

Charles Wood
Daniel Webster Professor of History, Emeritus

An Interview Conducted by

Chris Burns

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Hanover, New Hampshire

INTERVIEW: Charles Wood

INTERVIEWED BY: Chris Burns

PLACE: Charles Wood's home in Hanover

DATE: January 16, 2001

BURNS: Today is January 16, 2001 and I'm speaking to Charles Wood, Daniel Webster Professor of History, Emeritus, and we are speaking in his Hanover home. You came to Dartmouth in 1964 after . . .

WOOD: Yes, came to Dartmouth in '64.

BURNS: And you had been at Harvard?

WOOD: I'd been at Harvard. I'd finished my PhD in '61 and then taught the first three years after the doctorate, at Harvard, and then came up here.

BURNS: What brought you to Dartmouth? Were you recruited by . . . ?

WOOD: Yes, actually my predecessor, a man named Jack Williams who was a Dartmouth Class of 1919, had been a graduate student at Harvard with my mentor at Harvard, Charles Taylor. And as Jack was coming up on retirement he wrote Charles and said, "Do you have any graduate students or other people you would recommend as a possible replacement for me?" And apparently Taylor recommended me. I was interviewed at the American Historical Association in December of '63, and then ultimately offered the job. And it was sort of a situation in which I had a job at Harvard but on the other hand knew that Harvard did not hire for tenure people who had started out there.

So that I knew I had to go somewhere, and when I met the people in the Dartmouth department and then talked to a number of other people, I just ended up saying, "This is a congenial group." Or part of what I liked Chris, was that Dartmouth seemed to be committed to the ideals and purposes of a genuine liberal education for its own sake, in a way that I sensed a university like Harvard no longer was; that it was increasingly becoming nothing but pre-professional training. And I felt I was very much committed to the idea of a type of education that educated you in a way that allowed you to pursue a whole variety of careers, and that had a

carry-over value not as a professional scholar but as somebody who simply enjoyed things, like a friend of mine who used to define liberal education as teaching a person how not to be bored with himself. Sounds crazy, but it certainly is part of it.

And clearly, that aspect—another aspect that struck me was that everywhere you look for a job and they interview, everybody wants to know, "You do do research, of course." And you say "Yes, yes." And that seems to satisfy them. The striking thing about Dartmouth was that they said, "You do do research," and I said, "Yes," and they said, "What do you do?" And then we went on and, you know, had a wonderful twenty-minute conversation, about, they seemed genuinely interested in a collegial way. And I thought, "This is wonderful." So that was part of the sales pitch, if you will, of Dartmouth College, that got me here and has kept me here.

BURNS: How would you characterize the History Department that you joined?

WOOD: It was interestingly split. That is, I think half the department was new that year from retirements alone. The whole department had been hired in the 1920s, which was a time that Dartmouth had expanded, and then given the Depression and World War II, basically no one had moved, so that it still was the same doggone department. Now, Hopkins [President Ernest Martin Hopkins 1901] stressed, as I understand it, teachers. He was not interested in research. So that, by and large--Jack Williams, my predecessor, being a notable exception--that old department were great teachers, but they were not scholars in the sense of doing and publishing research.

I think John Dickey [President John Sloan Dickey '29]--because it was a College-wide phenomenon, not just history--recognized things were changing and that we ought to commit ourselves more to people who were teachers, but who also had that scholarly side. So that the younger people clearly were much more interested in and pursuing research in a way that the older ones hadn't. And I take it that there had been a great deal of tension originally between the original first few researchers and the old boys, if you will. When I arrived, Jere Daniell ['55] arrived, as I say this sort of contingent of half the department, that changed it, there were no longer, you know—and it became a very open and friendly department, and there weren't any wars on this. And the striking thing was, which was very useful during the Vietnam War, was that people respected each other's integrity and ability regardless of what their cultural or political views were, which allowed us to keep on speaking to each other during that Vietnam period.

BURNS: That's fairly remarkable for that period.

WOOD: Yes, it really was. I happened to be thinking about this simply because I'm writing a booklet at the moment on Dartmouth's war memorials, including one to Vietnam that no one knows about, and so therefore had been going through some of the battles in my mind and my writing, which show up vividly in the war memorial itself, which does not mention the name of the war, only the years in question, and it lists the Dartmouth dead without mentioning who they fought for. It's strikingly different.

BURNS: It's mysterious!

WOOD: Yes, right. And it's that mystery which was--basically wildly opposed sides; "what are the things we can agree on?" And the one thing they could agree on is, they could agree on honoring the twenty-one Dartmouth dead, but that was it. So how did you frame this?

BURNS: Wow. That's an odd compromise. We certainly have heard in other interviews—among the interviews Jane [Carroll] did was one with Leonard Rieser ['44], who said some of the same things about the shift in the faculty from almost the Hopkins era to the John Dickey/Donald Morrison/John Masland era, which kind of reflected what you were saying, that this earlier faculty had been more strictly teaching, and then there was more of a research component brought in. It makes me ask the question, which I had later on my list, but was there talk at the time that you joined, or shortly thereafter, I think, Kemeny [President John Kemeny] starts to propose that there should be more graduate studies programs—was . . .

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: I imagine that was—that's probably still to this day, an ongoing debate in the History Department.

WOOD: Not that much. Interestingly, what happened, I think, was clearly, as I understand it, when Kemeny was hired to begin rebuilding the Math Department in a more research-oriented way in the late '50s, he very clearly arrived at the conclusion that you really weren't going to be able to hire the math department you wanted, nor would you be able to attract the students you wanted, unless you offered a range of courses, which really meant that you had to go to graduate work. And that the graduate work would help to get the professors you wanted, but it also then would enrich the curriculum for the students who were really bright mathematicians who simply otherwise would run out of courses to take.

Now, many of the sciences seemed to face a similar problem, so that in the first years I was here, sort of Chemistry and Physics and Biology all voted to go PhD. The rest of the faculty, in the Social Sciences and the Humanities, were very nervous, not that they were necessarily opposed, but that would all of the resources of the College go into the expensive graduate programs, and then leave the Humanities and Social Sciences withering on the vine. So that in fact the PhD programs, or approval for Chemistry and Physics and Biology, Earth Sciences, was all put on hold for about a year as people talked this over. And also departments then sat down and [asked], "did we want to go graduate too?"

And I think you can see the dynamic of a new research-oriented History Department or whatever department it was, that initially, I think, there were some people who thought, "Hey, it would be nice to go graduate and have our own graduate students." I think in History, though, the more people looked at it, I think, the more they doubted it; that part of it was that Baker is a beautiful, or was a beautiful research library, but in most fields, as you looked at it, it would be great for building PhD's, or doing PhD's as they had been done about 30 years before, that you had real shortcomings in your research resources in the library. Also, I think, even by the late 60s, even though the market in history for hiring and job opportunities for graduate students didn't go totally to pot until the 70s, it was pretty clear that was going to happen. And so did you really need another graduate program, or would it be immoral to create one?

Then as we talked about it, one of the interesting things that happened was, say, "OK, graduate students can be terribly important, not just training them, but the sort of challenge and resource they provide to you for your own research." And what the History Department did at that point, we all agreed to become each other's graduate students. So that we would exchange our manuscripts and really argue about them, and mark them up, and so on, and--which sort of enormously increased the collegiality and I think it increased that sort of scholarly sense, so that as you look—oh, for example, my colleague Leo Spitzer, who was at that point in African history, you'll find there are a couple of his books where I appear as somebody who was terribly important to the shaping of it, buck, buck, buck. And I think this was true of everybody.

And so that the ultimate, I think, resolution, or sense of it, was we thought we could create a world in which we could have, in effect, most of the benefits of graduate education without the downside of having to deal with, you know, those people, with that—that classic cliché about people with graduate-student mentalities. And so that I think having gone through that, I don't think in History there really has been a serious re-examination

of, "did we want to go to graduate work," since then. It's always taken other forms of, "What can we do instead of graduate work?" It's an interesting . . .

BURNS: It is an interesting debate, and it does seem, and I think you spoke to this in your decision to come here, that Dartmouth is really focused on that undergraduate education component. The next area that I want to get into is something that we spoke about before we started the tape recording, which is some of your early extradepartmental duties. I'd like to start with one of the first committees you were on, which is the Great Issues Steering Committee, which you joined in 1966. And at this point the course was receiving a lot of criticism, particularly from the students, and I'm wondering if you can sort of lay out what the debate was at that time.

WOOD: Well, I think from the students' point of view, part of the objection in a classic '60s way, anything that's required is bad. So that a course for seniors that was required of all of them I think you had more and more students who found that bad. Furthermore, at a time when student dress was becoming much more informal, and it always had been informal, Great Issues was for "gentlemen," as John Dickey saw it, and therefore people wore coats and ties. This was abominable. So that you began finding that fraternities began developing—they were called "GI ties," the most outrageous ties you could find, that would be handed down from generation to generation. "If I have to wear a tie, OK, this is my tie!"

It was—attendance was taken in Spaulding Auditorium, but if you arrived late, in the back right there was a special section for latecomers who would give their names to people. What you would find happening would be, kids would come in, they would give their name as the late attendants, and then they'd head down and head out one of the side doors, sometimes with professors chasing them, while the poor bastard who was trying to speak is—there's chaos going on.

