on the job, there was a very important happening that I should relate. And that was that Tom Braden, John Clark, [Charles F.] Charlie Moore [Jr. ’25] subsequently of the Ford Motor Company, the Dartmouth alumnus who is now retired living down in New Orleans, father-in-law of one of Bill Andres’s daughters, and one other fellow whose name is escaping me now—four of them—decided to buy the Manchester Union. This was before Loeb got it. And Judge McLane was in on it as the general counsel of the bank that they were seeking to borrow the money from, part of the money from. Tom and John were very close to Nelson Rockefeller in some way. I don’t know how Tom was, but John Clark had been a very close intimate of Nelson’s down in Washington. I saw a lot of them and so on. And Nelson Rockefeller put some substantial money into it.

They thought they had the paper purchased, when Loeb came in with a million two hundred and fifty thousand which Judge thought was at least several hundred thousand more than the paper was worth, the bank thought. Judge was just thankful that the young fellows were out from under. He thought they were going to get trapped into an ungodly financial obligation. But in any event, Loeb got the paper, which I’ve always thought was one of the strange happenings of New Hampshire life. I’ve often speculated on what would have been the outcome if these fellows had gotten the paper.
DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But they didn’t. And they all went their respective ways. John went to the *Claremont Eagle*, John Clark went to the *Claremont Eagle*. I think Nelson helped him buy that. And I’m almost certain Nelson helped Tom subsequently when he left the Museum of Modern Art to buy the Oceanside—maybe it is, or whatever the name of that town is, out in California—paper∗.

DANIELL: I guess for all intents and purposes it became...

DICKEY: And Tom made a very fine success of that, paid off his debt as I understand it, and was going great guns.

I didn’t see a great deal of Tom during this period. But when we came to seek an alumnus on the West Coast, it seemed to me that Tom had many of the attributes we were looking for: youth, some familiarity with the faculty here and the way the College was run, definitely on the side of the angels so far as academic freedom was concerned. All of these causes that were important. And Mr. Hopkins had always regarded Tom as really one of the All-American boys that’s ever been turned out here.

DANIELL: Really?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. And Sid, who knew him intimately, thought he was just as fine a prospect as we could possibly get. Well, he got cross-grained in several ways in the alumni nominating process. First, there was [Donald C.] Don McKinlay ['37], who is now on the board, was the favorite candidate of a number of people, and a very fine fellow indeed. A fellow who at one point I had considered very seriously trying to bring into the job that Ort Hicks eventually took.

DANIELL: Oh, really?

DICKEY: Yes. Actually went so far as to write a letter which I never sent. But there was a feeling about that. There was also unquestionably... Tom was too liberal in the eyes of some. So there was a political angle. There was also the fact that Tom—and we discovered this later—Tom had an incredible

∗ *Blade-Tribune*
sense of, you could call it independence, you could call it irresponsibility, you could call it many things. But of not paying attention to engagements.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He would get something else on his mind. And whether he forgot about it, whether he just didn’t think it was important… Well, without going into the fact that the fight on his nomination never came off for various reasons….

DANIELL: Hold on just a second. I’ve got to turn this.

[End of Tape 28, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 29, Side A]

DICKEY: Quite aside from the fact that the opposition to his election never coalesced, there were a number of people who would have played a role in it, but didn’t want to lead it, one of whom was Sig, one of whom was a fellow out in California who’s recently died. And others. Don McKinlay was unwilling, I think to say to him, he had the good sense not to get embroiled in a thing of this sort, at least from my point of view. Because regardless of how something of that sort comes out, it leaves scars that are never corrected. But they didn’t. As long as Don wasn’t available to be a candidate, to contest it with Tom, the opposition just wasn’t able to rally an effective campaign. So Tom was elected to the board.

I never had any experience with Tom of anything going awry as far as Tom’s service was concerned. But what did gradually develop was that Tom was just unreliable with respect to attendance, something that was very serious in the eyes of all of us. I never knew—and I don’t know to this day—whether there were special reasons for this. But there certainly weren’t very good reasons for not letting us know that he wasn’t going to get to a meeting until afterwards or the day of the meeting. And we’d have this….

You know, Gil Tanis and I fussed about this several times, wondering whether there was anything we could do about it. The net of it was that while Tom in meetings would frequently be a very useful person in not only the position he took, but in his strength and articulate way of stating his position. But by and large he lost any influence in the board because he was simply not a person that was regarded, and properly so, as a stalwart in attendance and other matters.
So this is the reason that I would say that it was a disappointment. Whether we could have known that or should have known that beforehand, I can’t attempt to say. But the fact is the potential which some of us thought was there, which I’m perfectly confident was there, never was realized on the board. And then of course he sold out, he sold the paper. Came back East. He was—I think selling the paper left him in a footloose state of mind. She [Joan Braden] wanted to come back to Washington. She’s a great person to be in the center of things.

DANIELL: That’s clear from…

DICKEY: And she wanted to come back to Washington. He came back and started up this column. And I would just have to say that I look upon it as not a misspent life, but as an unrealized life.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I’ve met one of his daughters.

DICKEY: They’ve got eight of them, eight children.

DANIELL: They’ve got a lot of them.

DICKEY: [Rupert C.] Rupe Thompson [Jr. ’28], a very fine member of the board, came to us from, again, leading the Alumni Fund well, and took on the leadership of the last capital gifts campaign. Did a good job there. I got to know Rupe quite well. Used to go down and visit them. He was head of Textron. He was a very sharp-minded person. No fuzziness about Rupe. He and I traveled together on the alumni circuit and had a very nice relationship.

[Walter R.] Peterson [Jr. ’47], the governor, again, Dartmouth background and interested in the board. Never had occasion to, so far as I can testify, to make any great impression on the board.

Ralph Lazarus [’35] came to us again from the Alumni Fund circuit—and by this time we were looking for people that had some such background for board service—a man from a well-to-do family, a Jewish family of distinction. He came onto the board and has been a very unusual member of the board. He’s a fellow of very considerable independence of mind. He frequently will take a position in the board; and then before the discussion is through, he’d gotten around on the other side of the question, gotten himself around on the other side of the question. But a very able person.
DANIELL: He’s the one person of whom I have some personal, having observed, because I’ve been on a couple of subcommittees of the board at various times of which he’s been a member. When I was smiling, I couldn’t imagine, when I saw that, who that was. And now, because he looks so much older now, now it’s clear that’s what Ralph Lazarus looked like when he was younger.

DICKEY: And he was interested in the College. Even though he had a lot to do, he took on the Alumni Fund job. I’m sure Ralph is enough of a man of affairs to think, well, maybe this will lead to a trusteeship, and it did. He’s pretty savvy about affairs. He’s had considerable experience with important governmental committees and things of this sort.

[Harrison F.] Harry Dunning ['30] made his way as president of Scott Paper Company and the Alumni Fund, and also took over when Rupe was too ill to really carry the burden on the capital gifts campaign. A splendid, splendid man who was hit with a very fatal—

DANIELL: I heard him speak just before…not too long before.

DICKEY: —situation. His son I knew very well, did some research for me as an undergraduate. Very able boy. Teaches law now out at California.

DANIELL: Well, that’s a very complete… Now, I don’t know whether you want to break now or do you want to go into a question of substance, the easiest one...

DICKEY: Well, I might just say one word here and then see where that takes you. A word about the process of bringing alumni to the board.

I have said that Mr. Hopkins had a position, at least during the latter part of his administration, in which I think pretty much permitted him to say we ought to bring so-and-so on there, and that would be it. Very early on—I talked with him about this. I became very leery of this kind of relationship with the Alumni Council. I don’t want to claim that I had a greater instinct for the democratic way than somebody else. But I had never had any doubt really about the need to, if the Alumni Council was going to feel increasingly important in the life and affairs of the College, of giving it its head.

I think it’s fair to say that this rarely happened with Mr. Hopkins. He was a venerated figure, very properly so. And the council had not had occasion
during, at least the late years of his administration, to, as far as I know, to get into College policies very much. Well, increasingly it became clear to me and very early on that if we wanted the Alumni Council to be, as theoretically it was intended to be, sort of an assembly of alumni interests around the country, we had to be prepared to give the council its head as much as possible. And one of the immediate areas where it seemed to me this was very necessary was in this nominating process. So I think it’s fair to say I never—and never is a strong word to use always—I don’t have any memory of ever having just said, So-and-so is it, and that’s that. Usually we sought first to carry out a fairly rigorous analysis of what the board needed at that point.

DANIELL: It’s clear from your descriptions that...

DICKEY: Going to individual members of the board, the leaders. I would confer with Harvey, with Judge, with Dudley. And then I always talked it over very candidly with Sid as secretary of the College, who had a knowledge of alumni affairs which was really extraordinary. Of course he’d been doing it since he graduated in ’26. And occasionally would confer over some special situation with somebody else, particularly with John Meck if it involved something like finances and so forth. So that out of these internal deliberations, we would usually get ourselves, if you will, a profile of what we’d like to get if we could get it. Recognizing that we probably couldn’t get everything that we wanted, geographically, age, professional experience, on and on. And once we’d gotten that, then we would put together a list.

Sometimes we would have a list of a dozen names. Indeed a few occasions I think we would start out with just blue sky, a list that might get up to 15 or so. And talk these out. (Al Dickerson was one of those that I remember I turned to as a really wise man about these things.) And we would get down to two or three finally that we thought for one reason or another were the best bets for our purpose. Almost always, as far as I know, I would talk over with Jay Gile these people, but not until usually we got down to that point. Always with him if it was involving a New Hampshire person, and always with Dudley and always with Judge, as long as he was on the board, and Harvey.

Then we would get together—I would get Sid to get the chairman of the nominating committee of the Alumni Council, and we would lay out to him the picture of the board, to try to get him to see what was on the board and how the board operated. And one of the most important points to try to get
across—and Mr. Hopkins brought this home to me. He said, “I think you may want to go further with this than maybe we did.” But he said, “The board should not be used to reward somebody for alumni service. It should be used primarily with the view to what the individual will be able to do for the College.”

One of the things that you’ve constantly got an eye to is money. Is it a family that can provide you with money? One of the things you learn very quickly is that this is often a very dangerous—very dangerous—thing to fool around with. You find that you’ve made a miscalculation or somebody would expect something for their money, and on and on and on. But at the same time, if you can put something of this sort together with a Frank Harrington and I would say a Nelson Rockefeller, Bill Buchanan was a generous…. Ralph Lazarus had the potential there. Rupe Thompson. Then you’re in business, so to speak. But we would have to bring this home to them because almost invariably your chairman of the nominating committee started with somebody who’d been a big-time alumnus. He’s very well known to alumni, he’d say. He’s very well thought of among the alumni and so forth. Well, you don’t say we don’t want him. But you, at least in my experience, the effort was made to have them understand the board, how it worked. You had a small board, and you had just so many places to cover a lot of qualifications that you needed.

So that it was an educational process, and to some extent both ways. But mainly from the College administration to the chairman of the nominating committee. Usually we would also confer with the chairman of the council. But this would depend to a considerable extent as to when it happened, whether he’d just come onto the job or was just going off of the job. And also to a considerable degree we would follow Sid’s counsel about this, as to whether this was a good thing to do. But always with the nominating committee chairman. And frequently he would have a different way of going about things. Sometimes he would say, Well, now, I want to take these names back and what you said to me, to my committee. And then I’ll come back and have another meeting with you. Sometimes that would be it. He would say, Well, I think the committee would go for So-and-so and so forth.

This is the way it worked and on the whole I would say it worked well. The one thing that I became increasingly clear about was that we’d better not try to have our own way always, especially too fast. That this was a very dangerous thing. That usually you could have, especially as I began to acquire years on the job and a certain position…there were at least a
number of occasions when we said, Well, you’d better take these two or three names back to your committee. Then let’s have another session and see where we come out. And we changed our judgments on a number of cases.

DANIELL: That’s the question I was going to ask, is how much give and take did there turn out to be in the process?

DICKEY: The only case where there was primarily a taking was the one I mentioned to you on John Sullivan.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And this was because, as I said, a rather special problem.

DANIELL: [E. Spencer] Miller ['31] was part of the nominating committee?

DICKEY: He was the chairman of the nominating committee. And a very strong-minded, very able fellow. Good friend of mine, for whom I had great respect. But he was pretty clear that once we’d laid out the things we were looking for, and with some cause, where would you find a New Hampshire person, etc., to meet those qualifications? So I think that’s about all that can be said.

On the life trusteeships, so-called, we turned to the executive committee of the board to be the nominating committee for the board.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: And the executive committee would go over this. Now, we didn’t always, as I said to you earlier, turn to an alumni trustee.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Because for the best of all possible reasons in a sense, we might be looking for somebody that wasn’t on the board, or some qualification that wasn’t on the board, and we didn’t want to have to twist the arm of the Alumni Council to bring that fellow onto the board. Life trusteeship was something that rested within the board. If we could carry the board, that was it.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: And this was….

DANIELL: A very important distinction.

DICKEY: Oh, a very important distinction.

DANIELL: You don’t get trapped in….

DICKEY: Otherwise you just get trapped, and it’s a very difficult trap to get out of. A very difficult trap to get out of.

DANIELL: Very important to the institution not to get [inaudible] because [inaudible] Alumni Council to be pretty unpredictable.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. So I think that about winds up the overall view of the board. I would say that I look back upon my relations with the board as one of the most satisfying aspects of the job. I never had a single thing that came up where it was really critically in my eyes where I didn’t feel that I had support on it. And this was…well, this was just a great satisfaction.

DANIELL: I was going to say that completes anything I would’ve had about sort of the structure, selection, individual members of the board. At our next session—I think probably it’s wise to break now—but our next session….

[Break]

…discuss some of the concrete, I won’t call them necessarily problems, but situations that came up in which you sought the advice or help of the board of trustees in these. And we discussed this after I turned the tape on last time, and I’ve got a list of these. And we agreed perhaps the best way to do this would be to go simply chronologically because that would get at the developing relationship in the board.

The first three I had marked one, two, three, and this was the trustees and the admissions, basically changing criteria for admissions. Now you discussed earlier you and Bob Strong working this out inside. So all we’d be interested in here is the relationship of all this to the board of trustees.

You also, just to remind you, earlier in the session did speak about the episode in which there was one member, Sig Larmon, on the board of
trustees, questioned the changing criteria concerning Jewish admissions. So that’s been covered.

DICKEY: Well, I trust I didn’t suggest that Sig took that issue on directly.

DANIELL: No, no.

DICKEY: I don’t want to dwell unduly on the Sig Larmon thing because it was not that major a factor, and I want to be scrupulously fair to him. This was obviously something that was under the saddle as far as he was concerned and sort of a burr under the saddle.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And the one time it came up was at this meeting I mentioned at our house, where he said alumni were restless or unhappy about this, alumni he knew, which I think was primarily New York City. And brought it up in the context of alumni unhappiness about not winning as many football games. I think I mentioned both of those.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. That’s exactly how it came out.

DICKEY: But it was not a head-on thing.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And I just had to make clear that where I would come out with any head-on….

DANIELL: Yes. I mention that only to say that a portion of this was discussed before.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Did you go to the board of trustees in discussing the general pressures on admissions in those very early years?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Yes, we did. This was one of the earliest so-called pressure points in my experience on the job because of many things.

First, the veterans were coming back. And we, along with other institutions, felt an obligation to give first attention to the veterans, to get them back into the institutions if they had been there before the war. They
weren’t coming back either in a phased-out basis. They were coming back just as fast as they could make their way out of the service.

Secondly, you had, of course, a normal generation of young people coming out of the schools; they expected that they were going to find a place in the colleges in ’46 or thereabouts.

You also had the fact that the population that wanted to go to college was increasing. Economically they were better able to go. The schools were putting more of their graduates into the college picture. All of these things were in the picture.

And then there was another factor that we never talked very much about publicly. But during the postwar period, Dartmouth continued—and I think continued is the correct term, although I never looked at the prewar figures—continued to be a sought-after commodity in the college market. And the competition for admissions resulting from all of these factors became perceptibly sharper and was on an incline up from the very beginning.

This produced problems that were, I would call, normal, healthy problems because when you have more business than you can handle, ordinarily you’re in fairly good shape. But in one respect it produced a crisis, minor crisis kind of situation. And that was with regard to alumni sons. And this was where the board was consulted by me, and where we had to think our way through pretty carefully. And where I personally had to show really responsibility of carrying on as effective an educational program with the alumni as I could muster.

The alumni before the war had gotten very heavily imbued with the notion that the preference for alumni was an assurance that they would be admitted. And the competition was such—there was still a competition for admission—but the competition was not nearly as acute as it was after the war. And it was such that it didn’t bring home to alumni generally that there were going to be any great number who weren’t going to be admitted as long as they were alumni sons.

But the situation changed rapidly, and it changed drastically after the war. And I think it’s not too strong to say that we could’ve gotten into, if not irreparable trouble, we could’ve gotten into trouble that would’ve affected the life of the institution for a long, long time.
One of the things that I should want to be on the historical record was the fact that Al Dickerson was superbly qualified in respect to personal qualities to carry out the responsibility of being director of admissions at this point. He came into the job in the summer of '46 practically at the same time that I came on the job, just as part of a year later, when Bob Strong died suddenly in the summer of '46, and picked right up and went forward as director of admissions. At that time, I believe I said earlier, I had decided that admissions were going to be so critical a front that we would split off the dean of freshman—

DANIELL: Yes, you had discussed that.

DICKEY: --responsibilities and ask Professor Stearns Morse to take on that, and Al became solely director of admissions. Well, one doesn’t need to dwell on this unduly. But if you’d had a person whose integrity was a little wobbly, not dishonest, who was so easily influenced by considerations of friendship or class loyalties, not to speak of the normal campus pressures of athletics and things of that sort, we could’ve gotten a distorted admissions situation at just the wrong time.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: At just the wrong time, without my ever knowing it. At least knowing it in a way that would permit something to be done about it in time. There are too many judgments that have to be made back in the admissions office that he can’t and he shouldn’t be running to the president about. So that we, the College, was immensely well served by the fact that it had a man in there who had learned his way into Dartmouth life as an assistant to President Hopkins, who was devoted to the College, but who knew which way was up. And I never had a moment’s concern. I don’t think he ever brought a case to me that I took a different view of than his view. And in turn, I can say on my behalf that whenever he had occasion to say thank you to me, it was said in a way that meant a great, great deal to me. Because we lost friendships constantly—

DANIELL: Oh yes…

DICKEY: – during this period. We were regarded by quite a few people, and very understandably, very understandably, as being out of touch with Dartmouth...

[End of Tape 29, Side A]
DICKEY: This of course came to the attention of the board through their personal
acquaintance with alumni, through correspondence, through letters to the
editor of the alumni magazine, all the sources that reflect these
dissatisfactions. We were, of course, in touch with other institutions, so we
knew what was going on there.

But basically what we had to do was to make sure that we had the board
with us on the proposition that the Dartmouth alumni preference would be
maintained insofar as it permitted the admissions office to choose between
two equally qualified candidates and give the preference to the son of the
alumnus.

Now this inevitably involved a measure of judgment, of subjective
judgment. But it also required turning down—I don’t know how many, but a
substantial number—of lads who simply weren’t equal to the last...their
qualifications, particularly academic qualifications, of course, were not
equal to the last person that you could bring into the class. It was a little bit
like trying—and I often used the figure of speech—of trying to hook up a
freight train. Well, fine as long as you had one car immediately after the
other. But if you had one back down the track a half a mile, [Laughter] you
were in trouble, or at least that lad is in trouble.

If I undertook to be personal about some of the friendships that were lost,
it would just be unreal, but they were substantial, and they were difficult;
and for everyone I guess I lost, Al Dickerson probably lost ten.

So we had to be sure we had the board of trustees with us on this. I don’t
recall that we ever asked for a formal vote. But we talked it over from time
to time in the meetings and they stood with us. I never was pressured. I
would get letters occasionally from a trustee. But never was I pressured by
the board on admissions.

DANIELL: Did you use the board at all—use is not the precise term—did you seek
the assistance of the board in publicizing the alterations in policy? I know
today, for example, more frequently, I’m reading on the way the board was
back then was not as ready to serve that kind of a role as it became later.

DICKEY: No, there’s a difference. Of course this gets into fairly delicate
contemporary questions which I think I’d better stay out of. But the
situation was fundamentally different in this respect: My Dartmouth
identification was not open to question. Secondly, there was no chairman in the sense of a designated chairman to carry the ball if I didn’t carry it.

What I did look to was to have the board sufficiently familiar with the issue, sufficiently convinced themselves that when they got correspondence, as they inevitably did, when they met with groups although not many of them would have occasion to meet with a whole alumni club or anything of that sort, they were able to carry out some of the work of explanation.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: But the basic thing that had to be gotten across was that we had not changed policies. A new president had not come in and thrown the selective process out. But that what had changed was the competition for admission which had always existed, or at least existed during the period of the selective process for the past, well, almost the past 20 years. And the competition had changed so drastically that it was just way out ahead of the understanding of the alumni.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Now, as I said, we also had the normal problems of adjusting to the veterans and their needs and their ways. It was a difficult period on the campus because we had 17-year-old boys out of the high schools with men who’d returned from a pretty rough passage as seasoned soldiers and weren’t about to be taken back into the womb so far as their behavior was concerned. And this led us into some very rough problems. Getting the College started, I think we touched on that before.

DANIELL: Yes, we did.

DICKEY: And all of that, which the board was not much involved in but had to ready to deal with and support. Opening up a liquor—a beer room and things like that. Carrying it on under terms that would keep it outside of the—or inside the law as far as the state was concerned, things like that.

Also, I was, as I’ve said also before, deeply concerned that the notion that Dartmouth was a place for a helluva good time and that you weren’t really part of the inner circle of Dartmouth unless you were pretty hard-drinking, etc. kind of person. That this just had to be leaned against very hard at every point. And this came to a head with me, and I’ve already described that to you, with the Cirrotta case, tragic death of a student. And here
again, it required a board to understand what was going on. And I have nothing but warmest memories of the understanding of the board in dealing with these matters. So that on admissions, there’s no great problem.

