John Sloan Dickey '29

President Emeritus of Dartmouth College

An Interview Conducted by

Jere Daniell

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Dartmouth College

Hanover, New Hampshire
[Beginning of Tape 12, Side A]

DANIELL: ….President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey, held in his office in Baker Library on Wednesday, December 17, 1975.

DICKEY: …’44–’45 very far, it would probably be important to say a few things about that. I'm not sure whether I spoke about Stettinius coming in as....

DANIELL: Yes, that was the focus of....

DICKEY: ….the undersecretary. But he came in as undersecretary and then...

DANIELL: You mentioned that he was not the kind of person who was as easy for you to get along with because, I believe you said....

DICKEY: Well, I had no difficulties at all in getting along with Stettinius. No, I got along well with him. And perhaps should say a word about that. Are we on....?

DANIELL: Yes, we are. I just turned it on.

DICKEY: Fine. Well, I believe I did say that there had been a long-standing bad relationship between the secretary, Mr. Hull, and the undersecretary, Sumner Wells.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: This came to a head in mid-'44, as I recall. Wells was forced out and the White House appointed Stettinius to take over as undersecretary of state. I’ve always understood, and I think correctly, that Harry Hopkins handled this. And that the objective was to bring the State Department up to a more modern organization that would be more responsive to what the White House wanted done there.

Then came the election, of course, of '44. We all were familiar with the fact that Mr. Hull had not been well during that period, and that Mr. Stettinius was the acting secretary for a long stretch of time. But very shortly after the election, it was announced that Mr. Hull’s health would require him to resign and that Mr. Stettinius would become secretary of state.

I had been heading up, as a special consultant, I think the title was, to the secretary, the postwar planning work in respect to drawing in the support of American private organizations and keeping them informed with respect
to what was going on. And we did discuss Dumbarton Oaks Conference in that respect. Shortly after Mr. Stettinius became secretary and brought on his team of top people, he moved Mr. Acheson over from assistant secretary in charge of economic affairs, where I had reported to him as chief of the Division of World Trade Intelligence during the war....

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: ...to be assistant secretary in charge of congressional relations. And he also appointed Archibald MacLeish, who had been librarian of Congress, to be the assistant secretary in charge of cultural affairs and other information activities in the department. As I believe I said earlier, I had been the top career person on that side of things. I had been assisting Assistant Secretary of State Bill Benton, who’d had charge of this area prior to his leaving the department. So that when MacLeish came in, I worked very closely with him and worked very closely also with Mr. Acheson because his work with the Hill, of course, tied in very closely to the work we were doing with private organizations...

DANIELL: I don’t think you discussed this in particular last time...

DICKEY: ...on postwar planning.

DANIELL: ...the relationship with MacLeish and others. So this is fresh.

DICKEY: Well, it was a very important development in my life. Both of these men were exceedingly attractive individuals as far as I was concerned. I had already developed a close, I guess it’s fair to say, well, very close relationship with Mr. Acheson. But I had not known Mr. MacLeish except as an important literary figure and as librarian of Congress.

One of the more interesting happenings in this respect was that the day, I believe it was, that the newspapers announced MacLeish’s appointment, Mr. Acheson called me up and asked if I would be free to have luncheon with him. Well, of course, I was free to have luncheon with him and pleased to be asked.

I remember he took me over to his club, the Metropolitan Club, in Washington. We had established a very easy relationship so there was nothing stiff or formal about it. And we sat down to luncheon, and he said, “I suppose you wonder what’s on my mind, so let’s get right down to it.” He said, “You, of course, learned that Archibald MacLeish is coming in to be assistant secretary of state in the area that you’ve been handling.” And I said, yes, I had. And he said, “Well, what you probably don’t know is that
he has long been my closest friend.” And he said, “When I say closest friend, I don’t speak perfunctorily.” He said, “We have been intimate friends for a long time, ever since college.” (They both were at Yale.) And he said, “This is for me a terribly worrisome development.”

Well, I wondered what in the world was coming, you know. And he said, “It’s worrisome….” I’m not sure that he used the word worrisome, but this was what he was saying. He said, “The concern I have is that our relationship is a very close personal one, and yet I am terribly afraid that he will find the State Department a very, very uncongenial, difficult situation, totally different from the Library of Congress where, as librarian, he had the say about the policies to be followed. And he said, “As you know, having been around here quite a while, the State Department is a place where there’s an awful lot of internal maneuvering. And also it’s a place that has got to be and will be basically a conservative operation.”

Well, he said, “Archie MacLeish is, needless to say, one of the ablest men of our time. He’s imaginative, he’s got a nature that requires him to move quickly on things.” And he said, “I just worry about the possibility that he would have an extremely bad passage as an assistant secretary of state here in the department. And that I would just not be in a position really to help him.” So he said, “I’m going to ask you to do that.”

**DANIELL:** To do that, to help him?

**DICKEY:** To help him.

**DANIELL:** Okay.

**DICKEY:** Well, I listened to all this in what I suppose was sort of open-eyed wonder that Mr. Acheson should be coming to me to help him help his friend Archibald MacLeish. [Laughter]

**DANIELL:** He didn’t give any, in the course of that, any explanation of why—or whether he had tried to not have MacLeish appointed?

**DICKEY:** No, he did not. And I got the impression that this was something he wouldn’t have felt free to do. If MacLeish had asked him, he would’ve been candid and straightforward about the nature of the department. But he had a fastidious sense of how far you could go in intervening in other people’s affairs.

**DANIELL:** What was the nature of his relationship to Stettinius?
DICKEY: His relationship to Stettinius was, shall we say, a proper one, but not an intimate one. And certainly not one in which he would ever have said anything that would have hurt MacLeish.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: So that he was not in a position to say to Stettinius, this is a wonderful fellow, but this is not his forte. I would be just one hundred percent certain he wouldn’t have done that. And I'm not informed—or I was not informed and I am not now informed—as to what, if anything, he said to MacLeish. I would think it highly probable that MacLeish did come to him. And if he came to him and asked him, I think the chances are Acheson would have said, "Well, this is not an easy place. And I hope you will go in with your eyes open." You know, things like that. But I don’t think he would’ve said, "You mustn’t do it."

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Nevertheless, there was no question about the fact that he talked with me this way because he was very much concerned.

So he said, “All I can do is just tell you that if there’s anything you can do to help him here and keep him from being ground up by some of the internal difficulties of this place, I would very much appreciate it.”

Well, I, of course, have never forgotten that. It was a rather large happening in my life. I had a very good relationship with Mr. MacLeish in the department. He inevitably had a larger share of frustration than he might have had in one sense—than he might have had in another setup. But in another sense he was in there at just the right time to take hold of the evangelical function that the department had to try to play with the American public about the postwar plans and particularly the proposed United Nations.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: So that the secretary looked to him to carry out a different kind of role than normally that assistant secretary would be carrying out. And in this way he had more leeway than he would have had otherwise.

DANIELL: And that blended nicely with your position in the department.

DICKEY: That’s right, that’s right. And we worked, I think I can say, very closely and well together. There was one occasion when he said to me, somewhat
sharply, “You can think up more reasons for not doing something than I can think up reasons for doing it.” [Laughter] And I was quite aware that I had probably transgressed, as far as he was concerned, in being more cautious, more negative about something than was in order. But it was not a…. The relationship was a very warm one and has continued a very warm one. Indeed, we fell on each other’s necks just two weeks ago down there in a Boston hotel as if we had been parted for a lifetime.

Well, this was a big task in ’44, from late ’44 on through to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in the spring of ’45. And MacLeish stayed with the department until the summer of ’45, when Byrnes came in to succeed Stettinius as secretary, at which point MacLeish tendered his resignation and it was accepted and that was that.

Now I’ve made one mistake here I’m now conscious of in respect to the timing because I think I mentioned that—or said—that Bill Benton had been in ahead of MacLeish. That would be wrong if I did say that. I misspoke myself. Benton came in to succeed MacLeish…

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: …in the—well, the late summer of ’45, just as I was leaving the department. As a matter of fact, it’s quite an interesting little story in that connection which I can mention to you. From ’44—well, from the early… During the year, ’44–’45, I took on an academic responsibility outside of the department as a member of the first faculty of the School of Advanced International Studies, which was established under the leadership of, or under the sponsorship really, of Chris [Christian] Herter, who was in the Congress at that time, and very much established in establishing this graduate-level school in foreign affairs.

He came to me at just about the same time, curiously enough, that the president of Tufts, whose name is escaping me at the moment, subsequently went with the Carnegie Endowment—or with the National Geographic Magazine as a top officer of the Geographic. His name will come to me. But the president of Tufts had come to me and asked whether I would be available to be a dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. And these two things came right together. I didn’t realize at the time why they came together. But very quickly I knew; namely, the man who had been dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy had been lured away to be the new dean or the first dean of the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

DANIELL: I see. This is a man whom you had known before?
DICKEY: No, I had not known him before. I wasn’t involved to that extent. But I had by this time, however, committed myself to Chris Herter as being available to do moonlighting, if you will, as a member of the faculty of the new school when it was established, which was going to be that coming fall; it was going to have its first opening.

DANIELL: This would have been the fall of ’45.

DICKEY: Fall of ’44.

DANIELL: Fall of ’44. I see we’re back a year.

DICKEY: Yes. These conversations about my being available took place, I would guess, in the spring of ’44 or summer of ’44.

Well, I’ve mentioned that it was one of these somewhat complicated situations, as it subsequently turned out, because the dean had taken with him a considerable portion of the Fletcher School Library, which he claimed was his personal property. And this had resulted in some, as you can imagine, controversy between at least old Fletcher School people and the people down in the School of Advanced International Studies. That was ironed out. I was never involved in that. But I did agree with Mr. Herter to go to the school and they asked me to teach a course in the formulation of American foreign policies, and I worked to develop a course dealing with, as I described it, the institutional factors in the formulation of American foreign policies. That is, the State Department is an institution, the Presidency is an institution, the other departments are...

DANIELL: Yes. I was going to ask why they selected you? I mean, there’s a lot of people in your level—at the level you are in the State Department. Here you have two academic jobs coming, and this is before you’ve been approached for the Dartmouth job. Have you any insight into what you had done, or the nature of your reputation or visibility?

DICKEY: Well, my visibility was probably in part related to the fact that I had been heading up the relationships of the department with these private organizations, and this had involved a good bit of work with educational people.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I had also had charge of the cultural relations work abroad, and this had resulted in my being in touch with quite a few top academic people: Walter
Leland, the head of the American Council of Learned Societies, who was a very influential person in the university world of the country at that time. And I had done a little writing of reviews and a good bit of speaking around on foreign affairs.

Then my previous work, of course, in the department in handling the legal and, if you will, political public relations aspects of the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act over a 12-year period, from ’34 on, or ten, 11 year period, probably was a factor in my visibility.

I had known Chris Herter—and I think this is perhaps a better way to get at it. I had known Chris Herter clear back to the days when I’d been in the Department of Corrections in Massachusetts, and he’d been speaker of the house in the Massachusetts legislature. I’d forgotten that. I didn’t know him well then, but I’d dealt with him when I was an assistant to Sayre and Sayre was commissioner of corrections in Massachusetts.

DANIELL: Right, right. Those long linkages have a way of planting seeds.

DICKEY: And then of course when he came down as a representative, he was very anxious to get onto the Ways and Means Committee in order to have a part in the international commercial policy work. And I had occasion to meet him and see something of him during that period, which was at just about this time that he was interested in setting up the School of Advanced International Studies.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I suppose if I put my mind to it, I could answer your question a little more fully, but that’s all of these factors which I’ve mentioned were unquestionably in the picture.

DANIELL: Yes. That, of course, is of even greater importance later on when we get to your coming to Dartmouth because it isn’t just somebody down in the State Department. It’s clearly somebody in the State Department who’s had hands in and been involved with education for enough time so that….

DICKEY: Well, in any event, this was an important move that I made to take on this additional job and I did go to work to develop this course. The concept of the course, as I developed it, was… capitalized on my experience in the department working with people on the Hill and others in the formulation of American foreign policies. It also led to my subsequently doing some serious writing on the treaty power and things of that sort.
Well, I took the course in hand. It was the first time the course was offered because this is the first time the school was opened. I had a class of, oh, about 30 to 40 people, all at the master’s degree level. Some of them were going for the Ph.D. Others were in the course simply for the one year.

I had a very strenuous experience. I would meet with the class at eight o’clock in the morning for an hour and then rush down to the department. Or I would meet with them at night, one or the other. And it kept me going to put the course together, do the reading, and do the class work, and still….

DANIELL: Five days a week?
DICKEY: And keep up my State Department end. I don’t remember how many days a week it was. But it was quite demanding.

DANIELL: Boy, I’ll say! When I teach a new course for the first time, I arrange to have no other obligations for at least teaching during that time, it’s so demanding.

DICKEY: Well, it was a close thing. But it went well. So much so that… I’m at the point now where I’ve got to talk about a good many things that involve me personally and sounds a little too preoccupied with myself. But I had one of the nicest experiences that a teacher can have. I’m sure you would agree.

In the summer of ’45 one of the students who’d been in the course with me during the previous year, and the course was over, sent word that the group would like to have me as their guest at luncheon one day. Oh, I guess it was along in August. Well, it had to be along in August of ’45. And I went to have luncheon with them, and they said, after a bit of small talk, one of them obviously had been designated as the spokesman, and he said, “We’ve come to ask you whether you would be willing to teach another course, we don’t care what the course would be [Laughter] at the school this year. We would very much appreciate it if you would, and we’ve already gone to the school authorities, and they’ve authorized us to approach you.” Well, of course, that warmed my heart. But at that point I knew that I was going to Dartmouth.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: There’d been no announcement of it. And I said, “Well, I’ve just got to tell you that something has come up that you’ll understand or know about very
Shortly. And you'll understand when you do know about it why I can't do this." But that was a good experience that I had that year in all ways.

Well, the year, however, was mainly devoted to working with MacLeish and others in getting the United Nations launched. The spring of '45 was especially traumatic because the Yalta Conference came along. Roosevelt sent word from Yalta that he and Churchill had decided that this conference should be held in the spring of '45. And that they wanted it held in San Francisco. And would the department please begin to make the necessary arrangements. This involved me and one of the—as I look back on it more amusing although at the time it seemed nightmarish — events of my State Department career.

I remember very vividly getting word that the acting secretary wanted me to come right up to his office. This was Joe Grew, the American ambassador to Japan, who’d come back to be undersecretary under Stettinius. And I’d had a nice but not a close relationship Mr. Grew. And when I came up to his office, he was acting secretary, he handed me this telegram to read. It was a long telegram. But the gist of it was immediately quite apparent, to the effect that, from the secretary, that he was to immediately set things in motion for a conference, the United Nations conference, in San Francisco in the spring of '45. And he said, “I don’t quite know where to begin with this thing, but another assistant secretary named Holmes, Julius Holmes, had worked with me and gotten me to handle some problems that he had with the Japanese who had been interned in the country. People that had come in on, I think, on the Grisholm at one point. And they were interned up near Greensburg, Pennsylvania.

DANIELL: That’s right. There was a camp there.

DICKEY: And the community, for some reason or other, had been very much up in arms about it. Felt for some reason that it was dangerous or at least it was bad for the reputation of Greensburg to have these Japanese interned there. This had been a somewhat earlier thing and Julius Holmes, who was the assistant secretary in charge of administration [inaudible], had gotten me in to see what we could do about it. I had in turn gotten...

[End of Tape 12, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 12, Side B]

DANIELL: OK, we're on again.
DICKEY: I mention the Greensburg Japanese incident not because it was of any consequence itself but it did lead to other things. Assistant Secretary Holmes having asked me to help him out in handling it, he didn’t know where else to turn in the department, and we were just sort of a basket for problems that no one else had any sense of responsibility for.

I got Jack Purefoy as executive officer in my office, which was at that point the Office of Public Affairs, to go up to Greensburg. He handled the problem up there very, very well and it was quickly settled. This pleased Assistant Secretary Holmes and when the directive came from the secretary of state to the acting secretary to get things going out in San Francisco, Holmes said, “Well, why don’t you get John Dickey’s office to handle it?” [Laughter]

Well, this was the way, I guess, Mr. Grew happened to send for me. And in turn, I went back down to my office wondering where in the world I took hold of this thing, and decided, well, if Purefoy could handle the Japanese and the citizens of Greensburg, why couldn’t he take on this one? [Laughter] I hadn’t the remotest notion of what was involved, and I don’t think really anybody else did. So I called in Jack and he was pleased to be asked. And he said, “Sure, I’ll take it on.” He never lacked for confidence. He’s a fellow who’d had a West Point education and a request from a superior was an order as far as he was concerned.

DANIELL: How old a person was he?

DICKEY: Well, he was younger than I was. I suppose he probably was in his early thirties.

DANIELL: Ah, he was [inaudible].

DICKEY: Maybe mid-thirties. No, early thirties would've been about right. Actually he’d had an interesting background. His father had been a law partner of Jimmy Byrnes, so that this gave him a leg up around Washington, things like that. And he’d been with the Board of Economic Warfare and not had a happy time there during the war. I forget how he came to me. But in any event, he and I hit it off very well, and he was an invaluable man to me and had a real instinct for being an operator and enjoyed it, in a way that I didn’t.

Well, we did a little bit of preparatory scouting around the department to get the views of people there as to what was involved and what we ought to try to do out in San Francisco. We sent Jack out with a covering introductory cable from the acting secretary, as I recall, to Roger Lapham,
who was the mayor of San Francisco at that time, a great, big, burly, looked like a teddy bear sort of man—fellow. Quite a remarkable man. Had a good head on him, a lot of common sense, and a good capacity for the initiative.

Jack went out and formed just a wonderful relationship with Roger Lapham. Indeed, the success of Purefoy’s mission out there was directly dependent upon a good relationship with the mayor.

DANIELL: You'd think the mayor who had the chance to promote San Francisco....

DICKEY: Oh, it was that. But it also involved, as the full dimensions of this project began to unfold, that it involved the most complicated, incredibly baffling problems, all the way from requiring people to move out of all the major hotels in San Francisco in order to house the delegations, to taking on the wrath of William Randolph Hearst when we forced the eviction of his mistress, Marian Davies, from the penthouse of the....

DANIELL: Read about that somewhere.

DICKEY: ...hotel there, the.... Oh, my memory’s failing me here. Right at the top of the hill where the American delegation was and my office was. We were told that if we pushed Miss Davies out of that penthouse in order that the secretary of state might occupy it, that we would wreck the conference, that Mr. Hearst would see to it that the United Nations was given a hard time. But with the help of the mayor and Jack Purefoy’s skill, this was accomplished.

The logistical problem involved in getting food into San Francisco.... See, the war was still going on, and rationing was going on, and it involved getting food that would be satisfactory to a huge international conference that would be adequate. That would be more than adequate; that it would be satisfactory because you had a lot of pretty critical people to feed. We had to arrange for office space, taking over the Opera House for the conference, the plenary sessions. And then all the supplies and everything.

Well, this became a major thing during the spring, and we were also working on the development of a motion picture which was subsequently called *Watchtower Over Tomorrow*, which Mr. Stettinius wanted Hollywood—and arranged to have Hollywood—produce. Sort of a fictitious kind of documentary of how the United Nations would work to keep the peace. A perfectly horrible piece of simplistic propaganda which my office was responsible for. The deputy in the office, Francis Russell, who
subsequently became a foreign service officer, now retired, he went out to Hollywood to be our liaison man with them. At one point Alfred Hitchcock—I think that’s the right name—who was a very well-known Hollywood director….

DANIELL: Sure. Alfred Hitchcock is a classic of the mystery movies.

DICKEY: Yes. A rather short, very heavy-set man.

DANIELL: Right. Uh huh.

DICKEY: [Laughter] He and several other prominent Hollywood producers came to the State Department, and I spent a day trying to introduce them to what we wanted done. Well, they hadn’t the remotest notion of what the United Nations was supposed to be or do. It was an Alice in Wonderland day if ever I’ve had one. And then Hitchcock said, “Well, I’ll go off and do something.” What he did was, along with another producer whose name escapes me but who was the principal producer as the film was finally done, they produced this melodramatic thing called *Watchtower Over Tomorrow*.

I hope that this film exists somewhere just for purposes of showing to what lengths we went in an effort to reach the American public. It was shown, I believe, in almost every motion picture house in the country. Mr. Stettinius was a great believer in reaching the American public at all levels, and he had the access to Hollywood and this sort of thing.

DANIELL: I sort of think of it because I really think that I remember seeing this.

DICKEY: Well, if you were going to the motion pictures during that period, I think you could not have escaped seeing it.

DANIELL: Yes, because I was working as a delivery boy for Handbills for the opera house in Millinocket, Maine, of all places, at that time. And my pay was getting into movies free. So I saw every movie that came. And this just strikes a faint bell. When you mention the title…

DICKEY: Well, I mention it both because of its historic significance in its own right, but also to indicate the varied life I was leading that spring, teaching, working with various private organizations, being responsible for this film—although Francis Russell took on the primary, immediate responsibility for it—working with Purefoy and getting the first stages of the conference organization set up. Of course it subsequently had a life of its own with its own organization and all of that.
One of the funniest evenings of my life, which was almost frenetic in its fun, occurred during this period. When the Yalta Conference was over, Secretary Stettinius came back by way of Mexico City where he was going to meet with the Latin American people. I believe it was at the Chulapec Conference there in the spring of ’45. And he wanted us to—Stettinius sent word—that he wanted us to set up a national radio hookup in which he could make a preliminary report to the American public on behalf of the president—he wasn’t scooping the president, of course—and the American delegation of developments at Yalta and also something from Mexico City. I think that was the Chulapec Conference.

So this was the kind of assignment that came to our office. And I enlisted the help of Mr. Acheson, who was the assistant secretary for congressional relations, and of my chief, Mr. MacLeish, to participate in the conference. And we planned a radio hookup, national radio hookup, that would tie into Mexico City where we would pick up the secretary of state as the principal spokesman on the program.

Well, Acheson and MacLeish and myself and a number of other departmental people were down at the studios in Washington after, of course, a pretty hectic several days trying to get the thing set up and worked out. And we were in touch by telephone with Mexico City that the secretary was in the studio and so on and so forth. And there were difficult problems of timing I don’t recall in detail now, but in any event, there was a critical question as to when the secretary was coming on. And lo and behold, we had a dialog going on between Acheson and MacLeish, when suddenly over the loudspeaker came the voice of Stettinius saying, “Well, are we on the air or aren’t we? What’s going on with the ….?” [Laughter]

DANIELL: This went over the public…?

DICKEY: … Right out over the whole national network. So we shut off our microphones, and over the telephone told Mr. Stettinius to go ahead in Mexico City. Well, he didn’t get the word very clearly, and so he thought he was talking to us still, when he was talking to the nation. [Laughter] And I really sweat blood. And Acheson and MacLeish began to laugh. Neither of them had, I think, one has to say, any great respect for Mr. Stettinius as a foreign affairs expert.

DANIELL: His background was….?

DICKEY: His background was just very different from theirs. And both of these men were top-drawer intellectuals, and I don’t think anybody would ever accuse
Mr. Stettinius of being that. He was a very energetic, likable fellow. But these two fellows, including myself, just couldn’t help seeing what a ridiculous mix-up we had created. Well, we finally got it over with.

DANIELL: Did he say anything indiscreet over the radio?

DICKEY: No, just, “What are those fellows…? What are they doing? Why don’t they get going? What’s the matter with them?” And you know things like that. No obscene or…. He was a very carefully-spoken person in that respect, and I don’t recall he used profanity.

DANIELL: That was the era in which there’s a whole classic list of stories of booboos going on on the radio….

DICKEY: Yes, yes, yes.

DANIEL: Stories about….

DICKEY: At least if he did, if anybody was indiscreet in that respect, I don’t remember it. But all I remember was it was just a mishmash of people thinking they weren’t on the air and talking about it and so on. It’s just the sort of thing that would just infuriate Stettinius who didn’t like to be made a monkey of in public. And I guess most of us don’t.

[Laughter] In any event, when we got out of the studio, we went down to the car that one of us had, I forget whose car, but our wives were there, and a lot of the people said, "Well, the only way we can end this evening is to go out and really have quite a drink." [Laughter] So we started out sitting on each other’s laps in this car, six or seven of us. And I remember one of my better bon mots came to mind at that point. I said, “Well, if we can’t sell this damned State Department to the American public, we sure can sell it to Barnum & Bailey.” [Laughter] And Acheson and MacLeish began to laugh and got hysterical.

DANIELL: What goes down those fancy State Department…

DICKEY: And we never, never forgot that evening and used to laugh about it together. Fortunately, as it turned out, we were hearing all of this up in the studio, and the public was hearing it, but Stettinius wasn’t hearing it back in Mexico City. [Laughter]

DANIELL: So he never knew about it.
DICKEY: At least we never told him. [Laughter] And I never heard that there was any problem raised about it inside the department. And all three of us thought that within a day or two we’d be called on the mat.

Well, that was the sort of thing that lightened the atmosphere that spring. Then came the conference. It was convened in late April, as I recall. And Francis Russell went out as my deputy. And Jack Purefoy had stayed out there all through the late winter and early spring.

DANIELL: You didn’t go to San Francisco yourself at all? You left it in Purefoy’s hands?

DICKEY: The organization of it.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I was back in the department this whole time. Francis Russell went out to Hollywood on the motion picture and then worked with Purefoy. And Dick Morin, who was a deputy in the office, went out just as the conference was beginning to get underway to work very closely with Jack Purefoy. Dick was a deputy in my office.

DANIELL: In your office. There was one question I was going to ask sometime; I may as well do it right here: How large was your office?

DICKEY: Well, I don’t recall precisely what the numbers were, but there were four or five divisions in it. The office as such was responsible for coordinating these divisions and for the policy work of these divisions.

There was a Historical Division, which had charge of the historical work in the department, publishing of the Foreign Relations Series, very, very serious, responsible, editorial, scholarly work. There was a division of Public Liaison, which Francis Russell subsequently headed up. There was a Cultural Relations division, which had three or four different facets; that is, the motion picture section, the radio section, the book section. And I don’t think they were organized as separate divisions, but each one had a separate administrator. Bryn Hovde came in to be the chief of Cultural Relations in the office. I went out and recruited him in Pittsburgh. He subsequently went on to be president of the New School in New York and then of Queens University. Very outstanding historian. As a matter of fact, his field was Scandinavian history, going back to his own family’s interests.
I had some rather remarkable historians in that end of thing. They weren’t in the Historical Division. Wilder Spaulding was chief of the Division of Historical Affairs and the Publications. But Ralph Turner, the very well-known historian who subsequently went to Yale and really a major figure in the… His three volumes on the history of civilization and the history of the cities were, and I guess still are, highly respected items in that field. And then we had, oh, quite a few well-known book people over in the cultural relations work.

So on the international side, you had the cultural relations work with its various divisions. On the domestic side, we first had the press division. This was quickly canceled as a responsibility of my office, very much with my agreement. McDermott had headed up press, and he was very unhappy about having his operation brought into… as one office—or one division—of another office. But the Public Liaison Division was the division that worked with the American public. And the Historical Division was the publications division. There was another division which isn’t coming through…

DANIELL: Right, you mentioned… Well, anyway....

DICKEY: So, well, the numbers would have been up in the, I suppose three, four hundred people.

DANIELL: Really! That large?

DICKEY: Yes. Oh, yes, Oh, yes.

DANIELL: You were responsible for the recruiting of the heads of these divisions?

DICKEY: That’s right, that’s right.

DANIELL: And they would do the recruiting internally within these divisions?

DICKEY: That’s right, that’s right. And the policies of the divisions, their operations, and their major programs, and their budgets, these all came through my office.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: And then we would have our own operating responsibilities. I was, as the director of the office…Stettinius set up two new overall committees in the department. One was the Policy Committee, to which all major policy questions were supposed to go. And this was to be made up of the
directors of the 12 main line offices. Most of the offices were geographic offices: the Office of European Affairs, the Office of Middle Eastern Affairs, the Office of Latin American Affairs, and so on, the Office of Economic Affairs. I was director of the Office of Public Affairs.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: So I was one of the 12 members of the overall departmental committee that the secretary chaired on policy. Then there was a parallel committee called the Committee on Postwar Planning.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Okay.

DICKEY: Which had a comparable membership.

DANIELL: And you were on both of these?

DICKEY: I was on both of these committees as director of the Office of Public Affairs. Neither of these committees was really a successful operation in the long run.

DANIELL: Sounds like they wouldn’t be.

DICKEY: Which I won’t go into. But they were interesting opportunities for me to be in touch with the topside of the department on a regular basis.

DANIELL: Dick Morin was part of your staff?

DICKEY: Dick Morin was a deputy director in the office. He’d been chief of the Division of Public Liaison. And I think at this time, when we went to San Francisco, I think he was deputy director of the office. Maybe he was chief of the Division of Public Liaison. I forget which it was. But Francis Russell, who had been my assistant chief when I was chief of the Division of World Trade Intelligence, in charge of the blacklist work, left that work and came over to take over the Division of Public Liaison, I guess it was, when Dick Morin left the department at the end of the war to go back to Minnesota, to his home in Minnesota.

Well, we—and we were, our office and specifically myself, was responsible for handling the department’s liaison with the OWI and the Rockefeller Office, coordinator of [inaudible] American Affairs. And this was a major responsibility, a difficult one because the OWI especially had a continuing problem of getting things cleared with the department. I used
to have regular weekly sessions with Jim Linen, who was Elmer Davis’s right-hand man.

DANIELL: You really had some major executive responsibilities.

DICKEY: Yes, oh, yes.

DANIELL: I hadn’t touched what I wanted to ask you, but….

DICKEY: This was not…. And big money was involved. I forget what our budget was, but it was up in the millions.

And then one of the most interesting and indeed one of the most significant activities was planning the future, as we hoped, information programs of the United States government as well as the Overseas Cultural Relations Program when the war was over. It was one thing to have an OWI and a Rockefeller Office going during the war. Then who was going to take this over, and how were you going to organize this, and how were you going to carry this out unless Congress would appropriate an adequate budget for this type of activity in the postwar world?

We undertook to have this subject studied by Arthur McMahon, who was a very well-known professor of public administration down at Columbia, and a woman named Rowena Rommel. They did a report for us, a very important report, for my office on the future of the International Information and Cultural Relations Programs. One of my last responsibilities in the department actually, in the summer of ’45, was seeing through—seeing those postwar plans through the early stages of trying to decide whether there was a chance of getting the Congress to support. Because everybody was looking for the opportunity to close down this and close down that.

Well, to get back quickly now, in late April or May, I forget which it was, the San Francisco conference was underway, and they wanted me to go out and to take charge of the liaison work at San Francisco. So I was designated public liaison officer of the American delegation at the San Francisco conference. And went out to San Francisco.

I had a fascinating cross-country trip on the sleeper. I found myself in a sleeper with a lot of secretaries of the department. I was the only male in the car. I had a wonderful time going across the country for what is it, four or five days? Something like that. Got out to San Francisco, I was laid low with some sort of an infection, and Dick Morin and Dolores met me and took me up and put me to bed in the Fairmont Hotel, which is where our
offices and the American delegation had its headquarters. Jack Purefoy came up with a bottle of scotch, which was just part of the hundreds and I guess thousands of cases of liquor that he had commandeered for the conference. [Laughter] And then began an experience that was unique and demanding but also wonderful.

See, we, before we went out, had gotten the secretary and the president to agree to the appointment of representatives from 42 national private organizations—religious, educational, business, labor, anybody who was anybody in the private organizations of the country—and we had 42 of these organizations designate officially representatives as consultants to the American delegation. Now this was an unprecedented move really as far as I know, certainly in its magnitude. And the American delegation itself was a small group, but this gave these people a sense of having special access to it out there.

So we had to take care of them, their housing and that. Dick Morin worked very closely with them out there. And he and I met with them each day, briefed them on what was going on in the conference and in the American delegation, took their views back, and usually we would bring a member of the delegation in to talk with them. [Senator] Vandenberg, Harold Stassen, Dean Gildersleeve from Columbia was on the delegation. Senator [Matthew] Connelly. Leo Pasvolski was not a member of the delegation but was the top postwar planning expert in the group. Dulles came in. He was also on the same....

This was quite an experience I don’t think we want to go into in great detail. But it was a precedent-making move which actually provided the experience on which the nongovernmental observers have been attached to the U.N. subsequently that came out of the U.S. delegation’s experience with the consultants. And it worked out quite well.

The consultants had an influence on the charter, on the terminology of the charter—the provisions of the charter, particularly in the area of human rights, which had not been in the draft. And they were very anxious to have this included. Phil Reed, who was then president of General Electric, was representing one of the business organizations. And Bob Watts was representing one of the labor organizations. And, oh, a number of others. And the labor and the business people and the church people were quite insistent....
DANIELL: ...the role of these consultants....

DICKEY: To the American delegation.

DANIELL: Emphasized that indeed they did have an impact on the outcome.

DICKEY: Yes, they did. As a matter of fact, the story of the consultants was written up once by Scotty Reston in the New York Times Magazine in considerable length. And he gave the consultants very great credit for the relatively easy acceptance of the charter subsequently in the United States Senate.

DANIELL: Did it work out well in the other direction in that the organizations that had had the consultants there served as conduits for promoting the acceptance of the charter?

DICKEY: Very definitely...very definitely. This is what Reston emphasized, that these people felt they had been in on this, that they had been participants to some extent removed from the actual negotiations. But still in a position to have an input directly into the negotiations through the American delegation. And let it be said on behalf of the secretary that he was very good about this. He was very public relations-minded. Of course he'd come out of public relations to some extent, I believe in U.S. Steel. And he would come down at our request and meet with the consultants at least once a week. And somebody from the delegation would be down to meet with them almost every day.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: So that our relationship with these people and well... Our relationship with these people had integrity. They didn't' feel that they were....

DANIELL: You didn't have the same problems you had with Dumbarton Oaks then.

DICKEY: No. Well, that was part of the picture because that had put the secretary of state on our side, that is, the side of my office and my colleagues, in insisting that we had to be part of this operation if we were to be expected to persuade these representatives of American private organizations.

DANIELL: Were you the initiator of this whole—of all the consultants?

DICKEY: Yes, yes. I think I was.
DANIELL: Using the leverage that you’d gotten from the negative impact of everything that had fouled up in Dumbarton Oaks.

DICKEY: I think that’s fair to say.

DANIELL: That’s probably one of the most important things you did there in Washington.

DICKEY: It was a thoroughly worthwhile thing. And it also established a relationship with quite a few people that I would never have had an opportunity to know in the way I came to know: the heads of, for example, the two competing Jewish organizations, the American Jewish Conference and the American Jewish Committee, Judge Proskauer and [Henry] Monsky, who were the national figures. And they were both pushing the cause of a Jewish Palestine and things like that. And they wanted to be sure that the trusteeship provisions of the charter didn’t rule out that. The Palestine question wasn’t being settled as such at the conference. But they could foresee that the provisions of the charter in respect to the trusteeship council and things like that might be very important.

DANIELL: Were you aware of the significance of it?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. For example, these two fellows watched each other like hawks. When one knew that the other had been in to see me to get a briefing, the other would call me up on the telephone and say, “Oh, I just want to make sure that there’s nothing that I needed to know that I don’t know.” And sometimes it got a little delicate. But I was able to maintain a relationship of very close confidence really between these men. I’ve always been proud of that. And subsequently Judge Proskauer came up to receive an honorary degree at Dartmouth at the time President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower received his degree.

DANIELL: That was the year I graduated—or my junior year. ‘Fifty-four was it?

DICKEY: ‘Fifty-three.

DANIELL: ‘Fifty-three. It was when I was a sophomore then, but I’d been elected to Green Key, and I was scouting, and I remember the list of honorary degrees, and that’s when I heard the name.

DICKEY: Judge Proskauer was one of them. But he was a major private citizen in American life at that time. I could go on to relate some very amusing incidents that happened.
DANIELL: Have you done this for any other organization? I know you said when there were some people—I mean I don’t know how much of this you’d like to put on the tape—but I assume that if anyone’s trying to trace UN history, that [bells in background. Inaudible] wrote on it, they’re apt to come and [inaudible]. I wouldn’t go short on this now.

DICKEY: Well, my work, see, focused quite tightly really, not on the work of the committees in the conference or on the plenary session of the conference; but my job was based right on the American delegation at the Fairmont Hotel where we had our offices. And the big job was quite literally to see to it that these 42 representatives—some of them were, as I said, Phil Reed, president of General Electric; I guess he was the International Chamber of Commerce and so on, very substantial people—were well served. And I saw very little of the work of the conference committee or the work of the plenary session down at the Opera House.

DANIELL: Right, right.

DICKEY: Each morning we would have the consultants, as I’ve said to you, there at the hotel where we had a big room specially reserved for them. And then we would get somebody from the delegation to come down and talk to them. Usually it would be somebody that they wanted to see. Then Mr. Stettinius saw to it that I was in all of the delegates—so far as I know—all the delegation meetings, which were closed, of course, to other people. But I was privileged to be there as a member of the delegation. So it was a major experience.

Now I should mention one thing because it'll lead us into... Well, I'll mention this even though I do want to say a few more things about the conference. In the course of this -- I forget how many weeks it was I was out at the conference there -- I had a call one day from Judge McLane who I'm not sure I had ever met before. But I had known of him as a very outstanding Dartmouth man, and I'm not sure that I ever knew he was a trustee of the College. I don't believe I did at that point. But he and Mrs. McLane, as I recall, came into the office just cold one day in the middle of the conference, and wanted to know whether... And they introduced themselves as Dartmouth people. And as I recall, asked me whether it would be possible for me to get them tickets to one of the sessions of the conference down at the Opera House where we had a certain number. I said, "Why, of course I’d be glad to do that." And I saw them I think just once more.

I believe they invited us for dinner. Chris wasn’t out with me. But they invited me to dinner, and I think I met their daughter Lilla [McLane Bradley]
and I know Dave [David J.] Bradley ['38] who was out there then finishing his medical work. And I think we had dinner and drinks over at the Mark Hopkins, which is right across the street from the Fairmont.

I mention this now because although I had no thought of it at the time, no idea what they were up to, one of their principal reasons for being in San Francisco was to scout me [Laughter]. I didn’t hear about this until McLane told me about it some years later. But they were out asking about me from other people who were out at the conference and so forth.

Well, then I came back to Washington at the end of June, several days before the conference finally adjourned. Mr. Acheson was at that point acting secretary for a few days, I remember. And he got me to help him answer some of the congressional inquiries about what was going on at the conference. It wasn’t over yet. I remember one minor traumatic experience I had being called up by him while he had senator—the senator from Ohio who had been the lawyer… He went on the Supreme Court subsequently. Not Benton.

DANIELL: Benson?

DICKEY: No. What was his name? A very, very fine gentleman. Well, it may come to me in a moment. If it does, I'll give it to you. In any event, he was a senator then from Ohio, and had called up Mr. Acheson to get some information for use in a major speech which he was going to….  

DANIELL: Bricker?

DICKEY: Oh, no, no. No, Bricker’s counterpart. No, a totally different person. This was a very internationally-oriented man. Oh, gosh, it's right on the tip of my tongue.

But he wanted to make a speech supporting the charter in the Senate—this is before the charter had come back—to tell the Senate about what was going on in San Francisco and to help build up support for it.

So he’d called up Mr. Acheson who, of course, was the department’s liaison with the Congress, and was getting this material on the telephone from Mr. Acheson. And Mr. Acheson asked his secretary, Miss Evans, to call me up. He didn’t tell the senator that he was doing this. But he buzzed for her and said, “Get John Dickey. He’s just come back from the conference yesterday.” So I went into his office while he had this senator on the telephone. And at that point the senator asked whether the veto provision as it was being worked on was
going to apply to the amendment process of the charter. And somehow or other I got twisted in my memory of it, and I said, “No, it won’t.” And Mr. Acheson said, “I’m informed that it won’t apply.” Well, I no more heard him say this to the senator, than I knew I had told him the wrong thing, exactly the wrong thing. And I didn’t know what the hell to do! I’ll never forget it. It was the last major crisis I had since stopping smoking.

I had a pack, an unopened package of Chesterfield cigarettes in my pocket which I had purchased that morning for my wife down at the commissary. I pulled that pack out, ripped it open. I had stopped smoking the previous year in November, in ’43. Actually in November ’43. But I was buying these cigarettes for my wife. I pulled that pack out, ripped it open, pulled a cigarette out as you do, and stomped it, you know. And pulled out the matches, and lit the match, and I suddenly said to myself, well, this is a good way to really foul everything. [Laughter] I put that match out, and I have never been tempted since. It was a crisis. It was a minor one. But it was a real one in my personal life. So I put the match out. Mr. Acheson put the telephone down. I knew I shouldn’t interrupt him.

DANIELL: You shouldn’t interrupt him. No, that’s right.

DICKEY: I knew I shouldn’t because he was telling him about other things and so on and so on. When he put the telephone down, I said—at that point I was on a first-name basis with him, and I said, “Dean, I’ve really created an awful problem for you because I gave you the wrong answer to the question about the veto. I’m just as sorry as I can be, and I’ll explain it to you now at a little more length. And if you like, you probably want to call him right back.” “Oh, no,” he said, “no need to bother with that. Just go down there yourself this morning and just tell him and explain it to him. He’ll appreciate that,” he said. “He’d like that.” So he said, “I’ll tell Miss Evans to say that I’m sending you down.” Well, gee, he couldn’t have handled this more nicely, you know. I’ve worked for other people who would’ve said, Gee! Why the hell did you do that? You know. But he didn’t. He just simply said, “No problem at all. You just go down there, and I’ll tell that you’re coming. And you talk with him about it and explain it to him.” Well, I did. Burton, Burton! Senator Burton!

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: Burton.

DANIELL: Now you’ve got yourself walking down there, it’s easy to remember who you’re going to see.
DICKEY: It was a very nice opportunity which I wouldn't have had otherwise. Well, this is all preliminary to another wonderfully amusing experience that I had with Mr. Acheson.

Either that day or the next day he called me up again and he said, "I've got to go down and make a speech tonight to—" I forget which group it is, you know. The new congressmen all form a club, and they call it the 76th Club or the 76th, depending on which Congress it is. Both Democrats and Republicans, and they have a pretty good time together apparently. So he said, "I'm going down to speak to this group." I forget which group it was, the new congressional club. And he wanted me to talk to them about the charter. I said, "I don't really think I am qualified to do this." "How about coming down with me tonight?" Well, I thought this is awfully nice in view of what I'd just done. [Laughter] So I said, "Well, I'd like to." "Well," he said, "come on. You come down and have drinks and dinner with us. And I'll tell them a few things, and then I'll put you on your feet and let you talk to them."

Well, I had a great time with them. Of course we had lots of drinks and good food and so forth. And we didn't get out of this restaurant—it was down there at the Oriental or something like that—'til about one o'clock, I guess. So he said, "Well, why don't we walk back up to the department." Where he'd left his car in the parking lot. And then he said, "Come on out to the house." And Chris was I think by that time up in Canada. I'm not sure. In any event, I was on my own. He said, "Come on out to the house and stay with me."

So we started to walk back from the restaurant, and we came to the Treasury Building, came up Pennsylvania Avenue, then to the Treasury, and then we jogged up Pennsylvania Avenue to the front of the Treasury Building, right beside the White House, you know, the big wide sidewalk. And we were the only souls on that sidewalk. All Washington apparently had gone to bed. The two of us were walking along—I don't know what we were talking about—when we saw a big black car coming down Pennsylvania Avenue toward us. And it was being towed by one of these tow trucks. And the front end of the car was raised up. And it stopped right there at the light between the Treasury and the White House. And we both looked over at it. Oh, we had been talking about the announcement that afternoon that Stettinius was being replaced by Burns. And of course Acheson was much interested in this, and I was interested. I hadn't known anything about it. I don't know whether he had or not.

But in any event we were talking about this when this tow truck stopped in front of us with this great big black car raised up which it was towing along.
We both looked over, and we had both instantaneously recognized that it was the official car of the secretary of state. [Laughter] I will never forget it. We both— And he said, “Honest to God! Do you suppose that they would take the car away from him that fast? [Laughter] We’ve never done anything else in the department that fast.” We looked at it, and it surely was the secretary’s state car with the seal on it being towed down the street by this wrecker. Well, we’d had, of course, enough to drink, and we were in an informal, convivial state of mind once again. We practically collapsed on the White House sidewalk. He said, “I just don’t believe it! I don’t believe it!”

DANIELL: You never found out what happened?

DICKEY: Well, yes, we did, the next day. We went back to the department, got his car, and went up to his house. We had a delightful time. We sat down in his little garden at home there and had a drink before we went to bed, reminiscing about personal things and so on.

