John Sloan Dickey ’29
President Emeritus of Dartmouth College

An Interview Conducted by

Jere Daniell

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INTERVIEW: John Sloan Dickey

INTERVIEWED BY: Jere Daniell

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DANIELL: A good place, it seemed to me, to start. I know I found this fascinating when I was going over President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins's tapes. It was just fundamentally where the association with the institution started. And in your case I assume--and I'm not sure--that for some reason you chose Dartmouth as an undergraduate place to go to.

DICKEY: Yes. As a matter of fact, it's a memory which isn't entirely sharp and clear with me. But I am reasonably certain that I had never heard of Dartmouth until along late in my junior year in high school in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania. And possibly it was even in my senior year that I first heard of the college. I should say that there was no one from my hometown who, so far as I know--and I think probably I know this--

DANIELL: How big was Lock Haven?

DICKEY: About 8,000. It was a small central Pennsylvania town on the West Branch of the Susquehanna, mainly small manufacturing, tannery, paper mill. My father was the manager of a screen/wire cloth company which wove insect screening. And I was introduced to working in a mill very early as a bobbin boy there in summers and that sort of thing.

DANIELL: Very parallel to mine, incidentally.

DICKEY: Is that right?

DANIELL: I worked for a paper company in northern Maine.

DICKEY: Oh, really! Well, this was the bringing up that I had. My father had come off of a small five-hill farm about five or six miles from the town of Lock Haven. And he still retained his rural interests and ways while he was manager of this Pennsylvania Woven Wire Company, maintaining a big garden of corn and tomatoes and so forth which he expected me to keep
hoed and keep the weeds out. Well, in that town I'm sure there was no one, certainly at that time, who had gone to Dartmouth. And it's my belief that there was never anyone previously who came to Dartmouth from Lock Haven. Along about my junior year in high school, people began to--my friends and some high school teachers--began to talk about college, something that I had not thought about seriously at all previously. My father was not a college man, nor my mother. And there'd been no one from our family, as far as I know, on either side who had gone to college. So it wasn't something that came naturally.

But I had been very much interested in sports during high school, and became manager of the football team there in my junior and senior years. The football team in that town, I'm afraid I'd have to say, was a sport with a team that was supported beyond its normal expectations by town people who regarded it as something they possessed. It was a team that for a small town was winning more games from large city schools than it should have. Those days I guess are over. But in any event, they were very exciting for a young fellow to be manager of the team that in my senior year won the state championship.

DANIELL: Is this Class A? Did they have various levels?

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: They won the actual championship?

DICKEY: This was the actual championship of the state high schools. There were two conferences, the Eastern Conference and the Western Conference. We had been champions of the Western Conference for two years in my junior year. And we went down to Harrisburg that year to play Harrisburg Tech, which was a big powerhouse of all the high schools in the state. And we were defeated-- No, they came to Lock Haven in my junior year and defeated us very soundly. The next year we won and they won again our respective conferences, and we went to Harrisburg and won the state championship from them, which was, I thought, about the finest thing that had ever happened in my life. But it was through those associations with fellows who were going to college because they were football players, and a few teachers in high school who thought I ought to be a more serious student than I was, and who kept saying to me that if I hoped to go to college, I ought to get to work, it was through them that I heard about college. Then from some of my friends who were going off to college, I began to hear about specific colleges. A number of my friends had gone to what we now call Ivy colleges--Princeton, Harvard, Yale, and the
University of Pennsylvania in particular. A number had gone to Bucknell, a small institution down the river from us.

DANIELL: Do you have any idea of what percentage of, say, the graduates from your high school went to college?

DICKEY: A very small percentage.

DANIELL: Ten percent, 8 percent? Not even that high?

DICKEY: Oh, it wouldn't have been 10 percent. I would guess it might have been something in the vicinity of—oh, out of a class of 125, I would suppose maybe six might have gone to college. But a number had, and they began to come back and to talk about it. Well, the first thing that became clear to me was that I had to decide about whether I was going to attempt to take College Board Examinations in order to go to one of these institutions that required College Board Examinations. By the time I got around to thinking about that seriously in my senior year, it was clear to me I wasn't really qualified to take College Boards such as even they were in those days. Or at least I didn't think so. And the teachers that I talked to obviously didn't think so. And secondly, I began to hear a good bit about the fact that at some of those institutions, you really were supposed to have, as it was explained to me, some private means to be able to hold up your end in social life and things of that sort. And I was pretty sure I wasn't going to have anything except a very narrow margin of funds if I had that.

Well, all in all, the academic problem of College Boards, and the social life as it was portrayed to me in some of these institutions seemed to me to raise a serious question about my going there to one of them. And then I found that several friends who'd gone to Bucknell and Penn State and even the University of Pennsylvania were not making a go of it. They didn't like it, and they were coming back home within the year.

DANIELL: That was parallel to my experience.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, I imagine it is not unlike the experience of a relatively unsophisticated lad in a small town anywhere. But the other thing that I noticed was that a number of my friends went to places such as Bucknell and Penn State were home almost every weekend, and they obviously were not getting out of their college experience what I had assumed one ought to aim at, namely the life of the place and feeling that he was a part of it rather than running away from it every weekend. At some point in my— I think it was the fall of my senior year, to show you how close I was to the deadlines about getting into college—I read a magazine article in the town
library, which was right across the street from our home. I spent a good bit of my time, actually, free time, evenings and otherwise, just across the street in the town library. And over there I was reading a magazine, and I think it was Harper's. I must check it out someday. There was an article in it by Percy Marks: "Which Way Parnassus?" It was about college education and higher education. And there were several passages in it about Dartmouth and about my predecessor in the Dartmouth job, President Hopkins. I don't remember the substance of those passages, but they rang rather true to me. As I recall, they emphasized the fact that Dartmouth, located as it was in the North Country, had a tradition of being a fairly democratic campus. And this appealed to me as perhaps being a different atmosphere from the high polish of some of the better-known colleges that I've mentioned earlier.

The name stuck with me. And some days later, maybe weeks later, I happened to be in the little library, a one-room library, of the high school and saw a shelf that on it a number of college catalogs. And I just aimlessly turned them over--there weren't more than a dozen, I suppose, if there were that many there--and I happened to find one that was from Dartmouth. I remember it to this day. A gray, not very attractive format in its binding. I opened it up and read about Dartmouth as it was portrayed in this college catalog. The more I read, the more I wondered whether maybe this wasn't something that I might consider and be able to manage.

DANIELL: Did you ever find out how that got there?

DICKEY: No. I guess it was probably just sent there by the college to all high schools or something. I've never known. But in any event, it did attract me, and I remembered there was a considerable emphasis in the catalog's description of the college of its out-of-doors life. And there was some reference to the Outing Club and things of that sort. And my life in this small town of Lock Haven had been very importantly influenced by outdoors activities: hunting, fishing, trapping in the woods. And this quickly appealed to me as something that I might like. Well, I then talked with several of my high school teachers, and in particular a man, Professor Puderbaugh, who'd been my basketball coach and the manager of athletics, and who knew me quite well as an individual through my having been manager of the football team. He had attended Dickinson College in Pennsylvania and knew about Dartmouth, of course. He said, "Well, that's a very fine institution. I don't know whether you've got a good enough academic record to make it or not. But I'll be glad to do what I can to help you because I think you ought to go to college. Why don't you go ahead and write to them and ask for their admissions literature?"
He spoke to the superintendent of schools, apparently, a man named Benson who knew me also slightly, I suppose through the fact I had been fairly active in high school organizations. I'd been president of my class, I think, in the freshman year, first year of high school. And been active in different things in the school, as well as the more prominent position of manager of this football team which, as I say, got more attention from the town and from the school than I would think advisable, frankly, today. But that gave me a certain exposure that I wouldn't have had otherwise. Well, Benson spoke to me. He said that Mr. Puderbaugh, the director of athletics and teacher of science and et cetera in the school, had spoken to him about my interest, as he described it, in the possibility of going to Dartmouth. And he just wanted me to know that he thought it would be a wonderful thing if I could do that, and that he would help and be glad to write letters of reference and so forth. But in any event, they both encouraged me to have a go at this. So I wrote for admissions papers, and they came. They weren't very demanding.

DANIELL: This was after the so-called selective system?

DICKEY: Yes. The selective system was in effect. But as I subsequently learned, the selective system was at that point not terribly competitive. Indeed, we'll come to that later. But the selective system did not become really sharply competitive until after World War II.

DANIELL: This was, as I understand it, the introduction of the selective system was simply, or primarily, an abandonment of the traditional examinations or academics in order to introduce other criteria.

DICKEY: I think this is true. And as I look back on it, I think it was a realistic, and indeed very wise, approach on the part of Dartmouth in the early twenties to establish a stronger competitive position with some of these other institutions which undoubtedly were losing some people just because they didn't feel they were qualified to take their examinations or to meet certain rigid prescribed prerequisites.

DANIELL: Yes. It sounds to me like that.

DICKEY: And I was an ideal candidate for that kind of a selection system--or at least I guess I was. But the net of it was these two principal men--Puderbaugh at that point was I think also, I believe he was principal of the high school. No, I guess he became principal of the high school later. But at least he was a prominent teacher and director of athletics and so forth. And then the other man was superintendent of schools. They went to work. And when the application forms came, they undertook to write the letters of
reference for me. They must have said nice things, because while I was not a low-hanger in my classes, and I had gotten a fair share of good marks, I had not really applied myself to my studies in a way that one is expected to apply himself if he's aiming at a competitive college today. In the sciences I had not really done what I should have done in laboratory work. I think the same would have been true in mathematics. I'd gone through my plane and solid geometry and called it quits there and so forth. Already my interests were very strongly over on the side of the so-called social studies, history, and so forth. And I guess I could say for myself quite a person to read on my own, both by reason of living across from the library and just natural interest in reading.

Well, I filled out the forms and filed them, I guess, along in the late winter. On the financial side of things, my father had said he thought he could see me through. He thought he could borrow enough to get me along. There was never any thought of applying for a scholarship, which is something that I look back on that surprises me. We just didn't think of ourselves as people that were entitled to a scholarship, although I don't think there was any doubt that after I got here I realized that I would certainly have been as eligible as a number of other people that I knew for a scholarship. Well, I can remember very vividly the day--I believe it was in April--that I got a letter back from Hanover. And I can remember now--

DANIELL: Excuse me, 1925?

DICKEY: This is in 1925. I can remember now the thrill that I got with this thing named Dartmouth College and Hanover, New Hampshire on the envelope and the postmark Hanover. So I opened it, not with confidence it had a favorable result, but just very excited about it. And it was a letter from E. Gordon Bill who was then in charge of admissions at Dartmouth.

DANIELL: My parents live in his old house.

DICKEY: He very briefly said that they had my application. They'd considered it. There were aspects of it that they found acceptable or--I forget how they put it--attractive. And before acting on it finally, they would like to know how I was going to provide the necessary foreign language credits, which they still did require. At that point I was taking in my senior year in high school, which indicates how little thought I had given to the possibility of going to college in a way, I was taking first-year French, and they required two years at that point, as I remember, of high school French. Well, he very nicely put it in the form of a question. I remember this distinctly. He didn't say, you don't have the necessary credits. But he said, "How are you going to meet our language requirement?" Well, needless to say, I didn't
have the remotest idea how I was going to meet their language requirement. [Laughter] Indeed I'm not sure that I was aware when I filed the application of the language requirement, although I must have been.

In any event, I went up to show the letter to my French teacher, a young woman who had just graduated within the past year or two from Oberlin College, and whom, along with several other young high school teachers, we ran around with. Not a student-teacher relationship, I think I should say. She was great fun. We've remained good friends ever since. Her name was Molly Cushman. I showed her the letter, and she knew a lot about Dartmouth. Her cousins, the Littles of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, I subsequently learned, quite a Dartmouth family. Actually Larry Little in the Class of 1914 retired and lives down here in Cornish, I guess it is, or Plainfield or thereabouts. Well, in any event, she had a cousin in the Little family--I forget his name, what his first name was--whom she said had just graduated from Dartmouth a year or two before. Oh, it was a marvelous place, great college. And she was the first one who gave me a fight talk about Dartmouth. And she, having a good sense of humor, laughed and said, "Well, how are you going to get two years of French at this point?" And I had no answer for that.

Well, she said, "I have an idea. They're inviting you to come up with something. So why don't you say, if your family are agreeable-- And we can talk with the principal here at the school, and Dr. Benson"--who was interested in my application--more so than I realized--"about the possibility of your tutoring with me the rest of the year?" And she said, "If you tutor with me the rest of the year, and then take two courses in French at the summer school at Bucknell University this summer," she said, "I think you might be able to make it." So my family said that was all right. And I wrote back and said this was what I would do. Very positively, I didn't write back to ask would this be all right. But I just wrote back and said, "This is what I shall do." Thereupon, back came a letter from Dean Bill saying this was acceptable, and that I could consider myself admitted to Dartmouth. But unfortunately there were no rooms in the college, and he'd have to therefore advise me that it would be up to me to find someplace to room.

Well, Molly Cushman took care of that. She wrote to her cousin up in Pawtucket, and told him that this student of hers had been admitted into Dartmouth, and did he, her cousin, have any suggestions as to where I could find an off-campus room? This is rather interesting because he came back and said, no, he really didn't have any suggestions other than that he'd had a good town friend named [William] "Bill" Brock who ran the principal barbershop in Hanover, and was quite an entrepreneur in Hanover business circles. And he said I would be very certain that Bill
Brock either has rooms or knows where there are rooms and so forth. Why don't you write to Bill Brock? So I wrote to Bill Brock. And, yes, back came a letter from Bill Brock. He was just delighted to hear I was coming to Dartmouth, and he had a fine off-campus room that I could share with a young man—a splendid young man, of course—who was going to, that he had engaged, to work for him in the barbershop sweeping out and so forth. And the room was in 20 Davidson Annex, which I could have for $200 a year, which was about twice what it should have been. Bill was a real entrepreneur. My introduction to such things. Well, I went through the tutoring in French, and then went down to Bucknell for the summer.

DANIELL: How far away was that?

DICKEY: Oh, Bucknell was about 55, 60 miles. And attended the Bucknell summer school. I took two courses in French under Professor Clark, a very fine woman who subsequently became dean of Bucknell. She's retired, and I doubt that she's still living. She worked hard with me. I was not a good student, and never was able to carry on a foreign language study successfully because I had a very poor ear for the spoken language. I did reasonably well on the written work. And then I took a course in public speaking just to get my money's worth. I was permitted to elect three courses in the summer school, and I elected a course in public speaking under a man who was known as [Professor] Docky White, an old-fashioned kind of professor who taught public speaking from a book with the title, *The Conversational Standard*. In other words, you were supposed to learn to speak as if you were engaged in a conversation. I've never been very sure that that contributed very much to my work in public speaking. But in any event, I took the course and enjoyed it. It was not a very demanding course, I should say. And Bill Brock arranged the room business. Come September—

Well, there was one thing I perhaps should mention which is of interest in connection with the admissions process of the college at that time. When the forms came to me, one of them required that it was to be filled out by an alumnus of the college. Well, there were no alumni, of course, in Lock Haven, and I hadn't the remotest notion where there was an alumnus of the college. Nor did my father, nor did anybody in the school. I forget— I guess we must have written back to the college to find out about this. But in any event, they said there's a man in Williamsport, which was a town down the river about 25, 30 miles, who had attended Dartmouth. He was with the U.S. Rubber Company. His name is escaping me at the moment. And we're sure that he would be glad to interview you. So my father took me in the car down to Williamsport in due course, and I was ushered into this great—
Speaking of going to Williamsport to be interviewed by this Dartmouth alumnus. I'm sorry that his name escapes me, but he was an official of the U.S. Rubber Company in Williamsport, and I think I was duly impressed with the fact that his offices were fairly substantial. My father took me in to see him. He received us just very nicely. Said the usual polite things about his being pleased that there was a lad from central Pennsylvania who was interested in Dartmouth. He told me a little bit about Dartmouth. He was an older man. I forget what his class was, but it was back in the middle teens, I would guess. And asked me a few questions about my interests and my background, and said he thought I would enjoy Dartmouth. That was about it, as far as I know. But that was my first introduction to someone who'd been to Dartmouth and knew Dartmouth firsthand.

Well, when the fall came, my father bought me a satchel, not a suitcase. And they got me what was called a ski jacket in those days, a woolen jacket down at the Woolrich Mills which has since become famous for producing outdoor clothes and so forth. And I don't remember what else, but I wasn't burdened down with clothes. And my father said he would take me as far as New York. I'd never been to New York. In the course of high school I'd been to Pittsburgh and to Philadelphia on athletic events, track meets, and that sort of thing. But I'd never been to New York. And he said that he didn't think he would attempt to go clear to Hanover, which was regarded as quite a trek and pretty expensive and so forth.

So he took me there. We went into Grand Central Station, which seemed to me as big as all outdoors. I was terribly awed by it. And bought me a coach ticket to Hanover, New Hampshire. Norwich and Hanover was the name of the station then in those days. He took me. Well, I was pretty queasy by that time. As I recall, I was not weeping, but I wasn't many inches away from it. And my father, who was not given to any outward displays of emotion if he could avoid it, he just shook my hand and said goodbye. And, boy, there I was, on this New York-New Haven-Hartford train, feeling terribly alone, and not having the slightest notion of with whom I could become friendly. I just had a sense of being cut off from everything that I had known and everyone that I had known as a friend. Well, the train got going, and we got up into--oh, it had been out of Grand Central an hour or so. I began to notice fellows getting onto the train who were about my age, and I noticed that most of them were weeping. These were lads with their families. And I began to buck up a little bit because I--

DANIELL: Was there a specific date you were told to be here?
DICKEY: Yes, but I don't recall what that was. In any event, I was coming when I was supposed to. And to this day I remember seeing a Dartmouth fellow get on--and I didn't know he was from Dartmouth--but a lad got on. And I guess there isn't any reason why I shouldn't give his name. His name was Covey. He turned out to be a classmate of mine here at Dartmouth. C-O-V-E-Y. And he was just direct. I looked out of the train window and saw him weeping as he said goodbye to his parents. And I thought, oh, God, I'm at least not as badly off as he is. Well, he got on and came into the coach where I was. And in due course we met. I said--or he said--or at least one of us inquired where the other one was going and found we were both going to Dartmouth. We never became intimate friends, but that was my first Dartmouth undergraduate friendship, so to speak.

Well, we spent the day on the train. And then we got up--And as that train went along, of course it picked up quite a few fellows that I now know were going to Dartmouth, upperclassmen and others. And I found myself beginning to be terribly impressed with these fellows who seemed so worldly and having such a great time. "What'd you do this summer?" one would ask the other. And, oh, they responded with gusto. It seemed to me to just be a world apart that I had no great confidence I would ever enter into in that way. But we got to White River, and of course I don't think I'd ever heard of White River Junction before. And I also was not confident enough to ask about it. In any event, most of the fellows got off. But my ticket said to Hanover and Norwich--or Norwich and Hanover. And I thought, well--I asked the conductor, and he said, "Yes, it goes on up to Norwich and Hanover, but there'll be an hour or an hour and a half before we go up." Well, that's where I'm going. I now realize they all got off and took the bus.

DANIELL: Oh, they took the bus rather than walking.

DICKEY: But I didn't. I stayed on. When I eventually got up to Norwich and Hanover, I found that my trunk was there, which was one of these old-fashioned curved top trunks that my aunt had loaned to the family for me to put my things in. It was there on the platform. I guess it had been sent on ahead. I hadn't the remotest notion of how to get it up. There were a few people there, but not many, at that station. So I asked where the college was. And they said, right up that hill. And I went over and walked up, carrying my satchel. And that was my coming to Dartmouth.

When I got to the top of the hill, I knew that the first place I wanted to go was to Bill Brock's barbershop because it was the only thing I knew about the college and the town. And fortunately it was just to the right. It was down right below where the old bookstore used to be there. Just two
stores down from the CG [Casque & Gauntlet] House. So I went in there and introduced myself to the gray-haired man who had the front barber chair, and it turned out to be Bill Brock—a very affable Irishman. He greeted me with great gusto and so forth. And the lad that he had hired to sweep out the store, as I recall, was in the store at the time. A fellow named [James] "Jim" Cosgrove from Athol, Massachusetts, an Irish lad who had the map of Ireland all over his face. Rather tall.

DANIELL: Was he a Dartmouth student or not?

DICKEY: No. Well, he was going to be in the same class.

DANIELL: Oh, he was.

DICKEY: He was an entering freshman. Brock introduced me to him, and he took me up to this--I'm afraid I'd have to say hole in the wall--20 Davidson Annex, which is still there. But it was right up the stairs over Scotty's Restaurant; it was a restaurant at that time. And for the next two years—and I say with some feeling that I really should have gotten out of there at the end of the year, but didn't—for the next two years I lived there with Jim Cosgrove who was really an indolent, nice fellow who had, I'm afraid, no notion of why he was at Dartmouth. He had certain pretensions to being a baseball pitcher which were rather quickly dissipated. And he worked in the barbershop sweeping out and racking up the billiard pool balls. But if I had been an indifferent scholar in high school, I don't know what he had been because he was no student at all. Although he did fairly well in one field, Latin, which he had had drilled into him because he'd been in a parochial high school where they had given him pretty good work in Latin. But otherwise he really was not very well qualified—to put it mildly.

DANIELL: Was this the only two of you up there?

DICKEY: Yes, just the two of us.

DANIELL: The two of you, no other people.

DICKEY: There was the janitor who lived next door. It was a really slovenly place. And I hardly dare tell you how slovenly our room was. We had one room where we had our two desks. And in a little narrow closeted sort of place where we had our beds. And then a washbasin, washstand, and an outside toilet out in the hall. We had no janitorial service for our rooms, and we did not take care of them. Indeed, I think I wouldn't dare admit how long we would leave them go without sweeping them out or picking the
newspapers up off the floor. [Laughter] Quite a business. Well, that was the way....

DANIELL: Were you the oldest child or the only child?

DICKEY: Yes, I was the oldest. I had a brother. He followed me on to Dartmouth afterwards. He was Class of '32 and medical school '33. And then took his last two years of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania. And today is head of dermatology at Geisner Clinic in central Pennsylvania at Danville. He followed me here. Then I had two sisters. One of them teaches in high school today in Lock Haven, one of them married the son of a Bucknell professor, and we began to move into the educational world, I guess, rather actively. Then I had a much younger brother who still lives in Lock Haven. But that was the--

DANIELL: Just quite apart from your own experience, has your coming here made sort of Dartmouth a college which people at Lock Haven aspired to?

DICKEY: It did for a period. There were two or three who followed on within a matter of five years. I don't think there has been a Dartmouth student from Lock Haven, though, during all the years that I've been on the job here. At least I don't recall that there have. There have been Dartmouth students from around that area, but not from Lock Haven. But there were about three fellows, several of whom I played a part in getting to come to Dartmouth. One is quite a prominent psychiatrist today, a fellow named Furst. Another fellow who became a prominent Dartmouth athlete, Bill Hoffman. And my brother. And a fellow named Forney Winter who didn't last, and a number of others. But in recent years I don't think there have been--I don't believe there've been any. Certainly there've not been many.

DANIELL: Just a couple other things. Did you have any pretensions to be an athlete yourself? Certainly you'd--

DICKEY: Yes, I tried. All through high school I was not strong enough or well enough coordinated or fast enough to be any good at anything. But certainly I was not qualified to play football. I played basketball throughout my four years, mainly as a substitute. We had quite good teams. And when I came here, I was on the freshman squad, but not good enough to make the team. And I ran track, the distances a bit, in high school; I didn't here. Taught myself tennis of a sort, and would like to have been able to play tennis. Probably my best sport, actually, was swimming. But I didn't go in for any kind of swimming here because I did want to have a go at basketball, and I don't think I would've been good enough for competitive swimming at Dartmouth. But in any event, I was a lifeguard during the
summers at Lock Haven Country Club and that sort of thing. I was very much interested in sports, but I think the short answer is I was no good at them.

DANIELL: Again, I find that a very common experience, that small towns, of the sort you knew Lock Haven was like, tend to sort of value sports so highly that those often who, from a sense of wanting to participate but can't do it on the field, end up as managers.

DICKEY: Well, I think this would have been true in my case. I was certainly interested in sports. I spent too much time on them--there's no question about that at all--in high school. In college I didn't. I did go out for basketball and stayed with the squad for two years, and then subsequently was appointed a referee for the department of intramural sports, refereeing intramural games and that sort of thing. But I was never any good, period.

DANIELL: Well, why don't we switch now to beginning to talk about some of your undergraduate experiences? I have a whole immense range of things I think it would be useful to talk about. I don't know whether you have any particular way you'd like to start. The thing that occurred to me is just, well, comments on who you found as the most striking members of the faculty, the History Department itself--I know you were a history major which of course interests me. Your impressions of President Hopkins, of course.

DICKEY: I suppose the first thing to say is that I came to Dartmouth really scared. I didn't come up with any illusions at all about my qualifications to make a go of it in college. One of my high school teachers, a Miss Adams, who had been my senior English teacher, and who was a very straight-spoken person, gave me what might be called a Dutch aunt's, if not a Dutch uncle's, talk when she heard I'd been accepted to go to Dartmouth. And she said, "Well, all I'm going to say to you is, I'll look forward to welcoming you back here at the end of the first semester in college." She said it right out. And she was a very friendly, able person. She said, "You just haven't yet bothered to even come close to doing what you're capable of doing. And I don't think you're going to be able to turn around and do it in college. So good luck. But I'll see you back here." Well, God! Now, this shook me up. And I've never forgotten it.

So when I came, I was prepared to run scared if anybody ever was prepared to run scared. The first day or two I stood out in front of Bill Brock's barbershop, in the entryway, and watched the upperclassmen coming back and greeting each other with thumps on the back, and boisterous hellos, and have a good summer? And all of that, you know. Of
course I didn't know anyone except this fellow Jim Cosgrove who was working back in the school. But I began to take a certain confidence from those first two days. As I watched these fellows, I thought, well, these fellows don't look to me like they're great people, outsized individuals. They look to me to be normal, average individuals. Why can't I make it if they can make it, if I work as hard as they do? I began to try to think my way through this thing. And when classes started, I really went to work. I think one of the big breaks I got was living off campus. I think it made a tremendous difference for me. I had relatively few friends. One of the reasons I went out for basketball was to make a few friends out of class. And with fellows that I met at the Freshmen Commons. We ate at the Commons. But otherwise I wouldn't have met--I did not meet the men that you normally meet in the dormitories.

**DANIELL:** This was the Commons over in College Hall now?

**DICKEY:** Right, right. And I look back upon my living off campus as one of the best breaks I got. At that time the library was still in old Wilson Hall, and I began going to the library regularly. When I had a free minute, I didn't sit around and bull with anybody. I would go over there. One of the two or three memories I have from my freshman year, the most basic one is of running scared as far as my studies were concerned. I really worked at them. I was taking Latin, starting Latin--I enjoyed that--under a professor named [Adolph F.] Pauli, who subsequently taught at Wesleyan and was a good scholar as well as an exceedingly conscientious teacher. There was no nonsense about Pauli. He gave me, just by his example, a respect for the scholar that never left me.

I found myself also first assigned to an English section that was to be taught by Professor [James Dow] McCallum, "Red" McCallum, of the English Department who was still on the job when I came back here in '45. He's dead now. And during the first meeting with the class, he said, "I congratulate you gentlemen. You are obviously promising students because you have qualified for a fast section." I began to take on the warmth of feeling that maybe I wasn't as badly off as I thought. But the next time the class met there was another teacher in the room, and this was Stearns Morse, who became one of my closest and most admired friends. He said, "I'm sorry that I've got to disabuse you gentlemen of something that Professor McCallum said. There was a mixup on the assignment of our classes. And you're not the fast group that he thought you were." It startled us, as you might imagine. But he said, "I'm sure you will become the fast group."
Well, as you can see, I didn't forget that little bit of being brought back to earth. And Stearns Morse was my first professor of English. It was a great experience for me. I liked the feel of him from the very beginning. And English was an exciting course for me. We were using that volume, *Essays Towards Truth*, which some of the Dartmouth English Department had put together. It had ideas in it which just excited me. When we came to read Galsworthy's *Loyalties*, I just found myself as if I had a hold of a live electric wire. I can remember discussing the issue of loyalty. As I walked back and forth across the campus with men from class, going over to the Commons--and this was one of the great features of the Dartmouth education in those days which stayed with me. The common experience of having had the same subject.

Indeed, I didn't get that after my freshman year again until I got to Harvard Law School. I never forgot it, and it was part of the experience that went into Great Issues when I came back on the job in '45. But Stearns Morse found me the most baffling student, I think, he'd ever had so far as spelling was concerned. Indeed, I still insist--although he says he has no memory of it--that in the course of going over one of my themes with me one day, he said, "I think you bring the most original system of spelling to Dartmouth that I have ever seen." In any event, it was out of that year of rigorous instruction in English that I learned to use the dictionary for looking up almost every word that I write. And the writing of themes and getting them back with D's and E's and almost no A's was a wonderful way to keep me running as fast as I was capable of running.

**DANIELL:** John Finch, I remember, hit me with a D in the first paper I wrote in English whatever number it was when I was at Dartmouth; had exactly the same effect.

**DICKEY:** I also greatly enjoyed--and it contributed immensely to my intellectual orientation and development--the required courses in citizenship and evolution, which were then required of all freshmen. Evolution was one of the more venturesome things that Dartmouth took on under Professor [William] Patten. And while it stimulated and provoked me, it also caused something that I don't speak of lightly: great concern on the part of my mother about my losing my religion as she understood it. Because as with most freshmen, I went back at Christmastime and spring vacation, and couldn't resist telling my parents how liberated I had become with respect to religion and things like that. And this worried my mother, and I'm sorry about that. But in citizenship, Lew Stilwell, who was running it at that time and lecturing to us, he was a phenomenon as far as I was concerned, and I was excited by Stilwell. He took me on once in a discussion session over the issue of Japanese having the right to own land in this country just as
much anybody. Well, I couldn't imagine that they had the same right to own land as native-born Americans. So I went at him. Well, by the time he got through with me, I was, as you can see from my remembering this, really fairly shaken up.

DANIELL: Was this in class this discussion?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Yes, yes, yes.

DANIELL: Was it a formal debate?

DICKEY: Well, not a formal debate. But he just asked me what I thought about it, and I told him. And then he told-- It was one of those experiences that happens to all of us at some point, in which I learned that my views weren't necessarily the views of my teachers, and that maybe I had something to learn. I've never, never forgotten it. And then I had other young fellows who were handling sections in citizenship. They weren't of the same caliber as Stilwell, who was at that point really at the peak of his intellectual and physical energies. And that peak was very, very impressive.

DANIELL: He must have been quite young then.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. And one of the most vivid experiences, memories I have is of Stilwell giving a lecture on war, and the boredom that goes with a foot soldier sitting there in the trenches, lacing up your boots and then unlacing them in order just to lace them again. Nothing to do, but just waiting in mud and dreariness and wondering what it was all about. This is the first time that war ever had a reality for me other than the heroics of war that I'd heard and read about.

DANIELL: Do you know they're still broadcasting his lectures on WDCR?

DICKEY: No. But I'm glad to hear that. Of course I got to know Stilwell much, much better later through his other courses when I became a history major. Well, I could mention other things. One of the most amusing experiences in my undergraduate days--amusing at the expense of the teacher--came in my freshman year. You, I'm sure, knew or knew of Dr. John Bowler who had been head of the clinic here.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He was probably retired shortly after you were in college.
DANIELL: Well, I didn't-- The name wouldn't have struck a bell until I read the Hopkins tapes.

DICKEY: Yes well, he was Class of '15 here and was one of the founders--indeed I guess the principal founder--of the Hitchcock Clinic.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And died just a few years ago after having been retired for some years from the Hitchcock Clinic. Well, his father was at that time, when I was a freshman, was in charge of a physical education--I forget what they called it--course. A course that was designed to be a combination of sex education for the innocent and physical fitness instruction and so forth. Physical hygiene it was called, physical hygiene.

DANIELL: Goodness! That was still here when I came in the early fifties.

DICKEY: Yes? Well, I suppose so.

[End of Tape #1B]
[Interview continued on Tape #2A]

DICKEY: I was talking of the younger Dr. Bowler who was teaching the course in physical hygiene to all freshmen. And, as you just said, there was a lot of fun made of it. But at the same time, I took it quite seriously because I had never had anything like this in high school. Well, it was something that I found worth listening to. However, by the time we got into the spring, the course was wearing very thin, and we were being lectured to about our bowel movements and peristaltic action and things of that sort, which really was not a very exciting subject for springtime. Along in, as I recall, about the middle of May, the windows were open in 103 Dartmouth, as it was then called. I think it's now 105. I'm not sure if it's back to 103. But in any event, the central lecture hall.

DANIELL: The big one downstairs.

DICKEY: It did not have a high balcony in those days. It had a sort of a half balcony around the central floor area. The windows were all open because it was a warm, beautiful spring day. And physical hygiene was given at the worst possible hour it could have been given for purposes of commanding student attention--namely, the first hour after lunch in the afternoon. I don't think it's unfair to say that Professor Bowler was droning along, hardly looking up from his manuscript up on the platform. And a good many in the
class were dozing off. I guess I was more or less awake. But in any event, there was suddenly over on the left-hand side facing the rostrum, a god-awful clatter. Sounded as if somebody had kicked a big metal washtub or taken a club and beat it. Bowler glanced up over in the direction of this half balcony and then immediately kept right on going with his notes in good professorial fashion, not to be thrown off by any untoward noise or happening. And no one paid very much attention to it. We thought somebody had dropped something or other.

Bowler went on for about, oh, I would guess three to four more minutes. And suddenly there was a repetition of this, only it was worse. It was bang! Bang! And Bowler stopped and put his notes down in a dramatic, deliberate way and looked over, and he said, "All right, you. You did it just once too often. And now I know who it is. If you do it once more, you're going out of here. That's all we're going to say." And turned back to reading his notes. And all of us were properly impressed, except those who were over on that side, and who began to snicker, which seemed to me to be a fair degree of boldness. Bowler had no more taken his manuscript back in his hands and started to drone on when wham! came a third smashing crash. Whereupon everybody--who of course had been focused on this area--and at that point we realized what was taking place. They were taking the ashes out of Dartmouth Hall during the spring. And the men who take the ashes out were carrying them up the stairs, which were right under that window, of Dartmouth Hall, dumping them into the truck, and then throwing the cans down the stairs. Well, at this point the class just simply collapsed in laughter. And Bowler knew that he had made the most colossal mistake in running this bluff. So all he could say was--he tried to laugh, but he couldn't laugh. And said, "Class dismissed." It was one of the most dramatic lessons I ever had in being reasonably prudent about running a bluff. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Right, right, right.

DICKEY: Particularly with students. Well I remember that from my freshman year. There were many other things that I could—

DANIELL: Was President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins much of a presence in that, in initiating--?

DICKEY: Not in my freshman year.

DANIELL: I can remember come here--
DICKEY: He gave the convocation address, I remember that. But I don't remember what was said, of course. We got it in Webster Hall. I remember distinctly being signed in by him at matriculation. This took place in his office in those days over in Parkhurst Hall.

DANIELL: Parkhurst was built?

DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes. But I think I'm being accurate in saying that I had no personal opportunity to meet him in my freshman year or my sophomore year. Perhaps I should say a word about the way I made out in French.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: During that year. I took French, had to sign up for French, and took it with [Sidney] Sid Hazelton.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: Which is an example of the change that's taken place in Dartmouth College. Sid was an assistant football coach, swimming coach, and I guess he coached some baseball. But Dartmouth in those days, I guess, tried to get both milk and beef off the same cow. Sid was also expected to teach a section of French, and he did. And--

DANIELL: Did he speak French?

DICKEY: --I was assigned to him. Well, in those days very few of the department would venture to speak French, very few. And this is something that I'll tell you about that was one of the--well, I don't want to say battles--but one of the things that I had to help get changed when I came on the job in '45. The notion that an instructor in French or a modern foreign language spoke the language was not a generally accepted one in the college world of those days, and certainly not at Dartmouth. That the spoken language was something you learned at Berlitz; anybody could do that that wanted to do it. But that the language that really counted was the grammar and the literature. And a few scholars concerned themselves with literature and not with the spoken language. We'll come to that hopefully when we talk about some of the curricular changes. But Sid didn't speak any French in class at all. He didn't address us or ask us questions or anything. Thank God!

Well, I got I think it was a B or an A in my first semester with Sid. It was at least a B. It may have been an A. I don't remember accurately. Anyway, it was good enough that we were reassigned. In those days they reassigned
the sections on the basis of their previous performance. I found myself in the second semester in a so-called fast section in French with Professor [Howard Floyd] Dunham, who's gone now, but a wonderfully genteel, refined and cultivated person in speech and manner in the old-fashioned sense. Well, Dunham conducted his course in French, and I had had almost no oral French. At Bucknell I didn't get any to speak of, and with Sid we didn't have it at all. To put it bluntly, I just hung on by my eyeteeth because I didn't know what was going on most of the time. When he would address a question to me, I got it very imperfectly if I got it at all. And my answer was more inadequate. The result was I passed that second semester with the only D I ever got at Dartmouth. [Laughter] And I've always felt it was a fairly generous D. It was a ghastly experience. A ghastly experience! And it turned me off from languages forever more, I deeply regret to say. But Sid Hazelton, whom I came to like very much as an individual, to be absolutely blunt about it, had no business whatsoever being in a college classroom as an instructor of French.

DANIELL: Yes. Did the coaches in this sense all teach in the languages?

DICKEY: I don't know, I don't know.

DANIELL: Or were they assigned to other places?

DICKEY: I don't think so.

DANIELL: But of course that's understandable. That comes from the high school experience. I mean the combination of football coach and high school history teacher is a-- You know I still have students come up to me today and say, "I really liked your course, Professor Daniell. The only history course I had before was with the football coach." [Laughter] So there's a kind of continuity there.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, Sid's main job was not teaching French. Sid's main job was swimming, being swimming coach. Being, as I said, I remember seeing him--I was out one day watching football practice in the fall. This was when I learned that he was a coach. I saw my French teacher out there coaching the ends on the football squad. I guess there are other memories of the freshman year: individuals that I met. My closest friendship, I think, in the faculty at that time, I believe, was with Stearns Morse, my English teacher.

DANIELL: They didn't have anything like an advisory system such as--?
DICKEY: Yes, we had an advisory system of sorts. But the advisor was not a key person. I did have the experience of encountering Dean [E. Gordon] Bill's gruffness shortly after-- We were given these proficiency tests when we came here to put us in various sections, you know, in languages and so forth. Then Dean Bill interviewed each freshman personally. He was Dean of Freshman as well as Undergraduate Admissions. So he called me, and put on his best gruff manner. "Well, Dickey, you going to make it? Going to be a close thing, but I think you can do it all right. Any questions?" "No." And I was let go. But Gordon Bill was--

DANIELL: One thing everyone seems to agree on is that Gordon Bill was a gruff person.

DICKEY: Pretty gruff fellow, pretty gruff fellow. I came to know him after I came on the job in a totally different way. We'll come to that. But I lived through the tragedy of his last years with him, and it was terrible.

DANIELL: How about fraternities at this point?

DICKEY: Well, yes. I'd forgotten all about that.

DANIELL: I ask that mainly because--

DICKEY: This was the first year-- Now, this is-- As a matter of fact, this is quite important, I guess. I think my freshman year was the first year of several things. First, the first year when there was no compulsory chapel. There had been a student movement for the abolition of various requirements in the middle twenties that had some very strong student leaders here in the Class of '24, [William Harold] Cowley and others, who'd worked with [Leon Burr] Richardson on the new curriculum.

DANIELL: That's Jim Richardson or L.B.?

DICKEY: Oh, no. That's L.B., who was responsible for what was regarded as the new curriculum. The new curriculum was supposed to be one of Dartmouth's most important ventures in the academic world. Richardson had taken a year or maybe two years off to study new curriculum. It was his recommendations that led to the distribution requirements in the major in the form that I had it and that prevailed here up into the thirties. Well, the new curriculum went into effect my freshman year. There was no compulsory chapel, and there was a lot of pro and con talk about that going on at that time.
DANIELL: And is this the first year when freshmen weren't allowed to go into fraternities?

DICKEY: And this was the first time (I dropped that stitch)... This was the first year in which freshmen were not allowed in fraternities. They had open houses, quite formal affairs, when the upperclassmen would get all polished up with neckties on, and the freshmen would come very well dressed on Sunday afternoons; I think, about, oh, five of them maybe in the course of the year. And then the pledging didn't take place until the fall of the sophomore year, early fall.

DANIELL: But you were allowed to go into these fraternities in the fall of the sophomore year, or at the end of the freshman year, or both?

DICKEY: No, you became a member of a fraternity in the fall of your sophomore year. But in the freshman year you were allowed in only for these open houses.

DANIELL: I see. Yes.

DICKEY: My own attitude towards fraternities was quite relaxed and somewhat ambivalent. I had seen a lot of fraternities down at Bucknell, both during the summer when I was there and through my friends who were there at other times. And fraternities were terribly important there. They lived and ate in the houses, and your status on campus was to a considerable degree determined by the house you belonged to, and all of that. I had heard, and I soon learned, that the thing was quite different at Dartmouth. There was no eating in the houses, and that there were quite a few who were not fraternity members.

DANIELL: You must have come right after-- I remember President Hopkins saying that he was concerned about the degrees to which fraternities were usurping the educational purposes of the college. And it must have been just after you came that he announced that freshmen couldn't be in fraternities anymore.

DICKEY: He, I think it's fair to say, never ceased to be concerned about it. And indeed, I can't imagine a Dartmouth president ever ceasing to be concerned about it. When we come to talking about my experience with them, I'll have a great deal to say about that. But I only know--or I only remember--that there had been enough dissatisfaction with fraternities and the notion that they were largely responsible for freshmen busting out-

DANIELL: Right. That's what he said.
DICKEY: --that there was a definite restrictive movement on when I came on campus. Having seen something of them at Bucknell, I was not too much taken with them--or with the idea of belonging to a fraternity. I knew I was on very short rations as far as money was concerned, that Dad was having to borrow for me. And I wasn’t clear that I really wanted a fraternity that much. I was invited around to, oh, I suppose a half dozen to a dozen open houses, mainly through friends who wrote up from other colleges, particularly the Bucknell people.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: Who were determined that I should go, my friends down there in SE [Sigma Epsilon], that I should go SE. Well, SE didn't take any interest in me. They invited me to their open houses, but I never met any of those. So at--I guess it was in the fall the invitations to fraternities were extended--I was invited to join two that were relatively low down on the social scale, but in pretty good shape as far as their behavior rating and academic rating was concerned. One of them had a fellow in it who subsequently was an instructor in the History Department; you may have gotten to know him. He was editor of Current History and then the New York Times Book Review: Brownie, [Ernest] Francis Brown?