Then the other problem, I think, was that GI seemed no longer to be attracting the top world leaders that it had attracted in the '40s and '50s; that you were getting people, with some notable exceptions, that nobody had ever heard about or cared about, although with some bizarre—let me give you one example. I think the Daily Dartmouth felt so strongly about the lousy people that were being picked that The Dartmouth decided to run its counter- or anti-Great Issues course, inviting their own speakers. Now what they did, for example, civil rights being very hot in, say, 1966, who did they have as a speaker? They had Malcolm X, and people were willing to come to Malcolm X, they had heard of him. GI, on the other hand, picked this crazy guy from Chicago who was running something

called PUSH that nobody had ever heard of, Jesse Jackson, who showed up in a yarmulke, age 23 or 24, and you know, "who the heck is Jesse Jackson?"

Well, over the years I think these all continued on, that more people would remember him, and I suspect now if you talked to members of the Class of '66 or '67 they'd probably remember that evening with Jesse Jackson, but at the time, no. So that, given the type of resistance, some of which I think was justified, some was irrational, simply a cultural change, the committee went to John Dickey and said, "John, the interest simply isn't there any more. We recommend it be shut down, at least for a few years, and then possibly bring it back, but now it's not working."

BURNS: And what was John Dickey's reaction to this?

WOOD: John wanted the evidence himself. And part of it too, was he wasn't sure that either the steering committee or the students understood what the real point of Great Issues as a transition from the great issues as viewed as liberal arts questions of existence, to real existence in life. And so he said, "Before I make a decision, I want to give one of the lectures myself." And since anti-war activity had begun growing, and people were beginning to do acts of civil disobedience like burning draft cards, John came and gave a lecture on law and individual conscience, and if they come into conflict, what should the good person do?

And he said, "Well, let's see what the great literature that we've been studying in our liberal arts education has to say?" And, "Well, let's look at Antigone, who Clion says, 'You can't bury your brother.' So do you obey the king and the law, or do you obey your conscience? Your brother, in religion, must be buried. Or, let's look at Job. Or let's look at Henry David Thoreau refusing to pay his war taxes for the Mexican War." And sort of Dickey taking you through that famous scene in the Northampton jail, when Thoreau is in jail for not paying, and he is visited by Ralph Waldo Emerson. And Ralph looks at him and says, "Henry, what are you doing in there?" to which Thoreau, of course, responds, "Ralph, what are you doing out there?" OK. And you know, given the respect and awe that students held Dickey in, I think you had a more civil crowd and fewer people going out these side doors, but I think by the end of it, and having seen it all and experienced it, I think John finally agreed, and said, "Yes, the course really has to end."

BURNS: Yeah, I wondered. Because it certainly, from what I've read, seems to be one of his major achievements.

WOOD: It is, and it was enormously—the crazy thing, I was in the Class of '55 at Harvard, and so as all the debate "Shall we drop it?" going on, I received a tenth reunion report from my class, which it had, you know, a questionnaire. And one of the questions on it was a perfectly open-ended, "If you were going to college again, what sort of course or courses would you like to have seen Harvard offer that it didn't?" Well, with no choices offered it was purely a—something like fifteen percent of the class replied, "Something like Dartmouth's Great Issues." At which, when I brought this into a Great Issues Steering Committee, they were very surprised. But it was interesting that it really had caught people's imaginations, but as I say, times had changed.

BURNS: But Dickey was able to recognize that?

WOOD: Yes. He also saw that practically speaking, it was—in a day of [the] railroad, in the '40s and '50s, it was very easy to get to Hanover, New Hampshire, and was not a troublesome thing. By the '60s (it was before interstates were built up here), and Lebanon Airport effectively didn't exist, so—and the trains had pretty much stopped. So getting here was a real nuisance, which was part of the difficulty of getting people as well as, in terms of national, international leaders who were worried, in the 40s or early '50s, would the new American generations getting away from World War II go back to pre-war isolationism, that sort of "We must educate the young." Those people who were going to presumably be going on to positions in leadership. They felt an obligation, I think, to come. By the '60s that wasn't an issue any more. So it was, I suspect, much harder for people to, or it's easier for people to say no.

BURNS: Now I also understand that Dartmouth alumni, at this point, had some strong attachments to the course. Did you hear much of that?

WOOD: Oh, yes. No, we didn't really, at the time. Certainly once it was announced that it was going to be suspended, you began getting letters in the Alumni Magazine or direct letters to—[Eugene] Gene Lyons had run the course for some years, in Government; I think it was the Dean of the Tucker Foundation who was directing it that final year, and certainly he got letters, and John Dickey himself did. You know, "This is something we look back on"—although the question I've always had, Chris, is, lots of times you can look back with much more devotion on a shared experience with your classmates than you may have felt at the time. And that's something I think nobody has ever successfully been able to measure.

BURNS: Another committee assignment that you had early on, or perhaps a group of committee assignments, that you can maybe clarify which was which for

me, were some of the committee assignments that dealt with freshman issues. It looks as though you were on a Freshman Seminar Committee from '66 to '69? And then a Committee on Admissions, Financial Aid and the Freshman Year between '66 and '70?

WOOD: Mm-hm, '65 probably.

BURNS: What were the major issues you were dealing with on those committees?

WOOD: The Freshman Seminar Committee is easier. That is, Dartmouth, like every other school, had and still has a Freshman English requirement of two terms. And in, say, 1965 or '66, we had a general faculty committee called the Committee on Educational Policy, which no longer exists, which in effect wondered whether the total burden of teaching freshman English was something that the English Department alone should be bearing. This had two parts: one, it meant that an awful lot of a teaching load of anyone in the English Department had to be in this freshman English, at a time that the faculty was becoming more research-oriented and therefore in which most professors would like to teach literary criticism and the literature rather than the composition. The other—and I think that side of it, at least some of the English Department viewed favorably. The other side was a view that English has a particular way of writing English, which is aimed at being able to write lucid literary criticism. But that might not be the effective way to teach writing, or what good writing would be like in History or in Government or in Chemistry, so on. So that, why didn't we substitute Freshman Seminars for the second term of freshman English in which, while the emphasis would be on writing, and good writing, it would be on good writing within the discipline of the person teaching it.

Then furthermore, the argument was, "Well, part of what should be going on, then, is to introduce the student to the nature of the thinking and logic within the discipline in question: how does a historian think? What are the strengths and limitations of historical thought as opposed to, say, literary thought?" And so that, in some ways beyond simple English composition, the Freshman Seminar was designed to be an introduction to the various disciplines within the liberal arts in a more scholarly way than had ever been done before.

Now that elicited a great deal of doubt in the English Department, because obviously it was heard by a number of people as, "Oh, you think we can't teach historians how to write, instead of"—you know, "You are doubting our abilities to do everybody"—you know, "you are doubting our scholarly credentials, our integrity," buck, buck, buck. Which then led to a compromise: Freshman Seminars were approved as an experimental

program for three years, with a survey and serious in-depth study and report to be made in the third year back to the faculty, whether it should be renewed or not.

And Leonard Rieser, as Dean of the Faculty, asked me to chair the committee that did that review and then wrote the report, which was a fascinating thing, as you found English professors who were saying, "I'm eating crow and enjoying it." Or the Chemistry professor who would say, "I am really enjoying teaching English, except for a few linguistic cripples," so on. So it was a very—it was part, it seems to me, of that change that was coming to Dartmouth, of an increasing sort of seriousness about the scholarship side of things that led to a decision to introduce a little more scholarship as well as a little more variety into what had been, you know, what used to be called the "bonehead English program."

BURNS: And so the Freshman Seminars pretty much stuck, and . . .

WOOD: Yeah, they still go on. Yes, very much.

BURNS: And then the other committee I mentioned, it was the Committee on Admissions, Financial Aid and the Freshman Year, which I believe earlier you had said, especially admissions was a big component of the work you . . .

WOOD: Yes. As I understand it, John Dickey decided or felt that faculty ought to have some sort of input into the Admissions process, because if you were a school with academic standards, then academic informed judgment ought to come in. The sort of negative or tongue-in-cheek way this used to be put was, you could have political problems in the admissions process. What do you do if you're a normal admissions person and the knuckle-headed son of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees applies for admission? It could be very hard for you to say no; on the other hand, if there are academics on the committee who look at this and say, "Hey, as I see this kid's high school record and as I look at the Board scores, there is no way this kid is going to pass a course at Dartmouth College, and do you really want your son to come here and just flunk out?" That it gives more backing. Then I think he felt that, given that, and admission . . .

[End of Tape 1, Side A — Beginning of Tape 1, Side B]

BURNS: OK, you were speaking of . . .

WOOD: Yes, that admissions and financial aid are intimately tied together, and it makes no sense to admit somebody who can't afford to come, etc. So that

he felt, well, that the people who are involved in admissions then ought to also be involved in policies regarding financial aid, and should it be available to all, or do we have limits; and if there are limits, as there were when I first went on that committee, that there were some people for whom you simply didn't have financial aid money, which of the people admitted should be offered the financial aid, and which ones placed on a waiting list, etc. That it made sense, in other words, that the academics who participated in the admissions policies, process, should engage in the financial aid process.