Well, the next day it was published in the newspaper that the secretary of state’s car had been stolen that day. And the police had found it, and this was the police taking it back, towing it back. That was the story. But it was one of the most amusing incidents of the whole affair.

Well, I came back and worked then, worked very hard indeed, on drafting a message from the president to the Senate sending the charter down to them as a treaty. I was asked to do this at Acheson’s suggestion by Judge [Samuel] Rosenman. Wasn’t that his name, Mr. Roosevelt’s very close advisor who stayed on with Truman? Judge Rosenman. And I prepared a draft which I submitted -- I saw a copy of it the other day in my papers -- which I submitted to Judge Rosenman. Actually Mr. Acheson was going to be away and was not going to have an opportunity to check it over. So I sent it up to him with a note saying this is what I came up. He sent it back with his handwriting on it that was very nice, complimentary. Thank you for doing it. And I took it out to Judge Rosenman. Actually when the message came down, it only contained only a hint of what I suggested they say. But the charter went through the Senate, of course. I think there were only one or two dissenting votes.

Well then I was finishing off really the work in connection with the conference when one of these days, as you have been told by Dudley Orr, he and I and one or two other fellows went to a baseball game at night in Washington. And it was while we were at that baseball game, along in the middle of the game which was with the Detroit Tigers....
DANIELL: I imagine you remember the first half of the game.

DICKEY: Hank Greenberg had just come back from the war, and I remember watching him batting. Dud Orr, in his sly, puckish way, reached in his pocket and pulled out a long envelope and handed it to me. He said, “Read that sometime, tell me what you think.” So I opened it up, having not the remotest notion of what it was all about, and glanced at it. And immediately saw that it was a letter—as I recall, and here I’m a little hazy—I think it was a letter from Judge McLane to Dudley enclosing a letter from Mr. Hopkins to Judge McLane. I’m almost certain that was the way it was. In any event, Mr. Hopkins was either quoted in Judge McLane’s letter or there was a copy of Mr. Hopkins’s letter to Judge McLane. And the net of it was that the committee that had been working on the search—and it was handled solely, again very quietly, by the trustees’ committee under Judge McLane’s chairmanship. And the announcement had not been made, as I recall—I’m sure it had not been made. I know it hadn’t been made that Mr. Hopkins was planning to retire, and they didn’t want the announcement made until they were out of the woods with respect to his successor.

DANIELL: Several people have told me that, yes.

DICKEY: And he, Judge McLane, who’d known, of course, Dudley very closely and intimately, and Dud was a trustee at that point, said that the committee had been working, as he of course knew, on this question. And that they were fairly well along and had at one point asked Mr. Hopkins to comment on a number of names that they had shaken down. And that he had indicated his views with respect to a number of people, and they were referred to in this letter. And one of the names, Judge McLane said, was John Dickey whom he knew Dudley would know quite well because we were classmates. And Mr. Hopkins had known me sufficiently well that he had expressed an opinion about me. I don’t recall what was in the letter from Mr. Hopkins about me. But I think it was quite a favorable endorsement of his experiences with me and my experiences here as an undergraduate and my work as an undergraduate. And I should say that I had seen Mr. Hopkins on several occasions in Washington during the war, the latter part of the war, when he came down in his capacity as the head of the Committee to Aid the Allies. Was that the name of it?

DANIELL: Right. That’s right. That’s the one he was very active on in the beginning of the war.

DICKEY: It was something like that in any event. And he came to see me and wrote to me. And Sid Hayward, who was working for him on it, had come to see
me and I think corresponded with me about the work of this committee. And it tied in, of course, with the things which I was doing in the department during ’44 and ’45 with postwar planning.

DANIELL: Right, right.

DICKEY: And he spoke very complimentarily about, as I recall in this letter to Judge McLane, about me and what some others had said to him. I don’t think he’d ever asked…. My recollection of the letter was that there was no indication Mr. Hopkins had asked anybody about me in connection with Dartmouth, but had had occasion to ask them about me in connection with the State Department. And then Judge McLane went on to say that, as I recall in this letter, that they had had opportunities to check me out in certain situations, and that they had gotten favorable reports. And that they were very much interested in me therefore. And could Dudley tell them whether he thought I would be interested in being considered. Now remember this was the crux of the letter.

Well, I read it with some astonishment. I had not known at all that Mr. Hopkins was planning to retire. And I said to Dud—I forget, something to the effect that this was quite a thing to drop during a baseball game. Maybe we’d better have a talk about this in the next day or two. But offhand it’s something that certainly I would want to give very serious consideration to.

By that time I knew that I almost certainly was not going to go back to the law practice, I was pretty well certain of that. I’d been back and forth to the law two or three times. I had a couple of offers, as I mentioned to you, and I’d had a very good experience with this teaching at this school. I was obviously being scouted by one of the foundations. Devereaux Josephs told me subsequently—he was then president of Carnegie Corporation—he was scouting me at that time. He had been in to see me a couple of times. I didn’t know that I was, but I knew that he was president of the Carnegie Corporation coming to see me. Walter Leland, who was a major factor in the cultural relations affairs of the country in the university world and head of the American Council of Learned Societies—I believe himself a historian; I’m not sure what his discipline was now—had formed quite a well, we had a close friendship. He was on the advisory committee of the cultural relations work.

DANIELL: Yes, you mentioned it.

DICKEY: And he had said to me that if I wanted to stay in academic life after the war, he’d be interested to be of any assistance that I might need. So that I
was reasonably certain by July—I’m not sure whether you asked me this or somebody else asked me this—I was reasonably certain by July of ’45 that I would not be returning to law practice. I had already had enough of the State Department that I was pretty sure that to have the kind of good experience that I’d had in the State Department, one did well to move in and out and not just get set in there. So without having given it really any serious thought, and having, as I recall, nothing specific before me to decide about at that point, I was almost certain that I would be moving into a public service organization, a foundation or something of that sort, or into university work of some sort. I had really no thought of the....

DANIELL: You probably had not thought concretely about the timing of such a move.

DICKEY: No, not at all. Because the war with Japan was still on. The German war was ended while we were out in San Francisco at a very dramatic moment. We learned of that one day during the San Francisco conference. But the Japanese war was still on. But we were reasonably certain that the end of it wasn’t too far down the road. And this was the first I knew that I would be under serious consideration if I was interested for the Dartmouth job. And my best memory would be that this was around the middle of July. Well, I wonder whether we’d better break.

DANIELL: Yes, I was thinking that would be good. You’ll be fresh when you start....

DICKEY: ...Dud Orr, who’d received a letter from Judge McLane, who was a senior trustee and heading up the search committee, enclosing as I believe I mentioned to you, I believe I seem to recall a letter from Mr. Hopkins, although he may have been simply quoting Mr. Hopkins. In any event, my name entered into it and I guess he, McLane, may have asked Mr. Hopkins about me because he obviously had been gathering information as I now know from various sources.

In any event, I told Dud Orr, when he showed me the letter, that it was the sort of thing that I certainly would be interested in. And a few days after that, after the ballgame when Dud showed me the letter, we had, as I recall, a luncheon meeting, and Dud said that he would convey the word to Judge McLane that I was seriously interested if they should find themselves interested in me.

The next thing that I recall was a telephone call from McLane, which I would suppose came within a week or so and probably was in the third
week of July or thereabouts, in which he said that he had had a response from Dudley Orr, and that he wondered whether I would be available to come up to Boston to meet the trustees of the College at a meeting in early August. I think the precise date was August 16, which I remember because that evening, as I recall, the Boston newspapers were filled with word of the dropping of the first A-bomb on Hiroshima.

Well, I remember during that period just two things that I did. One, I wrote to Chris who was up with her family in Canada for the summer—for the summer—saying that I'd had this inquiry; that I had no idea how serious it was likely to prove to be. But I wondered whether she had any strong reactions about it in case I did need to make up my mind before we were together again. And at some point, I think it was during the interval between Judge McLane's telephone call and my going to Boston—although it may have been after Boston—I got out my copy of Richardson's History of Dartmouth [Laughter] and read a bit about the various presidents and their experiences on the job. Not, I might say, very encouraging reading.

DANIELL: Had you always had a copy of Richardson's? I daresay, there probably weren't too many Dartmouth graduates who did.

DICKEY: Well, I think so.

DANIELL: Probably a logical thing for a history major to get, I guess. Well, that isn't....

DICKEY: I hesitate—I'm hesitating simply because I can't imagine where else I got it, and I know I read it during that period. I suppose I could have gone to the library, but I don't think I did. I think I had a copy.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: In any event, I did go up to Boston for a dinner meeting with the trustees, held, I believe, at the Union Club, at least one of the clubs there in Boston. It was a very informal meeting. I had the impression that probably ten trustees were there out of the dozen. Mr. Hopkins was not there, and the governor was not there, as I recall, so that would have been ten at that point on the board. Maybe there were only eight or so; I don't recall exactly.

The questioning of me was very free, but very informal. It was a thoroughly pleasant evening as far as I was concerned. The evening was introduced by Judge McLane saying that I had come up at his invitation to meet the
trustees and have them have an opportunity to get to know me. That several of them knew me fairly well: Harvey Hood; McLane not as well probably as Harvey, but Mr. McLane did know me. And of course Dudley Orr knew me.

I don’t believe Dud was there that night, but I could be wrong about that. I have no memory of his having been there. And I’m sure Nelson Rockefeller, who was also a trustee, was not there. So there probably were about eight present. I remember Dr. John Gile was there. That was the first time I had ever met Jay Gile. And it was the first time I had met, indeed, I suppose five or six of the trustees.

I don’t recall very precisely the nature of the questions that were put to me. They related to my career up to that point, what I had done in law practice, in penology, and my experience in state government as assistant to Commissioner of Corrections Francis Sayre. My going to Washington, How I happened to do that and the nature of my interest in foreign affairs work. A little discussion about the teaching I was doing on the side at the School of Advanced International Studies. What my ideas were about my future career. Where I thought I might go after the war.

And as I recall, I told them what I have related here earlier, namely, that I was reasonably certain that I was going to move away from the State Department at some point after the war, and that I rather doubted at that point that I would go back to the private practice of law. I went on, I’m sure, to say that I was now reasonably clear that my interests in education, higher education, were fairly strong. That my teaching experience had been a very successful one at the School of Advanced International Studies, and this encouraged me. I didn’t dwell at length on that.

They were interested in what had been my administrative responsibilities in the State Department and in the Massachusetts government, and I described those. That’s about as far as my memory goes on the nature of the discussion.

DANIELL: Yes. Had you thought much before you went up, as you recollect, you may not recollect these things, but about, I was going to say, the procedures or the politics of accepting the presidency?

DICKEY: No, I hadn’t thought….

DANIELL: …[inaudible] about whether you were going to be interviewed by anyone except the trustees, faculty or…?
DICKEY: No, I gave no thought to that so far as I recall whatsoever. I have never been inclined to try to foresee that kind of a situation and to prepare for it. I was in a mood of being seriously interested but not out campaigning for a job.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I understand that, yes.

DICKEY: It is important to get the feel of this situation in that respect. I had not known Mr. Hopkins was planning to retire, as I recall, until I saw this letter that Dud had sometime earlier. And I had been having a thoroughly good experience in the State Department with about all the responsibilities that I could possibly want. I had not begun to really narrow down my thought of what came next, although I've said, aware I was probably going to move out of the department at some point at the end of the war, but the war hadn't ended yet. So that I didn't give any thought at all—that I can recall—to the procedures and certainly anything about the politics of the selection of a predecessor [successor?].

There's something else that's very important to realize: This was a totally different atmosphere from the atmosphere that prevails today in the search for a president. The trustees regarded themselves at Dartmouth and in all other comparable institutions, insofar as I'm familiar, within the general procedures followed by their institutions, as having this responsibility and not involving in it, as today is usually the case, faculty, alumni, students, parents.

Today it's a much different ballgame. And now that you have the situation where most of these institutions are required to advertise their vacancies, you, to be very blunt about it, you have much more politicking, much more rounding up letters of support and reference and so forth. I didn't have occasion to ask anybody to write a letter for me. All of this investigation insofar as the board was concerned was done on the initiative of the board, and I just went up as a witness, so to speak, that they wanted to examine.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Your description is very much like Dudley’s concerning his memories of this, too.

DICKEY: So that I think the most important thing to realize is that it was a totally different procedure, the basic process of search and selection. I'm morally certain—although again I do not know this as a matter of direct knowledge—but I'm morally certain that Mr. Hopkins was looked upon by
the board as the man upon whose judgment and knowledge they would rely very heavily. He, as I’ve said, was not at this meeting.

DANIELL: Do you know why he wasn’t at the meeting?

DICKEY: No. I have no knowledge or at least I have no recollection at all of that. No. I think probably it was—or my assumption I guess, and I believe it was my assumption at the time, although again I’m not sure how much is something I’ve since assumed and how much I assumed at the time—but my present assumption is and I think it was true then, that he had already offered his views of me, that he knew me as Dudley knew me, as Nelson Rockefeller knew me, and that there would be very little occasion for his being there to hear what I said. And probably and very possibly he felt that they would, the trustees would be freer to examine me and to get their own impressions if he weren’t there. Well, that’s about the way it looked to me.

The meeting lasted, I would guess, maybe two to three hours. Then we had dinner, and a great deal of the talk at first was simply the usual small talk of what was I doing in the State Department? What were the problems? And this sort of thing. Told them a little bit about the San Francisco conference. Established a rapport. And then discussion about education and the College and my administrative experiences came later. I remember I went fairly directly from the meeting to the sleeper to go back to Washington that night. Nothing was said as to what came next, if anything.

Oh, they did ask, somebody did ask: Well, suppose this came out so that we came to invite you to take this position, when would you be available? I’d forgotten all about that. But that did come, and I forget who asked that. I’m reasonably sure it was not McLane, but one of the trustees asked. And as I dimly recall, he prefaced it, or at least in the course of asking this question, said that perhaps I didn’t realize, but President Hopkins was anxious to have the man come aboard as soon as possible after the war or in the relatively near future. And what were my commitments? What were my commitments to the State Department? And at that time, as I recall, I simply said that I really didn’t know with precision; that I had a feeling that I would certainly want to feel that I should stay through the war. And I don’t think at that point that I knew about the bomb having been dropped that day. I think I saw that in the evening or in the paper when I got out of the meeting, although I’m a little hazy about that. Maybe I did see it in the early evening paper going into the meeting. In any event, I said our impression was around Washington that the Japanese war couldn’t go on too much longer, that the outcome seemed to me pretty well
a foregone conclusion at that point. But how fast it would wind up, nobody knew.

Now I did know when I went up there that we’d had discussion in the Policy Committee of the State Department about what was going to be our attitude towards the emperor at the time of surrender and so forth.

DANIELL: Yes. You’re already planning that.

DICKEY: The atmosphere was that of being in the final stages of the war. And my recollection is that I responded to the question about when I might be available if they wanted me was by saying, as far as I could foresee, I had no commitments beyond feeling that I ought to see the job through the war. And, as far as I can remember now that was…. Well, there was no further give and take on that question.

I got back to Washington the next morning and of course everything was focused on the news of the bomb and what was going to be the Japanese reaction. I went directly, very shortly, into a Policy Committee meeting with the secretary. No, the secretary was not there as I recall. But we had a good bit of discussion about this question of the emperor. This was one of the central issues that there was a fair amount of disagreement about in the department. The old Japanese hands, who were the only real experts around on Japan, were very I think unanimous in their view that there would be no advantage to us in seeking to put the emperor on trial, let alone treat him as a hostage but that we should regard him as somebody that could be useful to us at the time of surrender. There were others in the department who felt that this was too weak an attitude, and that it might be misunderstood by the Japanese people and used by certain elements in Japan to make people believe that they hadn’t really been defeated.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: The way you handle the emperor was a critical factor in the way the Japanese regarded their defeat. I didn’t have very much to do with this. I listened, but it was something that was beyond my experience and knowledge.

Well, I don’t know how long it was. But my impression is it was only a matter of days, I would guess maybe two days, maybe three days, that I got a call from Mr. McLane.

DANIELL: Had you heard back from Chris by this time?
DICKEY: Yes, I had heard from Chris, whose attitude was the same as it has been on almost all job changes, that she would be quite content with whatever I decided. That she had, you see, spent a fair amount of her life in an academic community. Her father had been a professor at Exeter for 30-some years and so forth. So that an academic community was no new prospect as far as she was concerned. My memory is that she simply said that she would be content with however it came out. I think I should say in that respect that again it was not something that she was panting to have come out as an offer to me. She’d known a happy life as a faculty daughter at Exeter and had been privy to all the talk that goes on in a faculty household and so forth. But she was more aware than I was that these administrative jobs in an institution of higher education inevitably set you apart…

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: …from faculty to a degree and others. And that is not always the most congenial thing.

DANIELL: And that’s not the kind of thing that Richardson speculated on.

DICKEY: No, no. But it was something that she was thoroughly familiar with. She didn’t talk about it. But it was perfectly clear that there were, as far as she was concerned, very real pluses and minuses about this.

Chris—I won’t dwell on her part, her part in this although it’s terribly important because a great deal of the job rested on her shoulders—she was and is a very private person. She’s not a go-go person and her principal interests have been books. She was a Wellesley graduate, a professional graduate thereafter of Simmons Library School, and we met here at Dartmouth in my senior year when she had her first job here in the Dartmouth library. And she lived the life of a—rather quiet, very private life of a faculty daughter, and her father was a rather old-fashioned faculty person, quite reticent, not interested in faculty politics or things of that sort. A classicist.

So that this question of coming to Dartmouth, while Dartmouth had an attraction for both of us in the sense that both of us had greatly enjoyed our experiences at Dartmouth, and we’d met at Dartmouth, and I had continued to be active as a Dartmouth alumnus, neither of us, as I’ve said, had any sense of wanting to chase this job. And as I look back on it, that was all to the good.
Well, Judge McLane did call me on the telephone. And I’m not sure how long it was, but I think it was two or three days after I got back. And he said he just wanted to say to me that if I were still disposed to be interested in the job, that they would very much like to have me come to it. It was a very straightforward, very simple, very uncomplicated invitation. No discussion, as I recall, about salaries or terms or contracts or anything. And as far as I was concerned, I never raised these questions then or later. I said I was clear at this point that this would be an opportunity that was attractive to me, and I would do it.

DANIELL: So you accepted right then and there on the phone?

DICKEY: That’s right. That’s right.

DANIELL: You hadn’t really at this point talked to President Hopkins about the job.

DICKEY: No, I had not talked at all to President Hopkins. He then—at least this is my memory. If you had showed me a letter to show that I talked with him, all I can do is remind you that my memory is not what it ought to be. But Judge McLane did say that he would like me to be in touch with Mr. Hopkins and I think it was with Sid Hayward to provide them with some biographical material that they would want for purposes of a press release, things like that. And just when I was in touch with Mr. Hopkins, I don’t remember that point very clearly. I had originally known Mr. Hopkins personally first when I was one of the finalists in the Rhodes Scholar selection in my senior year. And he, I think, chaired the interview meeting. I didn’t really know him out of that experience in any close way. But I then did see him, as I recall on my own initiative, in my senior year about the possibility of going to Japan to work on an English-language newspaper.

DANIELL: You mentioned that before, right.

DICKEY: A lecturer named [Yusuke] Tsurumi had been coming to Dartmouth and had been known personally to Mr. Hopkins, and I had gone to see Mr. Hopkins about my doing that before I went on to graduate school if that’s what I would be doing.

DANIELL: I’m going to break. This is just about...

[End of Tape 13, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 14, Side A]

DICKEY: I was saying that I don’t remember when I got in touch with Mr. Hopkins about the matter. He may have called me. I don’t think I called him. But I
do know that Judge McLane said they wanted to get this out now just as quickly as possible, the announcement. And there were a couple of things [that] needed to be checked out. I seem to recall that I dealt with Sid Hayward by telephone on this.

DANIELL: He was at that point the…?

DICKEY: I mean he was secretary to the College.

DANIELL: Secretary to the College, right.

DICKEY: And handling I believe the news service. I’m somewhat vague about that. In any event, I know they wanted to get it out shortly and that there was…. I’m not entirely certain as to just when I saw Secretary Byrnes about it, and whether that was before or after the public announcement. He had been…Mr. Byrnes, as I believe I told you, had been in Paris, I think it was, on one of the wartime foreign minister’s meetings, and I felt that I should tell him directly about this. So I’m inclined to think I saw him before the announcement was made. In any event, I know I left word with his assistant that I would like to speak to him and that it was about the fact that I would be leaving the department. And I think I’ve told you here the story of his efforts…. No, I haven’t told you that.

DANIELL: No, I think we talked about that after we turned the machine off.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, maybe I should say a word about that. When I went to see him, and it was within a day or two after he got back from Paris because his assistant realized that it was something that was reasonably urgent from my point of view, he was very gracious. Did undertake to see whether I might change my mind about leaving. He reminded me that Mr. MacLeish had resigned as assistant secretary and went on to say that if I stayed in the department, he would be glad to—and he thought he could arrange it without any difficulty—to arrange with the president to have me appointed assistant secretary of state in that job. I might say parenthetically I think it was the first of three such offers over the years I had to take on that job. But I told him that as much as I appreciated his attitude and interest in me, that it was a firm decision, and I had told the trustees that I would come.

DANIELL: He also, I think you said—suggested—that college presidencies weren’t all they were cracked up to be?

DICKEY: Byrnes did go on to say that he wondered whether I realized that college presidencies weren’t always just exactly what you might imagine. And he referred to another associate of his who’d taken on, I think, the presidency
of the University of South Carolina and hadn’t found it just everything that he’d hoped for. But it was quickly apparent to the secretary that I was not able to consider staying, and he wished me well, and said hopefully we’d keep in touch, and that was that. As I recall, it was immediately after that—or at least it’s my assumption now—it was very shortly after that that the announcement was put out. Well, this was a period, as it inevitably is, of your friends getting in touch with you by telephone and telegraph and letter and personal calls.

DANIELL: People looking through the yearbooks to see who John Dickey was.

DICKEY: Yes. Friends in the department were very nice about it all. Many alumni, of course, were shook up by the announcement that Mr. Hopkins was leaving. Mr. Hopkins had been on the job for 27 years, I think, or something like that and personified the Dartmouth of those days for a great many alumni, including myself. So that this was a rather traumatic announcement, leaving myself aside, for many people. But there was the fact that I was not widely known to the alumni body as a whole; indeed would be, I suppose, an unknown to the great majority of them. I had, the evening, I remember, of the announcement, calls from Hanover from members of the staff and several friends. I think they were faculty friends, but I’m a little unclear about that now. I remember that there were, oh, maybe three, a half dozen such calls. And there were hundreds of letters and messages to be acknowledged during the next week or two.

And my first official responsibility was to speak at an Alumni Association of Washington luncheon, oh, within, I would guess it was within two weeks of the announcement. It was either late August, early September. This was quite an affair because a great many Dartmouth men, of course, were down in Washington in connection with the war. Many of them didn’t know me, and then turned out out of curiosity to see who I was and what I was like. I got by, I guess, well enough. But that was that. Several….

DANIELL: You still hadn’t been to Hanover yet.

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: You still had not been to Hanover since this whole thing…?

DICKEY: No, I had not been. Several…in the course of the next few weeks, several faculty people stopped by. I remember Went Eldredge [H. Wentworth Eldredge ’31] was in Washington for a wartime job or something, and he stopped in. And others did. Bob Carr [Robert K. Carr ’29] and several other faculty friends had been in to see me just a few weeks before the
appointment about recruiting that they were doing in Washington for faculty people, people that I knew in the Budget Bureau and so forth. But of course there was no discussion of this. But this was a period of excitement for me and very pleasant. No great problems.

Then at some point very soon after the announcement, Mr. Hopkins got in touch with me—and I suppose it was by telephone—and asked whether I would be available to come up and spend a few days with him and Mrs. Hopkins at their Bar Harbor—or at their home over at Northeast Harbor, I think it is, Manset on Mount Desert [Island]. He suggested that I might do it I believe it was on Labor Day weekend. And I said I surely would welcome such an opportunity. He invited Chris to come. This wasn't feasible. I don't know that she was back yet from Canada.

But in any event, I went up by train. And I was met by Mr. Hopkins, stayed with them. Mrs. Hopkins was there and I don't recall anybody else was. We had a very relaxed meeting and a day or so of talking. And he said the only business we really needed to transact was to get a picture for the alumni magazine together, which they wanted. And he had arranged for some local photographer to come take a picture of us.

I remember it remained something of a joke between us that this Maine character came with his tripod and camera and seated us on a step somewhere. And he put the black hood over his head and took the picture and folded up his tripod. And Mr. Hopkins said, “Is that all you’re going to take? Aren’t you going to take more?” [Laughter] He said, “No, I don’t think so.” He gave a very Yankee-like response. I think I’ve got a picture. And that was that. Well, actually he got a very good picture. But he wasn’t going to waste film on us. [Laughter] And Mr. Hopkins chuckled about that, and years later used to refer to the fact that we’d had this experience with the Yankee photographer.

I don’t recall seeing other people on that occasion. And I left the flow of the talk to President Hopkins. And he said almost nothing about College affairs, College policies, College problems. He was, as you might expect, wonderfully warm and encouraging about my taking on the job. He clearly was at the point where he was somewhat relieved that this was settled. And he had been aiming at a transfer of the job at the close of the war. He had not been in robust health himself. He told me that he’d had this chronic heart condition that the doctors had been managing. But that they had put him on notice that he should cut down traveling and public speaking.

DANIELL: Angina was it?
DICKEY: Angina.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He didn’t speak at any length. If he spoke of it briefly, as he may have, I have no sharp memory of it. But there had been a very unpleasant episode during I guess it was probably ’44 or thereabouts, in which he got into a public controversy with a man named [Herman] Shumlin, as I recall, over a statement that Mr. Hopkins had made about Jewish admissions. I won’t attempt to go into that now. It comes up later in the course of my own handling of those questions on the job. But he may have said that he was sorry that there had been this public difficulty at the end of his administration because he very much regretted any complications that it might present for me. And that would have been all that he said, if he said that much. I don’t remember whether he said that much.

What I do recall vividly is that we came to the last day of my visit. I think it was only a two-day visit. We came to the morning of the second day, and he drove me himself up onto Mount Cadillac to see the harbor and the view. We had several hours before I went to the train. And as we were coming down off the mountain, once again, we were talking about everything really except the job. And finally I decided, well, my gosh, I’ve come up here for two days. And I should also say that I had to be fairly careful of my expenditures at that period because we were living very close to the line as far as money was concerned. And I was quite aware that I had to purchase tickets up and back out of moneys that were not too plentiful. So I guess I thought I’d better try to get something that would be relevant to the job…or at least relevant to my getting started on the job. And as we came down off of the mountain in the car, I said to him, “President Hopkins, isn’t there something that you want to say to me by way of counsel or advice about getting started on the job?” He drove without saying anything for, I suppose, oh, maybe a minute or so. And then he smiled and said, “No, I don’t believe there’s anything that I need to say. You’ll have to deal with these things as they arise yourself. And they may come up very differently than they now look to me. You’re coming into a totally new period.”

The College, you see, had been for practical purposes closed down as a civilian institution during the war and had been run very largely by the V-12, although there had been a nucleus of civilian students in the College. And he said, “I really don’t think there’s any advice that I need to impose on you at this point.” And he chuckled about that. And I didn’t feel that I could press any further.
Then he went for another 30 seconds and chuckled again and said, “I guess there is just one bit of advice I would give you.” My spirits went up. [Laughter] I’m going to get the true doctrine now and get something in return for my train trip and so on. And I said, “Well, I surely would welcome it.” And he said, “Well, I don’t think I’d have anything to do with murals if I were you.”

DANIELL: [Laughter] You’ve told this story….

DICKEY: This is a story which I’ve told before, but it’s one of literal fact.

DANIELL: It’s the one most public, I think, part of Dickey memorabilia which is publicly shared.

DICKEY: Yes. He said, “I don’t think I’d have anything to do with murals.” [Laughs] Well, I knew that there had been a controversy about the Orozco murals but I had not been involved in it in anyway as an alumnus and really didn’t know very much about it. It was the furthest thing from my mind at that point, I suppose, as far as Dartmouth College was concerned.

So I said, "Would you enlarge on that?" He said, “Yes.” He said, “When we undertook to do the Orozco murals and after they were finished," he said, "we had a very—" I forget how he characterized it. "—but a very stormy reception of the murals by a considerable element in the alumni who felt that they were a desecration of the College and the place." And he said, “As a result of that,” he said, “I lost at least half my friends.

So," he said, “some years later, or shortly thereafter, sometime thereafter,” he said, “I got the idea that perhaps I could recoup by having some murals done that the alumni would like. And," he said, “there was a fellow in the Class of 1914—" I think his first name was Walter, but his last name was Humphrey, who was a well-known illustrator, I guess one would say, painter. But he I believe made his living primarily as an illustrator rather than primarily as a painter. And he said, “I got the idea why didn’t I get Humphrey to do some murals for the new Thayer Hall grill down in the basement of Thayer Hall?” The Indian theme taken from the song “Eleazar Wheelock” was the form that the idea took. And Humphrey did those murals with the Indian maidens and naked Indian maidens, etc. “And then,” he said, “I lost the other half of my friends, who thought it was a desecration [Laughter] for other reasons.
So," he said, “I guess if I were doing it all over again, I wouldn’t have anything to do with murals.” Well, that was the extent of the advice I got from him on the occasion of that visit.

DANIELL: What's your explanation of why he was as reticent about it? Was it that...well, two obvious, it seems to me, potential explanations: One, he just didn’t want to interfere, tried to precondition how you would respond to things. Or secondly he really wasn’t aware of the kinds of problems that you’ve mentioned before when we talked, which really were quite serious when you took over the institution.

DICKEY: I don’t have any firm basis for an opinion about that. It was not his nature to volunteer advice. I can say that with very great assurance because I made it a point of keeping in touch with him over the years while I was on the job during the years left to him. And I suppose I saw him regularly at least once a week at his house. And I rarely asked him bluntly what he would do about a particular situation because I felt this was my responsibility, and usually these were personnel problems, and sometimes they were personnel problems that involved people with whom he had had a close relationship. But I did feel that I wanted to have him informed and to have him have an opportunity to say anything that he thought he wanted to say or that might be helpful to me. And I don’t believe there were three occasions in the course of these years—of those years—when he responded with an opinion or advice. Although he did very much appreciate and in a way enjoyed hearing about these things and would smile or chuckle.

DANIELL: That’s very clear in his tapes. He refers to these visits of yours, I think he calls them, at several points in the tapes that Ed [Edward Connery Lathem ’51] did with President Hopkins. So I think your reading on that is quite accurate, that he did enjoy them and remembered them.

DICKEY: Well, I think my memory in this respect is accurate. At least this was my reading. You’re quite right using that term because I could have been mistaken. But I’m not mistaken about the fact that he did not respond with opinions or advice except in the rarest circumstances. And then I think only when I rather pressed him to make sure that I was not dismissing his views—or at least not proceeding on the assumption that he had no views too readily.

So I think the most basic answer to your question is that this was not in his nature. He was a very thoughtful man, needless to say almost. He was a man of judgment, wisdom in respect to human affairs. But he had an old-fashioned kind of reserve. He could be very convivial and normally was
very convivial in social conversation. And he loved to tell stories. And sometimes you could get the best of his wisdom out of a story. But when it came to giving you direct counsel, he had a good bit of reserve about that.

I remember at one point he did raise the question as to whether I would have any qualms at all about his making his home in Hanover. I can remember so vividly that I said, “Good God, no!” For me it would be just a great reassurance to have him close at hand. But the other thing is that he of course recognized that in a sense he’d been out of the job—this is something that maybe is worth saying—he’d been out of the job from, well, certainly ’42 on when the war broke over the institution.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And the Navy… he was instrumental in bringing the Navy here to keep the institution going, working with people in Washington that he knew. A very great service to the College. But he at that point also for shortly thereafter took on the leadership of the postwar planning group, whose name I can never remember. It’s a long name.

DANIELL: I don’t know which group….

DICKEY: But you know the group I mean…I’m talking about.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: The group about….

DANIELL: I do have one question at this point. I don’t want to interrupt you.

DICKEY: No, you’d better ask because….

DANIELL: It’s simply about who were the people in Washington with whom Hopkins had such strong connections? I know something about his connections during World War I. But who were in the people in World War II that enabled him to, what you say can be argued I suppose, to save the College, certainly financially, to get through the war in a way that would be very difficult otherwise.

DICKEY: Well, I think one of them was Frank Knox, secretary of the Navy, that he knew through Knox’s ownership of the *Manchester Union* at that time.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: I’m not sure that that’s so, but I’m reasonably certain of Frank Knox.

DANIELL: He’s come up at several points, right.

DICKEY: John Sullivan was very active in alumni affairs at that point, and very well known to Mr. Hopkins and was quite close to Naval...

DANIELL: This is the one...

DICKEY: —he subsequently became secretary of the Navy.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And I’m sure he was involved in that. Now there may well have been others who were more directly involved.

DANIELL: These old connections he had were from the New Deal, Newton Baker and—which I assume were pretty well....

DICKEY: Those were gone. Yes, yes, those were gone. I would guess that Frank Knox, John Sullivan....

DANIELL: Is this Sullivan any relationship to the Sullivan who becomes the trustee?

DICKEY: Yes, that’s John Sullivan.

DANIELL: It is the same Sullivan.

DICKEY: He became trustee in my day and secretary of the Navy. And resigned, as a matter of fact, in a controversy with President Truman about the building of an aircraft carrier.

Well, the next thing that happened was that President Hopkins, he and Mrs. Hopkins, would like Chris and myself to come up and be introduced to the community by them at a reception that they were going to hold that they would like...

[End of Tape 14, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 14, Side B]

DICKEY: …primarily for faculty. It may also have included some townspeople but it was primarily faculty. It was a very pleasant occasion held in the main lobby of Baker Library. It was especially pleasant because at that point there were still a great many men on the faculty that I had known, several
of whom I’d had the privilege actually of working a bit with, correcting papers for them in the history department and things like that. We were here just for I guess two days, one or two days. I remember we went out on the campus, and [Laughter] I had my first experience of taking the review of the V-12, whatever you call it….

DANIELL: Marching battalions?

DICKEY: The brigade, or whatever the Navy term is for it, with Mr. Hopkins. I’d never done that sort of thing before. And met people in the administration. Again, there was very little talk of business.

I was very much engaged in disengaging from my work at the State Department. I think I had about the last two or three weeks off in the latter part of October. I believe my resignation became effective about the first of October. But I still had a lot of loose ends to tie up.

We were here for about two days, and Hopkins—Mrs. Hopkins—took Chris over to the house and talked about things she might need to know. We were clear that we didn’t want an inauguration. This was one of the things Mr. Hopkins wanted to find out. I had no taste myself for that sort of thing, and in wartime it was clearly not something that anybody would expect so that was settled very quickly.

He suggested that I come up and stay at the inn, that we come up and stay at the inn until the President’s House was available to us. We didn’t want any substantial renovating done in the President’s House, and the transition there was a very smooth one. Mr. Hopkins had purchased a house up on Rope Ferry Road that he’d always told me—he told me he’d always rather aspired to own, for some reason that I don’t recall.

We went back to Washington. Had a fair amount of packing to do. Had to arrange to move our stuff up. It’s an entirely private aspect of the matter, but I used what retirement money I’d paid in to move.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Now at this point did you know what your salary was going to be yet?

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: You didn’t know! [Laughs]

DICKEY: The trustees settled that my first day. And Mr. McLane spoke to me and asked me whether—I forget what it was; I think it was 15,000—whether
15,000 would be an acceptable salary. And I said whatever they thought was in order was fine as far as I was concerned.

That brings us up to our coming to the job. We came up and went to the Hanover Inn and stayed there. I don’t remember how long but maybe ten days, maybe two weeks or so, while the Hopkins moved out. And there was some painting to be done. And then we moved in. Rattled around in the house because we had very little furniture that was suitable. And the trustees provided a fund to help get some of the furnishings that would be used in the big room and things like that.

[Pause]

DANIELL: That completed that interview. What follows is an interview which began in the afternoon of December 30, 1975. We are on now.

DICKEY: The first experience I had on November 1, which was the first day I came to the job, was the installation ceremony, a very simple affair which was held in the old faculty room of Parkhurst Hall on the second floor, a room that had been created like a small House of Commons, with faculty seated on benches on both sides of the room.

DANIELL: There are a lot of comments in the faculty tapes about the faculty meetings that were held in that room.

DICKEY: Yes. That room very quickly became preempted by other activities. And it indeed had already become unduly crowded for faculty meetings. Thereafter, shortly thereafter, I think really within the year, the faculty meetings were transferred to the 1902 Room of the Library where they were generally held most of the time during my presidency. And then toward the end they were held, after we had the Hopkins Center, in Alumni Hall of Hopkins Center.

The installation ceremony has been written up in a little brochure by Al Dickerson, and I won’t go into that. It involved my having to put together the first honorary degree citation of my career, something that I continued to do personally all through the 25 years on the job; and an activity which I took very seriously as an opportunity to do teaching in a personal context, the context of the person being honored, and also without being too heavy-handed about the values I was seeking to impart to the College and in particular to the graduating class. We may get back to say more about that. But this was the occasion on which the trustees conferred an honorary, a Dartmouth degree, on Mr. Hopkins at the time of his retirement. And I remember how I worked very hard to find just what I
thought ought to be said at that time in the citation. Mr. Hopkins made a graceful statement on his own. And otherwise it was a very simple, formal ceremony with Mr. Hopkins handing to me the Wheelock Bowl and Judge McLane handing me the Charter. It was quite satisfactory.

DANIELL: This was before just the faculty?

DICKEY: This was before just the faculty and the staff of the College, or a few staff people. And I guess Mrs. Hopkins and my family.

I went directly from that installation ceremony into the president’s office, which is also the office of the board of trustees when it meets, and met with the board for the first time. I don’t remember very precisely what was on the agenda of that first meeting.

I do remember something that I’ve always thought was a very generous act on the part of Mr. Hopkins, namely a recommendation that, if I thought well of it, he thought it would be in order to put into effect a salary increase for the faculty. It was something that he could have as readily have done on his own during the fall before I came on the job and gotten a little kudos out of it. But he very generously thought that this would be a nice thing to start a new president off and wasn’t something that he as a retiring president needed.

DANIELL: Carroll Brewster once, I think, told me that Thad Seymour held off getting rid—the final termination of parietals so that this could come under his successor, with the same logic behind it.

DICKEY: That’s right. And it’s a form of generosity, it’s a form of sensitivity, it’s a form of identification with the problems that your successor is going to have that commended itself to me.

Very quickly it was apparent to me, not necessarily the first day but within a matter of days certainly, that the financial requirements of the College were going to be absolutely basic so far as any ability on my part to lead was involved. I’ll speak more in detail about that. But it was just immediately clear that all else almost was going to turn upon our ability to run a tight ship and to raise money to do some of the things we wanted to do. I’ll go into that a little later, as I’ve said, in more detail.

But it was clear to me from the very beginning, and I would say probably from the very first day, that a new president coming into the job was not in a position to—a new president coming really to the College, not just into the job—was not in a position to go out and be an effective money-raiser
until he had been on the job long enough to know really what he wanted to do or try to accomplish, and to know the job and the institution well enough to be convincing with critically-minded people.

So my first inclination was to first find out what our situation was financially as well as I could, to take it in, and to make sure that we were running as tight a ship as possible. I had no problems with that from the point of—in respect to my personal inclinations or way of life. I’d been brought up modestly, very modestly, in a family where money was not plentiful. I’d borrowed my way through college and law school so that…. And when we came here, we came with, well, a minimum of personal resources.

**DANIELL:** You said the last time that you used….

**DICKEY:** Well, as I mentioned to you, we used my retirement money to move on. But I mention this only because it was nothing unusual as far as I was concerned to begin to try to be careful with what money was available, and to make sure that it was used as effectively as possible.

Leaving the finances aside for a moment, it very quickly also became apparent that we were moving into a new era in respect to admissions problems. I was prepared, as I believe I mentioned earlier, for the fact that I was going to have to deal with the issue which Mr. Hopkins had faced, and in some degree I guess he would say created, that involved the question of limiting the admission of Jewish students.

But beyond that specific controversy, which was a very, very difficult, unpleasant, delicate issue, there was very quickly a new kind of competition for admission at the College that was coming out of the postwar period. First in handling the admission of veterans, men returning from the armed forces. But also handling that special kind of admissions problem, which couldn’t be put off, had to be dealt with right away; but handling it in a way that was fair and wise in respect to the high school graduates who were expecting to be admitted into these colleges that next year.

So finances and admissions were clearly problems that wouldn’t wait very long. There was also a time factor that a number of people had mentioned to me in respect to my winning a place, so to speak, with the faculty in respect to educational policies and programs and purposes especially. I came to the job with some convictions in this area that had to a considerable degree taken form during my year of teaching at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. And my friends, a few
on the faculty and a few on the outside, urged me not to postpone too long.

DANIELL: Yes, the grace period.

DICKEY: Having something to say in that area if I wanted, as I most surely did, to make a personal contribution to the enterprise in the area of educational policy. So this was very much on my mind.

And with these problems—and there were other major areas that I'll speak about—there was also the basic problem of taking the institution from, in effect, a mothball stage during the war when there had only been really a token number of civilian students on the campus, from its status as a Navy V-12 institution, back to a fully operating private college with a civilian student body. And this involved just one problem right after another each day.

DANIELL: Had the other Ivy League institutions...from my information here had gone to the military in the same degree Dartmouth had?

DICKEY: Not to the same degree, as I understand it, but to a considerable degree they had. But not the same degree. Dartmouth, I believe, was the largest V-12 program in the country.

DANIELL: That was the impression I had.

DICKEY: Well, that was an institution-wide problem that involved everything from faculty recruitment to admissions; the admissions, as I said a moment ago, of veterans. It involved finances, of course, moving out from under the umbrella of Uncle Sam's financial provisioning of the institution. And it involved the reestablishment, the reestablishment of the vital processes of the place. It's very hard for anyone today, I think, to imagine the condition of an institution which for, well, it's fully three years, had been in mothballs so far as its normal life was concerned. Publications had been closed down or taken over as official Naval publications. The newspaper was not operating as The Dartmouth is accustomed to operating. The fraternities were closed.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: There was no fraternity life, and we had to decide on what terms we would reopen the fraternities...if we would reopen them, which was a...

DANIELL: They weren't used as dorms during...?
DICKEY: It’s my recollection that they weren’t. One of them was used, two of them were used for social purposes, but I think the majority of them were closed. Social purposes connected with the Navy’s social life and things like that. But I know that the basic issue of reopening the fraternities and on what terms if they were to be opened was one of the perplexities.

Along with that was very quickly the urgent problem of deciding what should be the rules and regulations, the parietal rules, if you will, of an institution which was going to have this utterly unprecedented mix of veterans who had known the life of adults in respect to their sexual habits, in respect to their drinking, in respect to their attitudes towards authority, all of these things; along with youngsters coming in 16, 17, a few 18 years of age right out of the high schools. How did you set up the institution to meet these very great disparities in experience that were inevitably going to be a part of the student body?

Then finally—not finally so far as the problems or the challenges—but finally in respect to this group of immediate things to be done was my realization very quickly that the faculty had to be refurbished, a whole new era of recruitment was opening up. It was an old faculty by and large. It was a faculty which had of course aged during the war without being replaced. And therefore the most vital aspect of the enterprise, the quality of the faculty, was immediately at issue as far as I was concerned. Well, this tied into finances, it tied into everything else.

And in that connection, the staff of the College was also reaching retirement age in several critical positions: the treasurer, Halsey [C.] Edgerton [‘06], who’d been wonderfully careful with Dartmouth’s limited resources, had, I think, something like three years left before his retirement, three or four years. Dean [Earl Gordon] Bill, who had been dean of the faculty after having been director of admissions when I came to Dartmouth in 1925.

DANIELL: [Inaudible] Dean Bill on the tapes.

DICKEY: And he was in poor health, and his health got progressively worse. It was clear to me that this man—and he was a rather gallant person; he was quite a different person of course than I had seen across the desk as director of admissions and dean of freshmen, though I didn’t see much of him during my freshman year. But he was a man who was going downhill physically. And then the physical condition very quickly required surgery, a prostate condition I think it was at the time. And at a time when those operations were not as common or as well done as I guess they are today.
In any event, it was not uncommon, I believe, to have that operation at that point involve some mental depression. And Dean Bill went into a very severe mental depression, from which he never made a full recovery, and, it’s no secret, took his life.