DANIELL: Oh, yes. Well, I never did meet him, but the name keeps cropping up.

DICKEY: Well, Francis Brown, Class of '25, was in a house over here that's now the Gamma Delta House, but it was not that house--that's a new house physically. But he and several others there took an interest in me and wanted me to come in there. And there were two other houses that wanted me to come in--or who extended invitations to me. I just decided that I didn't-- [Sound of ringing telephone] [Pause] In any event, for various reasons-- First, I didn't have many friends who were in those houses. They were not prestige houses as prestige went among the fraternities in those days. And I was rather impressed with the fact that we were really running awfully close to the edge as far as money was concerned. So I just decided not to do it. And I didn't go into a house my sophomore year. And then really very glad I didn't. Very glad both for reasons that weighed with me then. But also when I came to the job later, I had the great advantage of having had the perspective of having stayed out of a house, although in my junior year I did go in.

DANIELL: You did go into one.

DICKEY: In my junior year I left 20 Davidson Annex, and went over with John Minnick, who invited me to come over with him--he was subsequently
professor at Thayer School--to live in Wheeler, Wheeler Hall, which was a very nice dormitory. He'd had a double room there, and his roommate graduated or something, and he invited me to come over with him and live in there. He belonged to the Theta Chi House at that time and obviously was not a gung-ho fraternity man. And after a few weeks of living with him, he said, "Look, I don't think much of fraternities. I don't pay much attention to the house. But you probably are going to want to have a girl up at Carnival your junior-senior year and so forth. Why don't you come over to the house and get acquainted as a junior? And you don't have to go through all this foolish of initiation and so forth." Well, this sounded pretty good to me. So I went over.

DANIELL: That's the same line that got me into its successor, Alpha Theta.

DICKEY: Is that so?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, in any event, he got me to come over. And I went over, and they invited me to come in and so on. I went in largely because of John's suggestion. And I had quite a good experience in there. By the end of the junior year, it was clear that the house was divided into two cliques. I forget now what the-- One was a great good-time group, and one was a group that didn't want a good time so much. Prohibition and whether they were going to abide by Prohibition rules was part of it. In any event, they decided that I should be president because I didn't belong to either clique. I'd just come in in my junior year. [Laughter] So I was voted into the presidency of the house the first year I was there and had just really gotten in. And I had quite a good experience with it, learning what it is to bear responsibility for others. I don't think it needs dwelling on. At the end of the year, or at the end of the senior year--in the course of the senior year--the house was on the threshold of being expelled from the national because we declined to pay the head tax. I went out and negotiated a settlement.

But the most important experience I had in the fraternity was when it came to pledging in the fall of the senior year, and I was president of the house. And I hesitate to say how naive I had been about the racial/religious prejudices that were operating on the campus. I knew nothing about them, hadn't thought about them. Or at least my memory is that I hadn't. And I'd been brought up in a home in Pennsylvania where my closest friend, my trapping partner trapping muskrats, with a Catholic boy. My other closest friend was a Jewish boy who came to our house to read the funny papers on Mondays because his family wouldn't let him handle the funny papers
and so forth. So that I came with really an incredible naivete with regard to these matters. Although I knew that Negroes, of whom we had very few in town, were treated badly, and so forth.

But that fall the house got into a split over whether they would pledge a certain fellow whose name I forget now. I think his name was [John Merritt] Lentz -- or something like that -- whom I didn't know. And the split was whether he was a Jewish fellow. And I said, "Well, as far as I'm concerned-" We had a big powwow about it one night. "I just am not prepared to believe that he's not eligible to come into this house because he's Jewish." "Well," they said, "do you realize that the charter of this house prohibits us from pledging a Jew?" I said, "No, I didn't realize that. I've never seen the charter." "Well, you'd better read it." So for the first time I got a hold of the charter and read it, and sure as hell, it did prohibit pledging Jews. Well, with a certain rigidity, if I had agreed not to do something and I'd accepted that charter, I decided there was nothing I could do. What I should have done, as I look back on it, probably, was get out. But this wasn't being done in those days; it never occurred to me that this was the thing to do, I'm rather ashamed to say. The other argument was that he was not a Jew.

So there was a big hassle on whether he was a Jew or not. A lot of wiser people than I have tried to settle that question about various people. But I, to show you the degree of my naivete, maybe also my forthrightness, I said, "Well, listen. If that's the issue, I'm willing to deal with it. I will undertake to find out." I didn't know him. But I said, "I have some very good friends who are very active in the Jewish group here." One was now Shepherd Stone, then Shepherd Cohen. And two or three others. I won't go into them. So I said, "Will you fellows who are opposed to this, if I come back and say this fellow is not Jewish in the sense that excludes him under the charter, does that end it?" They said, "Yes, we'll take your word for it." Well then, I said, "I will look into it." So I went over one night--it was the damnedest thing, and I wouldn't do it again under any circumstances I can think of. I went over to these fellows' room in North--

DANIELL: Fayerweather?

DICKEY: Fayerweather. And I said, "Why I'm here," I said, "I'm president of this house. There's a row going on about pledging this fellow, and the issue is whether he's Jewish or not Jewish. I'm not going to argue about my position. My position is he should be pledged. They've shown me the charter which says he's not eligible to be pledged. So I've agreed to try to find out whether he's Jewish." Well, these guys laughed and said, "Well, you sure are one of the most interesting guys on this campus." [Laughter] Well, I didn't see quite at that point why I was as interesting as I now
realize I was. But each one of them said, "Well, let's each one of us speak for himself."

DANIELL: Is Lentz in the room at the time?

DICKEY: No. Oh, no. They said, "He's attended a Jewish camp." One of them said, "He's attended a Jewish camp with me all his life. There are no non-Jews attending this camp." Another said, "Well, he probably is not a practicing Jew as far as synagogue and so forth is concerned today. I don't know. But in the sense that your friends are using 'Jew,' you'd better proceed on the assumption this fellow's a Jew." Well, I said, "Thank you very much." And from that day on I decided that one of these days I was going to have something to say about this, and I did. And that's a fairly large part of the story of my first few years.

DANIELL: Well, I just thank you for—

[Change to Side B of Tape #2]

January 10, 1975

DANIELL: On the tape we were dealing with a couple of days ago, you were talking about your undergraduate experiences, and you covered pretty thoroughly your experience in fraternities. You told me you had a number of other matters which in recollection were of importance to you in terms of your undergraduate career. So why don't you just launch into those?

DICKEY: The experience with a fraternity came in my junior year as I mentioned earlier because I did not go into a fraternity until my junior year when I went to room with John Minnick in Wheeler Hall, and he suggested that I might like to go into the house that he was a member of, namely, Theta Chi. Actually, I think it may be worthwhile saying that junior year for me was a year of fulfillment so far as the intellectual excitement of the college was concerned. During my freshman year I, as I said, ran scared to the point where, while I was excited by new ideas and having my prejudices challenged, I didn't feel the steady stimulation of getting into subjects, into literature, into history, with a little sense of depth. This came in my junior year. That year I took a course in the history of the novel. It was a course that was offered by a number of professors in collaboration. One of the attractions, I think, for me in taking the course was that one of my English teachers in the freshman year, Professor Stearns Morse, who was active in the course, Artemas Packard, and others. It was a thoroughly fine experience for me, and took me into the evolution of one literary form, namely the novel, in a way that I could never have gotten except through
an organized course. When people speak contemptuously of courses, I find myself going back to an experience such as that in the history of the novel, realizing that I would never have gotten it without having been in a well thought-out, well-designed course.

It was in this course that I had a somewhat--had an experience--which in my senior year produced what might accurately be termed a minor traumatic experience. In this course I became interested in the work of a relatively little-known, contemporary American novelist named Floyd Dell. A number of things contributed to my interest in Dell. He had been one of the fairly prominent people in the so-called Greenwich Village period of the early part of the century, or at least in the teens. And in that connection, he had known a cousin of mine who was a part of that group although he was not a writer; he was an artist, John Sloan. And this interested me.

DANIELL: What relationship is John Sloan?

DICKEY: Well, we were--we are--cousins. He's dead now, of course. Died here in Hanover, as a matter of fact, in his 80th year back in 1951, I believe it was. We were both born in the same small town of Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, and my mother was a Sloan. I forget--we're second cousins once removed, or whatever it is. But this was the relationship.

DANIELL: Is that the John Sloan of the Ashcan School?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

DANIELL: Oh, okay. I just wanted to be sure.

DICKEY: One of his most famous paintings--

DANIELL: Here?

DICKEY: No, up above you. No, the postcard there, "The Wake of the Ferry."

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: Which was used for a memorial postage stamp on the 100th anniversary of his birth just two years ago.

DANIELL: Okay. I just wanted to check to be sure it was the same one.

DICKEY: Yes, yes. That's right. Well, I had read about Dell and Sloan and others as participants in the so-called Bohemian, Greenwich Village period. This
was the time when Edna St. Vincent Millay was sowing her wild oats, so to speak. In the course that I spoke of, we read a little book entitled—by Dell—entitled, *Intellectual Vagabondage*. And this, along with these other things that I've mentioned, led me to read more of Dell's work. So I set out to read all of the Dell novels that I could put my hand on: *Janet March, Moon-Calf*, and on and on. Maybe half a dozen novels or so. Then I wrote my term paper in the form of, if you will, a biography of Dell with a rather pretentious undergraduate approach to criticism of his work. I put the—the term paper was well received—and I put it aside as something that I had done and would not be coming back to. Although I rather hoped that someday I might get to meet the man. He continued to be of some prominence in contemporary American literary circles during my undergraduate days, and shortly thereafter he wrote a play. I think the play was based on a book of his entitled, *The Unmarried Father*. And the play, which got onto Broadway, a semi-comedy I believe, was entitled, *The Little Accident*.

Well, in my senior year, to complete this story, I took one of the best courses I ever had at Dartmouth; not primarily because of the course, which was true of the "History of the Novel," but because of the teacher, namely Gordon [Willard] Allport, who was on the threshold of a very prominent career as an American psychologist. He left Dartmouth and became one of the very well-known members of the Harvard faculty as a psychologist. Indeed, was very active on the Harvard faculty when I came to the Dartmouth presidency. We had a somewhat sharp exchange at that point, as a matter of fact, in correspondence, over the problems of racial discrimination in student bodies. We can get into that if you're interested when we come to my first years on the job. But Gordon Allport was a very important influence in my undergraduate education. He was a rather shy man, quite introspective, very probing. Prided himself on his objectivity. I think probably, as is true of many of us, kidded himself at times about his objectivity. But obviously a first-rate—and at that time—very promising scholar in psychology. He taught a course entitled, "The Psychology of Personality," which intrigued me because it dealt with some of the concepts of psychopathology, as well as--

**DANIELL:** He must have been very young at this time.

**DICKEY:** Yes, he was relatively young. Although not by any means a newcomer to the faculty as a youth.

**DANIELL:** No.
DICKEY: He was a fairly mature-- Well, he was a mature person. He built this course, "The Psychology of Personality," which was a very personal kind of course, around a case study of William Ellory Leonard, who had been the professor--very notable professor--of literature at the University of Wisconsin. And wrote up his life or, if you will, his psychological biography, really, in a book entitled, The Locomotive God, a book that as a matter of fact I still have in my personal library. Well, William Ellory Leonard is not the point of this story. But William Ellory Leonard's book, The Locomotive God, focused on an experience he had as a child of being left alone on a railroad platform and having a locomotive bearing down on him, and this resulted in a neurosis that prevented him from traveling and the most elaborate--what's the word for it in psychology? Well, it has a common term.

DANIELL: Fetish?

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: Well, fetish isn't the right word, but--

DICKEY: No, no. But it'll come to me. Well, in this course of Allport's, he said, "I want you to do a case history on somebody. If you want to, you can do an autobiography, although I'd prefer that you did it on someone that you knew." I got the idea, which he thoroughly approved of, of taking my study of Dell done during the junior year, as the basis for my, if you will, case history on the psychology of Dell's personality. But with a, I trust, developing sense of scholarly responsibility, I thought, well now, I shouldn't do this unless I really was sure that what I said had some--had said--in the paper as I did it in my junior year, had factual validity. So with a naivete which parallels the innocent naivete that I referred to earlier in respect to going over to find out for some other fellows whether a particular fellow was a Jew, I just upped and sent Dell the paper as I had done it for Stearns Morse back in my junior year. Well, almost needless to say, that paper was written with all manner of indiscretion, with some speculation about Dell's affair with Edna St. Vincent Millay, and other things which today it sort of sends a shiver through me to recall.

I don't know. I guess I was in a state of mind in which I thought, well, these are things that I believe are to be true. I should be man enough to find out straightforwardly whether they are true or not. And of course my assumption was that he could deal with them objectively and without being emotionally put off by them. In this respect I was certainly wrong. He reacted to this paper in a way that just was incredible. I, of course, had never corresponded with him before. But he wrote me back a longhand
letter in a closely-written hand of eight pages or more. And then, in addition, wrote on foolscap about 30 pages of biographical material and some of his poetry of that period. But he just gave me unshirted hell for the liberties I had taken in my paper with his personal life. I don't understand to this day why he bothered to respond as he did if he was as outraged as he obviously was--

DANIELL: A good chance to work something off.

DICKEY: --by what I had done. Well, when I got this material back from him, I don't mind telling you I was really frightened. I had never had anybody take me that seriously. And he stipulated in his letter that this foolscap autobiographical material which he sent me was only for my information. That it was not to be shared, it was not to be copied, and was to be returned to him in due course by me personally. But the letter, the eight-page letter, whatever it was, was mine to keep and so forth. Well, I was quite shaken up for some days, maybe a week or more, and wasn't sure, really, that I could go on with this paper. I realized that I had gotten into something much deeper than I was prepared to handle or understand.

I went to see [Robert] "Bob" Riegel, I remember, about it because I was taking his course in the history of the West at that time and was working with him on another term paper about the Indians. And showed him the--I think I was permitted to show (I don't recall)-- At least I abided strictly by the injunction that he gave me. But in any event, I showed him the letter. Whether he saw the material or not, or whether I just showed him the bulk of it, I don't remember too accurately. But I said, "I just don't know quite what to do now." And I also spoke with Allport about this. Well, I think Riegel was the one who said, "This is very important. Dell is not going to probably be a major figure in American literature, but still he's been a reasonably conspicuous one. He's had this impact on you. His books are being used in this Dartmouth course. The first thing you ought to do is to make sure that this letter gets into the Archives of the College because this is something that the College ought to have." Well, it was the first time I'd ever thought of it in those terms.

DANIELL: A true historian through and through, I guess.

DICKEY: [Laughter] Yes, this was Riegel's approach. So that letter is in the archives, I assume. I've never seen it since. There's almost a psychological barrier between this and my looking it up. And indeed even talking about it. Well, I of course consulted with Allport, and he said, "I think you should go ahead with this. This is really raw meat, and see if you can handle it." So I wrote back to Dell and said I was prepared to accept
this material under-- He had asked me-- he said, "You must tell me whether you're prepared to use this material on the terms that I give it to you, or you must not use it all and return it to me immediately." So I wrote back and said that I would use it on the terms in which he gave it to me, and I went forward with my case history for Allport. In due course, at the end of that term in June, when I was going home, after commencement, I went home by train through New York. And I got off of the train at Grand Central Station, looked up trains out to Croton, New York, where he lived.

DANIELL: Where the reservoirs are.

DICKEY: Yes. And went out there on a very hot day by myself. Asked at the Croton Station when I got off where he lived. Well, they didn't know. And finally inquired around and found somebody who said, "Well, he lives about five miles up the mountain." So I hiked up the road with this manuscript, expecting-- really fearing, I guess, to be accurate about it-- that I was going to have a confrontation with him. But I had promised to take this back, and I decided that I just was going to see it through. Well, I got up there, and fortunately-- or unfortunately, I've never been quite sure which; maybe both-- he wasn't there. There was a housekeeper or someone there, and I left the material with a covering note saying that I was fulfilling my undertaking to bring this material back. It had not been copied, and here it was.

Well, of course, several of my professors were very upset-- well, not upset; that's too strong-- very disappointed that this material was not to be copied, this longhand stuff with Dell's poems. It was also a commentary designed to straighten me out about some things I had speculated about in his personal life. But that was it. I never had any further communication with him. I left the material with the woman, and I went down and went home. But that experience was one of the things that I have never gotten away from. My writing was influenced by it. I no longer-- never again wrote with utter abandonment, very tightly thereafter. And I have had a preoccupation-- not always carried out-- but a preoccupation of concern that what I write or say about someone should be quite factual.

DANIELL: I think all of us at some point have an experience at sometime in the process of growing up where you find your actions intrude upon the life of another in a way which you simply were unaware of.

DICKEY: This was exactly what happened.

DANIELL: And that sounds like exactly what that was for you.
DICKEY: Well, it was. And it's something I've recognized over the years was still with me as an influence. Well, so much for that. But it was quite an experience for an undergraduate. Then perhaps it's worthwhile saying that during my upper-class years, my junior and senior years, one of the important intellectual influences on me was that of McQuilkin DeGrange who was a professor of sociology, a rather lonely man. But one of the first-rate scholars on the faculty at that time. He had been devoting himself for years to a history of sociology, the intellectual history of sociology. And had taught a course which had a very real influence on me, entitled, "The Search After Social Law," which was in its early portion a history of the development of scientific method, and in the latter part of the course a study of the possibilities for extrapolating the experience of the physical sciences into a science of society.

DANIELL: I was just going to comment that even when you took English courses, "The History of the Novel," and take sociology courses, again, the same manner of sensitivity toward process and development.

DICKEY: This is something I recognize now was inherent in my approach to my undergraduate studies. Indeed, I took history to some extent because it gave me a freedom to do just what you've said: reach out into other fields. Well, this course I had with DeGrange, "The Search After Social Law," was a very major experience for me, and continued to be an influence--and has continued to be an influence--in my life and in my approach to the social sciences. He subsequently wrote his history of sociology; it was finally published--something that I was very glad of. I saw something of him during the war when I was in Washington with the State Department, and he was down there in a really lowly position with the OWI [Office of War Information] as a social science analyst of some sort, and used to come out to our house Sunday evenings for suppers and that sort of thing. And then I guess maybe I'll just button this faculty relationship up. When I came back to Dartmouth on the administrative job in '45, he used to come over to the house about once a week, frequently for Sunday suppers, and I saw something of him. He was a scholarly type in the old-fashioned sense. His friendship was deep and real, but not effusive.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, one of the experiences I had which is--I'm now jumping way ahead, but I think I might forget it later. In realizing how a man could get shortchanged by the administrative officers in respect to his worth was with this man. And this was therefore important to me later. I knew this man from my undergraduate days, and I knew his scholarly work. I used to go down to his rooms, and he was surrounded by these paperback studies
in French mostly of Comte's work and others. I knew something of the quality of his scholarship, and of course I thought I knew his teaching from having been a student. But when I came back and I looked over the salary scales which, needless to say, were very low compared with what--I mean comparatively, of course, with what good faculty today command, even though they certainly would be entitled to command more. I found he was more or less at the bottom of the scale of full professor. Well, this disturbed me greatly, and I wondered how many other such cases there were, how really well these people were being evaluated.

I got hold of Dean Bill right away. He was still Dean of Faculty. We won't go into the Dean Bill story until later. But having opened up this reference to DeGrange, perhaps I should complete it. I said to Dean Bill, "I think I know something about this man and his work and his teaching. And for the life of me I don't feel that this is a fair evaluation of this man, particularly in comparison with some of the other men that I knew somewhat the same way." Well, I found that Dean Bill really didn't know a thing, really, about this man's work. He had an impression that he was a loner, and that he didn't participate in committees. He just was the sort of person you're familiar with in the faculty.

DANIELL: That's consistent with just one impression I got going through the Hopkins Tapes, of the sets of attitudes that in general would tend to be reflected in the administration then, in which scholarship or that kind of lonely scholarship as you described, would not automatically get the visibility.

DICKEY: Well, he hadn't, he hadn't. And he obviously hadn't been pushed forward by his colleagues. Well, let me close this one out by saying that I told him that I thought I would start by exercising a personal judgment in this matter, and I did. For which I've always been glad.

Well now, moving into my senior year from my junior year, by this time I had begun to take hold, I suppose one would say, academically. In my junior and senior years I ended up, I guess, with a straight A record with the exception of a B in a course that I had found it impossible to feel compatible with the professor about, and I just consciously shirked that course. He was absolutely right in giving me a B, not an A, and I never felt anything but respect for him for his judgment. But I mention this because by this time I had no worries about being on the horse. I knew I could handle undergraduate work in the fields that I was interested in, and that was that. Speaking of the fields I was interested in, though, in my senior year I had three--I guess three--jobs with the faculty. And one was, of all things, in zoology. Professor Byers Unger, who had charge of the introductory course in--
DANIELL: He's still alive, isn't he?

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: I think ___.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, Byers Unger at that time was a relatively young faculty member, but he had charge of the introductory course in zoology, and I had taken zoology. I'd never gone beyond Zoology and Botany I. We got to know each other during that experience. I don't remember now just how it was that I got to know him personally. But in any event—

[End of Tape #2B]
[Beginning of Tape #3A]

January 10, 1975

DANIELL: You were just describing your relationship with Professor [Byers] Unger in Zoology.

DICKEY: Yes. He asked me whether I would like to come in and work with him as I believe they called it a laboratory assistant or teaching assistant. Not a member of the faculty, of course, but I think it was laboratory assistant or teaching assistant. In any event, my work was entirely in the laboratories helping students with their laboratory exercises. And I was very happy to do it, both because of the recognition, but probably more especially because I was borrowing money to get through Dartmouth, and it had paid, oh, I forget what it was: 100 or 150 dollars, something like that.

DANIELL: You still hadn't ever applied for a scholarship?

DICKEY: No, I had not. I never did. This is part of the whole family history. And this also involved grading quiz papers in that big introductory course which I did for him. This was a thoroughly good experience for me. It gave me the faculty member, the teacher's, point of view. Unger was a very methodical, careful person. He was not primarily a research man. He was carrying on some work of his own with amoeba. But he was essentially what you would call an old-fashioned, very good college teacher. Actually, the experience I had working with Unger provided me with a bit of very useful background--I'll come to that later--when I came back to the job here, and Zoology and Botany were at each other's throats in a way that I understood a little bit better for having had this experience.
Well, at the same time in my senior year I was invited by the head of the History Department-- I don't remember whether he was chairman; I guess he was, but of course they were on a rotating chairmanship basis as Dartmouth has been for some time. But he was the principal in the Department of History, namely Professor Charles Lingley, whose field was American history, and his specialty was late 19th-century, early 20th-century American history. He had a textbook entitled, *Since the Civil War*, which was used at Dartmouth and, I guess, at quite a few other introductory American history courses in American colleges. Lingley was a very dynamic, sharply-focused person.

DANIELL: Yes. We've still got his picture up over there.

DICKEY: Is that so?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He had nothing about him of the old-fashioned caricature of a professor as a fuzzy-wuzzy person. Lingley could have walked into a business boardroom and, at least in respect to appearance, have fitted in very well. As a matter of fact, he was taken on by President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins to run the admissions one year later in the thirties when Dean [E. Gordon] Bill, who had been in charge of admissions, was on a sabbatical, I believe. I never knew the full story on this, and I don't know whether it's recorded anywhere. But that year was sort of a prelude to the crisis that President Hopkins had in his last year on the job over admissions, the question of quotas with respect to Jewish students. I heard about this subsequently, I think from Bob Strong, who was Director of Admissions when I came on the job, and we'll talk about that at some length later. But having mentioned Lingley, it is appropriate to say that during this year that he was on leave from the History Department to serve as Director of Admissions while Dean Bill was away--and I think it was in the middle thirties--he, for whatever reasons, whether in defiance of what he understood to be college policies or just because he never undertook to ask whether there were any limitations, operated without any regard to, as I understand it, to quotas or limitations or so forth. And there was quite a little quiet perturbation apparently in administrative circles. And when Dean Bill came back, he found that the Admissions during Lingley’s year had produced, shall we say, a somewhat different profile with respect to the class, than Dean Bill had been familiar with.

DANIELL: Bill didn't come back in time to change anything.
DICKEY: Oh, no. No, I think not. I've never had occasion to go into this. But I was told about it--I may have been told about it by President Hopkins. I'm not sure about that. It was either by President Hopkins, Bob Strong, or Al [Albert Inskip] Dickerson. One of the three who knew at firsthand about this matter. Well, to get back to my relationship with Lingley. Although I had never been in the section of American history that he taught personally, I became acquainted with him, I guess, through other faculty members. And he asked me whether I would like to come on and be a research assistant to him during my senior year, to help him gather material on Theodore Roosevelt for a biography of Roosevelt which Lingley had been commissioned to do for the American Statesmen Series. This was, again, an extremely valuable experience because Lingley had developed a technique for keeping his research papers and so forth which was very instructive for me. And he told me about how he went about--he was a very orderly, systematic scholar--how he went about his project and gathering the material. And then he told me what he wanted me to read and how he wanted my notes kept. He taught me care with respect to the quotations as I copied them down and references to it. So when he came to use them--and he had envelopes of just a very definite size which he had decided was the right way to keep these notes and so forth--he wanted them kept so that he could rely upon them and not have to go back and check the original sources.

Well, this fitted into one of the better intellectual experiences that I had during my senior year. I was working with Professor Wayne Stevens in an advanced course he was offering in historiography, American historiography, at that time. I decided that I could combine--and I've always been a great fellow for combining projects if at all possible--I decided I could combine the work I was going to be doing for him, which was practically on a tutorial basis. He would assign my readings, and we would agree upon what my term paper project would be. We agreed that I would work on Theodore Roosevelt as a historian. Very few people today would be aware that Roosevelt had some 30 titles that he had published on--

DANIELL: I just quite recently read his book on the War of 1812.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, that gets higher marks, as a matter of fact, than many of the others. Although The Winning of the West series was a more ambitious undertaking. I might just say a little bit about a couple of those things in a minute. But Lingley was very glad to assign me to read all or as many of Roosevelt's books as I could in the course of the year, along with other specific things that he wanted me to do on Roosevelt. Well, this was a wonderful experience. And to be paid for it was just beyond anything I
ever had hoped for. Actually, I still have an unfinished manuscript for a term paper which I was not able to complete during my senior year for Wayne Stevens. But he was very well satisfied with the manuscript as he read it, as far as I'd gone, that it was all that he wanted or expected from an undergraduate student as a term paper. Along with this research work--I guess you'd call it research work; at least this digging into things about TR that I did for Lingley and writing up the term paper for Wayne Stevens--I was taken on by the History Department to be a marker, a grader, of quizzes in American history. It was quite an exciting senior year. Here I was one day grading the zoology papers, the next day grading history papers. And I learned a lot. I hope I did the job as well as you could expect an undergraduate to do it. But certainly it was a--

DANIELL: I should imagine that direct exposure, as you said earlier, to the teaching process and what is involved from a faculty point of view, given the fact you were away from the academic world for such a long period, that it became in retrospect, when you came on the job as president, just a very vital--

DICKEY: Oh, it definitely was, both directly and indirectly. It meant that I had quite a few friends in the faculty that I wouldn't have had otherwise.

DANIELL: Were Lingley and Stevens both still on the faculty?

DICKEY: No, Lingley had died. Lingley died of a heart attack as a relatively young man while still active in the--never finished the TR book. That was subsequently taken over by a man whose name escapes me. He wrote to me at one point when he found--he was going through Lingley's papers--he found a lot of my notes. [Laughter] And he wanted me to know that he was finding them useful, which pleased me very much, of course. The TR project was, again, an important learning experience for me because here was a figure that I had thought of as remote and heroic, a little beyond my having any judgment about him. It never occurred to me I should be passing judgment on TR. But when I read The War of 1812, which he began and pretty well completed, although not totally, as an undergraduate at Harvard, I realized that this was a man who had some pretty high-powered intellectual voltage at his command. Then, of course, as I read on and on into TR, I came across some pretty sloppy work, even by my standards, in The History of the Winning of the West. It got very personal. But the peak of some of his egocentric approach to his historical writings was perhaps with his Life of Oliver Cromwell, which he dictated while he was in the governor's office of New York State. And he had two secretaries, according to the stories, which I believe were accurate. One of whom he would dictate the letters that he had to write in the morning as
governor, and the other secretary he would call in and dictate his biography of Oliver Cromwell. Well, as one reviewer very sharply put it, "This is an excellent account of Oliver Cromwell's qualifications to be governor of New York State." In addition to all the other things I got out of it, this experience did sharpen my critical views in a way that might not have happened without it.

Well, other major influences during my senior year was the fact I took Professor Russell Larmon's, Cotty Larmon's, course in administration the first year he offered it in my senior year. And this was one of the best experiences I had during my undergraduate years. And I found that I took to it really just avidly. I did far more than was--

DANIELL: That was in the Government Department I assume.

DICKEY: No, it was a department of its own. [Russell] Larmon had been an assistant to President Hopkins. And during the period that he was an assistant to President Hopkins in the administrative offices, he'd gotten to know a number of the trustees who felt that there was great need in the college for the teaching of administration, if you will, as a liberal arts subject, not just as a technical subject. And Mr. Hopkins encouraged Larmon to develop such a course. And it was a very remarkable course. Indeed I was awfully sorry that we never found a successor who felt qualified or interested in carrying it on in the way that Larmon had taught it. It was a very different course from the management course in Tuck School. It had a lot of biographical material in it. Machiavelli, Taylor's *The Statesman*, really perceptive, philosophic views of the management of men. Along with a bit of organizational material to give you some feel of the context, the organizational context, within which management takes place.

Actually this leads me also to jump ahead to mention something which I might not remember to do later. Shortly after I was out of law school--Well, shortly after I had returned to the Boston law firm that I had been with from my first tour in the State Department, along about 1936, I think it was in the fall of '36, I got a letter from Professor Larmon. I remember the office I was in when I read it in the law firm. Saying that President Hopkins had been urging him to find someone to work with him in this course. I subsequently heard directly from President Hopkins about this. But the net of Larmon's letter was, would I be interested in considering the possibility of coming to the Dartmouth faculty as his assistant in Administration? Well, I was immensely pleased because I had great respect for Larmon, and had found the course, as I've said, an extremely worthwhile experience. But here I was just beginning to get on the horse in the law,
and I just wasn't prepared to dump the law at that point for what seemed to me to be a relatively uncertain future in a course which was so personally oriented.

DANIELL: I think it was in my fifth or sixth--fifth year--in graduate school I got a call from, if I remember the name correctly, a Dean [Gene] Hotchkiss who asked me whether I would be interested in coming back to the college--

DICKEY: As an assistant dean.

DANIELL: --as an assistant dean. Exactly the same.

DICKEY: Yes, yes. Well, curiously I remember that quite well. That was Dean Hotchkiss who's now president of Lake Forest College out in Chicago. Well, Larmon's course was one of the major influences on my life. I've continued to be interested in many of the things that I was first introduced to in the course. The course also resulted in my meeting President Hopkins, I think, for the first time. President Hopkins came into--was it an honors section? At least it was a small select seminar, perhaps, that Larmon had invited a few of us to, to meet with Mr. Hopkins to talk about administrative matters and some of the problems of administering a college. And I met him there. Subsequently [I] met him also in my senior year when I applied for a Rhodes Scholarship at the encouragement of several of my professors. I apparently did well enough to be in the final running, but didn't get it.

But that led to an interview in his office with the committee. I did not get to know him intimately. But I did reach the point where he knew me, and I felt I knew him, and I came to have just the utmost respect for his judgment and indeed his wisdom. Later perhaps in this oral history project I'll reach the point where I will feel a little more comfortable about talking in some depth about the great regard I had for him and perhaps things that we saw differently. But at least it was a small select seminar, perhaps, that Larmon had invited a few of us to, to meet with Mr. Hopkins to talk about administrative matters and some of the problems of administering a college. And I met him there. Subsequently [I] met him also in my senior year when I applied for a Rhodes Scholarship at the encouragement of several of my professors. I apparently did well enough to be in the final running, but didn't get it.

DANIELL: ...rather a lot of that comes through in the tapes, you know. Hopkins has been a distant figure for me, just sort of a remote kind of figure. And just spending 20 hours or so reading those tapes, I had again the same kind of sense toward him as you've spoken of.
DICKEY: Well, there's no question about it. This was one of the great--and great in the sense of relatively unique strengths that he possessed. And it came out of a very varied experience in his life: management as President Tucker's assistant and his family background, many, many things. But the nub of it was a man of mature judgment, penetration and confidence, qualities which put together came as close to wisdom as I have ever seen in an administrator. Well, you had asked about the extent to which I had seen him, and I did see him at that point. I went to see him actually toward the end of my senior year about what I did next. A number of my professors urged me to go to graduate school. A number of people in the History Department thought that this was what I ought to do, and assured me that there would--at least as far as they could--that I could get a college fellowship to go on in graduate study. And there were a number of other things like that that were suggested. But I had a--oh, I don't know--a restlessness about what I did next. As I said, I applied for the Rhodes not because I had any really great convictions about Oxford, but it just seemed to be a new kind of experience that I might have a go at. I remember Dr. DeGrange, when I didn't get it, saying, "Well, I know, I share your disappointment." But more importantly he said, "I share a sense of relief because this could have been possibly a sidetracking for you." And so forth.

Well, I went to see Mr. Hopkins about an idea that came to me of going to Japan to work in the English language newspaper there, the Japanese Times. During my undergraduate years--I don't know when it first began, whether it was my sophomore year; it was before my senior year--I'd gotten to know the Japanese journalist and sort of a semi-statesman, Tsurumi, T-S-U-R-U-M-I, who had been coming to Dartmouth about every other year as a lecturer. And I'd gone to his lectures and been invited to private discussions with him. So I'd gotten to know him slightly. Had a considerable admiration for him. And I wrote him at the time about the possibility of coming to Japan to get a job working on the English-language newspaper, the Japanese Times. I think the only importance of this is that it shows a young man reaching out for what he didn't have, but really beyond any sense of what he really ought to be doing. It was something that I've seen in undergraduates and you have seen many, many times. Nothing came of that. And in the course of the summer I decided that the best thing to do was to go to Harvard Law School.

DANIELL: That was one of the big questions I had when I was thinking about what I'd think would be useful, is why the decision to go to law school?

DICKEY: Well, I can say a word or two about that. Before I do, I should say that the senior year also introduced me to an aspect of Dartmouth that I hadn't
known previously, and that was campus politics, if you will. As president of the fraternity in my junior year, [I had been] been a member of the Inter-Fraternity Council. But that was an innocuous body that never did anything, it seemed to me, except set the dates for Carnival and things like that. But in my senior year several of the people at the fraternity house and in a nearby fraternity decided that they would run me for the Class Executive Committee, which was an elected body, in the spring of the year. Largely, as I recall that it was an effort on their part to break a monopoly of campus jobs or campus offices being held by the Dekes and the Psi U's and the Alpha Delts and some others. And several people in the house I was in decided that I would be a suitable candidate for them to back. And they went around and apparently electioneered. I was not, needless to say, really a campus politician or a well-known figure on campus at all. But they pulled it off, and I was elected to the Class Executive Committee which was to have charge of class affairs during the first five years of our alumni life, and also planning of commencement. This led to my being chosen to be chairman of Class Day, which at that time was a little bit more of an affair than it subsequently became. And being chairman of Class Day, I turned back, as I now realize, to my historical approach to things, and looked up the history of Class Day a little bit, and wrote it up for the Class Day Book. A little piece that was used by subsequent Class Day chairmen for a number of years on the historical background of Class Day.

Well, that really started me off, as I now realize, on a new--well, it introduced me into a new dimension of Dartmouth life, campus politics, in a sense, and, subsequently, alumni life. Because I met through that experience quite a few of the fellows who had been prominent athletes or prominent this or that on the campus as I had not been. And then I found that the things that I had been doing, if you will, on the academic side and with the faculty, had a greater prestige or a greater recognition than I had ever known or imagined, so that I found myself moving easily in circles that up to that time I had never thought of moving in. And this went right on into the alumni days.

You asked about the decision to go to law school. So far as I can know my mind at that time, I had had no feeling that I was destined to be a lawyer. I'd heard about lawyers in our small town, and our family knew one or two. But I think basically I came to it as a matter of elimination of other things, really, not because I thought law was necessarily what I was destined for. In the first place, I quickly, of course, eliminated--long before my senior year--the possibility of going into medicine or the sciences because I had not carried forward the sciences, and I knew I wasn't cut out or qualified to be a scientist or a practitioner of medicine. Quite unlike my brother who
followed me at Dartmouth, who knew he wanted to be a doctor from age ten on. Then the next elimination was business, and here—

[Change to Side B of Tape #3]

...retail and wholesale hardware store in a small town. He was quite well known as one of the hardest-working businessmen in town. It was said that he never slept in a bed. That he would work in the hardware store until twelve or one o'clock at night by himself, and then he would stand up in a corner and lean against the wall until he dropped forward. At which point he would be awakened by dropping forward, and he would start in working the next day. This was the sort of reputation he had. There was another story about him which I've always enjoyed. When some years later he sold the hardware store to a young man who thought it was a good business opportunity, the man sold it back to my uncle within two months. Somebody asked him why, and he said, "Well, because when I got into the store, I found everything was done up in 200-pound packages." Well, I had worked in the hardware store a bit Saturday nights, and my father had helped out in the store Saturday nights. That sort of thing. This was a store that got a fair amount of business from farmers, and they would come into town on Saturdays. When I went away to school, I guess my uncle thought it quite likely that I would like to come back and go into his business. Well, it was just perfectly clear to me that by my senior year that I had no appetite whatsoever for business. And my mother had the good sense to realize that and to tell my father that she just was sure that he had to make clear to my uncle that I was not coming back into the hardware store.

Well, that put business aside. And then I was quite skeptical that I was ready to take up one of these graduate fellowships and to become a professional scholar at that point. My interests [were] in management and in public affairs and things of that sort. I'd become interested in criminology through a course with Ralph Holben in the Sociology Department in my junior year. I'd done case histories in a women's prison in Pennsylvania. This, as a matter of fact, is one of those interesting, specific influences that, in a way, you could say led to everything else. That will come a little later. But that was beginning to develop in my mind. Indeed, I had stated to the Rhodes Scholarship Selection Committee that one of the interests I had in England, insofar as I could identify them, was an opportunity to become acquainted with the British criminal justice system, a somewhat pretentious suggestion on my part at that point, but subsequently had greater validity.

Well, all of these things suggested that if I didn't really know what I wanted to do, law school would still provide an advanced intellectual experience
and a professional cutting edge that would give me the kind of maneuverability that I instinctively wanted. So I applied--I only applied to, in those days, to one school. I had a very strong academic record, I guess magna cum. I think, as a matter of fact, that B that I referred to earlier was the dividing mark between my being summa and magna. But in any event, I had a good academic record and good support in my references here at the college, and apparently had no difficulties about being admitted to Harvard Law. And went to Harvard Law that fall when nothing came of the idea of going to Japan and working on a Japanese newspaper.

DANIELL: The way you framed your answer to the question interests me. Because you're talking about the options upon graduation very much as students still do today. Namely, a kind of implied assumption that with the liberal arts background that Dartmouth College gives you, that, you know, you're going to do what's generally called the professions. You sort of rejected the hardware store. But as you talked about it, you talked about medicine, you talked about academic profession, and you talked about law. Was that true of the student body as a whole? Had the academic process, that we know so well today of liberal arts in the professions, become defined so that you would say a good portion of the student body thought of things in that way?

DICKEY: I'm not sure that I know the answer to that question, Jere, in any very exact way. Among my classmates, the fellows who were going into medicine, I think, had taken their decision fairly early. They'd had to in order to get the prerequisites for medicine. So they were a group to some extent set apart, both by their decision and also by the necessity to work harder than most of my classmates worked on their studies. We had a very large group that went to Harvard Law, one of the largest groups that I guess ever went there. Certainly larger than any number that we've had there in recent years, at least while I was on the job. As I recall, Harvard Law admitted--I don't think I'm mistaken in saying--60 men or something, perhaps.

DANIELL: Sixteen or 60?

DICKEY: Sixty.

DANIELL: Wow!

DICKEY: At least it was way up above 30 men from Dartmouth into my class. A considerable number of them busted out at the end, or dropped out, at the end of the first year. Those were the years when Harvard Law, and I guess most of the other law schools, ran a really-- Well, I think you can
only describe it as an utterly irresponsible admissions operation, in which they just took you in if you came from a good place and had a respectable record. And then they performed their admissions operation during the first year when they busted you out. Harvard in those days had a reputation that it enjoyed too much for being a tough place to stay in. I was there during the period when one of our professors, who was a little bit of a show-off sadist, in the first class said, "Look to that fellow on your right. Now look at that fellow on your left. Now next year one of those fellows won't be here." Well, in the meantime two fellows had looked at you. And it impressed you with the fact that they were really going to--

DANIELL: They're telling this at the law school, right?

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: I've heard that same story told of Dean Bill toward the freshman class at Dartmouth.

DICKEY: Well, if that's so, it never happened to me at Dartmouth.

DANIELL: Yes, it's apocryphal. It's a story which is frequently told of a lot of admissions processes.

DICKEY: I suppose so. But I had it happen. I saw it happen. It did happen at Harvard Law, and it may have happened at other places. But it is a fact. And Harvard ran what I would regard--I think anybody today, including Harvard Law people would regard--as quite an inexpensive but really basically irresponsible admissions process.

DANIELL: They didn't have LSAT's.

DICKEY: No, no.

DANIELL: For law schools then.

DICKEY: No, it was based solely upon your college record. And I guess your references and the school that you came from. But my second year, I think, well, certainly at least a third of my Dartmouth classmates who'd come in in the first year didn't return.

DANIELL: One more question concerning, again, the--I'm trying to get some insight into kind of the college collective state of mind of people who were terminating four years as an undergraduate and where they thought they were going. When you talked of business, you talked of, in your case, the
hardware store back at Lock Haven. Now today when people think of their options of what they do after they get through, when they think of business, they think immediately of Harvard Business School, Wharton School. In other words, they think of business in a very different way, as kind of a managerial, as kind of an access to another form of profession.