And then I think it was purely a quirk that the freshman year and policies governing the freshmen flowed with it was the way John had organized his administration. The Director of Admissions and the Director of the Office of Financial Aid both reported to the Dean of Freshmen. And insofar as they did, I think, part of the thinking was the people who happened to be involved, but part of it was, "Well, they first arrive they are freshmen." That OK, then, oversight over the freshmen, and you could argue, "Should freshmen have freshman dorms or should they be integrated? Should freshmen be allowed to have cars where upperclassmen do, etc." So you had endless sort of sometimes stupid and sometimes serious questions.

BURNS: But it sounds like the major work that you were working on was kind of revisiting admissions policies.

WOOD: Right, right. Which very quickly became quite serious, Chris, because by '67, I think it is, you get the so-called McLane Report, of John McLane ['38] of the Trustees, recommending that over time the student body of Dartmouth should reflect the composition of the country as a whole, in terms of its racial, religious, ethnic profiles. Which then led (it was about '67) to a greatly enhanced program to attempt to recruit African-American students, northern New England impoverished students, and then with John Kemeny's coming, ultimately Native Americans. And clearly, in the African-American case, you had people whose Board scores, for example, were very different in terms of what their actual achievements were in school, to what it was for the typical white kid.

And so the question then became, you are dealing with a group whose profile in a sense looked very different from the traditional group you had had. And again I think there was this feeling: "OK, you really have to involve your academics on this, particularly in the initial years, which ones of these kids look like good risks and good bets, and so that we can begin understanding how to read an African-American application, with all sorts of interesting sidebars or difficulties." That is, John Dickey in his homely way always used to say, "You can't have a separate admissions policy for

whatever group you want, because you've always got to hitch the caboose onto the last car of the train. It can't exist in splendid isolation."

And the particular example that drove it home to me was that I think the first year I was on this committee, Dartmouth had also started the A Better Chance Program of trying to get kids from, say, ghetto schools and so on, into prep schools or into good high schools, and Hanover High School was one. And Hanover High School is a school that traditionally we probably took four or five kids a year out of a graduating class of about a hundred and fifty.

BURNS: Not very many.

WOOD: No, no, it's not a big school. And that first year that Hanover High School was part of the A Better Chance Program, in comes an application from a Better Chance student, applying early admission, who is a track star, and he's from Tennessee—I mean from South Carolina originally. And he is, at the point he applies, something like 73rd in the class. And everyone looked at Jesse's record and said, "Hey, this guy is superb." So we took him.

But then you have a stage in admissions, you take people individually, but there's some stage that you sit down and look, OK, you take it school by school now and say, "Who have you admitted and who have you rejected?" And if you have taken number 73 and rejected number four, you'd better have a good reason. You've got to hook the caboose to the last car of the train. So that year at Hanover High, instead of the normal four students, I think we admitted 35 students from Hanover High. The happy end of the story is that Jesse went on to be an All-American in track, graduated Summa Cum Laude in English and was a Rhodes Scholar. Quite a guy. What's happened to the other 35 I don't know.

BURNS: So the Committee, it sounds like, actually advised the Admissions Department on the applicant pool itself.

WOOD: That's right, you were supposed—each one of us was supposed to read at least two or three hundred admissions folders. And normally you worked with, you know, individual admissions officers on particular districts. And then at the end of the session, the final—normally in admissions you go through; the first reading you say, "OK, this is one I recommend we admit. This is one I recommend we reject. And then there are these people in the middle but we don't know how good the pool is yet, who are postponed decision." And usually of that first run you might recommend admitting

about five or ten percent, rejecting only about five or ten percent, and really eighty percent in the middle.

And you keep on trying to take from the top and reject from the bottom, and at the end of the process the final hundred people you are taking for the class, you still have a thousand or two thousand people who are fully eligible or clearly they're not going to flunk out. "Which are the best of these?" Those are the nightmares. But then, in that, also, you will have some of the very tough cases, the kid who looks awfully bright but he comes from—there was one we had one year, say, from New York Military Academy, and he seems to beat his roommate with chains. "Is he a safe bet to have?" That you could—or certainly a number of, originally, of the minority candidates would go to the full committee. It would be all the admissions officers plus all the academics. And it was an absolutely soul-searing type of operation.

To show how serious it was, I think the final meeting we had in '68, for example, took place in late March. We did our votes. Then we went over to a function room in the Hanover Inn to have our "celebratory dinner," that it's all over. Well, that was the night that President Lyndon Johnson was on the TV, giving a speech to the American people. We all turned it on to watch it. And at the end of that speech, not one of us caught the fact that he was resigning. We were so drained that he had said he would not be a candidate for the next election, we didn't catch it. We were dutifully watching this thing and nothing was penetrating.

BURNS: I was just re-reading one of the interviews that Jane Carroll did with Bob Field ['43], who was a Trustee. He described the admissions process almost exactly the same way, where you weed from the top and bottom until you kind of get down to the middle, and he also described that he thought the admissions people had the toughest jobs at the school.

WOOD: They do. Let me give you an example, Chris. That is, a psychologist always used to sit on the committee for the oddball cases like my New York Military Academy. The first year I was on the committee, I happened to be the first reader of a folder of a kid from Connecticut who is the son of a Dartmouth alumnus, and I think he is sort of second or third in his class, and his Board scores look awfully good, and he's done a lot of interesting good outside activity; he looks like he's—there's no way this kid is going to be turned down. So you know, I rated him in terms of not his academic, but sort of all of his extracurricular, everything about him, I think I rated him a nine. It was a one-to-nine scale that you normally—the very best.

Well then [Robert] Jay Evans ['49], who was the admissions officer for the field, read it, and he thought he was equally good. Except by that time a so-called College Board Writing Sample had come in. It was a voluntary thing, they now have it again. It was sort of, you ask a "big think" question of a person to write a 45-minute essay, and Dartmouth used to require this. We used it and the writing sample as one of the things to judge whether someone should be exempted from the first term of English composition. Well OK, you pick up this kid's writing sample, and I don't remember what the question was, but for 45 minutes he has written "bananas bananas bananas bananas bananas bananas bananas." So I picked up the writing sample, the folder, and I put it in [Francis W.] "Bud" King's box, the psychologist who was on the committee. Well, a couple of days later Bud comes in and he reads this folder, and he looks at me, he said, "Gee, interesting essay, but limited vocabulary."

So then we took it to [Edward] Eddie Chamberlain ['36], the Director of Admissions. Now Eddie was a very shrewd guy, and he read this through and he said, "You know, the funny thing is, this kid, among other things, has told us all the schools he's applying to, so we know what our competition is." And he said, "I know that of those schools, we're the only one who required this writing sample, so we're the only ones seeing it." He said, "I also notice that all of his application and everything is done on this fancy IBM Selectric typewriter, which looks like Daddy's secretary is doing all this, that I think the only thing the kid's done that Daddy has not seen and reviewed is that writing sample." He said, "I get the sense the kid doesn't want to go to Dartmouth." He said, "I think I ought to call him up and find out." So he called him up at school, and said, "We've just been reading your 'bananas' essay, and I get the feeling you don't want to go to Dartmouth." "I do not," says the kid. So—and he said, "Do you want us to turn you down?" and he said, "Oh, would you?"

So, OK, we turn this kid down. Now those things are usually mailed on a Friday or Saturday so that they'll all arrive *en masse* all over the country on Monday. So this thing must have hit this kid's house in Connecticut Monday morning. Monday afternoon Daddy is in John Sloan Dickey's office, and he is madder than hell. His son has been turned down, and this is just contrary to all the objective advice, data on his Board scores, his rank in class, all the things he does—it must just be anti-Semitism, says the . . . , a factor we had not considered. Well anyhow, John found this troubling enough that he decided he would go over to Admissions.

And so he walks in with the father, and approaches Chamberlain as Director, and says, "Eddie, I really don't understand this case. Can I see the file?" Chamberlain had to say, "No. That file is private information. It

is available only to people on the Admissions Committee. You're not on the Admissions Committee." Well at this point, Dickey begins getting kind of mad, and the father of course is just up and down. And you know, finally Eddie says, "Look. The only person who can give permission on this is the kid himself. It's his file. Would you like me to call him?" And they said "Yes!" So Eddie calls, he calls the kid and says, "You know, your father's here and he seems to be upset about something. Can we show him the bananas essay?" And the kid said, "Yes."

Well at that point we all sat down with John Sloan Dickey and the father, pulled out the file, said, "Hey, here's this," and told him the whole story of how all of this—Well, I understand afterwards that alum became one of the most loyal and most contributing alums in the—and you know to give him credit, by the time he had gone home... The son wrote us a wonderful letter saying, "Hey, there's been a reconciliation." His father genuinely did not understand the pressure he was putting on the kid, who wanted his own independence. But I think that is a kind of story that illustrates the pressure that [inaudible] been caught in interesting binds that a Dean of Admissions can find himself in.

BURNS: Sure. And perhaps a fairly common one at Dartmouth where there is such a tradition of generations going to Dartmouth.

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: And I would imagine the other aspect of your work on the Admissions Committee, besides reviewing the applicant pool, was maybe setting some criteria?

WOOD: Exactly, exactly.