Well, I had seen enough of administration in the state government and particularly in the State Department, to have some ideas about where I had to get ready to move with almost the greatest urgency.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And having had the experience of building up an office from nothing and creating a division, the Division of World Trade Intelligence, I was in a fairly good position not to panic about these things. But to realize that they were things that I just couldn’t put off until the most convenient time for doing them. They were things that had to be done, insofar as I could manage it, right then and there.

Well, all these things that I’ve mentioned went on at the same time, and it was a pretty full day. I think it was the second day I was on the job, certainly it wasn’t more than two or three days after I came onto the job, I was in the office, and the door of the office was open. I, both as a matter of policy and as a matter of personal preference, usually left the door of my office open unless there was something private that was going on in it. If my colleagues wanted to see me and there was nobody with me, why, they would come up and come right in.

Bob Strong [Robert C. "Bob" Strong '24], who was director of admissions at that point, and dean of freshmen, a wonderful person in his personal character, his competence, and his devotion to this institution, along with the saving grace which a man in that job needed, a sense of humor, came up to the door and stood in the doorway and said, “May I come in?” And I said, “You surely may.” “Well,” he said, “I think we shouldn’t wait too long before introducing you to some of the problems which I will be bringing to you.” So he said, “I’m bringing this to you which came in the morning mail.” And as he walked over to the desk, he held up a moth-eaten gray D, felt D, a Dartmouth D taken off some sweater. And I wondered what in the world this was. I didn’t know what it was all about. Bob said, “This came with this letter from an alumnus.” He identified him, a man over in Maine, as I recall. “Who has decided if we can’t accept his son for admission next fall, which I’ve had to tell him we couldn’t do, he no longer wanted his D which he had earned in baseball.”
Well, this is something that I subsequently learned to live with in much more acute circumstances than were involved in that incident. But nevertheless, it was mildly traumatic for me sitting there, to realize that here was a problem that involved individual personal disappointment and a bitterness, resentment toward the institution that inescapably was something I was going to have to come to terms with.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, Bob had, let’s say, a sense of humor about these things. But more importantly, he had a sense….

[End of Tape 14, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 15, Side A]

DICKEY: This little incident was the beginning of a brief, indeed less than a year’s, close relationship with Bob Strong. He died the following June during commencement—or during reunions—from a stroke. But during the period from November on until the following June, I suppose I saw him at least, well, several days a week, sometimes every day. And he and I went on the alumni circuit together once or twice.

DANIELL: He was the man, I understand, who took over as director of admissions when Dean Bill was made as…

DICKEY: Dean of faculty.

DANIELL: Dean of the faculty.

DICKEY: That’s correct. He had been an assistant to Mr. Hopkins and went into that job from being an assistant to Mr. Hopkins.

He told me that he had some very basic problems that he wanted to discuss with me to make sure that he understood what I thought was the way to go forward. But he didn’t come rushing at me. He said, “I’m available to you, and we ought to get at these just as soon as you feel you can.”

Well, I should mention at this point that one of the minor complications of getting started on the job was that I came to it with a damaged knee, as we discovered shortly when I got into the hands of the doctors. I had torn a cartilage playing softball in Washington with the State Department against the British Embassy and the Canadians. [Laughter]
I was batting, as I remember, against the pitching of Lester Pearson who subsequently became a close personal friend and later the prime minister of Canada, and I missed the ball and swung clear around and tore the cartilage in one of my knees. This had provided a bit of conversation, I’m sure, on the part of faculty and others here when I limped into the faculty room for the installation ceremonies. And I was limping around the campus most of the time until Dr. [John F.] Gile ['16], who had been a leading member of the clinic and was a member of the board of trustees, suggested that I should see Dr. George Lord ['30], a young surgeon up there. I saw George. And in I think the latter part of November, certainly within a matter of weeks after I was on the job, he said, “Let’s get this behind us.” And I went up and had an operation on my knee.

I mention this at this point because it was while I was convalescing at Dick’s House from the operation that Bob Strong and I started our rather intensive discussions of admissions problems and future policies. He came up, and it was really quite a good opportunity for that kind of discussion because I was not being interrupted by the telephone or other visitors, that sort of thing.

Well, Bob laid out for me, I thought very thoroughly, the admissions picture as he had known it as a director of admissions: the various stages that they’d gone through, the procedures and policies that they’d followed, and came right up to the, as far as he was concerned, critical question of how were we going to deal with the issue that had arisen out of Mr. Hopkins’s controversy with Shumlin and others about Jewish students.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: He opened that conversation, which he knew was of fundamental concern to me, by saying that while he had no sense of having not done the right thing so far as he was able to know what was the right thing, he nevertheless felt that this was an opportunity, in the changing of presidents, that required a really unencumbered, insofar as it could be, look at what should be the policy of the institution.

DANIELL: The policy before had been—was it a specific percentage [inaudible]…?

DICKEY: No, Bob, as I recall—and here I have to be careful because my memory on this could well be hazy a bit—but my memory is that he said that he had never been given a precise percentage of students from one category or another to admit. But that neither did he want me to imagine that there had not been a tendency to protect, what I subsequently termed frequently for a long period, the representative character of the student body. And he
said—he went on to say that Dartmouth had been at a point, in his judgment—he said some of these things are subjective judgments—where we were a sought-after institution and would have, as he thought, endangered the representative character of the student body because there would have been many more Jewish students than they’d had before, and that this would have set in motion conditions that would have made the student body a very different student body from the student body that….

**DANIELL:** Well, there were similar restraints in all the institutions with which Dartmouth normally competed.

**DICKEY:** There was no question about that. And to a considerable degree, the constraints were at least as severe, I subsequently became convinced at least in several institutions I was familiar with, at least as severe as they were here.

Now, it wasn’t very long, or very long afterwards, that I realized that the notion of a representative student body was not a satisfactory concept for many, many reasons, not the least of which was that the student body was not representative of American society. And that when you came into the area of especially the Negro, you had a student body that was at very best a token representative of Negroes, not because they were being excluded from the institution but because they were not being given the opportunity to qualify scholastically for admission into an institution of this character by and large.

But the specific question, namely the use of a precise quota, was something that I never pressed Bob Strong on. But I decided to take the initiative… But my impression, as I’ve said, was that there was not a—that they had not used precise quotas. That Bob had tried to exercise some flexibility and some judgment about this thing. But I decided, as this conversation went on, that there was no advantage to pressing that. That we were at a point where I was going to take the initiative and tell him what my view of it was.

So that toward the end of this briefing that he gave me on this subject, I said, “Well, I think we’re at a point where really I should take the burden of this question for a while.” And I said, “I am prepared to go forward with the proposition that there are no quotas, on the assumption that there have been no quotas.” I said, “I’m not going to go into that myself at this point. But I do want to be in an absolutely clean-cut position that as between you and myself there, and whenever I have occasion to talk to the board of trustees as to what our policies are and the faculty, I’m going to say there
are no quotas. That I am, however, quite prepared to believe that there is validity, educational validity, institutional validity, in a representative student body. That I had gotten a lot out of coming into a student body that at the time as a student I somewhat naively assumed to be a representative study body. And that at any point where I was confronted with a situation where it seemed to me the representative character of the study body, for whatever reason, was really endangered, I would be prepared to face the issue of restriction.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: “But,” I said, “I’m not going to face that issue theoretically in respect to quotas or things of that sort. And I think that I should say to you right now this is the way I want to proceed.” He said, “That’s utterly satisfactory to me.” I remember so distinctly. He said, “This is utterly satisfactory to me. I can proceed on that basis. We can proceed on that basis.” Now I think statistics will show--

DANIELL: I was going to ask you that.

DICKEY: --this opened up the gate quite a bit. And I was prepared for that. I felt not only was it a desirable thing, but something that I just was not willing to deal with on any other basis as far as I personally was concerned. I did learn in the course of the discussion of the history of our admissions here that there had been a period when, I guess it was Dean Bill while he was still director of admissions, had taken a sabbatical leave.

DANIELL: [Charles R.] Lingley had come in?

DICKEY: Yes, Lingley came in as director of admissions on an acting basis for a year. And whether Bob Strong told me this or Mr. Hopkins mentioned it or whether somebody else mentioned it—and it was no secret among people who were close to the administration of things in the College—that the number of Jewish students that came in during Lingley’s year, when apparently nothing was said to him about there being any restrictions, jumped up in a way that disturbed Mr. Hopkins as far as I know.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: No one ever made anything of that to me. But I learned of it either from Bob or possibly from Mr. Hopkins, and this confirmed my feeling that there clearly had been more of a restrictive policy than I was prepared to live with in the postwar period.
DANIELL: Yes. It's been mentioned on a couple of the tapes, in exactly the form that you have said, which I found intriguing because it suggests on the one hand that this was done in an informal way so that President Hopkins would assume that if it were Bill or if it were Strong, would pass on these instructions and not feel as though he had to step in the center in an informal way, or else Lingley could not have just gone ahead and been naïve perhaps if that was his....

DICKEY: Certainly there was no suggestion ever to me that Lingley had violated any instructions that he had been given. And my assumption was he just assumed that this was the way it was run, at least that this was the way he was going to run it unless somebody told him otherwise.

DANIELL: Yes. And given President Hopkins's background, that seems again perfectly understandable because most American business corporations at that time had certain quite specific assumptions I think about access of Jews to....

DICKEY: Now, I think it's important in connection with your mention of Mr. Hopkins's background and attitude on these things, to say that he never said more to me, so far as I recall, about this matter than that he was sorry to leave this controversy on my doorstep. And he said this had been a very unpleasant thing for him because it involved the severance of friendships. It went way back as far as Dartmouth's men of the Jewish community were concerned; many of them were unable to continue a relationship of friendship. And I am absolutely certain that he never made any attempt to convince me that his attitudes, that his practices were those that were right. And I respected him immensely for this. He apologized for leaving the controversy on the doorstep. But beyond that, so far as I know... And I'm sure that this was not an easy thing for him with me. He never sought to intervene, but certainly knew that I had changed the basic principles or the basic premises, that we weren't going to have restrictive policies here unless there was clear evidence, as far as I was concerned, that a basic principle of a representative student body....

DANIELL: Yes. If there was a run on the institution basically.

DICKEY: Yes. Even more than that. That I never sought, and I don't suppose one could, to be very precise about that, but I was very clear with Bob Strong, and he quite understood it, that I wanted the thing handled as clearly on its merits as it could be unless and until he felt there was a situation arising that I would have to make up my mind about.
DANIELL: One question about something mainly because there may not be other sources on this, could you say a word about the nature of the controversy, specific controversy, that Hopkins got in apparently with Dartmouth Jewish alumni? Hopkins does not mention it to the best of my recollection in his tapes at all except once in a very offhand manner. But I know that something which was fairly....

DICKEY: I'm hazy about this. It was written up in Time Magazine and it's available on the record somewhere.

DANIELL: Ah, was it. OK, yes.

DICKEY: But basically it involved, I think, a statement by Mr. Hopkins in correspondence somewhere with someone that there was validity in the restrictive policies that particularly were followed by medical schools in this country. And he used the German experience in a way that opened him up to the charge that he was defending Hitler because he made—or was at least understood—to have said in this correspondence in defense of restrictive policies in the medical schools, that if Germany had been more careful about this sort of thing, they might not have had a Hitler.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: It was the fear of the non-Jewish German.

DANIELL: That gets really loaded.

DICKEY: Yes. That led to Hitler's acceptance by these people. There wasn't the remotest defense of Hitler.

DANIELL: No, no.

DICKEY: But there was a suggestion that Germany to some extent was a victim of the swamping of the German universities with Jewish students and things of that sort.

DANIELL: This was a statement made in the thirties or...?

DICKEY: Oh, no, this was a statement that was made, I think, in correspondence in probably 1944.

DANIELL: That late! I see. So it was really fresh then. That's why I asked the question.
DICKEY: Yes. Certainly during the war. And I think it related to a question that he’d received from somebody, a letter that he’d received from somebody, an inquiry, perhaps a Dartmouth alumnus, perhaps one of the Jewish organizations. I’m not sure—my memory doesn’t serve me well here—how this correspondence was initiated. But in any event, in line with his extraordinary willingness to be quite candid about things, about his views on a thing of that sort, he wrote back and gave this explanation, this justification, as he saw it, for some restrictive policies in this regard.

This correspondence was then in some way shared I believe by its recipient with a man named Shumlin, who was, I believe, a Broadway producer. I don’t think he was ever known previously to Mr. Hopkins. At least this is my assumption. And it’s also my assumption that Mr. Hopkins did not expect this correspondence, when he wrote it, to be widely circulated. Whether he subsequently gave permission for it to be shared with Shumlin or whether it went to Shumlin in the first instance, I’m hazy about. But in any event, the correspondence quickly became a Hopkins-Shumlin correspondence. And Shumlin wrote back—or wrote to Mr. Hopkins—and took very sharp exception to the views that he’d expressed. And I think it may have gone a little far, as far as Mr. Hopkins’ view of the matter was concerned, in charging him with being sympathetic to Hitler or something of that sort. I don’t know whether that was in it. In any event, that correspondence became envenomed.

DANIELL: Yes, I can see why in ’45 or ’46.

DICKEY: Then this became public knowledge. Shumlin gave out the correspondence, I guess, and this led to a snowstorm of protests here at the College, especially from Dartmouth Jewish alumni. Bob Strong told me, in the course of our sessions in Dick’s House, that he had never in his life been through anything remotely as unpleasant as this had been because he had had to handle the bulk of this correspondence as director of admissions. And this involved inevitably many close personal friendships for him as well as Mr. Hopkins. And he made no secret of the fact that this had been an exceedingly heavy cross for him to bear.

DANIELL: Yes. Do you think that precipitated or had anything to do with Hopkins decision in terms of timing of…?

DICKEY: If it did, it was never mentioned to me or suggested to me by anyone. In other words, I would just have to say that that was something that I had no indication whatsoever. And I would be quite doubtful about it for other reasons, simply because Mr. McLane and others had said that Mr. Hopkins had intended to retire when the war was over, that the war was
over, and he had given them notice that he did want to retire when it would be convenient at the end of the war. He did have a chronic angina condition which had been under medical care, and he had been urged—I think it was Dr. Paul Dudley White—by Dr. White to ease up on his public speaking and things like that. So that I would be very surprised that this was a major factor.

Indeed, my memory is that at the time I came on the job, or at the time that my appointment was announced, there was not much mention of this controversy, which I think had to a degree been quieted down. If it still was a major factor in his, in Mr. Hopkins’ view of his keeping and staying on the job, it probably would have shown up in the press accounts. There were several references to it that he had been involved in this controversy and so forth but it was not the overshadowing thing at that point that it probably would have been if it had been the decisive factor in his decision to put it down at that point.

DANIELL: You also give very much the impression that Bob Strong was quite relieved by the freedom you gave him [inaudible]…

DICKEY: There is no question about it that, in my mind, that Bob at this point welcomed the opportunity to liquidate this issue.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I’m sure that he felt it had to be dealt with in some way. That a new man was in the best of all possible positions to deal with it. I, of course, was never privy to Bob’s discussions of these things with Mr. Hopkins. I don’t know whether he talked with Mr. Hopkins about our discussions. I would think it quite possible that they did talk because Bob was close to Mr. Hopkins, was a great admirer of Mr. Hopkins. I think it entirely probable that Bob kept Mr. Hopkins informed with respect to these discussions and my attitudes.

DANIELL: Was this ever discussed in the board of trustees?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. The next thing that happened, and even before I went to the hospital, I think it was my first meeting with the faculty. Certainly not later than my second meeting with the faculty, within a week or two of my coming onto the job, probably by mid-November. I was told by, I’m not sure which faculty member came to see me, but I think it may have been Alex Laing [Alexander K. Laing ’25]. If it wasn’t Alex Laing, it was somebody who was working with Alex in an effort to bring the issue before the faculty. I think very possibly it involved George [E.] Diller,
formerly of the romance languages [department], was one of the men involved in that. These were not young faculty at that point, but they were younger than most of the others. And I’m trying to recall who were some of the others. It was a substantial group so far as I recall, but not an overwhelming group. And there were other faculty members who came to see me before the meeting and said that they were not disposed to have this matter dealt with in the terms that Alex wanted it dealt with. And here again, my recollection of which faculty members were involved in that position is not entirely clear. I think one of them may have been [William] Stuart Messer, who was a very powerful… had been the chairman of the Faculty Steering Committee or whatever it was called during the war.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And possibly [Anton A.] Tony Raven of the English department who had also been active in faculty affairs. I think it’s fair to say that these people were not close to Alex and the other group in the faculty and indeed probably somewhat basically inclined to disagreement with these people—not over the Jewish issue, but just in general. The same thing you see in faculty groups at all times.

DICKEY: In any event, I remember distinctly talking with the group that wanted to bring this up… And they wanted to bring up a resolution that was ostensibly…

In short, I more or less said I need time here to know what this is all about, and I’m not going to become identified with some horseback resolution of this sort at this point. Just how that came out, I’m curiously not clear other than that that resolution did not pass in the form that they brought it up. My present hazy recollection is that it was withdrawn after some typical statements of position. And that some of the older faculty people said this
is not something that needs to be rushed to action at this point; there is a new president who has stated that he’s assuming responsibility for reviewing Dartmouth’s admissions policies and procedures, and that he will make his position on this clear just as soon as he’s completed that.

In any event, what looked at one point as if it might be a volcanic kind of eruption subsided. I had the opportunity to work out my position with Strong a few weeks later at Dick’s House. And subsequently made a statement to the faculty that there were no quotas as far as I was concerned, that there would be no quotas. That if it was necessary to protect the representative character of the student body, which I hoped it would not be necessary, this was something I would face with them if and when that came to be.

DANIELL: Did it ever get to any discussion or exchange or questioning from the faculty to you in a faculty meeting?

DICKEY: Not that I…. It must have been. It must have. But it was not a major thing in my life that I recall. I remember that at meetings of the executive committee of the faculty, we would talk about the admissions procedures and operations. But I don’t recall the Jewish issue was one. Now, when it came to the board of trustees…. What?

DANIELL: I was just going to say that the reason I asked is that I’ve listened now to all the tapes done from the faculty that Dr. [Arthur M.] Wilson has done, and, gee, I don’t think in all those it’s been mentioned other than in passing and my point is, I don't think from the point of view of the faculty… Even Alex Laing’s tape, it’s a little prioritized [inaudible]...

DICKEY: I think I’m being accurate, and I have no sense of being defensive about it whatsoever, I think I’m being accurate in saying that this did not become an issue that was difficult to handle insofar as faculty was concerned.

I had on the… but it did become within the board of trustees at one point where I just had to really put all four feet down and say this was the way—this is the position I’ve taken, this is the way I stated it to the faculty, and this was the way, as far as I was concerned, it was going to have to be.

Now here I’ll mention something that has got to be completely confidential and may be known to others; it would be known to people who were on the board then, but not very many of them are—I’m not sure any of them are living around. But the fellow who really subsequently—wasn’t on the board at the beginning on this, but when he did come to the board…and I
probably ought to talk later about additions to the board and things of that sort.

DANIELL: Oh, yes, very definitely.

DICKEY: The fellow who was not prepared to accept my position on this was Sig Larmon [Sigurd S. "Sig" Larmon '14].

DANIELL: I’d gotten a suspicion that was one of the issues involving Larmon.

DICKEY: Well, this was not an issue that was involved in his leaving the board. I can tell you, I think, with utter confidence that was simply—to put it right on the record now, and then we can come back to it—his being passed over when there was a vacancy in the Life Trusteeship.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: Jock Brace [Lloyd D. Brace '25] was given the nod by the board. But Sig kept gnawing at this issue. He kept identifying it with the fact that for the next few years we were not having much success on the football field. There is always a syndrome about these things that you quickly learn to identify. And we had a meeting of the board shortly after he came to the board, actually it was up at the president’s house one night. And Sig got to holding forth about the fact that the admissions policies had been relaxed and opened up to the point where Dartmouth was going to be increasingly unacceptable to non-Jewish applicants, non-Jewish alumni, and so forth and so on.

It was clear to me that he didn’t have anybody else on the board who was willing to at least—to take that position. I am not able to say, I just don’t know whether there was anybody else on the board that was glad to have this point of view expressed. There may have been. But there was nobody that took the position that he took. And I decided I had to take my position really just unequivocally and said it: I had taken a position with the faculty; I’d told the director of admissions where I stood and it was within the power of the board, as far as I was concerned, to reverse this, and I was quite prepared to face that if this was what was wanted but it was not something that I was going to take responsibility for. I never used any, in all the years I was on the job, any threats about resigning or anything of that sort. I just don’t believe in that sort of thing. I’d long since learned, back earlier, to stay away from that kind of talk. But I just said I was not going to assume responsibilities for an institution that was not able to pursue policies that I thought were basic to its integrity in this respect.
It was a rather tense session. But this was long behind us when Sig left the board later. I was very glad that when we went out that night and left—Judge McLane, who was the last one out the door of the house, said, “Well, you earned tonight.” And I knew that he was with me.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And I had a feeling that, well, that one is now behind us.

DANIELL: This, I know, questions of timing get…but was this in the forties, or was this in the fifties?

DICKEY: Well, this was shortly after Sig came to the board, and we can look that up. But he was very definitely….

DANIELL: ‘Forty-eight to ’56 he was on the board.

DICKEY: Well, this would have dropped probably then about ’49.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Probably been about ’49, maybe ’50. When we were…. I remember the football-athletic thing was thrown into the picture. And we’ll come to a discussion of it. But Sig was literally the only trustee that ever in my years on the job that I really had to in effect put down.

DANIELL: Put down, yes. Was this at an official board meeting or was this…?

DICKEY: This was an official board meeting.

DANIELL: That’s the way in which you have to meet those challenges at an official board meeting.

DICKEY: No, he brought it up. He brought it up that there was a problem with respect to Dartmouth admissions that he wanted to have discussed. And I welcomed that. I welcomed it because I needed to know where we stood on this.

DANIELL: You have a meeting at four, I know, and this is a convenient breaking place….

The interview on December 31, 1975 ended here.

[Pause]
The next interview was on the 2nd of January, 1976.

Yes, fine. I just had one more question, which the answer may be simply no to, concerning what we spent a good portion of the last session on, namely the question of Jewish admissions. And you talked about it in the context of faculty and the trustees. I wondered whether there was any difficulty or any response among the alumni body as a whole to the changed criteria or stance of the institution on this?

DICKEY: No. So far as I remember, there was not. And I’m quite certain there was no general expression of interest or concern as far as I was concerned. As I mentioned earlier, there was a rather extensive, very sharp correspondence that came in at the time of the controversy which Mr. Hopkins had with Shumlin. I’ve never looked at that correspondence. Bob Strong described it to me, and I gathered from his description that it was quite extensive and certainly it was very bitter in the main.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I do not recall if there was any occasion for, that is, any public statement by myself or the College that would have elicited alumni reaction of any consequence during my first years on the job. And as I said, there was not very much discussion of the subject once I had made clear that as far as I was concerned, they could be sure there were no quotas being used in the admissions operation, and that the only influence that might be exerted in the direction of restriction at any point would be if experience indicated that the principle of a representative study body was threatened. And we, I believe, never did attempt any restrictive policies that would have called forth alumni reactions.

And we only had, to my knowledge, one explicit discussion of the matter in the board of trustees. There must have been other mention of it, but only one specific discussion based upon the concern expressed by one of the trustees.

So that this aspect of the matter, while I’m sure it must have presented problems to the people engaged in admissions because whenever an individual is turned down, it’s only the most common human nature for him and—there were no girls involved then—and his parents and friends to feel that there must have been some ulterior reason for the individual not making it. So that I haven’t any doubt at all that, although I do not remember ever having been involved personally in any correspondence
related to such complaints, I have no doubt at all that there were such complaints.

DANIELL: With the same kind of syndrome.

DICKEY: Constantly in the admissions office.

DANIELL: Yes, same kind of syndrome that exists now both in terms of women admissions and even more in terms of the equal opportunity....

DICKEY: Very possibly, very possibly.

DANIELL: Bob Strong died within a year.

DICKEY: He died very suddenly actually from a stroke or heart attack in a meeting of the alumni, I believe, at the time of the Alumni Council meeting in June of '46.

DANIELL: And who took over the admissions right after that?

DICKEY: Al Dickerson stepped in and took over as director of admissions. This leads me to say that admissions per se became and remained for a number of years a critical focus of alumni concern. And not, as I’ve said, so far as I remember, because of any issue related to the controversy Mr. Hopkins had had earlier about Jewish admissions. But rather because we were moving very rapidly—much more rapidly than we foresaw—into a period when the competition for admission at Dartmouth was drastically changed from what it had been during the thirties and right up to the beginning of the war.

Dartmouth began her selective process back in, I believe, it was the early twenties, very early twenties. And from that time on right up until I came on the job, there was a policy of selective admissions. But I was told by Bob Strong, and I am reasonably certain it was an accurate judgment of the matter, that all through that earlier period the competition for admission was really not a serious embarrassment to the College simply because by and large they were able to take all of those who were genuinely qualified to do college-level work. A few where the judgment might have been arguable.

But after the war, very, very promptly, we found ourselves confronted for the first time certainly in Dartmouth’s history, I believe, with the fact that many of the individuals whom we were having to turn down could have performed college-level work, but who simply were selected out, denied
admission, because they were not as well qualified, had not demonstrated
the same potential for first-rate or good college work in school as some
other candidates.

DANIELL: This was true by the time you had become president?

DICKEY: No. This came, I would say, it really came for the first time with the Class
of 1950. The Class of 1949 was pretty well selected, you see, in ’45,
before I was on the job. The Class of 1950 was the last class selected by
Bob Strong in the winter and spring of 1946. And that class involved a
substantial number of individuals who were being readmitted after being
mustered out of military service, as well as men coming from the high
schools. And to a degree, that mix masked from us the fact that we were
entering into a totally different kind of competition for admission into the
College.

So that it wasn’t until the next year, when Al Dickerson as a new director
of admissions had taken over, and the year after that, the first two year or
three years of his period as director of admissions, made it just painfully
clear and painfully is the only word for it, that we were having to move into
a period when the disappointments of parents, and especially of alumni
parents, was going to be a new, essentially new, and critically—and
critically is not too strong a word—critically important problem for the
welfare of the College.

DANIELL: How do you explain this? I mean, you know, the problem over a longer
period of time is easy to understand. But I’m surprised, at least I wouldn’t
have predicted, that you would describe this coming in such a
concentrated way in that period. What had changed about Dartmouth’s
image?

DICKEY: Well, I think it wasn’t just the change in the attractiveness of Dartmouth,
although I think this had played a role and increasingly was a factor in our
ability to compete with the best for a share of the best. But the fact was
that there was a backed-up desire in American society for admission to
college. An awful lot of youngsters, you see, had gone into the services or
hadn’t gone to college for one reason or another because of the war. So
that you had a backed-up demand. And then the population increase
began to work. But most importantly, I suppose, was the fact that the
notion of going to college at this point became a prime value in American
society, probably largely because of economic conditions that were
changed. But there had been a steady upward valuing of a college
education through the twenties and the thirties. And after the war it
became just almost an essential in the eyes of....
So the [inaudible] colleges in which Dartmouth was in the circle of, without getting into the Ivy League thing which we’re going to handle a little bit later, New England, good liberal arts colleges, from what you knew, were they experiencing the same sort of thing?

Oh, very definitely.

Right.

Amherst, Williams, Wesleyan, and Bowdoin, which we were in closest touch with, we had a small group of these private, historic men’s colleges, which we called the Pentagonal Group. And we exchanged information with remarkable candor. Remarkable in respect to the difficulties of getting any really candid information in some other situations. But we exchanged information every year and discussed our common problems in admissions quite fully. And the directors of admission in these institutions were in close touch with each other. And the pattern which I’m describing to you was present there. I haven’t the statistics which would permit me to say what the variations were between institutions. But there’s no doubt about it. We were in an increasingly acute competition.

Now, one of the most difficult aspects of that problem for us from ’47 on through to—acutely—for another five years was that we had to do our level best to reeducate Dartmouth alumni concerning the alumni preference for admission. The alumni preference had been established back at the time of—I don’t know how much earlier—but certainly during the period of the selective process on the basis that most alumni understood as assurance that their sons would be able to come to Dartmouth if they wanted to.

As a matter of fact, there had been instances where the College had just felt the individual was not qualified for admission. And those had been dealt with as best they could—as best the College authorities could. And I’m sure there were some acute disappointments then, but not a great swell of disappointment and criticism.

But immediately after the war, we found that we were up against a situation in which we were having to say quite straightforwardly to parents, Dartmouth parents, that the alumni son preference only operated when the alumni son was theoretically equally qualified to the last individual who would otherwise be admitted into the class. Well, this is a theoretical thing. You cannot calculate admissions quite that exactly. But it was a very different proposition from saying that there is an absolute preference.
DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: That guarantees you an admission if you want to come. In other words, you've got to face the competition. And we were quickly clear and really utterly clear that if Dartmouth was going to be a strong institution, and it was going to compete with the kind of institutions that it claimed to compete with, there was no alternative to that policy. We just could not justify turning down well-qualified students or better-qualified students in the school in order to take a Dartmouth alumni son.

Now the fact is that we discovered very quickly that this was a view of Dartmouth that too many schools had. That Dartmouth was the place where an alumni son could come if he couldn't go anywhere else. And this was hurting us very, very seriously. It was one of the things we had to move right in on and be just as straight and candid as we knew how with school people. Namely, that while we would give the preference to an alumni son who was equally qualified with somebody else who would otherwise come, we would not jump a qualified person in order to take an alumni son.

DANIELL: How was this handled as far as the alumni were concerned? I mean, was there a statement of this in the alumni magazine [inaudible]....

DICKEY: Oh, yes! Oh, yes. Al Dickerson put out literature on it. We visited the schools. I made speeches to every alumni club that I met with for five years, and that would have been all of the big clubs several times. We carried on a continuing correspondence with members of the alumni body who either had had personal disappointments or had misunderstood the policy and were disturbed about it. The principal burden of handling the massive correspondence, and there was an awful lot of it, fell on Al Dickerson, and he was a superb letter-writer, so he handled the explanation as well as it could be handled.

I had the ultimate responsibility in the administration, and frequently Al would say to me, “I think this is a case where maybe it would be worthwhile your taking it and saying that this is College policy.” Now one of the difficulties that went along with this changing competition was that it was interpreted by almost all disappointed parents and concerned alumni as indicating a change in policy on the part of the College rather than a change in a situation.

DANIELL: Yes. Oh, yes.
DICKEY: And this was very, very difficult to handle because of course it was attributed primarily to a new president, that I was seeking to turn Dartmouth into a little Harvard or a little this or a little that, you know. This kind of business. And it was understandably extremely difficult for these people to believe that their sons and this fine boy, whether he was a son or just a son of friend, was not being denied admission because of a change in policy rather than simply a change in the competition. I've often said that I believe Dartmouth owed and owes a greater debt to Al Dickerson than almost anybody, except possibly myself, realizes because it would have been exceedingly easy for a director of admissions to have played it the easy way. And I can only say, without making speeches to each other or fight talks, we stood back to back on this matter and ....

[End of Tape 15, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 16, Side A]

DICKEY: I was saying when you changed the tape that out of the problem of keeping Dartmouth’s admissions operation on a, well, to put it bluntly, on just as honest a basis as we could keep it, Al Dickerson lost dozens and dozens of really close personal friends. Quite a few of them very shortly were classmates of his.

I lost my share of them, men who just couldn’t believe that if I was willing, I couldn’t instruct or shouldn’t instruct the admissions office that so-and-so should be admitted. It was not only the fathers. I remember one of the bitterest letters I received was from a mother, a Dartmouth mother, who just simply was outraged beyond her ability to express herself, at the fact that this boy, this fine boy, and he was a fine boy I’m sure, was not being admitted.

I think Dartmouth may have had a unique problem in this respect in the country because Dartmouth had tied her alumni so closely, so emotionally to the institution, that the denial of admission to a son became just a major disappointment, something which was understandably very difficult to accept under those conditions. At least I know of no other institution which had quite the same problem. Princeton in the Ivy Group came as close as any—as any others—to our situation. But ours was singularly acute.

DANIELL: I think if you believe the stories you hear, that probably at least Harvard didn’t play the game quite as straight or as hard-nosed as you’ve described Dartmouth playing it. I don’t know whether that’s true or not.

DICKEY: Well, you never know. And each institution has its share of anomalous cases. There was one very, very prominent case. I guess I’ll go so far as
to say the son of a presidential candidate, but I think I just won’t go further
than that because it’s of no consequence other than that. But the father
was an alumnus of another Ivy institution. And he was a person that I’d
had the privilege of knowing personally and whom I’d respected and
admired. His son came up to Dartmouth, and he was, of course, well
received by the admissions office. And yet in due course the director of
admissions had to say to me, with real regret, that he just couldn’t admit
this lad in the competition that existed that year.

We were at an Ivy Group presidents’ meeting shortly thereafter, and one
of the other presidents, whom I knew quite well, was commenting on the
fact that a third Ivy president who was present at the meeting had been
twitting him, this other Ivy president, about the fact that a son of that
president’s institution—that the son of an alumnus of that first president’s
institution was coming to Ivy University X the next year. The president of
the other institution obviously couldn’t refrain from telling me that the
alumnus had applied to have the boy admitted to his own college, but that
they hadn’t been able to take him. And he said, “I didn’t have the nerve to
tell so-and-so that we turned him down [Laughter] before he went to the
other place,” the other Ivy institution. And now I’ve got to say I didn’t have
the nerve to tell either one of them that we’d turned him down also.
[Laughter]

But there were not a great many, but each year you would hear of a case
or two like that. Frequently with candidates who were supposed to be
promising football players, that Institution X took somebody that had been
turned down at Dartmouth or somewhere else, etc.

DANIELL: Was there much discussion of this in the board of trustees as it potentially
affected the degree to which the alumni supported the finances?

DICKEY: Yes, yes. This was a subject of I won’t say constant discussion in the
board of trustees because the board of trustees understood the problem.
And the discussions in the board of trustees at the very outset were
sufficiently full that much as they might have preferred a different situation,
the board understood it and didn’t just constantly bring it up.

But it was otherwise in the Alumni Council where, of course, you were
going a turnover of alumni, and the Alumni Council members were
constantly being given a hard time back home: Why don’t you go up there
and really straighten out the College on these cases? So that this problem
continued I would say as an acute problem—and indeed it’s not too strong
to say an acute challenge to the integrity of the institution—for, oh, I would
guess five, maybe seven years.
Toward the end of that period, you’d begun to educate the alumni body to the fact that this was a changed ballgame as far as admissions were concerned, and that the competitive principle was what was operating, not some new admissions policy.

There’s another thing that entered into this situation that is very relevant to the amelioration of the concern or criticism. And that is that it began to be obvious that Dartmouth was competing for the kind of student that alumni, and especially trustees, were proud to know wanted to come to Dartmouth. And unhappy as all of us were when a fine lad didn’t make it, and especially a lad who was a son of a friend or son of an alumnus who’d served the College with dedication for years and years, we still had to recognize we couldn’t have it both ways.

If we wanted to stand well with the schools, there was absolutely no alternative, absolutely none but to have those school people feel that their candidates were going to be dealt with on their merits. And if you’ve taken two or three boys from a dozen who were seeking to come from the school, the school knew the score. And now there were often cases were a school would’ve preferred one close—or one applicant to another who’s reasonably close to him for reasons of their own. But by and large, we rather quickly established the proposition that Dartmouth admissions decisions were being taken on their merits. And that the alumni son preference was operating after the individual had met the basic competition.

**DANIELL:** I can remember when I was admitted to or applying to colleges in 1951, I had one year at Exeter Academy and then graduated from high school up in Maine. And I expressed an interest in applying to Dartmouth, in fact that’s the only place I applied to, and I remember at that point in time the perception was the old perception, that I was told, if I really wanted to go to Dartmouth, I didn’t even have to apply anywhere else because I was a son of an alumnus and because I was a reasonably competent student.

**DICKEY:** Well, you’ve mentioned a situation which there’s no reason I shouldn’t speak of, but which had some special angles to it that I had to deal with and that were not easily dealt with effectively in any short time.

At some point, and I don’t know just when it was, the view got abroad in Exeter, and Exeter was a center of it, more so than Andover and some of the other prominent private secondary schools, and for reasons that I could explain but it would require going into some detail, this view became
an entrenched point of view at Exeter and was centered around Myron Williams, who was the college placement man at Exeter.

Well, I had known Myron Williams back when my father-in-law was on the Exeter faculty, and we were married in the Exeter chapel, and I knew Exeter pretty well and the people around there. Shortly after I came on the job, it was said to me by quite a few people whom I respected, including some of my Dartmouth friends who were involved in Exeter alumni affairs on their board and elsewhere, that Myron Williams was really just utterly unable to take Dartmouth seriously as a place where Exeter students ought to go if they had any aspirations to have a serious college education.

Well, I decided not to take this on in a complaining way, but to try to do something about having Exeter know a little bit more about Dartmouth. Well, the further I got into this thing, the more appalled I was at the situation at Exeter in this regard. We could send down some of our faculty that were really able to hold their own as college teachers with any of them, and we would make some progress.

But then I ran into a situation where my son went to Exeter as a student, had a good record at Exeter, sat in a college briefing or college admissions briefing given by Myron Williams, and obviously he didn’t give a thought to who was there. It was something about the fact that if you’re going to such-and-such institution, you’d better get on the ball; we can shoehorn you into Dartmouth if you want to go to Dartmouth. Well, of course, my son reported this to me. And we at one point—I forget just how it was arranged—got Myron Williams up here. He’d never been to Dartmouth. Now here’s a fellow in charge of recommending boys for college in the same state, two hours or so away, by car from Dartmouth. I had luncheon with him down on the porch of the Hanover Inn; it was during summer or June, sitting on the porch looking out at the library. And I’d taken him up to the library. He said, “John, I never imagined that Dartmouth had a library like this!” Well, I didn’t say what was on my mind.

DANIELL: Very controlled.

DICKEY: But Exeter was almost a uniquely difficult problem for us in this respect. We gradually turned it around. And then one of the factors that helped us most was when we began turning down Exeter students that they just thought, that some of the Exeter people thought, should just walk into Dartmouth. And this was just exactly what we needed because it permitted us to say to them, under the most favorable circumstances, or at least the
most effective circumstances from our point of view, "Look, we just cannot take lads, much as we might like to, if they are not really in the same competitive range as other students, and these fellows aren't." "Well, but they've gone to Exeter." "Yes, we know they've gone to Exeter." So that was changed.

Now, we had this problem in a much less acute way in many other private secondary schools, and in part because Dartmouth had been able to work the public high schools much more effectively than the secondary schools—than the private secondary schools. But this was in part related to the fact that Dartmouth was not requiring College Board examinations up to the early fifties. At that point we found that our competition had strengthened, our competition for admission, had strengthened to the point, that is our ability to compete, to speak more accurately, had strengthened to the point that we really needed a better basis for passing judgment on a national group of applicants than we had without the College Boards. So we instituted the College Boards as a requirement. And I suppose the introduction of the requirement for College Boards at that time was one of the difficult decisions we took because we weren't at all sure that this wouldn't really handicap us quite severely. As it turned out, it worked the other way.

DANIELL: Do you remember the timing on this? I know I never took them in '51, but it wasn't very long after that.

DICKEY: Well, this would have been very quickly after that. I would have guessed within the next two years.

DANIELL: Yes. That's what I thought, too, yes.

DICKEY: The next two or three years. But it was one of the decisions that we weighed very carefully, discussed carefully, and then decided that we would take the plunge. And as so often turns out, it strengthened rather than handicapped our position.

DANIELL: It gave you something concrete on which in part to justify the rejections to alumni sons in particular.

DICKEY: That's right. That's right.

DANIELL: It's a lot easier to do that if the board scores come out low than if they don't.
DICKEY: And we fortunately also were able to avoid getting into the so-called first choice policy problem which had become a serious handicap in the admissions operations of places such as Yale and elsewhere, where they were candid with their candidates and said unless Yale is your first choice, you’re not going to be viewed very favorably here. We fortunately were not in a position to be that choosy at the outset. And therefore we were spared the fact of being stuck with what turned out for these other institutions to be a poor policy in the long run.

Well, I’ve used the term competitive a number of times. And I think it’s very relevant to say that if there was one great difference between Dr. Tucker’s period and my period on the job, it would be that I could never say, as he did at the time of his retirement from the presidency, that one of the nicest things about it had been that it did not involve any competitive relations with other institutions.

Well, the American college world in the post-World War II period was a competitive situation. We were competing for students because only insofar as you had a student body that was selected on its merits and had a strong potential for doing academic work were you going to have a fair share of your people going on to the graduate schools and the professional schools which were the entrée into the professional side of American society. And you needed that kind of strength in order to attract strength. Your ability to attract faculty, the faculty that you wanted, was related to that.

I was determined from the very outset, I think it’s fair to say, that if I had the time and luck and the resources, we were going to stiffen up the academic program to a considerable degree and this required a strong student body, required a strong faculty. They were all interrelated. And in all of those areas, you were competing with the strongest institutions in the private sector of American higher education: the Ivy institutions, the Pentagonal group.

I remember, oh, I suppose it was during my first year on the job or second year when I began to talk very explicitly about some of the—and concretely—about certain objectives that I wanted to see us accomplish. For example, I’m speaking now of moving up the percentage of people who were receiving financial aid at the College. We were in a time, I think, in a low twenty percent, I don’t remember exactly what it was, who were receiving from the institution. And I think some of our competition were up, oh, in the middle thirties, middle thirty percent or thereabouts, at least ten percent higher than we were. And I had borne down pretty hard on some other aspects of the budget, and had set some fairly explicit targets for us.
to try to meet both through raising money and being careful about what we spent our money on.

One day the treasurer of the College, a wonderful steward of Dartmouth’s limited resources, Halsey Edgerton, said to me, in his quiet Vermont way, “Well,” he said, “I don’t know whether it’s what you want to hear or not but I guess I ought to say that we don’t have—and I don’t think we ever will have—the resources to compete with these places.”

Well, I just couldn’t accept that and stay here, as far as I was concerned. I had whatever it was, pride or ambition or illusion, that didn’t permit me to operate on that basis. So we had a lot of opportunities to be creative, we might say, in finding ways to be competitive. We did move up our percentage of people who were receiving financial aid. We found ways to combine the loan and the grant for some of the others, felt it was quite necessary. But by and large, we competed.

Whereas in the faculty area, we never made any pretense to going out and competing for internationally recognized scholars who were primarily committed to a career of scholarship. We did insist that we wanted—increasingly we were insistent—that we wanted first-rate people who were committed primarily to a career of college teaching, but coupled with a strong, continuing activity as scholars in one way or another. We would be charged at times with being committed to the old slogan, “Publish or perish.” But in quite a few instances, we were by our promotion policies able to make clear that we rated creative, active scholarship as being present even if it wasn’t always in the form of published material.

DANIELL: The emphasis was initially upon—and that’s a huge topic we’ll want to spend a lot of time on because certainly from having listened to all the faculty tapes, you made fundamental changes in the whole nature of the faculty. But at this point, when we’re talking about the admissions….

DICKEY: I’m talking here about the general problem of competing, not particularly focusing on our internal situation. But mentioning students, admissions, financial aid, and the recruitment of faculty—

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: --as being part of the total competitive relationship which existed in these institutions during the post-World War II period. Apparently a totally different atmosphere than existed in the time of Dr. Tucker’s day…

DANIELL: Oh, absolutely.
DICKEY: ... At the beginning of the century.

DANIELL: It was very much a regional college then.

DICKEY: So, well, perhaps one can finish off this particular discussion of the competitiveness that existed in our group of colleges by referring to the formation of the Ivy Group in intercollegiate athletics.

When I came on the job in the fall of ’45, Mr. Hopkins told me that the eight colleges which became the Ivy Group—we never used the term Ivy League in our literature; the sportswriters took care of that very quickly [Laughter]—he told me that this group had reached an agreement for the establishment of a league, if you will, that would compete in intercollegiate athletics, and would establish basic academic policies that permitted the institutions to have confidence that there would not be insurmountable disadvantage because one institution was doing something that the other institutions weren’t willing or able to do.

The matter had not been reduced to a formal agreement or at least to a final agreement at that point. And quite early on, I forget just which year it was, I found myself working with President Conant of Harvard. The two of us were given the task of drafting or redrafting an agreement for the Ivy Group. I had by that time had a fair exposure to a discussion of the whole business of intercollegiate athletics in the country. I forget which organization it was, whether it was the American Council on Education or some national group that had sponsored a number of meetings of that sort, and it became clear to me that you were not going to be able to establish standards on a national basis that were going to be very helpful or satisfactory to a group such as the Ivy Group. And that in the main on issues such as spring practice and things of that sort in football, we had to decide what was wanted by a small group of institutions rather than try to get the whole country to accept these things.