**DICKEY:** I think there was relatively less of that. See, I graduated from Dartmouth while the boom was still on. The crash, of course, came in the fall after I graduated from Dartmouth. But I think most of my friends in the graduating class who thought of going into business, if they weren't going back to family enterprises--and many of them were around the country--they were planning to go into the brokerage firms where the big money was supposed to be in New York and in the cities. Advertising industry was beginning to pick up quite a few college graduates at that point. The banks, in particular, were also taking on quite a few college graduates. And very interestingly at that time, the banks--I happen now to know because I became interested in this when I came onto the administrative job later--the banks during the twenties, and indeed right up into the late forties and early fifties, felt that they could do their best recruiting at the AB level. They were not interested in taking on business school graduates, as today they are. I could tell about some conversations I had with bankers while I was on the job about that.

Quite a few of my classmates went into banks right directly from the college and then worked their way up through, into brokerage offices, into the big advertising offices. This was the pattern unless you were going back to a family business. Now, there were some who went on to graduate school. Of course Tuck School then was taking only Dartmouth graduates. They weren't going outside. I forget how many, but let's say, oh, I don't know, maybe 50 Dartmouth fellows were in Tuck School. I guess that's probably the best I can do on that question at this moment.

**DANIELL:** Yes. Well, that actually corroborates what I would have thought was true. Well, I know you've got that list there, and I see you crumpling it so that means we're through with that.

**DICKEY:** I'm through with it. [Laughter]

**DANIELL:** As I said when we started here, I think that we've got probably not more than ten more minutes on this side. And I think certainly for me this would be enough. But a couple of general questions I had about undergraduate experience since they're kind of old warhorses. The first is concrete and the second, really, is abstract. The concrete one has to do with, what do
you remember of the impact of Prohibition on your undergraduate experience?

DICKEY: [Laughter] Well, I have some very specific memories of that. They're not many, but they're very specific. I came from a home, I should say, where there was no use of alcohol. I can remember that when Prohibition came on, my father came home with a bottle of whiskey for medicinal purposes, that my mother abhorred having in the house, or feared having in the house, the way she might have feared having a rattlesnake brought home to live in the medicine closet. That bottle remained on the top shelf of our medicine closet all through my childhood. I don't know whatever happened to it. But there was no drinking in my home, no cocktails. It was a very sober, in this respect, household.

Well, so I came to Dartmouth without ever having used liquor at all. And in this off-campus room that I told you about, up 20 Davidson Annex over Scotty's Restaurant, I came back in the fall of my freshman year during a football weekend. I suppose it was the Cornell weekend. Happened to look under the cot that I slept on--you really couldn't call it a bed--and here was a great big box that I was sure hadn't been there in the morning, a big wooden box. I pulled it out, and it was a case, still nailed together and everything, of whiskey. And I wondered what in the world this was and where this had come from. So when my roommate, Jim Cosgrove, who worked in the barbershop as I said earlier, came in in a short time, I said, "Where did that case of whiskey that's under my bed come from?" And he smiled and said, "Well, Al Durochier--" who was one of the hired barbers, a real floater, really, but one of the hired barbers down in [William "Bill"] Brock's store had asked Jim Cosgrove whether he could store a box in our room during this weekend. Obviously going to operate a retail bootlegger's operation. Jim, who was a rather soft-headed fellow in any matters of this sort, said, yes, and had never said anything to me about it. Well, I said, "As far as I'm concerned, we're going to get that box out of here because I'm just not going to assume the responsibility for that kind of a situation." And Jim, somewhat shamefacedly, went down and told Al Durochier that he had to get the box out of our bedroom. As I look back on it, I think this was an indication that I took college regulations and Prohibition quite seriously, but this was my first exposure to it at Dartmouth.

I have no other recollections of being exposed to it until I became president of the house. Then I received communications at Carnival time from President Hopkins, in which he said he wanted the presidents of the houses to know that they were going to be held strictly accountable for any violation of the Prohibition laws, that the Prohibition agents were going to be on the campus. And if you got arrested and the house got arrested, it
was likely to be closed, and so on. Well, I took this very seriously, and talked it over with the group at the house in a meeting before Carnival. I think I can say for myself I did not project a prudish view of it. But I simply said that I took seriously this—[Sound of telephone ringing] [Pause] I'm referring to the experience I had with Prohibition as the president of the fraternity house.

DANIELL: I was going to say you may have taken that more seriously than, if I can believe the tapes, than Mr. Hopkins did himself. Because at least what he describes on those tapes was that as president, his primary concern, or at least as he reminisced about it, was to, since he assumed that students were going to drink, that they have non-poisonous liquor. And he seemed to accept, at least in those tapes, a kind of acceptance of a degree of violation.

DICKEY: I suppose that's a fair statement of the situation. Mr. Hopkins had a very, shall we say, high level of sophistication with respect to student behavior. He did not have unrealistic expectations of student ways. And I might say parenthetically that after you've been on the job as he had been at that point for 15 years or so, you certainly have a greater and real sense of the realities of undergraduate life than you had earlier. But nevertheless, I think it would be a mistake to imagine that Mr. Hopkins, insofar as he had the power and responsibility, ran an open-house college.

DANIELL: No, no.

DICKEY: Now, this does involve some pretty profound things in respect to my relationship to the college, and also probably some different judgments about what were weaknesses and strengths in Dartmouth, as between myself and Mr. Hopkins.

DANIELL: I think so, yes.

DICKEY: And I don't know that this is the point at which to go into those. But let me say first that Mr. Hopkins greatly enjoyed telling stories and recounting these things and seeing the humorous aspects of them. As Al [Albert Inskip] Dickerson—who was really insofar as any person could be, was a disciple of Mr. Hopkins, and had just the most affectionate regard for him—he used to tell me when occasionally I would recite some things that Mr. Hopkins had said to me, "Well, John, with affection for Mr. Hopkins, I owe it to you to warn you that sometimes his stories embellished or weren't exactly the way some of us remembered the occasion." As a matter of fact, just a year ago, I had a lovely experience—"I think it's fair to say it was—with Ann [Hopkins], his daughter, in which we
were talking about some things of this sort. And she said to me, "Well, Daddy could never resist making a story just as good as it ought to be." [Laughter]

DANIELL: That's right.

DICKEY: And I think in this area you probably have to realize that he looked back upon these things in a somewhat more relaxed way than he approached them while he was on the job.

DANIELL: Of course there was the murder case __.

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: Was that before you came or while you were here?

DICKEY: No, that was before.

DANIELL: Before you came. So I imagine if he had been loose at all before--

DICKEY: That's right. But let me just say in this respect, while I was here as an undergraduate, I knew of individuals who were thrown out of the college, just thrown out pronto, for getting into a mess with girls in their rooms...several fellows over in South Mass. one Carnival. So that we took fairly seriously the college attitude on these matters.

DANIELL: That's a very important observation to record because so many of course alumni, not only in President Hopkins himself when he was doing these tapes in his late seventies and early eighties, but alumni perceptions of what undergraduate life was like back in the twenties and thirties often take exactly the same kind of attitude of the things you're saying.

DICKEY: Well, that's right. And also I would have to say that I think alumni recollections frequently gild the experience to a degree. Although I've heard more of that than I would care to have to recount. I do want to say one thing about that, and it moves into the area of delicacy so far as what I would want to publicize.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Dartmouth bought--and you might even say Dartmouth cultivated--a reputation for being unconcerned about liquor and its abuse, and being boastful about Dartmouth being a hard-drinking college. That was one of the very, very serious handicaps that I found I had to deal with on the job.
And I think I can say this without any suggestion that I had different personal standards than other people and so forth. This became a part of the side of Dartmouth's virtues--it was the other side of the shield of manliness and virility and being able to do anything that needed to be done, including downing more than your own share of liquor. I think this isn't the time, probably, to go into this in any details. But I think I would have to say that out of this period Dartmouth acquired to some extent a false reputation. But nevertheless a reputation which hurt us in the schools, hurt us in the schools where we weren't doing as well as we should have been doing, hurt us in respect to faculty recruitment, hurt us with respect to recruitment of students and admission.

The great issue, as it shaped up in my mind as I began to really have to deal with it responsibly, was how to preserve those things which in my view were uniquely valuable in the Dartmouth experience, that were different from the metropolitan schools, that did recognize that some experience with things that could be abused was an important and necessary part of undergraduate learning, without having them become things that were definite handicaps in the college's relationship with schools, with academicians, with parents. And even more basically--even more basically--that the Dartmouth experience should not be a bad one for as many men as it had been socially. I knew just too many men--I won't want to say that there were more here than at Harvard or anything--but I knew too many men who never overcame their social bravado and went down the chute later into discredited lives so far as their social reliability, their business reliability was concerned, in their handling of liquor and so forth.

DANIELL: Well, you've already answered-- I said I had one specific question and one abstract question. And your comments in the last few minutes really answered the abstract question, which was exactly focusing on that: To what extent do you think that the isolation--the geographical isolation--of the college and other factors having to do with the college as a whole, what kind of problems you saw?

DICKEY: Well, I of course had no insights into this as an undergraduate. I did have some uneasiness when I began to occupy a position of responsibility as president of the house. Because we had several fellows in the house who, to put it right on the line, had no business being in an institution of higher education. They really were just here to carouse, to raise hell. They regarded college as a sanctuary for juvenile delinquency. They had money with which to do whatever they wanted to do. I shall forego putting their names on the record. But I came to realize, even while I was an undergraduate, that there were some things about the Dartmouth
experience which I honored and—it's not too strong to say—I loved, that weren't necessary or desirable. Well, I had no run-ins with the law during Prohibition as president of the house. We did have fellows bringing liquor in, of course, contrary to college regulations. And I never tried to turn myself into a sleuth or anything of that sort. But at the same time I made no bones about the fact, at fraternity meetings and elsewhere, that if I was expected to be president of the house, I had to do what I could to see that the house abided by the basic regulations that the college put down. And really, as I look back on it, there were very few men in that house—this was the Theta Chi House at that time—who were the what I would call the louts of the campus. I would guess that out of a house of 60 men, I'm talking about at the most three to five. These were fellows that I think would have been poor performers anywhere.

DANIELL: Probably a good time to break now. I think the tape's going to run out in just about another minute or so.

DICKEY: Well, we'll have more to say about some of these things, I assume.

[End of Tape #3B]
[Beginning of Tape #4A]

January 14, 1975

DANIELL: You'd just gotten through with your undergraduate career, and we talked a little bit afterwards about how it proceeds from this point. And we agreed that it's probably wise simply to go chronologically through the various things that you did after you left Dartmouth as an undergraduate. And feeding in where you felt appropriate the impact that these developments may have had on your eventual association with the college. I guess you went straight down to law school immediately after you finished with Dartmouth.

DICKEY: The Harvard Law School experience was, again, one of the major experiences of my life. And in many ways it ranks with the Dartmouth years as a decisive factor in what came next. And indeed, I suppose, ultimately in my coming back to Dartmouth on the job. I found the first year of law school—as many others have and are still finding it—a rather cold shower compared with the warmth and rather profound satisfaction I had enjoyed during my last two years at Dartmouth. I won't go into that.

DANIELL: That was kind of meant to be, wasn't it?
DICKEY: That was meant to be. And it was probably a part of the education of a lawyer, at least according to the Harvard prescription. But in my case, when the Christmas holidays came along, and a friend came to me to say that he'd heard of a company in New York that was looking for someone such as myself, with a salary that looked quite attractive to me at the moment since I was borrowing money on my father's notes, I was greatly tempted to take advantage of such an opportunity. In the course of thinking about it, I decided to talk with one of my first-year law professors, my professor of criminal law, Francis Bowes Sayre, who was best known at that point, I guess, as Woodrow Wilson's son-in-law, he having married Jessie Wilson. Previously he'd been one of the advisors to the King of Siam. But I knew him as my professor of criminal law. I admired very much the way he went about teaching criminal law. And since I had already established at least a passing interest in criminology from my work with Ralph Holben at Dartmouth, I had a little more interest, I think--I guess a good bit more interest in--criminal law and its relationship to criminology and penology than certainly the average Harvard Law School student who, frankly, had a very low tolerance for criminal law. I think that's changed considerably. But that's the way it was when I went to the law school in 1929.

So I went to see Sayre just out of the blue. Introduced myself. Said that I was in his course in criminal law, that I'd had this beginner's interest in criminology and penology at Dartmouth, and I hoped to continue with some further work at some point in that field. But my immediate reason for coming to see him was to get his counsel about dropping out of law school at that point to take this job opportunity. He gave me some good advice which I've since used in counseling quite a few Dartmouth students; namely, why don't you see it through for the rest of the year? You've invested almost half a year in it, effort, money, and so forth. Maybe the law isn't for you, it isn't for everybody.

DANIELL: Did he know you at all when he gave you that advice?

DICKEY: Not at all. Not at all. This was just an out-of-the-blue conference that I sought, and he gave me. Well, this was just enough to resolve my doubts about whether I should leave law school, and I stayed. Along in the spring of that year--oh, I guess it was probably in April or early May--he sent for me. And said that he remembered my coming to see him whenever it was, in December or January, and he recalled that I had expressed an interest in having an opportunity to do some work in the field of criminology and penology. He went on to say that his close friend, Dr. A. Warren Stearns, a well-known psychiatrist in Massachusetts, and at that time also Dean of the Tufts Medical School, had come to him, Sayre, to inquire whether by
any chance there were, as he put it, a couple of bright young men at the law school, who might be sufficiently interested in doing casework and being introduced into the fields of criminology and penology in Massachusetts, to be willing to come in during the summer on their own (that is to say with no pay) into the Massachusetts Department of Correction of which Stearns, Dr. Stearns, was then the commissioner. He had no money to put into these things at that point, but he was a man who had spent quite a few years-- [Sound of telephone ringing] [Pause]

DANIELL: We were discussing your being invited by A. Warren Stearns, who was the dean of the Medical School at Tufts, in the--

DICKEY: And also Commissioner of Correction in Massachusetts at the same time.

DANIELL: To work gratis during the summer.

DICKEY: To come in during the summer as, he said, an intern in the Department of Correction, being introduced to the Massachusetts prison system and to modern casework in penology, which he had had some firsthand experience with over the years, earlier, when he was the psychiatrist of the Charlestown State Prison, the maximum security institution, in Massachusetts. Well, Sayre called me in to say that Stearns had asked whether Sayre had anyone to recommend that might be interested in doing this. He said, "I'll recommend you if you'd like to do it." After thinking it over for a few days and talking with my family, I decided that I would go ahead. And this was a fairly large reach for me, to borrow money for the summer rather than to earn some more. But it was a bet that I made on myself, and one that really turned out to have been a very, very good investment so far as my development was concerned.

I spent that summer working in the Department of Correction, being introduced to their inmate files for various institutions in the system. Then working over at Massachusetts State Prison, I suppose basically learning the ropes, getting to know the warden and the deputy warden, and developing a basic confidence on their part that I was not a menace. Which is the immediate reaction of a professional prison man to somebody brought in from the outside, particularly in the area of casework. When I came back--

DANIELL: You did no casework per se that summer? Or was there direct involvement?

DICKEY: I don't think I did anything other than simply familiarize myself. And I did a few sample case histories just to begin to find out what it was all about.
Actually I was working that summer with a young Harvard graduate--not a law school man--a fellow named Richard Winslow, who subsequently had a career in penology and then in foreign affairs with the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York. He and I were sort of the two interns that Stearns took on that summer. We also worked with a Rockefeller Foundation fellow from New Zealand, who was spending the summer with the Massachusetts Department of Correction, in turn doing a more professional study on the attitudes of inmates in a maximum security institution. His name was Dr. Henry Field, a man who has remained a friend, and with whom I am in touch off and on. He was a professor of psychology, recently retired, from Canterbury University in Christchurch, New Zealand. I had a very valuable experience, I should say working closely with him, since he was a professional in all respects. A man of very high standards with respect to scholarship and research and professional--well, professional standards in the area of social work such as penology and related fields.

Well, at the end of the summer Dr. Stearns came to me and said that the Social Hygiene Bureau, which was a subsidiary affiliate of the Rockefeller Foundation, as I recall, had offered to provide him with a little money during the next year or two if he could find someone who was willing to continue as an intern with him. And he wondered whether I might possibly be interested and available to take this on. I was at a point where my finances made anything of that sort very attractive, and I began to think it over. Said I would think it over and consult with my friends at the law school because obviously the theology of Harvard Law School was that Harvard Law School was full time, and they didn't like to think of anyone being there on any part-time basis.

DANIELL: Was this going to be a full job?

DICKEY: Well, this was going to be a job for which I was paid, and as it turned out, it was practically half time. I went to see Dean [Roscoe] Pound at the law school to ask him his view of it. He was very brusque in his advice. He knew very little about penology; he had been an authority in the field of criminal law. But he simply said, "Well, my view is that anybody who can do two things ought to do them." [Laughter] Which has ever since struck me like the advice of the father to his daughter who was leaving the Kentucky mountains. He said, "Daughter, when in doubt, do right." The question was, of course, whether I could do two things.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: But he gave me no advice on that. He simply said that he'd always thought that anybody who could do two things should do them.

DANIELL: I expected a different punch line there, because that seems to me a very sensible response. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Well, I pondered it and decided that I would have a go at it, and told Stearns so. And came back in September--I was off for a few weeks--and took this on. It very quickly became, in effect, a half-time job, except for the evenings. I would finish my Harvard Law School classes not later than twelve o'clock, put my law books in the locker at Langdale Hall, rush down to the subway station there at Harvard Square, grab the subway to the underground at Filene's, change subway trains, and go out into the slums of Charlestown to Thompson Square--areas that I think today I would be frightened to go into at nights as I often did. Get off the subway and walk about three or four blocks to the prison, Charlestown State Prison, which at that time I think was the oldest maximum security institution in the country, having been built in the early part of the 19th century. It was a real Bastille. Well, I would work there on case history work, actually classification work. Very quickly they put me--or the commissioner, Dr. Stearns, with the consent of the warden and the deputy, because these are the two men that are really responsible for a prison of that sort--put me to studying and then making recommendations with respect to the transfer of all inmates who were eligible for transfer, for one reason or another, from the maximum state prison at Charlestown to institutions that were designed for specialized purposes, mainly to the new Norfolk State Prison Colony where they were building a new state prison. Today where Walpole is. But in addition to that, the open camp at Rutland, the Bridgewater State Farm, etc., etc.

As I look back on it, this experience over the next two years, during my last two years of law school, was probably the single most rigorous experience I had as a young person in what you might call learning the maturity of responsibility. Because I was really the person who had to pull together the material that justified a recommendation for transfer. I had to realize that a mistake, a serious mistake, that led to an escape from one of these minimum security or no security institutions, particularly of someone who would go out and get into another crime that would be front-page news in Boston--and almost any crime under those circumstances would be front-page news in Boston--could be an extremely serious thing for the Commissioner of Correction. So I learned about being careful and the problems of making judgments about people in a way that I think ordinarily a person wouldn't for another, well, I would guess, another ten, twenty years or more in an ordinary profession.
DANIELL: Did you have direct contact with the inmates themselves? Was that part of the--?

DICKEY: Oh, I not only had direct contact with them, my work was done down inside the yard where the deputy warden kept his desk, right down with the inmates. And every day when I would finish my work, interviewing them. I would have about maybe ten to twenty men--usually not twenty, but between ten and twenty--who wanted to be interviewed, or whom I had chosen to be interviewed in order to include the interview in the case history with the write-up that I prepared with respect to the man's eligibility for transfer.

DANIELL: They understood you were in this position?

DICKEY: Oh, they knew very much that I was, so that I was a sought-after person as far as the inmates were concerned, who had any prospect at all or wanted transfer to another institution. Some didn't want transfer for various personal reasons. Well, we could spend several days on this experience. The effort which I made to develop a little study of the factors involved in making a judgment about an escape risk: How long until the man was eligible for parole? What were his family ties? What was the nature of his offense, and how likely was it that he would repeat it if he did escape? All of these I gathered--and other factors--together, and attempted to write up a little study on the problem of dealing with escape risk in a classification operation in a prison system. This was a tremendous experience for me. I would go back to Cambridge for supper usually.

To get out of the yard where my work was carried on, I had to go through the whole inmate body which was exercising in the prison yard. Sometimes this was a little tense because there would be individuals who felt I had not done right by them so far as their desire to be transferred. Sometimes they would push up to me and say, "What's wrong? What do you want? How much do you want?" And this kind of talk, you know. And then I would have to go out through the first cell block and up a very narrow stairs to the guard room where the guard on duty would let me through a clanging iron door and back into, so to speak--

DANIELL: Back into a different world.

DICKEY: Back into civilization. It's a totally different world. It's a world that you have to get used to, I suppose, much as a surgeon has to get used to the atmosphere of an operating room. And when you first go into it as a lay
person, you're under a considerable tension from the atmosphere that is involved. Well--

DANIELL: It is for two years you did this?

DICKEY: I did this for two years, my second and third years at law school.

DANIELL: And you said-- just one--I'm fascinated with the details of this. You mentioned, you know, you said ten or twenty. How many interviews generally did you have? Is that an afternoon's worth of interviews?

DICKEY: It would depend upon where I was with my work. In other words, I would-- I had-- Let me back off of that. Charlestown State Prison at that time had a population that ran plus or minus 900 inmates. It was overcrowded. Charlestown would have been a much better prison, although it could never have been a modern prison because of its physical character; it was just a huge block of granite with cells hollowed out in between. They still had the bucket system. No plumbing, no modern plumbing. Each man had to carry out his slop bucket every morning and on and on. It would have been a better institution with 650 inmates or something. But that wasn't possible.

Well, my first job would be to go over on my own the file of every man who was committed. Or working through the backlog of 900 cases which took quite a while. Analyzing it, finding out what we'd like to know, that we had a chance of knowing more--that is, possibly going back to the district attorney's office about the offense. If it was one of the sex crimes of violence, a rape or something of that sort, and finding out how much community feeling was involved. And all of those things. So that I would first have to acquaint myself with the file. And some of them were awfully thin. They really sometimes would have almost nothing in them except a very brief report from the court or from the district attorney's office about the man, the offender. Others would have the man's record as we would get it from the Department of Justice in Washington when we sent the fingerprints in and get back his prison record. But whatever we had, it was my job to go through it, and then to put the case either as one that was eligible for consideration or one that was clearly not eligible for consideration. For example, the kind of case that we would just put aside and say, We can't consider it for transfer at this point would be a young holdup fellow, 18 to 25; these were the really tough babies who had killed somebody in a filling-station holdup, and had gotten 30 to 50 years. That sort of case.
But after I had been through the file and given it a preliminary classification as being eligible for consideration or whatnot, then I would go over each one of these with the deputy warden who knew every prisoner better than anybody else knew that man. He knew what kind of work he could do, what kind of a person he was. Deputy Warden Godendorf was one of the most extraordinary men I have ever known anywhere. He was as much a prisoner as the prisoners themselves. He lived in the prison. An old, quiet, wise, strong, old-fashioned German type. His hobby was growing chrysanthemums. He grew great huge chrysanthemums down in the prison yard. And he had a German shepherd police dog that was as big as a bear that went everywhere with him in the prison. I've often wondered whether that dog protected the warden. But I guess no one undertook to find out. Or, the deputy warden. No one undertook to find out. The warden was a man named Hogset whose life was a little freer than that of the deputy, although his quarters were also on prison grounds.

Well, then once I'd been over these cases with the deputy, and he'd--Sometimes he would say to me, "John, he'd make a fine worker down at Norfolk. He's good at the job. But let him alone. I need him here." Well now, I learned to know what that meant. That meant that he was the deputy's man, probably was what you'd call in lay language a stool pigeon, but they never used that phraseology in the prison. They were known as "wires." "He's my wire." And once the deputy said that, I knew enough to--

**DANIELL:** Lay off.

**DICKEY:** Lay off. Then there would be other fellows. The deputy and I established a relation--he was a much older man--but we established a relationship of confidence so that he would level with me. And insofar as I had anything to offer, I leveled with him about individuals. And if you wanted to go to a school in shrewdness, I think he ought to be the first of the faculty. He was one of the shrewdest men I ever worked under. Well, this went on, and in due course I was responsible for selecting and recommending and indeed, in effect, for the transfer of several hundred men to Norfolk to help build the new prison, along with the men that were transferred to the Rutland Open Camp because of health, the Bridgewater State Farm, and so forth. And I established a wonderful relation in there. I would go out and interview all the officers in the prison in their shops in order to get their view of the man that I was considering for transfer. In other words, was he a reliable worker? Was he strong enough to do the work in the foundry? Or sometimes the man in the foundry would say, "Well, you can have him. He belongs over in what they called the plate shop." This is where they made the auto plates. And this is where they would put fellows who didn't give a damn what they did. And they rather liked the banging and--well, I
don't think you would call it romance, but at least the diverting atmosphere of the auto plate shop, but they were not good workers as far as making a mattress or making manhole covers and so forth in the foundry.

Maybe I'll come back with just a word-- Well, probably I'd better button up this penal side of my life. I'm afraid I've been a little too fond of saying to strangers that I worked my way through law school in a state prison, but this is literally what I did. One of the big advantages of it was that, in addition to working with these men right down on the lowest level, if you will, the job level of prisons, I was also privileged through my association with Dr. Stearns, as a psychiatrist, to be in touch during this period with some of the leading theoreticians in the world on penology who were coming to visit the Massachusetts prison system because Stearns was regarded as one of the leading men in the whole field. Some of the principal psychiatrists in the country came there to study the casework and to do some of their own casework, some of their own research with us. And this for me was an opportunity to be acquainted with a field that otherwise I would never have known anything about.

Well, that went on. It didn't knock my law work down to the point where I had any worries about staying in law school. It definitely meant not aspiring to top-level grades in law school. [Sound of ringing telephone] [Pause]

DANIELL: You were talking about your being down at the prison, and you were just beginning to discuss how this affected your work at Harvard Law School, in which you—

[Change to Side B of Tape #4]

DICKEY: I think it's perhaps in order to say that these two years were very strenuous years. At night the problem was I was really too tired to do justice to my work. I would read my cases, but I'm afraid I'd have to say I didn't do justice to them. But the result was that I held pretty close to a B--well, during my last two years I held to a B average at the law school and had an A or two. But there was no question of getting up into the top A levels on this kind of a routine. At the same time I have no hesitation at all, as I look back on it, knowing that this was the right thing for me to do in terms of my own development.

Perhaps I should just jump ahead a little bit. When I was finishing up in the third year of law school and the second year in prison work, they raised the question with me in the prison system whether I might be interested in going on in penology in a professional career. By this time the Rockefeller
Foundation people, who were putting up the money, had an interest in this. And it was tempting. But I made up my mind fairly quickly and quite definitely that having put three years in at the Harvard Law School, and the money involved and everything else, that I wanted to find out whether I could establish a professional base in the law or not. If I found that I really cared for it at all, I was pretty sure I could turn back to penology. But I knew that if I started in penology, I sure as heck wasn't going to go the other way.

DANIELL: I should imagine just the being faced with thinking about what it meant in terms of just your daily activity of being in the prisons, and living as you've described the wardens, that probably entered into the picture.

DICKEY: It had a real bearing on my decision. And also I guess I should be sufficiently personal to say that by this time I was seeing a fair amount of Chris [Gillespie]. We were due to be married that fall after law school. And she never felt very friendly toward a career in prisons.

DANIELL: Showed good wisdom, on her part, I must say. [Laughter]

DICKEY: So there were a number of factors that made it easy for me to decide that I didn't want to go on. Although the pay would have been attractive compared with what I was going to be able to command in a law office as a young clerk. You might be interested in that. I started to walk the streets in Boston in the depths of the Depression, the winter of '31-'32, asking law firms just cold without being introduced to anybody at all, just going in and meeting the receptionist, whether they were interviewing law students. And it was a pretty rugged experience, pretty rugged experience. But one of the big firms, Gaston, Snow, Saltonstall, said, well, they would talk-- Their young partner who handled the employment in normal times would talk to me, although they didn't think they were going to take on anybody. I had an interview from him. Ten days later I got a call from him and said, "If you're still interested, come and talk with me again." And they said, yes, they would take me on as long as I didn't expect to go up the line in the firm. They didn't think there was any prospect of that. The pay would be $125 a month. And I said, "Thank you very much. I'm primarily interested in the experience. I guess I can live on $125 a month." And that was it.

Well, I went into the law firm as a young law clerk that September after the bar exams. Which, since these tapes are not going to be used prior to my decease, you probably won't mind my putting on the record, I decided when I took the bar exams that June, this was probably the last examination I was ever going to take in my life. And by God, if I could hit a long ball, I was going to hit it this time. I had the really extraordinary
experience of being called up for my oral examinations before the Bar Examiners from the prison. I was working in the state prison in August of that year. We're now talking of August '32 after I'd graduated from the law school, when word came into the prison--I'd left word at the Bar Examiners where I could be reached--that my oral interview was coming up. I went for the interview to the courthouse, rushed over on the subway somewhat out of breath, wondering what they ask you about, these five examiners sitting up on the judge's bench and so forth. They were very informal.

I had first an amusing and then a very satisfying experience. The amusing experience, which was a little startling, was that the chairman, a Mr. Hitchcock, quite a figure in the Boston Bar at that time, said, "Mr. Dickey, have you ever been in prison?" Well, obviously he was asking the routine question that they ask as to whether you had a prison record, and they just felt it necessary to ask everybody this question. Instead, I had my mind on myself, and I thought he was asking whether I'd had any experience in penology. In other words, whether I was qualified to enter upon criminal practice and so forth, an egocentric view of what the Bar examiners had on their minds. [Laughter] And I said, "Yes, sir. I've just come from there." Well, the whole group of them perked up. Some of them thought I was being a smart aleck, and others wondered what this was all about. Well, we got it straightened out in about 20 seconds that I was working in the prison. But it was the sort of thing which taught me that people, when they ask a question, aren't always thinking about what you're thinking about. That was the amusing thing. He then said, after we'd had a chuckle about that, he said, "Well, I don't think we're going to have to ask you any more questions. But I think maybe I might tell you something, though we don't usually do it." But he said, "I'd like you to know you were number one in the examination." Well, this is something I've never kicked around, but it always was a very nice thing to be told.

Well, I went into the law office that September, and had really a very satisfactory experience starting off working for older men. Doing law memoranda, having a few of the minor successes that a law clerk has in a law firm, having somebody commend him for his memoranda and that sort of thing.

DANIELL: Wasn't this kind of a letdown, though, from the intensity of the prison?

DICKEY: It was. But along about in the fall of that year, along about December, Dr. Stearns left the commissionership. And who comes into it? And who's appointed by Governor Ely, but my old law school professor, Francis Bowes Sayre.

DANIELL: Oh, oh!
DICKEY: To be Commissioner of Correction. As a result of this appointment, I got a telephone call from Mr. Sayre wanting to know whether I'd have dinner with him out in his home in Cambridge. Chris and I had been married. We had a very fascinating evening with the Sayres. And he took me aside after dinner and said, "I would like you to come into the Department of Correction as Deputy Commissioner. I thought, wow! [Laughter] Gee, I thought, somebody's sure turning my cards up somewhere, and I was of course excited by it. I should say, parenthetically, within a matter of weeks, even days, I guess, right after that, Sayre went through a terrible tragedy. His wife, Jessie Sayre, in an operation that was considered a routine operation. And so forth. Which rather delayed his getting back to organizing the department. Then for the next few months we marked time while this went through the political mills. And eventually it turned out that to get me the title of deputy commissioner, he had to fire a good old politician, a man named Bagley. The governor's office thought they would have trouble with the governor's council if they tried to fire him and if I went in to take the place of a man of that sort who was fired. So they said, "Change the title," and I went in as assistant to the commissioner, with much the same right-hand responsibility.

But this only after Sayre--I told him I hate to leave the law office. I had a heck of a time getting a job, and I want to go back. So he said, "I'll go down and see Mr. F. E. Snow--" who was head of the firm and whom I'd never seen; he was just a name to me "--and see if I can get you a leave of absence." Well, this is another little amusing incident. Mr. Sayre did come in to see Mr. Snow. Mr. Snow received him very graciously as a Harvard Law School professor, not as the Commissioner of Correction. And when Sayre said, "I've come to see if I can get a leave of absence for your young associate, John Dickey," he said, "We don't have anybody by that name." [Laughter] He called in his secretary. Sayre subsequently told me this story. He called in his secretary, and she said, "Yes, there is a young new law clerk in here named Dickey." And Mr. Snow said, "Well, I don't know him, but I'm sure we could spare him." [Laughter] So that was the way I went up to the Department of Corrections in early 1933, to be Sayre's right-hand man. Where I had a marvelous experience. He put me in charge of the rehabilitation of the institutions physically under the WPA and PWA federal work projects, and this gave me experience in contracts and all of that with all the prisons in the whole system. It was great experience.

DANIELL: Good interface between the prison experience and the law itself.
DICKEY: Right. Exactly. And being in the administrative level of the prison system rather than the case history work. Working on budgets. Well, in particular the feeding ration of prisoners during a period of rising prices was one of the few things I can look back on as something I introduced into the prison system. Well, Sayre very soon, in '34, was sought by Roosevelt to come down to Washington to be Assistant Secretary of State. I knew this was going on, but he never spoke to me about it until the decision was taken. And he did go down to Washington in late '33 or early '34 to be-- And I was about to come back and pick up my leave of absence at the law firm, when bang! A letter comes from Sayre saying, would you consider coming down and being my assistant in the State Department?

DANIELL: Wow! ___.

DICKEY: And this is how everything else unfolded. And this is why I say that to a considerable degree--and you can go back to that early law school experience--and say that without my knowing it, I was turning a right-angle corner. I'd had a latent interest in foreign affairs, but had never of course ever pursued it. So I thought this over and decided, well-- Again, this is like that summer when I decided to bet on myself by taking the internship. I guess I knew I'd have to give up the leave of absence. That was the only honorable thing to do. They'd never given a leave of absence to a law clerk, and they didn't want a law clerk on a leave of absence down in Washington. So I went down to see the people at the law office and said I'd had this offer, and I was going to take it, and would it be all right if I gave up the leave of absence? Well, as far as they were concerned it was all right. [Laughter]

At that point my mother died in Pennsylvania. I went down for the funeral. This is March of '34. And I came back--and this is another one of the mileposts in my life which close off one whole sector of possibilities. When I came back and went into the office of the Department of Correction, the commissioner's secretary-- And there was a new commissioner who had been appointed by Ely, Governor Ely; there'd been a big fracas in the meantime. The head of the new prison at Norfolk, Howard Gill, who was a very advanced reformer, had gotten into political trouble--not an unusual thing for a prison reformer--and the governor had had to fire him, had put his right-hand man, Fred Dillon, in as Commissioner of Correction while I was away. Fired Howard Gill, and the Boston papers were filled with two-inch headlines about the firing of the--he was called superintendent of the Norfolk Prison. And things were really hopping when I got back. I hadn't known really anything about this. I'd been down in Pennsylvania with my mother's last illness and her death. But the commissioner's secretary was a good friend of mine, Florence King, said the commissioner's hiding out--
this is the new commissioner, Fred Dillon, who'd taken Sayre's place. "He's hiding out over in the City Club, and he wants to see you just as soon as you get back, as soon as you get back in town here." I said, "Okay."

Well, I hadn't any idea of what was up. But I needed to see him to tell him that I had agreed to go to Washington with Sayre. I went over to the City Club, and went up to the room that he had, and went in. He was quite a broad, jovial Irish character who subsequently became a judge on the Probate Court, and a very good judge on the Probate Court. And he said, "Well, John--" He was very informal. "John, as you see the governor's gotten me into really a tub of hot water here as Commission of Correction and the firing of Howard Gill, and I'm hiding out from the press." I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "I need your help." I said, "Well, if I can help--" One of these loose, too-quick responses. I said, "If I can help in any way, of course, I want to help." Before I could tell him that I had made a decision to go to Washington, he said, "Well, I'm glad to have you say that because I want you to go down to Norfolk to be the new superintendent." Well, I felt that I had been hit on the head with a mallet. I couldn't have been more astonished. And I said, "I'm not sure that I understand really what you're proposing to me. But if I do, gosh, that's not for me."

"Well now," he said, "before you reach any quick conclusions," he said, "this is a very major thing for the governor and for me because we've had a rough time over the firing of Gill. And we're being accused of a political action." And he said, "It was not a political action." And I myself knew it was not a political action. He said, "We had a lot of political hound dogs after him. But," he said, "we reached the judgment on our own that we had to replace him. Regrettfully," he said, "but there was no alternative to it. Therefore we want to put somebody into that job where there can be not the slightest suspicion that he was put in there for political reasons. And therefore we've got to find somebody that really is not political and has some professional qualifications to do the job." So he said, "I'm going to tell you now why I've asked you to do it. I went over to Massachusetts State Prison, and I decided that by gosh if we're going to have a new superintendent at Norfolk, I was going to have to have the warden at the Massachusetts State Prison behind me." So he said, "I went in to see him, and I said, 'Who would you suggest?'"

DANIELL: This is Hogset?

DICKEY: Hogset. That I choose for this job? And he said, "Hogset said you're the man." "Well," I said, "Mr. Commissioner, I don't suppose anybody has ever said anything to me up to now that I regard as a greater expression of
confidence, that means something to me, than to have the warden tell you that. And I also recognize that this is an awful bet you would be taking to have me do this. But now I've got to tell you I've agreed to take another job, during my absence from the office, and I'm going down to Washington to be with Mr. Sayre in the State Department. And I just know this job at Norfolk, big and challenging as it is, and wonderful as it is to be asked to do it, is not for me." "Well," he said, "you sound very definite." "Yes," I said, "there's no point to us kidding around on this. This just isn't in the cards for me." "All right," he said, "you then propose the man." [Laughter] And the nut of that was-- And I said, "Well, I would like to have a little time to think about this." I did propose the man who had had charge of building the institution, the Superintendent of Works, a man named [Maurice] Winslow. And he appointed him, the Governor appointed him, and he became, really, an outstanding leader of the new prison for years and years.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: Maurice Winslow. And that was the end of my career in penology.

DANIELL: One additional question on that: I know that you at some point published some material, published an article or two, concerning this.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Now, was this while you were still in law school, or did this--? When did this come in?

DICKEY: Well, I first published several reviews. They were called "Notes," I think, in the Harvard Law Review under the sponsorship of the leading criminologist of that era, Howard Glueck--or I beg you pardon; his brother's name was Howard--Sheldon Glueck, G-L-U-E-C-K, and his wife [Eleanor Glueck] were a team of criminologists. They were the ones who did the first really systematic work in the evaluation of American prison institutions on the basis of follow-up studies of prisoners. Their first notable book was 500 Criminal Careers, the study of 500 inmates who had been through the Concord Reformatory in Massachusetts. He was professor of criminology at that time, later professor of criminal law, at Harvard Law School. Took me under his wing, so to speak. And when the Law Review would ask him to review books, particularly in prison work or criminology, he would say, "Well, I'd like my young associate to." And I did several things of that sort. Then I had finished off in my graduate course--I took the graduate course in jurisprudence, criminal jurisprudence--under Sam Bass Warner at the law school in my third year. And did a paper for the course which became the first paper I ever published, which was published in the Cornell Law
Quarterly. I believe you and I referred to that earlier. I'm not sure. Somebody asked me about it recently. The title of the paper I can still remember: "Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest."

DANIELL: Now that's what I wanted to get on the tape. So I think we did talk about it, but I'm not sure if it was recorded.

DICKEY: Well, it was published in the Cornell Law Quarterly in the spring of 1933. And, needless to say, it was also a big moment in my life, the first thing of that sort I had published, although I'd had these reviews, "Notes," done in the Harvard Law Review. I guess that's probably what you were referring to.

DANIELL: That's right. That's what I was referring to. Right.

DICKEY: Well, we've come really to a very natural breaking point, Jere. The next thing was going to Washington. I arrived down there and went to work in the State Department the next morning, March 26, 1934. And a whole new phase of my life began.

DANIELL: Okay. You want to break here?

DICKEY: I suggest we break here. I've got a student coming in at four o'clock.

DANIELL: Fine. That's perfect.

DICKEY: And I'm sorry to run out—

[End of Tape #4B]

[Beginning of Tape #5A]

January 22, 1975

DICKEY: I remember it because I'd never been to Washington before. We drove down, Chris and myself, the day before. Went to stay in a little residential hotel where Mr. [Francis Bowes] Sayre was putting up temporarily. The Blackstone Hotel on 17th Street, only a couple of blocks from the White House. And the next morning he walked me over to the State Department Building, the old State War Navy Building right beside the White House. I remember very vividly--you can see what an impression it made on me--that he said, "Let's walk over behind the White House around the Ellipse." Which we did. My first view of the White House. It was quite a stirring thing, as I remember it. As you noted in my memory of the day, it
obviously confirms the importance of it in my life. We walked over and into the State Department through what was called the Diplomatic Entrance of the old State War Navy Building, and then up to his office. I remember being quite awed a bit by the atmosphere of the State Department, and being taken into meet the under secretary, who was then William Phillips, a professional foreign service man.

I don't think I was introduced to the secretary, Mr. [Cordell] Hull until a few days later, but not very much later. Because I got down there in March of '34, just when the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Bill was coming out of the House of Representatives. And this, of course, was the central interest of Cordell Hull. He had spent a lifetime, really--years and years at least--in the House of Representatives as a congressman from Tennessee. Then in '32, I believe it was, the Roosevelt election year, was elected to the Senate and taken immediately, more or less, from the Senate to be secretary of state by Franklin [D.] Roosevelt. He was known as a conservative man so far as domestic economic policies were concerned. But as a, well, I think perhaps the word is "devout," a devout low-tariff man, and the people who were high-tariff people frequently characterized him as a free-trader. I think it's worthwhile saying Mr. Hull was never a free trader in any literal sense. But he certainly was an enemy of the high tariffs represented during his period by the Republican Party, and in particular the Republican leadership in Congress, basically by American industrial leaders. That leadership, of course, came to its peak and its ultimate downfall, indeed, in the Tariff Act of 1930, which became known popularly as the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, which pushed American rates up higher than I guess they had ever been. Well, of course that--

DANIELL: Was it assumed generally that Hull was appointed Secretary because of his known attitudes concerning the tariff? Or...