The issue which the board had to face in the area—two issues were involved that were quite fundamental as far the board was concerned: The first was one which I had—and I will be sufficiently contemporary on this confidential tape to say I still have—a very deep conviction that admissions policy had better be retained by the board of trustees as a responsibility that it’s prepared to assume itself. I think that the problems that are involved in trying to get a faculty to focus on admissions policy, including the question of size of a class, on alumni preferences, on keeping the student body sufficiently pluralistic in its interests without shortchanging the primary qualification of academic strength, has to be done very largely by seasoned, strong administrative officers working with a faculty committee. We always had a Faculty Advisory Committee in the freshman year, that sort of thing. But that ultimately when there’s a real crisis or crux that’s got to be faced, the need to go to a group that has continuity and unquestioned responsibility for what happens to the institution seems to me to indicate that the board of trustees has a responsibility here.

Now, this, of course, has become a contemporary issue which I’m entirely aware of even though I do no talking about it outside this tape. But at that period, during that period, several times in a Faculty Council meeting, never in the faculty as a whole as I recall, but in Faculty Council meetings or in committees, I said, “I’ve just go to be clear about this. I’m prepared to consult ‘til everybody else is tired of consulting. And I want the benefit of views on this. But as far as the institution’s ultimate exercise of responsibility in this area is concerned, I received an institution where this was a trustee’s responsibility, and as far as I’m concerned this is the way I’m going to operate.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: The board never made an issue of that with me during my time. But it was clear that they were quite prepared to believe this was the correct view. And it was never challenged. The closest it came to being challenged was in an area where I would be more concerned not to have the board get into the act, and that was the Jewish question.
DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Here I felt there was a proper educational component that there was no question but what the institution needed the faculty input, and we got it. Now the other question was on size. And here you get into—we got into—the question of what Dartmouth wanted to be. How big did it not want to be, could it be, and still stay on the Hanover plain? This involved taking a look in a preliminary way at the whole recruitment program. This was one of the new efforts that had to be given to the alumni. And this was quite a balancing act because on the one hand the alumni were coming at us and saying, Here you’re turning down the son of good old Joe who’s done all this for the College and so forth. And now you come to us and you want us to make the problem worse by going out and recruiting more students to be interested in Dartmouth. [Laughter]

Well, I often use the figure of speech—it was like not liking to cut grass and still going out and fertilizing your lawn. But we had to do it, and we did it. We were behind Princeton in this. Princeton, I think, was one of the first in the Ivy group that mounted an organized recruitment program, using particularly their alumni. But we weren’t far behind, and once we got going, we had some men who did very fine things in this respect. Don McKinlay, who’s now on the board of trustees, from Denver would be one that should be mentioned; was a notable leader of the enrollment program. But this became a form of alumni service, of alumni concern that was comparable to any other thing except possibly the Alumni Fund. And in some ways was equally important to the future strength of the institution.

DANIELL: How much of that had gone on under Hopkins?

DICKEY: Well, almost none in an organized way. And indeed the alumni weren’t aware of it. Their notion was generally—I suppose there were individuals who weren’t—but the general was, well, we’re getting along fine. We’re doing pretty well in athletics, which is where they read the thermometer. [Laughs] There was no organized enrollment program.

DANIELL: This becomes a very important ingredient in the process of meeting competition effectively.

DICKEY: Oh, absolutely!
Once you get the alumni geared up to the constantly stiffer criteria, qualifications, for the institution, then they get kicks if they can get their valedictorian or their best football player to apply to Dartmouth.

Absolutely. And it was critical in our relationship with the schools of the country, that we should go out and make an organized, continuing effort to present our best case and to make clear that we intended to compete for the best in the schools, as well as with faculty, as I mentioned earlier, younger faculty that we were recruiting. So this was a—this required some decision by the board of trustees with respect to size. And we took a decision—I forget what the first figure was—but it wasn’t very long before the first study of size, which was within the first few years that I was on the job, led us into the trustees’ planning committee work in an even more detailed way in the early fifties.

There was no pressure on the board to expand. Indeed, the assumptions in the board were that it was desirable to hold the enrollment to the lowest—to a feasible level. But we kept working up the size of the student body through what I called reverse attrition. That is, instead of having as many flunking out and as many dropping out as we had before, we were getting fewer and fewer people leaving the student body, so that we would take in a class of the same size and pretty soon we found ourselves moving up substantially in size.

Interesting, interesting. I hadn’t thought of it that way before.

Well, it showed up fairly quickly. And we also enlarged the size of the freshman class somewhat. Although here again, Al Dickerson was very hesitant, very reluctant to see us move the size of the class upward very much.

Well, those were the two principal things that I remember so far as the board was concerned in the area of admissions.

The next area—and you’ve answered every single question I had jotted down in my mind concerning that. I don’t know which, whether you want to do these together…or I don’t know how much they’re connected. I’ll be interested to find out. The Chicago Tribune episode and then McCarthyism.

Well, they were inevitably connected because they happened about the same time. The McCarthyism bloomed a little later, but it was in the wind,
in the climate, I guess more accurately, of the nation right after World War II. To some extent very much like, I guess, after World War I when you had the hunting of the IWWs and so forth. But the *Chicago Tribune* incident came in either the first year or early in the second year—it may have been early in the second year—of the Great Issues Course.

DANIELL: Right. I think it was, yes.

DICKEY: And it came out of—one of the objectives of the Great Issues Course was to give all of our seniors some experience with the comparative press. So that they would have some sophistication with respect to the fact that a happening might look very differently, depending upon which newspaper you read about it.

DANIELL: This is something you had done a little bit of back in your….

DICKEY: Back at the School of Advanced International Studies—

DANIELL: Right, right.

DICKEY: --I had had my students in the Formulation of American Foreign Policies reading three papers, reading the *Tribune*, reading the Washington paper, and reading the *New York Times*, and sometimes one of the Communist papers, in order to provide this perspective, this comparative perspective on the same happening.

Well, we went at this in the Great Issues Course really quite thoroughly. We set up exhibits. One of the finest aspects of the Great Issues Course and one in which we had to pioneer in, was the use of exhibits to teach with, because we were dealing with the entire senior class of 605, 600 men…well, 600 men, I guess. And therefore we had to do a good bit of the teaching through exhibits, and these exhibits weren't something you could buy. You had to create them. So that we had exhibits showing how a particular newspaper story was treated differently by….

DANIELL: I remember they were underlined in red.

DICKEY: Yes, by a whole series of papers and so forth. And we featured the *Chicago Tribune* and its headline treatment undoubtedly. And we then put some of the exhibits up for the benefit of the College as a whole up in the main exhibit cases at Baker Library. They were up there at just about the same time as the *Tribune* sent a fellow named Griffin, I think his name...
was—Griffith or Griffin; I believe it was [Eugene] Griffin—one of their star reporters probably, to Hanover to look into what they’d heard about the Great Issues Course, what they’d read about it in the *New York Times* and elsewhere.

Well, he came here and found that the *Tribune* was in the same case with the *Daily Worker* and the *New York Times* and so forth, showing how a particular story had been treated in each one of these things. Well, he wrote a series of articles for the *Tribune* which were highly critical of the College, of course. These were printed back in the *Tribune*. I don’t think they made the front page at first. Some of them may have made the front page. But they gave pretty good play to these stories. Then at one point in this man’s two or three days on the campus, someone got to talking with him on sort of a private, personal basis. Not—an officially off-the-record basis, I guess. But he said, “Well, sure, we print it the way the colonel wants to have it printed. We write the story the way....” And this was picked up—and I forget now just how it was picked up—by the other papers. Of course they were just delighted to have a story about somebody taking on the *Chicago Tribune*. Those were the days when people were scared to death of the *Chicago Tribune*.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: A lot of people scared of it who shouldn’t have been. But in any event, this just infuriated the *Tribune* and put Griffin on the spot. He immediately denied it, said this was all cock and bull. And they really obviously gave him a hard time in the *Tribune* when this was run. Well, at this point the *Tribune* pulled out all the stops.

DANIELL: I didn’t realize it got involved and that it had a personal [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Yes. They had editorials and a big [Carey] Orr cartoon on the front page in color showing me pouring New Deal syrup and internationalism out of a bottle down the throats of these liberal boys. [Laughter]

DANIELL: You never thought you’d be caricatured in a main paper.

DICKEY: I remember I got a letter at that time, which I enjoyed very much, from Scotty Reston, whom I’d known while I was in the State Department. We’d seen a good bit of each other out at San Francisco at the United Nations conference together and so forth. But out of the blue came a letter from Scotty, and it said: “Some people, if they work hard at it, make the front
page of the Chicago Tribune. And if they're especially fortunate, they might make the editorial page of the Tribune. But you're not playing on the first team unless you make a colored front-page cartoon. Congratulations!"[Laughter] Well, this has its amusing side. And at that time it wasn't something that I was prepared to have a nervous breakdown about. But I still had to do a good bit of thinking about how to manage it. Because it scared the life out of more alumni in Chicago than I ever imagined it would. I suppose this was naïve on my part.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But I began to get calls at the house from the president of the alumni association and so forth. Usually they would start in wanting to assure me that they were with us, and that they understood the Tribune. But then how could we get the Tribune off their back, it was going to hurt us in the Chicago area and so on and so forth. Well, it made good copy, resulted in [Louis M.] Louie Lyons of the Harvard Niemen Fellows coming up to Hanover and being so anxious to take our side that he did a thorough job of looking into all the Tribune's charges. And then wrote really a very effective piece for the Atlantic Monthly entitled, “Libeling Our Colleges.” I have reprints around here still somewhere. Which was a very useful piece for us because Louie Lyons had a good name in journalism and the Nieman Fellows did. He wrote it very effectively, this piece, “Libeling Our Colleges.” And he really gave Colonel McCormick a hard time over difficulties that the colonel had had of—I forget what it was now, I think it was at the time of Pearl Harbor, he'd been accused of being careless about news stories that dealt with the breaking of codes and things like that. Well, this attracted a lot of attention to Dartmouth. It attracted a lot of very favorable attention to Dartmouth in the academic world.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: People wondered what was going on here. And I remember the Dartmouth graduate [Leonard D.] White ['14], who was a very outstanding political scientist at the University of Chicago, had been chairman of the Civil Service Commission in Washington at one point, saying that he was very proud of the fact that we had taken on the Tribune, something that the University of Chicago had never been willing to do.

DANIELL: Very interesting.
DICKEY: It was publicity that without my reckoning with it helped us to be taken seriously as a major institution with, shall we say, integrity and intellectual guts. But it scared quite a few alumni, and there was nothing for it but to face up to the issue in my alumni talks out to the alumni and elsewhere. It was an indoctrination in what I guess I probably knew but had not had much experience with yet: That basically your alumni body is a pretty conservative, particularly the older alumni body, is a pretty conservative constituency.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And they don’t like to have the College exposed to that kind of criticism, particularly from the main paper in the Middle West and all of that. But it certainly confirmed to all of us who were working in Great Issues that the notion that people can discount this background bias of a paper was just not one of the realities of dealing with the press. They would say, well, we don’t read the editorial page. Well, they didn’t realize they were reading editorials all the time in the headlines and so forth.

So whatever else was accomplished, I think it helped us with our objective—to accomplish our objective with that group of undergraduates in the course. And did us, as far as I know, not a speck of permanent harm. I may be missing something. I may have not known about something which.... As I’ve said, there was a period of unpleasantness and difficulty, and it was discussed in Alumni Council and things like that.

DANIELL: Did you discuss it with the board of trustees?

DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes. But I don’t recall any discussion that went other than just to the explanation of what the facts were as we understood them. I don’t think there was—I’m sure there was never any trustee action or anything. And we had no trustee from Chicago at that time. So that most of it was secondhand. And most of our board were somewhat more sophisticated about the Chicago Tribune than the average alumnus.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, the Tribune fight was spectacular. There was no question at all, both from the way they behaved and from what I heard about others, that McCormick really felt he could get me personally. I got this from other sources. But they, after a while, got tired of it, and that was that. The
Tribune fight did not lead directly into any of the McCarthy issues. But it was a prelude to them.

DANIELL: I’m just going to turn this over before we begin the end of this.

[End of Tape 29, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 30, Side A]

DICKEY: We had, so far as I can recall, no direct issue with McCarthy or with McCarthyism that became a major public issue. There was the case involving the fellow that got into trouble with the State of New Hampshire. What was his name—Niedhaus? No, not Niedhaus. The Stefansson’s friend.


DICKEY: Yes, that’s right.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: But this was not directly a College issue. He was not connected with the College. But some of our faculty like [inaudible] and others went to bat for him.

DANIELL: This is when [Louis] Wyman was attorney general.

DICKEY: Yes, and I’ll speak of this in a moment. It’s awful, I shouldn’t forget that man’s name. But that will be well known to you.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And [Vilhjalmur] Stefansson’s name got dragged into it in some way. Stefansson was here as an arctic consultant. Dudley Orr I know helped advise Stefansson. I don’t know whether he represented him or not. But a number of people—Judge McLane and Orr and others tried to be useful and helpful to these people. But this was not a head-on confrontation as far as the College was concerned.

There was one case that came very, very close to it and was, for me…. Well, there were several cases that I had to think about pretty seriously. We had one very outstanding, relatively young fellow that had come to the faculty while I was on the job, who had been a card-carrying Communist.
Not here now, and he wouldn't be widely known. But not through any questioning of ours, but stated to I guess it was to Don Morrison or somebody, that he had been but had given it up. As far as I was concerned, that was history and not something that we were going to feel was any of our business and so forth.

But then came along, I’m not sure of the chronology here, but it’s in this period, the [William W.] Remington ['39] case. I’m not sure whether you are familiar with that or not.

DANIELL: No, absolutely not.

DICKEY: Well, this was a very, very difficult matter. Remington had been a Dartmouth undergraduate and a very outstanding member of the student body back in the middle thirties or thereabouts. And he had been, as quite a few others at that time had been, very far to the Left in his behavior. I had not known of him and never heard of the name, I guess I’d have to say, because I wasn’t around here in those days.

But then in the McCarthy period, Remington was indicted for I believe—I guess it was under the Espionage Act of some sort, having to do in some way. I’m just not recalling sharply what it was, but it was something. In any event, he went to prison for it ultimately. And while he was under indictment, I guess, or they were investigating him, he became a cause célèbre in the country and in the press and in the Congress and everywhere else. And it became known, of course, that he was a Dartmouth graduate. I didn’t get much correspondence on it really. I can’t recall now even a single letter, but I suppose I must have gotten a half dozen or more letters from alumni about it and so forth.

But then I heard that the government was going to be prying around in the records of the institutions to try to find out from the College’s files what the individual had been up to and so forth.

DANIELL: Maybe see who some of his buddies were, too.

DICKEY: Yes. Very definitely. Well, at this point I made inquiry as to where our files were. I had no idea where they were. And I learned that these old student files were in the dean’s office I guess they were. Or Baker Library. And I decided that I would like to know what was in there. So as I recall, I was given the file or—we had to hunt for it. We found it. And the one thing that didn’t frighten me but disturbed me was there was a letter in there by Mr.
Hopkins about Remington. Now, I forget now just what the date of the letter was. It would still be in the files. So if you find yourself curious, you would find it. And it may have been about Remington’s application for a graduate fellowship. I seem to—I’m not sure whether that was it or whether it was to the Rhodes Scholarship committee. But he was this kind of prominent figure on the campus. I don’t think it was in the postwar period. Almost certain it was not in the postwar period. But Mr. Hopkins, with the kind of candor that he frequently used and sometimes subsequently wished he hadn’t been so forthcoming, [Laughter] said that he really didn’t feel confident about Remington as to what his political loyalties were and so forth. Something of this sort. The sort of thing that if somebody got a hold of it, they could cause a good bit of trouble.

Well, I sent the file back. I didn’t touch it, of course. I just sent it back. But I just had a feeling that this was something that if it was gotten a hold of, could conceivably cause embarrassment to Mr. Hopkins and the College. But we’d just have to wait and see what happened.

Then the real worrisome development occurred. I got word that Wyman wanted to come see me. I wasn’t of course sure what he wanted to come about. But I suspected it was the Remington case. And when he came in, that proved very quickly to be the fact. And he was all business, very brusque. We hadn’t met before. And he said, “I want to have your cooperation in providing the College’s files, turning the College’s files over to me.” And, well, I said, “What is it you’re looking for?” “Well,” he said, “I don’t know. But one of the things I’m especially interested in is who taught him.” Well, he couldn’t have said anything that could’ve aroused my worries and antagonism more sharply because if it’s one thing I hold pretty strong convictions about, it’s you don’t get into the position of blaming the faculty member for how somebody turns out. At least you don’t run down individual faculty members.

So I drew him out a little bit more, and he said, “Well, we want to know where his views came from on these things.” And so on. Well, then I decided that I was really going to take him on, and I said, “Well, I just have got to say to you this would be, in my eyes, a violation of one of the most fundamental principles of the College’s operation, and would be something that was just simply utterly inconsistent with the normal relationship with our faculty. I haven’t the remotest notion who taught him. And I don’t think that in an inquiry of this sort it really is relevant. It could be misused. It could be misunderstood. And just cause all manner of havoc to the normal work and sense of confidence of the faculty.”
Well, he said, “We take a different view of this.” So I continued to try to persuade him of the other view. And I could see that I had—or thought I could see—that I had made some progress with him. I certainly had slowed him down a bit. So I said, “Well, I guess what I’ve got to say to you right now is that these files are not going to be turned over voluntarily. If we are subpoenaed, why, we will have to face that question when it comes. And if it’s found to be a lawful subpoena, that’s one thing. But we’re not going to turn over these files voluntarily to you.” And I said, “I hope you understand why. Because,” I said, “I’m really very much concerned about this.” “Well,” he said, “I guess even if I said I understood it, I’d have to tell you that I don’t think Senator McCarthy will understand it.” This is the first time that he really revealed where his concern was, to please McCarthy and that element.

So I forget what my response was to that, but it basically was, well, that would have to be as it was. But that wasn’t something we could take into account. He never came back. Never sought, so far as I know, subpoenas. And our files were never subpoenaed. Which was for me one of the really high-water marks of the McCarthy period. I had occasion, in addition to that one, to try to think my way through some of the questions that were coming up in the academic world....

DANIELL: Just one question.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: I should know this, but I don’t. Who was governor of New Hampshire then? Or do you remember?

DICKEY: Not with certainty. But I would suppose it was either [Charles] Dale or [Robert] Blood.

DANIELL: Yes, okay. Well, I ask that only [inaudible].

DICKEY: Neither of whom did I know.

DANIELL: Yes. I ask that only in terms of whether the timing on this was such that some people who were close to the College as Governor...

DICKEY: No, no. It was either Governor Dale or Governor Blood. I’m not sure which it would have been—who it was.
Now this was a decision which I took on my own. The trustees were not involved in this as far as I recall. I believe I shared—I know I shared this information, this experience, with the board of trustees. But I took this one on my own. I had a certain confidence about my own convictions in this area, some legal background.

I had occasion to go a good bit more deeply into some of the legal questions after that, as the Fifth Amendment issue [was] a central issue on the American university campuses. Faculty members or staff claiming the right to refuse to testify on grounds of the Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination. And also I decided that I was going to think my way through and take a public position with respect to the hiring of Communist members. This was not a likely thing to have happen, but it seemed to me one that involved principles that I wanted to be clear about myself, and I owed it to the people who were concerned about Communism in the colleges to at least say this much to them.

So I did a good bit of reading and thinking and made a talk to both what was called the Faculty Council at that time, a sort of a senate, and also to the faculty as a whole. And in effect I took two positions: I said that past membership in the Communist Party, being called a Leftist, this sort of thing, was, as far as I was concerned, something that was of no relevance to us. We were not going to hunt down faculty members because of their political affiliations. But that I did feel that membership in the Communist Party was, as far as I was concerned, unless there was some very unusual showing of fact that would change my judgment, a disqualification for service in an enterprise which was committed to the search for truth without led or hindrance from ideological commitment. And that I would not therefore knowingly be a party to the hiring of somebody who had accepted this discipline. And I said that I was now convinced that most party members, during that period or earlier, had accepted an obligation for the use of deceit and deception in dealing with their ideological enemies, which was incompatible with the free marketplace of ideas that I was prepared to defend insofar as was within my power. And that I regarded the use of deceit and deception as very different from the kind of what you might call happenstance lying that every human being might find himself involved in. That I was talking about the acceptance of a discipline to use deceit for the purpose of advancing this ideology or party responsibility as a Communist member.
And I made a talk to the Dartmouth Alumni Association of Boston, in which I laid out pretty carefully my convictions in this respect. I did also say to the Faculty Council, I think it was, and I may have said it in this same faculty meeting, and it was printed in the alumni magazine, that after really very careful thought and reading, and including the reading of the legal journals on the history of the Fifth Amendment—Zach Chaffee, who was one of the great liberals of the Harvard Law School faculty, and so forth—I was convinced that the Fifth Amendment never was intended simply to prevent the kind of normal interrogation that a court might find proper. I said if the interrogation was questioned and the court ruled that it was improper, that was one thing. But if it was dealt with by a responsible court, and the court held that it was a proper line of interrogation, I was not prepared to regard as a matter of indifference the claim of the Fifth Amendment by a faculty member. I was not prepared to say what I would do about it, if anything. But that I was prepared to say that it was something that I would have to give a lot of thought to. Because what it was doing was shifting the whole onus of being responsive to a proper legal proceeding to the College where the College was not in possession of the facts. And where, by assumption, the court had ruled that it was a proper source of interrogation. This was basically the position that Chaffee came out with in a very learned *Law Review* article. So I felt a good bit of confidence in this position.

This was not well received, I’m sure, by some on the faculty, although I can’t remember that I had any objection from inside the faculty. There may have been one or two, I don’t recall, questions about it when I spelled it out. I remember a Dartmouth alumnus out on the West Coast, who was teaching at the University of California at the time, became quite outraged, that this was cooperating with McCarthyism and so forth. I was sorry about that. He subsequently became a joint holder of a Nobel Laureate in physics. I’m forgetting his name at the moment. But neither of these, fortunately, became actual issues. That is, there was no proposal that we hire a Communist member, nor did anybody, so far as I recall, on our faculty. And to a considerable degree my purposes were served. Namely it was not to have the Fifth Amendment just become a lazy, easy way of avoiding responding to an adjudication that the court had a right to have this information.

So I guess I would say that although there were things that I might have done differently in retrospect, that was not one of them. And I have not changed my judgments about that. And I think that I probably was wise to have thought my way through and to have exposed this to discussion in
the faculty when I did, and not to have somebody trapped into thinking that
the institution would go to bat in a situation in which....

DANIELL: Is this at all related to your experience in the Hiss case?