DANIELL: Especially in the [inaudible].

DICKEY: So I did spend a fair amount of time and had a very satisfactory relationship—indeed it was the beginning of a close personal relationship—with Jim Conant of Harvard, the two of us working on these things. He took the view that I understood the problems of drafting an agreement of that sort because I had a background in law, and his background in chemistry didn’t fit him for that. But he was a very—and is—a very sensible, practical-minded person as well as being one of the top scholars of the country.
DICKEY: Well, I was speaking of the establishment of the Ivy Group. I don’t think there’s anything that probably I need to speak of in any detail there. The composition of the group, the eight institutions involved, had been, as I said, pretty well settled by Mr. Hopkins and his counterparts before I came on the job. The working out of the detailed language of the agreement was not a major problem. We were all clear that one of the things that we wanted to stop was spring practice.

DANIELL: That had existed before?

DICKEY: That had existed before. And there was a considerable amount of misunderstanding about this move on our part, that is, the move on the part of the Ivy institutions, among their alumni and among their coaches and to a considerable degree among sportswriters. The notion was that spring practice didn’t take any more time than maybe some other sport that had practice in the fall and then its schedule in the spring, and so forth.

But the thing that was clear to the presidents was that it wasn’t an issue of the arithmetic of the number of practices you had. But that this sport had just simply become a symbol of institutional power, a symbol of institutional vanity if you will. And that the preoccupation on the part of students and especially a very large sector of the alumni with football was not a healthy thing for these institutions in respect to both their primary academic purposes and in respect to their total life as an institution. It put one sport—tended to put—one sport into a special category.

The same thing was true of the Bowl games. It was not that playing in a Bowl game was poisonous. But it kept the focus of the campus on football and a winning football team clear into, as it does now for some of these teams, into mid-January. And we were just satisfied that this was not a healthy condition. And that one of the ways to move in on it was, at least for our time, was to say we’re not going to have spring practice, and we were not going to have our teams competing in these Bowl games.

Well, we had a fair amount of roughage in the sporting pages. We were denying boys the right to play in charity games, and a whole lot of nonsense was spread in some of the sporting columns. But by and large,
the formation of the Ivy Group and the terms of the agreement made their way on their merits. And in very few years most of our alumni and others were pointing proudly to the Ivy Group as a sensible way to have good, healthy, vigorous competition in intercollegiate sports and still not have the institution operating in the shadow of its football program.

DANIELL: I have a question about the whole Ivy Group in comparison to other institutions at some point. I don't know if this is the time to ask it. But you were….

DICKEY: Go ahead.

DANIELL: You talked earlier in terms of admissions and that there was cooperation with the Pentagonal Group of Bowdoin, Amherst, Williams. And here in athletics you're talking about an Ivy Group which puts you in competition with or in coordination with a different really, set of institutions: They're larger, they're graduate-oriented.

DICKEY: Totally different so far as football programs are concerned.

DANIELL: The uniqueness of Dartmouth quite frequently is said is that Dartmouth maintains its, has been able to maintain a halfway position somewhere in between these two groups of colleges. Have you made any observations on why it was that in one area the relationships were with Yale, Harvard, and Princeton; and in another area you considered them rivals and that you were trying to perform with the smaller schools?

DICKEY: It's a somewhat involved answer. It's not entirely simple. But the simplest, most basic answer in respect to, for example, football, is the size factor. We were in the 3,000 range as an undergraduate student body. Several of the Ivies were not more than that…Columbia, Brown. And the Pentagonal Group, in respect to football, had only one or two institutions that had broken through the thousand barrier.

You very quickly, if you earn your way into this jungle, [laughter] as I guess I did, you discover that you'd better be very careful about assuming that you're going to beat the odds or that you're going to beat the arithmetic. I won't undertake to say that there were some people around the campus in those years who said, Well, you just set off a block of admissions for your athletes, and you take care of having so many athletes that way. Well, that would last about three weeks, and you would find yourself read out of the Ivy one way or another. So that an institution that doesn't have a student… and Columbia has had a problem.
DANIELL: Yes. [Pause for telephone]

DICKEY: I was answering your question in a relatively brief way as to why—or how indeed—we managed to be a member, so to speak, in good standing of the Pentagonal Group—Amherst, Wesleyan, Williams, Bowdoin, Dartmouth—and at the same time a member of the Ivy Group. The most basic factor that separated us from the other Pentagonal institutions, in football particularly, and not necessarily in all other sports; we were rowing those institutions, we were engaged in track with them, we played baseball with them, and we were even playing basketball with them, and some hockey, soccer, frequently being beaten by them.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But when you moved—and nothing could perhaps be more eloquent testimony of the way football had set itself apart or had been set apart as a sport, than this fact that when you had a student body of the size that we were and had the tradition of playing Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, Cornell, in football, you were playing in a different situation than these institutions, and they just weren’t willing to be cannon fodder the way Norwich was here in my undergraduate days. We would play Norwich in the opening game, we would have three or four setup games, before we got down to business playing in our own competition.

DANIELL: Did this formation get you in any trouble or create any tensions within the Pentagonal Group?

DICKEY: Not the slightest. Frequently the Pentagonal presidents…. And we had a very… at the time I was president, one of the pleasantest relationships in my entire period on the job was as a member of the Pentagonal Group of presidents. I think that’s changed a little bit. But during that period it was an immensely satisfying, warm, good relationship. Frequently they would ask me about situations in the Ivy, and take a certain pride that they were not having to worry about the same problems that I was worrying about in the Ivy.

Now they were quite competitive with each other, even down to competing for good football players and so forth. But they just accepted the fact that their football was one kind of football, college football, playing in the Ivy was another. And we in turn accepted the fact, somewhat belatedly in the Ivy, that playing Notre Dame, Stanford, Michigan, was not something that we could aspire to do unless we were prepared to be a whole lot bigger.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: Now when you’re big, Jere, when you’ve got a big student body, maybe you’ve got five, ten thousand or more undergraduates, you get a spectrum on admissions. They may have just as many or more top-notch people than we may have or that Amherst had. But their spectrum goes down further, and they can bring in….

DANIELL: That’s what my faculty colleagues at state universities tell me. You get just as many good students, but the spectrum is so much more.

DICKEY: There’s just no question about it. And I’ll tell you something else that also was a problem, frankly, in the Ivy Group, which we had to work at. Several of the big institutions which had programs that were regarded by other institutions in the Ivy Group as not quite, shall we say, Ivy school quality. And those institutions from time to time had to stand the gap of some fairly pointed questioning in the Ivy presidents’ meetings: Were these schools really places where to some extent they were hiding applicants?

DANIELL: Was Cornell the main one in this with their hotel school?

DICKEY: Well, this was certainly one of them that was discussed. But Penn’s physical education program was one of the principal areas of concern. And there were others.

DANIELL: They proved that that was no problem by having mediocre teams in lots of sports for a long time.

DICKEY: Well, this whole business of institutional rivalry has a lot of pros and cons to it. I don’t think you can eliminate this rivalry by regulation, and I don’t think I should want to see us try. But the other side of it is neither can you just let it run wild or you pretty soon have somebody doing something that everybody agrees shouldn’t have been done.

DANIELL: Another question I have in this same vein and on the same subject is that sometimes in part to play what many would perceive the role of the devil’s advocate in defending the role of athletics in college, which you sometimes have to among faculty members, I’ve made the statement that in some ways Dartmouth was—the word shouldn’t be dragged—but the process by which Dartmouth became a respectable academic institution was one in which in many ways it got pulled into this because of the formation of the Ivy Group which initially was one of athletic prowess; in other words, in a sense the academic quality of the institution got pulled up by this identification in an athletic way. Does that make any sense at all to you?
DICKEY: Yes. I think you have to be careful you don’t make too much out of that because the Ivy Group is still essentially a group for regulating the intercollegiate athletic relationship of these institutions. But inevitably it involved comparing the quintile sheets of the institutions. And sometimes we would find some of the most prestigious of the Ivy Group institutions with a pretty heavy slog of football players down in the fifth quintile. And at least you could say, well, how is it? Are your programs so much more difficult? Well, there was never any convincing evidence that their programs were that much more difficult. But there was always some discussion about these things.

But what I was going to say, I think every institution in the Ivy Group, certainly Dartmouth, had to be aware that if it wanted to be a member of a group, whether self-anointed or otherwise, regarded itself as a top-drawer academic—group of top-drawer academic enterprises—then you on your own campus had to keep things self-respecting and right in regard to your admissions, in regard to one thing after another.

DANIELL: That makes fine theory. Inevitably, it seems to me, the one potential weakness in that, would be from your point of view as being in the position of the person engineering the whole process, is that the coaches might misinterpret this and assume that indeed they can have some leverage with the admissions office. Now later on…

DICKEY: Well, let me say that is up to the president and the admissions office. If he tells the coach that this is the business of the admissions office and it’s nothing that you are going to have any say in whatsoever, that they’ll be glad to know what you think of a boy, if you want to tell them, they’ll be glad what anybody thinks of a boy; but this is going to be done—it’ll be done that way.

DANIELL: Did you have any problems with coaches?

DICKEY: I never had, to my knowledge, any problems at the admissions office here and elsewhere, everywhere. And if there was any institution where the coach sought to have as much say as he could have around the campus in respect to these matters, it was at Harvard.

Well, this is [inaudible] record for a while we’ll hope. But I once had a Harvard faculty member who was a good friend of mine, but who had no sophistication with respect to what was going on between the presidents on these matters, tell me how he was on the committee on athletics—no, he was on the committee on admissions—at Harvard, and he thought it
was a great joke: One day one of the deans came in and very seriously said that he was speaking for the president in saying that the president just wanted more attention paid by the admissions committee to the athletic program. [Laughter] Well, I would no more have thought of doing that at Dartmouth College than I would have gone down and taken $1500 out of the till.

DANIELL: Well, I must say that when I taught at Harvard in the early sixties it was as a graduate student, the one problem case that I had with a student who clearly just didn’t have the intellectual ability that other people in the class did, that this individual although I didn't know it, was an athlete. And there was a different attitude toward that than when the same thing occurs, which it occasionally has up here [inaudible] obligation to go easy up here on him [inaudible].

DICKEY: It just— I never sought to make anything out of this. But neither was I prepared to have anybody tell me that we could not have our coaches, if they were out making speeches to an alumni group, be in touch with high schools or boys. And I’ve never had, rightly or wrongly, the slightest doubt that this was a correct position so far as this institution was concerned. And I think I can say that over all of the years that I had the ultimate responsibility for these policies, we never had a serious case of improper admissions or improper eligibility raised.

DANIELL: Yes. There’s certainly been no serious case since I've been here, better than a decade now. Half of that was while you were around.

DICKEY: But I would also want to say that I don’t have any doubt at all that when a sport gets to the position that football had gotten in the postwar period, and which could happen very quickly now, the pressure on the coaches becomes very close to intolerable, very close to intolerable. And you’re just walking a very dangerous line, never knowing when somebody’s going to have the bad judgment to try and get away with something.

DANIELL: Well, are there any other things in admissions that we should talk about? When we talked about this initially, the only other element that we haven’t discussed systematically was the question of the problems in admissions right after the war itself, basically right after the war, in the sense that you had veterans and you had 24-, 25-years-old some of them and…

DICKEY: Yes, I can say one or two things. It became apparent, oh, within a matter of months, certainly in ’46, that we had to give a great deal of attention to the rules of a civilian college that would be compatible with the mixture we had, the mixture of experience, that we had in the student body.
We established a committee at that time under the chairmanship of Professor John [B.] Stearns ’16 of the Classics Department, a very wise, very, oh, very solid person who understood the ways of youth about as well as I think they could be understood by an older person. So we asked John if he’d take on the chairmanship of a committee to study the question of what kind of parietal rules and regulations we should have here at the College during the first years after the war. I forget who all was on that committee. Stearns Morse was on it, I know, because—and I think I had not mentioned this earlier—when Bob Strong died, he had been holding both the director of admissions and the dean of freshmen jobs. It seemed to me that we were at a point where it would be much more satisfactory to divide those two jobs.

After a lot of thought, I decided to ask Al to take on the director of admissions; and Stearns Morse, whom I’d known since he’d been my professor of English as a freshman at Dartmouth, to take on the job of being dean of freshmen. And it was while he was dean of freshmen, I think, that he served on the Stearns committee. That committee wrote a very nice document that had a humanistic quality about it. It makes good reading still. And they recommended regulations that were freer than the regulations of the College before the war, but which still recognized that as all of us, or I think most of us, thought, that there had to be some concern by the College for the youngster of 17, 18, 19, so forth.

We tried to meet the needs of the veterans by opening up a taproom in the basement of College Hall. They had been familiar with drinking beer. The state still had quite strict regulations about liquor. And this involved some difficult administration problems for us in being sure that the taproom wasn’t used by people who were not eligible. [Pause for telephone]

**DANIELL:** …veterans in terms of admissions, and you were talking about adjustments that were made including the taproom.

**DICKEY:** Yes, yes, we established this taproom, and it was a very satisfactory move. It did involve problems of screening out students who were not old enough—I forget what the age….

**DANIELL:** Twenty-one probably then.

**DICKEY:** Probably—21 I guess it probably was…were not eligible for admission. And we kept that going for I think two, maybe three years, not more.

**DANIELL:** It was gone by ’51.
DICKEY: It was? Gone by ’51? We decided to open the fraternities. This was a close decision. There were some who thought, well, they’d been closed, let’s leave them closed. Let’s find some other use for these houses. But the more the subject was discussed, the clearer it was to me that we really had no satisfactory social alternative for that very substantial portion of the Dartmouth community who wanted that kind of social experience. I still would have to say, as I’ve said many times in talking to fraternity groups, the presence of fraternities on a campus such as this is, in my opinion, a fairly closely-balanced question.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I’ve come down on the side of leaning that, on balance, the fraternity is a useful thing. But I have seen situations where it was a thoroughly bad thing, where it was poorly led, where it became little more than a sanctuary for juvenile delinquency, and it was a question that I never felt that we could assume we had….

[End of Tape 16, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 17, Side A]

DICKEY: The question of whether there should not have been more fundamental changes in the nature of the fraternities is one I’m afraid we didn’t give sufficient attention to.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: If I had it to do all over again, I think I would say that I would have probably felt it desirable to be a little slower about opening them, to have laid down conditions for their opening, and probably to have opened them selectively, more selectively--

DANIELL: Umh!

DICKEY: --than we did. But we didn’t. I don’t remember how long we took to do it, and we had a good bit of discussion about it. We did not establish, for example, any conditions with respect to the racial and religious clauses of the fraternities. But within the matter of a year or two, it was clear that that was something we were going to have to face and require the fraternities to face, and we did face it. But it took a period….

DANIELL: That was a big issue when I was here.
DICKEY: Oh, yes. That issue began to come to the fore in 1950-51. The whole subject of the leadership of the fraternities was not adequately dealt with in my opinion. And it’s a very difficult problem which is still not satisfactory in many houses.

The College—this College and most other comparable colleges have tried many things from resident housemothers to graduate student residents to faculty advisors. And once you move over from the tightly-regulated situation with a housemother and all of that paraphernalia, which is not itself foolproof, to a situation where you’re getting both the benefits and the perils of a relatively freely-operated house…. Well, you have a situation then which is a very dangerous one. And the real question is whether on balance the danger is offset by the learning that comes from responsibility, that comes from mistakes, that comes from having to assert yourself as a student leader sometimes against the group.

Now I saw this as a fraternity president myself, and I had some experience, and I had some convictions about it. And I saw much more of it during my years on the job. I saw houses that were brought down to the lowest level by poor leadership. And I saw houses that on the other hand were brought up from being very low-level enterprises to being almost exemplary enterprises of social responsibility without preventing it from being a social enterprise where men were given the opportunity to enjoy themselves.

Well, the first issue that we had to take on, of course, was the—one the first major issue—was the racial and religious.

DANIELL: Can we spend, before we get into that, just a moment more on the decision to reopen the fraternities? I just hadn’t known before that, for example, that they were closed during World War II. So that I didn’t know that there was a point at which a decision had to be made. When you talked about making the decision, you said first it was made quite early in your presidency. And that support for reopening them was not unanimous even though on balance you came out for the reopening of them. Would you care to say a word about how those argued, those individuals argued, who felt that the fraternities shouldn’t be opened or that the opportunity should be taken advantage of to downgrade the importance of them?

DICKEY: I don’t think there were any members of the informal administrative group that was counseling with me who were openly, clearly opposed to the reopening of the fraternities. I think all of us were trying to develop both the arguments for opening and the arguments for not opening.
DANIELL: Yes, yes. I see.

DICKEY: So that we were engaged in an exchange of views and experiences. I can remember, for example, Dean Neidlinger, who was the dean of the College at that time and had been the dean of the College at the time the fraternities were closed when the V-12 came onto the campus, saying that he could only hope to heaven that we didn’t have to go back to what he’d been up against in ’39 or ’40.

Bob Strong was very emphatic, I remember, about this, and said, “Well, we can’t go back to it! If we go back to it, it could be the ruination of this place!” Bob was very strong about this.

Pudge Neidlinger, I think it was, sent up to me—a one of the deans sent up to me—one of the deans sent up to me—a copy of a letter that Mr. Hopkins had written as president to the Deke [DKE] fraternity in 1940, I guess it was, or ’39, late ’39 or ’40. One of his famous three-, four-page epistles, in which he said that he was now absolutely at the point where there was no further—no possibility of further leniency with respect to the fraternities and specifically of the Deke House. And he said, “I am writing not only as president of Dartmouth College, but as a member of the Deke fraternity, that this thing has now reached the point of just being a disgrace and a bad influence on the lives of the men who are brought into it. And that the next time there is a happening in the Deke House that is incompatible with a responsible fraternity operation, there will be no discussion of the matter whatsoever, we will have no alternative but to close the house permanently.”

DANIELL: So President Hopkins then had gotten to the point where he probably was glad....

DICKEY: He was desperate--

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: --as Dean Neidlinger described it to me, and I remember his describing it, where the fraternities.... And particularly as the war period came on. This was part of the psychology which to some extent was cited as being a basis for hoping that it wouldn’t be as bad afterwards as it was before. Because as the war was coming on, men were increasingly—undergraduates—were increasingly preoccupied with the thought, apparently, well, I may be off and killed, and I’d better live it up while I’m here.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: And the administrative structure of fraternities, the advisory system, everything they could conceive of was just inadequate to keep that from running into all sorts of trouble. I remember that letter very vividly because it made an impression on me. I could well see myself having to say the same thing.

So that what I’m saying to you about this decision was that almost everybody who was in on the discussions—Dean Neidlinger, Bob Strong until his death, and I think the decision on fraternities was made before Bob’s death, Al Dickerson, his assistant in the office, Sid Hayward, as I recall. I think John Stearns and several of the faculty members from the committee that Stearns had chaired. It was a fairly large representative group that exchanged opinions about it.

It came down on the conclusion that it was by no means something that you—by no means a decision you could take lightly. But that the alternative of keeping them closed with no idea of how you would use the houses constructively, of what sort of social facilities you would create to take their place….

John Stearns had recommended, as happened in your day and happened at least four times since, setting up social rooms in the dormitories. And we spent money in all of the dormitories knocking out bedrooms to create social rooms. We tried to set up a more effective advisory system in the houses with faculty willing to do it. On and on and on.

So that I think the most accurate way to put it is that the decision was taken as one that was justified on the balance of the pros and cons, but that it was still a pretty precarious balance.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And indeed a whole lot more precarious balance than I realized at the time, or I think I would have—or I hope I would have—insisted that we just must try to find a better basis for opening these houses than we had.

Now, of course, I moved in on this later myself at the time of the [Raymond "Ray" '49] Cirrotta death, which is something that I should speak about, in 1949, where the fraternity system as such was not directly responsible. But the fraternity system as such aided and abetted a group of I forget what it was, five or six undergraduates, who on a Saturday night got to house-hopping as they called it. Going around to houses that were having beer parties or liquor available, and getting free beer and free liquor,
moving from house to house until they were, if not drunk at least well intoxicated, if there’s a distinction.

Out of that condition, somebody in the group decided they would go and challenge some undergraduate—his name was Cirrotta, he lived in one of the Massachusetts dormitories—as being an obnoxious person in a class. Well, they got into a fistfight in the boy's room. He was knocked to the floor, and got a hemorrhage out of it, a brain hemorrhage, and died.

Well, when we investigated it, and we as well as the public authorities investigated it, it was perfectly clear this was not a murder where anybody set out to kill someone. But it was something that at the same time, as far as I was concerned, was just utterly incompatible with what was an acceptable atmosphere in an institution of higher education. And I would have to say that in this respect, my standards were more strict than probably some other people….

DANIELL: Well, this is quite clear, again from the other evidence that we’ve gathered."

DICKEY: But I was just clear that Dartmouth could not afford to have this kind of thing going on if there were any way to restrict it. After a great deal of attention, I decided to draw up—and I drew it up myself—an undertaking that we required every house to post in each house downstairs about what was required of the house in respect to what we regarded as socially responsible conduct. And we required that the president of the house and at least three other officers of the house should sign it, one copy of which, signed copy, should be filed with the administration, and one copy which should be posted on the bulletin board. And the president and officers were required not to come in and bear tales about anybody. But they agreed that this house was left open and permitted to be a social enterprise at Dartmouth College on the condition that if circumstances developed within the house which that individual as an officer knew were incompatible with the undertaking, he would come to the College and request to have his name withdrawn from the undertaking. That’s all we would ask of him, all we required. That would give us an early warning that something in that house, that the leadership in that house, was incapable of maintaining what we required. I spent a lot of time thinking out this thing. And for a considerable period it provided us with, I’m now satisfied, very, very substantial protection.

DANIELL: Yes. Did everyone ever--?
DICKEY: Yes. Not many, but a few. But the most important thing was that it operated to permit the president to say in a fraternity meeting, which I remembered I'd had to say….

DANIELL: I was going to ask you about its linkage back to your….

DICKEY: In my experience as president in which I said—I can remember so well saying—I don't give a damn how you want to lead your lives, either individually or as a group. You can turn this into a whorehouse if you want to. And this was during Prohibition. When I was getting letters as president of the house from President Hopkins about the Prohibition laws and my responsibility as president of the house not to permit liquor in the house during Prohibition. Or having illegal booze in the house. “But,” I said, “you can't do that and still expect me to continue as president of this house. Now you can—I don't care how you want to do it, but it just isn't going to be both ways.” Well, I….

DANIELL: A very effective device….

DICKEY: I really came out of that one on top. A couple of the real outlaws in our house…. [Pause for interruption]

DANIELL: The interview of January 2nd ended here.

President Dickey and I took up the subject again on January 7th.

At the end of the interview last time, what we were discussing broadly is the problems that came out of the fact that—well, two things came together. One, you had veterans coming back to the College who were older and much more experienced, and you wanted to build a pattern of social life, or the possibility for it, which acknowledged their being older and more experienced.

Also you were dealing with the question now particularly the role the fraternities would play in this. And you expressed a general concern that especially when fraternities were re-instituted and reopened, what would seem to you a lack of, well, to put it in simplest terms, social responsibility reflected in fraternity behavior. And in particular—this is when we were right at the end of the discussion—there were examples of this, and you took advantage of or in part in response to the Cirrotta case, was one in which you just, in effect, demanded greater responsibility from leaders within the fraternities. You described a pledge that you had leaders sign which had to be posted in the fraternities. And that's exactly where we were at the end of this.
The question I was about to ask when the student came in was how, in retrospect, after let’s say, this is in the early fifties, what degree of success do you think you had as the leader of the institution in implementing a greater sense of student responsibility? I ask this because remember these were the years when I was an undergraduate here. And one thing that really did strike me in the early fifties, as I got involved in student government, there was a high degree of a sense of student responsibility at least through that.

DICKEY: I suppose one never is able to take a thoroughly complete judgment on a question of that sort because...if for no other reason than because you never know what might have been the conditions if you hadn’t made the effort. I think I would say with confidence that if we had not made the efforts which we made, and not just in the first few years after the war, as far as I was concerned, right straight through the whole period of my presidency, I was determined that this self-image of Dartmouth campus life, the self-image of what constituted a thorough-going Dartmouth man, just had to be, as far as I was concerned, raised to a very different level of maturity.

I had no thought whatsoever at any time of changing the basic qualities of Dartmouth life, qualities that flow out of the place, that flow out of the happenings that are part of the Dartmouth heritage, the sense of independence and resourcefulness. But I also had seen as an undergraduate, and I knew as an alumnus, and I then had to deal with as an administrative officer, excesses that are inevitable in any group, that were anchored in what I would call a false notion of these virtues. And I was concerned that these excesses were doing a great disservice to the educational, the larger educational experience of a substantial number—by no means all and by no means a majority—of Dartmouth undergraduates. But that it was doing a disservice to a substantial number who were not yet ready to deal with the opportunities of adult life.

DANIELL: The students that you’re talking about.

DICKEY: Yes. And in a way that was compatible with the educational purposes of the College. Now I, as I said a moment ago, have no doubt myself that we over the years made very great progress in that respect. You referred to student government. I remember myself very clearly [Pause for telephone] I said that I remember clearly, for example, you as an undergraduate and your activities as a member of student government, particularly what we called the Judiciary Committee at that time, dealing with student behavior when it caused difficulties that the College in one way or another had to
deal with. And I can say with certainty that we brought during that period student concern, not just administrative concern, not just faculty concern, we brought student concern to a level that was a very important factor in working against what I've called these unnecessary forms of campus behavior, particularly in respect to rowd-ism, drinking, the presence of women in the dormitories, all of these things.

Now, having said that, I think it's essential to say that no one who pretends to be close to the life of an undergraduate, resident campus can ever have any doubt that he lives on the edge of trouble on a daily basis. This is true whether the institution be as religious as Notre Dame or as lacking in religious authority as, shall we say, Dartmouth College.

DANIELL: That's right.

DICKEY: And I get a certain amount of quiet amusement in retirement in knowing, in one way or another, about some of the things that I'm very glad I do not have to deal with in this area. I know that I used to hear about some of these things from Dean Dickerson before his death, from Dean [Carroll] Brewster, and, more recently, the new dean, Ralph Manuel, has had some very worrisome and some very unpleasant things to deal with.

So one never imagines that in any way whatsoever you are going to eliminate these things. And furthermore, it was quickly clear to me that you had to weigh the tradeoff between a campus that had the amount of individual self-confidence and enthusiasm and esprit de corps, all of those things which to a degree have been great pluses in setting Dartmouth in a somewhat special position among undergraduate colleges.

But you have to recognize that you were up against a problem of tradeoff, as the phrase goes today, between those pluses of youthful exuberance and spirit and the excesses that sometimes come from the plus side of youthful behavior, youthful enthusiasm, in the form of bad happenings that might have been prevented in one way or another. Now, that tradeoff had to be—and has to be—worked out on a continuing basis. It involves attitudes of faculty; it involves, of course, the attitudes of the student body, particularly of those individuals in the student body who have the personal qualities of leadership or at least the potential of leadership in regard to their peers; it involves your administrative associates; it involves parents; it involves the larger community in which the college exists; it involves the law officers. Very few people realize how often the College has to deal with a disciplinary situation fairly rigorously if it is not to turn over the situation to public authorities who will be forced to deal with it much more rigorously.
DANIELL: Yes. I can remember that being an important consideration in several of the cases we handled on the Judiciary Committee.

DICKEY: This is a constant problem. And this means retaining the confidence of the local authorities that you do have a concern for these matters, and that you’re not going to run a campus that is simply incompatible with the expectations of the community. So I would say that this from the outset, and throughout all of my years, was something that I just felt a president, certainly I had to be, concerned about, that I had to make judgments in regard to not particularly individual cases, although I didn’t shy from that either in the early years, but that in respect to policies and organizational and personnel matters I had a responsibility that I had to meet and that I couldn’t just wash my hands of it. Well, I don’t know how….

[End of Tape 17, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 17, Side B]

DICKEY: … certain need for more rigorous standards or different standards of behavior and this was certainly not easy. And I think it’s quite important to say here that the immediate postwar period was a period that made this very, very different in its difficulty from what it might have been in a period where you had not had the social discontinuity, if you will, that was involved in the war, that was involved in having the campus practically run as a military base from ’42 to ’45. So that in addition to the changed social mores and standards that the veterans introduced to the campus, you had to some degree to start afresh. And you had a certain element among the student body, of course, and among, in a smaller degree, among faculty, and to some degree among alumni, who really didn’t know the score, to be blunt about it, with respect to many of these happenings. These people would only become what I would call well and responsibly well informed and responsibly concerned when there was a dramatic happening.

DANIELL: Like the Cirrotta case.

DICKEY: Such as the Cirrotta case. But you’re not dealing just with Cirrotta cases. Here, a few months ago, you had some things happening, for example, in the dormitories and in the fraternities that simply made it clear that Dartmouth College had to step in and draw the line.

Well, all I’m saying at this point is this kind of normal tolerance was probably greater—or if you want to call it indifference—was greater in the immediate postwar period than it might have been under other circumstances. But there was really, as far as I’m concerned, no major
controversy about this issue. There were specifics…. If students got into trouble, you could count on their parents—serious trouble, suspension or being expelled or being threatened with jail by the town authorities or whatnot—you could count upon the parents turning up. You could count upon the parents trying to stir up alumni friends to testify with letters or telephone calls that this was really a wonderful boy: That boys will be boys, as you said, and so forth. And the parent would come up, and in most cases they would land in my office eventually. Deans would be able to go so far with them, and then they would say, "Well, you’d better talk with the president." And I think I can say I never ducked one of those sessions, even though they weren’t sessions that I would have chosen as a way of spending my time. And I remember some of them very, very vividly.

Well, to be very concrete, for example—I’m jumping ahead here now to an episode. After the Cirotta case, which involved an immense amount of damaging publicity in the newspapers of the country, and not just in this area, it seemed to me that everybody—and this was a bad break in a sense because, as I told you, I’m not sure that it could have been prevented under any circumstances. But whether it could or not is irrelevant to the fact that it happened and that you as an institution were held responsible for what happened. And I felt responsible as a president for it in a fundamental way. It seemed clear to me that all the constituencies of the College, the administrative officers, the student government, the faculty, everybody who had something to say or do about Dartmouth, should recognize that we were in a period when it was very important not to have more instances of this kind of student irresponsibility if we were not going to run the risk of just confirming the Dartmouth image which some of our critics enjoyed purveying. And I went out of my way to try to talk about this aspect of the matter on the campus radio, to faculty meetings, to student government, with alumni. And we came off quite well.

But just about at the peak of this post-Cirrotta [inaudible], we had someone shoot into the home of Professor Al Foley [Allen R. Foley ’20].

DANIELL: I hadn’t heard of this.

DICKEY: No, I don’t think you ever did hear about it and many other people. This is simply illustrating what I’m talking about.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But two bullets went through the living room—or one went through the living room window—of Al Foley’s home, right across the river in Norwich.
One hit, as I recall, the chimney, and so forth. Well, fortunately he was not injured. And this, of course, came to our attention. He reported it. I think the police were concerned about it.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: I don’t remember all the details about it. And we decided that this was just the sort of thing that, but for the grace of God, we would have had a professor shot. And that’s about all we would have needed in order to have had just an absolutely intolerable—to put it bluntly—public relations problem.

Well, we found out—and I forget now how we found out—that two students had been down on the riverbank with a gun. And apparently—I say apparently because we were never entirely sure about this—but apparently started to shoot at Foley’s house without knowing whose house it was. I don’t think there was any evidence that there was any effort to shoot at a professor’s house. And they may have been shooting simply at the chimney, and one of the shots or several of the shots fell short. Or they may have been shooting at a window as youngsters from time immemorial have been doing with stones and guns. As we know, with anything they can put their hands to, the temptation to break a window on occasion is pretty great with a young person. But whatever the intention was, we were able to identify these two who’d had the gun. And we decided that we just had no alternative, as far as the public authorities were concerned and so forth, but to really do something about this.

Well, one of the parents came up and ultimately landed in my office, and he was just in a mood to be outraged that we should think this of his son. The boys had at first denied it. And this is not an uncommon thing that you’re up against, frequently, people who will deny a happening of this sort. Well, then it became clear that the denial was not going to stand up, and I just had to say to the parent, “Look, I understand your role as a father in this and I respect it. But I’ve just got to tell you that my responsibility here is a very different one. That in my judgment there can be no doubt whatsoever that these boys were involved in this thing. And this has got to be regarded as a very serious situation, particularly because it comes on top of a tragic happening, and this could have been an equally tragic or more so happening.”

Well, I cite that case simply to be concrete about the fact that it was inevitable that on my job I knew of larger concerns so far as Dartmouth’s welfare was concerned than frequently would be the case with faculty, would be the case with most students. We were not out to hang somebody
in public for this. But neither could we possibly afford to have swept this under the sofa as a boyish prank, particularly in view of the context within which it happened.

DANIELL: Yes. Now when you came on the job, was the instrument for handling this the same as it was when I was named to the Committee on Administration?

DICKEY: No, as a matter of fact, we had to…. This was one of the things that had to be done in reopening the institution was the setting up of student government. Dean Neidlinger had had the….

DANIELL: I was thinking particularly of the Committee on Administration.

DICKEY: Well, the Committee on Administration had had no student participation during the early years. And perhaps I should make a point of saying that while the president had always been a member of that committee and the chairman of that committee, there were frequently occasions, I gather, when Mr. Hopkins did not or was not able to sit as chairman of it. I made it a point, I was sitting actively and regularly as chairman of the committee during, I would guess, the first five to seven years; certainly not more than ten years, but I would say the first five to seven years of my presidency….

DANIELL: You were still there by ’55.

DICKEY: …simply because I wanted to know firsthand what we were up against. I wanted to know firsthand what we were doing about it, what we ought to do about problems of this sort; in short, to be well informed. And also because, as I’ve said earlier in this interview, I recognized this as one of the aspects of Dartmouth which, as far as I was concerned, required very serious, continuing effective efforts to produce improvement.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: That it was not, as far as I was concerned, a fringe problem. It was something that was unnecessarily handicapping our ability to be as good as we claimed to be.

DANIELL: Did you ever talk this kind of a subject over or the general problem of this over with President Hopkins? I should imagine it was a very delicate area in the sense you were trying to correct, to put it in moral terms, a situation that had, you felt inevitably, to have been generated under his presidency. Was this a problem at all?
DICKEY: It was never a problem to my knowledge. Certainly I am sure, without recalling at the moment specific occasions, I'm sure it was something that I talked over with Mr. Hopkins. As I think I said to you earlier, I followed the practice of going up to see him at his home I suppose I can say regularly, at least once a week, sometimes more frequently. I would have—except when I was away on a speaking trip or something, I think two weeks would never pass that I would not have called on him. Frequently we would not discuss College affairs. But if it was something that I thought he might be interested in, I would tell him about it. I rarely asked him to say what he would do or wouldn’t do. If he wanted to volunteer any observation of that sort, I welcomed it. But I think insofar as I can reconstruct my attitude, I never felt this was something that he would have handled or had a fundamentally different view of.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: I was much more disposed to regard it as a problem which came with the times, that came with Dartmouth’s location, with Dartmouth’s history. And not a matter of a personal policy of a new president.

You must remember, in this respect that I was privy to the fact that he had taken some pretty strong stands against some of these happenings. I think I mentioned to you the threat in the three- or four-page letter from him to the president of the Deke house to close the Deke house the next time there was any untoward difficulty. I was aware of the fact that during his years on the job and in my undergraduate days and during the thirties, there were a fair number of students who were expelled. This was no completely wide-open society as far as that was concerned.

Indeed, the attitude that we, I would say the official College, took toward, for example, women in the dormitories and the visitation of men’s rooms reflected a much more permissive—much more permissive—American society in the postwar period than was true certainly in my undergraduate days. Or in the thirties. When if you were caught with your grandmother in your room, you were in trouble.

So I think it’s fair to say that I never—that I am not now conscious that this was ever a problem of delicacy as far as my relations with him were concerned. I am not at all prepared to say that he would have felt that what was done in any specific situation was precisely the right thing or that he would have done it that way.

DANIELL: I asked that question because I expected your response to be what it was. And I think it’s a very important idea or set of observations to get on the
record. Because from two different points of view, the record is going to suggest that President Hopkins felt more loosely about these things than you’re suggesting. One, his own tapes and his recollections of the past, which remember are some 30 years in the past, that are going to suggest that during Prohibition that, you know, his attitude. And also a lot of alumni have a memory of Hopkins which paint the institution much more permissive, the image that you were trying to control and to change. And increasingly, just a lot of….

DICKEY: Well, I think what you’re saying is quite true. And I would think it was also quite compatible with really what I’m saying. First, there’s something that probably should be said, and that is that Mr. Hopkins was a very—what shall I say?—warm, even fun-loving sort of person. And frequently, as Al Dickerson used to testify, and as Sid Hayward frequently testified to me, Mr. Hopkins’s statements to others about things took on the quality of a good story. That was not really quite the same thing as Mr. Hopkins’s personal worries and concerns in dealing….

DANIELL: A style very much like that of Abraham Lincoln.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, I don’t know about that. But these projections, these were stories that he would relate about his experiences and his attitudes, were frequently more relaxed, more humorous than when he was dealing with a very difficult situation.

Now, I don’t rely on my own memory or knowledge to say that. But two men who revered Mr. Hopkins I think as much as any two men who ever worked with him, and who knew him as intimately as any two who ever worked with him, namely Sid Hayward and Al Dickerson, both on occasion would say to me… Sometimes when I would say, "Well, I wonder what Mr. Hopkins would have thought about this," frequently they would laugh and say, "Well, we’re not sure what he would have thought about it, but what he would have said about it might not have been what he thought." [Laughs] In other words, he would put an easier picture on it.

But having said all of that, I don’t have any real doubt at all that I was prepared to be, and felt the need to be, at the time I was on the job, much more rigorous, much more, if you will, concerned with the structure of the government of the College—student government, faculty concerns, administrative—than, I think, from anything I know was true with Mr. Hopkins.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: So that I don’t want to minimize in that sense any difference. But I also think it rather important to say that Mr. Hopkins’s view of these matters was a good bit more relaxed.

Well, let me give you an example.

DANIELL: Historians always love concreteness.

DICKEY: Exactly. Well, and I do, too, because I think you can generalize to the point where you really don’t know, let alone, you’re not really persuasive about what you’re saying.

Back in the middle thirties, Mr. Hopkins had a very, very serious problem with the student newspaper, something that you probably don’t know about. But it was during the middle of the Depression, and the student newspaper was run at that point by a very capable, but very, well, one might say independent or one might say radical element. Budd [W.] Schulberg [‘36] was one of the editors. There were several others of the same general orientation as Schulberg.

One of the things that they got into was a marble strike over in Vermont in the Proctor marble quarries. And they ran a series of stories, I guess, and editorials very critical of the company’s attitude toward the workers in that industry. As a result of these stories and editorials in The Dartmouth, Mr. Hopkins apparently got quite a lot of very, very critical mail from alumni. And he also was very seriously embarrassed personally because the Proctors were close personal friends of his. (He told me about this, so that I know what I’m talking about.) And it reached the point where he decided that with all his belief in the freedom of student journalism, he had to do something.

So he called in Schulberg, I guess, and whether anybody else accompanied him, I don’t recall. And Mr. Hopkins said he had this pile of correspondence that he’d been having with irate alumni and other people and put it on the desk in front of Schulberg, and he said to Schulberg, “I’ve just to say to you now this is intolerable. And we’re going to have to have some different handling of this. I don’t know what it’s going to be, but I’ve now reached the point where I’ve got to tell you this is intolerable,” I think was the term he used.

Out of that difficulty, and I forget—I don’t know whether I’ve ever known the specifics as far as the paper’s editorials and stories afterward, after that encounter—but it was a very acute encounter, which ended the friendship or indeed any conversation between Mr. Hopkins and Schulberg.
until after I came on the job. So from the middle thirties—I guess this was '35 or '36, I don’t remember—until '46 or '47, probably a few years later than that, at least ten to 15 years, maybe 20 years, when I brought them together in my office.

Well, the first year or two that I came back on the job— Oh, I’m sorry, I should say one of the steps that Mr. Hopkins took was to set up a committee under Frank [Francis H.] Horan ['22], an alumnus back in the twenties, whose son subsequently came to Dartmouth. I think Frank, I forget whether he was…I guess Frank Horan may have been Class of '24 or thereabouts, first half of the twenties. A lawyer in New York, and a man who’d been an editor of *The Dartmouth* back in his undergraduate days. And they got a few newspaper people in and others, and the purpose of the meeting was not unlike the purpose of some of the other moves that I had occasion to make later, to try to put some structure that would assure a greater measure of responsibility in the operation of the paper.

Well, they had a real go. The Horan Report was well remembered by Al Dickerson and others who had been concerned about *The Dartmouth* and both its former editors and administrative officers.

DANIELL: Al Dickerson had been editor of *The Dartmouth*?

DICKEY: He was not the editor, but he was a prominent member of the editorial board and a writer for *The Dartmouth*. And they set up the Board of Proprietors as a result of the Horan Report.

DANIELL: That’s right.

DICKEY: And put the financial controls of *The Dartmouth* under some outside supervision.

Well, this was fought by some of the students, of course, as infringement of the independence of *The Dartmouth* and so forth. But Mr. Hopkins had had enough, and he pushed it through. Frank Horan, with whom I had luncheon a few weeks ago, said it was one of the most horrible experiences of his life. And he’s been through quite a few things as a practicing lawyer and so forth.

Well, what I’m now coming to is that after that experience, which was pretty traumatic and on the other end of the spectrum from any permissiveness that you might imagine being part of Mr. Hopkins’s nature. I think it was my second year on the job, Mr. Hopkins and I went together to attend the annual banquet of the *Daily Dartmouth*, something which I
did from time to time, and from time to time didn’t do. Both because they
might not have wanted me and also because I on occasion thought I had
better use for my time. But we were at this dinner. I remember it was held
down in the old ski hut beside the Inn.

On this occasion Mr. Hopkins was in this raconteur mood, this hail-fellow-
well-met stance. And at one point the students said, “President Hopkins,
wouldn’t you be willing to give us a little guidance as to how we should run
the paper?” Because the paper was already moving into a pretty high-
wide-and-handsome stance of independence. He chuckled with that
wonderful way of his, and then he said, “Well, I don’t think I have very
much that I want to say to you. Certainly not very much that would
probably seem helpful to my friend John Dickey here. But I guess I would
say to you, why don’t you have yourselves a good time and raise hell?”

DICKEY: His response to this invitation to speak was half jocular but only half
jocular. And he said, “I don’t really have very much to say, certainly not
very much that my friend John Dickey would think was particularly helpful.
And he said, “I don’t know that it’s my role to incite to riot—“ Some phrase
such as that. “—as a retired president. But,” he said, “I guess if I have any
advice it would be to have fun and raise hell.” Well, I enjoyed this advice.
At least I gave the impression of enjoying it. [Laughter] But I couldn’t help
but remember that it really didn’t coincide very perfectly with the way he
had had to deal with the newspaper back in the ten years previously at the
time of the Proctor Marble strike. Now I cite that only by way of being
concrete in saying, well, you can find this contrast in Mr. Hopkins’s past.

DANIELL: And that’s quite parallel to the Prohibition, as a subject. You could say the
same thing about what the tapes say about Prohibition and parallel it to
what he said in this Daily Dartmouth banquet.

DICKEY: Precisely. Precisely. For example, I received a very stiff letter from him,
not personally, but as president of a fraternity, as an undergraduate,
during undergraduate days, about what the College was going to do with
anybody that was caught in violation of the Prohibition laws. Well, Mr.
Hopkins, wisely I think, never thought much of Prohibition. But what I’m
saying is when the chips were down, and he had to stand the gaff of
responsibility, he was no patsy.

Now, at the same time, I think there was a cumulative aspect to this
campus difficulty. Because I remember so vividly either Bob Strong or
Pudge Neidlinger, I don’t remember which, when we were talking about the postwar standards and rules and regulations that we would establish in fraternities and so forth, saying that if the war hadn’t come when it did and gave them an excuse for really closing the houses, that they were on a course that had, as far as they could see, no outcome other than just a major confrontation on the part of the official College with the fraternity system because of the outlawry that was present in some of the houses. So we picked up from there.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. That’s makes— That’s a very important filler, what you’ve just said, in understanding that whole process, that it wasn’t just something that came at the end of World War II.