DICKEY: Well, that's a very difficult question for me to answer with any certainty. But my judgment, from all that I do know, both having been thereafter on the scene in the State Department for some years and around the Trade Agreements organization, my judgment is that he was not appointed by Roosevelt, or selected for this job, primarily because of his low-tariff views. But certainly they were part of his eligibility for this because he had been a student of international trade for years and years and really was not just anybody from the Congress who wanted a Cabinet position. He had established himself over the years in the House as a respected authority on international trade. You see it's necessary to remember we're now talking about the onset of the Depression in its most severe form. And the Tariff Act of 1930 had become, while [President Herbert] Hoover was still in office, the principal target of the professional economists in the country
as a factor in the aggravation of what today perhaps we would call a stock market recession or even a collapse.

**DANIELL:** Of course professional economists had a heightened role increasingly.

**DICKEY:** Increasingly. And they had gotten out a very notable protest addressed to President Hoover against signing the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Bill, on the grounds that it was the worst thing that could be done at that point because it would accentuate the worldwide impact of the Depression as it was beginning to manifest itself in various countries and especially in the United States. This manifesto was signed by--it was called the "Declaration of a Thousand Economists," and I guess they did have a thousand names on it. But in any event, it had become quite an important political public document. So that I don't think Roosevelt had any doubt at all that he was going to move in the direction of lowering--or doing something about--the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. Well, just prior to that, this general inclination got very much caught up in a riptide of nationalistic theories with respect to the price of gold and how to deal with the London Economic Conference. And I don't know that you would remember that.

**DANIELL:** Enough of my graduate study ___.

**DICKEY:** When Roosevelt came in, he put Adolph Berle, a well-known brain trust figure out of the academic world to a considerable degree, in as assistant secretary of state. And Berle went over to the London Economic Conference, thinking he had--and I guess he pretty well did--a personal line of instructions from Roosevelt what to do over there: the devaluing of the dollar and other things which most of the economists that Hull was in touch with and others looked upon askance because they felt it was going to plunge the world into just further beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Well, the London Economic Conference turned out to be really the high-water mark of that kind of an approach to that kind of-- Really, most of the people I knew felt it was almost a--well, to speak very directly--it was a totally unsound, unwise handling of an economic crisis, internationally. It was entirely too nationalistic in the narrow sense of the term. Hull was in London as a member of the American delegation at the conference, and became just simply outraged at the way Berle and a few of Berle's close associates took over.

**DANIELL:** This comes through even in the most pro-Roosevelt kind of biography.

**DICKEY:** Yes, this is correct. It was an irresponsible handling of American representation, I think you've got to say, on the part of Roosevelt and the people who were close to him. But he was surrounded at that point by
some fellows who had great confidence in their ability to just get a hold of the levers of the machine and turn things around. Well, Hull, who was not a man to suffer intrusion in his pea patch, mildly, came back from the London Conference with, for all purposes really, his resignation in hand. And in effect told Roosevelt that it had to be either he was in charge of foreign economic policy, or he was going to have to get a new Secretary of State. Well, things hadn't gone very well at London, and Roosevelt certainly wasn't in a position in 1933 to want to change Secretaries of State. Because--I'm coming back now to your question--I think the primary consideration that was in Roosevelt's mind was, not only was Hull a knowledgeable, respected person who had convictions and an understanding of the foreign trade process, but he was a respected, trusted political figure in the Congress. And Roosevelt, if he was going to carry forward his New Deal program with the legislation he was going to need, he needed to have that flank, the conservative flank, of the Democratic Party covered. And Hull could do that as, at that point no one else could, who also had the qualifications of understanding international trade. So that I think the primary consideration on Roosevelt's part in choosing Hull to be secretary of state was that he needed and wanted some protection, some strength, on the side of the Democratic wing of the--on the side of the conservative wing (I'm sorry, I'm getting it all twisted here)--the conservative wing of the Democratic Party. Hull provided that, but he also provided this experience in the area of foreign trade policy, and was known as a low-tariff man.

DANIELL: Now this particular possibility of resignation, this comes, of course, after you've been on the job?

DICKEY: No, no. This was just before.

DANIELL: This is just before.

DICKEY: This was in '33. I went down in March of '34.

DANIELL: I see. Okay.

DICKEY: But I heard about this from Mr. Sayre, who'd heard about it. Sayre wasn't there himself at that time. Sayre went down, I think, in late '33--either December '33 or January '34. And I also had good friends who were among the experts that had been on the American delegation there with him at the London Conference. So that when I got down there, it was the period when Hull was just returning, I think, from the Montevideo Conference down in South America where he, in effect, turned the American policies around to being cooperative policies based upon the
most-favored nation—the traditional, unconditional, most-favored nation--policies of the United States, at least traditional in the more recent years. We had followed the conditional most-favored nation policy earlier. And he came back from Montevideo really a rehabilitated man so far as his political leadership was concerned. And he had committed the United States at Montevideo to trade policies, lowering of trade barriers, in a way that made it necessary for Roosevelt to back him when Hull went forward down on the Hill with the Trade Agreements Act--the Trade Agreements Bill. This took place in early 1933, and the Bill was just coming out of the House of Representatives in March--I think actually it just passed the House--the week I got to Washington. Sayre was devoting practically full time to serving as Mr. Hull's representative on the Hill to get the Trade Agreement Act passed, which was to be authority, very basic authority, for the president to negotiate reductions in the American tariff up to 50 percent in return for reductions from the countries with which we were negotiating.

Well, this was really an extraordinarily critical period to be introduced to the State Department. And also extraordinarily favorable circumstances for a young fellow because I was going in as Sayre's personal assistant in the assistant secretary's office. Actually, I was appointed as an assistant to the legal advisor's office which was the easiest Civil Service procedure to follow, and detailed to Sayre's office as his personal assistant. So I was on the rolls as an assistant to the legal advisor and assistant to the assistant secretary of state. Well, here was the assistant secretary of state, my boss, in charge of the one aspect of U.S. foreign policies that, as far as Mr. Hull was concerned, was 90 percent of the game, at least at that point. And also, it was an aspect of American foreign policies which was now moving into a very active relationship with the American public, the American business community, the American academic community, all the people who were concerned with American foreign affairs. As well, of course, as the Congress where we had to go for the authority to negotiate these trade agreements. I suppose if I had set out to write a ticket of opportunity, I could have hardly imagined or been bold enough to have written the ticket which was handed to me when I got there.

Well, within a week--within days, I guess, several days--I was at work familiarizing myself with the hearings as they'd been held in the House with the whole Trade Agreements Bill, in particular with respect to the legal issues which were involved. And there were two legal issues which today we don't hear very much about, although we're hearing more about one of them, we did a few years ago, namely the treaty power. Mr. Hull was just utterly clear that if he was going to get authority that permitted him to negotiate on behalf of the president with foreign countries effectively, so
far as the tariff was concerned, there had to be a delegation of power to the president which would not be nullified by the treaty power requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate in order to put the agreement or treaty into effect. So he was just absolutely adamant that this bill had to go through, if it was going to be worth anything, without coming under the treaty power of the Constitution, which would require a two-thirds vote, and which had in years past been a great barrier to the negotiation of commercial treaties—particularly if the compact or the agreement was to involve the reduction of tariff rates which you got right into the heart of the American political process.

The other legal issue is one which was red-hot at that time throughout the New Deal; namely, the issue of the delegation of legislative authority, or legislative powers. At this point, this issue had not really been resolved by the Supreme Court. Later the Supreme Court did deal with it in the NRA, the Sick Chicken Case, and in the Triple A, and so forth, as to whether Congress was unconstitutionally delegating its legislative powers to the president. This was also at issue in the Trade Agreements Act, whether they were delegating their authority to make tariffs unduly, without sufficient guidelines that the president was required to follow. These were the two issues.

DANIELL: You're right in there on it because normally when historians discuss this whole issue, they focus on the NRA, and later on it's kind of a training ground in terms of the constitutional issues involved through what you were working on.

DICKEY: That's correct. That's correct. Indeed, out of the work I did defending the Trade Agreements Act, came later some quite interesting discussions in the government on the treaty power issue with respect to the delegation of legislative power. I don't know. Maybe you would like me to just detour for a moment and speak of that. Because ordinarily I perhaps wouldn't come back to it.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But it was about--when was it? In 1934, I guess it was, late '34, '34 or '35 certainly, the Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction to pass upon the NRA. This was the great domestic program of the president, run by General Hugh Johnson with the eagle as the emblem of it everywhere, the blue eagle and all of that. It's a little hard to reproduce the psychology of that period: President Ford's Win Program, Win Buttons, is a sad travesty so far as the NRA propaganda was concerned. People were desperate, and the NRA was regarded as the way of putting the
government into and behind the revival of the whole business economy. Well, that Act, that program, got up to the Supreme Court of the United States when the Supreme Court was still conservatively oriented—or at least the majority was conservatively oriented—in the early days of the New Deal. As I say, I think it was '34.

DANIELL: It was '34.

DICKEY: Late '34, early '35, in what was called the Schechter Case, the Sick Chicken Case. There were some sick chickens somewhere that the government had done something about with its regulations. Well, the Supreme Court threw the law out. And the country—or at least the government and some of the New Deal officials—that night, when the decision came down, thought that the universe had been repealed, it was such a traumatic shock. What were they going to do? And I remember Donald Richberg had by that time taken over from Hugh Johnson. Or maybe he was number two to Johnson. But in any event, he subsequently took over from General Johnson. I guess he had already taken over from General Johnson at the time the decision came down.

DANIELL: I know Johnson had been replaced by the time this decision came down.

DICKEY: Well then, it was Richberg. But I know Richberg was the one who came over to the State Department to talk with several of the State Department top brass: Mr. Hull, politically, and Mr. Hull referred him to Mr. Sayre because Mr. Sayre had been a professor at the Harvard Law School, and things like that. And Sayre was called into a conference with Richberg in Judge Moore's office. Judge Moore was the Assistant Secretary of State or the counselor of the department. In any event, he was looked upon by Mr. Hull as the ultimate man for political/legal wisdom in the department, an old crony of Mr. Hull's, I believe, in the Congress, a man from Virginia. It was in Judge Moore's office that they met, and Mr. Sayre took me along because I had been doing, so to speak, the legwork for him on the constitutional issues of the Trade Agreements Act to see whether there was anything involved.

Well, I guess it's not overstating it to say that I was the first one, at least in that group, to say, "Maybe we could get at this issue through the treaty power." Roosevelt didn't have much doubt that he could get two-thirds vote in the Senate to keep things going. But I said, "If we could get the Senate to ratify some of the ILO conventions--" And this was almost certainly in '35; I think it was right about the time we'd gone into the ILO or were considering going into the ILO. "If we could get the Senate to ratify some of the ILO conventions on labor conditions and so forth by a two-
thirds vote, then we could invoke the Doctrine of Missouri & Holland, which the Supreme Court had laid down some years before in the Migratory Bird Case, whereby Congress gets powers to implement a treaty that it would not have had unless there were a treaty.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: In other words--I won't go into the technicalities of this--but the broad proposition of Missouri & Holland was that the Founding Fathers intended to have their treaties made effective by congressional legislation if necessary; and that Congress derive powers, therefore, from the treaty power to do this. And if we had a treaty on the subject of labor conditions, maybe we could then get congressional legislation--congressional laws--to implement that treaty. I remember Mr. Richberg saying, "Gee, that's the best idea I've heard." [Laughter] I don't know whether anybody had come up with this--I think they had, probably--elsewhere in the government. But in any event, this was the State Department's contribution to their thinking. They subsequently decided that for reasons I don't recall now, but practical reasons of politics and otherwise, not to go that route.

DANIELL: Yes. I should think there'd be dangers in that way.

DICKEY: And of course later Roosevelt decided that he was going to go the route of changing the Supreme Court.

DANIELL: Right, right.

DICKEY: But in any event, I cite that because it indicated rather early, and certainly as far as my years were concerned and my qualifications as a lawyer were concerned, I was getting up into the stratosphere.

DANIELL: Yes. I was going to say, pretty heady stuff ___.

DICKEY: Right. A little fast. But the really big thing that happened that's relevant to my career, or development, very early was that the Trade Agreements Bill went into the Senate from the House in April of 1934. And Mr. Sayre put me to work right away getting ready to meet the issues in the Senate, where we were going to meet the treaty power issue head on. The House didn't care very much about the treaty power issue because they weren't going to be involved in treaty making.

DANIELL: Right.
They were much more concerned with the delegation of powers issue. But the Senate was going to really be a tough hurdle to take since their prerogatives in respect to treaties was at issue. I went to work on that, and went down and attended all the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. And then I was down on the floor sitting back on those benches back in the rear of the chamber with Mr. Sayre. The Bill was handled on the floor by--I'm not sure now. I think Senator Harrison was then chairman, Senator Pat Harrison, was chairman of the Finance Committee. I know he was later on one of the renewals, and whether he was then or not I'm just a little hazy about it. But Senator [Walter F.] George, who was a close personal friend of Secretary Hull, and certainly the most respected constitutional authority on the Democratic side certainly in the Senate, was given the responsibility for handling the legal issues when the Bill came to the floor of the Senate.

Senator [William] Borah, a name that wouldn't mean very much to most young people today, but who was the fountainhead of American isolationism in those days, who'd made his reputation in the League fight, and was subsequently to be quite prominent in the World Court fight, which I'll come to in a minute, he undertook to lead the fight against the Trade Agreements Bill in the Senate primarily on the treaty power issue. He also, of course, used the delegation of legislative powers issue. Well, Borah was not anyone to take lightly. He was a very able man. He had great prestige and great self-confidence, and he was listened to by both the Democrats and the Republicans when he spoke. And a speech by Borah on the floor was, I guess, not unlike when Webster and Calhoun took the floor for a major speech back in the first half of the 19th century. Well, Borah took the floor, and lit into the Trade Agreements Bill on constitutional grounds. I think it was about at the end of my second or third week--certainly not more, I would think, than four weeks--in Washington while the Bill had been going through the hearings in the Finance Committee, and then coming out on the floor of the Senate and so forth.

I remember vividly--I wasn't down at the Senate the day Borah spoke. I guess we hadn't expected that Borah was going to speak on this day. But Mr. Sayre came back to the department that evening from the Senate, and told Mr. Hull that there had been a very effective, very--he was afraid--dangerous attack made upon the Bill by Senator Borah. So they immediately huddled and conferred, I guess, directly--perhaps by telephone--with Senator George and the leadership down in the Senate. And Senator George said that he--Mr. Hull said, "I hope you will be willing to answer Borah." And Senator George said, yes, he would. But he really was going to need some help on this because he had not had an opportunity to really work on these issues. And he said, "When I speak, I
want to be sure that I've got a case." So that evening Mr. Sayre called me in.

[Change to Side B of Tape #5]

Well, I was saying before you turned it over, Mr. Sayre called me in, and said that Senator George--the senator from Georgia--had agreed with the secretary that he would answer Mr. Borah, but he wanted help from the department, and the secretary had asked Mr. Sayre to prepare that help. And Mr. Sayre, as is quite common in government, turned to me and said, "I want you to work on this for me, and to get the argument developed."

Well, I remember it vividly because I was still just getting acquainted with these issues, which I had never studied before. We didn't have this sort of constitutional law issue in law school. They were not terribly complicated issues as such, but they still had an immense amount of historical background. This was what I had to face up to, was the need to acquaint myself, in effect, with the history of the treaty power going clear back into the Constitutional Convention. And to translate that history and what Supreme Court cases we had--and we had very few Supreme Court cases at that point on this aspect of the treaty power. We had no direct cases, we had some collateral precedents perhaps. And I don't mind saying that in addition to feeling somewhat flattered and more important than I guess I had ever felt before certainly, I was scared, really scared, because I wasn't at all sure that I could pull this off.

DANIELL: How much time did you have?

DICKEY: Well, we didn't know for sure how much time we would have. But it was pretty clearly going to be not much more than a week to ten days, two weeks, or something. So I went to work night and day, literally, on this. I myself, mainly. The first thing that I discovered was that the legal advisor's office had really never penetrated these issues. They had written memoranda. Some of the people in the legal advisor's office had written memoranda on it, but the analysis was--at least at that point--superficial. And it didn't seem to me to have much substantive bite to it. I went through all their memoranda that they'd prepared for the testimony of the secretary in the House and in the Senate and so on and so on. And then I read every book I could put my hands on that had ever dealt with the treaty power; almost none of them had dealt with the delegation of legislative powers issue. But that was an issue that hadn't come up very much. There was a case on the flexible tariff back in 1926--and the name of the case is escaping me; very important case--that had upheld the Tariff Act of 1922, I guess it was. Had upheld the so-called flexible tariff positions. But they
had placed so much emphasis in that case upon the precision of the
guidelines, the cost of living--or not cost of living, I beg your pardon--the
cost of the products, as compared with the level of the tariff, provided, as
far as the court was concerned, in the 1926 case, rather precise
guidelines, that they said, made this a proper congressional delegation of
power to the executive. Because the executive doesn't have just unlimited
discretion in respect to moving the tariff up or down. He has to follow this
formula that was laid down by the Congress.

Well, this was what I did. And I don't recall how long I worked at it, but I
would guess it was two weeks and certainly not more than three. And I
came up with a theory about the delegation of legislative powers related to
the bargaining process which was the basic principle--the basic
functioning principle--of the Trade Agreements Act. That is, we would
lower out tariffs if the other people would lower their tariffs. So I worked
out, at least for my purposes, an argument that there was here a guideline
that required the executive to get some quid pro quo--not necessarily
statistically quid pro quo--but a clear quid pro quo if he was going to carry
out the power given him by the Congress. And that this was the guiding
limitation that was sufficient unto the circumstances. Well, that's a very
crude summary of the principle that I worked out on that side of the thing.
Then over on the treaty power side, I relied very heavily on legislative
precedents, most of which had not been before the courts previously,
going back to the McKinley Tariff Act and the earlier precedents, for
certain agreements that didn't go to the Senate as treaties--along with a
good bit of history that I had dug into. And I wrote this up as a draft
speech.

DANIELL: I was going to ask you that, whether it was a speech.

DICKEY: I wrote it up as a draft speech. Then one day, just as that speech was
finished (I was really on a much narrower edge than I realized), Mr. Sayre
said-- Well, he took the speech down to Senator George, and I was invited
to go down and go over it with him. He read it, and said it sounded pretty
good to him. But he's a cautious man, and he said, "I'll think about it, and
maybe there are some parts of it I'll want to put in my words." And on and
on and so forth. But he was really very fine to me as a young man. I was
taken down by Mr. Sayre to explain my draft and my theories and so forth.
And then Mr. Sayre said, "Let's take the next two days and go down to
Virginia Beach, and just try to get a little rest." Because I had been, as I
said, really working night and day for about two weeks. And I'd been really
worried. Well, I got to his hotel that afternoon with my wife, and we were
just coming out of that little hotel lobby to get in the car, when I realized I
couldn't say the words that I wanted to say. And I had some kind of
aphasia, the doctors call it, with my speech. It was one of the most frightening physical experiences I ever had in my life. I could move, and there was no problem about that. It was only when I turned to speak to Chris or to Mr. Sayre that I realized I couldn't say--what I was saying didn't come out in words.

Well, of course this scared the life out of them. And I don't know. I was scared, I guess, but I don't really remember too clearly about that. But Mr. Sayre realized that right away they had to get a doctor to see really what was up. If I hadn't undertaken to speak, they would never have noticed anything. But he got a hold of Dr. Walter Bloedorn who'd been Woodrow Wilson's doctor in the White House during Wilson's latter days. B-L-O-E-D-O-R-N. He subsequently was my doctor in Washington. This was a Saturday afternoon when all offices were closed and so forth. But Sayre had this relationship with Dr. Bloedorn through the Wilson days. And said he would appreciate it if Dr. Bloedorn would be willing to see me, that his assistant had just had an attack of some sort. They didn't know whether it was a heart attack, a shock, or what the heck it was. And I remember they put me in a cab with Chris, and Dr. Bloedorn said he would come right down to his office. And we went up there. While we were going, I realized I could say a few words. It began to clear up a little bit. When we got to Bloedorn, it was clearing up, although there was still enough manifestation of it. Well, he put me through various examinations you would be familiar with as a doctor.

DANIELL: I hope I wouldn't be familiar with.

DICKEY: In these circumstances. And he said, "Well, there's nothing wrong." I had somehow or other thought this was related to my heart. And he said, after checking it out, he said, "There's nothing wrong with the heart at all here." I don't know why I-- Well, I know why. I had been through a very traumatic experience just a matter of weeks before that. A man whom Sayre had brought down as his right-hand man on trade agreement economic policy, Professor--the name is escaping me. But a professor in the Harvard Business School had come down and had died in his sleep there at the same hotel. And I had had to go in and take care of the body in the morning, and it was quite a business. This had stayed with me in some way that I had some preoccupation that maybe I was having a heart attack. Well, Bloedorn said that wasn't the case. And while we were at Bloedorn's office for an hour or so, my speech began to return and finally seemed to be pretty clear. And he said, "I think it's been just a passing thing." And I've often wondered whether he really didn't take a helluva chance on me. But in any event, at that point I was quite relieved that I could speak again.
DANIELL: I can see why.

DICKEY: And Sayre said, "Well, can we go on down to Virginia Beach?" And I remember Bloedorn said, "Well, I don't see what good it would do not to go. He said I really don't see what good it would not do." He said, "We could hospitalize him and put him through a lot of tests, and at some point I think we're going to have to check this out and see. But at the moment I guess I would say, go ahead, if you really want to." I think my brother who subsequently had me checked out at the University of Pennsylvania [sound of clock tower bells interferes with Mr. Dickey's words] Hospital thought that was really___. Because up there they weren't sure they shouldn't give me a spinal puncture to see and so on. But in any event, we went down, got on this river steamer down the Potomac, and all I remember about that evening was I had one splitting headache. Didn't eat anything, of course. Went to bed in the boat. But the next day I was in quite good shape again. Had no problems at all. Never, ever had any problem of this sort since. As I said, once I got back, Mr. Sayre told me he wanted me to take a couple of weeks off because he realized I'd been pretty close to the edge. So we got in the car, and went up to Philadelphia. My brother took me into one of his professors who specialized in neurology, and he went all over me, and took the history of the thing. And said he was reasonably certain that it had been what they call an aphasia--which I guess they don't quite know what's the cause of it. But he said, The alternative is to really put him into the hospital and take a spinal puncture." And he said, "I just don't think the picture that we have now warrants that."

Well, what I was going to say to you was that while I was on vacation, or sick leave, Senator George gave the speech. One of the nicest things about it was that they sent me a telegram that said it went very well, and sent me a copy of the Congressional Record, which I still have. In which he used about, I would suppose, two thirds, three fourths maybe, of what I had drafted, and certainly followed the theories that I had laid out about the defense of the Trade Agreements Act. Well, that was a major thing with me. My friends in the State Department used to joke about it, and said that my principal claim to fame would be that I convinced Mr. Hull of the constitutionality of his own Trade Agreements Act. Mr. Hull had attacked it back in his House days, the flexible tariff, as being unconstitutional. But as my friends said, "You convinced him that the Trade Agreements Act is constitutional."

So that was that. The Bill passed the Senate the latter part of May while I was away for about ten days, two weeks, I guess, of sick leave. And it was
signed, I remember very definitely, June 12, 1934. And became the basic authority under with the Trade Agreements Program was carried on really right up into World War II days, with its being renewed every three years. And for at least three renewals, I was brought back to work upon the renewal fights, both on the law and in mustering public opinion for the renewal. This was marvelous exposure for me over the years to people in the House, people in the Senate, and the processes of the Congress, particularly the relationship to the State Department. It led very directly in 1935-36 to my doing this more or less on my own really, but as Mr. Sayre's assistant, in the department's effort to get the Senate to approve, under the treaty procedure, the World Court protocols. I believe we spoke about that earlier.

**DANIELL:** Well, you just mentioned that you were going to get to it later.

**DICKEY:** Well, this was the other major experience that I had during these first three years of State Department service. And this is a story all of its own. The United States, of course, had never joined the World Court at the time of the Versailles Treaty. The World Court was a part of the Versailles Treaty, along with the League of Nations. But since we stayed out of the League and didn't approve of the treaty, neither did we enter into the World Court. But many men felt that the World Court issue should be separated from the League of Nations issue and the Versailles Treaty. And from the early twenties on, all through the twenties, the Republican leadership—men such as, oh, Root, Elihu Root, and subsequently [Henry Lewis] Stimson and [Charles Evans] Hughes, these people pressed for United States membership in the World Court. On the Democratic side men such as Newton D. Baker and others were strong advocates of it.

Well, in 1932 the issue had finally reached the point where there were special protocols for U.S. membership in the court that took account of certain American positions on the matter, and which required ratification or approval by two-thirds of the senators present under the treaty power. Most importantly, perhaps, both parties had included in their platforms in '32, as I recall (certainly in '34), but in the national platforms of '32 approval of American adherence to the World Court protocols. And this looked like a very favorable circumstance. Then in 1934, in the election of '34, Roosevelt got a two-thirds majority, more than a two-thirds majority, of the senators—I believe it was the first time since the Civil War that any party ever had a two-thirds majority in the Senate (my memory's just a little hazy about that).

**DANIELL:** I think you're right about that. I'm pretty sure, yes.
DICKEY: I think it was the only time since the Civil War that a party had had better than a two-thirds majority. So that these two things—the party platforms both supporting adherence to the court, and this unusual majority—suggested to Mr. Sayre and others who still were pulling the Woodrow Wilson sled, that the time had come to move on the World Court protocols. The president agreed, and Mr. Hull agreed—although Mr. Hull never had the same interest in the World Court issue that he had in the Trade Agreements Act. But he was willing. He was, so to speak, a Wilsonian. As was Franklin Roosevelt. So in 1935 the department decided—and Mr. Sayre was given the primary responsibility for handling the matter for the secretary and the president—to put the World Court protocols down in the Senate for action. Well, this was a totally new experience, and Mr. Sayre assigned me, with the secretary's approval—by this time the secretary knew who I was; I used to be in his office from time to time for the conferences on Trade Agreements Act matters—assigned me down to be at least the legman, maintaining the liaison with the Senate. Mr. Sayre would go down if necessary, and I would report back to him and the secretary each day.

Well, the first thing that happened was that we couldn't count upon the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to lead the fight. It was [Senator Key] Pitman from Nevada. And Key Pitman, to put it bluntly, was not, in my eyes or in the eyes of a good many people, a very attractive, reliable person. He was not favorably disposed towards Roosevelt and, I guess, maybe Mr. Hull. In short, he was essentially of an isolationist orientation. He was pretty much a reactionary with respect to economic policies. I'm sure he was not in sympathy with what Roosevelt was doing in the New Deal. In any event, it became quickly clear that, contrary to usual practice, the president and the secretary could not count upon the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to sponsor the protocols. Well, this was a very serious thing, if you think for a moment, having a committee chairman bow out.

So the secretary and the president, I guess, must have handled it. I certainly had nothing to do with it. They went to Senator [Joseph T.] Joe Robinson, who was the Democratic leader of the Senate in those days. Quite a figure in American political life, and had, I think, at one point been considered for the presidency or the vice presidency. Maybe he'd been a vice presidential nominee. I don't recall too exactly. But Senator Joe Robinson of Arkansas, who was himself something of a lawyer—indeed had inspired to an appointment, I now know, on the Supreme Court by Roosevelt if he'd lived—he really played the role of a good soldier for the president and the secretary, and took on personally the leadership of this fight on the floor of the Senate, and Pitman just bowed out.
Well, this brought me into constant daily association with Senator Robinson and with his right-hand aide on the floor of the Senate, Leslie Biffle, a name that was known to everybody on the inside in American politics in those days. He'd come from Arkansas, was at that point secretary to the Majority on the floor of the Senate. Later became secretary of the Senate. Biffle was regarded as one of the shrewdest men on the inside of American politics—particularly politics involving the Congress, and especially politics involving the Senate—that had been present on the American scene, I suppose, for generations. He was a very shrewd, quiet, inconspicuous person. I should say very quickly, having said all this about him, that in one of my early years on the job, I brought him to the attention of the Honorary Degree Committee, and Dartmouth conferred an honorary degree on Leslie Biffle.

DANIELL: B-I-F-F-E-L?

DICKEY: B-I-F-F-E-L. Well, Biffle was the man to whom Senator Robinson looked as his principal aide on the floor. And this meant that I worked very closely with Leslie Biffle each day, going over, as we would call them, the laundry lists—the names of the senators and where they stood, and who might work on whom, and on and on. Well, this was a lesson in American politics and political processes on the inside that I just don't suppose I could have ever gotten in any other way. It was just great.

DANIELL: You're still about 25, 26 years old?

DICKEY: This was 1935, and I was born in 1907. So 27, 28.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And this fight was, again, a major experience in my development. In addition to the exposure to the inside of the political process on the Hill, it gave me some understanding of the processes of American foreign policy that I wouldn't have had otherwise. Because to jump right quickly to the end result, we lost the battle to the two-thirds rule. Before the fight was over we got a majority vote to approve the protocols, but we failed to get the two-thirds majority by—I forget how many—five to seven votes. There were many factors involved. One of the first was that [William Randolph] Hearst, who then had a position of power with respect to the American public (he later, I think, did not have in the same degree), he came out full blast against the World Court as the backdoor into the League, and just pounded this issue in all his papers across the country during the whole period. And then he was fortified by a happening that no one foresaw, and
which we ought to remember a little bit better today, I think than perhaps we do: Father [Charles E.] Coughlin, the Catholic priest who had been just beginning to become a major figure in American public opinion with his social justice programs that he broadcast Sunday afternoons on the radio. He came out--

DANIELL: Yes. One of my uncles worked for him, I think.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, he came out against the court as, again, a betrayal of the United States in favor of these foreigners. And whatever else one might say about Coughlin, you certainly have to say that he had no concern about whether he was speaking responsibility or moderately or whatnot. And he was a powerful voice on the American radio because we didn't have television in those days. Well, these two just pounded the life out of the court. And pretty soon some of the members of the Senate, who had assumed this was going to go through, saw the possibility that maybe this wouldn't go through--or it was going to be close. And if it was going to be close, it was the first opportunity they'd had to give Roosevelt a tumble. Because here was the two-thirds vote requirement, and all they would need is to pick up a few votes and they could give Roosevelt the first real tumble that he'd had on the Hill. I understand this much better now than I did at the time. But these few fellows began to get weak and wobbly.

After, oh, I don't know, two or three of Coughlin's broadcasts, Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, who was head of the Naval Affairs Committee and thought to be one of the staunch, strong political fortresses in the Congress, got a hold of Senator Robinson one Monday morning. I happened to have been with Robinson at the time, standing right in the back of the Senate. And he said, "Joe, I'm afraid I won't be able to be with you." Well, Robinson had been counting upon Walsh's as something he didn't even have to talk about. I forget what he said. But Walsh then said, "Well, the priest yesterday really went after us." Then he got quite emotional. And he was a big man, flabby. I can remember seeing his hands shaking, putting them up in the air. And he said, "If I vote for this now, Joe, they'll crucify me in Massachusetts." If I vote for this now, Joe, they'll crucify me in Massachusetts. I'd never heard a man that I had assumed was a pretty strong person really manifesting fear in this way. But there were others. [Senator Arthur H.] Vandenberg stayed with us on the Republican side. But just enough left us, I now believe not over the merits of the matter, but because they saw an opportunity to really get at Roosevelt on the issue, to produce this defeat. I believe I did mention to you earlier--I'm not sure whether we put it on the tape or not--but the World Court fight provided the one wonderful opportunity I had to be present with President Roosevelt.
DANIELL: No, you haven't mentioned that before.

DICKEY: We didn't mention it?

DANIELL: No.

DICKEY: Well, then I certainly should speak of this. We were coming down to the last week of the debates, and we were approaching a vote, when Senator Robinson called me into his office one Saturday morning, and we were going over the laundry lists with Les Bifflie. I remember the senator said, "Well, I guess I'd better talk with the president." So he got the president on the telephone. First time I'd ever been present where anybody was talking to the President of the United States on the telephone. I was awed a bit by that to be present at that. So he started in talking, and said, "Mr. President, we're going over this, and I don't like the looks of it." He said, "I don't like the looks of it. I don't know. I think we still probably have got the votes, but we haven't got as many as we ought to have." And this sort of talk. Then he said, "There are a couple I think maybe we can get some help on. There's one fellow, one senator, that's wobbly, and I understand Mrs. Roosevelt has some influence with him." [Laughter] And I don't know what the president said, but I do know that he must have said something, well, that's a funny thing. In any event, he said enough that Robinson said, "Well, I don't know why wives should have influence with him. But that's what my friends tell me." Obviously Roosevelt had raised some question about whether they wanted to get her into the act. But in any event, Mrs. Roosevelt, actually, was the only one we could get in the White House that we felt we could use to get on the air and answer Father Coughlin. Well, of course, she was milk and toast compared with Coughlin's power. Well, then Robinson said, "Mr. President--"

[End of Tape #5B]
[Beginning of Tape #6A]

January 22, 1975

DANIELL: Okay. I guess we're back on again.

DICKEY: I was speaking of the conference in Senator Joe Robinson's office with Leslie Bifflie about the outlook for the voting in the Senate on the World Court Protocols, which I think were coming to a vote within the coming week. And Senator Robinson was on the telephone with President [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt about several specifics. And then he said, "I think we'd better review this whole political situation, Mr. President. And could we do it tomorrow with you?" Apparently the President said, yes.
And said, "Why don't you come up tomorrow afternoon, Sunday afternoon, up to my second-floor study?" And then Senator Robinson said, "Well, fine. I'd like to have several people with me." He said, "We ought to have Dr. [Francis Bowes] Sayre." He always referred to Sayre as "Dr. Sayre." And he said, "I'd like to bring along the young fellow who's been working with me here on this, his assistant." Well, gosh! [Laughter]

DICKEY: If somebody had told me I'd inherited $5 million, I couldn't have been more astonished and more pleased. Because he'd never said a word to me about it. He just did this. And he said, "Of course Les Biffle will be with me." He said, "That's the group I'd like to have." And apparently the President said, okay. Well, Sunday noon I went over to the White House---first time I'd ever been in the grounds. Past the Secret Service and so forth, and was ushered in to sit down in the Green Room until I was called. Well, as it turned out, Robinson came in, and said, "I want you to come right along with me." So we went upstairs to the President's study. And I guess we were there--well, certainly we were there between one and two hours of discussion, in which Robinson reported to the President on how this had looked, and how it looked to him now, what the issues were. But primarily their discussion was about individual senators and what could be done about them, who could do it, and would the President do it, or what should they do. And this drew me into the discussion at several points. They would ask very nicely about somebody and who could do this, and whom did we have to help us on the outside? And things like that. I remember--

DANIELL: Had you done in this process any direct contact yourself with individual senators?

DICKEY: Not-- No. Not that I recall at all. I think I worked solely with Senator Robinson and Biffle. I undoubtedly was present when Robinson was talking occasionally with a senator and that sort of thing. But I was not authorized or qualified to approach the Senate. But I was working with outside groups. The Association for the United League of Nations Association, several business groups that I'd worked with on the Trade Agreements Act.

DANIELL: That's right. Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And with Professor James Shotwell of Carnegie Endowment, who was a great figure on this. Phil [Phillip] Jessup, who subsequently became the first American judge on the World Court after World War II. The professor of international law at Columbia, a very well-known man. I was working with these fellows on a daily basis, getting them to get support on the
outside. Well, that was the conference in the President's study. My impressions of Roosevelt aren't very different from those that have been written up by many other people. This was a very confident man in his bearing. And he liked to tell stories. He would interrupt what seemed to me to be the business of the meeting with--I must tell you, Joe, about So-and-so. And then he'd go off. And then pretty soon. Okay, well, let's go back now where we were. And this sort of thing. I remember only one case involving the Court vote of an individual senator.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: We were talking about Senator Park Trammell from Florida, who was a Democrat. And on whom Robinson had counted, but Trammell was wobbling. As a matter of fact, I guess Trammel was the man that they thought Mrs. Roosevelt could do something with. And I remember it came back to the President saying something about he didn't think Mrs. Roosevelt could do anything with him. And he said, "I had him in the office the other day." And I forget what the matter was, the senator had been in Roosevelt's office about. But he said, "When he started to leave, and he got to the door, I said, 'Oh, Park, by the way. I hope you're going to be with us on the World Court.' And he stopped, and he looked around at me, and he said, 'Mr. President, I hope you're going to be with me on that trans-Florida canal.'" [Laughter] Well, this was a wonderful small case history of how presidents occasionally apparently—or more often than not—deal with senators, trading back and forth on issues. But that was quite an experience. And that was the only time I was ever present at a working conference with Roosevelt.

Well, there's much more that could be said in detail about the World Court. But when the vote came at the end of the week, it was, I guess, the first great disappointment of my life. I mean I had a sense of failing, of wondering what we might have done differently, of being deeply shaken about the American political processes; scared by [Father Charles E.] Coughlin; bitter about Hearst, that a person of that nature could sway the American electorate this way. Worried deeply about the impact of this upon the atmosphere of the international community because trouble was rolling up with Hitler and elsewhere, I knew enough about that to know that. It was a period of deep discouragement. The only thing I guess I took out of it except my education and understanding, which was certainly large, was a lot of additional work on the treaty power. Because I decided that here was an issue that really had to get more attention. Because if it could derail something of this sort, and could invite that kind of partisan action once people saw an opportunity to give the President a bad time over a two-thirds majority, this was something we had to really take
seriously. Previously I'd felt we'd finessed it with the Trade Agreements Act. But you couldn't finesse it on this thing. So I went to work and pulled together the material that I'd gathered on the my work on the Trade Agreements Act and on the World Court, and subsequently got a really very nice article out of it--indeed it was the lead article--in Foreign Affairs the year I came to the Dartmouth presidency in 1946, I guess it--

DANIELL: 'Forty-six it was. I remember that article.

DICKEY: But the article was entitled, "Our Treaty Procedure Versus Our Foreign Policies." It appeared in the April 1947 Foreign Affairs, and I always was terribly pleased that the editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, gave it the lead position. And I received some very nice comments about it from people who were knowledgeable. It was a subject on which at that point I was probably as well qualified as most people. I'd stayed with the subject for some years. I'm still interested in it. But a great deal has gone over the dam that I haven't been able to keep up with. But the two-thirds rule issue is still an unsolved aspect--or as Secretary of State [Elihu] Root put it, "It's still the irreparable mistake--" as he put it "--of the Constitution." Well, I suppose this would be a good place to break. But have you got questions?

DANIELL: Well, just on how much more is there in terms of your stay during the State-- How long did you stay in the State Department?

DICKEY: Until the latter part of the summer of '36. I think the next thing that perhaps you would want me to speak to would be some discussion of my relations with Alger Hiss and the whole Hiss Case business, which grew out of this experience. Because, just to make the transition, when I left and told Mr. Sayre that I was going back to the Boston law firm, which had approached me to find out whether I was possibly ready to come back--the same firm that I had been with at the outset--he, through various sources, sought a replacement for me as his assistant. And Alger Hiss became that man. And it was on the job that I had occupied that he got into the trouble that led to the Hiss Case. Now that's a fairly substantial story and an important story.

DANIELL: Yes. Why don't we save that story until the next time. What I think what we want in tying this up is in terms of--or it may be the two are so closely related you can't answer it--but the nature of your decision to go back to Boston. The decision itself.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. I can do that fairly quickly. It was a very difficult decision because I was having a first-rate experience, as I have already indicated. I was privileged to be involved in things at a level that ordinarily I couldn't
possibly have looked forward to for quite a few years. And I was having—we were having—a fine time. We were enjoying the Washington of those days. We had a house over in Alexandria, and we had two small children. I was just on the crest of the wave, even though, as I said, I was deeply disappointed by the defeat of the World Court. But increasingly, I became aware that there were a great many career people in the department—not necessarily people in the Foreign Service, but career people in the department—who were really not very mobile in respect to their careers. And when administrations changed, they might not lose their jobs, but they lost the opportunities for satisfaction, and they were pushed off in a corner into routine things. And I began to think about it and to realize that the only mobility I was ever going to have, the only career independence I was going to have, would be if I could establish myself as a lawyer who could move about. And I had not done that, of course, having only been with the law firm a matter of really a few months before I left to go to the Department of Corrections with Sayre and then down to Washington.

So increasingly, I had been mulling over the possibility—and something that I hoped could be postponed for some time—that I had better go back and establish myself somewhere as a practicing attorney. I had this appointment as assistant to the legal advisor, but actually most of my work, except for the cases that I've indicated, was not legal. And in any event, the cases that I did handle were not the kind of law that private clients hired you to do. Well, out of the blue, came this letter from one of the senior partners of the office who remembered me, saying—no, it came from one of the junior partners, I guess. It came from Frank Hammond, I believe, whom I had known when he'd been down in Washington as a lawyer on leave-of-absence from the firm. He was down in Washington with the SEC. I'd seen a fair amount of him. Well, he wrote to tell me that—I think Mr. F. E. Snow, the head of the firm, had died, and that the firm was going through a reorganization which was moving some people up the line and so forth. And he wondered whether, by any chance—or they wondered; his colleagues in the firm—whether by any chance I'd reached the point where I'd had enough, as they put it, of Washington, because--

**DANIELL:** Had you talked about this possibility with Hammond at all--

**DICKEY:** No, no.

**DANIELL:** --when he was in Washington?

**DICKEY:** Never. As I recall, never previously. And if I was at all interested, as they hoped I was, in coming back eventually to Boston practice, maybe this was the opportunity that wouldn't repeat itself. This was the argument, of
course, that I had to consider. Well, Chris and I talked it over. It was something that I really wasn't ready to do. But neither was I confident of where I'd find a job when I was ready. So we finally said, well, I guess we'd better say we'll come back. And that was the basis of my decision. So I wrote back to them and said that I would come back. And the only stipulation I made was that I hoped I would have the opportunity for close association with a certain partner, Robert Holt, whose work with corporations and with banks had always impressed me as being absolutely first rate.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: The result was they said to come along. And I forget when we went. I think we went back in September or something like that--certainly late summer or early fall--to Boston, to the law firm. Leaving the department was a terrible wrench for me in all ways--professionally, personally, socially. Everything had been just exceedingly attractive and better than I could possibly imagine. Perhaps I should say, too-- Well, I don't know how--whether you want to go into the Hiss business or not. But I can say just this much about it: When I told Mr. Sayre I had made up my mind about going back, he, I think it's fair to say, was really extremely disturbed. Because we had established a good relationship. It had apparently been satisfactory to him as far as my work was concerned. And personally I had seen a good bit of the family and helped out a bit with the younger Sayre children and things like that. So we'd had a really quite close relationship. And I dreaded telling him, to be really blunt about it. But I did. And then he said, "Well, let's talk it over." And so forth. Well, we-- I said, of course. And I went out to his house one night, and we had a long session about it. And the result net of it was that I was not sufficiently influenced by his arguments to feel that I could change my mind about it. And within a day or two told him that I'd made up my mind.