BURNS: And I would imagine one of the factors would be the legacy factor.

WOOD: Yes. Although the policy was the Trustees', and officially, and I think it still is, that preference is not given to legacies in terms of giving them an advantage academically. Supposedly, it's if there are ten people who are qualified more or less equally for admission and there's room for just one, if one of them is a legacy (defined as a child, not as a grandchild or a brother or sister or what have you), it should be the Dartmouth person. Now of course that sounds good in theory; in practice there's always a give-and-take which it never comes that way. But what it does mean is that if, like the bananas kid, you were right at the top of the scale academically and in terms of extracurricular activities—he doesn't need any alumni preference to get in, he's going to get in, period.

The only place that it begins being important is as you get down the scale. So that if you look statistically, you'll find that there are more alumni legacies in the bottom half of the class than in the top half of the class, because it's only in those lower parts that that added qualification you've got will pay off. And I think it's played absolutely straight, but when people look at this without understanding why that happens, all hell can break loose. That egalitarian who says, "Hey, you are just letting in these people, these rich capitalists"—I'm referring back to, obviously, vocabulary of the sixties type of this sort of illegitimate institution of this capitalistic society that, you know, needs revolution.

BURNS: But again, looking at the Admissions model of peeling away the top and the bottom, when you get that pile of seemingly equals, this then is a factor that might push somebody ahead.

WOOD: Yes. And clearly—I know the first year I was on the committee, Chris, other members of the committee would say, one of them one day said, "Hey, you write the most interesting reports in terms of picking out stuff, that we haven't seen, but of course you're the first non-Dartmouth person ever to have served on this committee." Which was part of, I think, a real change which, I think, did sort of broaden—it wasn't just me, there were many other people who followed me—of just different types of points of view, or being sublimely unaware of something that was an important Dartmouth qualification that didn't strike me at all, you know.

BURNS: What were some of the other criteria that the College was specifically looking at, in terms of maybe extracurricular activities or athletics?

WOOD: There's always a competition that, I think, basically, even back then, it was looking for excellence in whatever it was that a kid did. So that clearly the football coach, or what any athletic coach is going to be pushing for kids, but it may be that this year I need a quarterback really badly, or the next year it's a center—the orchestra does the same thing. "This year, by God, I need French horn players." So they're out, and will come in and say, "Did you know that John Jones here is a world-class French horn player, he's been on the state high school orchestra for years, and so on." So in fact you find there are a lot of constituencies that are coming in, arguing for the excellence of whatever it is—and you're trying to look at all of this.

And I guess the way I looked at it, Chris, was saying, fundamentally a college like Dartmouth derives some of its excellence from the fact that its students live in community. That really, and you can see it talking to alumni of any school, that an awful lot of the education isn't something that

comes just from us professors, it's the people from their different backgrounds living together, teaching each other. So that in a sense, when I was reading a folder (and I think this was pretty generally done), was sort of saying, "OK, over and beyond the academics, what has this kid to contribute to that type of community experience?"

Which is not—you know there are a lot of kids who apply who have done a lot of what write-ups always used to refer to as "stuff." They have been the secretary of the French Club. Well, that's an activity, but is that really something that's going to contribute a heck of a lot to, you know, either to French or--it's sort of a punch, but it doesn't show much initiative or... And, so that you were looking—"OK, what is—is there something the kid does with a type of depth of commitment or ability or interest that it would become interesting for someone else? Or that another person might become doing this too." Where this would show up the most, I think, is that as you are rejecting people from the low end and accepting from the high side, obviously the more you move down the academic scale, the more you're looking for greater strengths in something other than academic. And regardless of what that is—it might be the French horn player, it might be the fullback of the football team.

But then at the end, as I say, you get this large mass of people who are both academically and extracurricularly predicted to be absolutely dead middle of the class. And they are always referred to as five by fives. Dead middle. Or four by fours, I guess. At that point you begin looking, and if you watch magazines each year when acceptances go out, you'll get these funny arguments, these crazy goddamn schools, this is the year they seem to like people who raise pet pirhana fish. Well, what's that got to do with a liberal education? Well, it's in those situations that the kid who does the unusual thing, like raising pet pirhana fish, but has got an interesting reason for raising those pet pirhana fish, that may differentiate that kid from the other people who look to be absolutely indistinguishable four by fours.

So that it's, I think, literally that community interaction excellence that you're looking for, with a lot of people with the particular things, the Drama Department, the Math Department, because some of it will be academic things too, trying to—John Kemeny, to give an example, really, I think, initially did not understand that if you are going to a school for liberal education it meant that you had things that you had to take in a whole variety of fields. So John had a genius for coming up with some kid he had discovered at a high school somewhere who was the math genius, but who didn't do anything else. And John would then be in there with everybody, [Robert] Bob Blackman, the football coach, fighting for this kid.

And you sit there and say, "John, this kid may be the world's greatest genius in math, but there is no sign whatsoever that he's ever going to be able to pass a foreign language. And if he can't pass a foreign language he's going to flunk out of this place."

We finally took one kid like this for John. He did flunk out after two years (it happened to be foreign languages, is why I'm thinking of it). Well he then came back and sort of—I remember his senior year he applied to Thayer School; I remember talking to the Dean of Thayer School, Myron Tribus, and Myron said, "Well, I don't know whether he'll ever graduate from Dartmouth College, but we've admitted him to Thayer School. He's the brightest mathematician we've ever seen." And indeed, he did in fact manage to graduate.

And he then went on—he was one of the early people in Kiewit who designed an awful lot of the software as well as causing a crisis at Dartmouth when he had the theory that—Dartmouth at that point had passkeys; there was only one passkey for all of Dartmouth College, opened every door in the place. And this guy went out and he grabbed four students and took their keys, and then wrote a computer program saying, "What's the passkey that's going to open all four of these keys?" And suddenly he had this. And students got it. And it used to be, if anybody was locked out of anywhere, you stopped the next student and said, "Hey, have you got a key to let me in?" And nine times out of ten they did. Which then ultimately led to a lot of changes of keys around Dartmouth College. But it was a fascinating case in terms of, you know, the kid who's the single-track genius who's going to have a lot of trouble in a school that expects more than one track. And it's that how do you look at the tracks, that is the tricky thing.

BURNS: It kind of says a lot about what Dartmouth's whole mission was. And it sounds as though you were really, as members of the committee, being actively lobbied by these different . . .

WOOD: Oh, yes. You would have—normally it was in letter form. It wasn't personal, it would be letters added to the files. You weren't being called up at night and saying, "Hey, listen, you've got to . . ."

BURNS: But I would imagine that you would not hear it on the other end from the parents of rejected students, that that would be . . .

WOOD: That's another place where the Admissions Office, why your Dean has to have iron pants. I remember talking to Eddie Chamberlain at the end of the first year, and saying, "One of the things that kills you is, you know

perfectly well that some of the kids you have turned down are going to do a lot better than some of the kids you've admitted. And because you find yourself, in a sense, playing God in terms of accepting and rejecting on the basis of incomplete information." And Eddie said, "Yeah," he said, "you know it happens. Every June I get letters, and they read, 'Hey Chamberlain, you remember that kid you turned down four years ago? This is to tell you that he is graduating summa cum laude from Yale University next week, fuck you, Sincerely.'" And you know, indeed, I'm sure if you went to talk to [Karl] Furstenberg he would tell you he gets those types of letters every year, but Eddie said the great thing about this is that he knows that the person at Yale, so on, is receiving the same letter, "Remember the kid you turned down four years ago, he's graduating from Dartmouth," this way.

BURNS: It's impossible to accurately predict.

WOOD: Sure, absolutely.

BURNS: So these early committees you were on—the Great Issues, the Freshman Seminar, the Committee on Admissions, Financial Aid, and the Freshman Year—were these typical committee assignments for a younger faculty member?

WOOD: No. No, they weren't. They sort of clearly involved . . .

[End of Tape 1, Side B — Beginning of Tape 2, Side A]

BURNS: OK. So you wanted to add one more thing about the admissions?

WOOD: Admissions. Yes. In terms of, I had mentioned that--the problem of each group seeming to have somewhat different records in terms of how they are actually going to achieve at Dartmouth. Now, John Kemeny becoming President in 1970, of course becoming President just as the College has celebrated its bicentennial. And I think John, in his inauguration, announced that he wanted to recommit the College to the education of Native Americans. And this came early enough in the year that we were able to get a significant number of Native Americans applying to be admitted in 1970.

And they turned out to have a totally different profile from that of blacks, of whites, of Hispanic Americans, of bootstrap northern New Englanders. I mean, the striking feature was, of the ones we were seeing--were people with incredibly high Board scores, but incredibly low ranks in class. I mean I can remember one kid who was coming from a Chicago high

school and, I think, with a verbal aptitude of 780 and about that for his math aptitude, but he was 630 in a class of 637. And horrifyingly—we always had a wonderful question on the admissions application form, which would say, "What is your greatest weakness that needs your most careful attention?" And that kid had written down, "I am lazy." He also was a junior chess master. I mean, clearly chess interested him.