DICKEY: Yes, but the Hiss case came a little later.

DANIELL: I see. Okay.

DICKEY: With regard to its acute form, as I recall. I could be getting crossed up here
in my chronology, but I don't think so.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: The Hiss case, and particularly the second trial, shook me up—

DANIELL: Yes, we've gone over that.

DICKEY: --very, very definitely.

DANIELL: I just wasn't sure of the timing.

DICKEY: I've covered the Hiss case, haven't I?

DANIELL: Yes, you have, in great detail.

DICKEY: Yes. And I'm just a little uncertain about it, but I think the Hiss case came
a little later. Now the McCarthy thing extended over a considerable period
of time.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And the high point of it as far as Dartmouth was concerned, I suppose,
was the speech of President Eisenhower here at the commencement in
1953 when for the first time, I believe it's fair to say, he took a public
position that was regarded as critical of McCarthy, the so-called “Don't
Join the Book Burners” speech. And I've always looked back on that with a
great deal of satisfaction that this took place here at Dartmouth at a
Dartmouth commencement.

Well, from McCarthy's demise—I mean his political demise—this thing
began to unwind a bit. And I think the—and to look back on it from the
point of view of a person who had to give an awful lot of thought to it during this period—I would say that, in retrospect, the Gettysburg was Eisenhower’s presidency.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Not because Eisenhower was the great shining white knight in respect to such matters. Although I think his instincts were right. Everything I saw would suggest his instincts were right. His courage was overlaid with some political corrosion. But at that point ’52, in the election of ’52, I had reached the conclusion that the welfare of the country required that the Republicans should have some experience with the responsibilities of governing. That they were becoming an anti-government party, regarding all government as conspiratorial, corrupt, God knows what. And I could only imagine that they could be educated by self-education, the process of self-learning, that would come with the responsibility of power.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: So that as I look back on it, I think the coming to power of the Republican Party under Eisenhower in ’52 was the Gettysburg of the McCarthy movement, although it didn’t become decisive until ’53 and ’54.

DANIELL: It sort of disengaged it in part… [inaudible]

DICKEY: But the party had to face the fact that it was responsible for government, and that a lot of things went on in government that sometimes you’d be happy if they hadn’t gone on during your administration. If I had the Hiss, the dates of the Hiss thing, a little bit more tightly at this point. I could….

DANIELL: Yes. But I mean the fact that you don’t automatically see, recollect a strong association [inaudible].

DICKEY: No. All I remember about that is that the Hiss case started early enough that I would have some correspondence from alumni, or I would hear that some McCarthyite kind of alumnus would say, "Well, what the hell do you expect? He came out of the State Department."

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Exactly. Yes.

DICKEY: Even though they might not have known about the fact that Hiss had taken my job when I left the department and things like that. So that during this
period of the McCarthyism, so-called, from ’47, the Chicago Tribune thing on, there was an element, of course, in the public, in the Congress, and in the alumni body which regarded the State Department as a nest of spies and this sort of thing.

Of course this was to some extent slowed up in respect to the Hiss case by the fact that Hiss was much closer to John Foster Dulles, to John W. Davis, and a few other invulnerable characters on the conservative side of things. See, Dulles had put him in as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and so forth. But it was used. Now when Acheson came on…well, this takes you back then a little bit further than I realized. Acheson came on as secretary of state shortly after Truman’s election. That would have been in ’48 that Truman was elected, elected in ’48. Now when Acheson came on, I’m not sure. But he was on by the time of the Korean War in ’50.

DANIELL: In ’50, right.

DICKEY: So he probably came on in ’49. And at one point he came up here to visit us in Hanover in the fall for a little personal holiday and stayed with us. The Manchester Union, by that time in Loeb’s hands, ran an editorial headline “Acheson, Dickey, and Hiss.” [Laughter] So that the Hiss case was already festering at that point.

DANIELL: Okay. That's what I was really [inaudible].

DICKEY: Now I think this was at the time that Acheson said he wouldn’t turn his back on Hiss. So it's fair to say the Hiss case was part of the concern, part of the background that undoubtedly made me, oh, I don't know what I would say, worried, concerned—

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: --about what had been going on and how far it had gone.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. And it may help in some way to account for your decision to make a.…

DICKEY: A statement.

DANIELL: To be the aggressor in making a public statement rather than having things pile up.
DICKEY: I would guess that probably is valid. But I’d have to look at the chronology a little more closely to be sure about that. But it’s clear that from ’48 on certainly that the Hiss thing had begun to surface. I think the first mention of Hiss may have been in the summer of ’47. I’m not sure about that.

DANIELL: I think it was ’48 and ’49.

DICKEY: Was it ’48 and ’49?

DANIELL: And ’49, yes.

DICKEY: But one thing would be certain: The Hiss case had disturbed me very, very much. Much more than I ever had occasion to talk about in public since I thought then, and I say now, I had no inkling whatsoever of this man’s interest in Communism or anything of that sort. But as I said, I guess, in the original testimony on the tape, after the second trial I felt it was just unavoidable for me that I would have come down where that jury came down.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. You made that quite clear when you talked about the nature of the photocopied material and all that. And you were probably in a position to [inaudible].

DICKEY: So I guess that is a once over on the McCarthy period.

DANIELL: Were there any episodes internally which somewhere—does the name Joe Barnes?

DICKEY: Oh, yes! Well, this is the one I told you about.

DANIELL: You started to tell about it, and then we held it off until...

DICKEY: Yes, yes. No. And this is one, the only one, that I’m not sure that I would do the same thing again. As I say, I’m not sure because I’m not sure. This was during the period of the Hiss Case. And just when I don’t know, but it probably was along in ’48 or ’49.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Joe Barnes had been with the Herald Tribune, and I guess he still was. And he had been close to Henry Wallace, and he had gone to China with
him. Didn’t Wallace go to China? I think he did. And I think Barnes went to China with him. And Barnes knew the Soviet Union very well. He, I think, spoke Russian and had been over and so forth.

I came to know him as a friend really is the way I would regard it during the early years of the Great Issues Course—this would probably have been ’47 and ’48—in which he spoke for us several times. And I had a very high regard for him, his intellect, everything. I’ve never had occasion to really think about this. But Barnes was, as I subsequently knew, was very close to some other situations which have never surfaced that I won’t go into, that could have caused him a lot of embarrassment if they had surfaced. I don’t know that they would have led to official actions or court cases, this sort of thing.

DANIIELL: I just want to turn this over.

[DANIELL: I just want to turn this over.

[End of Tape 30, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 30, Side B]

DICKEY: But there had been a close relationship with some other people who really did get into some serious trouble, including Hiss. But this didn’t bother me.

Then at one point there was, while we were under a lot of attacks in Great Issues—this was after the Tribune thing had broken—and we were being pushed by alumni and so forth, something happened, and I can’t now recall just exactly what it was. But it was featured in the press, the Times and the Herald Tribune, involving Barnes. Some allegation was made that Barnes had been—I don’t know what; I’d better not say just what it was. But it was public and created quite a furor. And it happened at just the time that we had put down another invitation to Barnes to come up in Great Issues. Sometime later, I don’t know, five—we’d usually put those invitations down to come sometimes two months ahead and never more than three months, but never less usually than a month. So it would probably be between one and three months that he would have been glad to come. And I recall very distinctly that I decided I just felt I had to talk this over with the steering committee.

DANIIELL: I see.

DICKEY: Faculty steering committee. So I said, “I put down this invitation to Barnes. And as far as I’m concerned, if everybody’s clear about this, that we
should let it stand come hell or high water, and see what happens. See it through. But I've got to say that I'm really troubled about this, as to whether we're going to out of our way now to provoke attacks on Great Issues and the College, and I don't think that's our function.” Well, we talked this out really very maturely. I don't know that there was more than one person who finally said, I would let it stand just as it is. But that was Arthur Jensen. Arthur was quite prepared to let it stand just as it was. Not only prepared, but favored that.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I don't recall now who some of the others were on the committee, but this would have been early so I could identify them.

DANIELL: Probably Arthur Wilson. Well, I...

DICKEY: I don’t know whether Arthur was still on it or not. But in any event, there was no clear support for the line that Arthur advocated. And as I recall, either the consensus was otherwise, or it was one of these situations in which—I had a few—where the faculty committee or somebody said, “Well, you go ahead and do your best, use your best judgment.”

In any event, I stewed about it, and felt I had a clearance from the committee to call it off if I thought well of it. I stewed about it for several days. And then one day I was down in New York, I remember I was at the Century Club, and I decided I would just see what it looked like if I wrote a letter, a friendly letter. So I wrote a letter to Barnes and said, as you can imagine, I was very concerned with this kind of publicity which had just come up since we’d invited him, and with the kinds of attacks that we were under, it would fortify people's judgment that there was something going on here that really wasn’t going on. And that—I forget whether I said, but I might well have said, that if this had broken before we put the invitation down, I don't think there’s any doubt about it, we wouldn't have felt it was a wise thing to do. And therefore I feel compelled, just as a matter of straightforwardness about this thing, to say that; and to say that I think there’s a very serious question as to whether you really would be well served by coming forward with it. But if you think otherwise, the invitation will stand. And this is my best memory of the letter.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: It was a longhand letter that I wrote in New York. And I got back very promptly a note from Joe saying, For God's sake, relax. I agree with you, and so forth. Now whether he did or not, I don't know.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Did anything come...? I don't know anything about the attack on him.

DICKEY: No, nothing. Well, he had a bad time for a period. He's dead now, so that I can't check up or know just what his views were. But this was an unhappy thing as far as I was concerned. And I just have to say now that I wouldn't want to argue I was right, and neither am I able to say I was wrong.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Oh, yes.

DICKEY: So that's the whole story of that episode.

DANIELL: In all of this period—and we're talking '49 anyway, in the beginning, early '49 or late '48, through the early fifties—did you take much of or any of your concerns up within the board of trustees?

DICKEY: Not on these specific things that I recall. I talked with the board about the positions I'd taken on the Communist question, Communist faculty members. Those were things I'd taken publicly. I talked with them about my position on the Fifth Amendment. I talked with them about my intention to—told them about the Remington matter, and that I felt that this was one of the great testing times with respect to academic freedom. And that insofar as I knew myself, there was no room for give on this question. And I was never, as far as I recall, put to any issue on the part of the board over it, for which I've always been glad. And I was so very glad I had this experience during this period. It was, as people are fond of saying now, a learning experience that was a very important learning experience. I found I could stand the alumni gaff, which you have to find out whether you can, and that I could carry the board with me. As far as I know, I had the faculty very substantially with me.

DANIELL: I imagine so.

DICKEY: There were a few individuals, I'm sure, the Alex Laings and a few others were much more inclined probably to take on what I would have regarded as somewhat extraneous causes or fights. But I had no faculty problems that I recall in that respect. We had a good strong give-and-take in faculty meetings about what my position would be on these matters. When some
of our faculty members came under criticism, I had no hesitation in just
going back clean-cutly about that. Of course Alex was one who was
constantly [Laughs] being assaulted in my correspondence. And I’m trying
to think who….

DANIELL: In fact perhaps enjoying it, as well as being a little bit frightened by it.

DICKEY: Yes, I would imagine there was an element of both in there. But we were
lucky to some extent. We were lucky this Remington thing didn’t go further
than it did because that could have been somewhat rough. And the
individual who, as I say, told us that he had been a party member, never
was, so far as I know, caused any trouble here by the authorities here at
the College. He subsequently went on to another institution.

But this was a tough period for freedom of speech. I guess I would have to
say that I can only wish that during some of the Vietnam stuff the faculty
had been as willing to stand up on some of the academic freedom issues.
We’ll get to that, I guess, some day. But if I had to say what was my
deepest disappointment with faculty attitudes it was the inability of the
faculty here and at Harvard and elsewhere to muster a strong, clean-cut
position that was forthrightly behind academic freedom. But that’s another
story.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. We’ll get to that later.

DICKEY: That’s another story.

DANIELL: Look, we’ve been going on about an hour and a half now.

DICKEY: Shall we call it?

DANIELL: Why don’t we call it quits? This is a logical….

[Break]

DANIELL: Well, why don’t we take….

DICKEY: Would you like me to follow on well?

DANIELL: Why don’t we take then the whole matter of the internal organization of the
board. As I understand it, there was no chairman, although there may
have been individuals closer to Hopkins beforehand. But the board begins
to take on a much more elaborate internal organization gradually during your presidency.

DICKEY: When I came to the board, the organization of the board was quite simple and straightforward. There was an executive committee, which functioned under the chairmanship of Judge McLane as senior trustee. There was an investment committee which functioned under the chairmanship of Vic Cutter. There was a buildings and grounds committee which functioned under the chairmanship of Ned French. And I think that was it. A couple I may be forgetting now, whether there was some other committee. But the chairman of the board, there was no chairman of the board.

The president customarily had served as the presiding officer at meetings, and I continued to do that throughout my presidency until I knew I would be retiring and asked Lloyd Brace to serve as chairman, at that point, to manage the questions that would be coming up in connection with the search for my successor. I might also add, lest we did not get to it previously, that I had strongly urged Harvey Hood to assume that responsibility. But he preferred not to for various personal reasons. And also I think because at that point he felt that as far as he was concerned, things were going well, and he was not convinced about the desirability of having a chairman at that point rather than simply having the existing practice continued, whereby the president presided at the meetings.

Shortly after I came to the job, and we became increasingly clear that there was need for a much more highly-developed development program in the College, we established a Development Council which had on it non-trustees as well as several trustees. And it’s my memory that Harvey Hood may have helped get that started as chairman, but I’m not too certain about that. But a number of the trustees did serve on the Development Council during the early years of that.

We went through a number of personnel changes in the staff of the College, seeking somebody to head that work up. Sid Hayward, as secretary of the College, had played an important role in getting the concept accepted and started. But we never had anyone at that point on the board who was primarily concerned with fundraising. Later, after we’d built up the membership of the board with a number of men who had previously served as chairman of the Alumni Fund committee, we had a nucleus on the board who had that, both formally and informally, that special, important responsibility, namely the development of our development program.
The big organizational step that I recall was the, well, the introduction of a trustees’ planning committee, under the chairmanship of Harvey Hood, along in the early fifties. I don’t recall exactly which year it was, but it would’ve been along sometime in ’52 perhaps or thereabouts.

DANIELL: ‘Fifty-two or ’53 is the time it appears most frequently in the files of the members of the board of trustees.

DICKEY: Harvey Hood had been active part of that time in helping us establish a board of overseers for the Tuck School. And he was, I think, of all the members of the board, the member who was most convinced that a planning operation was a very critical need for the long-range strength of the institution. I, myself, was rather keen on this. And Harvey built the trustees’ planning committee, very largely through his own conviction and leadership and dedication to it, into a central element of, well, of deliberation concerning large questions pertinent to the future of the institution. I think it’s fair to say that the deliberations were, at least for me, fully as important as any decisions that were taken by the committee. The committee was not, in my view, a particularly efficient body for taking policy decisions but it was an excellent vehicle for asking questions and developing the alternatives that should be taken into account in making decisions about the future.

Harvey and I worked very well together. I think we enjoyed working with each other. He had good staff assistants working with him on the affairs of the planning committee: Al Dickerson, Frank Smallwood. And there may have been others in the early stage. But these two had important roles.

I don’t recall how we developed our early agenda. But one of the first questions that came up for serious consideration, and one that was quickly perceived by everyone as fundamental, was the question of size of the College. And this was at a time when the question of size was receiving a fair amount of attention in the—the question of size of an institution—was receiving a fair amount of attention in the academic community across the country. The Ford Foundation had provided funds for a number of the small colleges, colleges with enrollments of less than a thousand or thereabouts, to study whether they needed to be bigger. And other institutions, the institutions of the Pentagonal group, Amherst, Williams, Wesleyan, Bowdoin, were or were about to review their commitment to staying small. And Dartmouth was certainly on the threshold of having to decide whether it was going to try to stay within the range of what we
regarded as an intermediate size, something about, well, substantially larger, almost twice as large as these, or more, than these other institutions. But still short of, of course, the large state institutions and indeed short of the larger institutions in the Ivy group.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. We were about 3,000 then if I remember correctly.

DICKEY: Well, we were...yes, in that area. But we were at the point at that time, as I recall, we were short of 3,000. I think we were down around 2800 or thereabouts.

DANIELL: I think you’re right. I think it was 750 roughly admitted, which means with attrition it was probably around 2800.

DICKEY: Just before the trustees’ planning committee was formed—or perhaps in connection with its formation—at least in the first effort to take a look at the question of size, Harvey asked me to do a memorandum on size and purpose, the relationship of the purpose of the institution to its size.

This was a subject that had increasingly seemed to me very important, and one that eventually was a factor in our thinking about the establishment of the Tucker Foundation. The point being that it seemed pretty clear to some of us, certainly to me, that institutions which had gotten up into the, oh, 5,000 plus enrollment as undergraduate institutions, many of them up in approaching the 20,000 range, had lost any practical possibility of having anything resembling what I came to call an institutional sense of purpose as a critical factor in the educational experience of undergraduates. It seemed to me that you could reach a point, and that many of these other institutions had reached the point, where the purpose of the institution was essentially that of departments, individual departments...and indeed in some instances, of the individual instructor as he conceived of the purpose of the place. And that there was very little room for the institution to have a purpose that had a generating quality about it so far as the educational experience was concerned.

DANIELL: I meet this very frequently when I talk to my colleagues that I was in graduate school with. They find it amazing that I end up talking about Dartmouth as my subject rather than the department as the subject.

DICKEY: Yes, yes. Well, I was very early a deep believer, a true believer perhaps you would say, in the importance of retaining a sense of institutional purpose as a factor in the strength and cohesion of the place as a, if you
will, a sort of influence that guided your recruitment of faculty, guided your development of your curriculum, guided many things in the institution. And also very early—and by this I mean within the first several years on the job, certainly within the first five years on the job—I became first perplexed and then, I guess I would have to say, rather frustrated in respect to the question of introducing into the purpose of the College some expression of concern with regard to the ethical, moral dimensions of educational experience in the liberating arts. I found that I, myself, was not given to approaching these questions religiously in respect to credo commitments or formal religious commitment. But neither was I inclined to believe that a liberal arts college was taking an adequate view of what the undergraduates should be encouraged to be aware of if it was going to follow the course that practically all the large universities had begun to follow, namely, this is beyond us. Somebody somewhere else has got to deal with these things.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And I’m mentioning these things now because I think they—I know they had a considerable relevance on my early efforts to see why we didn’t want to be bigger or at least of unlimited size. Because I early suspected, and subsequently came to have pretty clear conviction, that purpose and size were rather closely related.

DANIELL: This fits with a lot of the comments you made about your sense of a capacity to control or to discipline the student body. Clearly what you’re concerned about is the erosion of any kind of control, institutional pressure or shaping in a moral direction.

DICKEY: Well, I did this memorandum on purpose and size. As a matter of fact, I think I worked on it during one of my stays in Dick’s House. And I don’t recall now without refreshing my memory what specifics were mentioned with regard to size. But the basic position that I took was that size and purpose were related. And that I thought we would do well by the future of the institution to do everything we could to avoid unlimited expansion.

DANIELL: Yes. I’ve got to turn this over now here.

[End of Tape 30, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 31, Side A]
DICKEY: This work very quickly—and especially as the trustees’ planning committee began to take shape and see its mission a little more clearly—it led into more and more attention to the purpose of the total institution. And this, of course, meant immediately more concern for the place of the so-called associated schools—medicine, engineering, Thayer School, and the business school, the Tuck School.

I don’t remember now just how we originally organized these studies. But each had a different problem in a sense, and each was dealt with separately. And all of them had, at that point, different problems in respect to personnel, plant, and indeed in two cases, very critically, problems of purpose, namely medicine and engineering. The Tuck School at that point seemed to us to be on a fairly even keel with nothing in the nature of a crisis to be dealt with. We very early on in the Tuck School had occasion to change the leadership of the school, a particular personnel problem. And we had problems of recruitment, we had problems of program there, particularly in getting the faculty or developing a faculty which would carry on more active, more significant research in business education.

DANIELL: Yes. In this did the board of trustees play the kind of role that would have—that shifted Tuck School away from its exclusively—almost exclusively—Dartmouth undergraduate orientation, or was that kind of decision left up to the board of overseers of Tuck School?

DICKEY: The board of overseers had—was the principal agency that concerned itself with these matters. But here again, as with so many boards, the board was primarily a vehicle for raising questions for deliberation rather than taking policy decisions.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: These decisions—or these questions—were laid before the board by the deans. The enrollment question was rather thoroughly exposed, the development in the direction of a larger master’s enrollment from the outside rather than simply from the senior class of the College, these were questions that were discussed quite thoroughly. The decision-making ultimately, however came to the board of trustees if it was a large question of policy. More or less usually in a pretty cut-and-dried fashion after they had been through the discussions that took place in the board of overseers.

DANIELL: You had enough overlapping membership there—
DICKEY: Exactly.

DANIELL: --to be well informed on that.

DICKEY: Exactly. At that point, as a matter of fact, we established a practice of—I think it’s been carried on—of having a member of the board who would, in effect, provide a continuing liaison between the board and the overseers. Harvey did this originally.

DANIELL: Albert Bradley must have been.

DICKEY: Albert Bradley was involved in it. I forget who some of the others were that took this….

DANIELL: I think [John D.] Jack Dodd [’22] probably had some of that role later on.

DICKEY: I don’t remember whether Jack did or not. But I wouldn’t be surprised if he did. I think if he did, it was later.

DANIELL: Yes, that was later.

DICKEY: Well, the Tuck School at that point was, as I said, not regarded as having crisis problems. We were clear it was going to require continuing attention, and we did have to change the leadership in the school. And when Albert Bradley came on the board, he provided some funds to beef up the research activities of the faculty…or at least the scholarly activities of the faculty.

And the Thayer School, in due course…. Well, the Thayer School had had a board of overseers of its own before I came onto the job. This was provided for out of the terms of the establishment of the school. And it was a group of very…of very dedicated—that’s the right word, although I think that word gets overused to some extent—of very dedicated, old graduates of the school, former graduates of the school. And also men who actually were, as a matter of age, very senior. And all of them, I think without exception, were graduates of the civil engineering program in the school. But who were, I think, generally sympathetic with the efforts of the school that came out of Dean—not Graham, but the man who died before I came to the job here.* His name is escaping me at the moment. He had begun

* Frank W. Garran
the program of broadening the school out into mechanical and electrical engineering, at least it laid the objective out from being primarily or solely indeed a school of civil engineering. And [William P.] Bill Kimball ['28], who came to the deanship again before I came to the presidency....