DANIELL: Why don't we hold off on the Hiss thing until next time. I just had a couple of minor questions about this Washington experience. I think the way you told about it certainly suggests the answer to this. But did you have anything to do with Dartmouth alumni groups? Or were they active at all in Washington during this three-year period. Clearly it was a very low priority item at all, if it occurred at all to you while you were there.

DICKEY: I'm really not sure about that, but it surely was a low priority item. And very different in that respect from my experience later when I went back to the department in 1940. I just do not recall any Dartmouth activities. I had been a class agent for five years, from the time I graduated in '29 until '34. But I think when I went to Washington, I gave up being a class agent. I
don't believe that I attended--I must have attended some Dartmouth alumni meetings--but at least I have no memory of it. It was not a major aspect of our lives at that point.

DANIELL: Okay. Which is not at all surprising. The second is a very--the second question I just jotted down--is a very different kind of question, and it has to do with your kind of calculations or your thoughts concerning your potential career in the State Department. And the question has to do with whether or not your absence--or your not having had any specialized training in some foreign service program, if that made any difference in the sense that--Or was it, at that point, the kind of career officer that you saw button-holed in the department [voice over].

DICKEY: I can't answer that quite specifically. Clearly, you don't make a career out of being an assistant to an assistant secretary of state who is a political appointment. And I of course knew that even if I stayed with Sayre until he left, that one of these days, when Roosevelt was no longer there, Sayre would go, and I would be out of that office. I did have my appointment-- My basic appointment, as I said earlier, was as an assistant to the legal advisor. And it is quite important to say that I did establish a very fine relationship with the legal advisor who was Green Hackworth. And who subsequently became a judge on the World Court. As a matter of fact, I guess he was the first American judge appointed to the World Court after World War II. And then he was succeeded by Phil Jessup. But in any event, he was the legal advisor, and a very close personal advisor to Secretary Hull. Mr. Hackworth was a quiet, to a degree old-fashioned kind of person. Very cautious. I suppose you'd say even conservative. The sort of person in whom Mr. Hull had a great deal of confidence. And when I began to work on these things for Mr. Sayre and the secretary, I fortunately had enough feel of the possibilities for Mr. Hackworth being unhappy about having an upstart come in there and take over the handling of the legal issues involved in the Trade Agreements Act and the World Court to operate very carefully as far as he was concerned. I'd forgotten all about that. But the moment you asked, it comes back. That I made it a point that I never sent a memorandum to Sayre or the secretary that didn't go to Mr. Hackworth.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: That I didn't go in and talk to Mr. Hackworth about what I was doing. So that he did not view me, apparently, as a threat. But really took a certain amount of satisfaction in it, and was--well, he was not effusive in his praise. The most important thing was that when I--when the summer of '36 came, and before he knew, I guess, that I was back (I'm not sure about
this, but it was right at the time), he called me in and said, what would I think about accepting a permanent appointment with him in the legal advisor’s office.

DANIELL: All right. Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And this would have been the route that I would have gone.

DANIELL: I see. Yes. That giving you a degree of security ___.

DICKEY: Actually he did approach me once again later when I was back in the law office, I guess, in ‘37 or thereabouts. I got a letter from him saying that a higher-grade job was open, and would I be interested in coming back? But that would have been the route I would have had to have gone so far as having a civil service-protected job in the department.

DANIELL: By then you had already made up your mind that you needed a period of firm.

DICKEY: I was reasonably clear that--I was really immediately clear that this legal advisor’s office was not the place. They had some journeymen competence in there. But it was not a very stimulating group of practitioners.

DANIELL: Yes. I should assume that within that framework it would have been a lot less exciting than what you've described already, the give-and-take of the higher-level politics involved in the Trade Agreements Act.

DICKEY: And if I'd gone into the office, my relationship to these other things would always have had to have been entirely through Hackworth. Unlike being over there in the assistant secretary's office where I was sort of operating as an independent person. No, the atmosphere would have been bureaucratic. I wasn't ready for that.

DANIELL: Well, that seems to be a good breaking point here now.

[End of Tape Side #6A]
[Interview continues on Side #7A-
(skipping Side #6B)]

February 5, 1975

DICKEY: ...in the late forties. But what do you think?
DANIELL: Well, it seems to me--

DICKEY: Shall we wait and pick it up? Or do you want to do it now?

DANIELL: Is the linkage to your experience in Washington great enough so this would be a logical place in which to do it?

DICKEY: Yes, yes.

DANIELL: Okay. Why don't we do it now then, and then we can move up to-- What you had said before, you had basically just simply outlined, and it was your departure from Washington-- And you explained.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, I think probably this is as logical--could take it at either end. So we might as well take it at this end. I was speaking, when we broke off, about the fact that I was genuinely reluctant to pull out of Washington and my State Department job at just that time; namely, the late summer of 1936. And did it only because the law firm had taken the initiative in asking me whether I might not be ready to consider coming back, since there had been somewhat of a reorganization in the firm, and they thought there was an opportunity there which they would like me to at least consider. And after considering it, we decided that I should go back. I think one of the most interesting things about this particular moment in my career was the fact that Mr. Sayre asked me, after we'd settled the question of my termination to go back, whether I would help him find somebody to take my place in his office. I was his personal assistant. And as his personal assistant, I would be given certain assignments such as I had been given in connection with the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the effort to get the World Court protocols approved in the Senate, things like that. But my daily job in his office was screening all the papers that came in for signatures, and especially the papers that came in for his information which would be some hundreds of cables from all over the world, the diplomatic missions. And they were selected out and sent to the various offices in the department, depending upon the nature of the office's responsibilities. So that we saw all the cables and all of the dispatches coming in from the diplomatic posts around the world that dealt with commercial policy, trade policy. Also those which dealt with major political problems that everyone at the assistant secretary level--and there were only three, I think it was, maybe four--assistant secretaries in those days compared with today, at least twice the number. And Mr. Sayre was the assistant secretary in charge of commercial policy, trade agreements program, and a few special assignments such as the World Court fight.
Well, of course I responded that I would do anything that I could to help him find somebody. Very quickly after that conversation—in a matter of days, as a matter of fact—I happened to meet a Harvard Law classmate of mine at luncheon; just accidentally ran into him at the Allies Inn right across the street from the old State Department Building which is now the Executive Offices Building—known in those days as the State/War/Navy Building. I met this Harvard Law classmate, Donald Hiss, who was the brother of Alger Hiss, concerning whom this story will be primarily concerned. I had always had a very high regard for Donald Hiss’s ability.

DANIELL: You had known him in—?

DICKEY: I had known him in law school, not intimately, but knew him to speak to. Knew that he had been one of the top-notch men in the class. I think he’d been Law Review, as I recall. And he was in Washington at this time in one of the New Deal agencies; I think it was the Bituminous Coal Agency, something of that sort. So while we were at luncheon, I said to him that I was reluctantly going back to practice in Boston later that summer or early fall. He expressed interest in it, in this plan to leave Washington of mine. And then said, "By any chance has Mr. Sayre filled that job?" And I said, "No, as a matter of fact he hasn't filled the job. He has asked me to make suggestions to him for filling it." Whereupon Donald took the initiative and said, "Well, would you be willing to mention my possible interest in it to him?" I said, "I surely will." Donald today, as a matter of fact, is with the big—perhaps the most prominent—Washington law firm, Covington Burleigh. Later, actually, although we won't have occasion probably to refer to this, Donald became the personal assistant to Dean Acheson when he became assistant secretary in the same office, curiously enough.

Well, I went back to the department, as I recall, right after luncheon that day. And went in to Mr. Sayre’s office—and I forget which one of us spoke up first. I'm not sure about that. But either I said, "I have a name to suggest to you," which I think is the way it came up. Or he said, he asked me, did I know, or what did I think—? It came up one way or the other. Either he asked me what did I think of the possibility of Alger Hiss succeeding me on the job; or I said to him, I have a name to suggest to you, Donald Hiss. But in any event, we were quite surprised, both of us, that very quickly it was clear that both brothers were interested in the possibility of getting that job. When Mr. Sayre told me in this conversation that he had seen Alger—I think he'd seen Alger that day at luncheon or somewhere—and had mentioned that I was leaving, and that Alger had said, "Well, have you filled the position?" When Mr. Sayre told me this, he said, "What would you think of Alger for the job?" I guess that's the way it must have come about.
DANIELL: Yes. Difficult to reconstruct it.

DICKEY: I can't tell which of us said what first. And I was somewhat taken aback. I was surprised because Alger was about--at least two years ahead of me at law school, maybe three years ahead of me. And was a good bit further up the line in respect to governmental responsibility. He was assistant to the Solicitor General over in the Justice Department. And I guess that just had never occurred to me, that he would be interested in the job which I had thought of as down the line. And I said, "Well, I can't imagine that you could get anyone better qualified if he were available." And then we talked about Donald, and I said, "Alger is older than Donald and more experienced. And of course would have the very specific qualification that he had been working with us, that is primarily with me and Mr. Sayre, on defending the constitutionality of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

DANIELL: Oh. You want to back up there for a second? because I didn't-- I don't think, when you were discussing that, you mentioned Alger Hiss as having participated in it.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, between '34, when the act was passed, and '36, the period I'm talking about, a lawsuit was brought actually by some protectionist interest.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: It involved Cuban pineapples; I remember this. A protectionist interest imported Cuban pineapples and turned himself into an importer, really, on a phoney basis. He was really an interest that wanted tariff protection.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: But in order to test the constitutionality of the act, they brought the act as an importer, bringing in Cuban pineapples. And I forget the detail of the case now. But in any event, the purpose of the case was to test the constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act. And since I had more or less had charge of preparing the argument on that when we were seeking to get the act passed in 1934, which I did tell you about.

DANIELL: Mmmm hmmm. Yes.

DICKEY: And since the Justice Department of course had the primary responsibility for defending the constitutionality of law for the executive branch, the Justice Department--I was working with Hiss, who was in the Solicitor
General's office in the Justice Department, in developing the legal defense of the Trade Agreements Act. And we saw a fair amount of each other during that period which, I suppose, was the latter part of '35 and the early part of '36, working together in preparing a brief defending the constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act. Just incidentally, we had fairly definite disagreements about how the act could best be defended. But these were entirely professional disagreements, and we were on the same side of the case.

DANIELL: What kind of an impression did you have of him as an individual--quite apart from what you've said ___?

DICKEY: Oh, I--my impression of him was of an exceedingly attractive, highly articulate, pleasant, very bright individual. Indeed, I had no reservations about him whatsoever. And I would say now in the course of this fairly long story--I'll probably have occasion to say many times--I never in the course of the whole time had the slightest basis for being suspicious of his loyalties or thinking of him as somebody that could conceivably get into the kind of trouble that got him into court. And so forth. Now I will say one thing that if I look back in later years, as I look back, there's only one thing that in retrospect--not at the time, but in retrospect--when everything else had happened, took on possibly a suspicious quality. At the time it took on none. And that was the fact that he was interested in coming into the State Department at two grades level than he was over in Justice Department. At the time I was what was called a P-4. That is, I was getting my--

DANIELL: A P instead of GS.

DICKEY: My base salary would have been $4600, I think. But under the reduction in salaries that had taken place during the Depression, I think I was getting $3800--or maybe, by that time, $4,000--a year. And Alger Hiss was getting, I think, $6500. He was two grades up. He was a P-6, not just a P-5. Now the reason I remember this so vividly--and I have not talked about it, frankly, very much because it could be misunderstood; and since I'm relating solely a retrospective bit of, shall we say, thinking--the reason I remember it so vividly is that at this conversation with Mr. Sayre about Donald and Alger-- And I had responded very affirmatively about Donald. I said I think he would be just perfect for the job. Especially with his background of working on the Trade Agreements Act with us.

DANIELL: Right, right.

DICKEY: If he's available to you. "But," I said, "I am frankly surprised that he's available to you."
DANIELL: This is Alger you mean. You said Donald, but you meant Alger.

DICKEY: Oh, I beg your pardon. I meant Alger.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And Mr. Sayre said, "Well, I was a little surprised that he would be interested. But he is interested." And he said, "I want to say something to you now." He said, "I have inquired at the personnel office in the State Department, and we can probably get the job, in view of his experience, graded at P-5. But he would have to come back a grade from P-6." And he said, "I don't want you to leave and then to have this job upgraded. Because," he said, "if you'll stay, I would make an effort to get a P-5 rating for this job." Well now, I felt that was terribly decent of Sayre. Something he didn't need to say at all. I'd made my decision and so forth. And I said, "I very much appreciate that kind of thoughtfulness, but I'm perfectly clear that it's not an issue of salary. It's an issue of whether I prepare myself as a lawyer or not." So we never spoke of that again. But when looking back on this situation, and if you're prepared to assume that Alger Hiss had in fact gotten himself into some sort of a mess--and we'll come to that later--this then takes on, in retrospect, at least a somewhat bothersome possibility in its-- But at the time it didn't bother me because I just assumed that State had a prestige position, that he'd been working on these things, and he wanted to get into foreign affairs, and this was the way to do it.

DANIELL: Yes. Certainly it makes-- That possibility makes his action much more understandable, potentially, in retrospect.

DICKEY: Potentially, in retrospect. Well, the net of this was that when I said this, I then had occasion--and I think it was that afternoon--to call up Donald Hiss and say, "Donald, a very strange thing has happened. While you and I were talking, Mr. Sayre happened to be talking with your brother Alger and has been discussing the possibility of Alger taking the job." I said, "I'm sure Alger would have a primary call on it because he had been working with Mr. Sayre and with myself on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act which was a major responsibility in Sayre's office." And Donald was very fine about it, and laughed about it, and that was that. Well, this takes on also, I should say, a certain intriguing quality. When, you remember, as you probably don't, that when the Hiss Case broke later, in the latter stages of it, they accused Alger, as well as Donald.

DANIELL: Accused Donald as well as Alger.
DICKEY: They accused Donald as well as Alger. Yes. I'm really getting all mixed up here. I'm glad you're here to keep me straight. And then there was some very loose talk, you know, of course, that went on in many circles during that time. But I always thought that the fact that they were both interested to some--without having, obviously, conferred--rather suggested that there wasn't a conspiratorial link there between the two. Well, that's of no great consequence. But it was an aspect of the matter that did intrigue me.

DANIELL: Did you at any point have--when the Hiss trial was on or Donald's name was brought up--have any involvement in saying what you just said now to anyone to try and disengage yourself?

DICKEY: No, no. I never did because Donald's name wasn't brought into the matter until, as I recall, until after the trials were over.

DANIELL: Oh, I see. Okay.

DICKEY: Now the only thing that is properly something to say in this kind of an oral history, at this point about this matter, is that years and years later, after Mr. Sayre returned from the Philippines where he went to be U.S. High Commissioner just before World War II, and while he was--just after--I recall, he'd been appointed to be the U.S. representative on the Trusteeship Council of the U.N., which would have been I guess the late forties, he wrote me and said that he was trying to reconstruct how Alger Hiss had come to work for him.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: And his memory was that I had suggested him. Well, I wrote back and told, as I recall, this story. And I said, "If your memory is that I suggested Alger, I certainly don't want to be in the position of saying you're wrong about that. But my memory is this." I was just a little disturbed at Sayre's memory, to be absolutely, utterly honest about it.

DANIELL: Yes. I can see why. ___.

DICKEY: At the same time I had a great respect for him, and could readily see, with this conversation having taken place the way it did--as I told you, in his office--and my having recommended Donald, he might well have thought that I'd recommended Alger.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: I mean this would not have been unusual. But at the same time, I know, as a matter of fact, and I could have said in the letter, you're wrong about that. What I did say was that I talked to you about Alger--about Donald--at the same time that we were talking about Alger.

DANIELL: Well, it's understandable.

DICKEY: It's of no great consequence, but--

DANIELL: Well, it's understandable why he might--his memory might--go in those directions because it was clearly functional for him to disengage having been involved in it.

DICKEY: That's right. There was no question about it. He had a very natural interest in not having been responsible, perhaps, as assistant secretary, for bringing a fellow in that got into this kind of trouble. Well, I only mention that because this is one of the few aspects of this whole Hiss thing that--it's collateral, really, to the whole Hiss story--but in time I just wasn't entirely sure how to handle this in my response to him, since I didn't want to be in a position of appearing to be afraid of identification with Alger Hiss. Because I never could have disengaged from that identification, and never had any reason to do so. Never had any reason to do so! And made public on many occasions the utter confidence that I had had in him right up to the time of the trial. Now, I'll relate that story since this is a--

DANIELL: Oh, it is.

DICKEY: --a fairly major experience. Well, Alger got the job, and I saw a fair amount of him during the last--I guess the last three weeks or four weeks that I was on the job, by way of briefing him with respect to the procedures and responsibilities of the job that I was leaving and that he was taking on. Then we went back to Boston in I forget what it was. I guess September--August, late August, or September--of '36. I went into the law firm, Gaston Snow--I forget what its name was then; Hunt, Rice & Boyd, I guess. Well, I hadn't been back in the law firm a year, when in '37 I got a letter, I guess it was, from Mr. Sayre saying that the Trade Agreements Act was coming up for renewal. It had only a three-year term, and would be coming up for renewal, therefore, in '37. And they wanted to know whether I would come back--could come back on a leave-of-absence--from the law firm to help on the renewal of the act, and particularly working on The Hill and with private organizations, business organizations, peace organizations, church organizations, and so forth, developing support for renewal of the act. Well, this was a very attractive possibility. And I, of course, said, yes, and went down. And lived there by myself at a hotel during--oh, I guess,
for several months; I forget what it was--during the period of the renewal fight. And we got the act renewed without any crippling amendments, as we were fond of saying. During that period I saw Alger a bit, but really only off and on. I was working with him on renewal matters, but on nothing else.

Then I went back to the law firm, where I was engaged mainly in corporate law practice, assisting several of the senior partners. I had no practice to speak of. Well, I had no practice of my own. Every now and then some indigent client would come in, and they would ask me to take care of him or her simply because nobody else felt it was worth their time. But mainly my work was on the mutual investment trust clients working on SEC matters. Primarily Massachusetts Investors Trust was the big client in that field. And I did a good bit of their work. Along about this time--I guess it was just after I went back from the State Department period again in '37--the legal advisor of the State Department, Green Hackworth, whom I have mentioned earlier, wrote to me and said that there was a senior position opening up in his office, and would I be interested in coming to the department permanently and leaving private practice to do this? I think I mentioned this earlier.

DANIELL: No, you didn't.

DICKEY: Well, I thought fairly seriously about this. This could have been a career job and all of that. But it really didn't hold much challenge for me, and I couldn't see the routine of practice in the department would really be much better than the routine of practice outside. In many ways it could be less stimulating. And when I was outside, I had already discovered I could be called back to the department to do some things that I was interested in. So with a measure of reluctance, but still with no doubts about the decision, I declined to go back to Mr. Hackworth. [Sound of ringing telephone] [Pause] Well, just to keep the chronology in this picture, I went back to the law office there in '37, and was engaged in practice which we can speak about if we want to. I should later say that another thing that I had an opportunity to think about-- Well, there were two really attractive possibilities that came up during this period. This was the period of my professional mobility, when I had begun to just stick my head up through the--well, stick my head up a little bit, and was somewhat more visible than you are your first five years or so in practice. And I had a letter from-- during this period; I think it must have been in late '36 or '37--from Professor [Russel "Cotty"] Larmon, who taught administration here at Dartmouth, and whose course I had taken.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Cotty Larmon.
DICKEY: Cotty Larmon. Whose course I had taken in senior year, and regarded it as one of the finest courses that I had ever had. He wrote to inquire whether by any chance I would be able to consider coming back to Dartmouth on the faculty in his department which was a one-man department, the Department of Administration. He went on to say that President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins had wanted him to get somebody to work with him so that there would be a possibility of continuity in this field, if and when Professor Larmon left it. Well, this was attractive to me, except that again it would have meant a total break from the preparation that I had already put into the field of law. It would have meant compensation that was substantially less than I could look forward to in a year or two certainly in the law office—not that I could look forward to any great salary, but academic salaries at that point were decidedly a cut below those of young lawyers.

DANIELL: About down at P-3.

DICKEY: Well, yes. And the net of it was that I much appreciated the fact that they had invited me, but I declined. There was another one that came up during this period—and I can't be sure whether it was '37 or '38; conceivably even as late as '39, although I don't think so—which was a much more serious thing for me. And I'm interrupting the Hiss now, but we've got to do this in order to get chronology in. I got a message—I forget whether it was a letter or a telephone call or something—from a man named Packer. His first name escapes me. Who was quite mysterious about it. Said he was from New York and wanted to know whether I would come up and have a talk with him at the Parker House. [Laughter] I thought maybe I was going to get a client. And I said, yes, I would come up and talk with him. And I went up to the Parker House to talk with him. It's all very amusing now. But he was quite mysterious about all this. And when I got up, and we met, and he was an attractive enough fellow.

It came out fairly quickly that he was from the office of Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in New York. And was in charge of the Rockefeller Family's personal philanthropies. This was before there was a Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, and of course there was the Rockefeller Foundation. But the family carried on very extensive what you might call family philanthropy as distinguished from the foundation, which was quite separate even then. Well, Packer went on to say that I had been brought to his attention by someone—I am not sure now who recommended me. I had the impression that Nelson had not because I had not known Nelson well in college. I just knew who he was. Indeed, I'm not sure that he knew who I was in college. He was Class of '30, and I was '29, of course. But
somebody had mentioned me, and I guess Nelson knew of me by this time. But Packer had been investigating me as only a Rockefeller Foundation bureaucrat would investigate somebody else. And he knew more about me, it seemed to me, than I knew about myself. And he was terribly anxious that this shouldn't be discussed with anybody else, and on and on and on, and so forth. Well, the net of it was he wanted to know whether I would consider coming with him as his right-hand man, as his assistant in this work in the Rockefeller—

[End of Tape Side #7A]
[Beginning of Tape Side #7B]

DICKEY: I was--I think it's fair to say--intrigued by such a possibility. I had only been to New York when I passed through it on my way from Lock Haven to Dartmouth, and from time to time during my undergraduate years. And then in law school. Not very often. And I had no idea really what living and working in New York would be. But I knew it was a big place, and, needless to say, I realized that giving money away for--or recommending the giving of money--by the Rockefeller Family would be a very interesting activity. Or so it seemed to me. Well, I told him I certainly would want to give any such opportunity really serious thought. I'd have to talk to my wife about it. And I said I would want to feel free to talk with one or two people up in Hanover. And I had in my mind Cotty Larmon and President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins, whom I had gotten to know sufficiently to have great respect for his judgment. He said, fine. But other wise he would prefer that I not talk about it since they preferred not to have their affairs discussed unnecessarily. I don't believe I ever mentioned it to anybody in the law firm, as I think back on it now.

In any event, I did come home, talked it over with Chris, we decided it was something that had to be taken seriously. We had no idea where it would lead. This was one of the puzzling and intriguing things about it. But we decided to come up to Hanover. And I called up Cotty Larmon and asked him whether I could come up and talk with him about it. And he said, yes. Could come up and talk with him. I don't think I told him what it was about. And I came up and met with him at his house. Had a long talk. He was always a very cautious advisor. He didn't say you should do this or you should not do this. But he did, as I think most people, try to be helpful, to ask the questions that needed identification and probing. And then he said to me, he said, "You know, I really think this is sufficiently important to you, and I think it would interest Mr. Hopkins." Because of course he knew the Rockefeller Family quite well, and was a good friend of John D., Jr. He said, "I wonder whether you might not like to talk with him." And I said, "Well, I certainly would. I didn't know whether it would be in order to try to
see him or not." "Well," he said, "let me call him up." So he called up and identified me. I don't know whether Mr. Hopkins remembered me or not. I think he thought he did.

In any event, I went from Larmon's down to the president's house to see him. I remember it was the first time I think I was ever in the president's house. And we had quite a little talk in the study. And the net of it was, he said, "Well, I can understand how this appeals to you. And I'm very hesitant to come down as negatively as I'm going to. But," he said, "I'm not sure--" I forget what his words were. But the net of it was, "I would be afraid that this really was the kind of job where you had to--for a young fellow--keep your light under a bushel more than really you might want to from the point of view of other experiences, talking with people about your job, and so forth." As I looked back on it, Jere, it's not unlike advice I subsequently gave to quite a few Dartmouth students who talked about going to the CIA. I said, okay, if you're an older man, and you've made your peace with the world and with your career. But if you're still on the make--I used to say to these fellows--the CIA requires of you low visibility, confidential treatment of your job and everything else; and this, in my opinion, is not the way for a young fellow to develop and grow and really enjoy--

DANIELL: Yes. I think that would be particularly true in the case of a large ____.

DICKEY: Yes. It ___ on the job. But Mr. Hopkins did emphasize this. He said that family situation there, it's a wonderful thing. But they want you to keep your--well, keep things to yourself. So he said, "I really can't say that I think this is a job in which there's any opportunity for development and growth that I would like to see you have." And something else that he said that's always stayed with me. He said, "You know, I know this family pretty well. And I know the boys, and I think very well of them." He said, "There's a certain very polite competition going on for their place in the sun in this country." He said, "I think I know who's going to come out on top. I think it will be Nelson."

DANIELL: [Laughter] Oh, really!

DICKEY: "But even so," he said, "I guess, although I suppose this can get me into a little bit of embarrassment," he said, "my advice to you, it has to be fairly definite: I don't think it's what you're looking for." Well--

DANIELL: Are you still hoping to go back to Washington at this point?
DICKEY: But this was, as far as I was concerned, if Mr. Hopkins knew that situation as well as I thought he knew it, and was as wise and had as much good judgment as he did, and the weight of the argument got home to me--

DANIELL: Yes. Oh, yes. Yes.

DICKEY: I went back and wrote Packer, thank you very much, but I won't do it. [Sound of carillon] It was one of the fairly major--or so it seemed to me at the time--major decisions. Later, some of the family, when I got to know them well, and Nelson indeed a year or two later when he wanted me for another purpose, kidded me. And Mr. Hopkins told me that John D., Jr. had at one time said to him, "Mr. Hopkins, I never thought you would be unwilling to recommend me as an employer." [Laughter] Half jokingly, you know. But that was that. Well, that was one of the important things that happened during the period I was back in the law office. Also this was the period which, I think we'd better talk about separately, that I established a very active relationship with Dartmouth--in Dartmouth alumni affairs. But that's a separate story.

DANIELL: Yes, we'll get to that later.

DICKEY: Now to get back to the Hiss story.

DANIELL: I was just going to say, as we go along, and you mention things to cover later, I'm keeping a running list of that.

DICKEY: Okay. But this was the period when I met Harvey [Perley] Hood [II] and Walter Powers and major figures in Dartmouth alumni affairs in Boston. The next thing I remember about my relationship with Hiss was that one day I was down in the department in I think it was 1939. It was at the time that the issue of selling scrap iron to Japan was beginning to become prominent in American affairs. And that would have been, I think, in the summer and fall of '39. Conceivably it could have been as late as '40. Maybe it was the summer and fall of '40. I'd have to check this out a little. I could check it out very quickly. But in any event, I was down in Washington, I think, on some legal job. No! I know what it was. I was asked to come back to the State Department again on a renewal of the Trade Agreements Act in the winter of '40 because it's three years from '37 to '40. And this time they invited me to come back with a very nice title, special assistant to the secretary, which was about as high as you could go unless you took a political appointment as an assistant secretary or something like that. To work in the same way on the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act.
Now I think I'd better not go into that one. That was really quite an important experience. We'd better put that down for special discussion. But in '39, I guess it was, just before I did that, Mr. Sayre came at me and said that he had been appointed--or was going to be appointed--by the President to be in the U.S. High Commissioner in the Philippines, and to go out to the Philippines, which was a very major appointment at that time. And he wondered whether I hadn't gotten far enough in the law and private practice--

DANIELL: I think he was really after you.

DICKEY: --that I would be interested in coming out with him to the Philippines as his assistant out there. Well, this again was really terribly tempting because I had never had any overseas experience. And Chris and I read up on the Philippines, and read up on the climate of the Philippines, and so on and so forth. And I forget now just what the pros and cons were as they shook down in my mind. But what I do remember was that I decided, no. I'm not going to do it. And part of it, I remember, was the feeling that while I was deeply, really grateful to Mr. Sayre for the opportunities that he had given me for development and satisfaction and all of those things, and the great respect I had for him, that I probably was well not to make my career as just one man's assistant. And I've since given other people that advice, actually. But this was a consideration that began to loom with me. That I'd go out there, and where in the world did I go from there except being his assistant?

At this point he left the State Department. And when he left the State Department, Alger Hiss went from being Sayre's assistant to being assistant to Stanley Hornbeck who was in charge of Far Eastern Affairs. Now once again, I have to say on this particular kind of a record, that in retrospect, Alger's going to Hornbeck can be--as an assistant--can be a really worrisome thing. Hornbeck was--he was a most difficult curmudgeon kind of person in the department. Nobody that I knew in the department went out of his way to find himself working for Stanley Hornbeck. He was respected for his knowledge in Far Eastern Affairs. But he was a very opinionated man. He was not an easy person. And I--in retrospect again, not at the time, but in retrospect again--as I look back on this, I thought, my God! Maybe there was an ulterior reason for being willing to go up and--to come down--from being an assistant to an assistant secretary to being an assistant to the Foreign Eastern advisor.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.
DICKEY: But this again I want to emphasize is all in retrospect. Well, I happened to go up during this period to just go by and pay my respects and say "hello" to Alger Hiss. I remember this because I'd made a bet with him at that time when I went by. I said, "It seems to me that the U.S. government is really getting into a very unfortunate position on this scrap iron exports to Japan." I said, "I just can't imagine this thing isn't going to come a cropper, and I'm not sure how." But I said, "I'll bet you that by Christmas you and the others who are making this policy and are working on it will have pulled off." And he said, "Oh, no." Alger, when he had a position, was never in much doubt about it.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: He said, "Oh, no. No." And he said, "If you knew as much about it as I do, you wouldn't say that." "Well," I said, "I'll just bet you a half." And as a matter of fact, I won my half, and I never got it. Well, I subsequently saw Alger Hiss during the postwar planning period. I became involved in--quite a few things happened between now and then, but we're now finishing off the Hiss Case.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: When I saw him, he went from that job to being with Leo Pasvolsky, who was special assistant to the secretary for postwar planning. Leo Pasvolsky. And Pasvolsky put Alger in as the director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, I think they called it, which was really the postwar planning office that had to do with the planning of future international organizations, specifically the U.N. idea. A very responsible and important position. In 1944--I'm jumping over quite a few other things that I did which we may want to come back to--in 1944 I was asked to, after I got through with another Trade Agreements Act renewal fight, the fight of '43, I was asked by Pasvolsky and, on his recommendation, by the secretary, whether I would come over into the postwar planning work and take charge of developing the department's relationship with the American public with regard to postwar organization and planning. An assignment that appealed to me very much. And it was suggested that I should have a title special consultant to the secretary for the development of, if you will, public information about postwar planning.

I went into that--that work was one of the major experiences of my departmental years towards the end, and I think we'd better come at that separately. But in the course of that work, I reestablished a fairly close working relationship with Alger Hiss. Because he was working on the substantive aspect of planning, if you will, the U.N. with Pasvolsky and the
others; and I was working on the side of building up public support and public understanding about it. I did carry on that work, as we can say later, with a very definite philosophy that it had to be done on a two-way basis: That is to say, we had to help people on the outside make an input into the thinking of the department, as well as to make the department's thinking available to them for their support. But that's another story.

In the course of this year--this took place in '44, late in '44 and then in early '45. Alger and I had a fairly abrasive experience in our relationship at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington when the Soviet and the British and the U.S. had their meeting in Washington to agree upon a draft charter, really, for use at the subsequent San Francisco conference. The experience--or the abrasive incident--is not part of the Hiss story. I mention it only by way of saying that my relationship was not a social one. I saw very little of him except at big cocktail parties. We did have this cross-grained experience which I'll tell about later in the other connection, that is in the work I was doing for the department. But again I want to say-- And then we went out to San Francisco where he was the secretary of the whole overall conference, of the United Nations conference, in the international Secretariat. And I was out there as the public liaison officer of the American delegation. So that we saw something of each other at San Francisco, but really didn't see a great deal of each other in San Francisco since he was working down in one building, and I was in another. And my responsibility was to the American delegation and the consultants who were there with the American delegation--in itself an important story. Whereas he was running, so to speak, the conference as the secretary, international secretary.

When the conference was over, and I came back to Washington, and then I came to Dartmouth in the late summer of '45, when my appointment was made at that time--we can go into that later--but about a year later, I think it was in '46 or '47, I forget, when the Hiss Case first surfaced (it was the summer of '46 or '47; I guess it must have been the summer of '46)--

DANIELL: I don't have that. ___.

DICKEY: I had just left the department relatively recently when I was up in Canada with my wife's family. And the newspapers had a very small inch or two story to the effect that a former State Department officer-- Alger Hiss was then the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and had been put into that job by John Foster Dulles as a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and had such stalwarts as John W. Davis, the great former Democratic candidate for president, one of the leading lawyers, etc., etc. If ever there was an establishment
organization, I guess, it was the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Alger was in as president of it. And this little item said that somebody had charged him with having been involved in a Soviet network or something. It was just a little item in a Canadian paper. I remember seeing this, and I said at the family dinner table, I said, "This is really just about the greatest good news that we've had, because they have now finally accused somebody who can really clear himself without any foolishness at all. I mean they've carried this business of accusing people-- I mean 'soft on Communism' and this and that--to the point where they finally accused a man who can really clear himself. And we'll have unquestioned credentials with respect to his loyalty.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And I think probably this is a good place to break. But that, I must say, was my view of Alger Hiss and the original accusation.

DANIELL: Yes. Okay.

February 14, 1975

DICKEY: This might be the turning point in the witch hunt. I'm afraid-- Is it--?

DANIELL: Yes. I think we're going okay.

DICKEY: I'm afraid, as it turned out, it was the turning point the other way. Because it gave McCarthy and his cohorts a position of, well, respectability in the sense that they--as the Hiss Case subsequently turned out--they could point to it as something that proved they knew what they were talking about. Well, to go on with it, because we're just in the middle of it. I said that I thought this was the summer of '47.

DANIELL: That's right.

DICKEY: And it was either the summer of '47 or '48, and I'm not sure whether it dragged out for another year before it got into the House Investigating Committee on which [Richard Milhouse] Nixon, as a congressman, was sitting. My memory is sufficiently sharp to fix that. But I know, for reasons that I'll explain in a moment, that I did not have occasion to talk with Alger Hiss about this until '48, the summer of '48. And his trials did not come on, his court trials, did not come on until late '48 or early '49. So it just may be that this was the summer of '48 when I saw this item, rather than the summer of '47. Well, I don't have much memory of what transpired. I did have occasion to be in the State Department shortly after that or right
about that time. And a man who had been in my office, the Office of Public Affairs, with me, was then in charge of foreign service personnel in the department. And he took me aside and said, "I assume you've heard that there's real trouble around Alger Hiss." And I said, well, I had seen a--I think my response was that I had seen a small newspaper item, but I had heard nothing more, and I didn't think there was anything--I assumed there wasn't anything to it. He said, "Well, I'm afraid there may be." And that was all that I heard from State Department people.

Then I think the next thing that is of interest--or would be of interest to you and to historians--is that in the summer of 1948, and I'll say how I fix this. Well, I'll say it right now. Because very shortly--I was talking about the presidential election that was coming that fall. But in the summer of '48, and I would guess it was August or September, the latter part of the summer, I attended a meeting of the World Peace Foundation, which is an old peace society foundation in Boston. I was the trustee of the foundation at that time. And Alger Hiss, in his capacity as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was also a trustee of World Peace Foundation. The chairman of the board at that time, quite interestingly, was Harvey Bundy, a very well known Boston lawyer, who was the father of Mac [MacGeorge] Bundy and Bill [William] Bundy and so on and so forth.

DANIELL: That's a question I don't have to ask then.

DICKEY: No. And there were quite a few other well known Bostonians who'd had sustained interest as citizens in the problems and causes of world peace. By this time Alger Hiss had become quite prominent by reason of having been before the House committee--I forget which House committee it was. I don't think it was the House Un-American Activities Committee, but it may have been. But it was a committee on which Nixon, as a new congressman, was serving. I'll tell you all about that in a minute. Well, I had rather assumed that since Alger had been in the newspapers--and the big news had been that he'd denied ever knowing a man named Whitaker Chambers, and then had asked some questions about whether he was a fellow with bad teeth and other things like that--I had rather assumed from the newspaper accounts that Alger would not be attending the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the World Peace Foundation. But I got there in the morning, and there he was. And we greeted each other warmly as old colleagues in the State Department, and the fellow who'd taken my job when I left in 1936. And had seen a good big of each other in the postwar planning work. But we didn't say anything at all about what he'd been involved in. And sat down. And we had about two hours of business. And at about noontime, Harvey Bundy as chairman said, "Well, as we all know,
we've had a practice here of having luncheon after we've finished our business. And it's always been a pleasant thing to have some member of the board who's had an interesting experience tell the board about it informally at luncheon. He said, "I wonder, Alger, whether you'd like to do that. But I want you to feel completely at ease in saying that you'd prefer not to if you really would prefer not to. But if you would welcome an opportunity to talk about what must be a terribly difficult experience for you to go through, if you'd like to talk about it in the presence of friends, with friends, why of course we'd welcome it." Very warm, natural invitation.

Alger responded very quickly. And he said, "Well, Harvey, I would welcome such an opportunity. I haven't really had that kind of an opportunity, I would like to do it." So Harvey said, "Well, go ahead and tell us about it." Well, then he began and related the story that he'd--essentially as he'd related it to the committee. Told about how he had been uncertain in his identification of Chambers. I think by that time he had agreed that he had met this fellow in some way. But the Pumpkin Papers--I'll come to that later--had not yet been thrown on the table. Or brought out of the pumpkin. And he said it was a fascinating experience. He told about it in a really very cool, almost humorous way. He said, "It's not something that anybody enjoys. But," he said, "I found it a challenging experience."

DANIELL: I'll bet he did.

DICKEY: Yes. All of us listened with just studied fascination. Because we had all begun to be pretty well shaken up by this thing, even at that point. And at one point, Harvey or somebody said to him, when we were asking questions--and I didn't ask any questions of him in the meeting--but Harvey or someone else did say, "What do you make of this committee? What's their attitude? Are they in the position of the prosecutor? Or are they genuinely seeking to understand?" Well, he gave them pretty high marks for their basic objectivity, as he saw it. He said, "There are some that aren't very impressive, and some who are antagonistic and so forth. But," he said, "there is one fellow on that committee whom I hadn't know about before. But he's very impressive." And of course we said, "Who's that?" And he said, "Well, his name's Nixon, from California." And he said, "He really digs into the matter, and he's a very strong man on this committee." That's about all I remember him saying about Nixon. He was quite confident--and conveyed to us his confidence--that it was going to come out all right. It was unpleasant, but there'd been a tragic, ghastly mix-up here in some way, which he couldn't explain. Somebody just said, "How do you explain this situation?"
DICKEY: I had to leave the meeting about, oh, I would guess one-thirty or one forty-five to go down to North Station to catch the afternoon train up to White River. In those days they still had a parlor car that went to White River. And I had a seat on it. I excused myself from the meeting while they were still going on, and didn't say where I was going. Just said I had to leave a little early. I got down to the station. Was sitting in there reading the newspaper, when who comes into the chair car but Alger Hiss. The train hadn't left the station yet of course. I was mildly astonished, and I said, "Gee, if I'd known you were going to take this train, I certainly would have waited." And he said, "Well, I didn't realize that you were taking the train, or I would have spoken about it." I said, "Where are you going?" He said, "I'm going up to my summer home at Peacham, Vermont." That train went up the valley somewhere where he got off. He said, "You're going back, I assume, to the college." And I said, "Yes."

So we sat together facing each other with those swivel chairs that you could swing around and face each other. And I said, "Well, needless to say--" And of course I knew him as Alger. I said, "Needless to say, Alger, I was just intensely interested in what you had to say. And I certainly was impressed by the way you related this experience." And he said some unimportant observations, more or less along the lines that he'd been speaking on at the luncheon meeting. Then he said, "Well, how do you see this whole thing? You're a lawyer. You know the department. How do you see this whole thing?" Well, I remember that by that time I was genuinely apprehensive that something was wrong here. That if there were just a ghastly mis-identity, mistaken identity, or something, that I would have thought it could have been cleared up before that. If he was being pursued by some psychopath or psychotic person, then this was serious in itself. I just had a deep sense of apprehension that something was wrong.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: So I said, "Well, I really doubt that I have anything very helpful to say. Heaven knows, I would like to say something helpful if possible. But," I said, "I guess the most important thing to say to you is that your friends have faith in you, and all the people I know who've known you have just complete faith in you." And this was so at that point. But I said, "Perhaps the most important thing I can do is to tell you that many of these friends now feel that the burden of going forward is on you to clear this up. Now," I
said, "I don't know how you go forward." There had been talked about bringing a libel suit against Chambers, provided he made these charges outside the immunity of the Congress. I said, "I really don't know enough, Alger, about what the alternatives are here to say how you do this. But I do think that the most important thing for me to say in response to your question is that people who have gone to bat for you in this matter feel that it's really now up to you to go forward and clear it up." And I said, "I'm sure that's a large order, but I just think you must not leave this thing where it is." Now at this point there was no suits, no Pumpkin Papers, but just a lot of accusation that had not been adequately disposed of. And I said a little bit more about that.

He said, "Well, maybe you're saying the same thing as this letter says." And he reached inside his jacket pocket, somewhat dramatically I thought, and pulled out an envelope that had been opened, a letter, and just handed it to me. I remember seeing that the return address was Harvard Law School, Paul Freund. Well, he knew right away that would get my attention, because Paul Freund was the top constitutional law authority in the country at the time. And is today, probably, or one of the top. And had been in the Justice Department with Alger. Alger was in the Justice Department earlier. I hadn't seen anything or Freund or known him to speak--more than just to speak to while he was in the Justice Department. But I knew that he was a very substantial person in the law, and had had both practical experience in the Justice Department, as well as being an academic scholar of constitutional law.