Well, you sort of looked at these things, and you had no idea what to do with them, because they were so—and in the end, OK, we went with the people with the highest numbers, basically, and initially it looked absolutely disastrous. I think at the end of the second year of Native American recruiting, I think, see that second year there were fourteen kids who had been admitted in the class. At the end of that, their freshman year, thirteen of the kids had either withdrawn or had been kicked out, and one was returning, but on double warning.

Well, the interesting thing was, as the Native American Program then began getting going, and with more kids, you began seeing that, or it began turning up it was more a culture shock of being in the community. And that a pattern seemed to be developing which to some extent still continues, of kids who will come to Dartmouth for a year or a year and a half and then withdraw for a year, but then come back and then do fine. So that if you look, for example, at Native American graduation rates from Dartmouth, as compared to, say, the old-fashioned traditional white group, if you look at four years and how many have graduated, it's a much lower percentage. If you look at five years it's right up there with everybody else, because they come back and do it. But it's that adjustment time, particularly, I think, in the original years where a very, very high percentage of our kids were coming off reservations and had never, you know, been involved in a white or even relatively urban culture of a place as small as Hanover, New Hampshire. And it created all sorts of adjustment problems.

BURNS: That's an interesting phenomenon, the number of them leaving and then coming back. It sounds like, with certain segments of the population, like the Native Americans and the African Americans and the rural New Englanders, that the Admissions Committee was really trying to find new ways of trying to predict success at Dartmouth.

WOOD: Right, right.

BURNS: And I'm wondering, I guess you've spoken about how it turned out for the Native American population to a certain extent, how did those early efforts turn out in terms of the African American or the rural New Englander?

WOOD: The African American and rural New England both turned out, I think, much more—there were many fewer problems. Part of it, I think, was, with the rural New England kids you were dealing with very bright kids, very clearly, but economically disadvantaged, but who didn't seem to face the types of problems of prejudice that, say, the kids in the African American or the Native American or Hispanic group, so on, did. So that if they could be admitted, they seemed to function very well, although I've got over in my file there a couple of letters from some students I've had.

One from a woman from Vermont who was applying to med school and asked me to write a letter for her, and talking about it, her own statement for the medical school about who am I and what I hope to accomplish, and part of what she's talking about is her problem of adjusting to Dartmouth. And the problem, in a sense, was that she came from "very humble circumstances" in which her mother is a waitress and her father was—I can't remember what she'd tell people he was, but basically he mowed lawns. And so she arrived at Dartmouth and was a hell of a field hockey player, among other things, and immediately found out that all these field hockey players who had gone to Miss Porter's School, or who simply came from a type of background she didn't have, and that she felt socially—she didn't want to admit who she was, originally, and felt uncomfortable about it, until finally she made the break and, you know, had some kids home for Thanksgiving or something, and found it worked. And then wrote a fascinating, fascinating sort of letter of the type of hidden adjustment problem that the otherwise "mainstream" northern American, northern New England kid could have.

And clearly they had those types of things, but they were individual, and each one was uniquely different. Where there were many more things that seemed similar for the African American kids or for the Native American kids, that were longer problems of adjustment. The interesting thing was actually in the black case, some of the most disadvantaged were the ones who had the least difficulty. Let me give an—I mean, that is—you're too young to remember some of the stuff. It wasn't just the Civil Rights movement, but then within all of the tradition of prejudice and putdown, you then began getting the "Black is Beautiful" movement and so on.

A Dartmouth alum was an Episcopalian priest who happened to be the chaplain for one of the Illinois prisons, and he came into contact with the heads of a Chicago gang called the Conservative Vice Lords, Inc., who the Chicago police at that point were estimating were doing about 60 to 80 million dollars a year business in drugs and prostitution. Well, somehow he got interested in them, and the kids, particularly led by one of the

founders of the gang, a guy named Tiny Evans (Tiny was about 300 pounds), had sort of come to the conclusion that maybe gang life wasn't all there was in the world. That after all, there were something like 24 kids who had been the original founders of the Vice Lords, and of them there were only two who weren't either dead or in prison. And Tiny thought these were kind of bad odds and maybe he ought to do something different.

So anyhow, the Episcopalian priest wondered whether Dartmouth might be interested in these kids. And we debated back and forth, another admissions policy question. And we decided—and we tried to look at records, and you know, sort of any schooling transcript records would sort of run out inconclusively at the seventh or eighth grade at best. Well, we finally decided that OK, we would admit—I think the first year we took eight of these kids, non-matriculated. They were called a "Foundation Year Program" in which they would take Dartmouth courses, but also some special catch-up courses, and then you'd make the decision at the end of the year, did they have it to be matriculated and become regular Dartmouth students.

Well, the funny thing was that these kids arrived at the height of all of the Black is Beautiful and "we feel oppressed and you, Whitey, are oppressing us." Well, these kids, as they moved into the African-American Society, were hilarious, because they had never had any dealings with Whitey except on conditions of more than equality. So that they found themselves totally in a different world with much less cultural hassle than any of their much more middle-class black comperes.

And it was in effect a wonderful thing on the whole community of picking up and getting morale going and stopping worrying about all these types of—people always tend to forget the difficulties of moving into a different community, particularly if there's a bad history in the background: "Will that barber cut my black hair? And even if he does, does he like it?" This was a type of thing that would come up. And for Tiny Evans this was not a problem. So that you had—but, you didn't have anything like this on the Native American side, so I think it was a much tougher, and had to be sort of worked out by each kid on, at that point his own, since there were no her's.

BURNS: Sounds like it took a few years for the Native American community to really get its footing.

WOOD: It did, it did.

BURNS: I wanted then to revisit the question of whether these early committee assignments were typical for a younger faculty member.

WOOD: I don't think so. I think why they happened was largely a—must have been, I suspect, recommendations from [Albert] Al Dickerson ['56], who was the Dean of Freshmen and a very close friend of John Dickey's. And I think Al—at that point, being a freshman advisor was entirely voluntary. And Al was very shrewd. He would go around finding out from all the departments or the Dean's office who were the new hires for the year. And then before they arrived he would write a wonderful letter, "Don't you want to be a freshman advisor?" That "learning the types of things that you need to know to advise the freshmen will be a wonderful introduction to you to Dartmouth College and what all of its rules, requirements, expectations and so on are." And so I signed up for this, I'd been a freshman advisor at Harvard, but [inaudible] what happened.

But I think there was one meeting at the beginning of the year that Al had for all the freshman advisors where--Board scores and how to read them, and what the meanings of things, as you got your list of advisees, and who was apt to be having problems and who not--that he suddenly saw that I knew a lot about this, because I made a couple of comments to clarify or put things into perspective in a way that he apparently liked. And that, in other words, I had some practical background, if you will, administratively and counseling-wise, that most faculty members didn't have. So that I think, I suspect, it was Al then who immediately recommended that I be put on that committee for Admissions, Financial Aid and the Freshman Year.

How it happened, or what happened with the Great Issues, why that one came up I just don't know, although I do remember talking to John Dickey at the—the Dickeys always used to have a reception sort of in the fall for freshman advisors, and I can remember spending some time talking to him. And I think something must have struck him about something of interest that I happened to have in foreign policy and what was happening in the world, etc., that was different from the normal medievalist, but I really don't know what the thing there was.

BURNS: The next area I wanted to cover is sort of heading into the Kemeny administration, and I wanted to start with—you've talked a little bit about some interactions you had had with John Kemeny early on, before he was President, but I'm wondering how well you knew him when he was Chairman of the Math Department.

WOOD: I knew him pretty well, and I honestly can't say quite what it was other than—I think the faculty lunches that we used to have, that used—when I first arrived there were faculty lunches in Alumni Hall in Hopkins Center, in which, for a dollar, which I think was subsidized by the College, you got soup, sandwich, salad and dessert and a beverage. And Alumni Hall has these large round tables that hold, typically, eight people. So that as you would go in and go down the cafeteria line you might see someone you knew and you might sit down with them to talk, but there'd be other people at the table who you hadn't met. And it was a wonderful way to get to know the faculty as a whole, because it was always different people each day that were the new people.

And John was one of the people I met relatively early, because one of his colleagues in math happened to be a neighbor of mine, who I sat down, and John was there, and we got talking and found we had a variety of things in common, and so it simply went from there. I think you did, in the 60's, have a somewhat more collegial faculty, partly because it was modestly smaller, partly because you had this type of wonderful meeting ground like that faculty lunch, and also partly because so much of the faculty was new in the '60s, that we were all meeting each other, whether it was in departments or out of departments.

Also it was easier then, because if you look at housing today—the last figures I've seen were roughly 36 or 37% of the Dartmouth faculty lives in Hanover, and the rest scattered from here to hell and gone. In the 1960s, 90% of the faculty lived in Hanover. It was before—as I say, before interstates, before Lebanon Airport was really running, that it was before a lot of alumni and other people began returning to the Alma Mater and driving real estate prices up so high you can't afford to live here. I mean, the house we're sitting in here now I could buy as an assistant professor in 1965, where I think my salary was maybe \$8,500, I could buy it. As a full professor, or a full professor retired, with, you know, what at the time I retired I think was one of the higher salaries at Dartmouth, I couldn't possibly have afforded it, in terms of the price that you'd expect. Because it's, this street used to have houses in the 20s and 30 thousands, whereas now, typically, God help me, in the 600 thousands. This is insane.