DANIELL: Yes. I'm going to interview him when I get a hold of him. I know he lives here in town, but I guess he's on vacation somewhere.

DICKEY: Yes, he's in poor shape, as I understand it, physically.

DANIELL: I understand he had a prostate operation [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Well, and I think he has emphysema.

DANIELL: Oh, he does?

DICKEY: Or something of this sort. In any event, my wife said that she’d talked with Mrs. Kimball, and that she’d been concerned about Bill’s health. Well, he was the dean of the school at that point.

It was a school that still, as I look back on it, was having great difficulty in finding its place in the engineering world as a matter of program, as a matter of size, as a matter of its relationship to Dartmouth. And it was an enterprise that had a long history at Dartmouth, going back to Thayer’s providing funds to get it started. But I’m afraid you’d have to say that it was in very considerable need of a rather bold reexamination of its purpose and place in the world of engineering.

Well, we established an outside committee to take a look at it. We got a man from Cornell who was a civil engineer. I think his name was Hollister. And Gordon Brown from MIT who has continued to be closely identified with the board of overseers and the work of the Thayer School ever since. And another man whose name is escaping me now. And these three undertook an independent view of the position of the Thayer School here at Dartmouth and in the engineering community of higher education.

They came up with a positive conclusion, namely that we should stay in engineering education, and made some specific recommendations for strengthening the program. Gordon Brown shortly thereafter came onto the board of overseers of the Thayer School. We brought on a number of younger men. I think not all of them were old graduates of the school.
We had some mild problems of satisfying the civil engineering graduates that they weren’t being completely pushed out of the picture as far as alumni affairs were concerned and as far as positions on the board of overseers were concerned. Nothing very acute. But we had to be reasonably clear that we were going to recruit on the outside, and that the future of the Thayer School depended upon its ability to—I guess as good a word as any—its ability to modernize.

The whole thing was a very difficult problem in getting it to—in getting movement. Everybody would agree—or more or less they seemed to agree—that something was desirable, but there was little money available for venturing. There wasn’t a record in the school that was very saleable to foundations until later.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And we did make some very good connections with several of the foundations: Sloan Foundation and several others.

DANIELL: This involved really, essentially, a change in the deanship.

DICKEY: And it became increasingly clear that with all the respect that the board had for Bill Kimball, Bill, as with so many men, was not going to be the man to lead that school into a new level of scholarly activity and institutional purpose.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I think Bill was as quick to perceive this as anyone. And in due course he stepped out of the deanship, and Myron Tribus ['42] was brought in which was the point at which we went through a major overhauling of the Thayer School, raised its sights so far as programs were concerned up to the doctoral level. Established two programs: one Doctor of Engineering, one Ph.D. program in engineering science, as well as carried on some of the master’s degree work. That came later. Don Morrison had taken an interest in the Thayer School until his death. After his death, John [W.] Masland [Jr.] as provost took a considerable interest.

DANIELL: This is a question I was going to ask: to what extent did either you or the board of trustees get actively engaged in the process of recruiting? It’s different than a faculty member. It's essentially [inaudible]...
Well, when it came to the deanship, we were completely involved in it. We consulted faculty members individually, and we consulted members of the board of overseers very closely. John Woodhouse, whom I mentioned earlier, was closely informed. John Masland carried the laboring oar in turning up various possibilities and going out and seeking a great many different opinions. He kept me quite closely informed.

When we came to the question of whether to really go after Myron Tribus, it was a somewhat mixed bag of pros and cons that we had to shake down to a judgment. There were those who said Tribus will bring to you probably as much yeast as anybody has manifested in engineering education in the country today. He’s full of ideas and he has a reputation as a first-rate innovator. But there were people on the other side who said, Yes, he’s got all those qualities, but we’re not sure that he really is enough of an administrator to stay with the daily tasks of administration as closely as you would like. He would be a real risk as an administrator.

Well, I won’t go into all the discussions that took place. I don’t remember them sufficiently to do that. But I do know that there was no lack of understanding that we were approaching a decision that involved taking some risks in order to get some of the things that we felt we had to get in the school. We had to get somebody who had the kind of enthusiasm and kind of reaching out in respect to programs that would attract financial support. And we were reasonably certain that at least for a period we could supplement, if need be, from the central administrative offices to keep track of the financial administrative problems of the school sufficiently to permit us to have this kind of a person in the deanship. That’s about what it came down to.

But I remember before we came to a firm agreement with Tribus, I guess I wrote him a letter, and said that we thought he ought to know that we have these mixed feelings about his qualifications for the job, and was he prepared to register a confidence in himself in respect to some of these misgivings that would stand both of us in good stead by way of providing some stability in the school?

Well, I think over the years, it would be my judgment, that both considerations were present. The new programs that were introduced were certainly far reaching. Maybe in some respects too much so. But if I had that to do over again, I wouldn’t hesitate to follow the same course. Myron Tribus had some very critical difficult problems at home involving the health of his wife, that from time to time came close to tearing him
apart. Something we hadn’t reckoned with at all. And later he did find himself wanting to try new things out on the outside, tried government, tried business. Now, as you may know, he’s back again in the academic world down at MIT.

DANIELL: Yes, I knew he was down there.

DICKEY: Well, it’s easy to speak of these things in a way that avoids or at least doesn't take you through the long period of frustration and search for better answers. But the Thayer School, at least during this period, came to be regarded by many people I was in touch with on the outside as one of the more interesting and possibly significant small ventures in engineering education in the country.

DANIELL: Yes, that's what my brother, who’s now on some board down there, I don't know, himself a graduate of Thayer, says exactly the same thing, that it was a rough passage but at least during the decade of the sixties, initiated by Tribus' deanship...

DICKEY: It did—won real respect. And I would get this testimony from people that had no interest in Dartmouth and no interest in the Thayer School, but who knew about Tribus and Tribus' work. The situation that was in a crisis state in that something had to be decided and rather drastic decisions taken within a matter of a few years was the medical school.

DANIELL: I have a couple of questions about—at least one, anyway—about the Thayer School before we move over to the med school. It was—I think I may have mentioned this before, but I’m not sure that I did—when I talked to John Woodhouse, who really cared a great deal about the Thayer School and had a lot to do with the process of transition, he mentioned at one time about the trustees discussing the possibility of ending the Thayer School. And he mentioned—and I suspect it was not a serious effort. I think he said that Albert Bradley really had once made a motion to get rid of Thayer School, and which he, John Woodhouse, took very seriously. What I’m really after is not the details of that, but really was there any serious consideration given in the late fifties or right around 1960, it must have been, to terminate the Thayer School?

DICKEY: I think I’m clear that there was no motion made to that effect in any formal sense. We’ve already referred to the fact that Albert Bradley had no confidence whatsoever that the Thayer School was going to amount to anything. He took a—I’m afraid I’d have to say—a deeply prejudiced view
of the future of civil engineering. He was a General Motors top man, and I don’t think he ever came up against civil engineering, at least the excitement civil engineering had for other people. But he never pressed me, and I don’t think he ever pressed the board for termination of the Thayer School. I’m sure that if you asked Albert, he would say, Well, we would’ve done well to have pulled the cork. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes. I suspected what you were going to say. I wanted to get that on the record. Because I think probably in his memory John Woodhouse has exaggerated the degree to which this was a serious...

DICKEY: Well, I would incline to that view. I’m not sure that I can reproduce my own state of mind about this thing. It in my view was clearly an aspect of the College that required a major infusion of new blood in faculty and purpose and leadership. And that this was going to be necessary if we were to finance the school at any appropriate level.

After we got the report that we got from this outside committee, my memory is that there was no question in my mind or that of Harvey and a few other critical people at that point on the board, and we’re talking about quite early in the period, that we had to go forward and see whether there was a future along the lines that they’d predicted. And one of the things that came out there, which was subsequently a very major factor in our decisions about the future of the medical school, was the judgment that the rest of the institution, and particularly in the sciences, needed these professional schools to supplement their basic science work.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Or to complement their basic science work, I suppose, more accurately. This was said of the physics department, it was said of the mathematicians, and it was also in some degree true of several of the other—chemistry and even geology. There was a very emphatic positive note struck by this committee concerning the interplay between the liberal arts faculty and the school of engineering, to the benefit of both.

Well, now if we’re going to come to the medical school, we were coming to a major subject. And since you’ve been into it with Ralph Hunter, I suppose there’s no reason why we shouldn’t move in on it.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: But it was very early in the work of the trustees’ planning committee, along with the other two professional schools, an extremely important aspect of the way we regarded the purpose of this place. Perhaps I should say just a word about that at this point.

DANIELL: [Inaudible]. With Ralph, all I’ve done is I’ve not really asked him or learned very much at all about the relationship between the trustees and this. He’s such a rich source of understanding what’s going on inside the school. So that you didn’t worry about fundamentally repetition here at all.

DICKEY: Well, the question of purpose not only arose in relation to the size of the undergraduate college and how it viewed itself as an enterprise, it also came up in respect to the way the various Dartmouth constituencies viewed the institution as a whole. For a considerable period, certainly during Mr. Hopkins’s administration, the emphasis had been very, very heavily on the undergraduate college. And this created a view of Dartmouth on the outside and on the inside of the institution as being a liberal arts college with some very incidental…

DANIELL: …You might even say accidental… [Laughter]

DICKEY: … professional schools. I say incidental because they came to be regarded by many as not in the mainstream of Dartmouth’s institutional purpose.

One of the things I remember from my talks with Mr. Hopkins very early—I suppose within a matter of the first, I guess it’d be the first few weeks on the job, certainly within a matter of the first few months on the job—I asked him what arrangements he had had for keeping in touch with the associated schools. I was interested in the relationship with the deans, whether he met with the faculties and so forth. With that wonderful ability of his to be candid and at the same time not have it taken too literally what he said—not having what he said taken too literally—he said, “Well, I guess as I look back on it, my basic policy was to give them the absent treatment.” [Laughs] I’ve never forgotten this because it sort of shook me up. I wasn’t sure that I knew just what it meant. But I had a feeling it meant that if they didn’t bother the president’s office, they weren’t going to be bothered by the president’s office.

DANIELL: Before we go on, just let me turn this over….

[End of Tape 31, Side A]
DICKEY: He went on to say that this had been a reflection of his deep conviction that Dartmouth was primarily a liberal arts college and that we had to be careful that we didn't let these other things become too, well, too important in the life and work of the institution.

At the same time, I'm sure, insofar as I can be without ever having talked with him about it, that he regarded each of these as in its own way a contributor to the strength of the institution. I know that he had so regarded the medical school because, when I was a young alumnus working as a class agent, I heard him on several occasions pay considerable tribute to the medical school as an important element behind the health service of the institution. That it assured having a clinic in Hanover and things like that, which were important to an institution located where Dartmouth was. And I have no doubt whatsoever that he shared the views of Dr. Tucker, that the coming of the business school was a very important addition of strength to Dartmouth at a time when business was becoming a major—it was on the threshold of becoming the major profession, perhaps, of American life. And of course he was very familiar, and I think proud, of the pioneering role that the Thayer School had played in bringing mathematics and the sciences into engineering education with the emphasis that Thayer had brought.

DANIELL: So, in short, you don't take Hopkins' retrospective quips about [inaudible] seriously.

DICKEY: No, I think that anyone who worked with Mr. Hopkins, and I was tutored in some respects in this regard by two men who were as close to him as two men could be, and who had a veneration for Mr. Hopkins, Al Dickerson and Sid Hayward. Both of them from time to time would say to me, Yes, that's a good story. But to some extent it's a better story than it would be if you just got the straight facts. Mr. Hopkins did enjoy telling a story, and frequently would provide insights that were somewhat creative. [Laughs] But I don't think one can doubt at all that he had really very much less interest in the place of the professional schools in the life and work of Dartmouth than he had in the College, the undergraduate College. This was his life, this was his conviction, this was his forte.

Well, all of this set me to thinking and reading about how valid was this view of the College which had become almost gospel in the eyes and minds of so many alumni, that Dartmouth was a small liberal arts college,
period. And I came to the conclusion, both from my reading of the early
days of the College and the Dartmouth College case and the ambiguities
involved in the rhetoric of university versus college, and in the way these
professional schools had come to Dartmouth and the role they'd played;
that we had to get away from, if we were going to keep these schools here
and were going to spend the time and effort on them it seemed to me was
clearly going to be necessary, we had to get away from the notion that
they were second-class citizens.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Just had to get away from it. I never said this publicly, as I recall, in just
that way. But I think the bluntest way I can put it is that we just couldn’t
afford to have these schools tagging along, so to speak, behind. And I say
that because of something else. At about this same time, we had begun to
beef up our sciences very decidedly. Brought in some outstanding men
just before or just afterwards, or at about this time we were looking for
them. In chemistry, [John H.] Jack Wolfenden, [Francis Weston] Sears in
physics, teaching physics. And in mathematics we were going through a
major revitalization of math here. Most of our good professors were
approaching retirement, and this was the point at which we went out and
looked for a new leadership of the math department and ultimately brought
John Kemeny to that need here at Dartmouth.

So that it was clear that if we were going to press these other fronts
forward, we either had to carry schools such as the medical school and
the Thayer School at least with us, or they were going to fall further and
further behind and be a very serious problem.

Likewise, I rather soon reached the conclusion that, while an institution
could send out undergraduates who might or might not make a place for
themselves in the world, an institution such as Dartmouth couldn’t afford to
send out M.D.s or engineers who weren’t able to compete up in the front
ranks because you quickly got known for your professional products even
though you might or might not be known comparably for your
undergraduate products.

Then another factor was that rather quickly after the math department
began to develop its fresh strength and purpose, we had the question of
graduate work raised in that area, first at the master’s level, and then very
shortly thereafter at the Ph.D. level.
Well, all of this combined to make me convinced that whatever the case for retaining the designation of Dartmouth as Dartmouth College, concerning which I never had any question at all, we internally, in viewing our purpose, and in explaining what we thought we were to our alumni and to others on the outside, we had to get over the shibboleth that there was something dirty about the word university. And to be prepared to discuss Dartmouth as an institution whose purposes were those of a small university, a selective university, if you will. And the more I studied the situation of these three schools and what had to be done, the more firm became my conviction that through, to some extent I think historical happenstance, Dartmouth had three of the most relevant and most compatible professional schools that you could possibly put into an institution of this sort, even if you had had almost divine foresight.

DANIELL: Yes. That’s what Ralph Hunter talked about that in terms of the medical school, particularly the strong role that those who were clinical and associated with the Mary Hitchcock Hospital had in the medical school itself which was, in a sense, as though time had passed them almost accidentally, but left them in a peculiarly advantageous position in terms of educational possibilities.

DICKEY: Well, jumping way ahead, I came to believe that these three professional fields were probably as close to being the critical professional fields, serving American society, as one could get. And that therefore this wasn’t something to be likely dismissed simply because it presented great problems.

This was a very considered, very fundamental conviction that I arrived at on my own…along with the, as I said a moment ago, the conviction that we could—we had to stop being afraid of the word university, even though, as I said, I had no thought whatsoever at any time of taking on a Dartmouth College case, a controversy over the name of the place. While it was very amusing during these years having outside visitors come here, particularly from abroad, and being taken to the medical school and the business and so forth, and having them almost invariably end up the visit by saying, “But I don’t understand why it is that you’re called a college. You indeed are a university, are you not?”

Well, we would say yes, and then that brought about a lecture on the Dartmouth College case. Well, to go back to the medical school—and this is in many ways the longest story of all that I will tell, at least the longest chapter. And also it’s worth saying, perhaps at this point, that it is in my
view probably if not the longest chapter in respect to Dartmouth’s academic program, it’s all but the longest—possibly classics compares with it—but medical education, we’d do well to remember, was here earlier than almost all of the other departments that we have today.

DANIELL: Seventeen nineties, if I remember correctly.

DICKEY: Well, when we came on the job, of course, it was a two-year school with, for practical purposes, all of its students—I forget how many were in the school at the time, something like 40, I believe; I’m not sure whether there were that many.

DANIELL: No, 25.

DICKEY: Twenty-five, I guess. It was later when we doubled it that it went to 40 or 50. But there were some 20 students in the two years, all of them, for practical purposes, having come from Dartmouth although they were beginning to admit a few into the two-year school.

DANIELL: Yes. I think your figure 40 is correct; I think it was about 20 or 25 each class.

DICKEY: Yes. And the school was under the deanship of Dean Syvertsen [‘18], who’d been with it for a long time, originally as registrar and then as dean. Sy was a wonderful person who held his own counsel pretty closely. Who was a make-do man who insisted on a very high order of law and order in the school. He was a man that tied his students to him with devotion. But who also insisted that they live and behave in a way that met his view of proper conduct in medical school. He had, I believe it’s fair to say, very little, if any, personal experience with medical research. He, when I came on the job, had a small faculty that had only one research activity that I remember, which was, as a matter of fact, potentially very serious research activity: the development of the artificial kidney. And there were, I can remember, many discussions about whether that merited the floor space that it had down in the old buildings and so on.

But the school, to speak of it rather quickly, during this period was to even the lay eye approaching the exhaustion of its physical facilities; of its faculty, they were mainly older men. What little clinical exposure was provided was being done in the clinic with some bedside exposure. But it was not a major aspect of the program of the school. And the research budget, I don’t think it ever during those early years, my early years on the
job or in Sy’s deanship ever—I don’t think it ever reached $20,000. And I think in a number of instances it didn’t reach ten. A number of years it wouldn’t have reached $10,000. So that for practical purposes, except for the work which this one man in particular was doing on an artificial kidney machine, there was no research being done.

There was again a very loyal, small alumni body, and there was a willingness here on the part of people in the clinic, where they could, to help out in the school at very nominal compensation.

DANIELL: Ralph said he got $12 a month. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Yes. Well, I don’t know what it was. But it was a labor of love. It was a form of professional charity to the development of new members of the profession.

Well, Don Morrison and I talked about this, I suppose, almost as much as we talked about any other subject: How did we get at it? And talked to Harvey Hood about it. Later we turned to the trustees’ planning committee once we had the trustees’ planning committee to take it over. And we finally decided at just about the time the school ran into accrediting problems, we were put on probation by the accrediting association, I forget when it was, about, oh, the late forties, I guess. It may have been….

DANIELL: It was the early fifties.

DICKEY: Early fifties? Late forties or early fifties. I don’t know…about around then.

DANIELL: Actually it was…let me see. Well, I think it’s probably ’53 or ’54. Because it’s after Marsh Tenney has been brought on as, I believe, director of education.

DICKEY: No, it wasn’t. He was brought on as director of research.

DANIELL: And Syvertsen is still dean of the institution.

DICKEY: Yes. When did Sy die?

DANIELL: Well, it’s the second half of the fifties.

DICKEY: Oh, really?
DANIELL: Well, I'll take that back. I'm not sure when he died.

DICKEY: Well, no matter.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: In any event, we had been paying a lot of attention over in the central administration to this, although the visitors when they came up here never came near us. They thought it was better, I guess, to get an independent view of it. So they never knew really what our thinking was.

DANIELL: There were lots of problems involving that, at least according to Ralph Hunter, [inaudible] coming, he said Syvertsen who hadn't handed in the form to the [inaudible] responded to them when they came up here.

DICKEY: That may have been. I really don’t know that I ever knew or remember that. But what I do remember was that we were…Don and I were surprised to get this communication from the visitors without ever having had any discussions with them.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And any opportunity to tell them that we thought we knew the score maybe as well or better than they did. But that’s neither here nor there. But the first thing we decided—and this would have been probably before they came, as you indicated.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: We decided that what we needed was to introduce in some way a level of intellectual leadership and vigor in the school that would constitute a sell, so to speak, around which we could build. We were not at all clear that we were ready to ask Sy to step aside, although we had no doubts that that was going to at some point have to be done. But we were also aware that we might well find ourselves with nobody to hold the school together during this period. And that if we got into that situation, this might lead to the liquidation of the school long before we were ready—or at least before we were ready to make that decision.

Don turned up Marsh Tenney as a possibility for this while he was still at Rochester where he had been a Markel Scholar. And Marsh indicated to Don and then later to me that he had a deep commitment to the
importance of the Dartmouth Medical School, thought it ought to be kept and rebuilt. At first we were very doubtful that he saw himself playing an active role in this. But after several conversations, I believe, Don Morrison told me that he thought it was quite possible that if we could give Marsh some reassurances about what we wanted done, we might be able to attract him to this job.

It turned out to be that that was the case. And Marsh came on to be—I think he was director of research and education. But in any event, it was to begin, through his example and his work in physiology and a few others that he knew were interested, was to be the seeding of a more intellectual, scholarly situation in the school and the development of its faculty within modest limits at that point.

And this went reasonably well. I think Sy was sufficiently realistic to recognize he couldn’t do these things and wouldn’t do these things, and that he needed this kind of help. And that Marsh represented somebody who had an affection for the school and thought well of it and wanted to make it go and so forth.

I imagine Marsh’s being there bothered Sy a little bit more than I ever knew in one way. But in another way, it gave him, more basically, it gave him the assurance that some of these things that he couldn’t do were at least being begun. However, very shortly Don and I, having kept a pretty close look on the—watch—on the school, both from direct observation and discussions with people in the clinic and around and elsewhere in the academic world, were clear that this relationship between Sy and Marsh couldn’t be expected to go on as long as we had hoped, and that we were approaching a point where we were really going to have to make a move on Sy. What we could do that would be fair to him and wouldn’t arouse a storm of protest at Dartmouth’s ingratitude to his long-time service was right on our minds on a daily basis when we got the sudden word that he’d been killed the night before in an automobile accident.

DANIELL: Yes, it must have been earlier than ’60. It must have been between ’55 and ’57 probably.

DICKEY: Well, I’m not sure just when it was. But it was right in the middle fifties or thereabouts.

Well, this immediately cleared the decks as far as we were concerned, and we turned to Marsh to be dean of the school. And said that we would
give it a high priority as far as we were concerned in our attention and our efforts to really re-found it. And this was exactly what we did.