Well, I opened the letter up and began to read a full page. I think it may have been a two-page letter. It was "Dear Alger...." and so forth. And he went on to say that he and others had felt as if they were involved in this as much as he was, Alger was, because they had gone to bat, and they were prepared to go to bat to help dispose of this terrible situation that he was now involved in. But that the time had come when he had to say to Alger that "you've just got to take the initiative now to dispose of this thing. You mustn't let it rest because those of us who have spoken of your reputation and our knowledge of you, have really shot our bolt. And it's not that you owe it to us, but you owe it to yourself to take an initiative in clearing this up." It was quite a letter. I'm a little hazy in my memory as to whether he said--he spoke of a libel suit. And he spoke of the fact that libel suits were difficult. And whether he himself recommended that Alger bring a libel suit or not, I don't quite remember from the letter. The letter, someday, will speak for itself, I hope, if it's around.

Well, after reading it, I handed it back. And I said, "That's quite a letter. And it is essentially what I was trying to say to you, although it goes a
good bit further into the problem of how you might take an initiative. "Well," he said, "I've been giving this a lot of thought. I've been giving it a lot of thought." He hadn't spoke of this at all at the luncheon. "As to how I might take an initiative on this. And," he said, "I've had a lot of good counsel, as you can imagine." "Yes," I said, "I can imagine you have." He said, "I've had long discussions with John W. Davis." Who was a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the former Democratic presidential candidate in--when was it, '24? And the man that probably was regarded as the senior man in prestige in the American Bar. And he said, "Mr. Davis is very dubious about a libel suit. He says that it's an easy thing to bring a libel suit, but awfully hard to win. And they're also very concerned about where I would bring it. If I brought it up in New York, they think I might have trouble with a New York," jury for reasons that are extraneous to this. And he said-- I think he said he'd also conferred with John Foster Dulles, who, of course, was not then in office--this is the summer of '48--but who had brought Alger into be president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dulles was chairman of the board of trustees, which was a very prestigious board.

The net of it was he said, "I'm just not sure, from the advice I've received and my own thinking, about the libel route. But it certainly is going to be under active consideration." "Well," I said, "maybe it isn't the best route. I certainly am not going to express an opinion on that because this is a very important professional question to be dealt with by people who are dealing with it professionally and responsibly. But," I said, "of course here we are coming close to the election, and everybody that I talk with thinks that Dewey's going to win. And if Dewey wins, I understand there's no doubt at all that Dulles is going in as secretary of state. And will be a major figure in the administration. Might it not be possible that Mr. Dulles and others could arrange to have a really thorough-going investigation in this whole thing made by the Justice Department?" I said, "I don't know just what form it would take. But isn't it possible, that without going the route of a libel case, that the government could, the executive side of the Congress, could take some responsibility for carrying this thing on? Just as the Justice Department frequently has to deal with perjury testimony before a Congressional committee and decide whether they bring an action in for perjury or not." I said, "This wouldn't be too unlike that since you and Chambers have had your say before the House committee under oath." He said, "Well, that's another possibility." And he said, "We'll have to give serious consideration to that possibility if it proves to be the best course." Well now, that was about all that took place in this conversation. It was the last time I ever saw him--that I have seen him--in person.
The next thing that happened, of course, wasn't very long after that. I forget how soon after that. But the Pumpkin Paper-- Hiss did bring a libel suit, filed a libel suit at least, and had a lawyer named Marberry from Baltimore, quite an outstanding fellow--a man who's been prominent in Harvard affairs in the Overseers and maybe in the Corporation--as his lawyer, as I recall. I think they had no more than filed their libel suit--and I believe they filed in the federal court in Baltimore (I'm again a little hazy about this; all of this, of course, is in the general record)--when bang! (and again I think I've got the chronology right), Whitaker Chambers dumped the microfilm, the so-called Pumpkin Papers, on the table. And at that point I think the libel suit went out the window. They just decided that, for some reason or other, they wouldn't go forward with it. I'm just hazy about this. Or else they postponed going to the court with it. But at this point--Well, I think what happened was very shortly after the Pumpkin Papers were brought out, the government brought the perjury indictment against Hiss, which, of course, was another way now--there's no point to bringing a libel suit if you're under perjury indictment. That was the way it happened. They just had to throw their whole weight in behind the defense of that perjury indictment.

At some point before that went to first trial--went to trial--it's my memory that Hiss called me on the telephone one night. And said that his lawyer wanted to know whether I would be available to talk with him. And at that time I think he had a new lawyer who was going to handle the defense of the perjury case. A person that I knew of but didn't know personally. And I said, "Yes, of course." This is my memory of it. "Yes, of course I'll be available. Tell him to let me know when and where, and I'll come." And I--

DANIELL: Did you have any doubts at this point?

DICKEY: No. Well, I had-- I think the most accurate word I can use is I was apprehensive. I hadn't seen the Pumpkin Papers, you see, at this point. I just heard that some papers had been found and so forth. I was apprehensive about it. But I still when I was called--and I was called by a number of people. I was called by one of my friends who was editor of the Christian Science Monitor at the time.

DANIELL: Who was that?

DICKEY: Well, I think it was Roscoe Drummond.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. That's right. He was head of it then.
DICKEY: He was either editor or head Washington correspondent. He was both at various times. I think it was Roscoe Drummond who called me. And one or two other people who knew that I'd known Hiss. And said, What's the inside on this? They thought I must know the inside. "We don't want it for use in the paper. We just want it for background purposes. We don't know how to handle this story. We don't know how to handle this." Well, I can remember talking with I guess it was Drummond--although I wouldn't want to be sure about that, but I think it was Drummond. I said, "I don't know how to handle it either. But all I can tell you is that I would just--I would have as soon distrusted myself as distrusted this man." I said, "Everything that I ever saw of this man was exemplary. I had disagreements with him--pretty sharp disagreements with him--about how we handled some legal questions involving the Trade Agreements Act. And I wasn't generally on his side with respect to the handling of postwar planning information for the American public in the State Department. But," I said, "my admiration of his ability and him as a person was just unqualified." I remember using the phrase "I would just as soon have suspected myself as suspected him of being involved in anything of this sort." But I said, "I have no basis at all for clarifying this situation at this point.

At one point there was a trustees' meeting here during this--I guess it was during that fall. And I was talking after dinner over at the house with Beardsley Ruml, who was a trustee at the time, about it. And a fellow who was privy to a good bit of gossip and inside information around Washington and New York at the time. And I said something like this, my confidence that Hiss would be cleared. And Ruml said, "Well, John, I know why you say that. And a lot of good men are saying something like it. But," he said, "I wouldn't say it anymore." Now this was a warning that I took rather seriously. Because Ruml was not a frivolous person about something like that. And I was pretty sure that he had something to go on that I didn't have. And I've never forgotten that. That's all he said: I just--I wouldn't say that anymore. I know why you said it, but I wouldn't say it anymore. Well, either before or after that, or just about that time--I would guess maybe it was in the early winter. It was while they were defending--preparing the defense--in the perjury case. I did get a telephone call from the lawyer, whose name I've forgotten now. It's two or three of them, actually. And wanted to know whether I would meet with them, as I had told Alger I would, at I think it was at the Harvard Club, on a certain day when I'd be down in New York. And I said, yes, of course I will. So I went down to New York, and I met with them. And they knew almost everything that I could have told them, in the sense that I had been on this job before Hiss; Hiss had succeeded me. And all that and so forth. And they said, "You were a good friend?" "Yes," I said, "professionally. Not socially. That is we didn't run in the same group or anything of that sort."
"And you had confidence in our client?" "Yes," I said, "I have confidence in your client. I have worried about this thing." "Well," he said--I remember very well--one of them said, "so are we." [Laughter] Which relaxed me a bit. But they drew me out on these various aspects of the matter for quite a while. Would I be available as a character witness if they wanted me? Yes, I would. How long had I know him, and where? And on and so on. Had I ever seen anything that was at all untoward or suspicious? No, I hadn't.

Then they obviously were conducting a very well-thought-out examination because without saying anything about what they were going to do, they reached in a brief case, and they said, "We'd like to show you this material." And they pulled out a whole sheaf of photostats, I guess they were. And they handed them to me and said, "Would you look those--look through those, and tell us your reaction." Well, this was the first point at which I really got hit right between the eyes. Because I looked at the top one, and here was the office stamp, Sayre's office stamp, which I knew well. And unless somebody had gone out and duplicated an office stamp or forged an office stamp, this was an office stamp that was kept there and was kept locked and so forth. With the initials on it that I recognized.

Secretaries who'd answered. It was on a highly-classified cable that was in one of the most secret codes that I up in the--I've forgotten whether it was the upper right-hand or left-hand corner--there was a little legend which said: "This message has been sent and received in--" let's say it was A code "--A code and must not be, may not be, transmitted to anybody until it has been paraphrased. This was the essence of the legend in order to protect the code.

When I saw that this had-- I knew right away that this document had come out of Sayre's office insofar as I could know anything from a photostat. I went through them, and here one after another were these cables from the field, carrying Sayre's office stamp, and had clearly come out of Sayre's office. And they said, "What do you make of these documents?" And I said, "I've got to assume these are the McCoy. And I would assume, unless you know something that I don't know about forgeries and all of that, these are the McCoy. And these shouldn't have been kicking around." "Well," they said, "we want to know first, would you have had access to these as Sayre's assistant?" And I said, "Yes, I would have. I'd have handled them, and I would have selected the ones that Sayre would have seen." Because there were hundreds and thousands maybe that came in during the course of a day, and I might select 50 for him to see. "So it would be your impression that under the normal conduct of affairs in that office, these would go through Mr. Hiss?" And I said, "That's correct." "You don't have any doubt at all this is an authentic office stamp?" "Well," I
said, "unless there's been a major forgery in the office stamps, of course it's his--I know it's the office stamp. I know this is a highly secret code. And if Chambers had these papers, something very, very wrong has been going on. That I now know. This is not a figment of Chambers's imagination."

I was impressed by the fact that they had the coded true--we called them "true"--copies, true readings, as distinguished from a paraphrase, rather than the content of the message. I don't remember at this point what the content of the message was. They were quite a few that dealt with situations in the Far East, I remember. But it was a fairly substantial package of them. They said, "Did you take these cables home with you at night or anything?" I said, "No, sir. We were not permitted to take those out of the office. They would be locked up. The secretary had to account for them, and the receiving secretary would give a receipt to the messenger who brought them, and back they would go unless they were locked in the safe there in the office at night." "But you say Hiss would have had complete access to them?" "Yes," I said, "he would have done the--he would have been the first person to read them in the office after the secretary. And then he would have had complete access to them."

"Well now, we'd like you to look at these." And then they reached in again, and they pulled out another sheaf of papers, which was notepaper on Sayre's letterhead--Assistant Secretary of State, A.S.--long memoranda in Alger Hiss's hand. And they said, "We wish you'd read these, look at these." So I read those. And these might have been five, ten pages long, of longhand notes, summarizing dispatches. See, dispatches came in by air mail, and the cables, of course, were different. Mainly summarizing dispatches. Or, on occasion, I guess, summarizing a really long cable maybe, a 25-page cable or something. So I looked at them. They said, "We'll tell you, we acknowledge those are Mr. Hiss's handwriting, so that you don't need to worry about that. We're not ____ in that respect." "Well," I said, "that's a familiar letterhead and notepaper and so forth." "Now," they said, "we want to ask you a very important question, and we want a very direct, simple answer from you. Did Mr. Sayre have you prepare that kind of a memorandum for him?" And I realized that the room for [Laughter] maneuver was closing pretty tight, and I said, "Well, the simple answer to that is, no."

Then they went on from there. They said, "It's our understanding that this was not the established routine of that office while you were the assistant to Mr Sayre." I said, "No, it was not. I did prepare handwritten notes for him maybe one, conceivably two pages, summarizing a long dispatch in order that he didn't have to read the dispatch, and I would pin it on it. But
never this kind of extensive semi-verbatim summary of a dispatch. Indeed, "I don't really--" They said, "What would he have used this for?" And I said, "I really don't know what he would have used it for. Because," I said, "if he was going to get a summary from me, why, he'd get a much briefer summary than that. Or he would be told to look on page 6 of the dispatch or something like that. That was the routine." Then they said, "We want you to be really very careful about this now. You're quite sure that this was not a normal routine of that office as far as you're concerned, to prepare this kind of note?" I said, "No, it was not. But I want to be equally clear with you that he might have changed--requested this kind of thing to be prepared by Hiss." Because this was not just one of these. Obviously it was being done as a general thing." Well, the fellow said, "We're not--" I forget whether he used the phrase, "We're not playing games with you," but this was the sense of it. We're not playing games with you, of course. You're a very important witness, potentially, to us in this respect. But what you've said is disappointing.

DANIELL: I should say so.

DICKEY: I said, "Well, I'm sorry. I don't want any conclusions to be drawn about what was the practice during the period that Alger Hiss was Sayre's assistant. But this was not the practice while I was there." They said, "We understand that, and we appreciate very much your coming to see us. If we decide that we can use you, we'll let you know. But unless or until then, we probably won't have any need to get in touch with you further." Well, all I can say is, as I look back on it, they were genuinely disappointed that-- And they never called on me.

DANIELL: They were probably building their defense on the presence of the ___.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. That this was the way it had been handled, and so forth. Of course what the prosecution claimed was that these had been memos made for transmittal to somebody else. And had been in longhand so that he wouldn't be in the position of having dictated to a typist or whatnot. I've never had occasion to talk with anybody about this. I found myself wondering about those copies of the cables, how they got copies without it being checked up on. Whether those had been taken and photostated and then returned to the files. I don't remember what the story was on that. But I do know that—

[End of Interview of February 14, 1975]
[End of Tape Side #6B]
[Interview continues on Tape #8A]
DICKY: ...Hiss Case, so-called. I was not called again by the lawyers. I never heard anything more from Alger Hiss. And I have never seen him. When the first trial came, of course, I read it, the testimony as it appeared in the New York Times, avidly. I must say I was not reassured by the way that evidence went in. But I took some encouragement from the fact that it was a hung jury in the first trial. [Carillon bells] But a hung jury is not by any means a wholly encouraging thing. And there'd been enough evidence that was worrisome. When the second trial came and they put the typewriter evidence in, nailed it down... You remember that? I think they found the typewriter between the first trial and the second trial. And a few other things. I listened to that. When the guilty verdict came in, I had to say to myself, and I thereafter said to my friends, "I would have brought in a guilty verdict on that evidence." I cannot explain how he got involved in this.

I know that I heard subsequently and know it was so, that his wife, Priscilla, whom I knew slightly but only very slightly... Way back in his Boston law days in Choate, Hall & Stuart, he'd been a young partner or associate of Harvey Bundy's in the Choate, Hall & Stuart law office. And Harvey Bundy told me that in those days some of the law partners had been unhappy with Priscilla Hiss's radical views, which interested me. Because after the second trial and the conviction, there were quite a few people who undertook to explain Hiss's involvement in this thing on the grounds that somehow or other he'd been drawn into it by his wife in ways that nobody ever explained to me very convincingly. It could have been the case. But that was a fact: Her rather far-out radicalism had been noticed and led to some strain in his relationships with people in the law office back in the Boston days. Way, way on ahead. Shortly after he got out of law school. But from the second trial on and the conviction, whenever asked, I have said I do not have any explanation for this man's involvement in this thing. But on the case as it was presented to the jury in the second trial, I think a verdict of conviction, of guilty, was the right judgment.

It has remained a mystery to me. I've read a few books on it, not many, about it. Once I was over in Poland a few years ago in the early sixties on a Ford Foundation mission. And at the Bristol Hotel in Warsaw one evening, I happened to sit down at a table with two Americans: Buttenweisers, Ben [Benjamin] Buttenweiser and his wife. She is a lawyer.

DANIELL: They have a son named Peter?
DICKEY: I don't know. They may. He had a brother who went to Dartmouth. Clarence is dead. Ben is a very shrewd, smart fellow, an investment banker in New York, whom I've subsequently seen a fair amount of.

DANIELL: I think that one of their sons was a fellow graduate student with me at Harvard.

DICKEY: Well, that might well be, at Harvard. And at dinner that night, it turned out that she was one of the lawyers in the second Hiss Case, and had known something about my knowledge of Alger earlier. Well, I found her just aflame with his innocence. And I had to tell her that I could no longer accept that, unless there was some explanation. Well, of course, she believed that the typewriter had been forged and on and on and on. So that this has remained among people that knew him--

DANIELL: And still is today.

DICKEY: --an acute issue. I would simply have to say that I do not understand it, and I have no explanation for it. But until or unless there is something more, I'll have to stand with the judgment of guilty on this thing. There was a curious postscript to this whole business. My brother, who is an M.D., is a specialist in dermatology down at Geisinger Clinic in Danville, Pennsylvania, which is not far from the Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary. And occasionally my brother gets called over to the penitentiary to consult on difficult cases. He was called over there some years ago to see a patient who had a problem in his field. And saw him and diagnosed it and prescribed for it. He tells me it wasn't a really very difficult case. And then he said, "This prisoner said, 'Your name is Dickey?'" And my brother said, "Yes." And he said, "That's very interesting. I once knew--" My brother's fond of joshing me a little bit because he said, "I once knew a very fine man named Dickey." And my brother thought he was going to say, "When I was in Massachusetts State Prison System." But he said, "In the State Department." And at this point my brother came into enough of a focus to look at the name on the paper of his patient, and it was Alger Hiss.

DANIELL: Were there any--? At any time, did your past association with Hiss become any kind of embarrassment or something that you had to be answerable to during the McCarthy Era?

DICKEY: It was never, to my knowledge, in a direct way. But my identification with the State Department was quickly seized on by a certain type of alumnus--I guess I would fairly or unfairly say quite a reactionary type--to say, well, this is one of these State Department people, Hiss, and so forth. I don't know that many of those people knew at the time, that is in the early fifties,
that I had had this relationship with Hiss. I'd never made any secret of it. But they might well not have known it. But they knew of my State Department background, and they used this to suggest that I was an unreliable, dangerous kind of person to have around. There was an element of that, and the Hiss Case contributed to that--was a part of that. I wouldn't have any doubt at all that the Hiss Case, which of course would have been known, all of this presumably would have been known to the FBI in one way or another, that this was involved in clearance questions because I was cleared for--well, cleared for everything except a Q Clearance, which is the top nuclear clearance, very early. Of course had had all the clearances in the State Department and so on on that. But when I was asked by [Dean] Acheson to be a member of the Collective Measures Committee at the U.N. at one point in the early fifties, I had to get a fairly high clearance. And I had several other clearances.

But then in 1951-52 when he was secretary, Mr. Acheson asked me to serve on a small, very select committee he was setting up--and I should tell you about this at some point--to advise him on nuclear disarmament and whether there were any opportunities that had not been sufficiently explored that ought to be explored before the so-called thermonuclear device, which was then absolutely top secret, was tested or exploded. This required Q Clearance. And I have assumed that in the course of that Q Clearance, which was a long drawn-out affair with visiting your hometown and on and on and all this sort of thing, that in the course of that Q Clearance, this story that I'm telling you was pretty well developed. But I never had anybody that I recall seek to make difficulties for me.

DANIELL: Did you get the Q Clearance, or not?

DICKEY: Yes. Oh, yes. Yes, yes, yes.

DANIELL: You did. Wow!

DICKEY: I got the Q Clearance. And after I got it and performed this service--it was a committee that included Robert Oppenheimer, Vannevar Bush, Joe Johnson of the Carnegie--Alger Hiss's successor as president of the Carnegie Corporation. Mac [MacGeorge] Bundy was our executive secretary. There were a lot of interlocking threads. Allan Dulles, head of CIA. There was quite a bunch of people.

DANIELL: I'll put that down as one of the things you'll probably talk about later.
DICKEY: But after I got that clearance, I said this is the end of it. Now, if I'm ever going to submit myself to utter scrutiny, I've done it, and I shall not do it again unless it's a matter of absolutely imperative patriotic duty.

DANIELL: One more question I had on this. I don't know whether you really want to--Well, I should have thought after that meeting with the lawyers, which clearly raised questions in your mind of a sort that hadn't been raised before, you probably were concerned in some way about how you'd respond, if you were called--

DICKEY: If I were called.

DANIELL: --down as a witness.

DICKEY: Yes, I did.

DANIELL: Since you at that point were playing a different set of roles toward the institution of which you were the president.

DICKEY: This is correct. At that point I would have been... At this point I was just as glad not to be involved. Because I could... Well, they didn't want me to offer this testimony, obviously, or they would have called me. If they'd used me as a character witness--whether this could have been drawn out by the prosecution, I don't know; probably it could have been. But in any event, at that point I was sufficiently shaken. My concern was stronger than apprehension. I was shaken.

DANIELL: I can see why. Well, I don't have anything more on the Hiss Case. I don't know whether you've anything more or not.

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: Where we were before was you had just left Washington, and you had headed back up to Boston to participate in the law firm. That's where we were ___.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, we carried this on from '36 to the conviction of Hiss, which I guess took place-- The second trial must have been '49. Even possibly '50.

DANIELL: Yes, I thought it was '50.

DICKEY: 'Fifty, I guess.
DANIELL: Because I was just entering, just becoming aware of this kind of thing.

DICKEY: Mmmm hmmm. I guess the second trial would have been '50. Yes. Well, we can go back, if you'd like, and pick up that thread. In '36 I went back to Boston as a young associate, really, out of the clerk stage. With my name on the letterhead, as they say, below the partners' line. And found myself quickly swept up in the challenging corporate practice, primarily concerned with Securities & Exchange Commission questions for our investment trust clients, particularly Massachusetts Investors Trust, which was the largest and I guess one of the oldest in the investment trust of that period. And drawn into bank work as a junior to Mr. [Robert] Holt on the Securities & Exchange Commission work. I was understudying Frank Hammond and Warren Motley, a senior partner. I'd known Frank Hammond well when he was in Washington during the New Deal. In my first State Department days, he was with the SEC for a while. And I was called, as I believe I mentioned to you, to go back to Washington on leave of absence from the law firm within a year, or less than a year, after I'd gotten back, to help out on the Trade Agreements Act renewal that had to come up every three years and came up in 1937.

DANIELL: You got that through.

DICKEY: I went down and did that, and we got that through. That was a stimulating experience. And the renewal at that time was not unduly difficult. Then I went back to the Boston law firm. And about that time, as I told you, Green Hackworth, the legal advisor, had written to me and asked me whether I would consider coming into his office in a if not a senior position at least a permanent position. And I was clear that was not what I wanted to do. So I stayed at the law office. And I guess we talked about that Rockefeller Family job. That's out of the way.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, the next thing, I guess, was 1940. The war started in Europe. The U.S. wasn't in the war, but the European war was going. Am I not right?

DANIELL: Yes. The European War began in '39.

DICKEY: Yes. I, during this period, became quite active in the Dartmouth Alumni Association in Boston. I was invited to become a member of the executive committee of the Alumni Association I believe while Harvey Hood was president of the association. A very prominent Boston Dartmouth lawyer, Walter Powers, was also president while I was on the Alumni Association. Also another prominent Boston Dartmouth lawyer, Bob [Robert] Proctor, was president. I got to know these three men really quite well through
serving on the executive committee of the Alumni Association for I guess a matter of four years or so. Probably from '36 to '40. During this period I was in touch, off and on, with people up here at the college: Professor [Russell "Cotty"] Larmon, as I've mentioned to you. Had an event with President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins about that Rockefeller job. And saw a few other people. But I didn't get up to Hanover at all frequently. I was really pretty well tied down there.

DANIELL: When you were asked to serve on this Alumni Association, knowing, having been on the Alumni Council, for a couple of years, I for the first time really became fully aware of the degree of commitment and involvement and participation in this thing. Were you aware that you were going to get as involved as you did? Is this something you just--?

DICKEY: No. I had already been involved in class affairs because--perhaps I should have mentioned this earlier; it would be part of the Dartmouth story. At the time of my graduation in 1929, just before I graduated I was called into the president's office by one of his assistants--I guess it was Bob [Robert Chamberlain] Strong. This was before he became director of admissions--and asked whether I would be a class agent for the Alumni Fund during our first five years out of college. At that time they only had three class agents, not like today where they may have 40 or 50. So three of us--Bill [William Fewel] Coles, Gerard Swope, Jr., and myself were the three agents for the entire class during those first five years of our alumni life. I don't think we did a very good job. We did a conscientious job. But all three of us, as it turned out, were at the Harvard Law School, and that was a fairly full-time occupation. So that we had to do our class agent's work in a not very ample spare time. But that had involved me in Dartmouth affairs and keeping up with the literature and all of that in a way that a person who didn't have that responsibility wouldn't have done. And I think this was probably one of the factors that led to my being invited to be a member of the executive committee of the Dartmouth Alumni Association in Boston. And I don't remember to this day whether that suggestion--I don't know that I ever knew--whether that suggestion was made from Hanover or whether it was made locally.

DANIELL: Well, somebody must have been keeping a list of...

DICKEY: Or where they came from. But in any event I was invited to be a member of the executive committee, and worked closely with the three presidents that I've mentioned: Harvey Hood, Walter Powers, and Bob Proctor. Well, there was one interesting occasion: We were trying to find some way--and I was in the forefront of the effort, I guess I'd have to say, especially during Harvey Hood's presidency--to make the association a more meaningful
thing for the alumni who, if when they used a somewhat self-flattering expression, were seriously interested in the educational side of the college as distinguished from the general alumni interest in the sports and things like that. We finally developed a program of what we called Hanover Speakers, that we would bring down for an evening with alumni who were interested at the University Club or elsewhere, having an inexpensive buffet dinner so that the young alumni would come, and try to have people from Hanover who were interesting faculty people or staff.

DANIELL: ___ after that?

DICKEY: Right, right. They haven't changed a bit. Well, at one point along came Munich, the Munich crisis. And I had known Professor [Frank Maloy] Anderson in the History Department slightly through my being a history major and working with [Professor Charles] Lingley and others in the department as an undergraduate. And I thought that maybe Anderson would be a rather interesting person to get. Well, it turned out I was right as far as the alumni were concerned. We sent out invitations saying that Professor Anderson was coming down, and would come down and speak to the alumni on--"What After Munich?" I think was the title. Or "Where Do We Go From Munich?" A very intriguing question, as I look back on it. [Laughter]

I think I was suitably naive about the fact that this might be a very appealing subject because lo and behold, whereas we'd been accustomed to getting 25 to 30 people or so to come to these Hanover Speakers, on this occasion we got returns, I forget, two, three hundred who wanted to come. Well, Harvey came--I was in close touch with Harvey Hood--and he said, "I think we can get a place to go where we can get a meal." This was the problem: Getting meals that were inexpensive and so forth. He finally came up with the Old Boston Yacht Club, I think it was called, or something like that. A loft building down on Atlantic Avenue somewhere that had been abandoned for its original purposes, where somebody had run a nightclub or a dance hall or something until they closed it down a few months or years before. And he'd arranged for us to get this at a very inexpensive rate. And somebody was going to come in and cater with a spaghetti feed or whatnot. Well, this became quite an operation, as far as I was concerned, while I was still trying to practice law.

The thing that makes it worth relating is that the afternoon of the affair, after we'd had to scurry around and get more chairs and get the caterer to be prepared to handle 200 instead of 20 people and so on-- Or maybe it was three or four hundred. It was certainly up in the hundreds. Suddenly I got word from Harvey Hood, who'd gotten it from the people that he'd
gotten the premises from, that the gas company had turned off the gas in the building for nonpayment by the owner of the gas bill. Well, this was necessary to cook the dinner. So Harvey said, "Do you think you can handle it?" [Laughter] Well, I didn't know what in the world to do. I can remember a sense of panic and puzzlement. And then I suddenly remembered, gosh Almighty! The Boston Gas Company, we're counsel for the Boston Gas Company. I wonder if I dare ask the senior partner, Bob Holt, who handles that client, whether he would be willing to intervene. And I decided, well, whether I dare or not, I've got to. So I went- - I felt, well, I'm in a heck [of a] pickle. Well, he was good about it. And he called up the president of the Boston Gas Company, and said, "One of my young associates here has got a problem," and so forth. Well, that was the only way we could've gotten that gas turned on by five o'clock. We had about two hours to work with. And Harvey regarded this as the production of a miracle. Harvey's a great fellow, as you may know, for saying, "Now you can handle this. You just go ahead and handle it as you see fit." Well, fortunately I had that luck, and it went off.

That night I was really in a panic over the fire risk that we were involved in. Because we packed in--I forget what it was, as I say; three hundred people maybe?--into this loft, up a flight of wooden stairs, narrow wooden, winding stairs, and so forth. And I came to realize that we could have had just a frightful affair there. But we never did that again. But it was put down as one of the great successes of the Boston Alumni Association during my days. I think that covers, as far as my present memory goes, the Boston Alumni experience.

1940 came, and I was again asked to come down to Washington to the State Department on a leave-of-absence to help out on the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act at that point. This was really quite a significant experience. At this point I had moved up the ladder of a few years more: aged, had a little bit more prestige as a fellow who'd become a partner, a junior partner, in the firm. It hadn't made any difference in my salary to speak of or anything like that. But in any event, they invited me very nicely to come down as special assistant to the secretary, which was a top title, to handle this. And I did go. By that time [Professor Francis Bowes] Sayre had gone to the Philippines, as I mentioned to you, and I think I told you about my decision that I wouldn't go out there as his assistant as he had wanted. But Frank Grady, who'd been dean of the business school at the University of California, had taken on the job. His wife was a very prominent Democratic Party official. And he was an able man, a very different kind of man from Mr. Sayre. And he had charge of the Trade Agreements Act program renewal. And he really just turned it over to me. Sayre had pretty well--well, had been very active himself in it.
But Grady testified and did anything that I wanted done that needed to be done by an assistant secretary. But this was a point at which the show was much more mine to have the responsibility for than had been earlier when I'd been done. So that made it a little more interesting. The people that I'd worked with were there. There were new people, of course, in the Senate and the Congress; I got to know a lot of new congressmen and senators. And once again it was writing speeches for them, preparing answers, dealing with proposed amendments to the bill that the opposition wanted to tack on in order to slow down Mr. [Cordell] Hull's Trade Agreements Program.

At that time, however, as far as the program was concerned, the war had made it clear that there would be no new agreements for some years. But they wanted the authority to show that it was still there, and that they were ready to go when the opportunity came. More importantly, Jere, I now know--although at the time I just dimly, I was going to say, suspected it--I now know that Mr. Hull thought there was a real possibility that Roosevelt wouldn't run for a third time, and that he would get the nod. The Postmaster General, Jim [James] Farley, whom I used to see around Mr. Hull's office occasionally, was very anxious to get Mr. Hull to be the candidate. We didn't know that at the time, but I now know. And Mr. Hull clearly wanted that act renewed clean with no amendments or anything. He wanted a good win down on The Hill as part of the, if you will, the preparation to make him a viable candidate if Roosevelt decided not to run. Well, as we all know, of course, Roosevelt decided to run. But this led to my seeing a good bit more of the secretary directly--both because, as I say, Sayre was gone and Grady was giving me my head on this than I had. [Sound of telephone ringing] Excuse me.

[Change to Side B of Tape #8]

February 21, 1975

DICKEY: With my going to Washington, I think I went down in--well, I know I went down in the winter of 1940. And whether it was January or February or thereabouts, I don't remember. I was down there for I think about two to three months on leave-of-absence from the law office. Doing, as I mentioned, the same kind of work in connection with the periodic renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, which I had done previously in 1937, and originally, in a less responsible way as a younger person in 1934 when the act was first passed.

DANIELL: You say you had pretty much your head on it this time.
DICKEY: In 1940 I had pretty much my head in the sense that this was the third time around. So that I felt more confident about my ability to handle things. I was known by that time to quite a few of the people out in the business world and in the other private organizations that had an interest in American trade policies. And more especially perhaps, the assistant secretary in charge of the Trade Agreements Act program at that point was Dr. Henry Grady who had been dean of the School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley prior to coming into the State Department. He had not had previous experience with the Trade Agreements Act legislation; that is, getting it through the Congress, as my previous chief, Mr. Sayre, had had. And Grady was therefore disposed to hand over just as much responsibility on this side of things as I was prepared to take. And my close friends in the department-- The chief of the Trade Agreements Division, Harry Hawkins, one of the most outstanding of the career people in the department during this whole period was still there, and he was the senior representative of the secretary on The Hill during the Trade Agreements fight, as far as the economic trade policy issues were concerned. I was in charge of, so to speak, the legal questions that would come up with respect to different amendments that were proposed by people who wanted to cripple the Trade Agreements Program. I was responsible for doing--or getting done--a good bit of the drafting of statements and speeches and that sort of thing by supporters of the Trade Agreements Program. And more particularly I was almost solely responsible for the mustering of the outside private support in the business community and in the organizations, peace organizations. The League of Women Voters was a very major source of support for us.

The 1940 fight--well, as we characterized it, the 1940 renewal effort--was different from the previous two in one sense: The war had come in '39. I'm right, am I not, about that, yes.

DANIELL: In Europe anyway.

DICKEY: Yes, in Europe. And it was breathing down the neck, so to speak, of American foreign policy. We were quite clear that there was going to be no opportunity for a significant extension of the Trade Agreements Program through new negotiations until the war was behind us. But Secretary Hull and all the people who had worked on the program felt it was an immensely important thing to have the United States renew this policy, so far as action by Congress was concerned, to hold out the prospect in postwar planning of a liberal trade policy. So it was not a perfunctory thing. But since no one--either the opponents or the supporters--expected it to be translated into new agreements right away, the effort to renew the act without crippling amendments, which was the rubric under which every
renewal fight took place, became focused more upon domestic politics than really on trade policy per se.

As I think I said earlier, I didn't realize at the time that this particular thing was quite as close--or potentially as close--to presidential politics as I subsequently learned it had been. This was related to the fact that Mr. Hull was in 1940 probably at the peak of his influence as a major figure on the Washington scene. He was regarded as a conservative Democrat so far as domestic policies were concerned. His Trade Agreements Program had been carried on for six years without bringing down on the heads of business all the calamities that the protectionists had prophesied. He had a pretty good position among the other nations. So he was riding pretty high as a figure in the Roosevelt Administration. Indeed there was no other member of the Cabinet that approached Mr. Hull's prestige. Well, as I think also I mentioned earlier, he and James Farley, the postmaster general... I believe Farley was still in the Cabinet, though he left the Cabinet shortly--

DANIELL: I think he was.

DICKEY: I think he was. He left the Cabinet fairly early in the war as I recall. But he and--Mr. Hull and Farley were quite close personally. I can remember seeing Farley around Mr. Hull's office in the State Department occasionally. And we now know from I think Farley's memoirs or somebody's memoirs--a number of memoirs--that Farley rather regarded Hull as the only realistic possibility to head off--or to take Roosevelt's place--as the Democratic presidential possibility. Farley and Roosevelt, I guess clearly by that time, were on somewhat divergent courses so far as Democratic politics were concerned. Roosevelt's New Deal had been, I think, not Farley's dish of tea, so far as many of its domestic policies were concerned. And Farley had a sincere, deep admiration for Mr. Hull.

DANIELL: When you use the term "head off," do you think that Farley was attempting to head off ___?

DICKEY: This is my present judgment. At that time I didn't understand this or know anything about it, and indeed I don't think even had the remotest suspicion that this was in the wings. But the literature which we now have about that period I think does make quite clear that Farley did not want Roosevelt to have a third term. He was circumspect about it, but would have welcomed having Roosevelt decline to go for a third term. And if that had happened, the relevance of all this to my experience on the Trade Agreements Act renewal fight was Farley clearly would have tried to get the nomination for Hull. Whether he would have gotten it or not is the kind of speculation that
probably isn't very fruitful at this point. But it certainly was a realistic possibility. And I now have no doubt at all that Mr. Hull had this very much in mind, although he never spoke about it.

I remember the day we came out of the Senate with a clean passage of the Trade Agreements Act. And the secretary had been up on The Hill conferring with the leadership there in the Senate. I don't remember at the moment just what the occasion of his being there was. Whether it was the actual vote or something else. In any event, he invited me and Harry Hawkins to ride back to the State Department in his official limousine, and we all were aware that this was probably the last of the big Trade Agreement renewal fights that we were going to be in. We all were around for the 1943 effort during the war, but that was even more perfunctory in a sense than this one. This 1940 fight had involved the treaty power issue quite acutely and other things that I had been personally responsible for handling, so far as the presentation of our case was concerned.

There was one amusing thing that I recall, that happened while we-- The Bill I think was in the--the Renewal Bill--was in the House. It was customary for the Democratic leadership, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and the others who were working with him, after they had held their hearings on the bill, to ask the State Department to draft a report for the committee, for the majority of the committee, on the renewal, dealing with the issues that had come up in the hearings and the amendments that had been proposed, and why they were not going to support the proposed amendment and things like that. So that at that point Hawkins and myself and others who were involved in the renewal effort would be very fully engaged in drafting and consultation with members of the committee as to what they wanted and so forth. And then the leadership, the chairman of the committee, would call a meeting. Usually it would be of the Democrats at the final stages of the drafting of the report because there would be a minority report presented by the Republicans. And he would put up this draft to the committee with such changes as he wanted to propose. And then they would sweat out issues that Democratic members of the committee wanted to raise.

Well, we were in one of those sessions one Saturday--I think it was a Saturday morning--down on The Hill, just after the Bill had come, as I recall, from the hearings in the House. It might have been the hearings in the Senate, but I think it was in the House. And Hawkins and I were covering the committee, which meant that in the main we sat outside the committee deliberations and would be called in when there was something up that the chairman wanted us to answer questions about. At one point, Harry Hawkins had to leave. He was the senior representative of the
secretary on The Hill. But he had to leave. I forget what the occasion was. And he said, "I don't think anything's going to come up that you can't handle. But in any event, you're in charge now in handling our relation with the committee the rest of the morning." Well, of course something had to happen. And I was called into the meeting, and the chairman said, "We're discussing the proposed amendment here that Mr. So-and-so--" I forget who it was "--wants in the report, wants endorsed. And it looks as if there's probably a majority here favoring that."

Well, the one theology that we had stood by on all the renewal efforts was no amendments. No crippling amendments. Well, no crippling amendments really pretty much meant no amendments. I have forgotten just what this amendment dealt with. I think it was some aspect of agricultural policy. In any event, I quickly recognized that it was not a very welcome development and one that could cause us a lot of embarrassment. Because if the Democrats proposed an amendment, they were in a much weaker position to oppose the Republicans' more serious amendments. And I gave such a reply to their questions as I could. I knew the departmental line. I was not as well qualified, by any means, to deal with a substantive issue of this sort as Mr. Hawkins would have been. But in any event, I don't think either one of us could have headed it off at that stage.

I was excused from the meeting, realizing that this was going to be accepted. So I went out into the anteroom. and being aware that I couldn't get in touch with Hawkins for some reason for a while, I felt it was incumbent on me to post the secretary's office that this development was taking place. I didn't know what they would want to do, or whether they would feel the secretary needed to be informed about it right away or not. I got his principal secretary, his principal assistant, on the telephone--a good friend of mine, Joe Gray. Cecil Gray was his full name. He was a senior foreign service officer and had been in the secretary's office as his principal assistant for a good many years. A very competent, level-headed fellow. So I told Joe the story, and said, "I'm afraid there's nothing we can really do now about this. But I thought probably you would want to report this to the secretary."

Well, one of the things you learn fairly promptly is that there's an awful lot of validity in the old Greek tragedies, that it was rather dangerous to be the messenger bearing bad news. And that nobody around a bureaucracy particularly wants to be cast in that role. Because I had no more made this report to Joe Gray on the telephone, and suggested that at some point he might want to post the secretary on it, than he said, "I think it would be just as well, John, if you just go over to the secretary now about it." Well, I
hadn't anticipated this. But he said, "I'll put the secretary on." [Laughter] In a moment the secretary was on the telephone, and I was as direct and as succinct as possible. And said, "Mr. Secretary, there's been a development here in the majority committee. The majority of the committee are discussing the draft report. And the indication is that they're going to accept—or are disposed to accept—this amendment which I'm sure we will have to oppose." I undertook to outline who had proposed it, and who was supporting it, and what the situation was.

Now, there wasn't a sound at the other end of the telephone for about three minutes, three or four minutes, as I laid this out. When I stopped, there wasn't a sound. So I assumed that the secretary had decided he'd heard all he wanted to hear and had hung up. I was sufficiently perplexed about this that I thought I'd better not be in the position of hanging up in case he hadn't hung up. I was just about to say something, when the next utterance came in his unmistakable Tennessee drawl, and I'll never forget the line: "Quist! What a mess!" He had this impediment of his speech. So that the closest he could come to Christ was, "Quist! What a mess!" And that was it. And he said, "Thank you," and hung up. Well, that was one of the memorable lines I remember from assignment on The Hill.

DANIELL: Was there any time in this process in which you felt that people who were going to potentially ward off—or ward off a potential—campaign for the presidency or presidential nomination by Hull, attempted to do it through the vehicle of fouling up the—?

DICKEY: Yes. As I look back on it, I think that this was involved particularly over in the Senate. I don't think this was to the fore so much in the House. But what was going on was a jockeying with respect to the presidential politics regardless of who was the Democratic candidate. That is, the Republicans were trying to create issues that they would have in the presidential campaign which was about to get underway that fall—that summer and that fall. So that presidential politics were all through the thing. And I remember that over in the Senate it got a little more sharply focused on what you might call issues of concern to Mr. Hull personally: the treaty power and things like that. I don't think, however, that there was any major effort to get at Mr. Hull personally because most of these people probably would have favored having Hull become the candidate rather than having to face Roosevelt for a third time. This would be my guess. But still, they were trying to get at Mr. Hull and to create an issue, as I've said, for the presidential campaign. Issues on—mainly protectionist issues. The treaty power issue was essentially a protectionist issue. It took the form of being a constitutional issue, but the impulse behind it was high protection. Well, we finished off with a clean renewal, and all felt very good about it. I
remember as we rode back that day in the secretary's official limousine to the department. He obviously felt very good about it. He was not a very expansive person, or very effusive in expressing thanks and so forth. But out of it he said thank you to Harry and myself, and I later received a nice letter and so forth. And went back to the Boston law firm I guess in early May or maybe it was late April; I've forgotten just when it was, but it was in the spring.