DICKEY: Right. And I am not prepared at all to say that, quite aside from the way he might have talked about it and seemed to regard campus rules and regulations as an unnecessary evil during his retirement, I’m not at all clear that had he been on the job during that period, he wouldn’t have had to take many of the same measures.

But okay. That’s of no great consequence. Certainly we never had any discussion that indicated to me disagreement with what was being done. I talked with him I think on several occasions about the handling of the Cirrotta case, how we should handle it and some of the people that were involved and things of that sort. And I can recall no instance in which I detected any feeling on his part of wanting a different course.

Well, now you asked me about Dean Neidlinger, and I think I should say that insofar as there was an acute problem of—I don’t know whether disagreement is the proper term—but a different approach to these things, it was probably with Dean Neidlinger. And I am sure, although I have never talked with him about these matters since he resigned, but I’m sure that from our discussions at the time of his resignation that he felt that my feeling that we just simply had no alternative, as I’ve been saying, but to find more effective ways of governing the campus, were things that he didn’t have confidence in. That he was on the firing line, and I’m sure felt that if I were on the firing line 24 hours a day rather than on a much more limited basis, I wouldn’t have been—well, that I would have seen it differently.

But he was utterly loyal to anything that I felt should be done. He was prepared always to state his views with utter independence, never curbed the ball as far as I’m concerned one bit. Expressed disagreements sometimes in a committee vehemently because I don’t know whether you recall, but Dean Neidlinger was a fellow who carried a very heavy head of
steam. And when he got going, whether he was in agreement with you or in disagreement with you, he sometimes talked explosively.

DANIELL: Yes. Part of the reason I asked is one of the people I want to interview fairly soon is Dean Neidlinger. [Inaudible]

DICKEY: He was a fellow that had borne and was bearing what was a terrible responsibility for these things. He had a... I don’t think I would want to say a more relaxed attitude toward these things than I had, although that could be an interpretation. But he had a different approach to them. And yet our relationship has remained one of I think genuine mutual respect. Never, as far as I was concerned, or as far as I knew, any element of antagonism. But I’m sure—and I know—that there was a substantial feeling on his part that I was going to be better served by somebody on this effort that I was committed to by somebody who approached these matters somewhat differently than he did. But I never had any evidence from anybody that this man was one who, despite his disagreements, would sabotage your policies or your decisions. And this cannot be said of everybody.

DANIELL: No, it certainly can’t.

DICKEY: This cannot be said of everybody. Now I was also aware— And this would have to be one of these items that I should not want certainly to be out on the…

DANIELL: I’m absolutely [inaudible].

DICKEY: …anywhere until we’re both gone. I was aware from, well, from Sid Hayward, from Al Dickerson, and from Mr. Hopkins, that Pudge’s explosive nature and somewhat impulsive judgments were a matter of concern that went back much beyond my day.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I’ve done a little reading that.

DICKEY: That’s really as much as I want to say about that. But that does have to be said because I wouldn’t— I’m not at all sure that Dean Neidlinger ever knew this. And I would not want him to know it because his relationship again with Mr. Hopkins was one of just veneration, just veneration. His relationship with me was always correct and one, as I’ve said, so far as I know of just commendable loyalty, even on matters of disagreement and of trying to do it the way he thought I would want it done. But there is no doubt that the relationship with students that the dean had worried Mr. Hopkins. Sid was much more outspoken about it. Al was candid about it.
DANIELL: Yes. There are little inklings of this in some of the things faculty people have said when we’ve asked them questions about the administrative officers during this period. So that what you’re saying doesn’t really come as a surprise.

DICKEY: I don’t want to overdo it. But my respect for this man’s character, for this man’s courage, for this man’s integrity is very, very great. And his dedication to the College, it would be hard to really overstate it.

Now when you come into the area of judgment and taking a calm reading….  

DANIELL: Which it seems to me in the abstract would be of just such essential importance if you were trying to push the institution—well, in part subtly, but even overtly—toward a more responsible pattern of behavior in which people who are deviants, who have violated your sense of this, are going to be punished in the process, to have that, to have someone who outside is going to interpret as the instrument of punishment because of a bad temper, because of a lack of judgment, would be just the wrong thing, I think [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Well, you’re coming very close to some of the things I said I wouldn’t go into that I was privy to. But unless you have other questions about this, I’ll just close it off by saying that there was never any asking for his resignation or pushing him off the cliff or anything. He took the initiative in sizing this situation up and writing me his letter of resignation, a very forthright letter.

DANIELL: I don’t know whether this is the exact letter, but what appeared in the alumni magazine when I went to—because I try to get some background on people before I go to them—that’s in his folder over in the alumni office. And I’ve read through them and I’ve said this is about...

DICKEY: Oh, his letter’s not there, but I...

DANIELL: No, his letter’s not. But what he said in public was very, very consistent with everything you’ve said. Just that the dean’s office is a wearing job. You’re on the firing line all the time, and I’m just not up to it anymore.

DICKEY: Well, you see, it’s just unbelievable what it involves. And I can only say that I think a president, and particularly a president such as myself who felt it was essential to keep in touch with these things personally, more so than maybe Mr. Hopkins conceivably or my successor, would know. But this is true.
DANIELL: That’s plenty.

DICKEY: What seemed to me to be necessary at that point brings us to the question of Dean [Joseph] McDonald’s choice. And I don’t know that this is the point for me to go into that. But I have never made a decision about what was needed at a particular point that I look back on with greater satisfaction. This wouldn’t always be the situation. I mean Joe was no youngster when he came into that. But Joe at that point had the respect of the faculty as an utterly independent-minded fellow.

DANIELL: With everyone he comes in contact with, faculty, students... [Laughter]

DICKEY: Just know that you’re dealing with a very independent mind. You’re dealing with a man of warm, human instincts. A man who has a sense of perspective about human frailties, which is essential in a dean—essential in a dean. A man whose concern for the College extended very, very explicitly to the areas that we’re talking about. He just didn’t come with any prescription for solving these problems. But neither did he come with any attitude that boys will be boys, and I’m going to be one of them. This is something that a dean, especially a young dean, has to learn awfully quickly and awfully clearly. That he can be as much interested in the undergraduate, either collectively or individually, as is humanly possible. But he must always be clear, and he must expect the undergraduates to be clear, that he’s not one of the boys.

DANIELL: You’ll be interested to know—I think I’ve mentioned this before, and I guess this is... Since these tapes are confidential, I can say it because of something that came out when I was on the search committee for the new dean, our present dean Ralph Manuel, who was quite explicit about... Of the past deans he knew at Dartmouth College, that Joe McDonald was the one who was closest to his model of what a dean should be.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: And he had made the same substantive point quite clearly to the search committee that you just made.

DICKEY: Well, I could go on about this. I took counsel at that time. But I did not seek anyone’s agreement. Those were the days when you didn’t have to have a committee to approve something or an affirmative action program. I regarded this as a responsibility that I had to meet. I conferred—For example, I can remember one day Fergie Murch, who was an old-timer here, professor of physics, highly respected member of the community...
although he was essentially a teacher of elementary physics, not at all a scholar in physics, but a very respected and wise person.

I got Fergie to come over to the house one day for luncheon with me while I was going through my deliberations about what we ought to get. And I tried out the idea of Joe on him. He was quite surprised, hadn’t thought of it much. And the more he thought about it, he said, the better he thought of it. And I checked it out with a number of other people. And as I’ve said, as I look back on it, I don’t think I could have done better, particularly with respect to the circumstances of the moment.

If you’d been looking for a dean who might have 20 years or more on the job, well, that would have been one thing. But I wanted stability, and I wanted these other qualities, and I wanted to be sure that there was somebody there that the faculty wouldn’t constantly be saying, “He’s not one of us. He doesn’t understand.” They knew Joe McDonald understood the faculty side of things. And I had confidence he would learn the other side. Now learning the other side, I think Joe probably has told you—or would tell you—was really a very traumatic experience for Joe McDonald.

DANIELL: He had said that quite explicitly.

DICKEY: I remember so vividly during the first—especially the first—year or two that he was on the job. He would come up to the office frequently, and as I’ve said, my door was customarily open. And he would knock and say, “John, may I come in?” So I would say, “Yes, of course.” “Well,” he said, “you won’t believe this.” And this was almost always the way he introduced our morning talks: “You won’t believe this.” And finally after he had done this maybe ten or more times, I said one day to him, “Joe, I’ll believe anything about undergraduate life. What’s this one?”

DANIELL: What degree of exposure did you have to Joe before you made what was a very important decision, as you’ve described it? That’s one thing that baffled him, kind of. He said, “Gee....” You know, he said, I know he wrote to you. He said, “How much did John Dickey know about me?”

DICKEY: Well, I didn’t know Joe intimately certainly. I had known Joe professionally in one sense because he was teaching a course in foreign trade policy.

DANIELL: Ah, that connection. Yes.

DICKEY: And was teaching it at the Tuck School. And this had been one of the areas of my professional responsibility in the State Department, so that we had talked from time to time. And I think he got me to appear in one of his
classes several times—that’s my memory—to talk with the class about the whole Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. I had known his brother slightly, who was a more prominent public figure. He became ambassador to Israel, and I believe he was the first…

DANIELL: That’s one of the things Joe mentioned, yes.

DICKEY: …ambassador. And then he was the head of the Foreign Policy Association which I was in close touch with during the State Department. But I didn’t know him other than really casually. And then I saw a fair amount of Joe during the early years socially when I’d be around faculty homes or elsewhere. And I had gotten him—had decided that I would ask him to take on a very important assignment before the dean’s job when I asked him to chair a committee to review the whole Junior Fellows’ experience.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And that program. So in the course of that—and I took a personal interest in that—I had occasion to talk with him about that project and then about the report and the recommendations. So that I had some exposure to the man’s capacity for a thoughtful approach to a controversial matter. There were very sharp differences of opinion within the faculty about the Junior Fellow….

DANIELL: The Senior Fellow Program?

DICKEY: The Senior Fellow Program! I beg your pardon. Senior Fellow Program. And this was not the only experience I had with taking a reading on Joe, but it was a significant one. There may have been others, but I mention just those two.

DANIELL: Pretty good basis of contact.

DICKEY: Yes. And I got…. Joe, I remember talked with me about several things earlier involving administrative relationships with the faculty that he was critical about. But I remember once I had explained to him, and I forget what it was about, I think it may have been about summer compensation, which was a difficult problem to work out in the first few summers. He said, “Well, that makes sense.” Then I guess this was—this was before he came into the deanship, of course. He was…I don’t know whether he was head of the AAUP chapter or not. But he was close to it. And he had some official faculty responsibility. I don’t know just what it was.
DANIELL: His memory on that is just as vague as yours, I must say.

DICKEY: But in any event, I think it was probably as chairman of the local chapter of the AAUP. But in any event, George [H.] Howard, one of the older alumni who became a very close friend of mine, Class of 1907, I guess, and a very well-to-do man…. I believe I told you about his going up to the Grant with us every year with the McLanes and so forth. He was a widower, much interested in Dartmouth. Very much concerned to have the intellectual vitality of the College raised. He was a very first-rate Wall Street lawyer in one of the most prominent of the big firms in Wall Street. Had a very good, sharp mind. And we hit it off very well. I met him through Judge McLane.

One day he said to me in these early years, very early years, “I would like to set up an award in the College for good teaching.” And he said, “By good teaching I mean somebody that really puts some intellectual vigor into the teaching. But who is primarily a good teacher rather than a great scholar. Would you welcome this?” Well, naively I said, “Yes. I’m sure we would welcome it.” And I’d heard about these good teaching awards at other institutions. Never given them any thought at all. Well, we announced this. Or I announced it at a faculty meeting that we would be receiving this kind of an award. I forget what it was. It was a very substantial annual grant from him.

I didn’t hear anything more about it until Joe McDonald came to see me. And he obviously was somewhat personally embarrassed about it. But he said, “I’ve got to bring you a message that there’s an element in the faculty, an important element, that is utterly opposed to an award of this sort.” Well, if he’d hit me with a dead fish, I couldn’t have been more surprised. I said, “Well, explain it to me.” Because I was naïve certainly with respect to the reasons for faculty disapproval on a matter of this sort. And he said, “Well, I don’t know that I can explain it to you.” He was very candid about it. “Because,” he said, “I’m not sure I totally understand it or that I agree with it. But it’s something like this,” he said. “They think that everybody is doing his best. Or at least we must proceed on the basis that everybody is doing his best as a teacher. And if we begin giving awards or prizes to somebody, it’s just going to set up all sorts of jealousies. And it’s going to be sought by people for the wrong reasons.” “Well,” I said, “I begin to understand some of this. But, gee, Joe, I just hate to try to explain this to a fellow such as George Howard, whose interest in the College and in the faculty is just one of the most important things to encourage that I can imagine.” Well, he said, “I see that that’s difficult. But I felt that I just had no alternative but to bring this word to you, that this will cause a lot of trouble.” Well, I respected this very greatly.
DANIELL: Yes. He came on his own volition. This was [inaudible].

DICKEY: Oh, I assume so. But it may have been he was coming on instructions from the AAUP chapter or from a faculty committee. I don’t remember that. But he came with a certain amount of hesitation on his part, but still felt it was his obligation and his duty, and it was something he was going to do as well as he could, and he did. Just straight out.

DANIELL: He told me pretty much the same thing.

DICKEY: Then subsequently I talked with the faculty about this. We had discussion about it. And we decided, well, okay, we’re not going to force it. And I talked to George Howard about it. I said, “I think we can handle this if we’re smart.” I knew from what several others had told me that I had sounded out that there were an awful lot of people on the faculty who wouldn’t mind receiving an extra thousand dollars or fifteen hundred dollars, so long as it wasn’t a publicly-made award. So I got George Howard to agree that he would continue to make the award, which we would use for merit recognition without any acknowledgement publicly as to who received what. And it was very helpful to us in putting a certain edge on the services of some of our key, outstanding faculty members.

DANIELL: So that was another exposure to Joe McDonald. That was really [inaudible].

DICKEY: So all together, this is why I mention it.

DANIELL: Well, look, we’re right about the end of this tape now. We’ve been going for close to an hour and 20 minutes or so. This is a convenient break time. Do you want to break now?

DICKEY: I think so.

DANIELL: Okay. I’ll turn it off then.

[End of Tape 18, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 18, Side B]

DANIELL: The next interview took place on Wednesday, January 14.

Well, as I just said, President Dickey, the last topic that in the abstract that we thought we should discuss systematically under students in your roughly first five years or so here, is the whole nature of and purpose of
and experience with the student government, which I guess you were responsible for initiating really, weren't you?

DICKEY: Well, I don't think I could claim responsibility for initiating student government insofar as it was reestablished following World War II. And it had to be reestablished absolutely from scratch. I suppose that would be an accurate statement. But prior to the war and indeed going clear back to my undergraduate days, and I don't know how much further back, there had been student bodies, the most prominent of which was Palaeopitus. It never exercised extensive responsibilities, at least with authority. But it was a group during my undergraduate days that exercised an influence in the student community through prestige and example.

Immediately in the latter part of '45 when I came on the job, Dean Neidlinger raised the question with me and other interested associates as to what we should do about reestablishing student government or indeed establishing a new more effective type of student government than had been here prior to the war. He was convinced that there was no possibility of having a healthy campus in respect to social responsibility and student attitudes unless we could in some way draw upon the leadership of the student body for assistance.

DANIELL: And observation of subsequent events have only proved more certain.

DICKEY: Yes. I've never had any doubt at all about the validity of that view. And I think I would share your view that every time one comes up against the problem with its rough edges, you're reminded that imperfect as student government inevitably is, and in my view always will be, it's still better than no student government. I'm tempted to jump way ahead to the late sixties and just make a comment along those lines: That when the rebellions of the sixties began to surface in American academic life, there was a point of view which found expression here among elements in the student body—the SDS elements, Students for a Democratic Society, and others I'm afraid I'd have to say were swept downstream by the SDS point of view that student government was Mickey Mouse. And unless you were given authority to hire and fire everybody in the college and the authority to fix tuition and the authority to do everything, unless you had all the authority that was present in the place (I'm overstating it a little bit, not very much), then student government was meaningless. It was a fraud. Or as the phrase went in those days, it was Mickey Mouse. Well, we're working our way back [Laughs] from that nihilistic point of view.

I remember so vividly one of the fellows who wanted to regard himself on the campus as a rather anointed leader without portfolio calling me up one
night and telling me that Palaeopitus had decided to disband. And we had a little chat on the telephone about it. And it simply was a case of being, as I’ve said—and the figure is about as good as any other I can put my tongue to—swept downstream by the sentiment that the ultimate authority for college affairs rested with the trustees, faculty, and administration, and therefore there was no place whatsoever for student government, which was I thought then a very mistaken view. And today I’m all the more convinced that it was not only mistaken but very unfortunate.

DANIELL: There’s a point you might be interested in in that: There’s a residue of that, which I became really vitally aware of in terms of the timing of the process of appeal of that attitude. There was a movement, as I’m sure you’ve read in *The Dartmouth*, to reestablish some form of student government, a committee on student input, or something of this which has begun. I was in a group of freshmen and sophomores last year in which this was discussed with complete enthusiasm. That very evening I was with a group of our honor students who are seniors. And there—I don’t know how it came up in the conversation—but probably two-thirds of them were opposed to it. The timing on it is very precise. The popularity of that what you call that nihilism I think probably reached its peak in ’72 among the Dartmouth student body. And I suspect within a couple of years probably it will be back.

DICKEY: Well, any attitude of that sort, I think after you’ve been around for quite a while you learn, works its way through and out of the student body. The degree to which attitudes in an undergraduate student body are cyclical is just extraordinary, the degree to which their attitudes in almost any matter affecting their life work is cyclical is one of the most important things to hold onto if you’re going to take a long view of these institutions.

Well, to get back: The first exposure that I had to the reestablishment of student government was very interestingly with the Green Key. It was the group that coming onto the campus had an immediate and one might say ready acceptance of the proposition that the College needed student representation, student activity in the area of student government. Green Key had originally been—and has since been—mainly a hospitality organization assisting in extending hospitality to visiting teams and things of that sort. It had branched into some other areas in the postwar period. But immediately following the war Green Key was the organization which undertook to get things started again on the campus, to assume responsibility for, if you will, provisional student government, ad hoc efforts to organize student government. And I shall never cease to be admiring and indeed grateful to the undergraduates, most of whom were coming back out of the war and who were entitled to adult attitudes…more so than
the undergraduates of the sixties, to be blunt about it. But they were quite prepared to recognize that this was a service which they could render, and they were ready and willing to do so. So that the reestablishment of the life of the campus insofar as student organizations and student government was concerned, was initially, it's my memory, very largely in the hands of the Green Key.

Another very important agency in that period of getting started—and I'm talking now about the first six months of my experience on the job, late '45 and early '46—another agency that played an important role in that respect was the newspaper, The Daily Dartmouth. You sometimes might think that that would be the last agency that would be ready to help out in that sort of thing. But Al Dickerson, who had been a prominent member of the Dartmouth directorate in his undergraduate days when he wrote a somewhat irreverent column called “Skip the Shoveler”….

DANIELL: I haven't heard of that since the war. [Laughter]

DICKEY: He established a very good working relationship with the first editors, and they really helped very importantly in getting some of these things considered and getting the student body interested and aware of the opportunities which were going to be before them. There's one editor whom I remember. I'm not sure whether he was the first editor after I came on the job, but he was either the first or second. Certainly not—I would guess first or second, Jerry Tallmer. He was a very….

DANIELL: Do you remember how his last name was spelled?

DICKEY: Yes, T-A-L-L-M-E-R, Jerry Tallmer ['42]. He subsequently went on from here to a career in journalism. I believe he's still in journalism. At one point I think he was with the New York Post. And I know that for a considerable period—and maybe still—he was a prominent member of the staff of the Village Voice in New York. I believe he was drama critic of the Village Voice.

Well, Jerry Tallmer was quite an interesting example of what I'm talking about. He had been—he was a veteran. He came back with some very well developed convictions about politics, and was well over on what would be regarded as the liberal, maybe even radical, side of things. But had an attitude toward the institution that was distinctly positive, and he was prepared to play a role in reestablishing the life of the campus and regarded the paper as having an important role to play in that activity.
I'll never forget that while he was editor, there were editorial expressions that annoyed some alumni and others. You might well have wondered a little bit about Jerry’s political philosophy; although I worried insofar as the Communist issue was concerned, I never had occasion to have any misgivings myself about Jerry Tallmer although I could not say the same about one or two of his successors later on. But he was definitely on the side of as much responsibility and authority as could be achieved for student organizations and freedom for the paper.

I’ll never forget: Oh, maybe five years later, three years later after he graduated, sometime in that range, he was back on the campus for something. Maybe it was a football game or something of that sort and came over for a visit with us at the house. While we were sitting around talking, he said, “There’s one thing I just have got to get off my chest.” He said, “Ever since I’ve been out and working in the big wide world in New York City, and discovering something about politics and in particular about the Communist group,” he said, “I find myself just incredulous that you were able to maintain the position you did with respect to freedom of speech and the freedom of the paper on this campus.” It was a volunteered, spontaneous comment that, as you can see, I never forgot. And it played an important role with me in keeping up my nerve later on more difficult occasions. I’m sure he did not intend it that way, never thought of it that way. But I just find myself encouraged to believe that if a lad such as Tallmer could come back and recognize that this had been important and difficult, that it was something that probably I would do well to continue to regard as important, however difficult it might become.

Well, Green Key, the paper, and I don’t remember but I think very shortly we established—we reestablished the Inter-Fraternity Council. That had been here on the campus again going clear back to my undergraduate days.

DANIELL: Just one question.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Was there any publication, do you know, newspaper, during the war? Was that continued?

DICKEY: Not the *Daily Dartmouth* as such. There was a Navy-sponsored…

DANIELL: A Navy one.
DICKEY: ...paper on the campus. No, well, Dartmouth was operating as a V-12 institution although there were a few straight civilian students here. There was no place for the kind of freedom of expression.... [Laughter]

DANIELL: How about Green Key, did that continue to exist, do you know? I mean none of these things....

DICKEY: No, as I recall Green Key was reestablished when we opened the civilian college again or when we became....

DANIELL: All this is making even more clear....

DICKEY: I could be wrong about that, but I don't think I am.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I don't think I am. The campus was governed by and large by the Navy, and the Navy doesn't have a place, understandably, in its institutions for quite that kind of freewheeling....

DANIELL: I was just going to say that all this makes clear something that you said earlier and I registered but not with the degree that I am as we go through these individual topics; namely, you came on the job at a time where you were really in many ways reestablishing [inaudible] any way and to regulate the reestablishment of the College. Yes.

DICKEY: Very definitely. Well, we had to reestablish many, many things. Indeed, it would be very hard to identify any aspect of the College life other than something such as the board of trustees and the faculty.

DANIELL: The faculty, right.

DICKEY: But many of the faculty—I guess the majority of the faculty—had found themselves doing unfamiliar duty in courses that were regarded as necessary for the V-12 program. So that there was a curriculum to be reestablished. We’ll talk about that at some length. My earliest relationship with the faculty in the area of educational policy was with the old CEP, Committee on Educational Policy, which Charles [L.] Stone ['17], professor of psychology, an old so-to-speak Dartmouth stalwart in the faculty, was chairman.

But to get back to the student organizations, I don't recall now just when we reestablished Palaeopitus. But at some point, and fairly early on, Palaeopitus was reestablished. And when Palaeopitus was reestablished,
Green Key, as I remember, surrendered a good many of the things it had been doing on a provisional basis, and they were taken over by Paleopotis. They were taken over by the Inter-Fraternity Council. And the whole network of student publications, student clubs, student councils began to develop. I don’t recall just when we had what might be called the constitutional convention or the formulation of a new—rather totally new—setup with an elected assembly. I forget what it was called now.

DANIELL: Undergraduate Council. The UGC was the big body when I came here.

DICKEY: Well, I guess it was called the Undergraduate Council at the outset. But in any event it was an elected assembly from different constituencies of the student body. And Palaeopitus was to be, as I remember the concept, was to be its executive committee.

DANIELL: That’s right.

DICKEY: And this body had a very large area of concern, much more so than the old Palaeopitus had had. As I remember, Dean Neidlinger played a leading role in working with undergraduates, and some faculty members worked on it. I seem to remember that Professor Bob [Robert K.] Carr ['29], who was in the government department at that time, was quite helpful in drafting a constitution working with the students, drafting a constitution for the Undergraduate Council and the relationship with Paleopitus to it and the jurisdiction of specific committees. I could find out from my notes just what year it was, but it was quite early on. It was within the first—I would say within the first three years.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I know it was just completely organized and run, probably at the peak of its established visibility or acceptance in the student body, when I arrived in 1950.

DICKEY: Well, I remember a number of undergraduates who were really extraordinary men in their assumption of responsibility in that organization. One man that got a Rhodes scholarship, had been the editor of the *Daily Dartmouth*, and I had a very fine relationship with him. Received his Rhodes Scholarship, was on his way from his home, I think, out in Colorado to the East Coast to go to England and was killed in an automobile accident. Things of that sort that really seem so unnecessary. But also so very inevitable in the life of an undergraduate college.

As I look back on those years, I made it a point each fall to meet personally with the Undergraduate Council at the outset to try to give them some idea of their opportunity and their responsibilities. I met rather
regularly with Palaeopitus and from time to time with the Inter-Fraternity Council. I remember having rather, well, lengthy discussions with the Inter-Fraternity Council at the time that we established the undertakings by the presidents and the members of the house that I referred to earlier in connection with the aftermath of the Cirrotta tragedy.

I think that's about as far as my memory goes without being refreshed. I can remember distinctly that the effectiveness of student government, whether in the Inter-Fraternity Council or the Undergraduate Council or in Palaeopitus, went up and down with the quality of its leadership. One year we would think we were out of the woods, [Laughter] and the next year you would despair, particularly if you got some cross-grained individual in the job, in one of those jobs, and he couldn’t command the respect and support of his group. But he was determined to assert himself as an adversary of the official College. But you quickly learned to absorb that as part of the daily life and work of the place.

DANIELL: That answers a major question I was going to ask about this, which was basically—I know there are inevitable ups and downs in this sort of thing from the point of view of someone who had the responsibility you did. And whether you could see this as part of a general process or whether you were primarily what my impression would have been a function simply of the leadership. Until the sixties when external forces begin to erode the position of student government.

DICKEY: Well, we gradually turned over to what was called the Judiciary—Judicial was it? Judiciary Committee or Judicial Committee, I forget which was the precise name.

DANIELL: The Judiciary.

DICKEY: Judiciary Committee. You were chairman of that, weren’t you? We gradually turned over a good many responsibilities to the Judiciary Committee, and that had probably more of an up-and-down quality to its life than any of the other agencies because it had more power, and then it would get a tough case that would get a lot of notoriety on the campus. And if it handled it with some severity, you could count upon petitions being presented to the dean’s office and ultimately to me to reverse the committee. We would get as many petitions, as I remember, to reverse the committee, particularly to do away with any what seemed to be a harsh penalty, as we did on anything. I remember one or two instances where Dean Neidlinger sought to negotiate undertakings from petitioners or from certain groups or houses that in return for some leniency, they would agree that something wouldn’t happen again or whatnot. But here again
the big lesson that I had to learn, and everybody has to learn, is those things are good as long, at best, as long as those men are on the campus.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And those men are gone certainly within three years, and frequently they were seniors who would be gone the next year. Whereupon time after time after time you would be confronted with fresh undergraduates, all usually very attractive people who say, “Well, we don’t know anything about that. We didn’t have anything to do with that.” And you start in all over again. I think this is one of the deep ongoing realities of campus life that certainly I didn’t understand when I came on the job in any profound way as I think I did before I left the job. It was a built-in limitation on student government that after a while I began trying to have people each year as they began student government understand: Namely all other human institutions that I’ve had anything to do with, the College, the U.S. government, the state government, or whatnot, are somewhat like individuals in that an institution has a life and learning of its own that becomes cumulative and builds up. You may go through some bad experiences, but if you have the capacity for learning from experience, you’re hopefully a little wiser, a little better prepared to handle the next.

DANIELL: I was just freshly reminded of this because of the temporary revival of the Indian symbol controversy this fall, in which freshmen came on absolutely not knowing what had gone before.

DICKEY: Inevitably.

DANIELL: And though the process of education didn’t take as long as it did initially, still it’ll happen again three years from now.

DICKEY: Absolutely.

DANIELL: We may as well switch this. Yeah.

[End of Tape 18, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 19, Side A]

DICKEY: …early years, certainly during the first five or even ten years, I came to believe that the president had a very, very important role in transmitting this sense of continuity to the student body, and indeed even to the faculty because you were getting a sufficient turnover in faculty that you would find yourself confronted with the same attitudes and frequently the same
problems that you had thought had been talked out and settled—mistakenly—for all time.

DANIELL: Very fatiguing that whole process.

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: Very fatiguing that whole process.

DICKEY: Oh, and it’s a great temptation to frustration, to annoyance, to a quick answer, so forth. But as far as the student body’s concerned, it’s absolutely unqualifiedly the essential condition of an even moderately satisfactory relationship between the institution and modern student body. Because you can accept the fact, if you will, or the assumption I guess is better, that they’re brighter than some others were earlier. That they have had a better preparation in high school and all this and that. What you must not assume is that they have learned from experience on the campus.

DANIELL: I couldn’t agree more.

DICKEY: And when they have not learned by experience, the only way they can be helped to avoid some tragic learning by experience is if the people who are here can convey a few hints—maybe nothing more than a hint—that there is a continuity to the nature of the problems and the nature of the life of an undergraduate community that they should take into account for a while until they’ve had some experience with it. And then by the time they’ve had any experience with it sufficient to protect them, lo and behold, it’s commencement and they’re gone. Then within ten years they’re writing you letters wondering what’s happened to the place that these undergraduates don’t understand what they understand. [Laughter] So you go through an educational experience which is unbelievable before you get through with it. I guess that’s about all, unless you have questions, that I would volunteer about the….

DANIELL: No. The details of this aren’t important in the sense that they’re available in other kinds of records. It’s really your—and particularly what you said here right near the end, the purpose of tapes is they can convey a sense of attitude toward them, and I think that’s fine. I’d be happy to switch to the….

DICKEY: Well, perhaps I might just say one thing more that comes to mind. Our initial need was to get the wheels turning again of an institution, whether it be student government, whether it be judiciary committees, whether it be
magazines, newspapers, or whatnot. And to establish more adequate levels of, if you will, student government which I’ve referred to earlier.

Very quickly, however—and I would guess by quickly I mean within, certainly within two years, about two to three years—it was clear to me, and I think I was probably one of the early people to be convinced of its importance, but it was clear to me that the College just had to move into the issue of racial and religious bigotry much more directly, much more positively, particularly in respect to the racial and religious clauses, so-called, in the fraternity system.

Here’s where, as I look back on it, I’m not sure we didn’t make a mistake; that is, to open the fraternities without imposing conditions that would eliminate those clauses. We just—I certainly didn’t understand and no one else spoke to me about it at the time how fundamental this was to the future work and life of the campus. So we opened the fraternities. But in a very short time—and as a matter of fact it’s my memory that this did not grow out (this surprises me as I think about it, and I may be wrong about it), but it’s my memory that this concern about the racial and religious barriers to membership in the fraternities did not grow out of the controversy about Jewish admissions.

DANIELL: No, I think it was later.

DICKEY: As far as I can remember it had a—it developed on its own.

DANIELL: Yes. It developed out of the national interest [inaudible].

DICKEY: Yes, out of the national picture. Out of the national picture, out of the concern on other campuses, although we were one of the very early ones to register a concern on this. Amherst was in it. And this was one of the subjects that came up at our Pentagonal meetings very early, and it was very helpful to have these five colleges discussing this matter. I remember Amherst took a strong position on the matter. Indeed, I think they had a trustees’ policy on it before we did.

I remember going down to the New York Times for one of their editorial publisher's luncheons that I was invited to from time to time. And Mrs. Sulzberger, who was very concerned about this problem on American campuses, spoke to me about it, and wanted to know what my views on it were and what we were proposing to do at Dartmouth. Well, I mention this now—I think we probably don’t want to go into the whole story at this point—but it was one of the first major issues that had to be dealt with in the Inter-Fraternity Council.
DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Because we had a campus that was not ready for spontaneous action in this respect. We'd reached the point where we could count upon fairly good leadership on this issue from—within Palaeopitus and the Undergraduate Council. But the Inter-Fraternity Council was a sticky point for a considerable period for reasons which we would all understand. And yet it became clear, well, I would say by 1947, that this was a matter that had to be taken head on, and I decided to make my position just utterly clear, that we could not go on accepting the imposition of racial and religious discrimination from outside groups, national fraternities, on our student body just as a matter of educational principle. So that by 1950-1951, we had had...we were having a series of undergraduate referenda.

DANIELL: Yes, I think my timing.... Well, in the first place I know a little bit about this in terms of the timing—see if this checks with yours—because the house which you and I were both members of, the now Alpha Theta, which was Theta Chi, was the house which served as, if I remember there was a point, and I don't know who was responsible for establishing the rules, but that required fraternities to make reasonable efforts to get rid of their discriminatory clauses.

DICKEY: That's right.

DANIELL: Theta Chi did not do this. And the resulting controversy resulted in them going local.

DICKEY: Yes, that's right.

DANIELL: That must have been '48, maybe ’49.

DICKEY: I would think it was probably ’48-’49.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And as I recall, that was a policy that we got established by the Undergraduate Council, and it was supported by a referendum, a majority....

DANIELL: I know the referendums came later in '53 and '54 when the student body voted to get rid—you had the fraternities get rid....

DICKEY: Yes. Well, my memory is that there were several referenda.
DANIELL: Yes, that's what I'm really asking, whether the early referenda....

DICKEY: No, I think there were several referenda.

DANIELL: That's a risky undertaking.

DICKEY: And the first ones were simply sort of designed to register broad attitudes on these matters. Well, this was a battle that I had no doubt about our ability to win. I'd been through controversies where I hadn't, some private tough spots about whether we could win or not. But I didn't have any doubt about this one. You see I had also gone through in late '46, I guess it was, and '47, my experience as a member of President [Harry S.] Truman's first Committee on Civil Rights or Civil Liberties; I forget which word we used in the title.

DANIELL: Civil Rights Commission.

DICKEY: And out of that I sharpened my own awareness and concern which stood me in good stead when we got back here.

DANIELL: It's always nice to have morality on your side.

DICKEY: Yes, well, exactly. And by this time I had developed a really—I guess the only way to say it is a very low opinion of the national fraternities and the representatives who came here. They would come into the office with the most pious attitudes, come into pay their respects as they would say, and tell me how they were concerned about the level of scholarship in their house and what they were doing to raise the level of scholarship. I can remember sometimes getting just so fed up with it. That finally I said, “Before you make that speech, let me just clear the air.” If we were talking about the racial and religious thing, I was blunt as could be about it and where I was going to stand and where we were going to stand and what they were going to have to decide, whether they wanted to stay or leave. But as they would get off this pious talk about how hard they were working to raise the level of academic standards in their house, I finally reached the point where I would say to each one of them: “Look, don’t waste your time doing that. That’s our business. If it can be done, we’re going to do it. And I don’t think, much as I’m glad to have help on anything, that really there’s very much you can do about it. But what you can do is you can have a real influence on the social quality of life in your house if you are determined to enforce it. And this is where we need your help and where we’re going to have to have your help or we’re going to regard fraternities as a menace.”
DANIELL: That must have thrown them for a loop!

DICKEY: Oh, I’d reached the point where I really, just to be blunt about it, I didn’t give a damn what they thought as long as I was able to be perfectly clear about what we wanted. I said, “What we look to these houses for is not as centers of academic, intellectual stimulus because I’m just not quite that naïve or willing to kid myself to that extent. But,” I said, “we have reached the point where either these fraternities are on the side of social education of a sort that really contributes something to a man’s life, or they’re not. And I’m just going to say to you that as far as I’m concerned, this is a very marginal thing at best in these houses. And until you’re prepared to really take a stand on these and enforce some penalties where a house doesn’t perform satisfactorily, as far as I’m concerned, you’re really not serving any useful purpose.”

DANIELL: Did they keep coming to visit you?

DICKEY: Oh, yes, they’d come to visit me, try to get up on my blind side frequently about the racial and discrimination issue and so on. But most of the fellows that were making their living to be, again, to be blunt as all get out about it, were making their living running around to these campuses representing the national organizations, were not very impressive human beings. They had the patter, but they really didn’t have very much else.

Well, there is just one thing more that perhaps I should say in this connection, where I had to make up my own mind, and it was my own mind. The board of trustees was prepared to go with me on it. The Alumni Council had more disagreement in it on this issue than the board of trustees did. And there were was some disagreement on the racial issue of course in the Inter-Fraternity Council. But I’d decided that I was going to separate the issue of national affiliation and racial and religious prejudice in the clauses.

There was quite a bit of sentiment in favor of the College coming down flatly with a policy that required the fraternities to break the national affiliation, and that that would take care of the clauses and everything else. And there were many who just regarded the nationals, especially at Dartmouth, as outdated, expensive, and really performing no very useful function. The notion that you could stay at somebody else’s house when you went somewhere else was a lot of hooey that didn’t add up to anything.
But I decided that this was something that I didn’t see as being sufficiently incompatible with the purposes of the College to require the College to take a position on the national affiliation if the national affiliation was not overtly furthering attitudes that were inimical to the educational purposes of the College, namely the racial and religious clause. If these undergraduates wanted to wear a national pin, wanted to spend their money by giving it to the national fraternities, I thought maybe this was a fairly good educational experience for them to have, [Laughter] as to where the money came from and what it was being used for.

So I decided to stake my position on the proposition that if the national fraternities gave local option to the houses in respect to their selection of their fraternity members, we would not undertake to force the nationals off the campus simply because they were nationals. As I look back on it, I think that was all right. But at the time it was one that involved weighing some pros and cons that might have gone the other way.

DANIELL: And that’s in fact what became College policy.

DICKEY: That’s correct.

DANIELL: Those nationals then that did not change, give the local option, both the threat of administrative pressure but the internal forces in the community meaning that they went local; and those that were not able, had a more flexible national, remained national. And that’s pretty much the mix that exists now with some exceptions [inaudible].

DICKEY: Well, to show you how cyclical a campus is, I had a number of undergraduates the other day telling me about how their house was having a very serious discussion, indeed controversy, as to whether it would not go back and become a national.

DANIELL: Really!

DICKEY: It had been out of the national for 15 years. But now they wondered whether it wasn’t something they wanted to do. And they said quite a few houses on the campus were going through this.

DANIELL: I hadn’t heard that.

DICKEY: Which surprised me and certainly didn’t encourage me in respect to the educational [Laughter] aspect of learning about where their money went and what it was used for. But okay. That’s one of the things I decided: I would just sit and listen; I didn’t have anything to say to them.
DANIELL: You can write a note to John Kemeny warning him about the national representative speech he may have to hear.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Well, that’s certainly something I should have thought of in terms of student government because, you know, it seems to me in looking back on this, although I wasn’t aware of it at the time when I was an undergraduate here, I remember that final referendum. I remember as a student being for the good side on this. But having constantly people saying, Well, we don’t really want to do this, but the administration is forcing us. But the fact that struck me later on—I remember sometime ago I was talking about this to someone—was that it was kind of risky, I said, to put it up to a student referendum.

DICKEY: Yes, it was.

DANIELL: And that’s why I asked you, pushed you on whether the referenda that occurred earlier for these rules. That wasn’t a clear-cut thing at all.

DICKEY: No, it wasn’t.

DANIELL: It was engineered….

DICKEY: We went through a period of what we mistakenly perhaps regarded as an education, of educating the campus, having the matter discussed, having it voted on, and gradually building conviction about it. But I remember at one of the Pentagonal meetings, the Amherst president was very emphatic that it was much better to lay down the law as a matter of trustee policy, and that was that. I’m not sure that I would trade the way we did it for that. But there are different ways to get results, and I was ultimately well satisfied with the results we got on this issue. On this issue.

DANIELL: Why don’t we switch over to the next area we said we were going to tackle, and this I assume will take all the—as much time and as much range as the large area we just finished, namely, the student body, which is the whole nature of the faculty when you came here. We can stop anytime you want to if you…

DICKEY: No, I think we can do another 25 minutes to three-thirty. Okay?
DANIELL: We can just stop it anytime. It looks like there’s about ten minutes left on this tape, and then I’ll switch it over, and you just break anytime you want to. Now we’ve got a lot in the tapes, and I’ve listened to most of them now about faculty, a lot of whom were here during this transition. Although my information on the first has to do with having been a student here four years after you came on the job, there’s a fair amount of background, a lot of information pertaining to the faculty. But it seems to me this must have been an extraordinarily important concern, fundamental concern of yours soon after you got on the job.

Now a number of areas I have jotted down concerning faculty: One is the whole nature of the faculty recruitment. One is the nature of the curriculum, which I guess involved very much negotiations with or dealing with the faculty. One is the area of faculty salaries. And one is AAUP. I have no preference in which order you want to go or whether you want to really separate it out that way. Or whether you want to start with a few general observations.

DICKEY: Perhaps a few general observations would be helpful to set the stage because it is the front and center subject of those years and indeed of all the years on the job, as far as I’m concerned. There were other constituencies of the College which were fully as important to the functioning and welfare of the institution as the faculty. But the faculty for reasons which anybody who’s been around one of these institutions can understand was just the continuing, dominant constituency that the president had to deal with.

I think the first general observation to make is that it was apparent to everyone—well, that’s too strong. But at least everyone I remember speaking to me about it, and I have a dim recollection of Mr. Hopkins mentioning it to me in one of my talks with him, but regardless of the outside testimony and of anything he may or may not have said to me about it, it quickly became clear to me as I began to dig into the picture that we were willy-nilly at a very critical juncture with respect to the faculty of Dartmouth College. That it was an overage faculty in the sense that it had a very high proportion of people who were in their sixties or upper sixties, some beyond. And that this presented, this fact itself presented all sorts of considerations, from the one that was uppermost on our minds very quickly, namely the economic welfare of the faculty: How were these people going to retire to anything approaching a decent life? And how were we going to—one of the refinements of that—how are we going to push the retirement requirement lower? How are we going to recruit their replacements at a level that would accomplish the strengthening of the institution to which all of us in one way or another and to some degree
were committed? And along with all of these considerations and others was the consideration of how far, how fast one could take this and still retain a good working relationship with the faculty on all of the other subjects that were important to my leadership?

I should say in that connection, and we’ll come to it in a moment, I came to the campus with a determination that I was going to play an active role in educational policy or I wasn’t interested in the job. Just that simple. I was quite prepared to take—well, I was reasonably confident about my capacity to be an administrator; I’d been bloodied in state government and in the federal government. And I’d had a taste of teaching and of educational activity as a faculty member at the School of Advanced International Studies. But I still had to prove to myself and certainly had to prove to all the members of the faculty that I had anything to say that was worth their attention in the area of educational policy.

Well, I don’t remember at the moment just which things came first. But I think the first—well the first thing was to understand the picture of the faculty in respect to age, in respect to rank. Dartmouth had been following a policy that it was quickly apparent to me we couldn’t push any further, and indeed we had to begin to reverse, and that was the policy of frankly using rank in place of money to hold a man or keep them somewhat satisfied. And particularly to provide promotions that might take the place of competitive salaries. And as a result of this, we had a faculty that not only was overage in respect to its age distribution, but a faculty which was even more out of balance in respect to rank. The number of faculty members who were holding full professorships—I don’t recall the statistic now, that’s available in the literature, but it was well way up there. And it was aggravated by the fact that sometime earlier Dartmouth had eliminated the rank of associate professor. So that everybody that was somebody that the College wanted to keep, who got through his instructor and assistant professor years, jumped right into the rank of a full professor. And this was a condition of life in the faculty here at Dartmouth which was rather widely known, of course, in the academic community elsewhere. And while it had certain attractions for a young fellow to come as assistant professor and look forward to being promoted to a full professor within a matter of five or so years; it I think on balance worked to downgrade the reputation of the faculty—

DANIELL: No doubt about that.

DICKEY: --with other institutions. So the first task was to understand this picture. There were pluses to it, as I’ve mentioned, and some I haven’t mentioned. And there were minuses, a good many which I suppose I haven’t
mentioned. And after that to begin to see what could be done to get at these problems. Almost immediately—I think in a matter of days or certainly weeks—I began to be faced with the question of what salary arrangements we would make for some faculty who were not back yet but who had been away for very long on leaves-of-absence during the war.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: And they were writing to the College and saying I am getting out of such and such a service and I've been approached by [inaudible] university and so forth and before I decide, I would like to know what Dartmouth is going to do. [Laughter] I hadn't caught my breath....