At just about this same time, or very shortly afterwards, well, at just about this same time, as I said a moment ago, we had had discussions with Harvey as to whether we should seek to set up a trustees’ planning committee on this matter. And as I recall, we did not do—we did not set up a separate TPC committee. Instead, we in due course recruited a very high-powered outside group of consultants: George Barry, the dean of the Harvard Medical School; Barry Wood, one of the foremost medical scientists in the country from Johns Hopkins; Bob Loeb of the P&S in New York, one of the outstanding…. 

DANIELL: How do you spell that last name?

DICKEY: L-O-E-B.

DANIELL: Oh, Loeb, yes.

DICKEY: He pronounced it Lerb.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: One of the foremost internists in the country, and he and I were members of the Rockefeller Foundation board at the time: a Dartmouth alumnus of the College and the medical school, from the Mayo Clinic, the surgeon—he’d be very unhappy if he knew I couldn’t recall his name because…. 

DANIELL: I think Ralph mentioned him as well.

DICKEY: Did he give you his name?

DANIELL: I think so. I can’t remember it. He mentioned someone from the Mayo Clinic.

DICKEY: Yes, you will have no difficulty about that. He was a rather…. Well, he was obviously a very able man in his field. But he had pretty pronounced views he would assert from time to time that may not have been as relevant to medical education as they were to perhaps being a good surgeon. But this was a very high-grade bunch.

DANIELL: Was there someone from the Rockefeller Foundation?
DICKEY: Well, Bob Loeb was a trustee of the foundation.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: But what I think you’re referring to is when we brought Alan Gregg, Dr. Alan Gregg—

DANIELL: That’s right, yes. That was earlier.

DICKEY: --to do the study for us and to make a recommendation to us. He was—Alan Gregg had been director of the medical sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation for a long period, and I think at this point was vice president in charge of medical affairs at the foundation. One of the world’s genuinely wise men in the area of medicine, highly respected internationally as well as nationally. Knew all the personnel in the medical schools of the country and abroad.

Well, we had this question as to whether we would go for an outside TPC kind of operation. And I was rather leery about it. I felt, myself, that we could get—we had these high-grade consultants, who came a little later actually as a board of consultants—but that what we really needed was somebody who knew the score on medical education as a wise man and not just as an outstanding expert in some field of medicine. And I thought that if I could get Alan Gregg to come and give us the benefit of his judgment, this would be the most valuable thing that we could get. We could share this with the TPC without setting up a subcommittee and with the board of trustees. And also I was sufficiently Machiavellian to believe that if Gregg recommended something, it would carry a great deal of weight with other people, including, perhaps, the Rockefeller Foundation…although I had to be very careful that I didn’t compromise Gregg’s position in the foundation.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: In other words, he came to us not from the foundation, but he came to us as a personal favor to me, a personal relationship. He had known this clinic well and favorably over a period of time. And known Jack Bowler and Jay Gile. He thought well of the clinic, knew the situation of the medical school beforehand. Had been aware that its graduates had performed well, although it was primarily a case of reflecting the quality that they brought to the school.
DICKEY: Well, he, Alan Gregg, agreed to do this. He said that he would come up at least several times and spend several days. And this, on top of his earlier familiarity with the clinic and the school and his wide familiarity with medical education generally, seemed to me to promise the kind of examination and the kind of judgment that we were seeking. We weren’t looking for an extensive, analytical report when we really wanted the judgment of somebody on whom we could confidently bet.

Gregg did this. He met quite a number of times with Don Morrison and with me, getting the background that we had on this thing. And he knew of Marsh Tenney and saw something, I guess, of him. I don’t remember about that. He must have. And then said to me one day, “I’d like to spend a couple of hours talking with you alone about this.” And I remember we talked here in my office. Then he was going to take a train from Lebanon, and we went down to Lebanon, and we sat for another hour or two in my car while he talked about these things.

And he said, “It would not be appropriate for me to write a formal report since I’m not up here as a Rockefeller Foundation officer, and it’s better for you and better for me and better for everybody that I’m not. But,” he said, “I think I’m now reasonably clear on what I want to say.” And subsequently Don Morrison got him to summarize this in an unsigned two or three pages of notes.

But the net of it was, he said, “I think you ought to stay with medicine, first.” There had been various recommendations that have come to us from both the outside and elsewhere, inside, that we should leave medical education and go to paramedical education, training of medical technicians or one thing or another. Everything except M.D.s, doctors. He said, “I just don’t think that is Dartmouth’s opportunity.” He said, “There’s a case for stopping and just washing your hands of this situation, you’ve got a used-up plan, you’ve got a used-up faculty. You’re not committed beyond the point, the commitments could be very easily liquidated. And there is a case for stopping if you decide you want to. But my judgment is that you shouldn’t; that you should stay with medicine.” This was the first thing.
Well, he talked that out, giving me various reasons behind his judgment. And one of the important considerations was the one which had surfaced when we had the Thayer School study by the TPC committee. Namely, he said, “I think that a college such as Dartmouth really needs a relationship to a professional medical school for complementing its work in the biologic sciences and chemistry and elsewhere.” And he said, “Plus the fact that you’ve got one of the longest histories in the country in medical education. That medical education is never going to be less important than it is now. And you would be liquidating a very important intangible asset to just walk away from medical education at this point.”

So he said, for all these reasons and others that he gave, he said, “My recommendation to you is that you try to stay with medicine.” “Now,” he said, “there are various ways that you could stay with medicine. There’s the possibility of a relationship with the Harvard Medical School.” They had approached us and had suggested that we, in effect, enter into an arrangement whereby they would take all of our two-year students.

DANIELL: That’s amazing today...

DICKEY: Would take all of our two-year-school students and, in turn, would have considerable say with respect to our program and admissions and so forth. He said, “I do not favor that. I am a great admirer of the Harvard Medical School.” And he was a graduate of the Harvard Medical School and so forth. But he said, “These arrangements are very dubious arrangements at best. And here you are a school that has a lot of medical and a college that has a lot of pride.” And he said, “I just have no great confidence that you would be happy in the long run with a satellite relationship to Harvard Medical School. I don’t think you would develop as strongly as you would if you undertake your own development.” But he said, “That’s a possibility you should give some serious consideration to.” And he said, “I’ve given consideration to it, and don’t think it’s the route.”

"The other possibility," he said, “is to see if you can launch a totally new four-year school, as is being done in several places in this country, here.” And he said, “This is a possibility. You could probably arrange to get the clinical material that you would need, although there would be some difficulties there. You’d probably for a while have to use some clinical material in Boston, particularly in the area of obstetrics and some of the specialized fields. It would involve a close working relationship with the Veterans’ Hospital here and an assurance that they were going to remain
here,” which was one of the questions that was very wobbly all through this period. And he said, “Most difficult of all is the fact that it would involve,” he said, “in my judgment, nothing less than $50 million to found a four-year school.” And he said, “That might not be enough really before you were through with what you would need: total plant, endowment, and the operating expenses that would go with it.” So he said, “I don’t think I would recommend that.”

He said, “Therefore, I come to recommending the re-founding of the two-year school.” And he said, “I think you could do that on a relatively modest amount of money. That if you can recruit a really strong medical science faculty, it would fit into your College faculty much more readily than a large clinical faculty. And,” he said, “if you rebuild your plant, rebuild your faculty, and you can pull it off with what money is available to you, then you can leave to the future the question of whether you go to a four-year school because you can’t go to a four-year school unless you do that.”

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: You’ve got to do that anyway.

DANIELL: Right, right.

DICKEY: Well, I’m just reciting the picture that he laid out for me that day. And he said, “This is the net of it. That if you’re going to stay with medicine, as I recommend that you do, I would re-found the two-year school from scratch, and then see later whether you’re able and it’s necessary to go to a four-year school.”

This was essentially the judgment on which we acted. I exposed this to the board of trustees. Don and I tried to analyze it. And it was this judgment and the availability of Marsh Tenney’s leadership that led to the re-founding of the Dartmouth Medical School.

DANIELL: Well, this is probably a convenient break time. Why don’t I turn it off and just pick it up here.

[Break]

DANIELL: Now it’s back on. And the logical starting point is after that, after he had made his assessment, which apparently you considered as wise, was the decision by the trustees then to go ahead and....
DICKEY: My problem is to be a little clearer as to just where that is in respect to Marsh Tenney’s leadership of the school. Do you know?

DANIELL: I think at this point Syvertsen is still the dean. It’s before the….

DICKEY: And Marsh has come on the job?

DANIELL: Marsh has come on the job, and the director of research….

DICKEY: Research and education. Something like that.

DANIELL: You’ve got kind of a divided leadership over there. And I think it’s before—but this I’m not absolutely sure of the point in which the outsiders and Tom and….

DICKEY: Well, I’m sure that if that is the point that we’re seeking for purposes of connecting to the Gregg recommendation, that most of the—certainly most of the new people—had not come on.

DANIELL: That’s right, yes.

DICKEY: We had not taken the plunge in a big way.

DANIELL: Yes. Well, the details of the timing of this aren’t, it seems to me, so important.

DICKEY: They don’t worry you?

DANIELL: As the fundamental decision that you’ve already described not to sort of let it go at this point. And then later on it seems to me, the next point clearly that is important is, from the trustees’ point of view and from your point of view, how to respond to the great crisis of the early sixties.

DICKEY: Well, that comes quite a ways down the road. Although as events go, probably not too far ahead.

I think it's fair to say that Dr. Gregg’s recommendation that we go forward with the re-founding of the medical two-year program was the really critical decision in the future of the medical school. Critical because, beyond the realization of most people today who’ve been involved in the medical school, this was far from being a foreordained decision. I can’t emphasize
too strongly—I believe I’ve mentioned it earlier—that we were dealing with a very unusual situation so far as having a decision of that sort of make.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Namely, we had a used-up plant that clearly had no future. We had a faculty which was to a considerable degree approaching retirement, that was going to have to be almost wholly rebuilt.

DANIELL: Well, there were very few of them actually at that time because, at least that's what I get from Ralph, they were mostly clinical faculty.

DICKEY: It was going to have to be very largely rebuilt. Not wholly. There were a few individuals here that went on. And just as importantly perhaps, the whole program, particularly as it related to the introduction of scholarship and research into the work of the faculty, was going to have to be introduced anew. There was very, very little of that. So that on all three counts, we were painfully aware that we had an opportunity to close out the school without the kind of travail that would normally be involved in giving up a school or an established program. Against that were the considerations which Dr. Gregg had marshaled in his statement of the situation and the two very important factors, namely the history of the school, the long history of the school in medical education, and the existence of the Hitchcock Clinic which had been in many ways the creature of the existence of the school and now was a factor in its continuation.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I think the other factor which needs to be mentioned, and which in my view was probably the decisive—if not the decisive, one of the decisive—factors in the judgment which Don Morrison and I took together was the presence of Marsh Tenney and his willingness to shoulder the responsibility for the re-founding of the faculty and the program of the school. I’ve often felt that if we hadn’t had a Marsh Tenney to turn to, we might well have search in vain for such a person with the scholarly credentials, the conviction, the Dartmouth tie, all of the ingredients that had to go into finding the leadership we needed. Now it couldn’t have been very much after Gregg was here, if at all, that Dean Syvertsen was killed in the automobile accident.

DANIELL: I’m not sure.
DICKEY: But it was around this period.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And with Dean Syvertsen’s death, the way was cleared immediately to putting Marsh Tenney in charge of the school, and he took it on the run, so to speak. He went right to work on really all three fronts: planning the new facilities, recruiting new faculty, formulating a program for a re-founded two-year school. We were not, needless to say, Don and I were not innocents wandering in the forest concerning the possibility that if this two-year re-founding worked out, it would very possibly lead to the reestablishment of the two clinical years or the clinical years and the re-founding of the school as a degree-granting, M.D.-granting institution. But we were, I think it’s fair to say, just totally relieved or at least largely relieved by the possibility that we could get forward with, in Gregg’s judgment—and in Marsh’s judgment; his judgment was very close to that expressed by Gregg—that there was very useful, indispensable work to be done in re-founding a two-year school without worrying what came next down the road.

I think I might just add that while later, particularly after Carleton Chapman came, the pressure for going forward with the establishment of a four-year school mounted very considerably because to a degree the situation in the medical schools of the country had changed from there being places for the graduates of a two-year school. There was a considerable question as to whether there were going to be places in the future for the graduates of a two-year school. I, myself, wondered whether to some degree the enthusiasm for the reestablishment of the four-year school later—I’m getting out ahead of my story now—may have contributed to the unqualified conviction on the part of those who were committed to the reestablishment of the four-year school. But this was not my profession, and by this time Gregg was gone. And we had at that point very little opportunity or very little possibility of relying other than on the professional judgment of those on the job and their professional judgment. And indeed the advice of people such as Dean Ebert of the Harvard Medical School was that the future of the two-year school was behind us because of developments in the other medical schools of the country which did not permit the kind of linking which had existed before. And as I believe I mentioned in our last session, we had rejected any thought of making a tie with the Harvard Medical School, which would have been one way of continuing the two-year school.
DANIELL: Basically what you’ve said is exactly what Ralph’s assessment was, really that at the point at which the decision was made to go to a four-year medical school there really were no alternatives.

DICKEY: Yes. I would only have to say that I think quite frequently when you get into situations of that sort, not in medicine but in all areas of administration and the development of an enterprise, when people become convinced they want to do something, they rather lose their capacity to develop alternatives to what they want to do. So that I…I was not opposed…far from that. But neither was I entirely convinced that there were not other alternatives that could have been developed. Whether they would have been as good or as desirable is something we'll never know.

DANIELL: Do you remember whether you had anything specifically in mind when you say alternatives that might have been developed, the general framework of what you thought were not being or might have been explored more fully?

DICKEY: Yes. I had in mind some possibilities of…it had been something that appealed to people who were bearing the professional responsibilities of the school. But this was not the case. For example, with the number of medical schools that were present in the country, with the earlier Harvard approach to us, I was by no means clear that there were not two or three schools at different levels of competitive admissions where with some effort and imagination and creativity we might not have developed a relationship that made it possible to continue the two-year program somewhat longer. In other words, all I’m saying is that I was not as convinced as some of the others were that this had to be a now or never decision. My experience has been that you really never know what your alternatives are in any large question of that sort until you’ve pursued rather persistently the possibility of doing something other than what you want to do.

DANIELL: Was part of your concern in this—and you put it quite precisely; you weren’t opposed but you were not as completely convinced that all the alternatives had been explored—was part of your concern—this may link back to the [inaudible] blow-up internally in the medical school shortly before this—that a four-year medical school might in the long run become a kind of burden which….
DICKEY: When we come to that, and I think probably we’d better postpone that until a little further down the road in the story, I was acutely aware, and I held the feet of the board of trustees, let me say, up to their being aware that the plans for financing this were to a considerable extent based upon several uncertain propositions…not the least of which was the continued commitment of the federal government to support. But this brings us to another section, another portion of the story.

To go back, Marsh was deeply committed to the notion of re-founding the two-year school, believed in it. And believed that there was an opportunity here for the development of, if not a unique, a very strong program of medical science work on the part of the faculty, which was focused very heavily on research in the basic medical science field. Focused without the distracting difficulties that later arose and which have been present in many, many medical schools if not all, the internal stresses and strains between a basic medical science faculty and the clinical faculty.

Well, Marsh went out and did what, by all the testimony I’ve ever heard, was a remarkable job of recruiting creative indeed one could say in several instances, I believe, very high-powered, in a way for example, medical scientists. What we subsequently learned, after several years of growth that was nurtured by, as it seemed, the almost unlimited federal research grants that this group attracted, what we learned later was that this growth was based upon a view of the two-year school that became increasingly incompatible with its primary sense of purpose—at least as far as Marsh was concerned and as far as the official College was concerned—of being a school for the development of physicians.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: This was the…if it was fatal—or… it didn’t prove to be fatal, but this was the critical difficulty which was not foreseen either in respect to the law of gravity which such a program created toward basic science; nor was it seen, perhaps even more importantly, with respect to the nature of the individuals being recruited into the program.

By and large, as I look back on it now, these were not only high-powered people; they were people with really tunnel vision in respect to what they wanted to accomplish. And I’m not sure that most people who are going to accomplish great things in a specific area don’t acquire a certain kind of tunnel vision, a kind of concentration of efforts and everything else. But however that may be, before very long Marsh began to be concerned.
DANIELL: Okay, that's an important point.

DICKEY: And this was really the beginning of the difficulty. And with any difficulty of that sort, you can look back on it and say that there were various factors involved that coalesced. But the principal one that I became convinced was, well, that had become the central focus of our difficulties, was that Marsh became convinced—and I subsequently, further down the road, became convinced—that this group that he had brought together, which he had been very proud of and the rest of us had been very proud of their accomplishments—were increasingly committed to a biological, advanced biological, medical studies institute kind of enterprise.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: And were themselves increasingly leery, wary of anything resembling a normal medical school. That they came to regard the clinical work that was being introduced into the two-year program with suspicion. And their appetite for expansion, a very normal thing in a sense, was being fed by their achievements—

DANIELL: And by the money.

DICKEY: --and by the money that was available. Well, once Marsh became convinced that they really were no longer—or indeed perhaps never had been—committed to the vision that he personally entertained for the school, he became unsympathetic with these people. Many of them were very difficult people to live with individually anyway. Several of them were well qualified as prima donnas.

DANIELL: I lived next to one of them at that point, and this is [Kenneth W.] Ken Cooper.

DICKEY: Well, Ken Cooper would be.... [Laughs]

DANIELL: He’s in that category.

DICKEY: He was a prima donna with capital letters.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: Albeit, according to all the testimony, a very able person in his field. And I could relate another three or four if I could recall their names to mind. To some extent they rather rallied around [Shinya] Inoué, who was the kingpin. Well, this at first seemed to me to be something that we ought to be able to manage and not an irreconcilable difficulty insofar as the two groups were concerned. And I spent, John Masland spent when he came onto the job...

DANIELL: Just a second. I think I better turn this over.

[DICKEY:] [End of Tape 32, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 32, Side B]

DANIELL: OK, we're back on.

DICKEY: Masland and I and others that I consulted with spent a great deal of time trying to reconcile the interests of this high-powered group of molecular biologists, which was the broad category, rubric, under which they did their work, with the need of the school to have a place, and a very primary place, for the purpose of medical education within its program.

The alienation of the group from Marsh Tenney became increasingly complete. It became, indeed, an embittered relationship. Some of these individuals with whom I continued to have amicable relations in an effort to find what could be worked out manifested a feeling to me that they had been betrayed by Marsh, that he had brought them here under false pretenses and things like that, and had now changed his convictions and so on.

Marsh, I should say, I’m sure felt just as strongly as they did, or more so. But he was not given to quite as much bitter comment to me as some of these other individuals. And I did my best to remain above the controversy so long as I had any hope that the thing could be worked out.

Well, I believe the next need was to search for a replacement for Marsh after he decided he wanted to give it up. When he put the job down, he didn’t say to me that the fundamental difficulty was this growing division within the faculty. He asked to be relieved of the job, and I think it was pretty clear that there was more difficulty there than just his personal inclination to get back to research and teaching. But that was a major thing with him.
Well, we, as I recall, consulted with our advisors, the outside advisors, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Barry Wood of Hopkins, Dr. Loeb of P&S and the Rockefeller Foundation board, both of them. I’m not sure, but I believe George Barry, the dean of the Harvard Medical School, was still on our board of consultants at that time. Waltman Walters [‘17] from the Mayo Clinic, a Dartmouth graduate, was still, I believe, on our board although not close enough to this to be of any real help.

After looking around a bit, but relying primarily upon the resources and judgments of our consultants, and indeed primarily upon the two that I knew very well and had the greatest confidence in, namely Dr. Loeb and Dr. Wood, they recommended a man who had been assistant dean at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, [Gilbert H.] Bert Mudge, who had been an assistant dean, I believe, in charge of graduate studies. He was a pharmacologist. We had not known anything about him to speak of. I believe a few of the people at the medical school had known something about him, but not very much. I would have to say that any recommendation of somebody to fill that spot, coming from Dr. Loeb and Dr. Wood, carried just almost unquestioned weight with me. These were two of the top medical educators in the country with international reputations. Careful men.

DANIELL: And you had really to go outside because internally the nature of it was such that probably everyone was already identified with the other camp and…

DICKEY: Yes, this was true. And this was truer than I realized at the time, that the thing had really coalesced in a separation of the two groups to a degree where it’s now my judgment that nobody could have put it back together again. It was Humpty Dumpty. Although at the time I wasn’t quite prepared to accept that.

At about this time, I guess just before it, I had a sabbatical leave to do some visiting at universities around the world on a grant from the Carnegie Corporation seeking to give college presidents an opportunity to get some perspective from visiting other institutions. I think this was in ’56. And again, I’m not sure that I’ve got the exact dates just right, but I think this was in ’56.

One of the things I did, as I visited various universities around the world, from New Zealand to Germany to New Delhi, and in Thailand for the Rockefeller Foundation and so forth, was to make some rather pointed
inquiries about what had been their experience in respect to the relationships of the clinical faculty in a medical school and the basic medical science faculty?

Well, I discovered what I’d been told here at home was present in almost every medical school that I approached in these different countries. And in several situations they were amused that the question should be asked. But they were also just emphatic about the oil-and-water nature of this problem, particularly if you’ve got some difficult individuals on both sides of the issue.

I can remember two universities—one was in New Zealand and I think the other was in Germany—which emphasized to me that it was, in their experience, quite futile to attempt to have your biochemistry taught by one department. That you had to decide that biochemistry as a basic science was one thing, and biochemistry for the education of medical students was another. And until you made that decision you were just going to be in a constant hassle between the two groups, which was something that I hadn’t yet—which was a point that I hadn’t yet reached in my judgment about the situation here.

Well, I returned convinced that this thing was, shall we say, more endemic in the medical education community around the world than I had realized. But we needed new leadership, had to get new leadership. And we decided to go after, seriously at least, to investigate the possibility of bringing Dr. Mudge from Johns Hopkins here. He came up and looked it over. I had several long talks with him. And we went forward with him to be dean.

As I look back on it, rather quickly—by that I mean it was in a matter of, oh, six months or so, I forget just how many months and certainly not years—I came to the conclusion that we had made a very fundamental mistake in the choice of Dr. Mudge to be dean. Not because I think that anybody could have put the thing back together again. But because we reached a point rather quickly in the effort to manage the situation, where Dr. Mudge—and I’m speaking now quite candidly in a way that I should not want to make public at this point lest it hurt somebody, although there was never any secret about this between myself and Mudge—he lost the confidence of both groups as an administrative leader.