BURNS: Things have changed.

WOOD: Right, exactly. But as long as everybody was in town, the likelihood of meeting people, and it might be that you met that person for lunch and then you'd meet them elsewhere, whether it was at the Coop, on the street, what have you. And John Kemeny just happened to be one of those people that I'd keep on meeting. And so that I felt I knew him well

enough to deal with some sort of crazy dicey ones in 1970, when he was President. I mean, upon first becoming President. I don't know if you want an example from 1970 just to—I mean, understand, here is John. He becomes President, what, in March of 1970, and then in May suddenly you have Kent State, and you have to decide, are you going to go on strike or what's going to happen?

Enormously difficult first year, with, of course, things like the Manchester Union Leader having a wonderful time with all of this: when Dartmouth goes on strike the banner headline across the Union Leader was "Dartmouth picks another lemon." And—which then led to a wonderful sort of total College meeting down in Leverone Fieldhouse. There was John during the strike sort of giving his thoughts, but before saying anything he simply tossed a lemon out into the crowd. I mean, a lot of people thought that John was not, you know, a huge human relations type. In fact he was, he was very good at this.

The problem that I came up with, or that was—I knew I had to know John well to do it was that—well, early in the spring term, a colleague of mine, Jeanne Prosser, who was our French Revolution historian, came down with liver cancer. And she was teaching a freshman seminar on the French Revolution in fact and fiction. And so suddenly Jeanne was in the hospital, couldn't teach. Well, I was the only one in the department who had been trained as a French historian who could step in and take over. So I did.

And one of the kids in the class, who clearly stood out from the first couple of papers he had done for me—he was a kid named Michael McCarthy ['73], from Cleveland, Ohio. He was an alumni legacy. His father, from Cleveland, a man named Gene McCarthy ['43 TU '47] (bizarrely, for that period), Class of '43, although he was an ex-Marine and, as Michael would say, you know, far to the right of Attila the Hun. Well OK, the strike comes along, and Michael, who I think was very conventional and got along with--suddenly got wrapped up in it. The Government Department was running a program in Washington, D.C. which wasn't so much petitions as visiting Congressmen and trying to persuade them to change their views on the war, etc. Michael goes down and does this.

At the end of the strike, the faculty voted a complicated series of arrangements in which, if a kid simply wanted to finish the term, take his exams, do his papers and so on and get graded, fine. That was good. If the kid felt that, given the time that's been off, they didn't--couldn't complete in time, in June, they would automatically receive an extension till September—they could complete their work by then—or, if they were

doing something worthwhile within the context of the war, so on, they could simply opt not to do anything at all. They could receive credit for their courses, in which they didn't have to do any more work. They would simply receive an asterisk.

Now that's what Michael wanted to do. His father, when he heard about it, was absolutely outraged. Well, I didn't know any of this at the time; all I knew was, when classes resumed Michael was back in class, and I can remember the final paper for the course was to be on any subject the kid wanted to write about as long as it was related somehow to the French Revolution. The kid, in his case, he wanted to write on the crowd in the French Revolution, which seemed appropriate to the experience of 1970, so I recommended some books precisely on that topic. OK, at the end of the term he came in with a paper and handed it in, and I said, "Did you read so-and-so on the crowd?" and he said, "No, that's one I just didn't have a chance to read." And OK, fine.

Well, I sat down to read papers and as I began reading his (his other papers had just been excellent, straight A's), this one was just crap. And then I just began thinking, well, how hard a topic did I agree—am I doing this kid a disfavor by having set him a topic that was just beyond what a freshman could be expected to do? So out of curiosity I sort of reached back and I got the "crowd in the French Revolution" book off my shelf and began looking, and by God, suddenly it was, here were sentences that were exactly the same as this book. And it was the strangest compilation of sentences taken at random, scattered from all over the book together, but it was all from this book! Well, given the craziness of that term, Chris, I hit the ceiling, I was just madder than hell. So I didn't think to call the kid in, anything else. I wrote a letter to the Dean of Freshmen saying, "We have a plagiarism case here." And so I've done this.

And the next morning McCarthy's back in my office, and he says, "I don't know whether you've read my paper yet, but if you haven't, don't." Then he sat down and told the story about how he'd suddenly been yanked into school, and how he went about normally writing papers. Apparently what he would do in history, was he would go out—he'd take all this patchwork of quotes from others and then he'd begin rewriting and rewriting and rewriting and more and more of his own stuff coming in to it until he had something that was genuinely his paper, it was something to say. In this case, he had gotten so rushed, and he was so screwed up from the thing with his father, he just was unable to complete the process. And so he handed in what he had, then realized he couldn't live with it.

OK. So I sat down and I wrote the Dean of the Freshmen another letter, saying, "Hey, Al, we've got a problem here and this is less clear-cut plagiarism under normal circumstance stuff as you could—as I had originally thought." Well anyhow, I guess the, you know, Conduct Committee met, and I went in. I guess I ended up sort of testifying for the kid, and went off to—there were a bunch of students who had taken over the Tommy Dent Cabin down by the river to hold a huge steak cookout, "thank God it's over" party, sort of, with faculty.

And so I happened to go to this, and I'm down there. The Kemenys are there, among others, and I guess about 7:30 the Assistant Dean of Freshman comes into this thing, and he's looking absolutely ashen and he looks at me, he said, "They've bounced him, they've expelled him, just out, completely!" And I was sitting there and I just sat out in the kitchen trying to escape from everyone. And Jean Kemeny came in and said, "Charlie, what the hell's wrong with you?" It's one of these situations that—I told her what was wrong with me. Well, she went and grabbed John, so John and I then talked, and he said, "OK, write this up in the morning." So I did.

And the upshot of it was, one, I received a very severe letter from John Kemeny: "Don't go off half-cocked. This is your own goddamn fault, and never do anything like this again." The other was, for what I believe is the only time in history, all the conduct rules have always said there is an appeal to the President, and the President, like the President of United States could issue pardons: John pardoned him. Although he never came back, his father was so mad about the whole damned thing—he finished out at Case Western Reserve, I guess. It was a fascinating sort of John picking up on it, and where it was one of those no-no things, you let the committees decide things, by God he intervened in what he thought was right in terms of this kid. And I think he was right. And, which, again there's a number of things that he did that were of this variety.

Next session I'll tell you about the one time I really feel badly that I never followed through on John. It was the first time in history that Dartmouth had ever beaten Yale in swimming—I might as well tell you this now—it was middle '70s, and I used to time for the swim team, or stroke judge, so on. And it comes down to the final relay, you know, and Karl Michael Pool is just going wild, and we win.

[End of Tape 2, Side A — Beginning of Tape 2, Side B]

BURNS: OK, you were talking about the swim . . .

WOOD: Well, I retreat as quickly as I can to the coach's office for protection while the team is going wild, and tossing the coach, Ron Keenhold, into the pool and so on. Well, I'm standing—the back door of the office opens and in comes John. He has been watching this meet, and he's in a three-piece tweed suit. And John looks at me and says, "Charlie, where's the coach? I want to congratulate him." And I said, "Well, right now, John, he's out there in the middle of the pool." "Oh," said John, heading out there. I said, "If you go out there, I think you're going to end up in the middle of the pool too." And he sort of stopped and looked a while, then he smiled and said, "That's all right, I know how to swim."

Well he then heads out, and he happens to run into the captain of the team, who of course stops all this activity immediately, sort of comes to attention for his President, and John proceeds to congratulate him on his wonderful race, not realizing he's talking to a diver. And I've killed myself ever since, not having told that guy that John had said, "That's OK, I know how to swim." And there's a side of me that says, "Hey, it's not only for those kids, but that it would have been the high point of John's presidency, that my swim team tossed me in the pool." But it didn't happen, it's just one of those "what-ifs" in history that you feel sorry about.

BURNS: I wanted to take a couple steps back and talk about the--kind of the search process for John Dickey's replacement, which eventually became John Kemeny, and ask you how aware you were of that whole search process, and whether you knew John Kemeny was a candidate, or were there any other candidates that you were aware of?

WOOD: The interesting thing on that one was that I was blissfully unaware of the search process, and you know, right now looking back on it, yes, I think there were other candidates who were rumored. I think a guy who ended up as the President of Stanford was described, I think even hit the New York Times or something as probably the leading candidate for the presidency of Dartmouth. But there was remarkably little, as I remember, of discussion or rumor mills or high sense—I think there was much more when Kemeny retired. So that whether it simply was sort of a process which didn't, as later presidential searches did, I think, involve as many other faculty members, student members, so on, which may have kept it more within the Trustees and less rumors getting going. But that's my general sense of it.

BURNS: What do you remember of the reaction to his election as President?

WOOD: There, I think, initially quite mixed. Because John had expressed views about how the faculty should be reorganized. He wanted to change all the

divisional structures. He was interested in putting different departments in different sorts of sets of organizations with each other. So that I can remember—in those days you used to have—now you have sort of divisional councils of sort of the Chairs of departments meeting from each division. In those days it was the full division that would meet. So I can remember having a meeting of the Division of Social Sciences with the new President, and everybody asking him terribly suspicious questions about, "You really are going to eliminate Social Sciences?" or, "You are going to reorganize us with—"; and I can't remember the specifics of whatever the fears were on the basis of what his statements. And yet it ended up with a good deal of anger, in which I think John Kemeny sort of walked out of the meeting. Part of it—I think part of the reason John had—one of the things for John in terms of his selection as President was that he clearly had had an enormously important part to play in the fund drive that was going on . . .