[End of Tape 19, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 19, Side B]

DICKEY: ...was an aspect of the job for which I was frankly not prepared [Laughter] and....

DANIELL: ...[inaudible] always took care of that by their ratings.

DICKEY: ...had very little help on it. And this leads me to the fact that Dean Bill, who was dean of the faculty was on the threshold of declining vigor and ill health and ultimately his death to a degree that Dean Bill, it's fair to say, never was able to be of any help to me. I don't say this critically, just as a matter of fact; health and his own problems just ruled out his playing a vigorous role as dean of faculty. And I would have to say within the privacy of this kind of archive that was probably just as well because.... Well, Dean Bill had many friends who respected him and some of them very fond of him as a man. Dean Bill at that point commanded very little support or respect even from the stronger members of the faculty as an intellectual leader. Indeed, that day, if it had existed, when he was a practicing mathematician, and it may well have, I don't know anything about that.

DANIELL: The tapes generally—and this is a question that's been asked and answered in a lot of them—the general reading you get on the tapes is that most faculty who lived through that period in the forties and in the thirties assumed that Bill (a) had been kicked upstairs because he didn't work out in the dean of freshmen's job, and Bob Strong took over; and that (b) that he really did very little as the dean of the faculty [inaudible] President Hopkins [assuming that role].

DICKEY: Well, this corresponds to the picture that was painted for me at the time by various individuals that I came to know well enough to have them speak to
me frankly about that. But for my purposes immediately it was clear that I could not look to the dean of the faculty for help on these fundamental problems of policy and recruitment.

I'll never forget one case that he brought to me. It was a case of a man who had been a good faculty man. I wouldn't characterize him from what I know as being a really outstanding member of the faculty. But he was a better than average faculty person, and he'd gone off and been with a government bureau and wanted to come back. And wrote and said that he had an offer from somebody. And Dean Bill came to my office and said, “Just thought I’d tell you about this. I know we can’t do anything about it. He’ll have to go.” Well, I said, “Why does he have to go if he’s somebody we’d like to have?” And he said, “Well, we couldn’t touch that salary.” And I forget what the salary was but I looked at it, and I thought, God, if we can’t touch that salary, we were really in trouble. [Laughs] But I didn’t know the whole picture well enough to know whether I could just step right in and say, Well, go ahead, match it. Because it’s awfully easy to say something like that and then discover 48 hours later that you have stirred up all matter of inequalities, and you’ve really got a mess on your hands. So I didn’t do more than just say I was really a little taken aback that we couldn’t compete for this man.

Shortly thereafter...well, I guess out of that conversation I said I would like to see the salary scales right away. And this was within a matter of a week or so after coming on the job. And Dean Bill sent up the salary scales. Well, I know that academic salaries were in that period generally on the low side as far as the American community was concerned. But I was immediately disturbed that this was more of a crisis than I had hoped or expected. It had been somewhat ameliorated by the move which I told you President Hopkins had permitted me to make about that time or just before that, a matter of days, of announcing that there would be across-the-board adjustment of salaries upward. But I remember looking at one salary of one full professor, not a youngster either, on the campus whose work I knew personally very well from having been a student of his and having kept in touch with him. And of having had some basis for judgment with respect to his professional position—qualifications.

DANIELL: This is the fellow in sociology?
DICKEY: I’m talking about Dr. [McQuilkin] DeGrange.
DANIELL: Oh, yes, yes.
DICKEY: No, I’m talking about Dr. DeGrange.
DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: Who was in sociology.

DANIELL: No.

DICKEY: And an internationally known historian of sociology. But a sort of recluse as an individual, not a card player, one of the hale fellows well met with Bill, and so forth. So when Dean Bill came back within a day or so, I said it just was clear we really had to take this question of faculty salaries on and get right after it. But, I said, “There are a few here that I think I know something about already.” "I don’t understand?" "And, oh, here’s this one of Dr. DeGrange, McQuilken De Grange." (He’s dead now.) And I said, “I was a student of his, and I subsequently kept in touch with him, and I also know enough about the opinion of him by people in the other academic institutions to know that he’s one of the respected scholars around this place.” He was still working on his lifetime magnum opus, History of Sociology. "Oh," Bill said, “He’s a nice enough fellow, but he’s a fuddy-duddy.” [Laughter]

Well, this was clear, the point at which I had to just tell Dean Bill that I had a different view of the matter and that I was prepared to bet on my view of the matter. And I said—I forget what he was getting. It was something in the 5,000 range. And I said, “There’s no problem here of messing up the rates. This is a question of judgment about an individual.” And I said, “I’m just perfectly clear this fellow should be in the upper level of his grade and years of service here on the basis of what I know about his professional qualifications.” “Well,” Bill said, “you’re the boss. Okay.” [Laughs] And that was that. Well, I cite those things to document the fact that—as concrete instances of the fact that Dean Bill was really not in a position to play a helpful role.

DANIELL: The tapes are filled with stories about Dean Bill.

DICKEY: I suppose. Well, I won’t burden it with any further stories, other than to say that very shortly after that—and I don’t again remember the dates—but Dean Bill had a series of illnesses which culminated in, and maybe they were all related to a prostate condition. He had to go through surgery. Surgery at that period for that condition I believe was not as advanced as it is today. In any event, out of it—whether out of the surgery or along with it I couldn’t possibly say—came a deteriorating mental condition that manifested itself in an acute depression which took him out of the office forcibly, fortunately, because he would’ve been no good and really just
would've been a menace to the whole show in the office. He went down to Arthur Ruggles Hospital in Rhode Island, in Providence, I think, for a period. Back and forth several times. And before it was all over, took his own life.

While this was going on, that is the period of his being around but not able to do anything on the job and certainly after his death, I'd decided that this was one area where we had to move quite decisively. But I also knew enough about personnel practices and problems, not just here but elsewhere, to know that this was one I really didn't want to move too fast on and find I had to move again. And I didn't want to find myself in a position where I just had to take other people's opinion for a man because this was a very great temptation. I'll just mention something along those lines in a moment, made quite an impression on me.

So I decided to temporize with the situation while I became more familiar with it, and to take three highly respected members of the faculty and to create what I called the Dean of Faculty Committee to operate the dean of faculty's office until I was ready to make an appointment. I chose Bancroft Brown to be chairman of the committee. I'd come to have a very great respect for Bancroft's independence of mind and his mental vigor and his standards, nothing soft about Bancroft.

Stewart Messer had been a leading figure in the faculty for some years as a classicist, and had been, I think it's fair to say, the dominant faculty voice during the war and immediately after the war in dealing with Mr. Hopkins on faculty affairs and the Navy. A very bright, sharp person who was highly articulate, could hold his own with anybody in thinking about a matter, rigorously honest intellectually. And one that I think it's fair to say many faculty members avoided crossing because they didn't want to take him on. He was one of the good ones around here and one of the hard-headed ones. And also was one who was prepared to be very independent-minded about a young new president, which for whatever favor may win on high, I wasn't afraid of. Indeed, I was rather looking for it because I wanted a committee that could hold its own with the faculty because I wasn't quite prepared yet to know whether I could or not, or whether I wanted to try.

And the third man was a totally different character personally, much more quiet, unassertive person, but still a wise, highly-respected human being, Andy Truxhal of the sociology department. These three men under the chairmanship of Bancroft became the Dean of Faculty Committee to run the dean of faculty's office in Dean Bill's absence and then after his death for a while.
I don’t know just when they came onto that—I’d have to check the records—but it was sometime during the very early years. And I had, as I recall, before I appointed the committee, I had already had—I know I’d had some personal experience with Stewart Messer in connection with the transition from the V-12 institution to the civilian college. And had come to have a very real respect for his mind.

DANIELL: His is the name that appears most frequently in the tapes in conjunction with the process of the coming of World War II, in which there was divisions within the faculty, and Hopkins found that certain members of the faculty he felt were taking a position that he didn’t want to institution to take, basically an isolationist position. And Stewart Messer was one of the faculty—

DICKEY: Oh, he was one of those?

DANIELL: --who sided with President Hopkins.

DICKEY: Oh, oh, I see. I never knew anything about his position in that respect. Never sought to know and never did know. But he was a quality person, I had no trouble recognizing that, and not somebody that anybody in the faculty was going to shoot at as a stooge of the president or a handpicked presidential favorite. And Bancroft Brown was decidedly not such a person. And I had already, I think, I may be getting my dates mixed up here, but I’d already worked with Bancroft Brown as a member and perhaps the chairman of a committee that I had established to give me a report, first report I asked for, on the faculty salary schedules. And Bancroft Brown worked on that, several other faculty people worked on it. Several people—Halsey Edgerton, the treasurer, worked on it. And we got one of these representative, so-called, committees.

DANIELL: Ad hoc we call them now.

DICKEY: Yes. And I got John Meck to work on that from the outside. John Meck had had a very responsible position during the war helping administer the V-12 program from the Navy Department from Washington. He had visited a great many campuses, knew the setup on I guess all of the campuses that had been V-12 institutions. And I wanted to make sure that we got a good view of what was going on elsewhere in respect to faculty compensation and policies, and he provided that.

This was a very useful group. Its recommendations today would look very modest. I don’t remember what they were fortunately. But they’re in the
record somewhere. But they went right at it and with the thoroughness that you would expect of a Bancroft Brown….

DANIELL: They had nothing to lose; they had plenty to gain.

DICKEY: They went into what should be the cycle of raises, what should be the cycle, the time cycle, and promotions and so forth.

I don’t recall whether that committee also—I don’t think it did—went into the retirement question. But I was perfectly clear that we had to get at that one fairly promptly. And whether that was dealt with by that committee or not, I at the moment am not sure. But I should say a word about that because it came—it was a question that came right along not only with the compensation subject, but it was one that involved our ability to cut off the age, to reduce the age at which people had to retire.

Dartmouth had had difficulties with its retirement program from the very beginning. I don’t remember now all the details of it. But in any event, they had not made it compulsory. It had been voluntary. And as I recall, it had been if not a 50-50 affair, 50 percent being put in by the College and 50 percent by the faculty member, it at least was a shared program. The acute troubles came some years later while I was still on the job. Two or three very well-known Hanover figures, who for reasons of their own and in several instances because they didn’t think they could afford to contribute to it at the time, and in one or two instances because it ran against their principles that they didn’t believe in retirement, [Laughter] or something of that sort which I never understood…. In any event, they hadn’t participated in a retirement program, and later it was a case of where we just had no alternative but to take care of them as charity cases without knowledge of the community. One alumnus, as a matter of fact, took care of one man pretty much on his own. And we arranged to work things out for one or two others who had that problem.

DANIELL: It’s a continuing process. I was on the COP last year or the year before, in which we took this up as a concern of the faculty for in the abstract rather than concrete cases that I guess have disappeared now.

DICKEY: Well, I know that a review of the faculty salary program—or faculty compensation program—came along I think after we had gotten the first study done on faculty compensation. And when it came along, I forget what our first step was, but very quickly we made the breakthrough as far as most institutions are concerned of going to a 16 percent level of institutional contribution with no contribution from the individual. Of course this worked to increase faculty salaries, and did, probably as much as any
other single policy that we introduced, to give me a little more leverage in the retirement program and also respect on the part of faculty for the good faith of the leadership in seeking to do whatever could be done even at some risk.

DANIELL: Was this done while you had this Dean of the Faculty Committee? Or was that done after Don Morrison became dean of the faculty?

DICKEY: I don’t remember that. But my guess would be it was after the Dean of the Faculty Committee was eliminated—it was after Don Morrison was appointed.

DANIELL: What I’m asking really is the initiator of this. You said this came more from the committee, from you, from Don?

DICKEY: No. I don’t remember clearly enough to say. John Meck played an important role in that, I believe. I think by this time Halsey had retired. John was on the job. This was, I’m beginning to think as I think about it, sort of a second stage move on the compensation front because it was definitely related to what Don and I were determined to do to push the retirement age down. We had to do it by phasing it in from 70 down to 65 gradually. I think that went out over, oh, I would guess a five- to ten-year period, that we worked back to the 65 age. And this took some fairly careful administering because you had to phase it out with a salary that gave the fellow a reasonable chance of having a satisfactory retirement. Indeed, it worked out extraordinarily well. I was worried about it the whole way through that there would be some injustices done that we hadn’t foreseen. And there may have been, but we certainly didn’t get into any crisis over it. Faculty I think at the time was generally not only pleased but I would guess a little amazed that we were prepared to make this move to a 16 percent non-contributory which practically everybody was on a matching basis.

DANIELL: Arthur Wilson has a standard question in his interviews with faculty emeriti: What are the differences between your experience of the effect of President Hopkins’s presidency and John Sloan Dickey’s presidency, and just letting them respond automatically. And the quick response always has to do with John Dickey gave us secretaries, and he gave us a decent living wage, and he gave us a retirement plan. So it registered somewhere.

DICKEY: A telephone in every office. [Laughs] Which is something I took quite a bit of persuading on. But another thing we did, which many of these faculty members probably have forgotten, or they’re gone or they’re dead and so
forth, was to establish the Children’s Scholarship Program. And this was
one that came home to me very sharply because I learned of a teacher
that I had had who had gone through just a terrible experience with two or
three daughters who were not eligible to come to Dartmouth if they’d
wanted to. And who had not had the money to really put them through
college without very serious sacrifice. So we moved in on that one. I won’t
take the time to go into the details of that. But we worked out an
arrangement with the Pentagonal Group for a while, permitted an
exchange of scholarships with women’s institutions and our Pentagonal
Group. We pushed that up to the point where the treasurer began to worry
about it over the years. He said that what it was doing was simply drawing
to us large families of faculty members and so forth. But once again, it
took the monkey off the back of quite a few faculty people, and was a
lifesaving factor for some of them.

Well, these were the aims that we had. I don’t—I’m not able to place the
dates and the chronology of them too exactly. But they came, the first
ones, were sort of emergency moves, ad hoc moves. The first concerted
effort was the Bancroft Committee on Faculty Compensation, which, as
I’ve said, Halsey Edgerton served on, was very skeptical that we could
afford what was proposed.

DANIELL: He was skeptical about affording anything, wasn’t he?

DICKEY: But went along with it. And John Meck was on it. And it was out of that
introduction to Dartmouth’s affairs and his interest in the College that led
to his coming in as treasurer when Halsey retired.

DANIELL: Well, that covers pretty well the area of compensation, which is one of the
categories. I just know we don’t have but a couple of minutes left on the
tape. You said 20 minutes, and it’s been another half an hour since then.
Unless you want to add something more in there, this might be a
convenient time to break.

DICKEY: No, I don’t think I have anything more to add. Other than to say that when
Don Morrison came in—and that’s another story we should deal with in a
separate interview—I had a man that I was perfectly certain wanted the
same things I did broadly in respect to the development of the institution
and the faculty in particular. And I think it was after he came along that the
full retirement program was developed and introduced. And we—Well,
every two years I think we moved the compensation scale up in one way
or another, directly or indirectly. The Bancroft Brown Committee launched
this. But it was quickly obsolete so far as what we were competing with.
DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And the competition became the critical factor because we increasingly got our nerve up to stand pretty staunchly on the proposition that we were going to compete with the best for the best as long as they were people who were primarily interested in teaching along with their scholarship.

DANIELL: Yes. Well, your timing is superb. You’re getting used to my 32-minute tapes.

[End of Tape 19, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 20, Side A]


DICKEY: Okay.

DANIELL: Do you want to begin?

DICKEY: Well, yes.

DANIELL: I just said that you suggested as I left last time that another area in your relationship to the faculty which quickly became important to you was generally in the area of curriculum. And quite soon after you came on the job that you had reason to come in contact with the…I guess you said the Committee on Educational Planning or Policy, whichever it was then.

DICKEY: Yes. It was known as the CEP, the Committee on Educational Policy. I mentioned earlier that when I was thinking seriously about coming to the Dartmouth presidency after it was offered to me—or that I knew that I was under consideration, more accurately—I was clear in my own mind that I would be attracted to the job only if it did present an opportunity for active participation in the educational policies and processes, indeed some teaching in the institution. In other words, I was not looking for a job in the academic world that would be solely administrative, even though I quite recognized the fact that would be the primary responsibilities of the presidency.

At about the time I came on the job—and indeed before I came on the job—the Faculty Committee on Educational Policy had been engaged in reviewing ideas and various possibilities for a fundamentally revised curriculum in the postwar era. You may remember that there was a good bit of this going on in the country at the time. One of the most prominent results was a book on general education put out by Harvard, which came
to be identified with President Conant. It was a report directed very largely at restoring the primacy of, well, what they called general education, a broadly-oriented liberal arts curriculum, designed to provide a comprehensive introduction to liberal studies rather than a highly-specialized or deeply professional program.

DANIELL: The first teaching I did to college students was in these courses, general education courses.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: When I was in graduate school at Harvard.

DICKEY: Well, this made a very important and widespread impact upon thinking in the American academic community. I think it was within two weeks probably, certainly not more than two or three weeks, that the chairman of the Committee on Educational Policy [“CEP”], Professor Charles [L.] Stone [’17] of the psychology department, called on me and said that on behalf of the committee he would like to invite me to meet with the committee to discuss any thoughts I might have about the work they were doing and to hear what they were thinking. It was a very thoughtful move on his part, and one which found a ready response on mine. We met down in the basement, as I remember, of Parkhurst Hall. I had heard, either before that or shortly thereafter, that Mr. Hopkins had not had an entirely satisfactory relationship with the CEP. Apparently sometime earlier there had been a question raised about the president serving as chairman of the CEP. And at that time—and I don’t know that I ever knew just when that was—but in any event, sometime during the latter part of Mr. Hopkins’s administration….

DANIELL: Would this have had to do with the rather abrupt termination of the social sciences course in which [inaudible] and other people who were thought to be leftist, I suppose, is the general term?

DICKEY: Well, if it did, it’s something that as far as I know, I never had any knowledge about. But I do know that he at one point almost in passing mentioned to me that he had not been very close to the CEP since the time when there had been the move from his chairmanship to a faculty member’s chairmanship.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: And I don’t recall that he made anything out of it in particular, and I didn’t. And there was never any question as far as I was concerned about the
chairmanship of the committee. It clearly was something that under the organization of the faculty at that time was the responsibility of a member of the faculty. In this case, as I’ve said, Professor Charles Stone.

Well, the secretary of the committee at that time was Professor [Anton A. “Tony”] Raven of the English department, a very quiet, effective person, who was subsequently very generous to the College and individuals and then the hospital here in town. He was a man of some independent means. An exceedingly quiet person. I mention him because it was in the course of his keeping the minutes of my remarks that the name for the Great Issues Course….

DANIELL: Oh, really! I didn’t know that.

DICKEY: ...came about. Well, they described to me the work that they’d been doing, their interest in the idea of general education, and a few other areas in which they were planning to make suggestions to the faculty for changes in the curriculum. I don’t recall that I was impressed with the proposals they had under consideration as being radical or very innovative. They looked to me to be rather tightening-up improvements. And I suppose actually at that point I wasn’t as sophisticated about departmental interests or the kind of interests that get involved in faculty curricular revision.

But the important memory I have as far as I’m concerned is that I was asked at I think the second meeting of the committee—and they were meeting at least once a week and I guess maybe more frequently—whether I cared to make any comments myself about possible approaches to the revision of the curriculum. I welcomed this opportunity because I had been doing a fair amount of thinking about it. And I drew on my experience in teaching at the School of Advanced International Studies the previous year, along with some convictions that I had developed over the years out of my Dartmouth undergraduate years and my work at Harvard Law School.

I don’t think probably it’s necessary for us to go into the detail of comment that I made. But the basic ideas I expressed were that we were in a period, as far as I could tell, when attention to international affairs specifically and to public affairs generally was going to be a necessary part of a first-rate undergraduate education. I thought, myself, that the time had come to reexamine the question of whether an institution did not have some responsibility to all of its graduates to see that they had a minimum exposure to these areas. And I said I had been for a considerable period very doubtful that it was enough to rely upon the so-called distributive requirements to provide that exposure.
I said that one of the most valuable experiences that I had had as an undergraduate was in the introductory courses in the freshman year in evolution and citizenship. And I knew that this had been true of many of my classmates. And that when I got to the law school, I was once again impressed with the great importance of giving the students a common intellectual experience in sufficient measure, at least, to permit an ongoing, out-of-class discussion of the intellectual work of the enterprise on the part of students…at meals, in the dormitories, wherever they gathered.

I emphasized my deep conviction from experience and thinking about it that you just could not hope on a resident undergraduate campus for this kind of out-of-class intellectual give-and-take in any general way unless the students had had some common experiences with it. I referred to the experience I’d had in English 1 and 2 as an undergraduate, where I remembered vividly walking back and forth to Freshman Commons at noontime after our English classes and, strange as it may seem, discussing Galsworthy’s loyalties and things of that sort.

I went on to make the observation, nothing very new about it, that by and large if you were going to put the kind of money that was involved in a resident undergraduate campus into education, into a college education, you certainly had to, I thought, work at finding ways to see that the intellectual experience was carried on out of class to a degree in the lives the students were living at meals, in the dormitories, and in the fraternities, and not simply regard the out-of-class experience as reading an assignment and spending the rest of the time in extracurricular activities, important as I regard such activities.

I then said that this, of course, was an observation that was basically or fundamentally in line with the resurgence of interest in the academic world and general education. But I said I was prepared to suggest that it would be a more significant approach to general education if this common experience that I was proposing could take place during the senior year when there would be an opportunity to help the student acquire familiarity with follow-through material that he might expect to use as an adult: mainly the newspaper, current documents, material of that sort. And I made the observation that having been teaching at the graduate level the year before, I was appalled at the utter lack of familiarity on the part of these college graduates I was dealing with in respect to the most fundamental follow-through materials. They were still in a spoon-fed state of mind with respect to how they became educated.
So I said that without having thought it through, I would like to see the senior year in some respect—and I didn’t have it packaged precisely at that point—but in some respect involve the entire senior class in an experience that would apply their liberal arts education of the three previous years to the world that they were moving into as adults. And apply it in a way that brought this world into a focus that had relevance to liberal arts subjects and purpose. And I said really what I would like to see them have an exposure to is the great issues of life as they come up in public affairs, as they come up in one’s relationship to the universe either scientifically or humanistically.

Well, that was about as close as I came in the course of I suppose two or three meetings with the CEP to laying out a proposal in any specific way. I mentioned earlier that the secretary of the committee was Professor Raven. And in the course of recording the minutes of my observations, he used the phrase in the minutes that the president had suggested—I don’t know whether he said a course in great issues but something in great issues—attention to great issues—as a format for general education in the senior year. Well, thereafter they just picked up the terminology of the great issues idea or the Great Issues Course, and that’s where the name came from. Not, as many people thought, a takeoff on the Great Books of St. John’s which had been….

**DANIELL:** At this point, though, you hadn’t suggested any particular framework for this, but just the basic idea as you’ve articulated.

**DICKEY:** Just the basic ideas as I have mentioned them. And indeed they were expressed very informally without any documentation from me at the time. I did describe to them the kind of course I had taught at the School for Advanced International Studies on the formulation of American foreign policy. And the use that I had made of the comparative press, requiring my students to read on a daily basis the *Chicago Tribune* and the *New York Times* and possibly the *Daily Worker* or something. So that they could see that the same happening might have a totally different appearance depending upon the newspaper in which that happening was reported. And I had had, I think it’s fair to say, a very successful experience with this course at the School of Advanced International Studies. And therefore I had a certain amount of confidence that I knew what I was talking about and wasn’t just trying to say something without having any basis for knowing whether it had validity or not. As I remember, there was only one critical reaction….

**DANIELL:** That was the next question I was going to ask.
DICKEY: ...in the committee. And if you knew the committee and knew the individuals, then, of course, you know this individual, you might think that he....

DANIELL: Will you stop just a second? I just want to check to make sure that the recording light’s on on this.

[Pause]

DICKEY: Where were we?

DANIELL: Well, we were talking about... You were in the CEP and just beginning to discuss the one critical remark by....

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: Was this [Leon Burr] L.B. Richardson [1900]?

DICKEY: [Laughs] No, I don’t think L.B. was on that committee. But it was [Robert E.] Bob Riegel.

DANIELL: Oh, yes. That’s just as bad.

DICKEY: And anybody who knew and knows Bob, even, would realize that Bob wouldn’t instantaneously arrive at the conclusion that a new president had something to offer in the area of curriculum planning. [Laughter] That is, Bob....

DANIELL: He had the same attitude toward new people in the history department, too.

DICKEY: As a matter of fact, I’ve always had a very fine relationship with Bob. I studied under him as an undergraduate and have the highest regard for him. But there’s no doubt about it, Bob is a little inclined to porcupine-ish postures or at least stances.

Well, I forget now what his comment was, but it was to the effect that colleges had been trying to teach these things for a long, long time, and he wondered whether there really was as much need for attention to international affairs as I perhaps thought, and things like that.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: A little bit the point of view of what one might call the traditional historian: Are we likely to get too caught up in the current affairs, and thereby minimize unduly the relevance of our historical background? I remember this not because there was any difficulty in the passage of arms between and myself, but obviously he felt called upon to speak up with various questions about it.

I subsequently learned from individuals that—and individuals outside the committee on the faculty—that what I had said had really gotten through. Because several people said: What did you say to the Committee on Educational Policy? Because you really stirred them up, and the principal subject of discussion now on the campus in faculty circles is this idea which you threw out.

DANIELL: Do you remember specifically who was on that committee besides the chairman, Professor Stone, you’ve mentioned, and Bob Riegel now. Were there individuals--? I’ve asked this of faculty members before—Arthur Wilson has—about who were the main types of supporters of this idea in the CEP, and no one could seem to remember. After it people remember what was said in the faculty meeting when this thing was finally implemented.

DICKEY: No, I don’t remember. Tony Raven, Charlie Stone, Bob Riegel are the only ones that I clearly remember as being present. It was a fairly large committee. It was a committee I would suppose of ten, 12 people. And I do remember that within a matter of days word had come back to me from several different sources, that what I had said had gotten through and was being seriously discussed as a new idea in faculty circles. I don’t remember how many more sessions I had with the CEP about the idea, but I must have had a number. And they had their own discussions, of course, when I wasn’t present. My next definite memory is that I was told sometime later that the committee was very favorably impressed with the basic suggestion and wanted to bring it to the faculty. I don’t know now just when that was. But presumably it was in the early winter of ’46.

DANIELL: Yes, I think that’s right.

DICKEY: And they asked me whether I would be prepared to support their recommendation or their interest—I forget how it was put—in the matter with a statement to the faculty along the lines that I had made to the committee. And I of course said I would be glad to do that. And the matter was discussed in the faculty. I don’t remember now the pros and cons that were expressed. I assume that L.B. Richardson spoke up, but I don’t remember that. I know there was some expression along the lines that
Bob Riegel had expressed: skepticism that there was anything new under the world or under the sun in curriculum planning. It was a thoroughly good discussion. No personalities or animosities or anything of that sort in my memory. And I don’t remember whether it came up in the context of all the recommendations of the committee or whether the Great Issues Course idea came up alone and separately because there were other recommendations being made by the committee. I think it is fair to say that the Great Issues Course suggestion did command the most discussion and the greatest interest in the faculty.

It was after the approval by the faculty of the committee’s recommendation that I was asked—I think Charles Stone spoke to me about wanting to know whether I was prepared to carry the burden of implementing the idea. Well, there was no alternative to that, and I was interested in participating. So I said certainly. I then looked around the faculty to see who was available to work on the planning of the proposal because there was an awful lot of, as you would realize, concrete structure that had to be developed for a required course for all seniors…and one built around bringing to the campus each week a visiting speaker.

I found that there was very general support for enlisting Arthur [M.] Wilson, if he could be enlisted, as a key member of the Great Issues Planning Committee. The name of Arthur [E.] Jensen was suggested by a number of people from the humanities and [William W.] Bill Ballard ['28] from the sciences. I think these were the three first members of the steering committee. We enlisted [Alexander K.] Alex Laing ['25] who was working in the library at that time and had a great deal of interest in this sort of thing to meet with us. We also enlisted Tom...

[End of Tape 20, Side A – Beginning of Tape 20, Side B]

DICKEY: It was launched in ’47. Well, it launched in the fall of ’46-’47.

DANIELL: Yes. Right.

DICKEY: And the story of the Great Issues Course is a big story. It’s been told by various people in various ways. Arthur will have been....

DANIELL: It’s [inaudible] independent research [inaudible].

DICKEY: Yes, Arthur Wilson has written about it.
[Thomas W.] Tom Eggleston ['74] was the student who did a lot of taping of [inaudible].

DICKEY: Yes, that was Tom Eggleston.

DANIELL: It wasn’t a great report, but it was a lot of rich and [inaudible].

DICKEY: That’s right. He came to see me a number of times, and I tried to help him with it. There’s a great deal of primary documentation on the lecture schedules, the manuals to the students, the exhibits that were used. We made a great deal out of the use of exhibits for the entire class, things of that sort. Well, for me it was, I suppose, in some ways the single most valuable initial experience that I had on the job because it required me to work at formulating my views about the purpose of the institution, about the implementation of that purpose, the economics of teaching which were very important to the Great Issues Course, and the effectiveness of certain large-scale classes such as we had in the Great Issues Course.

It also brought me in touch with the student body in a way that I could not have been in touch with the total student body through teaching a normal class. It brought me in touch with faculty. It kept me in touch with the outside world in a way that at the time I didn’t fully appreciate but which, as I look back on it, was an immensely valuable thing for me on my job because it involved my keeping in touch with people at the top level of government in the foundations and throughout the American community. This was something that Dartmouth needed and will always, I suppose, need to a little larger degree than an institution located in Boston or New York or one of the great metropolitan centers. So that this was a very important, if you will, collateral aspect of the work I did in the course.

DANIELL: You couldn’t even really think of a more effective way to get....

DICKEY: I was involved in inviting most of these people. I, for the first two years and indeed most of the first three years, I guess, worked closely every Monday and Tuesday and Thursday with the class. Arthur Wilson took over wonderfully as co-director of the course and did the full-time job of directing. I helped him in every way that I could and took over the large-scale question-and-answer sessions which we had with the guest speaker each Tuesday.

At the end of I think it was the second or the third year, in reviewing things, I stayed on the steering committee, but withdrew from the directorship of the course. I was available to give certain lectures myself in the area of foreign affairs or other subjects that were within my own area of
experience and interest. But it was clear to me that this had gotten off the ground. And that if it was to go forward for a substantial period of time, it was important that the president not dominate it from his administrative position because this would certainly build up—I was not slow to learn this—a degree of faculty resistance and feeling that this was some pet project of the president’s. And thereby it would lose its validity and indeed a measure of its vitality in the eyes of faculty and others. I stayed with it up through I think as a member of the committee—my memory’s a little hazy about this—but I stayed with it up through the questionnaire survey that was made by an independent committee of the faculty five years…. 

[Break]

So I think that’s about as far as we probably…. It’s three o’clock. But you want to ask some questions, don’t you?

DANIELL: It’s ten of now.

DICKEY: Oh.

DANIELL: Just a couple of questions that have to do with this, and one is just a factual question and has to do with the fact that on a couple of the other tapes, in discussing the faculty attitudes towards the coming of Great Issues, that particularly a couple of people have a memory of more controversy in the faculty meeting in the sense that, well, I think specifically there’s a tale told twice—it’s probably apocryphal, but I just wanted to check—that you made a very effective plea for it. And when there seemed to be some opposition, especially from L.B. Richardson, two people differently have said they remember you distinctly taking off your jacket and saying that basically…explaining the purpose of it, you know, in a way in which may or may not have made a difference in the vote. Now that’s quite inconsistent with what you’ve said. And a couple of other faculty when we asked them that said they didn’t remember anything like this at all.

DICKEY: [Laughter] Well, first I don’t remember any vigorous exchange in that faculty meeting. But that was one of hundreds of faculty meetings, and I am sure that there were many faculty meetings later where the exchanges were sharper, and I might have occasion to remember them, but I don’t. I do have a vague, vague memory of L.B. Richardson standing up and making one of his well-known, somewhat ironic, somewhat sarcastic, somewhat humorous speeches apropos of the theme, well, new ideas come and go and we don’t know whether this is…it’s hard to know whether this is a new idea that’ll work. And probably with a new president
it’s a good idea to let him find out on his own or something like that. I’m just imagining now frankly what he might have said, knowing L.B. as I did, without having any memory of it.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: [Laughter] Now, something that is important perhaps to say that while I have no memory of taking off my jacket, this with me is a very common characteristic of my behavior that goes way back. I can remember in some fairly high-level meetings in the State Department, not being comfortable in a jacket, and taking it off, and hanging it over a chair, and being the only one…and realizing later that I was the only one who took off his jacket. I’ve done this. I still do it frequently on speaking occasions. I did it last year down at the New Hampshire World Affairs Council. I do this often.

DANIELL: That’s probably the explanation. Probably you did it as just a normal part of your pattern, and it was interpreted as….

DICKEY: This would definitely be true. That any time that I’m going to put myself into something, I have developed a habit of taking off the jacket and then really getting into it. So that that—if that is remembered, it’s remembered because probably this is the sort of thing I’m sure Mr. Hopkins didn’t do.

DANIELL: I expect. That makes a whole lot of sense.

DICKEY: And it would seem, therefore, quite unusual to faculty members. And it would be natural that they'd remember and speak of it and I wouldn’t think of it. But I’m so aware of this practice on my part that I can say with just utter certainty that this was not a manifestation of, well, let’s get down to cases.

DANIELL: That makes sense of this [inaudible].

DICKEY: I have no doubt at all that I did this, knowing that I do this so often. And secondly I have no doubt at all that it is not, as it might have been regarded by these faculty members, as an indication of the fact that I was worried and decided to put an unusual effort into the matter. But as far as the other aspects of the meeting are concerned, if it was controversial in their eyes, if the tenor of the meeting was one of acute controversy, I have no memory of that. And I would only have to say that it just may well be that I was more immune to controversy from my experiences in the government and elsewhere, and then wouldn’t have been as conscious of this as maybe they were with an older president who didn’t do that sort of thing.
DANIELL: I was going to say you can even see the same set of observations, and this is beginning to make sense to me in ways, that having been used to the faculty meetings as they were conducted under President Hopkins, any even slight show of disagreement really with a president—although the faculty members argued an awful lot with each other when President Hopkins was there—it could be interpreted by some people as [inaudible].

DICKEY: Well, it might well be. There may well have been more controversy than I remember. In other words, I don’t want to assert there wasn’t any because I don’t have enough memory of it. But it does not remain in my mind as a difficult occasion.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: That, I think, is clear.

DANIELL: Well, it is close to three o’clock now. So why don’t we break here and then we can continue with this.

[Break]

The interview began again on January 30th, again in President Dickey’s office in Baker Library. At the end of the interview last time, we had begun to go through the set of the initial relationships you had with the faculty, and we had talked about your relationship on curriculum matters, and you had focused entirely on the initiation of Great Issues. And then I thought the next question we could go to after this is the whole question of the whole process then of beefing up the faculty professionally, recruitment, and Don Morrison. But I wanted to start by asking—we’ve already gone quite adequately through the Great Issues; there are a lot of other records on that—whether or not you had any kind of close or memorable relationships initially in these years over other curriculum matters besides Great Issues?

DICKEY: No, I don’t believe I did. I kept in quite close touch with various sectors of the faculty. I did some teaching in several courses. Bob Riegel, who was teaching the course in biography in the history department at that point, each year had a session or two on Cordell Hull. He very nicely invited me to come into the course and give the lectures each year on Hull. I guess I must have done that for, oh, I don’t know, three, four years or so. I went into [Donald] Don Bartlett’s ['24] biography courses… I believe again it was on Cordell Hull. And I did a little bit more in the political science courses on foreign affairs. I was invited in to deal with such subjects as reciprocal
trade agreements program, the treaty power, which was my particular specialty in the State Department. And when I came back here, I handled classes on executive agreements and the treaty power, several—over a number of years—in political science courses. I continued to lecture – after I got off the Great Issues Course steering committee – in the Great Issues Course several times a year. So that I kept my hand in. But I had no doubt at all that my primary responsibility, so far as faculty was concerned, was to create conditions that were conducive to building and maintaining a strong faculty. Very early on we had to go through the McCarthy period. I assume we’ll come back to that.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I was blooded on the issues of freedom of speech and things of that sort, academic freedom. But the critical fronts of developing the faculty were compensation, working out policies aimed at reducing the number who were holding the full professorial rank, and most especially developing our recruitment practices and standards. Here was an area that it’s got to be said the faculty...there were too many soft areas in the faculty.

DANIELL: Now that’s something that numerous others have said on the tapes too.

DICKEY: They had simply gotten somewhat flabby in respect to their recruitment standards. And in another way they had gotten—not all places, not all sections of the faculty, but too many of them had accepted the proposition that they couldn’t compete or that there was no point to trying to compete with the best for the best. It was too comfortable of a position. This was a good teaching faculty. And it was a good undergraduate campus. I don’t want to be put in the posture of suggesting that this was a sinkhole or anything of that sort. But the issue in a college such as this is always being good enough. Not just being good, but being good enough. And your competition, as I mentioned earlier, in this respect was very aggressive during the postwar period, totally unlike the competition or lack of competition which Dr. Tucker referred to during his presidency.

Well, since the critical front was going to be faculty development and recruitment and the holding of the men you wanted, which involved standards and promotion procedures, it became clear, if one can use the clichéd phrase, painfully clear, I guess very accurately, that my first job was to find a dean of faculty that could work in harness with me on these matters. I don’t remember now exactly which year it was, but as I’ve told you, when I came on the job, Dean Bill was active but barely active. He was in a declining—he was in declining health, had to go through surgery. Then became emotionally incapacitated with depression and so forth. And
then I brought in, when he was no longer able to do it, a committee of the faculty, which I’ve already described. I guess they called it the Dean of Faculty Committee chaired by Bancroft Brown and two other men on it. But this was in everybody’s eyes a holding operation. And frankly one that I wanted to have regarded by everybody as a holding operation. In other words, I was leery, to be direct about it, of having an acting dean of faculty, a man who would, I was reasonably certain, regardless of who it might be, if I’d chosen carefully, would be satisfactory. But who still might be short of what I was clear I was going to need.

DICKEY: Then you have the awkward position of a kind of heir apparent.

DICKEY: Well, that I would find myself unable to shift the fellow out who’d worked hard and satisfactorily, but who might not yet be quite what I was looking for. I had to make up my mind also about the procedure I was going to follow in this respect.

I’m not sure whether I told you in these interviews about the somewhat traumatic experience I’d had at the time of Bob Strong’s death. When, before the funeral took place—now this was the summer after I came on the job; I hadn’t been on the job yet a year when Bob died suddenly in June of a heart attack or cerebral hemorrhage, I guess it was a cerebral hemorrhage—and before the funeral took place, a faculty member who was on the CAP, Committee Advisory to the President, called on me, a man with whom I subsequently throughout our career had a close, fine relationship, he called on me to tell me that the committee wanted to be sure that they were in on the selection of the new director of admissions.

Well, needless to say probably, Strong’s death under those circumstances was very much an emotional jolt for me. And the idea of a faculty committee coming to me about the appointment of his successor before he was buried struck me as just incredibly insensitive. But also suggested to me that there was something going on that I wanted to take a pretty careful reading on. I of course said I’ll in due course welcome the opportunity to confer with you. And I think that’s about as much as I said in the first meeting with that individual.

I subsequently did some talking and listening around the campus. And I concluded that I just could not fill these positions satisfactorily, at least in terms of my satisfaction, by making them subject to the approval of these committees. That I was going to have to break ground, break fresh ground in a number of these places—situations. And out of the consultation that I did.... And I would go to the committees and tell them what we’re looking for, what I thought we needed, say that I wanted to know what they
thought we needed, and I also wanted them to make any suggestions either in the group or privately to me of people that they thought met the qualifications that we were seeking. And I’ve got to say in every instance involving a major appointment, director of admissions, dean of the faculty, dean of the college, dean of the Tucker Foundation, and I could name some others, but I’m being concrete about this, the consultations really did not develop significant statements of standards or a really critical view of things.

**DANIELL:** Yes, yes.

**DICKEY:** All too often it developed a statement that is very conventional, that was basically characterized by, “Is this somebody we’d be comfortable with?”

**DANIELL:** Yes, I was going to say that [inaudible] index of that.

**DICKEY:** I’ve just got to be just as blunt as I can be about that. And this was all with the best of intentions. These people that I was working with in this respect were good people. They weren’t out to do any fancy act of outmaneuvering—oh, there were some political operators. But by and large, these committees that I’m talking about in this respect were very conscientious. But they just simply weren’t in a position to break out of this mold. And also they didn’t, of necessity, and this was something I had to learn, I didn’t have the perspective of a teaching faculty man; but neither did they have the perspective of a man who had to be responsible for the whole show. So that somehow or other the fellow who had that perspective, I decided, had to find a way to take advantage of what these people understood that I didn’t understand. But still to reserve my freedom of action in this respect.

I also talked with the trustees in the meetings whenever I had one of these vacancies. But less surprisingly, probably, the board rarely had any great…. Well, the board rarely—indeed I’m not sure ever—had any strong views about recruitment policies or standards. I did of course….

**DANIELL:** Did that apply to administrative people as well as faculty?

**DICKEY:** Well, I was just going to say the one area where I went to the board and where it was a board appointment under the charter was the treasurer of the College. Am I right about that? I think I am. Well, I know I went to the board on the question of the treasurer and what we were looking for. And then talked with individual trustees at considerable length about it before we went to John [F.] Meck [Jr. ‘33] when Halsey [Edgerton ‘06] was retiring. But to come back to the Don Morrison matter—or I guess I did...
earlier discuss the appointment of Al Dickerson to succeed Bob Strong, didn’t I, as director of admissions?

DANIELL: Not really. But I’d just as soon stick right now to the faculty [inaudible].

DICKEY: Well, then let’s do that.

DANIELL: And then deal more systematically with administrative changes later.

DICKEY: So let’s stick with the dean of faculty matter then for the moment. I talked with Committee Advisory to the President a number of times about what ought we be looking for? And I said I would like now specific suggestions. And I was pretty sure, and I was right about this, that most of them preferred to give their suggestions privately or individually. And I got those.

What I’ve got to say, and it’s somewhat repetitious to what I’ve just said, these were just very predictable suggestions of good men, seasoned people in the classroom, highly respected faculty members, almost without exception men who had had no administrative experience, or were on the low side of forty. Most of them were on the high side—I guess all of them were on the high side of 40.

I also went to people on the outside and talked with them. By this time I was a trustee, as I recall, of the Rockefeller Foundation. And I took advantage of that opportunity to talk with some of the key professional people there. I found that, as I knew I would find, that there was a feeling that Dartmouth had not been as rigorous perhaps as she ought to be with regard to these things. And that there was need for more emphasis on the scholarly work of the faculty and things of that sort. These were not new points of view. But they were very responsibly given to me.

[End of Tape 20, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 21, Side A]

DICKEY: I was saying that the outside people I consulted about filling the dean of the faculty vacancy were people in the foundations, particularly the Rockefeller Foundation staff people, some people over at the Carnegie Corporation where I had gone to get the first grant I ever solicited, namely the money to start the Great Issues Course.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And a few other places of that sort. And the counsel that I got pretty well fitted my inclinations, namely to feel that this was a responsibility which
had to be mine, to seek as much advice as I could get, but not to put myself in a position where this had to be a committee appointment and so forth.

Well, and then I began to make my list from the suggestions that had been made to me. I can remember carrying around in my pockets [Laughter] lists that I would make up sometimes sitting in a meeting and not being very much attracted to what was going on, I would just write down two or three names. And I found it useful to do this. And also I wrote down my own longhand qualifications—I don’t think I preserved them—the qualifications I was looking for. And then I went back over the faculty. I guess I had probably, oh, at least three people that would’ve been satisfactory and maybe very good deans of faculty under what I would call steady-state conditions. But it was perfectly clear to me, rightly or wrongly, that we weren’t going to be in a steady-state condition, that I was going to need somebody who felt at home moving out to other institutions, who felt at home in the government, could move into government areas where there were many very able young fellows who’d been in the government during the war but were getting ready to move off to other situations and particularly back to faculty opportunities.

So I looked around, and I don’t think I had many such people on my list. Certainly I know I didn’t have many. I had probably two or three, and one of them was Don Morrison. Well, Don Morrison had only come to the College I guess not more than two years before. He’d come—or at that point was an assistant professor, which was about as far down the line as you could get because at that point there weren’t many instructors to recruit. A young fellow whom I had known of—I don’t think I knew him personally; I’d probably met him—in the Budget Bureau. I know about him because Bob Carr [Robert K. Carr ’29] had, when he was recruiting for the political science department, had come to me in the State Department and asked me about several people in the Budget Bureau, and one of them was Don Morrison. So that I knew about him, and I may have met him, but I didn’t know him well. I was in a position to get a reading on him from other people in the department who had worked with him. The reading had been favorable, and the department had taken him.