The group that rallied around the molecular biologists also had on their side some of the people in the science departments of the College, biology
and chemistry. And I would have to say that, while I had the greatest personal admiration for quite a few of these people and indeed very close friendship, they were far from being a group of objective people in regard to this controversy. Their professional self-interest was involved, certainly in the biologic sciences with respect to participation in graduate programs, and just the normal professional identification of like with like, was operating in chemistry and indeed both of these departments primarily. So that their lack of confidence in Mudge, who was a pharmacologist over on the other side of the spectrum, was almost inevitable. I’d hoped that he would have the flexibility and some sort of administrative magic that would bring them around in due course.

But the thing which made that impossible was that in relatively sure order it became clear that the people on the other side, Kurt Benirschke—I believe that’s the name, close to it, the German—and indeed I guess I would have to say Marsh Tenney, although more slowly, and several others with whom I consulted in physiology and….

DANIELL: The four P’s as Ralph put it: physiology, pharmacology, psychiatry, and anyway, the clinical.

DICKEY: Yes, the people who were clear about this being a medical school rather than a biologic institute was the way I would define it. These people lost confidence in Mudge’s ability to administer the school, to hold their respect as an administrator.

Well, I won’t go into the personalities that were involved here. But I began to take a pretty critical look at this. And I saw in Bert attractive qualities of integrity and courage, willingness to, so to speak, in General [Ulysses S.] Grant’s terms to fight it out on the peninsula if it took all year. But with that, a rigidity and inflexibility that is in the long run, in my judgment, just incompatible with administrative leadership in a difficult situation.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I was in close touch with John Masland, who was in touch with me constantly as this thing would jump from one crisis to another. And with Ralph. And I would have Inoué in the office frequently at luncheon time for an hour talking with him about really what was wanted and so forth. Along with the difficulties that quickly developed in respect to what I’m afraid you’d have to say were Mudge’s lack of qualifications for this kind of administrative leadership—I’m sure he would say that he would have
made it if I had agreed to back him 'til the ship sank, which I had to say to him, in due course, I just could not do. Because I had, by this time, when these so-called four P departments came to me, and they came to me individually and said: We just owe it to you to tell you that—they had been in, you see, on the employment of Mudge very much—that they had lost confidence with him, and I knew the game was over because it was sure the other group wasn’t going to be changed.

At about the same time, and it began a little earlier, I began to be concerned about the future financing of the operation, particularly the financing of the molecular side of things, and keeping some balance in the situation with respect to the budgetary support of the two branches or the two sectors of the school. And I was sufficiently in touch with people who were close to the National Science Foundation and to the other granting agencies of the government that were relevant to this kind of research, to be given some friendly signals. Not red signals, but yellow signals that the day of free-wheeling grants for this kind of research were perhaps coming to an end.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: In any event, it was clear to me, from my own examination of the figures and the evidence I was getting, that we were certainly no longer going to be going up like that. And that we were at least approaching a plateau.

Well, I can remember one meeting we had in my office in which most of these molecular biologists, the leading ones, were there. And I said—and they had come in with a budget for a new laboratory and so forth—and I said, I just had to say to them that I no longer believed that we could assume that simply because they were doing a good job, there was no limit to the financing that was available to us, and that I was going to have to take a much more cautious approach to future commitments along these lines. Well, this, along with the personnel incompatibility which was in the picture, resulted, in my judgment, in freezing the divisions in the situation beyond repair.

Well, the next thing—just when, a matter of months or years, I’d have to check up to be sure about—but the next thing that I remember is I took a very deliberate judgment that I had to tell Bert Mudge that it was no go. And I remember I conferred with Leonard Rieser, who was basically, of course, over on the other side of this thing. He was dean of faculty working
with the College departments of the sciences. His orientation was that of a basic scientist and so forth.

DANIELL: He was over on that side maybe in that way, but certainly in style he wasn't.

DICKEY: What's that?

DANIELL: Certainly in style he wasn't, he much more flexible.

DICKEY: Oh, yes, much more so. But his basic sympathies, his basic confidence was more with these people than with the other people, although he became, I think to be increasingly aware that management of several—oh, three or four—of these people was probably a poor bet under any circumstances. But in any event, he had lost confidence in Mudge's ability to do it even before I decided that I just had to pull the plug on Mudge.

So I was perplexed as to what we did next. I had several—went down and had several long talks with Wood, Dr. Barry Wood, and Bob Loeb, because I wanted to be just damned sure that once we blew the whistle on Mudge, we didn't create a situation in which these two men felt that Mudge had not been given a proper chance, proper support, and so forth. Well, let it be said there was no question whatsoever of that sort.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Both of these men, individually and together, said they were just really smitten by the realization that, largely on the basis of their recommendation, we had gotten the wrong man for this kind of situation. And both of them made it clear to me that as far as they were concerned, as much as they regretted it, and particularly to have a friend that they had known professionally well and personally closely, not to be the proper man for this thing, they were convinced that he was not. Well, once I had that established to my satisfaction, I had no question at all that we just had to move as fast as we could.

I had very real difficulty getting Bert Mudge to see it that way. Indeed, I don't think he ever saw it that way. I think to this day he must still entertain the view that he got a very unfair deal. That if we had stuck with him in hell or high water, he would have been able to have pulled it off. I can only say
that I’m satisfied, and everyone from whom I took advice, confirmed that there was no prospect of that.

Well, before I did that, or just about the same time that I did that, I decided that we just had to play for time in this situation. And to get somebody in there that was just simply above the fray and who would hold the fort because he was above the fray, and not going to be involved in the future of the medical school as a faculty member or a candidate for the deanship. And this was the basis on which we asked Ralph Hunter to hold the fort.

I went up to see [Jarrett H.] Jerry Folley. And I can remember he was a little taken aback. He in effect said, “Well, I never thought of Ralph Hunter as an administrator. Are you sure that you know him and his way of doing things well enough?” Well, I said, “I’m not sure that I do. But what I’m looking for is somebody for a matter of months here until we have quieted things down a little bit and had a chance to look around, and who will not be a candidate for the deanship and will not be a partisan person as a trustee one way or the other. And so he said, “Well, all I’d like is a brief leave-of-absence from his clinic duties that will permit him to do this.” And Jerry went along, and Ralph went along.

Well, this was a situation that was clearly not something Ralph wanted to stay with very long. And I think we accomplished in some degree, not totally, a quieting down of some of the more strident personalities. But we were at a point where we had to now look out ahead and see what kind of leadership we could attract to the school. And we began that search. I think John Masland was still with us, although at some point here he went off to India for the Ford Foundation, and I’m not sure whether he participated in the search. We kept in very close touch with the departmental heads and the medical school faculty. I would go over and meet with them.

DANIELL: Is there any exodus by this time of the group from the molecular biology component?

DICKEY: Yes, I think there was. It was at about the time....

DANIELL: What I’m really getting at here is the question as to whether the appointment of Ralph Hunter, who clearly—although it’s temporary—is a stimulant to that exodus. Or whether the process—or in the process of searching for a new dean, which ended up as Carleton Chapman, that the
lines were drawn there. So they were fighting over the new deanship or is the fight sort of over?

DICKEY: Well, I can’t recall exactly without getting my chronology a little better.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: But I’d say there were several factors in it. Yes, the Bert Mudge period and the yellow signal I had to give this group with respect to the future financing and future growth, this was a real factor in this picture because this meant they saw the opening beginning to close down for unlimited growth on their side of things. The fact that I made no bones, in due course, about my dissatisfaction with their behavior was a factor in this thing. The fact that I probably backed Mudge as long as I did was a factor in this situation. The choice of Ralph may have been a factor. I would guess it was a minor factor compared to these other things that I’ve mentioned. That’s about as well as I can do with this.

DANIELL: That just fits with my recollection. Because this is at the time where I’ve come on the scene here because of my being next door to Cooper and knowing through the accidents of being a young faculty member [inaudible]. By this time it would have been...

DICKEY: I think the primary factors were the realization that the wide-open door for growth in the molecular sciences was closing, and that I was the one that was closing the door.

DANIELL: That’s right. Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And that the issue had been drawn, and we weren’t going to back away from that. We made this very clear, that this was a medical school, two-year medical school. It was not a biologic institute. We couldn’t go that route, weren’t going to go that route. Which was a very fundamental proposition.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And then the personality difficulties with Mudge. I don’t think there were personality difficulties primarily with Ralph that I was aware of. These were in the picture and I think were the primary factors. Well, and then as we began to search for a new dean, these people, I think, felt increasingly out of positions of decisive power in the affairs of the school. And they began
to look for other opportunities, all of which—and all of them did find other opportunities. But I think the most important thing to say is not one of them went to a medical school. Not one of them went to a medical school. They all went to biologic institutes or governmental laboratories.

DANIELL: An important point that Ralph did not make.

DICKEY: Oh, this is one of the most important things to say. Their professional purpose was different. And as long as Marsh was able to keep them harnessed within his sense of purpose for the medical school, well and good. The moment that that came apart, as I now see it, the parting was inevitable.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I might mention that just before they began to disappear into these other places, a number of them tried to put pressure on me by enlisting the support of eminent scientists: Wald down at Harvard, the Nobel Laureate in—what’s his field? Is it chemistry?

DANIELL: That’s not up my alley. But he’s in one of the fields that was relevant to the molecular biologists. They approached him.

DICKEY: Well, they got George Wald, as a Nobel Laureate in biology or chemistry, I forget which is his specialty, to approach Gerard Swope, a classmate of mine, and a very good friend of mine….

DANIELL: Really, to get to that level.

DICKEY: To come at me and to say that I was going to lose these eminent scientists and so on and so forth. And that I didn’t understand how good they were and on and on and on.

Well, I quickly had no difficulty knowing what was going on in that respect. And decided to really lay it out for Swope and said, "Here’s the picture now. If Wald’s really got something to say to us, I’ll go down and talk with Wald or Wald can come up here. But the picture that you’re getting from Wald is just simply a fragment of this, and a fragment concerning which we had no doubt at all that these were very good people in their fields. But
this has become irrelevant to the question of whether we can keep them harnessed under the rubric of a medical school purpose."

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: "And if we can’t, then that’s that, because we’re not going to turn this into a biologic institute at this stage. Then we’d lose all the relationship with the clinic, the historical justification of the school, on and on and on."

Swope, it turned out, was very well satisfied. Whether he ever went back to Wald, I don’t know. I subsequently followed Wald’s behavior in other controversies and learned that while he was a Nobel Laureate in his field, in some other areas he was really a pretty wild fellow [Laughter] who had problems of judgment, at least in the eyes of many admirers of his scientific work.

Well, the next stage that comes to mind was the search for Mudge’s replacement while Ralph was holding the fort. And I had in this search one of the most unpleasant, difficult experiences of my years on the job.

We had quite an extensive list of people that we wanted to investigate for the deanship. And at one point Marsh Tenney introduced the name of a man who was an assistant dean at the University of Rochester Medical School, whom he had known when he was there. And Tenney’s recommendation that we look at this man was just that, not an all-out urging that he was just what we wanted. But the net of it was, without drawing the story out too finely, that he and I met with this man once or twice in New York City. I found myself basically attracted to him as a sensible, prudent whatever you want to say person who’d had some administrative experience in a medical school as assistant dean. And while I was not, I’d have to say, swept overboard by his intellectual qualities so far as I could judge them without making a professional judgment, I still thought he was an attractive candidate.

Just before we got to this point with this man, whose name escapes me and may be a Freudian screening-out of this, we had gotten the name of Carleton Chapman, who was at that point had been president of the American Heart Association and who was a cardiologist and a medical historian down in Texas. I forget now which university he was with, whether it was the University of Texas or one of the others. He was in Houston. And he had a very fine reputation as a nationally known figure in
medical education, cardiology, and medical history. And we had had him up here for a preliminary go-around.

Our faculty search group, which was, in effect, the group of chairmen of all the departments, was all for Carleton. There was some reason to believe, as we thought, that he might be able to hold some of the people that we thought were salvageable from the molecular side of things. And we went to the point where we made it clear that we would like him to come. He, in turn, gave it, presumably, careful consideration and decided that it was not something that he wanted to do. Whether he was leery of the schism that was in the school, whether he was doubtful that we had a sufficient commitment to a four-year school which he ultimately was clear we had to undertake, or whether there were other factors in the picture or not, I don’t know. I checked him out with a very good source, in his school actually, that I had through other personal relations and had a good recommendation from him—about him. Although there was some qualification in it about his being a pretty stubborn fellow about his own views once he’d decided what he wanted to do. And that was not something that particularly bothered me at the time. But that’s the only negative that I remember was even mentioned as a consideration to keep in mind. But he decided that he couldn’t come or wouldn’t come.

It was about this time we had begun explorations with this other fellow and Marsh Tenney and I spent a morning with him down at the University Club in New York. I cannot now reproduce exactly the exchange of views and of positions that we took. But the net of it was I said, as I recall, "This looks to me like a good prospect. And we would like to pursue it seriously. How does it look to you?" And he said, "Well, I think I’m attracted to it." Well, we did not talk salary. We did not talk terms—length of employment or terms. But we had come, what I would call, to a gentleman’s understanding that unless something else happened, that we would go forward on our side and on his side.

I got back to Hanover, and I think within 48 hours—certainly not more than 72 hours—I got word from Bob Ebert, who at this point was dean of the Harvard Medical School, that he wanted to pass on to me an urgent message that had come to him secondhand from Carleton Chapman that he thought he’d made a mistake; and that if the job was still open, he would like to come.

Well, I decided I just had to really think this out as well as I could. On the one hand here was the medical school board of departmental chairmen,
the search committee, gung-ho to get Carleton Chapman, thought that this would be a great hit as far as the school was concerned. They regarded it as a solution to all their problems, that he had a national reputation which would stand up against some of the embittered difficulties that had been encountered in the school, that would get the school a very strong acceptance because of his past position in medical education. I was aware that they were really very keen on him.

At the same time, I was troubled as to how far we had gone with this other man. And I can say with utter assurance that I am recalling accurately because I thought long and carefully about this. I was by no means clear that we had gone beyond the point where there was no—the changing of our position was beyond consideration. I was sure from my lawyer’s background that there was no—that no contract had been made. But I wanted to be a little bit clearer that there was no moral commitment that we ought to be honoring.

So I decided that, well, the first thing to do was to share this knowledge with the board of chairmen in the medical school. I was quite clear that I would have been acting improperly if I had not shared the fact that Carleton Chapman was now available to them. This would have been an untenable position, I don’t have any doubt at all, for a president to have been in if he had withheld that knowledge.

So I went over to the school and laid the whole thing, so far as I could, right out on the table. And said that I had not called this other man yet. But if they still felt that we should go to Chapman, I was going to have to call this other man. But I wanted, before I did that, to make sure that they felt comfortable about doing—about turning now to Chapman. And that there was no question at all that they greatly preferred him to this other man. Because if this is a close thing, I’d just as soon not get into a discussion with this other man about. Well, the net of this meeting was that they were just to a man emphatic. My God! We can’t let this, miss this opportunity, and that I should have a talk with the other man.

So I came back, and it was one of the most difficult conversations I’ve ever undertaken in personnel work. And I’ve had occasion to have to fire my share and disappoint people and so forth. But I decided that the only thing I knew how to do was to walk right up to it. So I called him, and I said, “A very difficult situation has developed here. And it involves another
candidate who we thought was not available to us, who within a matter of a day or so, we’ve learned he feels he made a mistake in not coming to us. And our board of chairmen of the departments is clear that this is the man that they would prefer to have come as the dean. But before we cross that bridge, I’ve got to be sure from you that you do not feel that we have settled on your coming to the deanship. I said, I have no question about it, no contract had been made, legal obligation.

Well, it quickly became apparent that he agreed no contract had been made. But that he felt just terribly let down—quite understandably—because he’d set his heart on this. And he said that this was, he felt, the wrong thing for us to do. In fact if that was our decision, however, why, of course that was up to us. And that was that. Well, I said I was afraid that this was just what it was. If we were clear that there was no commitment here, even though we’d gone as far down the road as we had, then I was going to have to follow the view of the board in the medical school. Because, I said, actually we would be in an intolerable position on the other side of this thing if you came against the judgment of the leaders of the faculty. So I said, “I must give some weight to that. And I think giving weight to that, there’s no alternative but to go forward with the other man.”

I subsequently had an embittered letter from him that convinced me that we were damned lucky. It was the kind of letter that a person who, after he’d gotten over an emotional shock, wouldn’t have written if he had the confidence about his own position in the world of education.

DANIELL: We’re going through a similar thing in terms of our department. A person we did not give tenure to and his response to that convinces me every day that we were wise.

DICKEY: Well, I then—I would say finally, I, in respect to this, experience—I then sat down and wrote this man a three-page maybe four-page letter and said, Just as a matter of being fair to myself and my colleagues and you, as far as I can, I want to retrace our whole experience with each other step by step, detail by detail. And I did. I never had any acknowledgement from him of it. But once I spelled it out, I either convinced myself or it was a pretty convincing statement, that there was very little alternative but to go with Chapman…at that stage.

Well, we did. And Chapman came up, took over the school. And as far as I’m concerned, did a fine job. He had, of course, his difficulties. I don’t think any dean mentioned that I’ve ever known has ever gotten by without
difficulties. Perhaps no president does. But he was also in a position to take the boat downstream because he wanted to do what the others wanted to do, the people in the clinic were glad to have done, the people in the medical school were glad to have done. And that was to launch it on a course ultimately of returning to the four-year M.D.-granting school.

DANIELL: In many ways that’s a kind of protection against the basic scientists of the institute people as you would call them. Given the nature of the medical education, which tends to be much more oriented toward basic science in the initial years, the first couple of years, of this, and becomes more clinical as apparently time passes.

DICKEY: That’s correct. Now, I don’t think there’s any particular reason to spell this out. I arranged to have the board of trustees meet at the medical school to hear a full presentation by Carleton Chapman, as to how this four-year program would be phased in, how it would be financed and manned, and so forth.

I at this point, as I said earlier, was quite clear that this was a very, very major venture as far as Dartmouth College as a whole was concerned. The attractiveness of it was self-evident. The risks were, in my view, not as self-evident. The federal government was still in this picture in a fairly big way, although they had run up a yellow flag by this time, which related to the development of our plant to take care of a four-year school. And at one point, one of their visiting committees gave us a negative judgment, or at least indicated that a negative judgment was likely about money being available for this. Well, Chapman went to bat about this and had the power or the strength to carry his case with the government. So that tentative judgment, if that's what it was, was reversed, and they made money available at least for plant purposes, expansion of our plant.

The board, as it heard this question presented, and I suppose at least two times and maybe three times as we went along over a period of several years in developing this position, was convinced, as far as I'm aware—and I think there may have been one or two who were less than convinced at least they did not register an objection—to taking the decision in principle that we would aim at a four-year program.

The last thing that I had to do on it was after John Kemeny’s designation as my successor but before he came on the job. I told John, as I told Carleton Chapman, that I felt this was one of the largest decisions that any president was going to have to make as to whether we really now
committed ourselves to going forward with this recruitment of a clinical faculty and the development of the facilities to do it. This was about a two-year lead—

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: --on this. And I said, "I think it would be just simply wrong for me to take that decision"— I was moving out within another two months or six weeks or whatever it was — "without exposing it to my successor fully, as fully as I could." So I said to Carleton and to John independently that I would like to bring him over to hear Carleton on this and that as far as I would go was to say that I felt it was a very, very critical decision at this stage that involved primarily timing. To find out just how solid the interest of the federal government was going to be in the financing of medical education. By this time the thing had become, in my view, increasingly wobbly.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: But not to the point where I was clear that it wouldn’t be available. But I was clear that it was going to be, to some extent, a problem. So John and I went over to see Carleton in his office on this. And I said just about what I’ve said here. And that my sole purpose at this point was to make sure that Carleton had the benefit of knowing any questions that John Kemeny had, and that either one of them, if they wanted any views of mine, had an opportunity to have them while I was still on the job. And that I was not going to advocate any particular course. But that I did want particularly my successor to be aware that this was a very, very large proposition concerning the timing of which I had increasing doubts. John very quickly said, “Well, I think the worst thing to do is to disappoint a faculty. We’d better go ahead.” And that was that.

DANIELL: Yes. An understandable statement, given his background.

DICKEY: That was almost word for word.

DANIELL: Yes, I can see how it was very well meaning.

DICKEY: So that, with I’m sure some important omissions that I’ve overlooked, was the story of the re-founding of medical school.

DANIELL: A story that may not be over yet.
DICKEY: Oh, we don’t want to get into that. It’s not part of this story.

DANIELL: No, no. In conjunction with what you said....

DICKEY: And I would only bring up what I have brought up at the end because it is the end of my exercise of responsibility.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. No, the two things together, and this is in part planned, but in part accidental and fortuitous of what you and Ralph, talking about this from different points of view, but the stories just mesh completely. And, yet, some little things [inaudible] would give the record ...

DICKEY: Are there questions you want to put to me?

DANIELL: Not really. Not a single question at all. I had several in mind, but you’ve answered them in the process of going through it. So as far as I’m concerned, this is a very logical place to break. I really don’t. I mean I really have a sense that if a person began listening to these two would get as full a description—and of course I’m going to go to Marsh Tenney later, and he’ll be another, it seems to me.

DICKEY: Well, this would be a very important view of it. Carleton Chapman’s view would be, in some respects, less significant on the things that we’ve been talking about because he was clearly...he came on the job, he wanted to aim at a four-year school. And we told him we were quite prepared to....

[Break]

DANIELL: This Tape 33A of President Dickey ends here.

[Knocking sound] Come in!

[Break]

[End of Tape 33, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 33, Side B]

DANIELL: ... February 28, 1977. As I just said, today what I would like to do is spend as much time as it takes discussing the whole question of the degree to which Dartmouth College as a whole became committed to or, in your perception, should have become committed to graduate studies and
not the associated school programs, but internally in the traditional departments of the College.

I suppose the first real observation is simply to note that once having committed, as you've already discussed before, to an increased professionalizing of the faculty, this eventually must have been something that you knew that the College was in some ways going to have to come to terms with. And what I'm really interested in is how you as the chief administrator of the College saw sort of the phasing or the pacing of this, and the extent to which Dartmouth College should go into the graduate programs within, again, the traditional disciplines.