BURNS: The Third Century Fund?

WOOD: Yes, the Third Century Fund. In which, as I later learned, as somebody who's done a lot of fundraising since, one of the things you do is, you draw up a shopping list of things that potential donors might be interested in giving money for. I think most faculty members didn't realize that, and John—John had dutifully, for example, solicited ideas for things that were needed, from members of the faculty of the Social Sciences, and of course had received zero responses. So under those circumstances John developed his own shopping list, which, you know, is—I suspect if I were to look at that list today it would look perfectly reasonable and OK, here are things that people might want to fund, and that really don't have any curricular implications, necessarily—"we are going in such-and-such a direction." But as faculty viewed it at that point, they thought, "Hey, here is this doggone mathematician who is attempting to tell all us social sciences what to do, and he's doing it through this shopping list of which he's sought no consultation." So all these charges were going back and forth, in which, in the end John just walked out madder than hell. It took a long time to sort of cool down.

The interesting thing was, John always was a person who consulted other faculty members, and continued to do so in his Presidency. Although one aspect of John was—he was very bright—and as faculty member before he became President, I can remember two or three occasions in the faculty where John had been one of those sponsoring a motion to the faculty that had been brought by petition or what have you, and then as the faculty debate would continue on whatever the subject was, John relatively late in the debate might get up and—in those days everybody smoked and John

smoked European fashion, sort of back [handed], and he'd be up in this faculty meeting. And he said, "You know, I was one of those who was a sponsor of this, but as I have listened to my colleagues who supported this, their arguments are so stupid I can no longer support this."

So there were sort of memories of this type of statement from John that had people very nervous. And I think people who did not know John, because that was part of the key to it--and if you did know him you weren't bothered by this; this was John expressing some irritation as a logician. And he always told me, he—you know, he really wanted—at Princeton he had taught philosophy as well as math, and he really wanted to go back and end his career teaching Plato. And—well, so anyhow, those types of things—but I think they disappeared very quickly, partly, or overwhelmingly, it seems to me, because of Kent State. And the leadership that he showed there, which came so—only months after he had become President, and after that display of leadership as faculty, I think almost universally, viewed it, all these other issues that you had had simply disappeared. You had a President.

BURNS: So, two followup questions there. One is that it sounds as though the faculty reaction was somewhat mixed at first.

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: Was it along divisional lines, somewhat?

WOOD: Not entirely, no. You know, I'm not sure, in terms of the Science Division, but I don't think there was any sense that it was the scientists, including the mathematicians, versus the humanists and the social scientists. I didn't get any sense like that, no, no.

BURNS: And how much of a sense . . .

WOOD: Although I think part of the problem, which may be [from] looking at the Social Science Division from a historian's point of view: history, as you probably know, in most schools will be in the Humanities rather than in the Social Sciences. And clearly John's vision of the Social Sciences was much more purely social science with a much more mathematical base to it than a lot of people in History as it then existed, although we did have one or two quantitative historians, including [President James] Jim Wright. So that I think there was some nervousness that if we weren't ever sure we really belonged in the Social Science Division to begin with, we sure as hell don't belong in whatever he wants to do! So—but as I say, I don't really remember it as something that then spread out into an argument

about, you know, the Sciences versus the Humanities versus the Social Sciences. It was much more John Kemeny's misunderstanding of--was the way I think it was viewed.

BURNS: How much was there a popular sentiment that he's one of us that's been elected as President, among the faculty?

WOOD: That certainly was there, but not—you know, I don't remember it half as much as: there certainly wasn't any resentment against John Sloan Dickey that I was aware of, that here was this outsider who was this State Department lawyer who used to work in prison reform at the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. You know, "what does he have to do with academe?" So that I don't think there was any—in other words the type of thing that built up, say, after the McLaughlin [President David "Dave" McLaughlin '54] presidency, "Thank God to have an academic, as opposed to this lawnmower salesman"—to put it into the types of cliches that it always came as—that—or the idea, put it this way: the idea that academe—that you had to have an academic as a president of an academic institution was not an idea, I think, that was widely recognized or believed in 1970.

Because it hadn't been the case, and it was partly, it seems to me, academe in general and Dartmouth more particularly simply hadn't gone through that academic total professionalization with the emphasis on scholarship and so on that it takes only another scholar to recognize, type of argument. So that that sense of, "Thank God one of us, a real academic, and not even an administrator who claims to be an academic because he got a degree in some field that he's never done anything in"—that simply—I don't remember it as being a strong issue. It may have been with some people, but it certainly wasn't out there as the current.

BURNS: Well, as you say we'll get back to that later when we get into the McLaughlin portion, and his presidency. The other issue that you bring up there is almost two months into his presidency you have the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State shootings, and there's a—

WOOD: There's a little bit more than that, too. Bobby Seale at Yale—I mean, there's what people don't know, and it's only because a very good friend who I toured the Middle West with after we started to explain to alumni what had been happening who's now my nephew-in-law, [Winthrop] Win Rockwell, Class of '70, who is a lawyer and was John Kemeny's counsel on the Three Mile Island Commission. But Win was the head of WDCR, the student radio station. And he and the President of The Dartmouth and a variety of other of the sort of Dartmouth media types had all gone down

for a huge rally at Yale, which the principal speaker was Bobby Seale, who was one of the Chicago Seven, who was up for contempt of court charges for God knows what the hell they had been doing in Chicago, but sort of still flowing out of the 1968 Democratic Convention. Well anyhow, this whole rally, and it involved all of the Ivy League and so on, was taking place when Kent State took place. So all of the editors of the Ivy newspapers and, you know, the radio stations, whoever was there, got together as a common petition how all of the Ivy schools should go on strike.

Now they then left, and they—the Sunday after Kent State, and driving back, and they got back to Hanover at about two in the morning. That was what—Rockwell had done enough with Kemeny, he knew Kemeny was a hopeless night owl, and he said, "Hey, we've got to go see the President." So they all went down to see John at two in the morning. And they spent the next couple of hours going over it, so that John had lead time. It wasn't just Monday when it suddenly hit, that he had this advanced warning and, you know, some informed student reaction. As—and, but, I think Win always said, "Hey, when he went in to DCR to have his press conference, or speech to the community at six o'clock that night, Monday," he said, "We still had no idea what the hell he was going to say." And that he then announced the strike. They thought he had done the right thing but they didn't know until then.

He—if I'm laughing it's that—one of—you know, the crazy things that happened, it's that we have Leverone Fieldhouse, that—you go into it now, it has these nice, you know, Astroturf, and it has Astroturf tennis courts. At that point it was all absolutely dirt and was used for nothing except football practice on rainy days. And because, as you're a football player down there and your cleats dig up all this dirt. And so dust everywhere, awful, people coughing. So some genius decided, "Hey, you've got to do something about this." So some genius said, "The thing to do is, we'll keep the dust down by pouring #2 heating oil over all of it." Which they did. In which the net result was, OK, it stayed down but you had this place just reeking of oil.

Well, Seaver Peters ['54], the Athletic Director, managed to come up with somebody who was willing to give the College something like \$350,000 specifically to put Astroturf on Leverone. And Pete had an appointment with John at 4:00 that Monday, to talk about Astroturf. Well, Pete arrives—I've heard this story from both of them, so I—Pete arrives at four, and nothing's happening. The President's in his office. And Pete is one of these guys who was totally oblivious, and had no idea that the world was coming apart. And he's sitting there, and I guess he sat there waiting for

John until about 5:30 when John came out to walk over to WDCR, and John sees his Director of Athletics sitting there, he says, "What are you doing here?" Pete says, "I'm here to talk about Astro turf." Which was not exactly at the center of John's mind at this point. And John apparently just looked at him, and he said, "Get out! Get out!"

Absolutely—you know—and it just—there was a division that lasted for some time. I finally got the Astro turf for them, but that's a story for coeducation, which was two years later. But there was two years of incredible things, at least from Pete's point of view. John, of course, had totally forgotten about it. But you could just see this thing, this Athletic Director who doesn't know about Kent State, who doesn't know about any of this, and he wants to talk about his Astro turf, and his President just saying, "Get out!" Yeah—oh, boy.

BURNS: So how—what sort of activities went on that week; what sort of activities did you play a part in that week?

WOOD: There were a whole series of things. The main activity, I think, that almost immediately picked up was that they wanted to get out to the communities all over the state to communicate with people to pass petitions to tell what was happening, "Hey, we've got to get out of this war." So that there was an enormous amount of meetings in all sorts of buildings to plan who goes where to do these things. And clearly very early use also of computers, and with computer networking, that people were already beginning to be able to—not just around campus, but you might be able to—we were connected to UNH, or we were connected to Harvard or so on, so you could do some sorts of organizing of activities. But then, with all sorts of other sort of quirky things that—"Hey, if you're going on strike everybody ought to be on strike, and so that ought to include, say, the janitors." And so you would be looking for volunteers, and not just volunteers from the students, but from our community, to come over and wash floors and do this sort of thing so janitors could be out on strike too.