DANIELL: I just have one question.

DICKEY: Right. Go ahead. I'll then finish this one off. Yes. Go ahead.

DANIELL: The question is, at this point had you any identification or any involvement with either of the political parties?

DICKEY: None at all.

DANIELL: None at all?

DICKEY: None at all. As a matter of fact, I had never voted in a primary. So that I had no voting status. Indeed at this point I was in a position to vote because I was registered, at this point, back in Winchester, Massachusetts. But I was not registered in one party or the other. And indeed I can jump forward with that and say I never registered with either party until I decided in 1952 that it was important to the nation, as I saw it, that the Republicans should have some experience with governing again. I thought the Republican position was becoming so utterly irresponsible out of the McCarthy period, that unless the Republican Party had some experience with governing, then they were going to really be a terribly dangerous, destructive force in opposition. Eisenhower's candidacy seemed to me to present a respectable opportunity to reeducate the Republican Party, to be absolutely blunt about it. Therefore I voted in the New Hampshire primary--registered to vote in the New Hampshire primary for Eisenhower. I have since gone back, I should say, as soon as the opportunity presented itself under New Hampshire law, to my independent status. But at that point in 1940 I had no party identification. Indeed, I am not sure today how I voted in 1940.

DANIELL: Really?

DICKEY: I was terribly torn about it. And I remember I was not very keen upon a third term. I thought the [Wendell] Wilkie possibility was an acceptable, attractive one. I was deeply concerned, however, about the problem of changing leadership, presidential leadership, at that point when most of us
who were pretty close to things thought the war was eventually going to hit this country. So that I can remember weighing different considerations: the third term issue where I would have preferred not to have had to have a third term; the fact that I found Wilkie much more attractive than most of the Republican politicians, and from my point of view, in this respect, acceptable. But the international situation and the war weighed on me very heavily as to whether it was really a good thing to--at that point--to change.

**DANIELL:** So you blocked out how you actually voted.

**DICKEY:** I'm really not entirely sure. If I had to say how I think I voted, I would say that I think I voted for Roosevelt. But I would not be able to take an oath on that just because it was such a relatively evenly-balanced issue in my mind. Well, what you might enjoy is, so to speak, the sequel to the Trade Agreements Act fight of 1940. I was back in the law office, oh, only a matter of about three to four weeks, probably in May, when along about the latter part of May I got a letter as I recall--maybe it was a telephone call--from Joe Gray, the secretary's assistant in Washington, and he said, "The secretary thought you might like to know that he's coming up to Harvard to receive a degree and make the commencement address next week," or whenever it was. "And if you would enjoy coming in, he would like to see you." Well, of course I was terribly pleased that they felt that way. And I said, "Well gee, I'm deeply appreciative of your thoughtfulness. And I surely will be there." And he said, "Well, we're going to be staying at the Copley Plaza. Perhaps after the ceremonies you might want to get in touch with us."

Well, I went over to the Harvard commencement--one of the few I ever bothered to attend--that day. And sat well back in the audience. The secretary gave an address which had been written, of course, by somebody else. But a very stirring address. Nothing like Secretary [George] Marshall's Marshall Plan address later, but an acceptable address. And after the ceremony was over, I stood around as people went up and paid their respects to the secretary, oh, for, I suppose ten or 15 minutes. And I worked my way up through the audience. As the group around the ceremony began to thin out--all the officials of the commencement going off in their respective ways and so forth--it suddenly began to dawn on me that no one had the secretary in hand, to take care of him. There were, as I recall, several women standing there finally, asking him questions or whatnot. And Joe Gray was standing there. So I moved over to Joe Gray and made my presence known, and he welcomed me warmly. And he said, "The secretary will be through with these people in a moment." But he said, "I don't know how we're going to get back to the
hotel." And I said, "What do you mean? Isn't Harvard providing the transportation?" "Well," he said, "I assume so. But there's nobody--"

[End of Tape #8B]
[Beginning of Tape #9A]

February 21, 1975

DANIELL: Okay. We're all set here.

DICKEY: As I said when you changed the record, it was one of those incredible lapses, and there was nobody from Harvard there to take care of the secretary after the ceremonies. And the Yard was beginning to be emptied, the people going on their way. And here was the secretary of state, a fairly elderly, dignified gentleman, and his assistant, Joe [Cecil] Gray, and Joe Gray turned to me to see if I could help. Well, I didn't see anybody there that looked like a Harvard official to go speak to. And suddenly realized, "Good God. It's up to you, Dickey, to find transportation." Well, I didn't have a car. I'd come out on the subway. And I didn't see anybody that had a car that I knew. So I decided to go out and see if I couldn't get a taxi. Well, as you can imagine, finding a taxi in Harvard Square the morning of commencement was not the easiest thing in the world to do. I went out, and there were no taxis standing anywhere, and the Square was filled. But I looked across the street toward to Harvard Coop, and there was a taxi standing in the traffic with a person in it--I forget at the moment whether it was a man or a woman. And I said to myself, well, this is one of these moments when they separate the men from the boys. [Laughter] So you'd better get going.

I rushed out into the traffic, went over and opened the door on the traffic side on the cab, and said to the person who was sitting in there--they were held up in the traffic--"I'm terribly sorry to do this, but we've got a very embarrassing situation on our hands over here at the commencement. The Secretary of State of the United States has just finished making his appearance at the commencement, and somehow or other there's no transportation available to take him back to the hotel. Could you possibly give us this cab for that purpose?" Well, the cabdriver was looking around at me bug-eyed. I had never done anything like this in my life. And the person was wonderful. I don't remember anything about what he or she looked like. But they were startled, and they simply said something like, "Of course," and got out the other side of the cab. I got in on the side, and I said to the cabdriver, "Turn right around in the middle of the Square." I thought if a policeman came up, by God, I was going to draft him.
So he turned right around, made a U-turn over to the other side of the street where Joe Gray by this time had brought the secretary out. It was hot as the dickens, and I could see that the secretary was really damned annoyed. You could tell. He didn't say anything. But we got—opened the door, and he got in, and Gray got in, and as we were pulling out down around Memorial Hall, the secretary just said, "Joe, be sure to remind me that this is the last commencement we ever do." And this was about all that he said until he cooled off between there and the Copley Plaza as the cab made its way back to the Copley Plaza. Well, they then said, "Come on up to the room." So I went up with them.

In the sitting room part of their suite the secretary sat down in a stiff chair, I sat down across the room, and Joe Gray went over and picked up a little occasional table—I can see it to this day. It was about three feet long and a foot and a half wide or so. Took it over and sat it down in front of the secretary. And I wondered what was coming. Then Joe went into the bedroom and came out with a little black doctor's satchel, and he brought that over along with three glasses that he'd gotten out of the--no, two glasses; he didn't take one himself--out of the bathroom. And he put these two glasses down on this little table. Opened up the black doctor's satchel, an old-fashioned little thing, and brought out two medicine bottles, as they seemed, and put them down on there. And went in and got some water.

Well, obviously there was going to be a drink. So the secretary turned to me with his courtly Tennessee politeness, and he said, "John," he said, "which will you have?" Well, I had not been accustomed to being offered a choice of things that way. And I said, "Well really, Mr. Secretary, it doesn't matter to me at all." And he stopped... By this time I'd acquired a certain amount of his humor. And he said, "Well, all I can say is, if you've reached this far in your career and have no choices between bourbon and scotch, your education has been sadly neglected." And proceeded to pour me I don't know which. I short I had an immensely pleasant visit with him, and excused myself and went off. Well, that was, so to speak, the postscript on the 1940 renewal fight. And it had been the secretary's way of saying thank you.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. Now when you said a meeting, I thought maybe he was going to offer you some position. Well, that got you then-- You went back then to Boston and remained there for several more months?

DICKEY: Well, I... Yes, through the summer in the law office. In the early fall I was approached by someone who was working with Nelson Rockefeller getting his Coordinator's Office, as it was called, Coordinator of Cultural and Economic Relations with the American Republics, I think, was the long-
handled original name of his office. I was approached by someone who was involved in getting that activity, that very nebulous activity, organized. I was asked whether I would be available to come down and help out on a, so to speak, a part-time basis from my Boston base. I think the person who originally approached me was Carl Spaeth, who'd been a classmate of mine at Dartmouth. He went on to get a Rhodes Scholarship at Oxford that I had been in the competition for. And then he came back to Yale Law and had worked for Nelson in Venezuela--one of Nelson's commercial projects down there. And when Nelson was appointed by [President Franklin Delano] Roosevelt, I think through the good offices of Harry [L.] Hopkins--and I'm sure Anna Rosenberg, who was a very close advisor of Roosevelt and Hopkins, probably her good offices.

In any event, Nelson's interest at that time in Latin America, which was very great, seemed to make him a good person to bring into the Roosevelt Administration during those early years of the war, before we were in it, of course, in mid-'40, as I recall, with a view to trying to create a better relationship for the United States with the Latin American countries. And I think Carl Spaeth, who was then Nelson's right-hand man, was the person who asked me whether I would be available to come down and help out. They were in the midst of a survey conducted by John Lockwood, a New York lawyer who'd been a close associate of Nelson's in a professional way, and Percy Douglas, who was at that time, I think, Executive Vice President of Otis Elevator. These two men had led a delegation--or had led a survey group--in an investigation of Axis activities, Axis commercial activities in the South America during the spring and summer of 1940, gathering information about commercial firms down there that were acting as agents for American manufacturers, commercial agents of American manufacturers, but who were believed to be very active in promoting the Axis cause in Latin America.

The Coordinator's Office was anxious to organize a program, in the first instance it was to be a voluntary program, of going to major American firms who were in the exporting business, or that had commercial activities in South America, asking their voluntary cooperation in replacing these agents and other business connections in order to attempt to dry up Axis financial resources in Latin America that were being used for propaganda purposes. Probably also, certainly later, were being used for espionage activities and any activity that was important to the Axis countries in Latin America, particularly the German Nazi group, although the Italian fascist group that were also active in some of the countries. Well, the Douglas-Lockwood Mission, as we called it later, brought back extensive reports on these activities, and identified a long list of agencies that according to the information they had--some of which was not as well-established as some
of the rest of it--were engaged in these activities that the United States wanted American firms to curtail.

So when I got down to Washington--I forget when I first went down to talk this over; I would guess it was probably August or thereabouts--they asked whether I would undertake to organize this work, such a program, of replacing these Axis agents--organize it in the Coordinator's Office. Which would involve collaboration with State, Commerce Department, Justice Department, and so forth. I agreed to do it, going down to Washington at first I think it was two days a week or something like that. And the other... Well, and we got started that way. We organized this information. I had to build up, as it turned out, an office that ultimately was a pretty large division of the State Department. It was subsequently transferred into the State Department. At this time it was out as a division of the Coordinator's Office. Built it up from absolute scratch. Douglas and Lockwood both went back to their respective private responsibilities at that point. And one of my jobs was to recruit people to organize this information and to keep--and get more of it for purposes of carrying out these approaches to American firms--General Motors was the big target, and we had a real crisis with General Motors--asking then to replace their agencies in these countries on a voluntary basis.

As I look back on it, it was really a pretty bold thing. I guess at that point I didn't realize how bold it was. Well, this meant I had to get in people who were capable of doing this work and building up slowly a division in the Coordinator's Office with these files. And I remember I came back to Massachusetts and persuaded a fellow named Bill Irving--who had been in the Massachusetts prison system as a young man earlier, and whom I had known in that connection--to come down and take charge of just setting up our files, which was a large undertaking since before we were through we were dealing with, oh, several hundred thousand names. And just keeping those straight was quite a task. Needless to say, we didn't have computers to do it with. We had to do it all the so-called old-fashioned way.

Well, I did this on a commuting, part-time basis through the early fall. And then it became clear that I just couldn't do justice to law practice and this job which was mushrooming in Washington on a part-time basis. And I had to make a major decision. I just couldn't ask the law firm for another leave-of-absence. I'd been on a leave-of-absence on the Trade Agreements Act fight in the early part of that year for two or three months. I knew it would just be wrong to suggest anything like that to them. So I thought it over and talked it over with Chris. By this time I was reasonably clear that the war was going to go on for quite a while. We were probably going to find ourselves increasingly involved in it. And that I would do what
I at this point was rather naturally reluctant to do: I would resign from the law firm. I'd become a junior partner, which is a fairly important step, and had the prospect of a career in a big Boston law firm that I was hesitant to give up because I just had no idea what would come next. Obviously this was a wartime agency I was going into. It was not like going down to be a permanent member of the legal advisor's office in State and that sort of thing. But circumstances had changed.

So I told the law office I had made a decision to--that I would have to resign and go down there. The Coordinator's Office had been after me to take on a full-time responsibility as special assistant to Mr. Rockefeller, the coordinator, and as the director of this new division which we were setting up to replace Axis agents of American firms in South America, in Latin America. Another aspect of this that developed at this time, that is, at the time that I made a decision to go down full time, was that the Coordinator's Office and Mr. Rockefeller personally and a lot of his people dealing with other things--cultural relations, sending American orchestras and so forth--had begun to get into, as they say, the hair of a lot of the people at the State Department and elsewhere in the government. Because there's nothing more resented really as an active agency than a coordinator in the United States government. Nobody wants to be coordinated. And least of all the State Department was not very anxious to be coordinated in regard to the handling of foreign relations.

Well, this began to boil up into quite a major problem for the Coordinator's Office because Mr. [Cordell] Hull, as I've indicated to your earlier, was not someone to trifle with. He didn't like people in his pea patch. There were some people in the State Department who were much more sympathetic to what Rockefeller was trying to do, which the State Department couldn't do nearly as well, the promotion of cultural relations and things like that. Well, Larry Duggin, who was head of Latin American Affairs, was such a person. But there were also quite a few people in State who were very skeptical of the activities of the "Rockefeller office," as it was called. The net of it was somebody got the bright idea that what they needed was somebody to act as a liaison between Rockefeller's office and the State Department, to keep things more or less on even keel, or at least peaceful down the line, not just between the secretary and Rockefeller. They were doing their own talking and, more especially, Mr. [Sumner] Wells, who was under secretary and personally very largely in charge of Latin American Affairs in the Department. Those top-level discussions would be between Rockefeller and Wells and the secretary. But where the problems were occurring and then bubbling up into the secretary's office or the under secretary's office was down the line, the people in the different working divisions of the department.
So I believe Rockefeller took the initiative, as I recall, and went to the secretary and said, "Might we not do well to get somebody here to act as sort of a liaison between your department and my office. And he proposed, I believe, or at least was told, that I would be persona grata, having worked in the department from 1934 on, off and on. And the result was that in addition to handling the development of the pre-blacklist activity in the Coordinator's Office on a voluntary basis, I had the responsibility for trying to keep the lines un-fouled—from getting fouled—between the department and the Coordinator's Office. And this turned out to be quite a strenuous responsibility.

DANIELL: I can see why. What was the...? I don't understand completely what the relationship of the Coordinator's Office was to the government as a whole?

DICKEY: Well, you are not alone in not understanding that. Everybody around the government in the permanent agencies was asking to whom does this office report? And of course Nelson Rockefeller's view was that it reported to the White House. And he was terribly determined to keep his relationships with Harry Hopkins in the White House and the president out from under the State Department. And his argument, which had substance, was that if we get in under the State Department, it'll just be another division of the State Department and suffocate in the bureaucracy, and we won't get the kind of initiative and action which Rockefeller was capable of taking as long as he was a totally independent office.

DANIELL: Right, right. Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And which was partly what was resented. But--

DANIELL: Had Hopkins or Roosevelt directly asked Rockefeller to do this? Or was this something ___?

DICKEY: This is my understanding, that Hopkins, on behalf of the president, said, "Come on in and set up this office." Or, "Give us a proposal." And Rockefeller had proposed this kind of an office. Well, it grew like Topsy, and Rockefeller brought in a lot of high-powered people onto his staff: Will Clayton, the very outstanding head of Anderson & Clayton, the big cotton brokers, who knew Latin America through his commercial dealings; a very outstanding man on trade policy, Joe Ravenski, he brought down from the Chase National Bank who'd been a foreign trade, foreign finance expert in the Chase Bank; he had Percy Douglas, as I said, from Otis Elevator. And I could go on and name another two or three dozen. Indeed, today the concerns about what Rockefeller may do with the vice presidency is not
totally unrelated to what he did as coordinator during this period. And he had an assignment which as coordinator really permitted him to get into almost everything in the U.S. field in Latin America.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: He might well have said that he wasn't going to get into U.S. political problems in Latin America. But by the time you were into the commercial promotion, into the cultural affairs, and helping facilitate transportation when submarine warfare became so difficult, all of these things, why, you were really in the whole situation. And he had developed a pretty close relationship with the defense people. As the war went on, the single operating program in the Coordinator's Office that became accepted by everybody was the handling of U.S. propaganda in Latin America. This had involved an early issue with Elmer Davis, who was running U.S. propaganda in the OWI [Office of War Information]. Elmer Davis having a... But Elmer Davis and Rockefeller fairly early reached a treaty of peace-or alliance perhaps more accurately—in which Rockefeller was given complete responsibility for the cultural relations, the propaganda, the information work in Latin America. And this was very important to the United States war effort later. Actually, I found myself involved in that—we must be sure to come back to this—toward the end of the war in a very delicate way. But Rockefeller also had charge of the economic warfare activity, or at least aspired to have charge and thought he had charge, of the economic warfare activity in South America because he had organized this work that I was in charge of, the blacklist work. And then there was the Verclusive Buying Activities and all of the other critical segments of an overall economic warfare program.

Well, his ability to negotiate that jurisdictional issue wasn't quite as smooth going as had been the propaganda thing. And fairly early he began to have really major difficulties, jurisdictional difficulties, with the Economic Warfare Agency under Milo Perkins, which had overall responsibility for economic warfare. And as I look back on it, I think you'll have to say that the conduct of economic warfare probably required a worldwide responsibility or a worldwide jurisdiction, more than perhaps was true in the propaganda/cultural relations field. In any event, this became a very acute jurisdictional issue. The Coordinator's Office was in a jurisdictional issue with somebody all the time.

DANIELL: Yes, that was just the job.
DICKEY: Just by the nature of the job. The economic warfare thing became one of the more acute. Henry Wallace was vice-president at the time, and he was a close personal friend of Rockefeller's.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: They got on quite well. And Roosevelt at one point put Wallace in charge of the--overall charge--of the Economic Warfare Board. This was not a very effective organizational arrangement, but it held together for a while. But Milo Perkins was a real in-fighting kind of person, and he was not about to have Rockefeller take over the whole economic warfare thing in Latin America. We had, as I might say... Well, I'll come back to the side of the work I had charge of and its subsequent transfer into the State Department in July of 1941.

But along about that time--I forget just when it was--Milo Perkins established an increasingly close operating relationship with Carl Spaeth who was Rockefeller's, as I've said, right-hand man in the Coordinator's Office. Carl Spaeth was a very able fellow and had worked for Rockefeller in South America and so forth, who was a very strong man in his own right. He probably made a very serious mistake but quite understandably in that when he went to Washington, he went out to live in the house that Rockefeller had in Washington, 2500 Foxhall Road, which is still used as--until he goes into the vice-president's new home. Sheila Spaeth, who was an exceedingly able, attractive person, really became, so to speak, the person running this Washington household for Rockefeller, since his wife, Todd [Rockefeller] (his first wife), did not come to Washington full time during the early years of the war. She did pretty much later. But she kept their home open in Tarrytown and the apartment in New York and so forth. So that Sheila was really running this. Well, this was a helluva job for any woman. There were dozens of people in the house every night with these constant wartime conferences and guests and dinners. I don't see how she ever did it. And of course she had as much help as she needed, hired help and all of that.

I mention this because the break between Rockefeller and Spaeth was an unhappy thing all around, and was unhappy for me personally. I had known Carl as a classmate and respected his abilities. Knew about some of his personal problems. And I was working for Rockefeller; my responsibilities were to him. But they began to pull apart. There began to be tension in this situation. I don't think it began back—

[Change to Side B of Tape #9]
Problems between Nelson and Carl Spaeth came to a head in the economic warfare area where Carl was working very closely with Milo Perkins. And although I never have known the full inside story of the bust-up, I think the net of it was that Nelson came to the conclusion that Carl was not loyal to him—or as loyal to him as he should have been, and he was working too closely with Milo Perkins, and that Milo Perkins was out to take over Nelson. And you can see the pattern of difficulty that arose. In any event, they came to a clean break. Or not a clean break, a full break. And Spaeth went over with Milo Perkins's operation. And they have never since then had a close relationship. They've had, of course, a speaking relationship, but that's about all. After that Carl had several other foreign affairs assignments, one in Latin America. And then after the war went out to Stanford University as Dean of the Stanford Law School. And has recently retired from that.

DANIELL: One question on this. You know earlier you said you had an opportunity to go with the Rockefeller Family. And after talking with President [Ernest Martin] Hopkins, among others, decided against this. As you're talking about at this time, it seems like a more natural—you haven't described any kind of hesitancy in it from that point of view—or the nature of the activity, which was, as you said, kind of a bold thing to do.

DICKEY: Well, the nature of the activities of course during wartime that I was asked to take on were totally different. The impulse was public service, public duty, not the Rockefeller Family. And the context of the war and the uprooting that it was almost inevitably going to have with respect to all private careers. So that it was, as far as that question was concerned, it was never—even came into my thinking that it was comparable to the earlier one.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: Well, these were quite strenuous days and quite wonderful days. We moved our family down. I resigned from the law firm and moved the family down to Washington. We got a home out on 29th Street out in the Cleveland Park area of Washington. I think we moved down Thanksgiving weekend in 1940. And it was a big, big move for us and involved, as I said, the wrench of resigning my junior partnership in the law firm and so on. So I had cast the die, as the expression goes, completely with the government for the war.

DANIELL: How many children did you have at this point?
DICKEY: At that point we had the two little girls, the two small girls. That's right. That's right. Two small girls. All three of our children, it worked out through my commuting back and forth to Washington, were born in Washington, but at different times. Subsequently, our son was born there in 1941, after we had moved down. Well, my responsibilities during this period were getting the blacklist work organized on this voluntary basis. We had our share of crises. The one that's most memorable was with General Motors. General Motors, of course, had some very outstanding agencies in Latin America that were very important to them. One was a fellow named Barletta in Cuba, who was an Italian and believed to be, by our sources of information, very close to the Mussolini regime, particularly while things were going well for the Axis. And of course you must remember that for the first few years things went exceedingly well for the Axis, right up to the time, really, of the Graf Spart sinking.

DANIELL: I was just old enough then to be beginning to tune in on it. I know that we had big maps out on our sun porch, and we followed it.

DICKEY: Well, I did that. And acted increasingly as a liaison with the State Department for the Coordinator's Office. When somebody in the Coordinator's Office would have a jam with State, while usually they would call me in and say, What do you think? How do we handle this? And when State was annoyed at the Coordinator's Office, they would call me in and say, You've got to slow down these fellows over there. They're not the foreign office. And on and on. So I was sort of a Mister Fix-It, along with running-

DANIELL: Good training for a college president.

DICKEY: --building up this division of the blacklist. Well, without dwelling upon many specifics, the General Motors Case really became the make-or-break case in respect to the voluntary program. If we couldn't get General Motors to cooperate and change their agencies, the word was going to get around the business community very rapidly that the big boys didn't have to do it. And if the big boys didn't have to do it, the little fellows didn't have to replace their agents either. And so forth. So General Motors had these two agencies: one in Cuba, Barletta; and one in Bolivia, Gundlach. I will never forget these names. I lived with them morning, noon, and night. The Gundlach Agency in Bolivia, I think, was, as I recall, also handling the General Motors agency in Chile. The connection was very close. So that this was a major thing for General Motors. Well, after discussions on my part and with other people--and we had full support from State on this. State was anxious to curb the Axis activities in South America. And State, I think it's fair to say, had confidence in the way I was handling things and
in me personally. But we reached the point where the people down the line in General Motors simply said, "This is going to have to be dealt with at the top. We just are under instructions that General Motors never chooses or breaks off its agencies for political reasons. And we just can't do business on that basis." Now, I understood that, and I understand it today. And therefore if these people are breaking U.S. laws, that's one thing. But there was no U.S. law that they were breaking. And this was almost a covert U.S. policy, not very fully publicized. So they said, "We're not going to change these agencies."

Well, at that point I had been keeping Rockefeller posted on it, and he had talked with some of these number two people in General Motors, but hadn't gotten anywhere. We'd written letters to Mr. Sloan, who was head of it. So far we'd gotten a polite reply, but nothing had happened. So Rockefeller decided that we had to go to the White House. So he went to the White House first to make sure we started at the top. And we had a meeting, I remember one day, with Harry Hopkins. Harry Hopkins was in very poor, frail health off and on in the White House. We went up, as I recall, to his bedroom. And Rockefeller had me outline what we had done and where we were, that we weren't able to move General Motors on this. I'll never forget Hopkins's flashing eyes. And he said, "Well, they're going to move. So don't let's discuss that any further. Let's just decide who's going to go after them." [Laughter] Well, we decided that probably the best thing to do was to have State handle it. And if it was going to be handled at the top at State, the man to handle it was Sumner Wells, the undersecretary of state, who was just like an icicle or like a ramrod in his appearance. And it was agreed that Rockefeller would get in touch with, as I recall, get directly in touch with Mr. Sloan and say that the White House had instructed him to take this matter up with the very top officers of General Motors, and that it was going to be handled by Mr. Wells, as undersecretary of state, on behalf of everybody. And would Mr. [Alfred] Sloan either attend personally or send a personal representative with authority to act on this matter. Which was a very stiff--

DANIELL: Heady business.

DICKEY: Very stiff business, yes. Well, the meeting was held in Mr. Wells's office. I was there, and Nelson was there. A man named--I'm not sure what his name was. It seems to me his name was Packer, not the Packer I'd dealt with of course earlier in the Rockefeller office. A top vice president was there and said he was attending at Mr. Sloan's personal direction and so forth. Well, Wells was at his iciest best. And he said, "Gentlemen, this is a matter of the highest importance to the United States government. And I am directed by the White House to ascertain whether the United States
government can count upon the cooperation of General Motors." Well, [Laughter] this is in effect saying, if General Motors wants all these war contracts and a lot of other things, they'd better cooperate. Well, these fellows just melted, just melted. And made a little speech about why they hadn't felt they could cooperate. But if this was the direction from the top responsible officers of the United States government--and they sort of bypassed Rockefeller in this respect; the coordinator didn't have this kind of authority--they, much as they regretted it, would abide by the direction. They dropped Barletta, and they dropped Gundlach. And this, in effect, opened the whole voluntary program to a new round of effectiveness. I forget the month when that took place. But this would probably have been in the late winter or early spring of '41.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Must have been in '41.

DICKEY: And then to just complete, perhaps, this aspect of my wartime experiences. In June of '41... By that time there had been a number of events that indicated we were approaching really an open commitment. I forget whether the--I think the destroyers' deal had taken place. I'm sure it had. The lend-lease of the destroyers and so forth. But the U.S. position was no longer, in any respect--

DANIELL: By the spring of '41 it's clear.

DICKEY: But by the late spring of '41, we knew that this thing was moving from a voluntary thing to an official thing. In early July--I forget the date; July 17th, perhaps--under the leadership of the Treasury, really, but we were all very closely involved in it, the United States issued a proclamation, a presidential proclamation, with respect to certain blocked nationalists, which was the euphemism for people in firms in other countries with whom our people were not to be permitted to have financial transactions or commercial transactions. In effect transferring the list that we were using, the confidential list, to a public list. Establishing a blacklist, which we called the "Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationalists."

At that time the work was transferred to the State Department. The whole division that I had built up in the Coordinator's Office was transferred to the State Department, not physically actually. We stayed in the Commerce Department Building where the coordinator's headquarters were. But we were transferred over to the State Department. I was made chief of the division while I was still in a dual capacity. I was called "acting chief," but I was pretty much chief of the Division of World Trade Intelligence, it became known as; that was its formal title. It was made one of the divisions of Mr. [Dean] Acheson's office as assistant secretary of state in
charge of economic affairs, and subsequently in charge of economic warfare affairs.

DANIELL: This is formally a division of the State Department?

DICKEY: A formal division of the State Department. And called WT, Division of World Trade Intelligence; I was made head of it. But I retained my connection with the Coordinator's Office; indeed was paid on the coordinator's payroll; continued to be paid on the coordinator's payroll as special assistant to the coordinator, assigned to the State Department as head of the Division of World Trade Intelligence. And we went through immediately that this proclamation was issued a burst of activity. Because going public was another very, very bold proposition. And we put out a list of--published the first proclaimed list in I think it was July 17th; same time the proclamation came out--of, oh, I forget what it was: 2,000 names throughout Latin America.

Well, if ever the figure of speech "scrambled eggs hitting the fan" had validity, this was it. [Laughter] As soon as you went public with this list, everybody said, "I don't belong on that list. I'm a great friend of the United States. I hate Hitler, I hate Mussolini." And so forth. And the American firms came running down. Their accounts were blocked with these people in South America. The Treasury was a very aggressive, militant bunch. And everybody just said, "Well, you go see John Dickey. He's got charge of whether you're on the list or not on the list." Well, they began to go to Sumner Wells that morning. I will never forget this. Particularly the people down there in Cuba. Barletta was on the list. And it was one thing when Barletta was on a confidential list. But when Barletta came out on a public list, it turned out that he was a friend of Wells from Wells's days as ambassador in Cuba. And I was called into Mr. Acheson's office, and he was wonderful. I shall always remember with appreciation and admiration his calmness. Because Wells had called him and ripped him up. "What the hell is going on that we put out a list with my friends on it?" And so forth. And I didn't know it was Wells's friend. Nor did Acheson, of course.

So he got a hold of me, and he said, "We've got a real rough situation here on our hands inside the department." And so on. "And how solid is this list?" "Well," I said, "to tell you the honest to God truth, I don't know how solid it is. We've put this information together from military intelligence reports, from the FBI reports--" The FBI was operating all through South America in those days "--from the reports from our consular offices and diplomatic offices. We've got evidence in every case, some evidence. Now whether it's good evidence, whether it would stand up to a critical scrutiny
in some situations, I just don't know. But we'll just have to start in, painstakingly taking up every protest, and check it out."

DANIELL: And this was supposedly just a list of those who were trading with the Axis, or actual sympathizers, or what was the basic distinction?

DICKEY: Well, both. Both. If they were trading with the Axis, this, except in the rarest exception--other than the rarest exception--would be regarded as being trading with the enemy and made them eligible for blacklist treatment.

DANIELL: Okay. Fine.

DICKEY: But it went much further than that. If they were openly known to be Axis sympathizers, encouraging Axis causes, propaganda, making contributions... The Nazis did a great deal of assessing people in the German communities in Brazil, in Venezuela, and elsewhere, and then that money would be used to support propaganda activities, because it wasn't the easiest thing in the world for the Germans to get their money at this point. See, the British blockade was still pretty good at this point into Latin America. And some of it even went to the point of people being regarded as involved in espionage, that is, as drop points, shop...

DANIELL: So it was various businessmen.

DICKEY: So it was the whole gamut. But a much broader definition of a blacklist than we'd ever had in World War I. I went back and looked at the history of the blacklist in World War I, just to see what they had done. And it was as nothing compared to the blacklist that we ran in World War II. Because you had a different kind of world to deal with. You had the world of propaganda to deal with in a way that you hadn't had it in World War I. [Carillon bells] And in South America we had to deal with a great many people who were citizens in good standing--some of them the most prestigious people--in these countries. For example, we had Barletta--

DANIELL: In Cuba.

DICKEY: --in Cuba. We had Gundlach in Bolivia. We had Golda Helmann, big wool firm in Peru. Perhaps the most notable of all, the Blums whom I began to think owned better than half of Venezuela in Venezuela. And on and on and on. So this was not sandbox games. This involved very real internal crises for these governments when a company such as Blum's went to the Venezuelans and said, "Gentlemen, what are you going to do about this?" They came to the United States government on horseback to see what
could be done. Well, we went through after--when this was first published--a period of very acute crisis. We put out a deletion list within a matter of days, certainly within a week, where, after we went over it and there were protests, we decided we didn't have a case. That is a case that we were prepared to stand on. Some of those later went back on the proclaimed list when we had the evidence. But really, as I look back on it, the list stood up amazingly well, considering the informal, ad hoc basis on which it had been put together. But the thing which I remember most vividly, and most appreciatively, was the way Acheson handled it. Because quite a few men could have buckled in his position and said, For God's sake, let's get somebody to run this list who knows what's going on, and so forth. And get out of this, Dickey." But he didn't. He said, "This is one of these things that we're moving faster than we're in a position to move. Okay. Let's see what we can do about it." A wonderful, wonderful man. Well, out of experiences like that came my close friendship with him.

DANIELL: At this point he was...?

DICKEY: Assistant secretary of state in charge of economic affairs. The old office that [Francis Bowes] Sayre had had and Grady had had ahead of him.

DANIELL: Ah, same one. Yes.

DICKEY: As a matter of fact, I worked with him on the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, which I mentioned to you, in '43. Even though, as I've said, that was a pretty perfunctory kind of renewal at that point. Well, it's twelve o'clock. I'm getting a little hoarse. Maybe this would be a good point to--

DANIELL: Yes. No, I think this is—

[End of Tape #9]

[End of February 21, 1975 interview]

[Beginning of Tape #10A]

March 3, 1975

DANIELL: We can get started right now.

DICKEY: Okay. Actually the official publication--indeed the official establishment--of the blacklist, formally known as the "Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals," in mid-July 1941 was the real beginning of what became a very
close and highly prized personal relationship with Dean Acheson. I had first met Mr. Acheson back in I believe it was the spring of 1940, when I was in the State Department, as I've related, on a leave-of-absence from the law firm helping out on the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1940. At that time he was asked by President [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt and Secretary [Cordell] Hull to come into the administration as assistant secretary of state in charge of economic affairs, the office earlier held by my first State Department chief, Francis [Bowes] Sayre. And then in the winter--late winter and early spring of '40--by Henry Grady. But Grady was leaving, and President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull decided to ask Mr. Acheson to come into the department as assistant secretary.

I remember being asked--being told about this at the time by Harry Hawkins, who was chief of the Trade Agreements Division, perhaps my closest personal friend in the department, and one of the really remarkable career civil servants in the department. He had told me at the time that the secretary had asked him if he, Hawkins, would see Mr. Acheson and describe to him the nature of the responsibilities that had previously been involved in that office.

DANIELL: What was Acheson's position before this comes up?

DICKEY: At this time he was in his private law practice with Covington & Burling. But he had been in the Roosevelt Administration in the very first weeks of that administration, back in 1933, as Under Secretary of Treasury under Secretary [William H.] Woodin. Woodin--W-O-O-D-I-N, I believe--had been the first Secretary of Treasury under Franklin Roosevelt. He died within a matter of months, as I recall, of assuming office. And Acheson resigned as Under Secretary of the Treasury quite early. I believe prior to Woodin's death although I'm not sure about that. The issue had been one that involved policies with respect to--well, monetary policies really, fiscal policies. And Acheson felt, I believe, that the Roosevelt Administration at that point was not keeping faith with its earlier campaign pledges.

DANIELL: Yes. In kind of a general way.

DICKEY: In any event, I can say, as I subsequently learned, that Roosevelt came to have a very high regard for Mr. Acheson. And once, some years after Acheson had resigned, had occasion to say, in connection with the resignation of some other member of his administration who had not handled himself very well, at least in Roosevelt's eyes, in resigning, he had occasion to say that that individual ought to take lessons in leaving from Dean Acheson. Well, to go back to where we are, in the spring of '40,
Acheson was making up his mind about coming back into the administration. I think he was attracted to it because of the circumstances that were present: wartime and a fresh kind of responsibility in the State Department which he had not had previously. But he also, I think, wasn't entirely sure about how he would fit into Cordell Hull's State Department. He had had this rather unhappy experience in leaving the Roosevelt Administration back in '33. So that it wasn't something that he jumped at.

He had this talk with Hawkins at Secretary Hull's suggestion, and Hawkins in turn asked me if I would sit in on it on the theory that I had been handling, so to speak, the legal/constitutional aspects of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for the department and in particular the renewal activities. He thought that Acheson would be particularly interested in those and might prefer to hear about them from a lawyer rather than from an economist, as Hawkins was. Well, we had a very satisfactory talk. I don't think I contributed anything very significant to Acheson's understanding of the opportunity. But he did decide to do it, and had charge of economic affairs. And this very quickly came to mean primarily economic warfare activities of the United States government even before we were in the war. Because by early, well, by 1941 it was pretty clear which side we wanted to win, and which side we were going to be on if we became a belligerent. So in July of 1941, with the establishment of the blacklist openly and officially, Acheson had primary responsibility for it in the State Department. And a division was set up, of which I was made chief, under him to carry out the administration of the blacklist.

DANIELL: Was your accepting this position as chief of the division closely related to your respect for Acheson at this time?

DICKEY: Well, in a way. But I had not really gotten to know him closely prior to that. I really was simply, as one might say, on a speaking acquaintanceship, but that's about all. But this was the beginning of what became a very close relationship. And in many ways the closeness, at least as far as I was concerned, took root quite quickly when he behaved, as it seemed to me, magnificently in respect to the difficulties which we caused for him with a published list that had many weaknesses about it. And which brought Sumner Wells down on him fairly sharply because Wells was under secretary and Acheson was assistant secretary, and it turned out that some of Wells's friends in Latin America were on the published list. Another man might well have blown his top and taken his wrath out on me, but he didn't. He said, "Obviously we've had to do this in a hurry. And it'll require a period of time to get it tightened up. But go ahead. I'll explain these situations to Wells." And that was that.
Well, we had really a very fine relationship throughout the war and thereafter. Indeed it was one of the most--his friendship and his subsequent high regard for me as mentioned in his major book, *Present at the Creation*--were rewards, as far as I was concerned, of very great importance to me because I did come to have such a high regard for him. And the fact that it was reciprocated was immensely satisfying.

Well, we went through the usual travail that was present in, I suppose, most aspects of the government during the war period. I remember, however, in those early weeks or months of creating the Division of World Trade Intelligence another incident that taught me something about administration. I had to put together a division, really, in a matter of days, certainly weeks. And this meant frequently bringing people in that we didn't know very much about. The checking on them was pretty thin. There was one man who was recommended to us--I forget now by whom--to be an assistant chief in the division. And we got out his--put together a folder of references, including recommendations from high officers in one of America's largest companies that this man had been employed with. Well, he came in. He was a very personable person in manner and appearance. Had the kind of--seemed to have the kind of--business experience in export/import work with a large company that was relevant to what we wanted. And we took him on as an assistant chief in the division.

It was not more than two weeks before I began to be uneasy about this man's judgment and his fundamental personal qualities for this kind of responsibility. And within a matter of days after I began to be uneasy... He seemed to me to be impulsive and too quick and too sure of himself. Not a very stable--not nearly as stable a person as it seemed to me his references had suggested. Well, within a matter of days after I began to be uneasy about this, I was called over by Mr. Acheson--my office was out of the main State-War-Navy Building where his office was--at the end of one day, and he said, "Do you have a fellow in your office named So-and-so?" He said, "I've not heard of him." I said, "Yes, there is a man there. We took him on as an assistant chief in the division several weeks ago." And he said, "What's his background?" "Well," I said, "I really don't know as much about him as I'd like to know. But his background is that he was a responsible officer with this large American corporation, and we have references from them on him and so on." And he said, "Well, he's been sending personal invitations to Sumner Wells to come up to a party which he's giving at the..." I forget what it was. The Plaza Hotel I think it was, in New York, one of the big New York hotels. For the ambassadors of, I guess, it was to the United States from Latin America, maybe it was. But in any event, some large group of foreign diplomats. And he had been sending his card as a chief of the--assistant chief of the--Division of World
Trade Intelligence of the Department of State to Mr. Wells along with the invitation.

Well, right away I knew there was something very much amiss, and that my worst fears had been confirmed that I had gotten a hold of a, let's say a disturbed person. So I went back to the office that night and undertook to find out where this fellow was. I had assumed he was in his office and around. No, he was up in New York and so forth. Well, I got a hold of him, and asked him what this was all about. And he was obviously in an excited--I guess I'd have to say really disturbed--state of mind. And not able to give me anything like satisfactory answers. So I asked him to come down that night from New York and to meet me in the office first thing in the morning. Well, by morning I knew that we had an impossible person in the job. I'd done some checking around with some people that were in the office and had been watching him more closely, and so forth. It wasn't the first time I had to fire anyone, but it was in my life as an administrator--nor the last--but it was one of the early experiences of that sort with me, and one of the more traumatic.

DANIELL: Yes, let me see. You're about not much older than 30 years old then.

DICKEY: Well, I was born in 1907, and this was 1941.

DANIELL: So you were 34.

DICKEY: So he came into the office and was very presentable. He was always dressed very well and so forth. I think I'll just skip his last name; it's of no relevance here. And his first name was Henry. And I said, "Henry, we've got a very serious problem, as I'm sure you must realize from my call to you yesterday." And he said, "Well, I don't know that we have. If Wells can't come to the party, why, that's that." And, well, I said, "Henry, gracious, you don't really invite the under secretary of state as a member of his organization this way to this sort of thing. And then invite all these ambassadors in your name as a State Department officer to a party." I said, "It's something a little--" I forget what I said. "This is just something that doesn't quite make sense." And I said, "I've been called on the mat about it, and in turn I've got to tell you that this is just not suitable behavior, and that I think you've got to put this job down because obviously you're in a rather excited emotional state of mind." By this time I knew that this--I forget where I picked this up during the night--that he had come to us, in effect, out of a mental hospital where he had been receiving treatment, and that all of these people who had written references for him had covered up for him.
It taught me something that I subsequently made, I think, good use of in being very skeptical about written references. If you're going to check anybody like that out, you'd better check them out on the telephone. Written references, yes, they don't do any harm perhaps, but in this case they did. So I said that--all I could say was that I quite accepted the fact that he had a problem of illness to contend with; this was not anything other than that. But this was just not the sort of a position or a time that permitted somebody to--permitted me to be responsible for somebody on the job of this sort who had this kind of a problem. Well, he got quite emotional and left. And in the course of the day he sent me I think it was a written communication to the effect that he had put the matter in the hands of his lawyers. [Laughter] And this didn't terrify me quite as much as it might have if I hadn't had a little background myself in the law. But it did upset me because it seemed to me that here, once again, I was going to be bringing down on Acheson's head, innocent head, another contretemps that had involved Mr. Wells and so forth. And he said he was going to sue Mr. Acheson and myself and everybody else.