DICKEY: This was one of the major questions of fundamental policy that came along fairly early in my years on the job. It was not a question that was on the agenda of things that had to be dealt with during the first year or two. It flowed out as a question that arose out of several other things. And you have very correctly diagnosed one of them; namely, as we began to see the results of our commitment to developing the scholarship in the faculty, more especially the recruitment of young replacements for the faculty which was approaching, very generally approaching retirement. We were aware that we were recruiting out of a pool of generally—we hoped—highly qualified young scholars, and that these new recruits would in many instances find themselves wanting some type of advanced scholarship work in order to find the opportunity here at Dartmouth an attractive one.

I put it the way I do because I think as soon as we began to think seriously about this need for attracting and holding the kind of teacher-scholar that we wanted, we were aware and made aware often by these individuals that this kind of opportunity was not always going to be found in the direction of graduate work. Indeed, some of the very best of these people, particularly people working in the social sciences and the humanities, said that they just had no desire to find themselves burdened with graduate students in a way that in their particular field would simply detract from the time that they would otherwise have available for their research and their writing. And this was something that was no secret anywhere to anybody who lived and worked in the academic community. But it was a very important factor in our early, if you will, strategic explorations of the subject of graduate study at Dartmouth.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I came in on the – I was on the graduate committee in '65, I guess, which is the point where a lot of this crystallized out in what you described as clearly....
DICKEY: Another fundamental factor in our approach to the question of graduate study was that it inevitably did have some relationship to what we aspired to do in the way of strengthening the programs in the graduate schools—in the professional schools, that is to say. In fact, in the area of medical education, it became very quickly one of the prime questions in the re-founding of the medical school. Because we were still talking about primarily basic medical science if we were not talking about clinical....

DANIELL: Right. Especially when it was just a two-year school.

DICKEY: Exactly. Well, this was true, of course, until 1970 or thereabouts. So that the faculty appointments in the re-founding of the medical school were essentially scientists, as we’ve said earlier, or at least their orientation was to basic science. And therefore we found ourselves very early—indeed I think very possibly the first Ph.D. program; I’m not sure about this, but very closely related to the Ph.D. program launched in mathematics was the Ph.D. program launched in physiology in the medical school.

Well, it was not only that we were seeking ways to strengthen our associated school faculties and the programs in these schools, but there was the even more fundamental consideration that the more I personally examined the history of Dartmouth, the clearer I became that we had to in some ways—and indeed many ways—get over the feeling that Dartmouth was simply a small liberal arts college, and that that was all it ever would be and could possibly want to be.

This was the old question of university versus college, which we’ve touched on earlier. And the further I looked into this, the further I became acquainted with the history of the founding of the three associated schools of medicine, engineering, and business administration, the clearer I became, as I’ve said earlier, that while there was no need to have another Dartmouth College case involving the use of the word university; neither was there any validity to the notion that any advanced work on the part of our faculty in the arts and sciences or in the associated schools was necessarily inimical to being a first-rate undergraduate liberal arts college.

So that you had a convergence of these factors coming forward toward the early fifties and mid-fifties that to some extent prepared the way for a serious consideration of graduate programs, either in connection with the associated schools or independently. The first two programs—and at the
moment I’m just a little uncertain as to which actually produced the first Ph.D. program, but they were within a year or two of each other….

DIANIELL: I know there were reports with all the details…

DICKEY: We were considering them together to a considerable degree. Were in physiology in the medical school, which also involved some people in the department of biologic sciences, and the mathematics department Ph.D.

The latter was preceded by a move into master’s level work, which John Kemeny, who’d been in the department for some several years and had been given the opportunity to rebuild the department as men were retiring fairly rapidly… He, rather quickly after coming to Dartmouth, felt there was an opportunity and a need for the introduction of master’s degree work in mathematics. And we gave this particular question a good bit of thought. Don Morrison was living at the time. Don and I talked about it, I remember, quite often.

I remember one day in particular: We were standing together in front of the window looking out over the campus in my office, which was a favorite spot from which to ponder something that I wasn’t very clear about. I was standing there with Don Morrison, and we were about at the point where, as far as we were concerned, we were prepared to recommend to the board that we go with a master’s degree in mathematics. And I was pretty sure that this was not the end of the road if we did that. And I said to Don Morrison, “Do we know what Kemeny really has in mind here? Have we discussed this with him?” “Well,” Don says, “he assures me that this is what he wants, this master’s degree work.” And I said, “Well, I wonder how well he knows his mind and where this is likely to lead. Because if we’re not taking the decision that more or less automatically leads into Ph.D. work, I think we owe it to ourselves and to the board and indeed the long-range planning of the institution, to be fairly clear about that.” And I remember Don turned to me and smiled and said, “Well, I wish I knew the answer to that question.”

Well, as it turned out, of course, the master’s degree program was simply en route to a Ph.D. program. At the time the Ph.D. program was proposed, not entirely but very largely and certainly, I would guess primarily on the basis that it could have a distinctive purpose that would emphasize the teaching of mathematics.

DIANIELL: Yes, yes. I remember that.
DICKEY: And this made it more saleable to the board. It made it more palatable to those of us who wondered whether this was going to be the entering wedge for graduate programs generally. And I’m sure it was not a capricious suggestion that had no relevance to the realities because this was the period when the new math was blossoming, and John Kemeny had been very successful as a teacher of mathematics. Had, in the opinion of a number of colleagues, a primary commitment to teaching of mathematics as distinguished from advanced scholarship in mathematics.

Subsequent... This was just at the point when they were moving into the computer age, but before John had become primarily, I think it’s fair to say, or at least very heavily, committed to the computer as an educational vehicle. So that that program was an extension of the master’s degree, which had been aimed primarily at people who were going to look for opportunities in teaching. And they, of course, were—I say of course because this was the general assumption—they were encouraged to go elsewhere if they wanted to go on for a Ph.D. degree, which is the common practice in many institutions, as you know.

I think that one of the concerns that was present and voiced to us in the mathematics area was that they felt that with a master’s degree program they were not getting the best candidates. And that if they had a Ph.D. program, they would have a more attractive thing to offer students elsewhere who were applying to the Dartmouth program. So that there was a quality factor in it. There was a purpose in it. There was the fact that you had recruited a strong mathematics department that was made up mainly of newcomers, young people, and so forth. It was the, in many ways, natural place for this development from the master’s degree to the Ph.D. program. And the emphasis on teaching was a conviction that I know Kemeny held personally very strongly. I think it’s fair to say that this didn’t turn out to be as, well, as high a priority, didn’t have as much payoff—that is the concentration on the teaching purpose....

DANIELL: Never does.

DICKEY: Is that so?

DANIELL: Well, I think it’s impossible...

DICKEY: Well, in any event, this was edging off very decidedly during the later years in the program. But at the same time, the basic purpose of the
program was well served, so far as I know, by providing the opportunity for graduate student work for many of the faculty.

Over on the medical school side of things, as I’ve said, this was also particularly appropriate because we were re-founding the medical school during this period with people who were, as it turned out later, really only marginally interested in the medical school and much more interested in molecular biology, basic medical science; and who made common cause very readily with the science departments of the College, in particular biologic sciences, chemistry to some extent, and physics.

This program, which was conceived…. Well, one of the programs in the medical school fields was conceived originally as a disciplinary program in molecular biology—an interdisciplinary program in molecular biology—was, I think, as is true with too many interdisciplinary programs, it really didn’t have a strong sponsor who would stay with it. So that it became increasingly—these became increasingly programs that were oriented primarily at the department of biologic sciences or in the department of physiology in the medical school and so forth.

DANIELL: That again seems to me from experience to be almost inevitable.

DICKEY: Yes. I discovered that. [Laughter] Well, we took these programs in part out of an understanding of the total strategy of the institution. But I would have to say also we took them very importantly on an ad hoc basis. It would be wrong to say that we were from the outset committing ourselves to institution-wide graduate work, that we wanted to be a small, comprehensive university. And yet it would be wrong also to say that we went into this without a pretty careful examination of what were the implications—tried to know what the implications were—for the institution as a whole.

DANIELL: Yes. When you say we, are you talking primarily of you and Don Morrison?

DICKEY: Well, no, not primarily. Well, primarily about myself and Don. But we had a committee, an advisory committee, on this of the faculty. And we were in very close touch with people in the faculty who were deeply personally interested. These were primarily people in the physical sciences, particularly people who were related to the medical school basic medical sciences, people in chemistry, people in biology, people in physics to some extent but not to the same degree.
DANIELL: Yes. A couple of people on the tapes have—and I’m really using this to check what I think is their mistake here—but have said that their impression of the process was one in which Don was as much the initiator, was more the initiator rather than the recipient of initiations from the various departments in the College. That he had a very strong commitment to creating a kind of mini-university. And there are some people that disagreed with that. You were probably in a position to be closer to what Don’s own sentiments, sense of scale, in this from the beginning more than anyone else. That’s why I asked the question particularly about his vision or the degree to which his vision was imparted in policy.

DICKEY: This is a difficult thing for me to be too certain about. I was very close to Don, a good bit closer than probably many people realized. I had [Laughs] made the bet, as you know, on Don Morrison when I was absolutely alone in doing it. And when you’ve made a bet on a person and gone through the processes of decision and being willing to take your chances and so forth, why, you acquire not only a friendship, but you acquire a vested interest. So that I don’t think it would be accurate to say that I wasn’t as close to Don, quite aside from the fact that we were cheek-to-jowl in office space and that we got on…never had, as far as I recall, really not a fundamental disagreement or an important disagreement. We’d frequently talk things out. But I also was clear that Don saw this as being an issue that was inescapable as we developed the faculty.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And that I was probably more concerned to be sure that we didn’t get out ahead of where we were reasonably aiming to go than Don was. This is true in administration. I think if a president is familiar with where the institution has been, he is inevitably a little more cautious about ventures that may take you further than you really see clearly you ought to go. Now Don came into Dartmouth from a background that was not a liberal arts college background. He came from the university, and his graduate….

DANIELL: Which university was that, do you know?

DICKEY: West Virginia.

DANIELL: That’s…okay.
DICKEY: And his Princeton work had been at the graduate level. So that I think there would be an element of validity in what your other tape-making people may well recall.

DANIELL: [Laughs] We call them narrators.

DICKEY: What your other narrators would say. But saying that, I would still stop short, in my understanding of the matter, of characterizing Don as primarily the initiator. He was a receptive factor in these things. He wanted to see faculty reaching out. He wanted to encourage young faculty who had scholarship. He was positive in his attitude toward these things. As far as I was concerned, I was not negative. But I really wanted to see the whites of their eyes in respect to commitment.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I'll put something on the record here that...again, because it's not going to be used too quickly. One of the things that I was—questions that I pressed Don on, I said, “How firm is the commitment of some of these fellows that want these programs to Dartmouth?” We were in a time when the academic community is moving around and so forth. These programs were going to depend on leadership. You can’t give the leadership to programs of this sort from Parkhurst Hall. You can say go ahead. We'll try to help find the money and so forth. But the work in graduate study has got to be done by the faculty, and the faculty in this area required leadership. I said, “Are these fellows going to be with us to the point where we know these programs have been a success? Because if we get one of these things launched, and Kemeny decides he wants to go somewhere and somebody else wants to go somewhere else, and we don’t have someone to lead them, there have been some very sad experiences in the academic world, especially in the smaller places, where they found themselves with graduate students and unable to meet their obligation to the graduate students because they lost their key man in the field that the graduate student was working in. Sometimes the graduate student just had to transfer, as you and I know, in order to complete his Ph.D. program, to follow his professor.

DANIELL: Obviously a very important question. I mean you get into [inaudible] nature of the faculty.

DICKEY: Well, I pushed Don very hard on this. And indeed at one point had a conversation with John Kemeny on this.
And said, “I am not so foolish as to believe that we are entitled or are able to get an ironclad commitment. But I do want to go so far as to say that this is a very real factor in my ability to go to the trustees and to support these programs; namely, that I’m not dealing with somebody who doesn’t recognize that launching a program of this sort is a very different thing from engaging in graduate study at a university that’s been carrying it on and has a large staff of teachers to man these programs.” So that in that respect, in those respects, I would characterize myself as being a fairly cautious person who wanted to be shown as much proof as we could get concerning the stability of it if we launched into it. The quality of it, I had a perfectly…well, I won’t over-characterize it. But I had a very strong feeling that the one thing I didn’t want to do is to get into a second-rate graduate program.

Because this advertises your institution to everybody and much more so than undergraduate degree work. And I had a feeling that it was clear that we could be good, as good as at least I was aiming to be, or thought we could be, at the undergraduate level, given time and money. But I wasn’t readily or easily convinced that we could be comparably good in graduate work. So I was…. What?

I was going to say, all these arguments that the history department so eloquently put into a campaign, sounds like you were already articulating five or six years earlier.

Exactly. Well, I’m going to come to that, and I trust I’m not known for second-guessing and saying, I told you so. Although I suppose everyone one of us has a little bit of that in him. But my concern was that when we moved, we moved with commitment, we moved with strength, at least as much strength as we could believe we needed in order to launch these programs and to stay with them. And that we moved on an ad hoc basis and not with respect to the institution as a whole.

Well, this was an issue which was discussed and debated in the board of trustees. And there was a very great amount of reservation in the board on this issue. I think it’s fair to say that after the discussions on, oh, at least probably two times, maybe three, maybe as many as four times, but I
would guess two or three times they came up in the board, we were able to go forward with a unanimous board so far as I knew. I’m sure the degree of enthusiasm varied greatly within the board. But I do not now recall that we ever had a minority vote on it.

But we had very great misgivings. And they wanted assurances from me on these questions, as I wanted them from Don. And we wanted them from Kemeny, and we wanted them from the people in the medical school and so forth. And there was a very—during the first part of it—a very definite influence from the past where we were really departing from an emphasis on undergraduate education. And here I was at ease because I had made my peace completely with the proposition that to be as good as we wanted to be—

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: --we would need to have teacher-scholars and not just teachers. [phone ringing]

[End of Tape 33, Side B]  
[Beginning of Tape 34, Side A]

DANIELL: …saying basically—discussing the trustees’ misgivings or the trustees’ sense of wanting from you assurances that Dartmouth wasn’t going to get involved in something which…and then with the loss of the key individual, give them a program they didn’t really want to….

DICKEY: Right. Or which would not be first rate. And of course with the shrewdness that is present with most men of affairs that get onto a board of trustees, they asked the question down the road, so to speak, Is this just going spread to the whole faculty? And if it spreads to the whole faculty, are we going to have the resources to do it well? And these were serious, serious questions that I, in effect, helped them to ask. Because I’d been trying to ask myself such questions for some time.

Well, all I’m saying is that these decisions with respect to going forward in graduate work were ultimately accepted, I think, because they related to building the strength in the associated schools. They related to what I was able to convince the board I think related to building strength in the faculty. In other words, before they approved these programs finally, they were satisfied that these could be financed, that they would contribute strength, and that they would contribute strength to the essential Dartmouth
purpose of being a first-rate undergraduate liberal arts college, but with appropriate activities in professional and graduate education…in short, a selective, small university.

I should also mention that this came up, of course, in the, so to speak, re-founding of the engineering school. Because we moved there not only into some broadening of the master’s degree program, but we moved into two doctoral programs: a doctor of engineering program for the professional and a Ph.D. program for the man who did not expect to be a practicing engineer but was likely to go on in research. So that these programs were related to our re-founding or strengthening of the associated schools. We did not have the same pressure for them at that time in the Tuck School. Later, I think, several faculty at the Tuck School got restless about wanting them, and we had to talk this out. And we did not launch into Ph.D. programs at that point.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But this was not as necessary in the eyes of the people who were concerned with Tuck School at that point, as it was in respect to first the medical school and then engineering.

Well then, of course, we did have, as was anticipated, a, oh, I don’t know what you’d call it, a rash of departmental interest in graduate work. It came first in the physical sciences. I think there was general agreement among the faculty members who were in on the planning that mathematics was a good place to start, both because of the personnel, because of the nature of the subject and things of that sort. There was very great skepticism in the faculty, wisely I think, about launching into master’s level work, as to whether it would really prove anything other than taking on a responsibility that didn’t add up to anything very much from the point of view of assisting the scholarship.

DANIELLL: That they did accept. At the same time I can remember our department saying we were interested in master’s study, but a very different kind of master’s study which was of primary service to secondary schools.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].
DICKEY: I remember those programs. Well, I don't know which came next in the physical science departments, but in due course, and not very long after these other programs were established, we had programs authorized I believe in all the physical science departments. And the last one, and the only one so far as I know, well, I do know, during my years on the job, the only one that went into the social sciences was in psychology which it was also very closely related to experimental psychology.

DANIELL: That's where it stopped.

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: That's where it stopped.

DICKEY: That's where it stopped.

Now, I want to say that this took some stopping, which isn't probably as widely known as it should be—or as I'm willing to have it. I don't know whether you were at the faculty meeting where this subject was discussed very heatedly about extending it into the social sciences, primarily, rather than being focused—the discussion was not focused primarily on the humanities, but primarily on the social sciences. And the man who is on the faculty today in one of the strong social science departments got up and spread eagle—I'll never forget it—saying that if Dartmouth didn't extend graduate work into the social sciences, within eight years there wouldn't be a Dartmouth in the same terms that we were talking today; that the wave of the future was in the direction of graduate work.

It really was very all-out talk. I've never forgotten it. And this was supported by quite a few people. And I would have to say it revealed the fear of certain—these were not entirely new recruits; these were sort of middle-aged fellows that had come with us in the postwar period, in my period—that they were going to be left behind in some way. That they were going to be secondary citizens in the faculty if they didn't have graduate students. This is what it came down to. I had some very searching discussions with several of these people individually. And I remember....

DANIELL: I have a question here which is maybe...it's just for my own information more than that. Now, I am well aware of the eventual resolution of this in a faculty policy in which they said, okay, departmental autonomy in graduate programs, and in no case more than 10 percent as many graduate
students as undergraduate students. Are you talking about a faculty—the speech that you’re talking—do you remember whether it came up in that context of this concrete….

DICKEY: No, no. This came….

DANIELL: Much earlier then.

DICKEY: This was much earlier.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: This was the question of whether we were going into these other departments…

DANIELL: Okay. But, no, I wasn’t here then.

DICKEY: --graduate studies.

DANIELL: That was before I came here.

DICKEY: Well, I don’t mind identifying the department. I think I won’t identify the individual that I’m referring to because he wasn’t the only one, but this was the department of economics.

DANIELL: Oh, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Which was gung-ho.

DANIELL: Oh, yes. Still is.

DICKEY: Well, I didn’t know that. But I remember leaving….

DANIELL: I don’t know the person you’re talking about. The person who still is very vocal about it is [Meredith O.] Mug Clement.

DICKEY: This was not Clement.

DANIELL: It wasn’t Clement, okay.
DICKEY: But I know about Clement’s position. And there’s nothing secret about it other than I just don’t want to kick a faculty member’s name around over something that’s still under discussion or consideration.

But I can remember coming out either of that meeting or another meeting, because it wasn’t just one meeting that we had this issue discussed. And a man that I had a very high respect for walked out of the faculty meeting with me. We walked across Wheelock Street. He said, “I just want to ask you one question.” We knew each other by first name. He said, “Are you worried mainly about the money, or are you worried about more fundamental things?” And I said, “If it’s a question of which I am most concerned about, it’s more fundamental things. But I’m concerned about the money of course because that is a very fundamental thing.”

DANIELL: [Laughs] Somewhat.

DICKEY: But he said, “Well, that’s all I want to know. Because,” he said, “if that’s the case, I think you’re on pretty strong ground.” And I said I appreciated that and so forth.

Well, subsequently the money began to, of course, shape up as a pretty big factor. And then the market fell in behind [inaudible].

But by this time I had hardened. I want to say this. I was clear, from what faculty members were telling me as individuals and I was the recipient of a whole lot of testimony on this, that there was a good case for graduate work in the physical sciences. That the graduate student, if he was first rate, had something to contribute to a man working on a complicated laboratory experiment. But that more often than not, the people with whom I—well, I suppose there was a self-selection by the people whose opinions I respected—but in any event, many of the people that I respected, particularly in the humanities and to a considerable degree also in the social sciences, said what I said earlier: Look, let me be clear about this. If we’re going in for graduate students, I don’t want to have to do it. I’m interested in my own work. I’ve got my own research out ahead. I’d be glad to have a little bit more time to work on it. I’d sooner you spent that money, if you can allot it, on giving me a little more time to do my own work. I don’t need a graduate student. It would encumber my life, my professional life.

I began to hear this often enough from people in the humanities and the social sciences, whose work I knew was pretty darned good, that I didn’t
worry about whether we could recruit and hold our share. Not necessarily as many, but our share of the sort of people that we wanted. So as the money began to be a factor, we began to see how much these things cost as attempting to keep up our standards with respect to faculty compensation, which were just marginal in the kind of competition we were trying to maintain. And as I became aware that you paid a cost frequently in respect to undergraduate education even though I felt the cost was not as great as the benefit, my position hardened: that Dartmouth was probably going to be best served by not extending graduate studies into the humanities and the social sciences, at least at that time. If that was going to come, it should come later.

Well, later the market became a major factor in maintaining that position in the academic world generally, as we all know from places that....

DANIELL: Dartmouth came out smelling like a rose.

DICKEY: Smelling like a rose because others had to give up their graduate programs in many areas that they’d already.... So that’s about the story, as I recall it, except as you would like to develop it with questions.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Well, that basic framework...

I came in late in the process, about ’64 is when I came here. And I think probably the first 18 months that I was here, that was—it was the very tail end of this in which there was enough feeling in the faculty in agreement with what you’re saying, and certainly I was then and strongly am today, so that at the point at which the faculty finally took a formal stand on this, they came out by very much limiting the extent of graduate study and leaving it entirely up to the departments.

And I should add one thing just for the tapes here: At that point I think there was another mechanism for limiting it, too. In the faculty committee on graduate studies, which I was on I think my second year here; Frank Smallwood got me to sit on that after he resigned because he felt that because government wanted a program, and he was against it, that put him in an impossible position.

But another way in which this graduate committee sort of tempered the movement that you’ve been talking about was by basically turning down programs that were proposed. There was a proposal by government is the one I remember most vividly, in which it just came to us two or three times,
and we kept turning it down, saying you don’t have the gear basically to launch it, until finally that died. So that the instrument...

DICKEY: I remember that. My memory is not sharp, but I remember that.