DANIELL: The State Department had taken him?

DICKEY: No, the department of political science.

DANIELL: Oh, the department of political science, okay. Yes.
DICKEY: They’d taken him, and he’d come here. And after he came here, having come out of the government both of us very recently, we saw—began to see something of each other. I forget how we first became acquainted socially. I’m sure I remember going to their first home. And I had, of course, an acquaintance with Betty…not a friendship but acquaintance with her through her position in Secretary Stettinius’s office.

DANIELL: Oh, I didn’t know that.

DICKEY: Yes. She was his principal secretary, I think, or at least one of the top girls--

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: --in Stettinius’s office.

DANIELL: I knew she’d been in Washington. I didn’t know where.

DICKEY: And I had seen…of course I’d been fairly close to that office staff, both in the department and out at San Francisco. So that I was on a speaking acquaintance with Betty and knew favorably of her work.

No one ever suggested Don to me, I can testify to that with certainty. And I put this possibility, I remember, and hardly dared think seriously about it for a considerable period. By that I mean of weeks, months, and so forth, while I was intensely in this. And each time I came back from one of the names that I knew would be acceptable and wondered whether it was really what I was looking for. And I decided that I would really think seriously about him.

So I began to make some inquiries, blind inquiries, around campus, and all the inquiries I got were very favorable, favorable responses, but not…obviously the people weren’t thinking about him as dean of faculty. And then he came to me once on his own during this period. I’ve never been sure whether he smelled the possibility that he was in my mind or not. I never asked him. But he may have. In any event, he came to me to talk about faculty affairs, as many faculty members did over the years. But this was at a particularly crucial time.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: And I don’t…while I don’t remember what the specific things were that he said, they were in the area of recruitment, of promotion policies, of scholarship, all the things that were on my mind. So that if he didn’t have
some thought that maybe this would be of interest to me as I looked for a man, he clearly wanted these ideas to be in my mind as looking for the man.

DANIELL: Did he, to the best of your knowledge—what kind of association had he had with Dartmouth?

DICKEY: None at all.

DANIELL: None at all?

DICKEY: None at all. None at all. No, he was....

DANIELL: That’s what I was pretty sure. I just wanted to check that.

DICKEY: He was—I don’t know who in the political science department knew about him. But Bob Carr, who at that time I think was chairman, at least he came down to Washington to talk with people around the government, and that’s how he happened to come see me, about two men they were interested in in the Budget Bureau. One of them was Don, and other was a fellow named Thompson, as I recall, another good man. No, I don’t think Don had any....

DANIELL: The reason I ask that is that it’s not difficult to understand why a man as high-powered basically as Don was, would, in coming up here, be probably a bit distressed by what he found in the faculty and the lack of professionalism, etc.

DICKEY: Yes, I think that’s probably so. I think he found some strong men; I know he did in the government there, Bob and others. He, of course, had come out of a very, very modest situation down in West Virginia. I think his father had been in education, had been a teacher I believe in public schools. I may be mixed up on that. But a background that was such that he honored teaching as a professional thing. And then he had done his graduate work at Princeton and then, I believe, went into the Budget Bureau.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And came from there up here as a very young man. I don’t know what his age was, but he was well under 30. Well, I remember that session that I had with him. And I was made much more acutely aware that this man obviously had been thinking very much along the lines that I’d been thinking and wanted to find somebody, as dean of faculty, who thought along those lines. So in due course, and I guess it wasn’t very long after
that, I decided I would just, so to speak, pull up my socks and see what happened if I went with Don Morrison.

I don’t recall at the moment how and just when I presented this—when I told the Committee Advisory to the President about it. I know that before I told them what I was going to do, I told them that I was not going to ask for any approval of what I was going to do. That I had gone as far as I was going to go in seeking their views as to what we should be looking for, what the need was, and of inviting and considering suggestions for the position. I said I want to be very clear before we come to it, that I am not going to bring a name to you for approval. I didn’t get any objection to that. Indeed, I had several fellows come to me afterwards, before Don’s appointment was announced, and say that this was a very smart thing to do.

DANIELL: Several of—I missed the…?

DICKEY: Faculty.

DANIELL: Several faculty.

DICKEY: Yes, individuals.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Who were on the committee and said—they didn’t want to say anything in the committee, but that they wanted me to know that they thought this was a smart thing to do. That it would be better in the long run. I don’t know whether they thought that afterwards. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: But in any event, my memory is that I told the committee—I believe it was either one day, I’m sure it wasn’t more than two days before the announcement—that I had decided that this young fellow was what I was prepared to bet on. And I have no memory at all of it. I don’t know whether this is what I would’ve expected, but my reaction is that there was no reaction, that people were a little stunned. I know that the next morning when it appeared in the Daily Dartmouth, I learned of course from people around the campus in coffee breaks and so forth, there was who is Don Morrison? And what in God’s name goes on here, you know, and so forth, picking an assistant professor to be dean of faculty? The people in the government, some of my friends who were in the government department were half elated and half stunned.
DANIELL: Yes, [inaudible]...

DICKEY: But I don’t think there was any objection voiced to me by anyone. There must have been, but I don’t remember. In any event, the appointment had an effect which I hadn’t sought and probably should have foreseen: Just the very venturesomeness of it established an expectation on the part of people on the faculty that maybe there was going to be a good bit of movement and that things were going to be fairly shaken up from time to time. I hadn’t sought to accomplish that purpose. I was thinking more conventionally about what the qualities were I was looking for, what was the background and experience and so forth. And I remember thinking sometime afterwards that I had come in short in my expectations. That is, I could’ve expected much more of this sort of thing than I had expected. And by and large it was a very healthy, helpful thing.

DANIELL: I think the tapes as a whole reinforce just what you’ve said, in that Arthur Wilson has asked a number of what was their response to Don Morrison’s appointment—to Don Morrison and Don Morrison’s appointment. I think a couple of the tapes, individuals say, well, it was kind of a signal that things were going to...that now we had a leader who was not going to stick with the status quo. And that gave encouragement to [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Well, this was what I was saying somewhat more awkwardly than you’ve put it, it was a signal. It was not a signal that I had, as I say, planned on giving as a signal. But it did work out that way, and I think generally quite fortunately. I remember when I talked with Don about whether he would take the job—whether he was interested in it. And I quickly sensed that he was. And this is why I’m not sure he didn’t even have a remote aspiration when he talked to me.

DANIELL: Even more than a remote aspiration.

DICKEY: But in any event, when I talked to him about it, he manifested the kind of savvy that he had and which you needed. He raised questions about how it would be accepted and things of that sort. But it was clear to me that he was ready to go if I was, and I was. So there was no long drawn-out negotiations or consultations in that respect.

DANIELL: I should say for your information there was one other reaction in the faculty, which was that—and I guess it was mentioned at least on one of the tapes—that John Dickey intended to be his own dean of the faculty, which had been the model earlier under Hopkins. And therefore he’s taking a person who doesn’t have the status with the faculty, and therefore
he didn’t have to worry about Don Morrison. Some of the more complacent members of the faculty [inaudible]…

DICKEY: I again can only say this never crossed my mind. What I was clear was that I wanted somebody that had the capacity for the initiative, both in his background and in his nature, and in his understanding of the academic enterprise, at least the postwar academic enterprise.

Both Don and I had, just to sum it up, a just, as far as I was concerned, a perfect relationship. I never had a moment’s doubt over the years that he was a singularly fortunate selection for the position at that time. He and I spent a great deal of time talking about our approach to these objectives, how to get at them. And we went up a number of if not dead-end streets, at least unpromising wilderness trails in our search for things. We set up interdepartmental committees for curricular planning on the theory that we would get some cross-fertilization from one department to another.

I remember what rather elaborate plans we made, and it didn’t work. We had various reorganization of the faculty as a faculty council and committees. And we very quickly or at least reasonably quickly tried to make clear to the Committee Advisory to the President that we just had to have a more systematic, more thorough-going review of promotion cases and appointments than we’d been having. And that there were going to have to—we just were going to have to have some very difficult experiences in not regarding promotion as really settled if a man stayed here long enough, or if he stayed here for five, seven years.

Don immediately was ready to go out and become acquainted around the college and university circuit to let it be known that we were looking. We went at the question of compensation again very quickly. It was a pretty thorough review. And on all of these fronts, there was a decided movement. But as we knew, that movement frequently had the reverse side of seeming to be a threat to certain people, certain departments. And we went through over the years of Don’s life—how long did he live on the job?

DANIELL: Well, he became—let’s see, in ’57?

DICKEY: I would think he was on the job about….

DANIELL: A little less than a decade, I’m pretty sure.

DICKEY: I was going to say about nine years, eight or nine years.
DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: He died of a heart attack down at Princeton. I'll never forget the morning that this Princeton professor where he was staying called me up and said, "I have terrible news." And he said, "Don has died." And I couldn't get it through my head what Don. I knew that Don had gone out on a trip, but I didn't know he was at Princeton and so forth. And it just was a...I listened and wondered what Dons I knew he could be calling me about from Princeton. And suddenly it came through it was Don Morrison. It was just like the sky falling in.

DANIELL: Had you known that he had a weak heart before this?

DICKEY: Yes, I can come back to that. I'll just say that when it finally penetrated me, and I knew that I had to go break the word to Betty...she was over here in one of these art classes in the old Clark School gymnasium building, white-frame building right across the street here. Went up there. I don't know that I've ever had anything harder to do. Just ghastly.

But to respond directly to your question about the heart thing, I had known of this.... I'm not sure whether he told me back when we were talking about his coming on the job. I don't think he did.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But at some point I did know about it. And then he began to be seriously considered for the presidency of several institutions.

DANIELL: I should think so, yes.

DICKEY: And he was not interested in several of them. I don't recall now with certainty which ones they were. But the one that brought everything to a head was Bowdoin. He had become well known around the Pentagonal circuit because of our meetings annually and was very highly regarded; and obviously felt at home in these liberal arts, historic liberal arts colleges. Bowdoin was looking for a man to succeed Sills. I knew a number of the trustees over there fairly well. And in due course they came to me and said that they were very much interested in the possibility of Don Morrison. And it was down to a choice between one or two people. I think it actually came right down to a choice between Don and Spike Coles, who subsequently went there. He'd been a professor of chemistry down at Brown.
In any event, Don came to me about this and said that they had been after him to come see them, and he’d gone to see them. And that obviously this thing was at a point of serious discussion. He wanted to know what I thought. And I said I thought it would be a first-rate opportunity as long as that’s what somebody wanted, that is, a presidency. I said, “You’ve seen enough of it to have, I should suppose, a realistic view of the pros and cons of it. I don’t have any doubt at all that you would do a good job on it. And I would assume that it would be a satisfying job in view of your interests.”

Then I think he brought up and said something such as: But what do you think about this question of health? Knowing that I knew something. Or maybe he said you should know that there’s a question of health. In any event, it came up something of that sort. And he said my situation…. Well, I know. He’d been in the hospital a couple of times really deathly ill. Had to irrigate his whole system with whatever it was they used to get at this—was it a virus?—from rheumatic fever—he was still susceptible to this sort of thing.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: And the treatment for it then, I don’t know what it is now, but they would irrigate his system, have this stuff draining into him for days at a time to counter this situation. And I was told it was a very serious thing. It could never be cured, and really it in a sense would flair up and then have to be brought under control. And sometimes didn’t get it under control, and that was lights out. And I’d known about that. And that this went back to a childhood rheumatic heart.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: So when he came in on the Bowdoin question, he knew that I knew about it, and we talked about it. And he said, “What do you think about this?” He said, “The doctors tell me that there’s no reason why I shouldn’t be able to do this. It’s no more likely to knock me out on a presidency than on a dean of faculty’s job. And do I have any obligation to discuss this with them?”

Well, we kicked that one around for a while. And so far as I remember, I said, “Well, this is such a personal decision, and I really hesitate to be very clear about it. But I would rather guess that the mere fact that you raised the question with me suggests that you’d better raise it with them, to feel comfortable about it.” I said, “I don’t think they would ever criticize you for not raising it with them. But obviously it’s something that’s on your mind, and I would guess maybe that it should be shared with them.” And my
memory is he did. And whether that knocked him out, I never knew. But I
did hear from one of the trustees subsequently when they’d settled on
Coles that it had been a tossup as far as they were concerned, and they
didn’t refer to the health thing at all in their conversation with me and said
they just decided to go for Coles. But we think very, very highly of Don
Morrison and so forth.

Well, there were a number of such instances. This was the only one that I
remember he came to me about for a serious talk. Others I knew about.
Reed had approached him and one or two other things.

DANIELL: Yes. I think Joe [Joseph L.] McDonald kind of suggested, when he was
talking with me, that it was really a matter of real concern with Don as time
went on in the fifties about the health matter. He didn’t put it more
specifically than that except that he had known that Don had had a bad
heart for some time before he died.

DICKEY: Well, perhaps we should say a word about some of the things we did.

DANIELL: Yes. That’s exactly [inaudible]…

DICKEY: After trying various, if you will, organizational approaches to introducing a
little bit more initiative into the departments, a little bit more
venturesomeness, we became rather discouraged--

DANIELL: Yes, I should think so.

DICKEY: --about that approach. And I can remember to this day standing in front of
the window with him in the president’s office and saying, “Well, really what
this comes down to is that we don’t have the horses for this kind of
venturing that we’re trying to promote. And I guess if we don’t, the only
thing to do is to stop wasting our efforts in that direction, keep the thing on
as even a keel as we can, keep the pressure on in respect to promotions
and standards, but to begin some really intensive recruitment, looking for
some really key fellows. I remember I used the phrase, I think, “loss
leaders” in certain of the strategic departments. We agreed on this, that
this was going to be the main focus of our efforts from that point on for a
while.

DANIELL: Do you have any sense of the timing of this? Was it ’50 or ’51 when you’d
come to this conclusion or….

[End of Tape 21, Side A –
Beginning of Tape 21, Side B]
DICKEY: ... election to fix the date but I would guess it was within, certainly within not more than two years, maybe less than two years after Don came to the job. And we began identifying situations in which we were prepared to go all out for certain people. I don’t remember which year now, I’m sorry to say, [John H. "Jack"] Jack Wolfenden came....

DANIELL: Well, I was going to say, that’s easy enough to date it by the fact that I can just look and see [inaudible]...

DICKEY: But Jack Wolfenden’s coming to us was one of the big quantum leaps forward. We got a man of genuine sophistication in respect to higher education out of his Oxford experience. And he had everything that it took to fit into a situation which was developing and established a relationship with his colleagues, with the people in the humanities, with Don and with myself, and a very first-rate man. Another key person in this respect—and just when this people came, I’m not—

DANIELL: That’s easy enough to get.

DICKEY: --I’m not sure. Another key one was Francis [W.] Sears from Cal Tech who was generally regarded as one of the foremost teachers of physics in the country—indeed continued to be regarded. A man who’d had a very good record at MIT but not that of a major research person.

DANIELL: [inaudible]...

DICKEY: There were a number of others I could mention. But we decided that in the area of math we would make one of these major efforts to rebuild the math department. We had an over-age math department. A lot of men who’d been very strong teachers. And Don took the lead in this. He went out, visited quite a few people around at different institutions.

One of the questions was what were we looking for? What did we want? And there weren’t many views, as I remember, back here in the department about what they wanted. It was a department which didn’t have very much departmental cohesion at that point. Bancroft Brown was doing good work in his very special courses. And other men were doing good work in their fields. But as a department it didn’t manifest any great sense of vision for the future of the department. I think there was rather a feeling that, well, we’re approaching the retirement side of our careers. Somebody else had better do this.
Don worked very hard and very effectively at this. And we made a pretty thorough canvass. As a matter of fact, Kemeny’s name came to our attention through a mathematician down at NYU—I forget who it was—that there was a young mathematician down at Princeton who was very much on the make and a very able fellow and so forth. I remember Don checked that out with a number of places, with people here, and this was borne out that he would be an attractive possibility for us.

I actually took up from there and did some investigating of my own that was not related to primarily the professional side of it, but more on the personal side of things down at Princeton and elsewhere. We kept Bancroft Brown closely informed on what we were doing here. I was quite clear that we owed this to Bancroft, that he’d been a staunch, strong person in that department. And I was also aware that if we got out ahead of what he was prepared to accept, we could get into a mess. Because to recruit this fellow, we recognized we’d have to go to a full professorship. And it involved—practically all these appointments did—very special deals in respect to tenure and….

DANIELL: Salary.

DICKEY: Waiting periods and things like that, which….

DANIELL: I was thinking, just as you were saying, trying to recollect which of the tapes it was—and it’s probably the Arthur Jensen—mentioned that, talked about this because it’s about the time that he and Don worked kind of in tandem. And it may be in any case that Bancroft Brown simply took the attitude that, yes, you know, basic changes had to be made in the department. But it was better for him not to be the person doing it. And he described his full cooperation with the administration in the changes you’re describing.

DICKEY: Yes, I think that’s essentially correct. At least it lines up with my memory. I do remember one conversation I had with Bancroft; I think it was just after he retired from the department after we had made quite a few new appointments in the department, largely through John Kemeny’s leadership. And Bancroft and I were talking about the fact that it was a very different department from the one that was here when I came. And he said, “Yes, I couldn’t have done it myself, but I could’ve prevented it.”

DANIELL: That’s right. Okay.

DICKEY: And this was a very good summary.
DANIELL: Yes. He must have been an extraordinarily astute man—I don’t mean astute in a clever way, but just with a real sense of perspective toward himself, toward his strengths and his limitations.

DICKEY: Well, these recruitment activities went on on the outside. They were essentially....

DANIELL: Excuse me again. Can you just mention some of the others? I ask this because…I know we did a very good tape with John Wolfenton, but I wouldn’t have guessed that Francis Sears played this kind of role from anything we’ve gotten in the tapes.

DICKEY: Well, it was when we had our eye on…the physics department had had its special problems. It had been dominated in some respects by the personality of Gordon Ferry Hull, Sr.

DANIELL: Oh, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Then Gordon Ferry Hull, Sr., when he retired or before he retired even, they brought in Gordon, Jr.

DANIELL: [inaudible]...

DICKEY: And my God, it was as bad as the music department, sixes and sevens. And I can remember one day Professor Hull, Sr. in his retirement came in to see me and to tell me about the qualifications of his son for promotion. He was not bashful at all about such things.

DANIELL: He wasn’t bashful at all, period.

DICKEY: He gave me quite a rundown, and it was a very interesting, penetrating one that didn’t get into the areas of vulnerability, but dealt with the strengths quite well. And a few days later [Arthur B.] Meservey ['06] was in. He was then chairman of the department. And I said, “What do you think of this?” I made the mistake of saying something that I knew Gordon Ferry Hull had a reputation for being pretty well satisfied with himself. But I said I thought that on this occasion he had talked quite objectively. And Meservey, in his quiet, wonderful say, said, “Well, if he did, it was the first time I’ve ever heard him doing it.” [Laughter] So, I learned something from that. But what we were seeking there—and I forget who first brought it seriously to our attention—was a distinction in teaching.

DANIELL: A counterweight.
DICKEY: We even knew what we were going after, and that we wanted that.

DANIELL: The other departments—you said there were others you could name. I don't know whether you'd [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Well, let me see.

DANIELL: Now Lou Morton later played that role in the history department, but that was subsequent to it; it was about '60.

DICKEY: Yes, that was a different...it was a different case. Lou’s coming was a rather special thing. There were some doubts as to whether really the department saw a place for Lou as a permanent thing. They had a high regard for him in his specialty. But whether they wanted that particular specialty or not was a question. There were some recruitments in music, some of which worked out and some of which didn't, that we were trying to find somebody who could go in there and be a bellwether. Well, if there’s anything I learned it is that music departments don’t want bellwethers.

DANIELL: [Laughter] That’s right. Some of the more entertaining tapes comes from retired members of the music department.

DICKEY: And bringing [Stephen] Marsh Tenney ['44 DMS '44] back was a major interest to both Don and myself to...see, we brought him back before the decision to re-found the school or anything of that sort was made.

DANIELL: Exactly.

DICKEY: Brought him back as director of research in the old school, when our research budget in medicine was $15,000. I don't know whether it was $15,000. I think it may have been $1500 a year. But it was a faculty that had just totally used up...brought Marsh back from Rochester to do that long before Syvertsen and his death and the accident...

DANIELL: Yes, we'll get to that all later.

DICKEY: ...opened that situation up.

DANIELL: [inaudible]

DICKEY: Well, we went through a long fruitless effort to establish a viable northern studies program here, and looked over people from England, and I went over to the Scott Polar Institute in London. And we talked with a British
geologist-geographer type about coming. Nothing came of that. Let’s see, what were some of the other areas?

DANIELL: Well, just systematically, just for... go down to.... I know economics was a pretty strong department then. Ah...

DICKEY: Well, economics, yes. Yes, but we had one of our principal crises, Don and I... Don really was out in the front-line trenches on it—with economics over [Joseph F.] Joe Marsh [Jr. '47]. And I remember this day so well. We knew it was an issue that was going to have to be met. We were fond of Joe Marsh as a person. He had done very good things as an instructor and as an assistant professor for us. He regarded himself as professionally committed to labor economics. But he had not gone on to an advanced degree. He’d done a job for us over in Cutter Hall setting up sort of a residence operation there. And he was—as two or three others were around the campus, [Frank S.] Williamson [Jr.] in chemistry, a fellow in political science, his name is escaping me at the moment—very popular with students as far as we knew, effective as a classroom teacher. But with no evidence that they were going to be men who would generate their own intellectual vitality in the long haul.

Well, I think Joe Marsh’s case came up before Williamson’s case. But we knew that economics was a pretty strong department—or strong individuals in it, men that we respected. So we didn’t walk into this blindly. However, we had two or three meetings with them, and finally they came in—men like [William A.] Bill Carter ['20], very reasonable guys, Clyde [E.] Dankert, a little more brittle and so forth, and what’s his name who just died.

DANIELL: [James F.] Cusick.

DICKEY: Cusick. And so forth. Came to me and said, “We just won’t accept it. We won’t accept it, that Joe is not going to be promoted.” And they said, “We won’t send up any more recommendations.” Well, it was just sort of a ultimatum that we either took it or else. And I could see that this was a make-or-break crisis for Don. It wasn’t focused as much on me as it was on Don because he’d been out talking with them and so on and so forth. And Don was... Don was clear in his own mind it was make-or-break if we had to accept promotions of this sort, nothing catastrophic was going to happen, but neither nothing very good was going to come out of it. So we adjourned, and I got into the act a bit with some individuals subsequently. And we were able to take it on.

DANIELL: Well, you had support in the department, people like Earle [Ray] Sikes.
DICKEY: What’s that?

DANIELL: You had some supporters in the department, people like Earle Sikes, I believe.

DICKEY: Well, Earle was at best ambivalent about this.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: Earle—I was very close to Earle, and I think we respected each other. But this was a tight department at that point, and they had coalesced on this issue. And I don’t recall there was anybody that was prepared to manifest publicly—and the whole department came into the meeting with us, that is all the seniors—and I don’t recall that anybody broke ranks in the meeting.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: After the meeting….

DANIELL: Afterwards is where I’m getting confused.

DICKEY: I talked with a number of them and discovered that they weren’t quite as rigid about this as they had seemed. And subsequently we were able to bring it off.

DANIELL: Yes. I think where, if I’m correct in my memory, and I’m never quite sure even though I listened to these tapes quite recently, is that where Earle Sikes stepped in was when the members of the department threatened to go to the board of trustees, at least as he describes it. And Sikes and one other discouraged him from—discouraged the department from doing that, saying, you don’t want trustees making promotional decisions. And this would have been after the solid front presented by the department itself.

DICKEY: I don’t recall that at all.

DANIELL: Well, you may not have known….

DICKEY: But anyway it must have happened if somebody has….

DANIELL: Well, nothing came out of it. It’s what didn’t happen.

DICKEY: Well, I don’t recall just how fast the confrontation was dissolved, but it was dissolved, and Joe was not promoted. The case over in chemistry was
also a cause célèbre. Campus petitions and students signed up who didn’t even know Williamson [Laughter].

DANIELL: Is this later? I don’t know...

DICKEY: Well, this must have been later.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: As I say, I don’t know what the timing was on these. But there was hardly a department that we didn’t have an issue with. There are some of the people around the campus today, so I have to be a little circumspect about this. But there was hardly a department that we didn’t have to break through on. It was true in the math department. John Kemeny may have not as clear a memory of some of this… [Laughter] He wishes he didn’t have.

DANIELL: He hasn’t retired yet. We haven’t asked him those things.

DICKEY: But we had a real problem with the math department.

DANIELL: I expect all departments have had problems with these things.

DICKEY: And there were others. But I don’t recall any where it was as crucial from the point of view of Don Morrison and our basic objectives as the one with Joe Marsh.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. And that was a real...

DICKEY: If we hadn’t won that one, I suppose all the others would have been prejudiced by it.

DANIELL: Yes. And that was interpreted by the faculty members as a kind of new standard or a signal. Because one thing that had struck me is how often outside of the retired economics professors…in other words, how often those outside the department mentioned the Joe Marsh case as a symbol of a transition in attitude toward promotion basically. So that I think your reading must be absolutely accurate on that.

DICKEY: Well, that’s the way it comes through to me now. There are many other specific things that I could speak of during this period. But I look back on it, as I say, with great satisfaction. Don and I had worked closely together. As a matter of fact, we had about decided that on this northern studies thing Don might take a leave-of-absence from the dean’s office. We were at a
point where that would be tolerable for a sabbatical or something. And tool himself up as a person qualified to do international relations work in the polar areas.

DANIELL: Oh really?

DICKEY: This was just beginning to be an important subject in Antarctica and in the north. But that never came off because of his death. Well, does this cover about everything that you want on Don?

DANIELL: Yes, this was…. I’m… Actually this is close to a convenient break time. We’ve been going on for close to an hour now. I just had a couple of questions about stuff…

DICKEY: Go ahead.

DANIELL: …we’ve gone over, and then we can move on at the next interview. One has to do with, again, the subject of your relationship to the faculty. When you first came here, were there individuals on the faculty whom you sort of, from past experience, expected them to play leadership roles in the faculty, so that when you had problems of this you went to them concretely? I mean I’m really looking for a clue as to the pattern of faculty leadership as seen from your point of view in the late forties. The main input we have on this is, of course, what happens in faculty meetings, and [inaudible] Gordon Ferry Hull [inaudible]and that’s very different.

DICKEY: Incidentally, one of the recruitments—I’m not sure just when it came, but it was during this period; we regard it as sort of a bellwether recruitment—was [Maurice H.] Morrie Mandelbaum [Jr. '29] in philosophy.

DANIELL: Yes, I want to get to him later on. Of course, he's down at Johns Hopkins now.

DICKEY: Yes, he’s just gone through the loss of his wife and is in very bad mental shape, as I understand it. Has been very depressed and so forth. But there was a multitude of young fellows that were involved, of course, in this recruitment effort. I’ve been trying to put my finger on some of the more senior appointments.

There was one case—the individual is retired now, and I think you would identify who he is, but I think probably it’s just as well on this tape while he’s around to not introduce him. But shortly after I came on the job and was working with the CAP…. Well, I guess there’s no reason why I shouldn’t; certainly it’s no secret to him. But [Thomas S.K.] Scott-Craig…
DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: ...was in the philosophy department. I'm reminded of it by mentioning Mandelbaum. And I did not know Scott-Craig and really had never gotten to know him intimately. We were always on a professor and mister basis. But I would suppose it was within a year after I came on the job, the question came up about his tenure appointment. He had been brought on from one of the smaller colleges, I forget which it was, whether it was Hamilton or....

DANIELL: Arthur Jensen outlines a good deal of this in his interview.

DICKEY: Oh, does he?

DANIELL: But he mentions the college, and I don't [inaudible]...

DICKEY: I don't remember where it was. No, it was at Hobart, I think it was. Someplace in New York State, I'm sure. It was fairly well known as a small liberal arts college. Apparently he'd been brought on by Dean Bill under an arrangement whereby—and I remember the phraseology of the whole thing—if his service proves satisfactory at the end of two years, I think it was, or maybe it was at the end of three years, he would be given tenure. This appointment, I subsequently learned—or I got into when that time was up; I believe it was the end of my first year on the job. The question came up as to whether he should be given tenure. [Philip E.] Phil Wheelwright at that point was chairman of the philosophy department. And I don't know who was in the dean of faculty's job. My guess is at that point it was still the Dean of Faculty Committee or maybe Dean Bill was still around. In any event, this was one that was right in my lap very quickly.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: It went to the CAP, and quickly it was clear to me that there was a long history on this case. That the faculty had resented the appointment of Wheelwright at the time.

DANIELL: Scott-Craig.

DICKEY: Or Scott-Craig. And that there was a clear majority sentiment—there was a divided committee—there was a clear majority sentiment in the CAP that would not favor granting tenure. Well, Wheelwright had recommended tenure strongly. And then came in to see me. It was one of those first meetings when you learn a lot. I'd heard about Wheelwright as being a
very able person in his field. Extremely conscientious. Conscientious to a
fault. But I’d never had anything to do with him, as far as I recall, up to that
time, which isn’t surprising. He came in to tell me that this was an issue as
far as he was concerned of Dartmouth’s integrity. He used those words,
maybe even stronger words. The ethical standing of this institution. That
he had to testify that this man’s service had been satisfactory, although
he—and I’m afraid I’d have to say rather enjoyed saying this—although he
had not been in favor of his appointment originally. This was sort of a
classical Phil Wheelwright position.

DICKEY: But he was just clear no man could now stand up and say it had not been
satisfactory. Men might have their disagreements about what was
satisfactory, but here he was...he had to say that in these terms the
administration had bought this problem, and Dartmouth, in his opinion, had
to honor it. I can remember questioning him a bit on this and thinking
about it. It was within the CAP. The CAP recommended against tenure.

It was the only case in all my years when I took a recommendation of the
board and took a different position than the CAP took. We frequently had
long sessions in reconciling our views on a matter usually because of
disagreement within the committee and not necessarily my disagreement
with the committee. But it was the only case in which, as I told the
committee, I’m going to have to take this to the board with a
recommendation contrary to the committee’s position.

I went to the board and I said this was something I had no background on
other than what was given to me by the members of the faculty and by
particularly the chairman of the department, Wheelwright. But I was
satisfied that Wheelwright was determined to have this viewed as an issue
of Dartmouth’s honor. And if there was doubt about it, my position was
we’d better come down on the side of Dartmouth’s honor.

DICKEY: There were no difficulties in the board, and Phil was promoted.... Or uh—

DANIELL: [Laughter] You keep wanting to promote Wheelwright and not Scott-Craig.
This is perfect timing here, our tape...

[End of Tape 21, Side B]
The following interview took place in President Dickey’s office on February 12, 1976. At the end of the last tape you were discussing your relationship, really, in one particular faculty case to the CAP, Committee Advisory to the President and you suggested there would be more to say on this.

The CAP was one of the critical points that had to be dealt with or very much taken into account in the effort to recruit a strong faculty, and most especially to develop a strong faculty by having increasingly rigorous standards with respect to promotion.

My first memories of the CAP are a little dim. I can say, I think without any hesitation, that throughout my years on the job, I never had a crisis in my relations with the CAP. I’m sure there were occasions when I might have preferred to see a different judgment on the part of the majority of the CAP, but usually when that was the case I was in the company of one or two other faculty members who would have liked to have seen a different judgment. But working with a committee of that sort over the years, you very quickly accept the fact that most of the difficult decisions are resolved not through majority or votes, but by a process of mutual education and persuasion. That given enough time, usually, at least in my experience, it comes out pretty satisfactorily.

Now the only area where I remember the need to be somewhat sensitive to faculty prerogatives was at some point—and I don’t know that it was early on; it may have been some years later when we were going through a restructuring of faculty committees—but the question was raised as to whether, if the CAP members, faculty members, had need to meet alone on some matter that they wanted to discuss without having the administrative officers present, they shouldn’t have a faculty chairman who would handle the arrangements for such a meeting. I don’t recall when that came up or just how it came up. It was not a subject, as far as I was concerned, that involved any resistance on my part. And in point of fact, my memory is that throughout my years on the job, the committee rather preferred usually to have me preside at the meetings.

That’s the way it is now. I am on the CAP now.

Which kept all faculty members in a position to vote rather than to have one to some extent disqualified from voting unless there was a tie or something as presiding officer. I rarely voted. I felt very free to express my
views to the committee if they were wanted. But in the main, I regarded my function as one of seeking to be sure that the committee had a full understanding, so far as I could provide it, of a case. That the deliberations were free and full. And that we in the administration, whether it was the dean of faculty or myself, or at the times we had the provost as the principal academic officer, that we in the administration should be as sure as we could that the concern of the college or the interest of the college in maintaining standards was constantly articulated.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: I think I’d have to say that while this was a concern I’m sure of every person who served on the committee, there inevitably is a tendency for each person to have his own particular view of what’s wise in a specific situation, and he may well not have had occasion to think across the whole range of faculty personnel in making a judgment about an individual case. So the role of the administrative officers in the committee was not importantly that of being represented to vote, but primarily to be there as resources, knowing frequently something that wasn’t common knowledge throughout the faculty or that the members on that committee didn’t know. Of bringing to the deliberations background that was necessary to have a policy context against which the individual case was being judged. All too often, as I’ve said, the individual case, if it is not perceived against that background, tends to be in the eyes of at least somebody a special case.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. In this context, did you and your administrative officer—provost—sitting on this committee, feel it was one of your functions to pressure the faculty into a greater use of the criteria of professional status for promotion? Or did the faculty members on this committee tend to be reluctant to change from the Hopkins’s years? Or were the people who were generally in these early years selected to the CAP those who already had in their own minds the criteria of publication or professional status as well as teaching ability?

DICKEY: I find it difficult to generalize about that. I don’t think there was any pattern I could identify at the moment without going back and looking at individual people.

I am very conscious, however, that generally speaking the committee, especially during the first five years or so—and I’m speaking roughly there when I say five years—was much more oriented in the direction of accepting the standards that they were familiar with if they were old-timers of feeling that teaching was, well, not only important but was the dominant consideration in respect to promotion. And there was on the part, I’m sure,
especially of some of the older men who were not themselves active scholars, a sense of uneasiness that they might be putting themselves in a false position of giving too much weight to a man’s scholarship or of not granting him promotion because of a lack of adequate scholarship, when they themselves were no longer active scholars. Very, very understandable feeling on the part of any man that he didn’t want to be a hypocrite about these things. So that we were going through, certainly during the first ten years on the job, a gradual process of mutual education of faculty and administrative officers in the committee, but constantly aiming at what you referred to as higher professional qualifications for the promotion to tenure.

Now almost every one of the *causes célèbres* in the committee…and we didn’t have a great many. I can recall, oh, offhand, if I worked at it, I suppose I could recall a half a dozen that attracted campus-wide attention. But all of those were cases where the issue was, was the man sufficiently strong on the side of his scholarly work to permit a confident expectation that he would be a good teacher 20 years from that time, recognizing that as of that particular moment, he probably was a very good teacher. But the issue was, will he run out of gas in another ten years when he’s well beyond his Ph.D. work if he is not constantly refreshing himself through his own work?

Now, increasingly—and I would guess after the first three to five, first three years or so—this is a problem not within the committee primarily, but a problem between the committee and the departments.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: So that it was not….

DANIELL: With the committee standing for an acceptance of professional criteria.

DICKEY: Increasingly, increasingly. And not in an arbitrary, gung-ho way. But ready to accept the, I think it’s not unfair to say, leadership of the administration in this respect.

I came through my presidency with great respect for the CAP. I was at ease with that relationship. Indeed, we began a practice—I don’t know whether it’s still maintained—that after we’d been through a particularly difficult period, promotions or tough cases with departments, why, we would go out and gather socially and felt very, very much at home with each other. And there was a relationship of rapport and confidence that was very good.
Of course we tried to get strong people on the committee. The president was given the choice usually of selecting from two names, I think it was, that were nominated in those days by the three, is it?

DANIELL: Well, that’s what it is. It’s been since…

DICKEY: Well, I guess that’s what it was then, selecting from three names. I almost always would ask the advice of some member of the committee or some faculty member that I thought would know the situation well. So it was a key group. And from time to time I shared with the group some very delicate perplexities, where it was not primarily a CAP responsibility, but where I felt the need of being able to talk with a group that I felt completely at ease with about something that I was going to have to do, or that was….

DANIELL: Yes, this was the next question I was going to ask. Apart from the personnel responsibilities of the CAP, did you early begin to use the CAP as, well, a sounding board is putting it in too narrow a way, but just as a faculty advisory group? And I guess it was really intended [inaudible]…

DICKEY: Well, yes, I did. I don’t remember how soon I began to use it that way. But I surely used it from time to time, as far as I can recall, throughout my years on the job. It was the only group that had a tradition of confidentiality with respect to deliberations that didn’t put a burden on the members. They expected that this was the way that committee should function. And you didn’t have to say, well, now, you know you mustn’t tell anybody this or that and so forth. If a CAP member wanted to discuss a matter back in his department, he usually, in my experience, spoke up to the committee and said, I assume everybody agrees that I should discuss this with the senior members of the department or what not. Or do you have any objection to my doing so? And so on. Well…

DANIELL: I have one more question about the CAP unless you have something else you were going to add right there.

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: The question I have is: One thing that’s been difficult for me to find out is who really were the members of the faculty who were most highly respected within the faculty? Faculty people don’t want to toot their own horn and this sort of a thing on the tapes. At least they don’t come up in the tapes that Arthur did.
The CAP is a particularly, it seems to me, useful body. First, they have to be selected by their peers within the faculty. And then you have a chance to observe them. Do you have any recollections of particularly strong and effective people during these late forties and early fifties who served in these roles that you’ve described on the CAP?

DICKEY: I hesitate to identify people because my memory of the membership is too spotty, and I would—I’m afraid I would miss somebody that I would quickly mention in response to your question if I saw the names. If we have the names of that committee—

DANIELL: Maybe [inaudible]...

DICKEY: …I could quickly give you and would be glad to give you such a response.

DANIELL: Okay. That's easy enough to do because that's all on file...

DICKEY: Yes. Well, I think that that would be more helpful to you. And then of course there were, on the other side, there were quite a few people who…well, there were a number of men that were wonderful colleagues and highly-respected colleagues. But whose attitude toward their personal relationships with colleagues was such that they just agonized over negative decisions, particularly if it involved a man in their department.

DANIELL: Oh, yes, yes.

DICKEY: One of the most outstanding men who’s still active in the faculty and a close personal friend of mine, and one that I regarded as one of our really finest successes on the recruitment front, Walter Stockmayer was such a person. And I don’t think Stocky—I don’t know how many times he served on the committee.

DANIELL: He’s on it again.

DICKEY: He’s on it again. Well, if he’s on it again, I don’t need to say very much. But Stocky, the first time he was on the committee, just suffered tortures of the damned in passing on some of these individuals even though he himself was very possibly the outstanding scientific scholar on the faculty.

DANIELL: He has said the same thing to me—I’ve talked. He is the committee—serves the role of the faculty chairman on the group now. When I came on it, I talked to him a little bit about that. And he said, well, he said, at one point he said, Gee, my first years on this were awfully rough. [Laughter] And I knew that was just what he meant.
DICKEY: Yes, it was no secret. There were others. And then there were other men who were more what I would call professional departmental representatives with whom you would have more difficulty about a case that the department had a different view of. Now there weren’t a great many of those, but there were some who regarded their identification and their responsibility as primarily to the department in a matter involving a departmental case. But if you get the list of these committees, I’ll be glad to point out some of the stronger men. And there surely were men who were quite prepared to stand the gaff, and who welcomed administrative leadership.

DANIELL: It’s easy enough from the tapes to identify those people who were the acknowledged and apparent faculty leaders in the thirties and, you know, that period of Hopkins’s administration. But I’d say from—I’ve listened to all the tapes of the faculty people now with a couple of exceptions, and there’s such a transition going on in those first years that that would be very useful. And I will get those names and have them, and then we can talk about those next time.

DICKEY: I’ll be glad to do that.

DANIELL: Yes. Any more general observations you want to make about the CAP? You’ve already asked really….

DICKEY: Well, I would only conclude by saying not only did I have respect for it, but I had sympathy for it. Because many of these men had to go back the next day into a department that felt aggrieved. And this was no small thing for these men to go back and have colleagues feeling that, well, they hadn’t really…that the departmental man, although he was not supposed to be just a representative of the department, of course, but that their departmental colleague had not either presented their point of view effectively or sympathetically or whatnot. So that….

DANIELL: Yes. That statement implies there must have been a fair number of cases then in which the CAP chose to act differently than a department [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Well, there certainly were a fair number of cases. I don’t know what fair would be. But it was not…let’s say it was not a rare thing. And it was even a common thing for the CAP to put a department to its proof concerning a man. I always took the view, and I think my administrative colleagues were sympathetic to it, that we should not get in a position in which the only proof of a man’s intellectual vigor was his publications. But this was the
easiest and the most natural, the most familiar form of evidence of a man’s intellectual vigor. But that there were other ways that one could test this to some degree or get some reading on it, and that we should be looking for that. Well, the departments became aware of this, and became a little bit more imaginative in presenting their cases, rather than just saying he’s a wonderful departmental man. He does all the things that we’d like a man to do that we don’t want to do.

DANIELL: Did you get into formal, written student evaluations? [Inaudible] recommend.

DICKEY: We did not solicit formal student evaluations. We frequently were the recipient of communications—not frequently, but from time to time we were the recipients of communications from students or student groups, even petitions occasionally whenever one of these cause célèbre came to the committee. We did seek to get student opinions from time to time. And indeed we, on a fair number of what we regarded as quite critical appointments, we would write to young alumni…

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: …around the circuit for confidential response. [phone ringing]

[Break]

Oh, soliciting student views.

DANIELL: Soliciting student views, right. You were saying you had begun going occasionally in critical cases to this. Those who were a couple of years out.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. We didn’t do this with every case. We did welcome and encourage the departments to give us this testimony. And if the members of the committee had such testimony, they, of course, shared it with the committee. But on, oh, I don’t know, I would guess maybe on, in the course of the years, dozens of cases, several dozen probably, we would communicate by letter with young alumni who had been in the department, and we would try to communicate with people who had done well and people who hadn’t done so well.

DANIELL: This is formalized now. So that all promotional recommendations are… I think there’s roughly 20, 25 letters from… The dean of the faculty sends out for that [inaudible].
DICKEY: Yes. Well, we may have done more of that formally than I remember. But we did a fair amount of it.

DANIELL: Fine. I have no more questions really about the CAP. And probably if we go over individual names the next time, that will fill in your general observations.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: The other faculty matter which seemed to me—I really don’t know of what importance this was—I find it very difficult to find out anything very much about the American Association of University Professors. I know it began just about the time you became president. When I came here on the faculty a decade or a bit more than a decade ago, there was an area of dispute over publication of salary ranges. But I asked people, and no one seems to think in the faculty that it was a terribly important institution. Do you--? It may not have been.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, this is of course something that I’m sure different people would have a different view of. I remember enough occasions for taking…well, of being involved in discussions with personnel cases where the AAUP either had standards or regulations or rules for tenure. And that I wouldn’t want to say this was unimportant. I would say it was an important influence in our approach to some cases. It put a rigor into our decision-making in that we had a real problem, I now remember, in keeping some departments from just leaving these doubtful cases hanging on the clothesline, so to speak, until just as a matter of humanitarian concern you would say, well, okay, let’s go ahead. So that these AAUP standards for granting tenure, there was a time when you had to take a decision, we used it for our own purposes to crowd the department. And this was one of the most annoying and difficult problems in the early years, at least, that we had. We had to bring a number of departments up to the point where they were making at least tentative judgments right straight along and not just letting a case run ‘til it was within months of being an embarrassment. So that I do remember quite a bit of attention to AAUP matters.

Now, the first time that I became involved personally, that I remember, in an AAUP controversy was one where the individual was a member of the AAUP, and the national office got into it. But as you know, it’s the practice of the AAUP generally not to involve a local, or at least it was in those days, not to involve a local chapter in an issue that the national office can carry simply because they don’t want to prejudice the relationships of the local members with the college or the administration or whatnot.
This was a case where right after the war, we took a man on. Actually it was in economics, and I don’t remember his name now, who had been at some other institution, not a conspicuously strong institution. I don’t remember where it was. I think somewhere during the war. So that he had in his eyes, and in the eyes of the AAUP people in Washington, a….