Well, so I went over that evening to Mr. Acheson's office and told him what had been done. I said that "I have told the individual that we could not go forward with him as an officer of the division." He was still well within the probationary period of appointments so that there was no problem of civil service difficulties, as I remember. But there was this threat to bring suit and all of that, and I didn't like that. And I remember once again how well Acheson handled himself. He said, "Well, obviously this is something that is upsetting to you, and I quite understand that. But," he said, "I assure you I have no concern about it. You've done the right thing. And we'll be lucky if we only get stuck with one such person, having to recruit entire divisions overnight as we are doing." And he said, "I'll tell you something else, too." He said, "Over a fairly extended career, I've found that most people who make such threats don't carry them out. That if somebody's really going to sue you and they go to a lawyer, the lawyer will usually advise them to get the suit started before they begin to make threats. So," he said, "I would not worry too much about this, if I were you."

Well, he was right, of course. Henry subsequently got mental help--or got help from a psychiatrist. The end of that story--I don't know whether it has ended. But he had to go back into the hospital. And some years ago--I think maybe four years ago--just after I retired from the job, I got a telephone call from this individual. [Laughter] And I couldn't place the name. And he said, "You don't remember me, do you?" "No," I said, "the name is familiar." "Well," he said, "I was the assistant chief in the division of the State Department that you let go." I said, "For heaven's sake!" And, well, the only reason I relate this is that once again he'd been in the
hospital, apparently once or twice between the time that I had seen him and then, and he was out again now, and once again he was in a manic state. And he was over at a reunion at Hamilton College, calling me from there. And he was all upset about the dormitory rules at Hamilton. And he knew that I was here at Dartmouth, and he wanted to call me and find out whether I didn't think it was outrageous and immoral, etc., etc., the way Hamilton.... I mention this because it's the sort of incident that sticks with you.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And to a degree educates you for God knows what. But it taught me something, both about the way to handle a associate who's had a bad experience, and also about checking out references--and in particular to be a little careful about these situations where people, as they think out of good intention, cover up. I subsequently, of course, ran into, well, I won't say innumerable such cases, but quite a few such cases in our admissions work, where schools would send us people that had everything except emotional stability and would cover up a problem that some lad had that shouldn't have been covered up--both for his sake and for ours.

DANIELL: Yes. You run into the same thing, of course, in faculty recruiting, too.

DICKEY: Yes, yes.

DANIELL: Now in the History Department we've just--we narrow down through the normal written applications. But we have the person on campus for a whole day before the department makes up its mind among several candidates, for just that same reason.

DICKEY: Mmmm hmmm. Well, you learn from experience on these things. But those were two of the experiences I had as an officer in the department reporting to Mr. Acheson. During this period, right up through, indeed until the latter part of the war, I continued being on the staff of Mr. Rockefeller as advisor and as coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, serving informally as the liaison officer with the State Department. But my primary administrative responsibilities were as chief in the Division of War Trade Intelligence. I think there's no need for us to go into detail of that work. I've described its nature. It was something that I believed in. I have since come to realize that economic warfare is a pretty rough business, as warfare itself is. And I should not want to see the country undertake a peacetime program of economic warfare, simply because I think it's a type of activity
that's not very compatible with the basic democratic standards and processes.

DANIELL: Yes. Remember I asked you earlier last time, that it was quite a shift from what you were doing as part of the law firm in Boston, to coming into a kind of activity in Washington which was, at least in '40, certainly clandestine in part.

DICKEY: 'Forty it was. And indeed right up to July '42 when we went public with the blacklist.

DANIELL: Just one question that occurred to me then. I didn't ask it then; it was very late in the session. But it's a very general question, which is, namely, kind of at what point, from your just living through this experience, did you as an individual became really aware of the--I can only describe it and say--the moral implications of the growth of Axis and particularly Nazi power? And to what extent, if at all, did this feed into your decision to engage in a kind of activity which, you know, you must have had some compunctions about?

DICKEY: I don't think I have a good memory about any particular point at which I became convinced of the dangers to the United States involved in the Axis position in Europe, indeed, before the war. But this I can say: That is definitely preceded my going down to Washington.

DANIELL: Yes, it must have.

DICKEY: Indeed, the answer to that question, insofar as I can develop it, would be rooted back in my experience in the State Department in '35.

DANIELL: Really!

DICKEY: And '36. I had occasion to know at that time a good bit about what was going on in Mussolini's effort to take over Ethiopia. This was quite outside my normal responsibilities in Sayre's office. But a great many different things would come to Mr. Sayre, and then he would buck many of them off for me to handle. And in the course of 1935, at some point-- [Carillon bells] I guess it was '35.

[Change to Side B of Tape #10]

DICKEY: Saying that in '35, I believe it was--it might have been early '36, but I'm almost certain it was in '35--Raymond Rich, who was then executive director of the World Peace Foundation in Boston, came to see Mr. Sayre
about getting the cooperation of the State Department on a project they wanted to develop to publish a book about the trouble that had developed in Ethiopia, through Mussolini's aspirations to take over--and his military effort to take over--Ethiopia. Mr. Sayre referred Rich to me, and I became the person in the Department of State who was responsible for arranging for the World Peace Foundation and their author, a Miss McCallum, as I recall, to get the help of people in the department who were experts on Ethiopia while she was working on this book, a little book. The book subsequently came out under the title, *Rivalries in Ethiopia*.

In the course of that particular assignment from Mr. Sayre, I had occasion to be exposed quite early to what seemed to me to be the really very aggressive behavior of Mussolini, and of course the behavior of Hitler in the Rhineland and elsewhere. I became quite convinced--indeed before I went back to Boston in the latter part of the summer or early fall of 1936--that we were now faced with a challenge which if not met forthrightly and strongly by the League of Nations and the United States supporting the League, would lead to a world war. I do not have many prophetic happenings that I can claim in my life. But I have never forgotten that when I went back to Boston in the fall of '36, a number of us who'd been together in law school (Dartmouth friends mainly), we had an evening together at Jakie [Jacob] Wirth's in Boston, a German restaurant. And in the course of that evening one of my Dartmouth and Harvard Law classmates, Bill [William Chamberlain] Coles, now living in Venezuela, asked me what I saw ahead so far as international, as the threat of war. Was there a threat of war, and did I take it seriously? I went out on a limb and said I not only took it seriously, but at that point I was prepared to believe that insofar as anything was inevitable, the coming of a European war was now inevitable.

Coles has never forgotten that. He frequently says, "You're the only person that ever called a turn, to his knowledge, about what was coming." Well that, of course, wasn't true. But it is true, in response to the question you put to me, that from '35-'36 on, I had come to the--I came increasingly to the conviction that the combination of Hitler and Mussolini would bring us to war in Europe. And I had no confidence whatsoever that a policy of neutrality would prevail. I had participated in a number of private discussion groups on the questions of neutrality, which were very much to the fore in '35 and '36 in the government. And out of those discussions, as well as my own experience in the department, I came to believe that if war came to Europe, it was only a question of time when we would be drawn in. Now this may be fairly important in the development of my own career, because this is the background against which I decided in 1940 that the time had come to leave the law firm and go back to government: I was
convinced that war was coming. And I had already made a deep personal judgment about the evil, it seemed to me, that was inherent in the Nazi/Axis position.

DANIELL: Yes. That makes that decision much more understandable.

DICKEY: Now, where were we? We were talking about the experience I had as a division chief working under Mr. Acheson in the department. And I stayed with this work until 1943, when once again I was asked by the department, Mr. Acheson this time and Harry Hawkins on behalf of the secretary, to come over and give full time to the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which was coming up again in 1943. Well, as I've said before, this renewal really was rather perfunctory.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Because the war was on. Even as 1940 had been something of a holding action—the renewal of the act in 1940 had been something of a holding action—in 1943 it was nothing but that. Simply a symbolic token of the readiness of the United States government, or the desire of the United States government, to develop a liberal trade policy in its postwar plans. But this took me away from the blacklist work for a period of months, and I never went back to that work. Shortly after we'd finished with the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in '43, Harry Hawkins learned that the secretary and the people who were working with him on postwar planning—principal person was Leo Pasvolsky—that they had reached the point in their postwar planning where they were, perhaps somewhat belatedly, aware that they had to develop public understanding and support of the U.S. aims for the postwar if they were to get the kind of action in the Congress that would be essential to carry these plans out.

So I had a call one day from Pasvolsky—I believe at the suggestion of Harry Hawkins that I would be a good person to enlist if he could in this work. The upshot of it was that I was appointed special consultant to the secretary of state to develop the public liaison work between the department and the various segments of the American public that would have a concern with the postwar plans of the United States. I went into this with relatively little realization of the magnitude of the task. It was something that had not been done in the department. But insofar as it had been done, it had been almost solely confined to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act renewals, where, as a matter of fact, I had had, I suppose, more experience on this sort of thing than anyone else. And of course that work and my other work in the department had created an acceptance of myself personally on the part of many departmental officers,
whose cooperation would be essential in developing a program of this sort. It is no exaggeration to say that the Department of State was not a very open enterprise at that point. Indeed, I suppose it never is a very open enterprise so far as the public was concerned.

So from late '43 on, as special consultant to the secretary, undertook to develop a wholly new segment of activity in the State Department concerned with creating a two-way relationship between the department and those organized elements in American society that had an interest in foreign affairs. Indeed, many, as it turned out, many of the organizations or so-called pressure groups that we worked with had very little interest in foreign affairs until we helped them develop those interests. I'm talking about, oh, church groups, some of the service groups -- Rotary and Kiwanis, which had a potential interest and a certain kind of international interest, but had not worked very seriously on foreign policy problems.

I began by taking over responsibility in what was called the Special Consultant's Office -- all State Department offices have initials; those were SC/D. I began by taking over, oh, I don't know how many it would have been but maybe a half a dozen people -- Shepard Jones was one of the professionals, and there were two or three others along with some assistants -- who had been working previously in Pasvolsky's office on what would most accurately be termed "public opinion studies." That is, they had been conducting in-house studies of American opinion with respect to prospective postwar planning proposals. Studying the newspapers, editorial material, the history of some of the difficulties with the League of Nations, and so on and so forth.

I got Dick [Richard] Morin who subsequently, of course, came to Dartmouth after I came to the job here as a librarian. He came to Dartmouth to work with me as an executive assistant, and then later moved into the vacancy created when Goodrich retired as librarian. But he was then in the State Department, had been in the State Department off and on from the early 1930's when he was there as a foreign service officer. He came back for the war. I got him to come back. He came back to the department during the war and was working on foreign funds control, which was closely related to the blacklist work. And he readily accepted my invitation to join me in this work of the Special Consultant's Office. And became a very close associate in that work.

We built up what might be described as a small division in the department - I forget how many people we had in it, but we would have had several dozen in it -- during the 1943, early 1944 period. It was an intensely interesting assignment for me because it involved working very literally as
a go-between or liaison office, as we called it. We called it the Public--we
set up a Division of Public Liaison in this Special Consultant's Office, of
which Dick Morin became the chief. It was a go-between liaison activity
between the professional people in the department working on postwar
plans and those elements in the American public which were interested, or
which we felt we needed to interest, in these plans. This meant a fair
amount of traveling. It subsequently involved a good bit of speaking to
these groups around the country. And it involved an awful lot of internal
efforts to cultivate a receptive, cooperative, positive attitude on the part of
departmental officers toward these people on the outside. Particularly in
respect to these suggestions and concerns of these people to have an
input in respect to the postwar planning.

This activity had been held very closely. Pasvolsky's nature was secretive.
He was working with a staff that had been pretty well immersed in the
philosophy of secrecy. Mr. Wells was not an outgoing person. He was
doing a great deal of this. Mr. Hull certainly didn't want any more public
discussion of some of these issues than was necessary to get public
support. There were some very top people in Congress who were working
with the secretary and with Mr. Wells: [Arthur] Vandenberg, [Tom]
Connally, and others like that. So that we came into this thing with--I don't
think it's too much to say--an uphill job of getting the people inside the
government who were working on these matters into a frame of mind that
permitted us to work at the development of a two-way relationship. And
the two-way is the key aspect of what I was trying to do, a two-way
relationship with the American public.

This was one of the most fundamentally challenging jobs, in a way, I've
ever had. Well, it went pretty well during the period from '43 on, until really
Dumbarton Oaks, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which was held in
Washington with the British and the French and the Russians. When
would that have been? I guess it was the summer or early spring--or
maybe it was the fall. In any event, it was in the middle of 1944, as I recall.
Or the latter part of '44. The primary purpose of the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference was to bring these major wartime allies together on some of
the fundamental issues involved in drawing up a draft for a United Nations
charter--of a United Nations charter. They had been carrying on serious
discussions through diplomatic channels every since September and
October of 1943, when Secretary Hull took his famous, or well-known, trip
to Moscow. Quite an interesting contrast between his activities as
secretary of state and the activities of the secretary of state today, who's
away from Washington more than he's there. Mr. Hull's trip to Moscow
was a singular thing, in which he sought to enlist the cooperation of the
Russians, and to find out whether we had the prospect of cooperation of
the Russians in setting up a postwar organization. In this respect it was really a critical juncture.

Mr. Hull returned from Moscow very much encouraged by the attitude of the Russians, and believing that we could count on them. Well, of course that, in a sense, was also the point at which they began to realize--the department people began to realize--that they had to begin to bring the American public into this situation, because they were getting pretty far down the road in their international discussions of the shape the postwar world was going to take if these plans materialized. Well, the Special Consultant's Office and its Division of Public Liaison was quite active from the Moscow conference on, or shortly after the Moscow conference, in establishing what you might call good personal relations with various organizations: church groups, educational groups, business groups. Such foreign policy-associated groups as the Foreign Policy Association, etc. And we were in quite a good position with these groups when the Dumbarton Oaks Conference came along.

Well, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference got off to a sour start with the press from the very beginning. It was held out at this estate, the Bliss estate in Washington, which was called Dumbarton Oaks. It was surrounded with all the trappings of wartime secrecy. They had military sentries posted around the walls of the place. And somehow or other it just got dominated by the wartime climate. Here was supposed to be an entry into the postwar period, but it was being carried on, as I've said, in the style of a wartime conference. Well, the press jumped on it, and began to complain very bitterly that they had been excluded from the conference. That they were only getting pablum handouts from Pasvolsky's office and others and weren't being told anything. And the public, as a result, began to get a pretty steady exposure to critical editorials, critical cartoons, critical news stories. And this very quickly began to sour our relationships with these organizations.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Because we in the Special Consultant's Office were not able to tap into this. We were excluded from Dumbarton Oaks. The only people in the department who were at Dumbarton Oaks were Pasvolsky's people and people who were specifically invited by them to come out to the conference. Well, needless to say, this didn't sit very well with me. You never like to be on a job where you have to tell somebody from the outside, "I don't really know what's going on." And when you have to stay that, regardless of how nicely you say it, they immediately don't think you
need to be taken very seriously. So this was a difficult situation for us on this side of the department's work.

I guess this was the early fall of '44. I believe it was right before elections. In any event, Mr. Hull was not well at that time, as I recall. Indeed, I think he was out of the department most of the time. And I just might say parenthetically that I came to be quite clear that this was one of those occasions where the top people in American government get very arrogant about their right to keep from the American public something which would be potentially disadvantageous to the party in power. I'm digressing here to say that I subsequently became quite certain that during the fall of 1944 [E. R.] Stettinius, [Jr.], as under secretary, and the White House, the people around the president, knew for a reasonable certainty that Mr. Hull would not be coming back to significant responsibilities in the State Department again. His health was not going to permit him.

But they played up him as part of the '44 campaign in a way that... Well, as I look back on it, I really don't think it was playing fair with the American public, because Mr. Hull was still regarded as a man above the fray as far as American politics were concerned. This reminds me of something I must be sure to mention because of its intrinsic interest. And remembering this, leads me to be sure--leads me to correct--what I said just a little bit with respect to timing. That is to say, Mr. Hull was around the department in the late summer and early fall. And it was only during the very latter part of the presidential campaign of '44 that I think his illness kept him out of the department most of the time. But he was clearly a relatively frail man at that point. But I do want to be sure to come back to this other incident which is of, I suppose, some minor historical consequence. Well, to return to the Dumbarton Oaks story.

DANIELL: Just a second now. You want to come back to this incident--?

DICKEY: Yes, I think I'd better deal with the Dumbarton Oaks story.

DANIELL: Okay. Can you just give me a clue as to what the incident is so that we don't forget it?

DICKEY: Oh, well, it related Mr. [Thomas] Dewey's use of John Foster Dulles to see whether the 1944 presidential campaign could be kept nonpartisan with respect to foreign affairs.

DANIELL: Okay. Yes. That's fine. Okay. Which fits in exactly. The one thing that I've been thinking as you've been going through this is the linkage of this to the presidential politics that are coming up. I'll make sure we get back to that.
DICKEY: Well, to come at the Dumbarton Oaks thing, we in the Special Consultant's Office had been excluded from what was going on out at Dumbarton Oaks. And I just felt that if they wanted us, they would have included us. And if they didn't want us, well, we weren't going to push in. I thought they would come to us in due course, that is, the other people in the department. Rather than having us go around begging to be let in. I was surely right about that.

[End of Tape #10B]
[Beginning of Tape #11, Side A]

DICKEY: As I was saying, after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference had been going for, I guess, a week or ten days or so and had begun to have a sour press, and we were getting complaints from the organizations with which we were working that they didn't feel they knew what was going on and that they should, I got a telephone call in mid-afternoon from Alger Hiss, our old friend, who was Leo Paslovsky's right-hand man at this point, carrying out the postwar planning concerned with the development of a draft for the United Nations Charter. Hiss had transferred from Stanley Hornbeck's Far Eastern Office that he had gone to from Sayre's office when Sayre went to the Philippines, and he had transferred from Hornbeck to Paslovsky's office to work on postwar planning for Paslovsky. He called me from Dumbarton Oaks, and he said, “Mr. Stettinius,” who was then under-secretary and who was handling Dumbarton Oaks for the secretary, “has instructed me to call you and say that he feels we should be doing more with the church groups to enlist their support of Dumbarton Oaks and the planning for a United Nations organization. And would I please take hold of that?”

Well, to say that I was outraged [laughter] would be about right. And my response was not a very diplomatic one. I said, “Well, Alger, I am not surprised that the secretary doesn’t feel we’re getting as much help and support from the church groups in the country as he would like. But perhaps it won’t be out of the way if I give you a message for the secretary, mainly that we are simply, in this office, not in a position to tell the church groups anything about what’s going on at Dumbarton Oaks; that we can’t go out and just sell them a pig in a poke. We’ve got to know what this thing’s about if we are to command their respect, let alone their support. And we cannot do that unless the department is prepared to take seriously the interests of these groups in making some contribution to the shaping up of a postwar international organization. They feel they’re shut out. We certainly have been shut out. So all I can say is we continue to keep in touch as far as we can with the church groups. But as far as
getting them into a more positive, cooperative, friendly state of mind about Dumbarton Oaks, we’re helpless.”

Well, this put Alger Hiss back on his heels a little bit, and he said, “Do you want me to make that report to the secretary?” “Yes,” I said, “I think you’d better.” Well, I didn’t know whether this was my last day or not. [Laughter] But I was just damned well fed up, as the expression goes, with the situation as it had developed. Within the hour word came from Mr. Stettinius’s office that he would like me to—that they were arranging a meeting in his office later that afternoon or early evening that they wanted me to attend.

Well, I wondered what in the world this would be. I thought—I didn’t know what it was; whether it was to tell me that I had exhausted my welcome or what. But when I got there, there were about four other people there, all from what I call Paslovsky’s side of the department, people who were out working at Dumbarton Oaks. One was a man named I think it was Ed Wilson—it was Wilson certainly—a career foreign service officer, who was heading up at that time the postwar planning on political affairs. Alger Hiss. One of Stettinius’s top assistants, I think Rayner was his name. And Mr. Stettinius himself. Possibly one or two others. I don’t think Paslovsky was in the meeting.

Well, let me say that Mr. Stettinius got the point very quickly. As you may or may not know, Mr. Stettinius was a man who placed an inordinately high value on public relations. He’d come out of big business, U.S. Steel, and was a salesman type if ever there was a salesman type.

DANIELL: Oh, I didn’t know that.

DICKEY: A very overt, outgoing, dynamic with a capital D sort of person. He took relatively little interest in the substantive work of postwar planning. I don’t think anybody ever accused him of having very profound intellectual interests. But he had a genuine instinct for the idealistic side of things. And he knew how to cultivate what might be called business-like public relations very, very well. And in any event, he didn’t want any unnecessary sour notes in any show that he was running. I could mention other experiences that I—and I shall mention other experiences which I had with Mr. Stettinius, and I’m trying now to be sure I’ve got my chronology right, and I think I have. It’s important. It’s a point about Mr. Stettinius that I do want to mention at some point.

Well, at this conference, Mr. Stettinius said, “Alger tells me that—” addressing me “—that you’re not satisfied with the way you’re being kept
informed about what’s going on at Dumbarton Oaks.” For better or worse, I’ve never been one to make a mystery of my feelings. And I said, “That’s certainly an understatement.” [Laughter] I said, “We haven’t been informed at all, Mr. Secretary. We are in the dark completely about this. And indeed the first word I’ve had from Dumbarton Oaks these past two weeks has been the call this afternoon from Alger Hiss that you were not satisfied with the attitude of the peace groups and that they were not being kept closely enough informed and so forth about Dumbarton Oaks. And you’re quite right about that. They are unhappy, and they have not been kept informed. But neither have we. This is the first word I’ve had from the conference. And if we are to carry out our job, which, as I understand it, is to keep these people informed and to give them the opportunity to have their views known inside the department and so forth, we obviously, in the first place, have to be involved.” “Of course you do,” he said. That’s what I meant by the fact that it didn’t take him long, and he never really waffled one inch on this. He just turned to the people, Hiss and Wilson and the others, he said, “I want John Dickey out at Dumbarton Oaks tomorrow morning at nine o’clock.” [Laughter] “Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary.” We all got up and walked out into the hall, I remember.

DANIELL: That was the end of the meeting?

DICKEY: That was the end of the meeting! He said, “You be out there at nine o’clock tomorrow morning.” Well, this was fairly clearcut.

DANIELL: You walked out of that meeting.

DICKEY: I walked out of that meeting and walked down the hall with Alger, and I said, “Well, I guess that’s what happens…” He said, “I guess that’s that.” We both were perfectly clear that there was to be no further shenanigans. Indeed it was almost a little embarrassing because the next morning I got out there, and I had met a lot of the people who were on the delegation. There were a number of admirals and a number of generals and so on and so forth. They obviously wondered what was up. And I… They didn’t know who I was and so forth. And all I can say is that clarified that situation once and for all. And from that time on, I never had any complaints.

DANIELL: You sat in for the rest of the conference?

DICKEY: Well, we didn’t quite sit in on their detailed negotiations, but we wanted to know what was going on. And we did know. We were kept informed on what was going on. And we did develop a, I think, what proved to be a fairly satisfactory relationship with the outside organizations, including the church groups which had been the cause of this affair.
What I was searching for a moment ago in my memory was when it was that I had my first contact with Mr. Stettinius. And I guess it was before this. It was just after he came in as undersecretary of state and I don’t know just when that was. Wells was dismissed under circumstances that were terribly, terribly difficult for everybody. The animosity between Mr. Wells and Mr. Hull deepened and deepened all the time during ’43. It finally reached the point where Secretary Hull detested Mr. Wells. And then he had something on Mr. Wells's personal life that was beyond gossip or dispute. And this permitted him to force the issue with Mr. Roosevelt and Wells was forced out.

This was something that was never widely understood in the public, in the press. It was laid to Mr. Hull’s tendency [to a] feuding nature. And there was a considerable element in that. But I guess since this recording is definitely under wraps, unless they’re taken off, and these things were hinted in the press, Mr. Wells—Mr. Hull had Mr. Wells dead to rights on homosexual behavior. I mean it was no longer a gossipy kind of thing.

DANIELL: I’d heard that somewhere.

DICKEY: Well, this was hinted at in the press and believed. It just so happens that I was close enough to the secretary’s office and to another individual who knew whereof he was speaking to know that this was not a bad rap as many newspapermen thought and still think. This was a tragic situation but it was a factual situation. And when Mr. Hull finally had the facts and laid them before the president, that was it. There was just no question about it: Mr. Wells had to go and he went. I think that was the latter part of ’43.

DANIELL: ’Forty-three, I thought, yes.

DICKEY: Just after Mr. Hull came back, I believe, from the Moscow Conference. In any event, very shortly after Mr. Wells left the department, the White House appointed Mr. Stettinius, who had been the head of Lend-Lease, to be undersecretary of state. We were all taken a little bit by surprise with the appointment. It was clearly something that was handled pretty much entirely by Harry Hopkins, who had, I believe, been responsible for putting Stettinius in as head of Lend-Lease. And it was in response to the feeling in the White House, held very strongly by Hopkins and by the president, that the State Department needed to be tightened up administratively and in other ways very, very much.

They were aware that Mr. Hull was not really well. And even in his best of health, he was not a paragon of administrative leadership. And with the
necessity of pushing Mr. Wells out, which I am sure was not something that Mr. Roosevelt felt very good about, they decided to bring in somebody who was really their man, and this was—there was no doubt about that as far as the finish was concerned—to reorganize the department and beef it up, particularly, I guess, for the postwar planning that everybody assumed was ahead one of these days.

Just the exact month that Stettinius came in, I can’t remember, but I think it was late ’43, certainly not later than early ’44. Well, it was right after I had taken over the new responsibilities as special consultant to the secretary. At least this is the chronology that now comes back to me. And I had written a memorandum I believe addressed to the secretary—maybe it was addressed to the undersecretary—about the overall need in the department for developing a more positive relationship with the American public. This went beyond just postwar planning. The whole need in the department for a positive attitude in regard to the department’s relationships with the public, going way beyond the press conference type of activity, which was the traditional activity of the department. That memorandum in some way got to Mr. Stettinius shortly after he came to be undersecretary.

In any event, I was at home one Sunday when word came—Chris called me to the telephone and Mr. Stettinius was on the telephone. I don’t think I had met him prior to this. Mr. Stettinius was on the telephone and wanted to speak to me. I wondered what in the world this was all about. And I went to the telephone and he said, “This is Stettinius.” He was very fond of saying, “This is Ed. This is Ed Stettinius.” And so forth. “I’ve just read your memorandum about the department’s public relations. It’s the first thing I’ve seen around here that has any signs of life in it. [Laughter] I wish you would come into my office tomorrow to discuss this matter.” And I said, “Yes, sir.” And I went in. Well, he had taken hold of it. This was an aspect of the department he felt totally at home with.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: And it was the first time that he realized there was anybody in the department who thought there was any problem in this area of the department. So he said, “I just want you to know that you’ll have my interest and support on this, and let’s get going.” I remembered this as I was talking about the Dumbarton Oaks incident. And I now guess they were not unrelated, although the Dumbarton Oaks thing, it’s my memory, came a good bit later.

DANIELL: Yes.
DICKEY: But as I think back on it, I guess his rather instantaneous support was not unrelated to this earlier occasion when he called me in to encourage me about the proposals that I’d made in this memorandum.

DANIELL: Probably got so overwhelmed in the meantime....

DICKEY: Well, the next thing that happened was I got a call from a man named Paige, and his first name is escaping me now. And he said, “I’m a friend of Ed Stettinius’s.” Paige was at that point the top vice president of AT&T, I think, in charge of AT&T’s public relations. And had been, I believe, earlier with the steel company when Stettinius had been president of the steel—U.S. Steel. In any event, my memory is that Paige got in touch with me. Maybe Stettinius told me to get in touch with Paige.

In any event, Paige was not in the State Department, he was not in the government, as I recall. [He] was sort of one of these elder statesmen. He was definitely an older man used for advice around Washington during the wartime, and I guess had been used probably quite extensively by Stettinius when he was in Lend-Lease and elsewhere. I don’t remember accurately whether Mr. Stettinius told me to call him, or Mr. Paige called me. But in any event, within in a matter of a day or two after my conference with Mr. Stettinius, I did have an appointment with Mr. Paige to call on him over at his house, up, oh, not far from the department, up on I guess it was around G Street.

I remember going over, somewhat mystified as to what this was all about. And the meeting was itself a rather strange affair. He was a very gracious, older, quiet man. And he said, “Mr. Stettinius wanted me to talk with you about some of your ideas in the department. He doesn’t think that the State Department has a very adequate public relations-type program.” Well, I subsequently came to realize that this had been Stettinius’s way of getting a reading on me by somebody that he looked to as a—as he should have—as a really top professional. Obviously I was an amateur...

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: …really moving into this sort of thing although I knew my way around in the State Department. But I had never had a job in public relations and so forth.

So at the end of the meeting with Paige, which I guess must have been an hour or an hour and a half, he sort of smiled, and he said, “Well, I think I’ll
tell the secretary you'll do.” [Laughter] [Inaudible.] And it was at that point I realized that he'd really been asked to get a reading on me.

I don't recall whether Stettinius ever referred to that again or not. I think he may have. But I never saw Mr. Paige again. He didn't want to get into the act. He'd just—he'd made a few comments about my ideas, and they were all fairly...just wise observations about public relations. And he drew me out as to what my philosophy was about it and my concept of the two-way relationship between the department and so forth.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And so on. He spoke encouraging words and then said, “I'll tell Mr. Stettinius that you will do.” To let me know he'd been given this assignment. I don't know whether Mr. Stettinius had really expected that Mr. Paige would be drawn into this work or not. I rather doubt that because, as I say, he was older, and this was not his bag. He was just a wise man about public relations work in business.

Well, having picked that up, that incident up, and told the Dumbarton Oaks story, that brings us up to late ’44. And I guess at this point the next thing to tell is the John Foster Dulles incident.

DANIELL: That’s right.

DICKEY: That I mentioned earlier. This will take a little time, but if you want, we can finish it off.

DANIELL: Sure. It's fine with me. The buzzer's going to ring here in a second there. So don't be surprised at that. If you’re up to it, fine.

DICKEY: Well, this story goes back to the fact that in the course of my work as special consultant on the postwar planning, liaison with public interest groups, I had met John Foster Dulles because he was head of the Church Groups Postwar Planning Committee that was developing substantive ideas for the postwar. And, of course, Dulles was a very well informed person in the area of international affairs, and was regarded as probably the principal private nongovernmental spokesman on postwar planning ideas on the outside. I hadn’t gotten to know him well. I had met him, and I guess I’d gone to several meetings at which he was present. But really did not know him well. Had a high regard for the reputation that he had as an expert on international affairs.
Along about I suppose it would’ve been August of ’44 -- and whether this is before the Dumbarton Oaks incident that I’ve just spoken of or right afterwards, they were both very closely related -- I got a telephone call. You’ll think most of my life was spent in getting unexpected telephone calls.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: I got a telephone— No, my secretary, a Mrs. Haynes, wonderful person, Betty Haynes, had a marvelous sense of humor, came into my office—this is the special consultant’s office—and said, with a smooth smile on her face, “There’s a man on the telephone who says he’s John Foster Dulles and wants to speak to you.” Well, I laughed, and I said—I forget what I said. But I assumed it was one of my practical-joking friends who wanted to make a luncheon date or something and thought he’d have a little fun with Mrs. Haynes by saying it was Mr. Dulles.

Now the reason why this would’ve been a good practical joke was that Mr. Dulles, during the previous week, during the previous 48 hours, had been on the front page of all the newspapers in the country and big screamer headlines in the Washington papers as being on the point of having a conference with Mr. Hull in Washington as Governor Dewey’s representative to see whether an arrangement could be negotiated that would keep foreign affairs out of the 1944 campaign because it was wartime. And this was regarded as a major thing because it was—I think it had been announced that or at least it had been very widely assumed and certainly correctly—that if Dewey became elected, was elected, Dulles was to be secretary of state. So this was an occasion that was going to bring together Roosevelt’s secretary of state with Dewey’s, in effect, designated person to be secretary of state….

[End of Tape #11, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 11, Side B]

DICKEY: Well, they said the Washington papers had been filled with the fact that Dulles was coming to Washington to hold this meeting with Secretary Hull. But apparently they didn’t know just when or where it was going to take place. And God knows, I didn’t know anything about it other than what I’d read in the newspapers.

So it would’ve been the most natural thing in the world for one of my practical-joking friends to call me up before—saying they’d like to have luncheon together—to tell Mrs. Haynes that this was John Foster Dulles calling just as a…not expecting to be taken seriously but to have a little
fun. But this individual, when he called, said to Mrs. Haynes, “This is—“ He often referred to himself not as John Foster Dulles but as Foster Dulles. So he said, “This is Foster Dulles calling. May I speak with Mr. Dickey?” And she didn’t think it was Mr. Dulles, of course. And she came in to see me sort of giggling or joking. She said, “There’s a man on the telephone who say he’s Foster Dulles; he wants to talk with you.”

So I took up the telephone and in my best practical joking manner said, “Hello. What have you got on your mind?” [Laughter] It never entered my head that…because I didn’t have this kind of relationship. I didn’t have any kind of relationship really to speak of with Dulles. And I forget what his response was, but he chuckled at the other end. Obviously I’d said something that made it clear to him that I didn’t think it was…. And he said—he repeated again. He said, “This is Foster Dulles. I’m sure this is a little bit of a surprise to you.” Well, at that point, I recognized enough of the voice and the manner to pull in my horns, and I said, “Yesss….“ Still somewhat non-believing, but rather wondering whether I hadn’t completely misunderstood. But I was polite at this point and not any longer smart-alecky. And he said—and he always had a way of chuckling. He enjoyed chuckling to himself in a situation of this sort.

This is what he did. He said, “Our mutual friend George Franklin has suggested that I give you a call.” And he said, “I guess if you’ve read the morning newspapers, you know why I’m here.” Well, then I knew darned well that this was the McCoy. And I said, “Well, yes, I have read about your coming meeting with the secretary.” He said, “Well, that’s what I’m calling you about.” And I wondered, what in God’s name was coming. He said, “I am down here for that meeting, and I’m sort of hiding out.” I forget whether it was his—somebody’s house out on Rock Creek Parkway near the Shoreham Hotel. But he said, “I’m hiding out. I’ve got a bad foot. So I’m really confined today to the house.” And he said, “I have my appointment tomorrow with Mr. Hull.” But he said, “As you might imagine, this is a very delicate mission I’m on. And I really feel the need of some feel about the situation in the department and some guidance with respect to the kind of reception I’m likely to get from Mr. Hull.” And he said, “Your friend—our friend—George Franklin….“ Franklin had worked for me in the coordinator’s office in the very early days of the Black List. He was the man who subsequently became president or head of the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York, Council on Foreign Relations in New York. And he and I had established quite a close personal friendship while he was working for me in the coordinator’s office, and then he’d had to leave because of illness, and I think was at that point working in the Council on Foreign Relations. In any event, he was a close personal friend. Mr. Dulles was a close friend of George’s mother. Well, I knew then because
George's father, who was then dead, had been a partner of Mr. Dulles's in Cotton—in the big law firm, Cotton and Franklin. George Franklin's father. That's how that relationship had been such a close one. And he said, "I asked George who in the department would have a basis for giving me a little guidance? And he said he thought you would be the right man. So he said, "Would you be willing to come by where I'm staying tonight and talk with me about this?"

Well, I remember there was a crisis in my own mind right away what response I gave. And it was one of the fastest decisions I've ever taken. Because I knew that if—or I sensed right away that if I hesitated, this could conceivably worry Dulles that this situation was even more delicate than he thought. And at the same time I thought it sure as hell would be hard for the secretary to believe that I had any business talking with John Foster Dulles about him before Dulles came to see the secretary. I knew enough about Mr. Hull's suspicious nature…

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: …to realize that this would be awfully hard to explain to him. So I had to weigh these two considerations just like that. And I decided, well, I'll play it straight, and I said, "Yes, I can come to your house."

Well, I don't think I've ever gone through a day after that conversation until that evening in which I really have been more torn than I was the rest of that day. I had a feeling that this just couldn't be and wouldn't be understood by the secretary. I knew about how suspicious he'd been about Wells and how quite a few of my friends in the department had come under suspicion in the secretary's office because of their dealings with Wells as to whether they were Wells's men or not, and how worried they'd been by this sort of thing. And here I was exposing myself to the enemy, dealing with the enemy, so to speak, because Mr. Hull regarded Mr. Dewey as the enemy; there's no two ways about that. But I'd crossed that bridge, and all I could do was just worry.

So I went home that night and told Chris about this. And then I got to worrying about something else. I got to worrying that—could this have been a trap that somebody had laid? In other words, was I going to go down there and find myself confronted by somebody in the department?

Well, I remember I walked down. The Shoreham was just about two or three blocks from where we were, and it was just across the bridge from the Shoreham and around the corner. And I don't know. I suppose anybody could get into this state of mind. But I really, by the time I got to
this house, was of two minds as to whether I wanted to go through with this thing. But I found the house, and it had the number on it he said it had, and so forth. I guess I was somewhat reassured. Anyhow, I rang the bell, and a maid came to the door. I said, “My name is Dickey, and I believe I’m expected by Mr. Dulles.” And this was the moment of truth as far as I was concerned. If she didn’t know anything about Mr. Dulles, then I was in for something. And she said, “Yes, he’s upstairs and expecting you. You can go right up.” I can just remember the sense of, well, it is for real.

DANIELL: That took care of part of your problem.

DICKEY: That took care of part of the problem. So I went upstairs, and here he was in bed, propped up in bed. And he chuckled, and he said, “I’m sure you think this is strange,” or something like that. And I said, “Well, it’s unusual.” And he said, “I appreciate very much your coming. I don’t know whether I ought to ask you to do this, but,” he said, “it really is important.” He said, “I’ve got a date to see—” He went right to the point. He said, “I’ve got a date to see Secretary Hull tomorrow morning I think at ten o’clock or whatnot. And,” he said, “we’ve had no exchanges to speak of prior to now. And the purpose of the meeting is to see whether we can keep the foreign policy issues out of the campaign.” He said, “I don’t imagine we can keep them entirely out of the campaign. But if we can, we would be better off and the country would be better off.” He said, “I think having this campaign during wartime is difficult enough.” So he said, “What I really want you to do, if you’re willing, is to tell me just a little bit about Mr. Hull as you see him as a young associate in the department. And how you think he feels about things like this, and what his reaction might be. And any guidance you want to proffer to me about the position I take.”

Well, I’d been thinking obviously all day long about this, and I went ahead and said, “Well, I’ve got to be very clear I’m not an intimate of the secretary. I’ve been close to him on Trade Agreements Act work and some other things. But there are quite a few others in the department, of course, who are much closer to him than I am personally.” "Well," he said, “I understand that.” He said, “I think that’s all to the good because frankly I couldn’t expect to have one of his intimate counselors respond to this kind of question.” Well, I said, “I can tell you my impressions of the secretary, and I’d be glad to. It seems to me this is perfectly proper. And whether it’s very helpful or not, I don’t know.”

So I went on to describe the secretary as I knew him. And I said, “He is a very partisan man in regard to party politics. This has been his life. At the same time,” I said, “the more overriding consideration of his life of the past 12 years has been to make a success of this great responsibility as
secretary of state. And,” I said to him, “I really I think I’m entitled to say to you that I don’t think he will approach this kind of a question in a small way.” And he said, “Well, if you’re right about that, that’s the most important thing that you could say because,” he said, "if I’ve got to deal with him in a very close-handed kind of negotiation, that’s one thing. If I can go in there and assume that he feels that this is a major thing for the country and not just a game between Dewey and Roosevelt—" I remember he used the names Dewey and Roosevelt, he didn’t give them their titles "—that’s another thing," he said. "And," he said, "I think I can respond in like way." "Well," I said, “that’s my judgment on the matter.”

I forget what else I said. He had put a few specific questions to me, how did I think this, and how did I think that? And so forth. And I responded. But the main thrust of what he was interested in and of my response was whether Mr. Hull would approach this, so to speak, in a big way, or whether it would be a highly-partisan situation in which neither man could dare let down, you know, show his hand at all.

I’ve never known what took place or how it went. I was with him that night I suppose for, oh, an hour or an hour and a half. And when I left, he thanked me very nicely for coming in. I went out and walked about a foot off the sidewalk going home feeling that it hadn’t been as bad as I’d feared and that I would be prepared to say, under responsible circumstances, what had taken place to anybody in the department. I did not see any need to do that because I was worried about how that would be misunderstood, and I never did mention it to anybody in the department. And all the rest of his life, whenever Dulles would see me, he would chuckle and say, “I’ve never told anybody about our little secret, you know.” I’d say, “Neither have I.” [Laughter]

DANIELL: Not even later you never told anyone? Did you tell…? Well, I guess Hull died soon.

DICKEY: I never told anybody in the department.

DANIELL: In the department, okay.

DICKEY: Whether I’ve told anyone else or not, I don’t know. George Franklin and I had a brief word about it once. But if so, it’s never been written.

DANIELL: Of course you left the department soon after that so that you ceased to have intimate contact in the same way with people.
DICKEY: That’s right. Shortly thereafter Mr. Hull was ill and not active in the campaign and resigned as secretary of state right after the election.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: About two weeks after the election, all of which bears out what I was saying earlier, that he really was not nearly the same man physically in the matter of health that he’d been some years before. Well, I guess that’s probably enough of that. Of course the Chicago Tribune printed its evening edition election night saying Dewey elected. The next morning—Oh, no, that was the Truman election. I’m getting ahead. But they all thought that Dewey had a good chance.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: But Roosevelt, of course, won. And that was that. I saw a good bit of Dulles later in other connections that we may speak of. At San Francisco where he was…

DANIELL: Very briefly went out there.

DICKEY: …out there as the Republican expert, looked to very strongly by Senator [Arthur H.] Vandenberg for advice on the delegation. And then he became secretary of state. And perhaps I should mention now offered me one of the tempting jobs that I have not been able to—was not able to take. We should come back to it in due course. But he asked me to come down and take charge of what was to be the ten-year review of the United Nations Charter in 1955, ’56. We can talk about that again at a later date.

DANIELL: Well, it’s been a long session for you.

[End of Tape 11, Side B]