DANIELL: And another ingredient in this was that about this time, two of the men in the history department, of unquestionable professional credentials—by far the strongest in the department were [Louis] Morton and Harry [N.] Scheiber—wrote an extensive report explaining the history department’s opposition to graduate study with a Ph.D. or an academic master’s, saying they support what later became master of liberal studies; and that served, at least it seemed to me at the time, as a focal point around which an awful lot of people who agreed with you in this coalesced and agreed. So that I came in really on the tail end of the process.

One question I do have, however, and it has to do with this. Now Don Morrison, of course, has died by now. And John Masland is the provost of the College. Was John disappointed with the resistance to across-the-board graduate study? Or basically what was his attitude toward the constraints that eventually were placed on this? I’m asking that to see whether fundamentally that may or may not have had something to do with his ultimate resignation.

DICKEY: Well, I’m really ashamed to say that I don’t recall sharply John’s position on these questions. I probably can refresh my memory.

DANIELL: Actually, if your memory isn’t very sharp, then probably it is not that important.

DICKEY: This is what I would guess, if it’s not that important. I don’t recall any critical discussions with John on this question such as I had with Don Morrison. We had gone through the exploration stage when John came in. I think our principles, our approach to the question was a good bit more tightly formulated by the time John came on the job.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: So that I think the discussions would have been more tightly focused on feasibility in respect to and the position of departmental members. I’m sure John must have had discussions, of course, with the government people and with others about these things. I just don’t remember that John and I had occasion to discuss at any length these questions. I believe John—
well, so far as I do recall, I believe John shared my views at the time he came on that if we could launch these programs step by step, case by case in the physical sciences, the division of the sciences, that was the thing to do at this stage. Not to get spread out all over the place.

In short I'm saying that I had no reason to believe that there was any strong disagreement with the position which I've been outlining to you on John’s part. And I think if there had been disagreement of a basic sort, I would remember it.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: The other thing to remember is that John, himself, had established himself as a scholar who could work on his own or in a team with Radway and then with Gene Lyons on the books that he produced. He was a very hardworking scholar, much more disciplined than most of us. He really budgeted his time and worked…. So that I don’t think Don would have—I’m just now reaching out ahead in interpretation, from what I knew of Don, I don’t think Don would have been….

DANIELL: John.

DICKEY: What?

DANIELL: John, John Masland.

DICKEY: John! I don’t think John Masland—I beg your pardon; I used Don carelessly – I don’t think he would have, from his own experience, have felt the need for graduate, Ph.D.-level work in order to do the recruiting that he wanted to do or to hold the people that he wanted to hold. Now I do know that he had discussions, because of their common interests to a considerable extent, with Lou Morton about this. That’s coming back now. And I think I’m recalling accurately in saying that Lou encouraged him not to yield on the extension of graduate work because they were quite close to each other. John had brought Lou here, and regarded Lou’s attitudes on things of this sort very highly. I think I can say with certainty that Lou exercised some influence on John’s attitude.

DANIELL: Yes. That’s a very important linkage that just hadn’t occurred to me, but that close personal relationship. Certainly Lou would never—I’ll put it this way—have engineered the report I referred to just a minute ago about what came out through the history department…and this hadn’t occurred
to me before. I’m sure he wouldn’t have done that unless he and John were in essential agreement, and that this was seen as an effective way to get a kind of counterweight to the economists and some other people probably in the government department who were...

DICKEY: I can’t swear to that. But I think this is a correct interpretation—

DANIELL: That makes sense.

DICKEY: --of what I did know.

DANIELL: Okay, the next question then, and I think I probably know the answer, but I think it would be useful to get it on the record: As you said, your position had hardened in the direction of seeing the limits to which you wanted to go.

DICKEY: Exactly. I have no doubt about that.

DANIELL: Was that greeted with a big sigh of relief in the board of trustees? In short, I’m trying to get at some way of getting the sense of importance the members of the board felt about this. And you said before…. 

DICKEY: Yes. Well, once again, I’m trying to refresh my memory. I remember the interest that John Wolfenden took in Myron Tribus’ desire to establish these two doctoral programs at Thayer. And as far as I recall, John Woodhouse was favorable to these things.

DANIELL: He’s talked about that.

DICKEY: And I do not recall offhand any discussion in the board beyond the fact that I reported to the board constantly my views as they developed on this subject. So that I would gather from the fact that I remember no dissent or any applause [laughter] that this was accepted as very satisfactory to them. Of course we were moving into ventures that we knew had big financial implications. The board’s view, I think it’s fair to say, was one of confidence that I was not going to just go gung-ho on this thing and then walk away from it. And this is something that perhaps should be said on a record of this sort: These questions came up during the time I had to make my mind up where I expected to spend my life.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: I have not gone into the various things that were put before me on the top of the mountain.

DANIELL: I have those down in a separate section.

DICKEY: But this was not irrelevant to what we’re talking about, the kind of questions we’re talking about. I decided that if we took some of these ventures, that I’d locked myself in insofar as any individual can lock himself in, and that I wasn’t just asking faculty members whether they felt that they could see something of this sort through. I had to ask myself. And we’re talking about a period when I think the board had reason—certainly the key members on the board—had reason to believe that if they liked what they’d seen, it was going to be around here insofar as a man could plan his future. And that...well, just that. So that I think that once again, by this time we were at a point where the board felt the boundaries had been drawn, at least as far as we could foresee. Now maybe something would come up that we hadn’t foreseen. We were during the late fifties preoccupied—well, not preoccupied—but we were giving a great deal of attention to what was going to be the future place of the Hopkins Center in the relationship to the humanities.

DANIELL: Next big question we get to, I think.

DICKEY: Oh, a tremendously big question. And we were engaged in the re-founding of the medical school and later in the medical school controversy, which slowed us down quite a bit about molecular biology, a subject which we began to discover what some of the realities were in regard to this kind of interdisciplinary program. My answer I guess is I think the board was entirely satisfied to have us hold the line. And probably you’re right in saying relieved to have us hold the line.

DANIELL: I’ve done enough interviews with trustees now, a half dozen or so, so that I’m struck with what, of course from a faculty person’s point of view, is a very important point in the College’s development is not to have done what Dartmouth did not do. And I think tremendously important. That’s a paramount decision made inevitably. It rarely comes up in the discussions of the trustees. They clearly are occupied and concerned with different kinds of things. And the one person who did bring it up is the one himself, John Woodhouse, who clearly would be more concerned about that because of his own academic background. So everything else from the trustees corroborates basically what you’ve said.
I don’t really have any more questions, I don’t think, about graduate study itself. There’s plenty of stuff on it from the faculty point of view. So why don’t I just turn this off a second.

[Pause]

DANIELL: As I said, after we turned it off last time, we thought it would be a good idea to turn to the Hopkins Center as the next major subject since it wasn’t just another building. The functional purposes, as I understand it, were much broader and more important purpose in your ideas about fundamentally how you wanted to guide the shaping of the life at the College.

DICKEY: That’s certainly true. Indeed I guess I would say that if it was not the prime single educational move I led during my years on the job, it was certainly one of two or three such initiatives.

To understand the significance of the Hopkins Center, one needs to go back a ways. When I came on the job in the fall of ’45, I was immediately made aware that the principal plant project on the agenda was the building of a large auditorium, along with a small so-called little theater.

This project had been on the agenda for a long period. When Warner Bentley came to Dartmouth back years before—I don’t know just when he came.

DANIELL: Nineteen twenty-nine or ‘eight.

DICKEY: Well, it was in the late twenties or middle—certainly late twenties.

DANIELL: I just finished indexing his tapes.

DICKEY: He was told, as he often said to me, that they would build a theater since his field was drama. And also since, to be very blunt about it, Dartmouth was not only lacking first-rate theater facilities; Dartmouth did not have a theater that was worthy of, as I had occasion to say before, a third-rate high school. Indeed, the only theater to speak of was the theater in Robinson Hall which really wasn’t a theater. And the only way they got enough room to move a few actors around on the stage was by building a pigeon coop out behind the building which was a poor makeshift.

DANIELL: That’s all there was when I was here as an undergraduate.
DICKEY: Yes. Well, one hardly needs to elaborate on the fact that any institution that presumes to be first rate in the teaching of the liberal arts and to have a vigorous program in the humanities stands in need of at least respectable theater. And it really should have a theater that is outstanding. The relationship between first-rate facilities and first-rate people in areas such as the theater and music and the fine arts is very very close. In the case of theater and music it's an indispensable relationship: first-rate facilities, first-rate facilities command….

[End of Tape 34, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 34, Side B]

DICKEY: …will be periods when that isn't so and there are also exceptions. Warner Bentley was such a notable exception himself. He came expecting to have a theater and was promised that there would be a theater. Then one thing after another, the Depression…

DANIELL: …killed the first plans, and World War II killed the second plans.

DICKEY: …and so forth, stepped in between. And Warner was sufficiently rooted and devoted to Dartmouth and had confidence that one of these days he would have a theater, that he stayed. I think it's fair to say that if Warner Bentley hadn’t stayed, it would have been an even longer time before we got a theater.

Well, the other need which had been talked about a great deal was this need for a large auditorium. Mr. Hopkins was quite convinced of its importance, and other people on the staff were similarly convinced: Sid Hayward, for example, was a strong supporter of a large auditorium. Webster Hall was, again, a very limited, very poor facility for large-scale musical and not a very satisfactory facility for lectures. We had a number of smaller lecture halls, but the feeling was that there was need for a large auditorium which would provide or at least permit large-scale musical and lecture affairs.

I remember that one of the first things that Mr. Hopkins spoke to me about sometime before I came on the job—I guess it was in October when Chris and I were here being introduced to people and meeting faculty at a reception…. In the course of that visit we had dinner with the Hopkinesses, and either Mr. Hopkins or Mrs. Hopkins brought up the auditorium-theater project, primarily by way of telling us that they had disagreed over its
location. Apparently there had been quite a bit of disagreement about it. The issue related to whether it should be located down back of the Thayer School, which was open territory at that time, where there would be ample parking. Or whether it should be up on the central campus where it would be more central to the life of the College, but where there would be parking problems and things of that sort. Mr. Hopkins had favored the—I believe, although I’m not entirely sure about this now—I think he favored having it on the central campus, and Mrs. Hopkins favored having it down below.

DANIELL: Yes. That’s been mentioned on a couple of the other tapes. And I think you’ve got that right, but I’m not absolutely certain.

DICKEY: In any event, the decision had been taken by the time I came, that the location would be on the central campus where the Hopkins Center is now. And the project was going forward with Mr. [Jens Frederick] Larson, who’d been the architect for Baker Library and a number of other buildings, having the job. I was not particularly personally interested in the project at that point. I had quite a few other priorities on my mind. And I had pretty well made up my mind that I was not going to get into large-scale building activities until I was clear about their place in the educational strategy of the institution. At the same time, it was clear, as far as I could see, that the decisions, all the decisions had been taken with respect to the project, what was going to be in it, where it was going to be, who was going to be the architect, and so forth. And I very quickly was informed in one of our early board meetings that the matter was a fully authorized project. And that all we had to do now was to raise some money for it.

Well, I had occasion within a matter of months certainly, several months I guess, to begin to become familiar with the project. And I would have to say that while I saw the case for a large auditorium, I was uneasy about it in a mild sort of way from the very first exposure. I have always had a strong feeling from my very early days that when you spent a lot of money on a facility, it really ought to be a facility that was going to be used as nearly as possible day and night.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: This goes back to, I suppose, to my boyhood and my father’s preoccupation with getting the fullest use out of things. And increasingly as I looked at this project, it look to me as if we were going to put an auditorium on a space that was a really critical space as far as central
campus was concerned. The large auditorium had almost no prospect of daily use and yet it was going to be a pretty expensive thing.

Well, these doubts were not sufficiently sharp to lead me to question the project at that point and this was both fortunate and unfortunate. Fortunate in the sense that if I had questioned the project and been unwilling to go forward with it, I probably would not have had the experience of finding out how little I understood about money raising. And even more importantly, I would not have had the need to think through, as I subsequently did in a very careful, continuing way, what were the prime physical plant needs of the College? What should be our educational strategy? If I had stopped that project, I don’t know what we would have done. But I was years away—years away—from really having a confident feel with respect to the educational strategies of the College in the years ahead. So that maybe it was just as well that I didn’t have that responsibility on my back at that point.

Well, we went forward, Larson developed plans.

DANIELL I was just going to say it would’ve been very difficult for a new president fundamentally to step in and shut off something that had been...

DICKEY: It would have been difficult, unquestionably. And one that I’m sure I would’ve been reluctant to have taken on just because of a consideration that you’ve mentioned, namely this was something that Mr. Hopkins and Warner Bentley and many others here had set their hearts on. And to have stopped it would’ve been—it would have been a very difficult thing to do. Indeed, I’m not entirely sure it would have been possible because the board was committed to it. I would’ve had to persuade the board. I would have been involved in persuading them against Mr. Hopkins’s judgment. As a new president, that would’ve been an uphill thing.

But however that may be, it is fair to say that I had my private doubts about whether this was something that I regarded—would come to regard—as a prime need. Although I did recognize that there was need for some kind of large auditorium, and certainly some need for theater facilities. Although even there I had not taken hold of the educational side of the matter in a tight way.

Well, we launched out into a money-raising campaign without adequate preparation. I wrote a brochure for the campaign. I’ve looked back over it in recent years, and it’s not a bad brochure. But we had not undertaken a
careful analysis of the alumni body in respect to its potential for giving large sums of money for a facility of this sort. There was no—very little—experience within the Dartmouth alumni body of that sort of giving. The Baker Library had come from a single large donor, not a Dartmouth alumnus, Baker. And most of the other buildings that were here had come about through other than a campaign directed—a capital gifts campaign—directed at the alumni.

These were things I didn’t understand, and I think it’s fair to say, nobody here understood. We simply felt that the auditorium project would be something that would carry its way. It was not called, I should say, at this point the Hopkins Center. That came much later. It was simply called the auditorium-theater project. And I can’t remember that we ever discussed what name it would bear, but maybe we did.

Well, as soon as we began to mount a campaign with [John W.] Jack Hubbell ['21], a very fine alumnus, heading it up, and we got the usual committee and exposed the project publicly, we discovered that there just was not the kind of money immediately available to us that we had hoped for. And the effort went very slowly. We had combined it with a project to build an addition or a new facility for physics. And that didn’t make much more progress either.

DANIELL: I just heard about that for the first time—I just finished an interview with Ford [H.] Whelden ['25]…

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: And he came on as a special assistant to Sid Hayward. In his first year that was his first assignment, to try to raise funds for that physics project. That didn’t work very well either.

DICKEY: Well, we got Gerard [B.] Swope ['29], a classmate of mine, who’d majored in physics and a man of substantial means, to serve as chairman of the effort. But with all the best intentions, I’m sure in the world, he was not an effective money-raising leader.

The campaign went very slowly. And as it went, we picked up a fair amount of criticism of it from people who were very anti-Larson. I think it’s fair to say anti-Larson, and I think in considerable degree, at least from my point of view, unfairly anti-Larson. I subsequently found that I could not support the auditorium project…and I’ll come to that in a minute. But I had
no doubt at all that he had done a good job. There are neo-Georgian buildings that he’d created, built here, during the twenties and early thirties in the main. And the Baker Library was a very great addition to the College, even though it had its limitations as a facsimile copy almost of Independence Hall in Philadelphia.

DANIELL: Was he down at Wake Forest by this time? Or had he…?

DICKEY: I don’t think he was there yet. But shortly thereafter he was down there. Well, it began to come out when we exposed the project publicly and undertook a campaign, that there were a substantial number—not in the hundreds, but in the dozens at least—who felt that Larson’s day at Hanover was over as far as they were concerned. That he’d done it, and to go on repeating his neo-Georgian was a great mistake.

This was unrelated to the concept of the project. Indeed, the concept of the project had received very little analytical attention, so far as I could make out, in faculty circles or in the alumni body or elsewhere. It was just assumed from the early exposure of building the theater back in the thirties, when there’d been a good bit of publicity about it, that this would be something that was going to be done, and that was that. I don’t remember now the exact sequence of events. But the campaign went slowly…or really not at all in any significant way. And when we approached the—I believe it was the Korean crisis, I’m not sure….

DANIELL: The timing’s just about right for that.

DICKEY: Just about then we decided that…. Well, before we decided to call the campaign off, I guess, I think we decided that we just weren’t going to go forward with this project as it was. Now, whether we called the campaign off first and then made that decision or whether it was the other way, I can’t remember accurately now. But they were very closely related.

DANIELL: Yes. I know on a couple of the tapes individuals linked this with the coming of the Korean War, with not knowing what the consequences of that were going to be, with the recent experiences of World War II. I recall now one of the tapes saying at least that he was under the impression that this was a device which….

DICKEY: Well, I remember the decision to postpone or give up the campaign. And more especially I remember reaching a judgment myself that this was really not something that I had my heart in. And the question of the
architecture bothered me…not because it was not new because I was not myself an addict of either the Georgian or the modern—indeed I like the Georgian very much—but I became increasingly clear that the Georgian placed a great limitation on what we could do inside the building.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: At the same time, people such as Lewis Mumford, who was living here in Hanover at the time and a very outstanding critic of architecture, once came to me in the president’s office and said that he was unable to make any financial contribution to Dartmouth, but he would like to make a professional contribution by saying that this project for a large auditorium-theater building in the style that was projected was going to—he used some strong language—going to be a catastrophe or something of that sort. Which was not decisive with me because while I admired Mumford’s intellectual qualities, I still was very mindful of the fact that there were many other considerations that fell on my job I had to take into account before I undertook to cancel out the project.

The decisive thing with me was that I lost confidence that the project could be done in the Georgian that Larson was committed to…and there was no question about that; it was either Georgian or not Larson. And I did not reach this judgment without something to go on. Because I took the whole thing up with Larson at one point and said I just feel it would be a mistake to build a brick wall—this was really what it was—a brick fortress wall facing out on the central campus. I said, “I feel we’ve got to let the campus—draw the campus—into that building in some way, an outlook, a lobby.

Well, he did his best as far as I’m concerned to try to accommodate my feelings. And I think he wasn’t very clear about what I was unhappy about. And he was not able to show me anything very imaginative in the way of alternatives. He did try putting up a small windowpane front in the building, which was some improvement. But basically Georgian was simply incompatible with opening up the structure, and the large auditorium which was going to dominate the whole thing was also incompatible with very much multiple use, which I’d begun to feel was necessary.

So we washed it out. I think we paid Larson. The trustees felt that if we were going to cancel the project, we had to pay very substantially for the plans, which they had authorized earlier. I forget what it was. But I believe it was something in the vicinity of $75,000. Something in that range.
DANIELL: Somebody else said 50,000 to 100,000.

DICKEY: Well, I’d say it was something like that. And once we got out from under this obligation to Larson, I just took a very quiet decision that I didn’t share with anybody that we were going to take a very critical look—or I was going to take a very critical look—at what was really the priority needs of the campus in respect to program, educational program, the basic activities of the College community, and the facilities necessary to those needs. I had had a committee working on the earlier project. Cotty Larmon had been chairman of it; there were a number of other people that served on it. I’ve always felt badly about Cotty’s disappointment in the original project because I’d gotten him into it. I think he went into it largely because of his loyalty and close relationship with Mr. Hopkins. But when we had to call it off, I think he felt, very understandably—let down. But once we had called things off, I decided that this was sufficiently central to my interest in the future educational development of the College and the community, that I was going to get into it myself and chair a committee, planning committee, and work at it.

DANIELL: You chaired the planning committee? I didn’t know that.

DICKEY: Yes. I don’t know whether we had other planning committees. But I guessed maybe I should chair what we called the building committee.

DANIELL: Yes. There were a lot of subcommittees, I know.

DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: But in any event, I remember day after day and night after night sitting at the head of the table with a lot of conflicting, [Laughter] undigested views being put out for consideration.

The first thing was to, as far as I was concerned, was to be sure that I had what one might call inner conviction about what the priorities were. I felt that we had begun to know what we wanted to do with the faculty on the recruiting side. Don Morrison was shaping up nicely, and that was going well. I had established a good relationship with Warner Bentley, gotten to know Paul Sample pretty well. We’d begun to make a few moves in music after having to take that department apart because of personality
difficulties in the very early years. And I undertook to gather personal opinions myself, here and elsewhere, and to visit quite a few theaters and other centers of this sort.

DANIELL: Did you ever go out with Warner Bentley to look at those together? Or was his visiting these things separate from yours? Or don’t you remember?

DICKEY: Oh, I think his was separate. I don’t recall that we ever went together. I usually did it in connection with an alumni speaking trip. I’d be out and go...oh, I went into the art center in Milwaukee, in Minneapolis, in San Francisco, in at least, I suppose, a half a dozen other places, other campuses, other cities. And the more I worked at it, the clearer I became that we just couldn’t afford to commit ourselves to a large auditorium. That the auditorium—we needed an auditorium—but the immediate need.... And someday I could see that maybe there was going to be need for a 2,000, 3,000-seat auditorium, and we would go for it. But we were right up against just scandalously inadequate facilities for music, for the fine arts work, and the theater, as I’ve said. We were tearing down the old Thayer School building, Bissell Hall, with the workshop in there which had been a very highly-valued facility by a substantial number of faculty and students.

DANIELL: It used to be the old gym, didn’t it?

DICKEY: The old gym originally. And there were just a multitude of these things.

Well, one of the first—as we took an inventory of these various needs or desires that were being registered—one of the first large questions was were we going to build something in the nature of a student center? And there was quite a bit of sentiment for this sort of thing, as there always is on every campus. It’s the easiest kind of unimaginative project to plan. I found everywhere I went around student unions were—the world seemed to me to be awash with student unions with billiards and bowling alleys and snack bars and so forth. I had no objection to them at all. But I just simply could not bring them, that type of facility, within my sense of priorities at Dartmouth at that point. But other people thought differently.

And then there was a more serious—I’m not sure that’s the right word—but a more educationally related project to bring a bookstore to—mount a college bookstore. There was a good bit of dissatisfaction at that time with the old bookstore, that it was not really keeping up with the faculty and things like that. So there was a good bit of sentiment for putting a
bookstore into the center. And quite a few student unions around the country, as you may know, have bookstores in them.

Well, we talked and argued about these things…as I look back, it sometimes seems as if it was endlessly. And there was one person working with us who made a key….

[End of Tape 34, Side B]