DANIELL: Excuse me…. Just end it here and flip it over.

[End of Tape 22, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 22, Side B]

DICKEY: Well, it was one of these cases that they call tacking, tacking together. Service rendered in another institution was service rendered here. And the total was deemed by this individual and by the AAUP officers in Washington, at least tentatively—they never made a final issue of it with us, but they tried to push us in that direction—was viewed as being a period of time beyond which under the AAUP rules a tenure decision should have been taken. We never accepted that view that we were bound by this. We said we would be willing to be influenced by it, to be guided by it, but that we were not prepared to accept it as something that’s binding on us in taking our tenure decisions.

DANIELL: It’s all reversed now.

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: It’s all reversed now. The AAUP doesn’t push for quick tenure decisions. Those cases…

DICKEY: Well, they did. They had—I forget what it was—seven years or….

DANIELL: I think seven years was the figure.

DICKEY: I think seven years was the figure. Well, I got into the case to some extent because it did involve what you might call legal interpretation. Because the letter of appointment had said that he accepted the fact that this was an appointment for a two-year appointment. And we took the position with the AAUP that we just simply could not accept the view that a faculty member wasn’t free to make any contract with us that he wanted to make.

Well, ultimately they decided this was not a case they wanted to push with us. We had a pretty good reputation, I think it’s fair to say, as a place that didn’t cut corners on personnel matters or academic freedom or pushing tenured people out and so forth. So that this was a technical issue.
I remember it somewhat annoyed me that the AAUP in Washington went as far as they did with it. But ultimately our view of it prevailed, and we did not make a tenure appointment. I forget the individual’s name, but I remember that the local chapter of the AAUP did not get into the matter at least in any important degree.

This was different in the matter of publishing salaries. This was something where the AAUP chapter, certainly a strong majority I’m sure of the chapter members, supported the national organization’s desire to have the institution publish its salaries. This was something that I was not prepared to do unless we had no alternative. We talked it over many, many times, or a number of times, in the board of trustees, and the trustees were of this opinion on their own. There were also a substantial number of very strong faculty people who on their own held this view. But some of them weren’t members of the AAUP or might be, but who were not reluctant to tell me that they were not in favor of this view. But the majority, I suppose the majority of the faculty—certainly a majority of the AAUP—were behind this policy of the national organization.

**DANIELL:** I know—I’m pretty sure—the assumption of the faculty was then that the scales at Dartmouth were significantly lower than the institutions to which Dartmouth was normally compared, and this would be a vehicle through which there’d be upward pressure on faculty salaries.

**DICKEY:** Well, as a matter of fact, when this issue came up, I don’t think that was as much a problem as you might imagine.

**DANIELL:** [Inaudible]

**DICKEY:** See, this didn’t come until, oh, I don’t know…this was not during my early years.

**DANIELL:** No, this was in the late fifties…

**DICKEY:** And we were in pretty good shape as far as comparative salaries went, particularly when you took our retirement program into account.

**DANIELL:** Oh, yes.

**DICKEY:** And things of that sort. So that really I think the objective of the AAUP was to put pressure on some of the smaller, less well-to-do institutions. We were not at the top, but neither were we embarrassingly low.
DANIELL: I can remember when they finally did get published, that that almost killed the AAUP because the salaries were so high, and that had been the main reason for keeping the AAUP together.

DICKEY: That’s right. That’s right. Now the issue, as far as I was concerned—and one which I still would have to say I would stand on—was the relationship of this policy to your ability to maintain some merit in your salary scales. And let me tell you that I saw enough of this to have no doubt whatsoever that publication definitely closes your ability to exercise—to have a merit scale.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: There’s just no question about it. Actually I followed this issue in the public schools. And in particular down in Wellesley, Massachusetts where my daughter had been on the faculty down there in the public schools for 15 years or so. And while I quite understand that there’s room for difference of opinion as to whether you want merit scales or not, on balance they may not be a good thing or they may not be practical. I’m not arguing here either of those propositions. But I am saying that if you held the conviction that you needed a merit scale in your institution for the situations you were up against…. And we had still at the time this went in, we had a terribly large spread with respect to some of the men we were recruiting and paying well and some of the men who were here and were going to be here until God Almighty decides to promote them. So that as far as I was concerned, maintenance of what little leeway we could have in regard to recognition of merit in our salary scales was a part of—it’s not too strong to say—a part of the strategy that I was seeking to pursue with regard to the Dartmouth faculty. Now I’m being very candid about this.

DANIELL: Well, it fits now. That fits together. I mean that makes sense.

DICKEY: And I would have to also say that when you’re involved in it the way I was, you saw some things that sometimes some faculty members didn’t see. For example, when these ratings were published, or people thought they had the ratings and published them and so forth, there were some awful marital sadesses in this town, and wives who made clear to me that they thought it was just simply terrible that their husband wasn’t in the same level as so-and-so was. Well, you don’t like that kind of sadness if you don’t have to have it.

DANIELL: Of course publication wasn’t of specific salaries; it was salary ranges. So they’d be comparing salary ranges.
DICKEY: That’s right. They knew where they came in…. [Laughter]

DANIELL: In the range, yes, yes.

DICKEY: If they didn’t know they guessed. So that this was very rough. All I’m saying is that publication just inescapably closed the range of your ability to maintain these individual salaries. Now it may well be that in a community of this sort…and I think once you’ve got your rates up for everybody, once you’ve got your standards pretty well where you want them, maybe there’s less trouble. I think there was less trouble through publication than otherwise. But I would also have to say that I had at least one AAUP chairman who came to me about the publication issue, very good friend of mine, personal friend, and I said to him—let’s just say I called him Jack; his name wasn’t Jack—I said, “Jack, do you have any idea where you come out in this?” “No,” but he said, “I’ll tell you this: Goddamn you if I don’t come out at the top of the scale, our friendship is over.”

DANIELL: [Laughs] Oh, really! Wow.

DICKEY: So it’s not well to ever disregard human personal feelings, whether they’re mine or your’s or anybody’s, in a matter as this.

DANIELL: Especially given the framework in which you and Don Morrison together were attempting to revitalize the faculty under somewhat limited financial circumstances.

DICKEY: Well, we were pushing the merit side of the thing very hard. And of course we could be wrong on some of those merit rates. But this was part of what was behind—I remember I think I told you earlier about the rebellion against an award for…

DANIELL: Teaching, right.

DICKEY: …teaching. This is a very understandable thing, and I’m not preaching the other. But I’m simply saying that under the circumstances that I was dealing with, I don’t have any doubt about what we did. And we stood our ground on it. I told the trustees on several occasions that we could have an easier passage on this issue if we yielded the position.

I don’t think John Masland ever had as much conviction about it as I did. He came out of the faculty during the period when there had been agitation for the publication. I don’t remember that Don Morrison was ever involved in it. But Don was very strong on the merit policy. I don’t believe
that the publication issue was up while he was on the job, but maybe it was. At least it would’ve been the latter part of his years.

DANIELL: It was Arthur Jensen who described Don….

DICKEY: So that to a degree is the story of the relationships to the AAUP in the early, relatively early years. Later I’d have to say, in the sixties, particularly in the latter part of the sixties when student protest involved direct challenges to the academic freedom of the faculty really, or faculty members in the classroom, I lost my respect or a very great deal of my respect—and my respect for the AAUP had been quite high in this area—I just thought the AAUP had folded and defaulted to a degree that was most regrettable. Had an AAUP chairman—well, it was Henry in the government department.

DANIELL: Ehrmann?

DICKEY: Ehrmann who led the justification of the behavior here on the part of a group primarily of blacks that did not permit [William] Shockley to speak. And justified it as a protest against breeding group libel. And that this justified this kind of behavior. Well, he came into the office. He certainly didn’t have the AAUP with him on it. And I said, “Henry…” I remember talking with him, and this, of course, is the latter part of the sixties. And I said, “Henry, how in God’s name can you represent what the AAUP said it stood for over the years and principles that, without being too self-satisfied about it, some of us stood up for at considerable cost? How in the world can you justify your leading the AAUP on this and taking this position that this kind of behavior is acceptable on the campus?” Well, Henry and I have been friends and neighbors, and we’re still amicable. But from that point on, as far as I was concerned, the AAUP had clays of feet….[Laughs] Feet of clay as an organization. And as you must know or remember, this was a view that was held by some of the strongest academics in the country who were just simply outraged that the AAUP didn’t move in on this more—not this incident, but this problem, with greater vigor.

But to sum it up, I look back on my relationships with the AAUP as having been not particularly difficult. I always felt that the AAUP was sort of like a shotgun behind a door as far as most faculty members were concerned, but they weren’t very active in it most of them unless there was some issue which we didn’t have then very often. So that the AAUP, I guess it’s fair to say to you, was not in my judgment a major factor one way or the other in faculty development or faculty policies.
DANIELL: That said…the most interesting point to me is really the first one you made about how in the position Dartmouth was at the time you came on the job, the AAUP criteria was a useful kind of leverage for the institution to force faculty, to make decisions that they didn’t want to make before. And I never could quite see it that way.

DICKEY: Oh, we used it for all it was worth, even though we to a degree were playing it both ways, In other words, we were saying to the AAUP that we weren’t prepared to agree that we would abide by these principles. But we were saying to the faculty that we thought it was better if we followed this practice and certainly didn’t stop letting these things run to the point where they were…well, they just weren’t right.

DANIELL: Oh, no.

DICKEY: It just wasn’t right.

DANIELL: I often tell people, you know, people who are critical to me about the tenure system, outsiders, it’s an easy thing to be critical about. I say, look, the tenure system, it does one thing: It forces each department in an institution to constantly clean house, and it’s the only way to maintain quality. Basically what you’re saying is that by the AAUP affecting the timing of the decision, helping to determine the timing of the decision, it’s an essential ingredient in the process of upgrading faculty.

DICKEY: This was true, and it is true. Parenthetically, in case we don’t ever get back to it, I would like to be on the record as having believed that, on balance, tenure was and is a good thing. This is a larger subject which you may want to deal with separately.

DANIELL: Yes, I was going to deal with that later on in the interview.

DICKEY: By and large, when I came to this job, I came with the deeply inbred commitment to freedom of speech of the Holmes variety. This was no problem for me to reach that position.

DANIELL: And in the context of this, the freedom of speech, freedom from external coercion—

DICKEY: Precisely.

DANIELL: --was a very important ingredient in what made the AAUP strong in the early fifties.
DICKEY: Right.

DANIELL: By the sixties it had become really more like a union.

DICKEY: Right.

DANIELL: And that basically explains why the AAUP ceased to play the role, both nationally and in the local chapter, about freedom of speech that it played very aggressively in the early fifties, I think anyway.

DICKEY: We perhaps should say just a word about some of these most difficult cases where you had to terminate a tenured position. And these were situations where an administrator earns his salary for the year because you didn’t move in this situation until you really had to move. And these faculty colleagues either wanted you to move or wanted no part in the situation. One man is dead. He was a great figure here. But it was one that was very difficult, and one that had reached the point where it had to be dealt with, and that was Professor [James P.] Jim Richardson [1899] in the government department. He had been, as you may or may now know, quite a figure. He came to Dartmouth from practicing law in Boston. Taught constitutional law and other legal subjects.

DANIELL: It was a very controversial appointment initially [inaudible].

DICKEY: Yes. [Laughs] But subsequently even more controversial during that Sacco and Vanzetti case when he got embroiled with the institution—or with one side of the Sacco and Vanzetti case—because he was playing golf here with Judge Webster Thayer [1879], and Thayer made some derogatory remarks about Sacco and Vanzetti, and he’d been the presiding judge. And Richardson, I think understandably, whether necessarily, but at least understandably, felt that he had to share these derogatory remarks with the public at the time when the question of commuting the death sentence was up. And this stirred up a helluva row with faculty [Laughter].… Or not faculty primarily, although faculty I guess were in on it, but alumni. And they wanted Richardson fired. And Mr. Hopkins wasn’t, I think, particularly pleased that Richardson had been quite as much of a volunteer as he’d been in the matter. But neither was he prepared to see him pushed out by alumni complaints.

Well, of course when I was an undergraduate, Richardson was quite a name in the department of government. But by the time I came to the job, Richardson’s health had begun to fail. And before we had gone very far, I don’t remember which year it was, fairly early, I began to hear that
Richardson was having trouble attending classes, and his health was really declining.

One day Bob Carr came to me. I don’t remember whether he was chairman of the department at the time or whether he came to me because the department knew that we were classmates and friends. Bob, however, was a strong man in the department and was an AAUP leader. But he came to me. And I’ll never forget it because it was two human beings dealing with each other about a situation that neither of them were very happy about. And he said, “This is not the easiest assignment I’ve ever had.” But he said, “I’ve got to say that I think it’s essential that Professor Richardson be kept out of the classroom from now on, and that this be understood. That he’s no longer able to meet his responsibilities as a teacher. And at the same time,” he said, “I’ve got to tell you something that is difficult for me to tell you, that the department just isn’t up to telling him this.”

**DANIELL:** How old was Richardson at the time, do you know? Was he very close to retirement?

**DICKEY:** Not…. We certainly hadn’t worked back to a 65 age at that point. So Richardson may have been in his middle sixties. But he had a three maybe years to go and so forth. And he said, “Therefore,” he said, “I’ve just got to leave it on your doorstep with the statement that the department will understand.”

Well, I was wondering whether there wasn’t some way I could put this behind me. After I’d thought it over and talked a little bit with whomever it was I did consult with—I don’t remember whether Don was yet on the job. I thought well, gee, this is your baby. So he was up in Dick’s House in bed there in one of the student wards actually at the time. They were crowded. And I went up and had a talk with him. And the net of it was I just had to say, “Professor Richardson, we’re at a point where this illness problem just doesn’t make it possible for you to go on and do what I’m sure you would want to do....” Well, he was very decent about it. And we made a settlement that made this possible. But it was a sad, heavy business. And it was one of the things that taught me the weakness—there are many strengths—taught me the weakness of rotating chairmen. And what a burden rotating chairmanship... [ringing phone]

[Pause]

**DANIELL:** You were discussing Jim Richardson, and you were telling me he was leaving, and you had just described doing it.
DICKEY: This is probably a good point at which to mention these things that I didn’t mention back in the CAP discussion. Of course I went to the CAP with this. This was the sort of thing I went....

DANIELL: I see, okay. Yes.

DICKEY: And I said we don’t want a removal procedure here. Clearly none of us. This is just a sad problem. But neither do I want to take an initiative and then find people saying that I hadn’t consulted and that I didn’t have the benefit of the CAP, and was the CAP in on this, and so forth. Because we subsequently had some cases later where the question was whether the CAP had been consulted, and they weren’t too anxious to have it bruited about that they had been consulted. But neither were they disposed to cause trouble because they had been consulted.

Well, I also had in the course of the years two cases where we had to move against tenure appointments over aggressive homosexuality. I say aggressive homosexuality because I never felt that the mere fact that an individual was a homosexual was an automatic disqualification or anything of that sort. But in an institution of mostly minors, I don’t think anybody who’s—I’ve never known of anybody at least during the years that I was on the job—where if you had faculty members who were pursuing students actively, I don’t mean against their will, but pursuing them, I just had no doubts that it was the sort of thing that would not be acceptable to the community, the parents, and whatnot. And these were things that came to me under, well, under terms of strictest confidence from reliable sources, which I did not move on until I had checked with other sources that knew what was going on. And which I talked over with the CAP, and which the CAP just didn’t want to have to take a position on.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But who understood my need to tell them and to see whether they had any doubts about it. One of the cases was settled just by my talking with the individual. And he said, “Well, I quite understand your position. I’ll get another job.” The other, which had happened—both of these happened quite early on—I thought maybe we were going to have a need for a hearing by the CAP and so forth because the individual first said that this was a violation of his contract and so forth. But we left it that he would think it over, and if he wanted this to go before the CAP, why, there was no alternative to doing it. But he decided he didn’t want that. And I think I would feel more comfortable just not putting names into that. But I cite these cases only by way of documenting the range of consultation with the
CAP that goes beyond, or went beyond, any prescribed normal jurisdiction on personnel matters.

I had some problems of that nature that…. Well, I mentioned one earlier. It was where a couple of young faculty members violated the standards, you may remember, that were laid down for faculty in respect to student demonstrations.

DANIELL: Yes, that was [inaudible]...

DICKEY: That [inaudible] formal action of the faculty.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And when these two faculty members decided to go on their own to more or less disregard these—well, not more or less—disregard these standards, I decided I had a responsibility to call it to their attention and say that this was a serious breach of College expectations as laid down by the faculty. And that I had therefore to admonish the individuals concerned.

DANIELL: Plenty of that…

[End of Tape 22, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 23, Side A]

DICKEY: …in his capacity as AAUP chairman. And wanted to know whether I had consulted with CAP before I wrote these letters. And as I remember it, I told Henry that I didn’t think I was prepared to tell him—to discuss my relations with the CAP with him—but that I would say to him that I thought he might rest assured that there was not a problem in this area. Well, the fact was I had discussed it with the CAP. The CAP was quite content to have me do what I did.

So the CAP was a very, very important agency, and one that I guess I’d say I’m awfully glad we had. And I’ve always been indebted to the faculty men for the kind of service they gave it.

DANIELL: To put this in kind of structural terms, basically at a point in which you felt the distance between you and the faculty as a whole, or the nature of the problem was such that there was a distance there, that the CAP could be a way of checking your sentiment from your point of view, although you didn’t ask them to act where you felt you should act. And it probably worked exactly the other way from the point of view of the faculty: At least
the potential was there for if the faculty felt very strongly on something, to use the CAP as an instrument through which—through these peers…. It’s kind of a mutual self-help, in a sense, group standing halfway between the faculty and the president.

DICKEY: Yes, yes.

DANIELL: Before, you were about to make a comment on Jim Richardson, in which you said the problems of rotating chairmen. And that’s just where the phone rang. And you didn’t finish that thought as it related either to…..

DICKEY: Well, I was going to say…and this is a very important area but doesn’t require a lengthy discussion. Very early, oh, within the first year and from time to time thereafter throughout my years on the job, I had to recognize that there were very strong pro and very strong con arguments on this question of whether a faculty is better served by having a so-called rotating chairman or a so-called permanent chairman. And I don’t think this is the place to go into a detailed discussion of those pros and cons. But what is relevant to what we were talking about is the fact—at least the fact as my experience indicated—that a rotating chairmanship arrangement places a responsibility and a burden on the dean of faculty and the president that is not normally present in the same degree with permanent chairmen. I had many occasions over the 25 years in which chairmen might come in to discuss with me personally or with the dean of the faculty personnel problems, and would say, Well, now you understand I’m only on this job for at the most four years. I’m going to have to go back and be one of my colleagues. And I don’t want to be the strange man out with my colleagues when I’m no longer on this job. So I’ve got to behave as a chairman of a group and not really as somebody that bears anything like the kind of administrative responsibility which you—if he was talking to me—and the dean of the faculty have for this institution. Something that’s very correct and understandable.

But I think sometimes this reality was not fully appreciated by some faculty people: That it didn’t mean that everybody could wash their hands of these unpleasant personnel tasks. But that it does force a conscientious president and the dean of faculty sometimes to be a little bit more [inaudible], a little bit more on their own than they otherwise probably would prefer to do or the faculty think they would like to have them do. And this, therefore, is what led me to frequently want to be sure that I had touched base with the CAP on some of these cases before I went ahead.

Well, I still think that in the Dartmouth situation, on balance, we were better served by a rotating chairmanship than a permanent one during the
period I'm talking about. We violated that principle in a number of instances where we extended the services of John Kemeny. We extended it while we were building mathematics up. He was carrying the ball. We extended his term, I think once, at least twice beyond the normal four-year period. And we did this in one or two other situations for special reasons.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And there was no difficulty about it. But by and large I'm sure the faculty as a whole, whenever we raised this issue for discussion—and we must have discussed it I suppose seriously three times during my years on the job—the faculty, while they also were somewhat split about it, basically they came down on the side of rotating chairmen.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. This was one of the issues in the Jim Richardson case; namely, there was a rotating chairmanship there, and this is the context in which you brought it up [inaudible] consideration.

DICKEY: That's correct. I don't remember whether Bob Carr—I have a sneaking feeling he was not the chairman of the department at the time. But was asked to come see me because of our personal relationship.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: In any event, he said, “I've just candidly got to say this, this is a burden the department can't carry.”

DANIELL: Well, this has been a very rich discussion on the faculty, I mean, as we've gotten into this. We've got probably two or three hours on this together. This is a logical break point as far as I can see.

DICKEY: It would suit me. I'm tired.

DANIELL: Why don't I then turn off the machine.

The interview of February 12th ended here.

The interview began again on the afternoon of February 20th.

Well, as I just said, I think today we should begin with a general discussion of your observations on the nature of the College administration when you got here, and the kinds of changes, both in personnel and in organization, that took place in these first few years.
DICKEY: I came to the job in the fall of ’45 with no advance knowledge whatsoever concerning the structure of the staff or its composition in any precise way. I was aware that Al Dickerson was here as an assistant to the president, and I knew Bob Strong who was then director of admissions and dean of freshmen.

DANIELL: Had you known Al Dickerson before?

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: Had you known Al Dickerson when…?

DICKEY: Just who he was, that’s all. We had not known each other in college. I had known about his work on the *Daily Dartmouth* while we were in college. I think I mentioned to you he wrote a column under the title “Skip the Shoveler.” And I guess I would have to say that I was not an unqualified fan of that column. But my knowledge of the staff was very meager. I quickly found that I was coming up against people that I needed to know both professionally and personally better in order to do my job.

I’ve already mentioned that Dean Bill, who was dean of the faculty, was not in good shape physically. And I saw relatively little of him, but I was concerned about his health and the fact that he would be out and then would come back in. There was a discontinuity in his ability to be useful that made it necessary in fairly short order to face the need for replacement in that office. And we’ve talked about that with the setting up of the Dean of Faculty Committee and then bringing Don Morrison to the job.

Similarly, I have touched upon another area that required my immediate attention, and that was the area of admissions, and the fact that we were moving into a period of unprecedented competition for admission. So that that along with the problem that had arisen over the question of restrictions on Jewish candidates led me to become well acquainted with Bob Strong during my first year on the job. Only to have Bob die from a stroke before I’d been on the job a year. And this required me to give a great deal of attention and thought and quite a bit of consulting around the community on what we should do to fill that critical job.

There, as I believe I’ve said, I decided that it would be well to split the responsibilities of director of admissions and the dean of freshmen, Bob Strong having carried both responsibilities. The selection of Al Dickerson to be director of admissions was something that I recognized as being a very important decision. I was determined, as I explained earlier with
respect to dean of faculty, that this would be a responsibility that I would have to carry myself personally, even though I wanted as much consultation as I could get. And I sought that with the Committee Advisory to the President, with people who had been on the admissions committee in the faculty, with other staff people. Making clear, as I did in respect to the appointment of the dean of faculty, that while I was anxious to have ideas with respect to the operation of the office as well as suggestions for possible individuals to fill the office, I was not going to be seeking approval of anybody for those appointments.

Once again, I think it’s fair to say that my thinking about what was needed was not just a duplication of what I was hearing from others. There is a good part of what I was hearing from others that I had no question about. But I also had been on the job already long enough and I had already taken a sufficient reading on the competition that we were facing, and in particular the very critical problem of relationship with the alumni body over the issue of preference for alumni sons. That I was sure that once we found a man who had some understanding of the fundamental need for getting the, to use the hackneyed expression that has somewhat been downgraded, the brightest and the best that was available in the competition, we had someone who could really stand the gaff with the alumni body and who had the capacity for explanation, especially through correspondence and the patience. And above all, some feel for the specialness of Dartmouth and the specialness of the Dartmouth relationship to her alumni. These were ingredients which very rarely were ground into the opinions that were expressed to me by faculty and other staff people because they had no exposure to this side of the problem or of the job. And this was not that I was in any way more prescient than they were. But I was exposed on the job to quite a different—well not necessarily a different—but to additional aspects of what the job involved.

And the other thing that needs to be repeated is that this was a new situation. This was not a situation that the faculty had been hearing about before. We’d been talking about a selective process ever since the early twenties. But as I quickly learned and Bob Strong told me, the selections had been not very difficult. That the number of applicants that we were taking pretty well permitted you to take anyone that was qualified. But what was now perfectly clear was that we were going to have to begin turning down applicants who were basically qualified to get a Dartmouth degree. And that therefore you had to have somebody who understood that the need for following an alumni son preference, that gave the preference only if other things were equal rather than having a preference which was one that if you were an alumni son, you came into the College almost automatically unless you were totally disqualified.
DANIELL: Would you say that that latter condition, the one in which alumni sons pretty much came in unless, as you say, they really looked like they had no chance of making it, was that the way things had operated pretty much in the latter part of Hopkins’s administration?

DICKEY: I think that that would be closer to the truth—closer to the reality than any other way I can put it. And I rely upon what was said to me by Bob Strong during this period, that during this last year of his life and the first year of our postwar competition, he kept emphasizing that it was already clear to him that we were going to have to face a situation in which we were turning down—this was the phrase—we were turning down individuals who probably could make it. But who in a competitive situation just weren’t in it with others who were applying. I never saw any statistics that supported that judgment about the past. But this was….

DANIELL: What you say corroborates what a couple of others have said.

DICKEY: But Al Dickerson, who was about as close to the affairs of the president’s office and the total administrative setup as anybody, and who had a really splendid mind, just a very good mind, he had no doubt whatsoever about this. And if anybody had had any doubts, all you needed was about one or two more years and these doubts disappeared because…. Well, just to jump ahead a little bit: Al no more came on the job than we realized that this was one of the really critical passages we were going to have to negotiate if we were to make a go of it here at Dartmouth. The alumni sons issue was to the fore, and the Alumni Council for the first three years at least, and probably for another five years, before people began to have some knowledge of what was happening elsewhere in the country.

The first very understandable judgment was that this new young president was some sort of intellectual wild man who distrusted all alumni sons and didn’t know what had been done before. And most basically, that the admissions policy was being changed. This was the essential story that somehow had to be told straightly and convincingly, namely that the admissions policy remained as it had been. But that what had changed was the competition for admission. And in a competitive system as ours had professed to be at all times, there was just a limit—just a limit!—to which you could confer preference on alumni sons without destroying the position of the College to compete, particularly in the large schools and some of the private schools from which we wanted to draw, where they knew what was happening because they knew who was getting in and who wasn’t getting in.
Well, Al performed that job, so far as I can know, as well or better than I imagined anybody else could have performed it. At the same time that I made the decision to go with Al…and this was a surprise, and I’m sure one that was not enthusiastically applauded in faculty circles insofar as Al was well known in faculty circles, he was known as an intimate of the president, President Hopkins. And I’m sure that many faculty at that point regarded him as somebody who wasn’t their intellectual equal and things like that.

So it was a situation for different reasons somewhat comparable to the appointment of Don Morrison. That is, I had to bet on my own judgment that in short order he would, by his performance, convince people who’d had misgivings that he was the man for it. And this happened. By the time Al Dickerson moved over to be dean of freshmen and stepped out of admissions, he had won, in my judgment—I could be wrong about this—but I think he had won the respect and admiration and confidence of, well, I don’t know what the percentage would be, but it would be the overwhelming percentage of faculty people.

DANIELL: I think it was probably initially an item of lower priority for the faculty in comparison with Don Morrison. If I can read from the tapes, several faculty people do describe the questions they had about Don Morrison when he first came in. I don’t think anyone has—when I asked them about their attitudes toward administration—I don’t think they even mentioned in any negative way or hardly mentioned at all the staff changes that you’re talking about. Perhaps that was because Al had won them over so much through his performance or it may have just been a lower, say, priority of concern. Because obviously being dean of faculty means more than that did.

DICKEY: I’m a little surprised at that testimony. But I’m not in a position to contest it. The only evidence that I have that points the other way is what I think I’ve mentioned to you, I’m not sure whether I’ve put it on the tape, of the experience I had at the time of Bob Strong’s death.

DANIELL: I don’t think you had mentioned it.

DICKEY: Well, it was one of the minor traumas of my first year on the job. And not so minor because I’ve never forgotten it. But before Bob Strong’s—between Bob Strong’s death and his funeral, the chairman of I think it was the admissions committee, conceivably it was CAP, a CAP representative, but I don’t believe so, I think it was the admissions committee. In any event, a representative of the faculty committee—either CAP or the admissions—came to me before the funeral had taken place....
DANIELL: You had mentioned this episode, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I was pretty well shaken up by this sudden death of Bob. And he said that he just was calling to make sure that when I filled the position, the faculty committee would be consulted. Well, this suggested—this would suggest to me that there was a concern that was at least as, well, I won't say as great, but at least was serious about the way the job would be filled.

I don't recall anybody coming to me to object or protest. Here again, I would not want to say this didn't happen because I find that I've forgotten many things. But nevertheless, I had a feeling, rightly or wrongly, that this was an appointment that had to prove itself, that I was going to have to justify, and that it wasn't like taking a highly respected member of the faculty and putting them on the job and people saying, well, that's good. That's somebody that we know and have confidence in and so forth.

The other side of what had been the dual responsibility held by Bob Strong was selecting a dean of freshmen. And I was very anxious to get somebody that was right for that job. This involved, again, some effort to think through what we really wanted in a dean of freshmen. I was clear that we wanted somebody who was familiar with the, if you will, the classroom daily experience of undergraduates. This was, as far as I was concerned, essential at that point compared with the admissions office. I wanted someone who could have an easy, warm, if you will, understanding relationship with freshmen. Who had a sense of humor and could roll with the punches. And who would be prepared to be much more of a, oh, the phrase sometimes is used, father figure, than I wanted in the dean of the college job. Because the freshmen deanship, as we were organized and as Dartmouth’s experience has been, was an experience of transition from a pretty closely supervised life at home or in a preparatory school to the freedoms of the College. And at the same time, taking as many boys as we were from the public high schools, we got quite a few lads who during the first three months of college really were pretty shaken up and needed more guidance, more personal attention, more understanding than was generally true of preparatory school boys whose problem was on the other side: They knew the ropes, and they didn't want to have too much guidance. Well, I had had Stearns Morse as a teacher during my freshman year in freshman English.

DANIELL: Why don’t we just flip this over.

[End of Tape 23, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 23, Side B]

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: Having had Stearns as a teacher in freshman English during my undergraduate years, I had firsthand knowledge of his qualities. And while I recognized that Stearns was far from being what might be called the administrative type, he had a considerable amount of puckishness in him, and he was not disposed to spend his energies on bureaucratic ritual or things like that, I was pretty sure he had the essentials that I wanted at that stage for that job. So after again asking around the campus and again, so far as I know, I don’t think Stearns’s name was introduced into the discussion by anybody, I went up one day to his farm on Goose Lane, up in....

DANIELL: Landad?

DICKEY: No...is it Landad?

DANIELL: That’s where it is now if it’s the same place.

DICKEY: Yes, same place, Goose Lane up in the—Swift Water. Swift Water’s the name of the village. Swift Water. And we were talking the other day about it. He said that he really was just flabbergasted that I should come up and ask him to take an administrative job. That he thought possibly I was coming up to consult with him about filling these positions. That he thought possibly I was coming up to consult with him about filling these positions.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I was. [Laughter] But I had more immediate objectives than consultation. And he thought it over and without any undue delay said he would be glad to do it. And I’ve always regarded the selection of Al Dickerson for the director of admissions and Stearns for the dean of freshmen as very fortunate choices at that time. They were very compatible, and this was quite important, to have two men in these two jobs that were compatible because it had been held by one man before, and they had to work closely together. And both in their respective areas did, as far as I was concerned, very, very satisfactory jobs.

At about the same time but a little later, I had to face the replacement of the retiring treasurer, Halsey Edgerton, who’d been a fixture here at Dartmouth for many years. Almost a caricature of a Vermonter. Very lean in his speech. And a man who had the reputation of being awfully close with a dollar or a nickel. And yet who was respected as a one-man source
of almost all knowledge that related to the plant of the College or the financial affairs or the locations of the sewer lines in town. He was just a one-man everything having to do with the business side of the College.

But once again, it was clear that whereas he had carried an immense load and had taken care of things in a way that as Mr. Hopkins once put it, he found Halsey Edgerton trying about 363 days in the year. But on the last two days of the year or the last day of the year, everything was forgiven, and he was more than glad that Halsey had been on the job for the 364 days or whatnot of the years. Namely when the books had to be balanced, and Halsey brought the budget in or the report in to show if there was a deficit at least a manageable deficit.

I had not known Halsey at all before I came. We got on, as far as I know, very well. He was, in respect to, much older than I was. I think he wouldn't mind my saying more or less an old-fashioned person compared to myself. I had been through budget procedures in my State Department responsibilities which involved millions of dollars. So I wasn't awed by the Dartmouth budget.

I'd had no experience in the area of investments, so that I was quite prepared to follow his judgment and the judgment of the trustees in that area. And I quickly came to have confidence and great respect for him.

At the same time, it was clear to me in short order than when we replaced Halsey, when he retired, if I could find him, I wanted somebody who had had some exposure to the American academic world on the financial administrative side. And I wanted somebody who had, if at all possible, some firsthand experience in looking at the quality side of higher education. In other words, I wanted a financial man that would understand me when I said we've got to find a way--

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Which Halsey really didn't do.

DICKEY: --to do this rather than just to save this money. And as I believe I did say in the course of these interviews earlier, Halsey was unable to believe that we were really going to be in a position financially to compete even as an undergraduate college very realistically with other private Ivy institutions, so to speak, in the East just because he didn't think we had the resources. And being determined that we were going to have a go at it, I was quite certain I needed someone who I guess I would say was of my generation—

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: --to hold that very critical post. Earlier we had had the benefit of having John Meck come to us from his work in the Navy V-12 program, in the course of which he had represented the Navy in visiting various institutions of higher education around the country. And he came to us as a consultant, as I remember it, on one of our first internal studies of faculty compensation. He was very useful in that respect; he knew what was going on elsewhere. And it was quickly apparent to me that this was a man, again, with a very first-rate head on him, which was, of course, confirmed by the fact that he’d been on the Yale Law School faculty.

DANIELL: Right. Yes.

DICKEY: And had seen first-rate intellectual work. Knew these other institutions that I’m speaking of who’d been in the V-12 program from the inside. Had a deep interest in and indeed devotion to the College. Was in a very good law office right after the war, the law office of one of the ablest Dartmouth lawyers of his time, [Robert] Bob Proctor [1919] of Boston who had a Washington office. And I consulted Bob about John. I’d known Bob from my days in Boston law, and also had served with Bob Proctor one year when he was head of the Boston Alumni Association, and I had been on his executive committee. So we had a pretty good relationship. And told him that I was facing the need to get a treasurer, that this would be essentially a trustee decision. But that it was recognized it would have to be somebody that the president had confidence in. And I described that I wanted. Bob was as sharp a person as I’ve ever dealt with. Sometimes almost too sharp for his own good.

I’m reminded of how he was described to me before I ever met him during my first year as a law clerk in Gaston, Snow, Saltonstall. I was doing the backup work for one of the senior partners in a law case that I won’t bother to describe for you. And Bob Proctor was on the other side of the case. I didn’t even know he was a Dartmouth man at that point. But he was in Choate, Hall & Stewart, another of the old offices. So I asked this partner for whom I was doing the work in Gaston, Snow what kind of a person Bob Proctor was. And he looked at me and smiled, and he said, “Well, I guess the best way to describe Bob Proctor is he’s the sort of fellow who would take your right eye out and then convince you that you looked better without it.” [Laughter]

DANIELL: He’s not still alive, I guess.

DICKEY: No, Bob’s gone. But we subsequently established not a close relationship but a good relationship. And he gave John [F.] Meck [Jr. ’33] a very strong
recommendation in all regards. Needless to say, when one is out to select a treasurer, you want somebody that you don’t have to be putting an auditor on every 20 minutes. I wanted to be very sure, insofar as you can ever be sure, that I had somebody that wasn’t going to go sour on me in a bad way. He reassured me. I talked with Mr. Hopkins about it, and said that I really wanted to—this is one of the things where I felt would be very important to me to have the benefit of his views on the treasurer. Because he had been through a very rough experience early on with a treasurer with whom he did not have a satisfactory relationship, and who insisted on pursuing quite an independent course with the board of trustees.

DANIELL: Wasn’t this the man who really thought he should be Hopkins’s… be considered for the presidency?

DICKEY: I don’t remember that. But in any event, Homer Eaton Keyes [1900]. Well, Mr. Hopkins was very helpful to me, very helpful, describing not only the experience he’d had, but what he knew about the academic world about this problem, the relationship of president and treasurer elsewhere. And it is a problem which subsequently I learned a good bit about from knowing what was going on elsewhere. Of course we’re talking about a job that was not just treasurer in the limited sense, but a man who could carry the primary responsibility for investments, financial records, and the business affairs of the College.

Mr. Hopkins had known John Meck not well, but he knew about him, knew about his reputation and so forth and warmly endorsed him as a possibility for this job. I don’t remember the others whom I consulted. Talked with trustees from time to time about it, both individually and collectively. And that appointment was made, and I’ve always been very, very admiring of the job that John did.

He would not object to my saying that he has had a problem over the years of being somewhat brusque and awkward in certain personal relations. But once again, while I from time to time had to do what I could to smooth such things over, the fact is he had an indefatigable sense of responsibility about knowing what he was talking about, of digging into subjects on his own and not just taking what people said, that produced really a quantum leap in our ability to know where we were in respect to the business affairs of the College.

This was long before the day of the computer and printouts and all of those things. These things had to be developed, so to speak, by hand. And also John quickly had a very great instinct for, what I call, an instinct for the dollar. He became quickly and perhaps he brought it to the job, I
don't remember, but he was much interested in what had been his specialty ever since, investments.

In short order after he came—I don’t know just how soon but certainly within a matter of several years—we moved to take on professional managers for our portfolio, the Colonial Management people. And John worked very closely with them. Previously we had worked it just out of the treasurer’s office with [Donald L.] Don Barr ['18], assistant treasurer, handling investments primarily for Halsey. And one or two trustees who, through their business life, had an interest in investments: [Victor M.] Vic Cutter [1902], [Edward Sanborn] Ned French [1906] notably. Subsequently, to some extent, Harvey Hood.

DANIELL: I was going to say I've worked out a relationship with Mr. Hood who is not well now. But he is putting into a recorder and then having someone transcribe episodes, one of which he sent me in the mail just the other day, which is of an investment he, along with Ned French and others, involving the International Paper Company and certain land rights that turned out apparently very well. So I have the detail of that from the inside of things.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, he was a director of the International Paper Company.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And was in a position, through his relationship with John Hinman and so forth, to develop a very nice thing for the College in that regard. So Vic Cutter, who was one of the first of the old trustees that I worked with, and Ned French. [William J.] Bill Minsch [1907] somewhat; he was in a broker’s office, but not a major figure on investment policy. Harvey. Later, of course, Lloyd Brace and so forth. But we turned to professional outside money managers in Colonial for the professional advice in the industry.

DANIELL: Dartmouth has been with them well over 20 years now.

DICKEY: Mmmm hmmm. I dare say. Well, I would say at least 20 years. I don’t know when John first did that. But John went through a very careful sifting of the choice of our money—or our investment advisors. I was favorably impressed with that.

John was also an aggressive person in respect to money raising. Although that wasn’t his primary responsibility, he didn’t mind doing what he could on that side of things. So I was very, very well pleased and basically admiring of what he brought to that side of—that very critical side—of the
College. Because the one thing you learn—and some people have to learn it the hard way, and some people never learn it—is that you can talk a good game, but if you don’t have the financial muscle, and you don’t have your finances under really tight control, you’re ultimately going to go shipwrecked, and you’re going to begin to get into a very loose business of inflating your rhetoric and deflating your performance. So I couldn’t overstate the importance that I attach to the way John managed things on that side.

Again, I should not want to cover up that he had his administrative relationship problems and so forth. And I did, too. I had to pass over two men who had been around for a long time. One had it in him to take it quite realistically and indeed generously as far as our friendship was concerned. But this was one of those situations where I just decided I had to go outside to get what I was looking for.

Well, we had the same thing come up during these early formative years of my administration—I forget, it was a little bit later—but [Robert O.] Bob Conant [1913], the registrar’s office. And this was a situation where…. This came up after Don Morrison was on the job, I know. And Don was very much interested in this and to see us, so to speak, upgrade the professional service that the faculty wanted from that office. Bob Conant was something of a martinet. A record of this sort would have to say that he was one of the fellows—the only person that I recall feeling as an undergraduate somewhat aggrieved by his abrupt manner when I went into his office one day.

DANIELL: I don’t think he remembers that. I’ve talked with him at length…. Well, not at length actually. It turned out to be the shortest interview I’ve done. Because he really didn’t have an awful lot to say. But the personality you’re describing is a familiar personality.

DICKEY: Well, Bob was—I think a martinet is not too strong a statement. He wanted…. And then let there be no foolishness about it. A fellow on that job has to insist that things be done usually the way they’re prescribed. Because if he doesn’t, within 48 hours he’s got the whole thing balled up with faculty and students and everybody wanting an extension of time or special privileges or this and that, and he doesn’t know where he is. Well, I think it’s fair to say that Bob just felt that, okay, he would take a little bit of grief in his personal relationships in return for having a more orderly operation. Bob and I always had, as far as I know, a very happy relationship. And I liked—we were never intimates socially or professionally—but I liked his spunky nature. But I knew that when the time came for him to retire and for us to replace him, that we would be
looking for other qualities. Don Morrison and I put our heads together on that one, and brought in almost a custom-made man for the job in Robin Robinson ['24] who did great things in developing the registrar’s office that’s been carried on. This was not in a sense a major appointment; but from the point of view of servicing the faculty and faculty happiness, student affairs, it was important.

DANIELL: I wouldn’t be surprised if the faculty thought it was a major appointment.

DICKEY: Well, they may well have.

DANIELL: Things didn’t have to be the way they were under Bob Conant.

DICKEY: Again, I don’t have any memory of faculty reactions on that. We talked. Don and I, I remember, talked together with the CAP and told them how we would like to develop that office. This was applauded. So I would guess this was an appointment that probably was universally, so far as I know, well received.

Well, the other area of course we’ve mentioned previously was the area of the dean of the College. This was a situation in which I had to face ultimately the fact that the relationship with Pudge was not easy for him nor easy for me. There was no clear cleavage with respect to fundamental policies. But I think there was a very sharp difference in approach to matters. Mine had been training in the law, to a degree analytical, of standing off from decisions a little while and a little ways. Trying to make sure that I had all the evidence that I was going to get or that I needed. And my administrative responsibilities in the State Department had taught me a good bit about taking decisions and not taking them too fast and so forth.

DANIELL: Which became very much a trademark of your presidency, I should say at least as I knew even as an undergrad. It was just clear that for any students who had contact with you that this was one of the main learning experiences for them of the value of the slow process of decision-making.

DICKEY: Well, Pudge was just constitutionally constituted otherwise. And I can say without any attempt at masking the differences, that I had a—had and have—an admiration and affection for the guy that never in the course of any disagreements or difficulties was compromised in the slightest degree. But I began to hear from others what I quickly observed myself: He was just by nature a very compulsive, impulsive person in taking his decisions and his judgments. Very scrupulously fair and would go out of his way to be fair. But once he’d taken a judgment, he didn’t let loose of it very easily.
or quickly. And he also, I think it's fair to say, had been on the job probably long enough—certainly longer than I had, of course—that he was prepared to be, in a curious way, well, I say curious, more tolerant of campus behavior than I was. Curious in that he would lash out at things in a way that really frightened me on occasion, telling a fraternity he was going to close it up and didn’t want to hear anything about it, you know.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, that’s the reputation he had.

DICKEY: And so forth. And then he would begin to find out there was a lot more to the story, you know. Whereas I had a feeling that we had to just constantly make clear that certain things weren’t going to be acceptable. I didn’t care how that was made clear. But just constantly making it clear. And I wasn’t necessarily concerned about…. Well, I didn’t care for these particular ways of doing. Now he would regard—he frequently regarded this, I think, very understandably, as a way of responding to what I wanted. I think this would be very possibly a criticism that he would level at the way I was proceeding on these matters. He would think that what I wanted was somebody’s head knocked off [inaudible]. Indeed, I had a fear that that was just going to produce a backlash that we couldn’t handle.

So this was a mixed relationship in which, as I said, there was admiration on my part. And it’s not too strong to say, an element of affection for this guy. But my difficulties with his manner of proceeding and his style, I think it would be more than anything else, were confirmed….

[End of Tape 23, Side B]