There were an enormous number of teach-ins also, because obviously some people claimed to be much more informed about what was happening than others, so that you would have a series of that. I got hauled in with—you know, somebody decided there ought to be a bench reading of a relevant play about this type of war activity and people attempting to stop it. It may have been Vietnam-directed specifically, I honestly don't remember. But I can remember sort of a quick run-through and then suddenly being on the stage in Hopkins Center in the Center Theater, now the Moore Theater, with a whole bunch of faculty members and students, doing this bench reading of the play.

The latter part of the week I know I was hooked up with a young history major named Ken Lay ['73], who, interestingly, was an enormously conservative guy. I think if the Dartmouth Review had been—if he had been around in Dartmouth Review days Ken probably would have been one of the founders of it. But no, by God, he felt strongly that he had to be involved, so that somehow, since I had a car (and cars were in short supply for students in those days), that we were driving around. I think we went to, you know, to University of Vermont and Vermont State, St. Johns[bury], or [inaudible] schools like Putney, or down to Mount St. Mary's and other campuses all over New Hampshire and Vermont, as well as stopping at radio stations and doing interviews. And I guess Ken and I probably spent, oh, three, four days on the road doing this, and just coming back totally exhausted.

And it was interesting that, in terms of say faculty or other reactions, of saying, “Hey—you know, there were very few people who supported the takeover of Parkhurst in '69. And that's kind of breaking the rules.” The interesting thing here was, all the kids were attempting to observe the rules and go through the proper, normal protest forms that were accepted by society, which I think you've got a lot—you know, I think a fair amount of faculty support of, from people who weren't wildly anti-war, but sort of say, “Hey, look, if they're doing this right this time we've got to show them we support them.” Which is part of, I think, part of the mushrooming that went on.

BURNS: That is maybe why so many people deem it a successful move on Kemeny's part, is that it really brought people together.

WOOD: Right, exactly. Exactly, mm-hm.

BURNS: So what would you and Ken Lay, is that his . . . ?

WOOD: Yeah, L-A-Y.

BURNS: What would you talk about on these campuses?

WOOD: It was partly, you know, “What was Dartmouth doing on this?” And you found—it would change, because it partly would depend on the schools and what they were doing. I mean, what's the really radical Deweyite college up on Vermont Route 2? that . . .

BURNS: Goddard?

WOOD: Goddard. Well, by the time we got to Goddard, Goddard of course is a very radical place, and you know, they immediately wanted to go out and attack some government installation, but of course there aren't of course a lot of government installations in that part of Vermont, so they all, I guess, went out—at least forty or fifty of them were arrested for lying down on U.S. Route 2. But at least they could express the—to which they protested violently because they said, "We were not lying down on Route 2, we were levitating above it." So OK, that suggested, you know, you were dealing with people that weren't necessarily going to get interested in the continuing presence in Washington, our lobby group down there, or the petitioning, but we tried to do it.

A variant would be, down at the Putney School, that you suddenly saw the virtues, if you were going to do--again a relatively liberal Deweyite education--of why they had an experimental farm. They—you know, Putney was outraged, and they had already rented a bus to go to Washington to show their outrage. But before they did that, since they had to wait for a while for a Washington bus, they were going to go to Montpelier and the State Capitol and do this, and sort of everybody in the school had signed up. And so Ken and I are sitting listening to this before we are able to speak, and all the plans of what's coming, what Putney activities are coming along, and it's clear that—as I say, every single student in the school had signed up. And then one of the faculty said, "Hey, who's going to stay behind to milk the cows?" Very interesting question. You know, cows really aren't terribly political animals, and I think all those kids could recognize cows need to be milked or otherwise they're going to be in pain. Well, you know, the next twenty minutes, as it now seems to me (it probably was only three or four) of absolute silence; and so they were processing this. I have never seen such learning going on in my life. But Ken and I then are looking, and saying, "What on earth do we say after that one?" And I really don't remember what we said.

BURNS: Yeah, that's an interesting dilemma. Did you have much opportunity to address alumni at this point?

WOOD: Yes, and we sort of—toward the middle or end of May, [David] Dave Orr ['57] in the Secretary's office decided that there ought to be some sort of communication with alumni to try and tell what's happening. So Dave—I had done a fair amount of alumni stuff by this point, and Dave signed me up to go out on the road with Winthrop Rockwell, who I've mentioned before as the editor or the head of WDCR, to go out to the Midwest. He sort of assigned this, the wonderful sort of starting out in Cincinnati, Ohio, and gradually working our way through Grand Rapids, Michigan, ending up in Milwaukee, Wisconsin—I mean sort of hitting every sort of center of

conservative heart to tell people what the hell was happening and to answer questions. And so, I mean, one sort of a faculty member talking about it, and then a student, and sort of then taking discussion.

And Oh boy, I remember in Grand Rapids, for example, we met in a home, and everybody was civil, but I can remember sort of as this is going on, the president of the club biting his knuckles just to keep from shouting. And you know--and then finally he sort of said, "Hey, you know, in the Cuban Missile Crisis I was one of those Marines in landing craft 1200 yards off the coast of Cuba and we were ready to go in if our President told us to, and by God why won't people do that now?" And I thought, God, this is something I've never heard about before. Well, this as I said--with the other students who had simply left college to go out and petition, and types of things like one kid, where the—some alum at the other end of the room says, "Are you prepared to go to jail for your beliefs?" and the kid saying "Yes," and you know as they sort of argue back and forth, suddenly you realize it's father and son talking to each other. But at two in the morning or so when this finally broke, I remember the president coming around and grabbing me. He said, "Hey, this has been the most stimulating contact I have had since Dartmouth, since I've graduated. Don't ever send the football coach again." And with the interesting result that that alumni group...

End of Interview

INTERVIEW: Charles Wood

INTERVIEWED BY: Chris Burns

PLACE: Charles Wood's home in Hanover

DATE: January 23, 2001

BURNS: Today is January 23, 2001 and I'm speaking again with Charles Wood, Daniel Webster Professor of History, Emeritus, at his home in Hanover. We left off last time speaking about the May 1970 strikes and protests around the campus, and how you and—it was Win Rockwell?--went on...

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: ...an alumni tour of the Midwest?

WOOD: Yes. We got sent on what I kiddingly call—Dave Orr had lovingly selected sort of the conservative belt of the Midwest, sort of starting in Cincinnati and ending up in Milwaukee. I think I had taken you through Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, that sort of thing. But Milwaukee was interesting because a number of students also simply dropped out and went home to be activists, which they were allowed to do, trying to change the world. So that when Rockwell and I showed up in Milwaukee we found there were a number of students there, and we proceeded to have a very pleasant lunch, and then I think we each were allowed to say what we thought was happening on campus and why there had been a strike and why we thought it had been positive. Among which, to make the point at how different this had been from the takeover of Parkhurst the previous year, I commented that when you found the Beta House, not particularly a political action group, I said, out petitioning against the war in Newport, New Hampshire, you had to recognize you had a different situation.

Well, at the end of Win's remarks and mine, all hell broke loose as everybody began shouting in their anger at once, and just going on like

mad. And we couldn't get a word in edgewise. And then suddenly there came a—sort of one of those sort of seven-minute lulls when everybody stopped at the same point. And here is an alum, a member of the Class of '36 and in fact an Olympic athlete, talking to the person next to him, and the words that suddenly drift across were, "I still say Adolph Hitler was a much misunderstood person." And you sort of sat there and said, "Oh my God."

Well anyhow, they finally calmed down when one of the students stood up, who was himself apparently one of Wisconsin's best and most sought-after high school athletes, which the Club was enormously proud of, as both an athlete and as a damned good student. And this guy said, "I'd like to introduce myself: I'm so-and-so from Stevens Point," and said, "I wasn't in Hanover when the strike came along; I was in Madison because I'm hoping to go to law school there next year." He said, "But I didn't get close to that law school—too much tear gas." He said, "So I hopped a plane back to Hanover because I had a seminar that night that I had to take, and I got off the plane and got in a taxi, and when I mentioned to the taxi driver he said, 'Don't you know, Dartmouth's on strike too.' So I said to myself, 'Oh my God, another Madison.'" And he said, "I got back to Hanover, and found it wasn't another Madison." He said, "it was a beautiful scene," and said, "It was so good I felt I ought to get involved too." He said, "You know, I'm a Beta, and I was one of those pushing petitions in Newport, and I'm here to tell you to get involved too." It was the most interesting type of meeting I've ever seen, because he cut through, and there were no more shouts. Then there was discussion. I think that sort of sums up, I think, the useful part, or also what made the '70s so different from the '69, or in effect, how effective John Kemeny had been in making decisions which in effect kept control of this so that it did not become another Madison.

BURNS: Now, after this incident, the term ends shortly after that, and then from what I've read, I haven't seen too much more in the way of protest about the Vietnam War; nothing on that scale.

WOOD: It turns around remarkably fast, Chris. I mean, to illustrate it, I can remember the next fall, in the fall of '70 I was teaching a Freshman Seminar. And if you're teaching in the fall it means you're teaching the most verbal and best kids in the class of freshmen. And I guess at the opening meeting of that seminar all the kids are sort of sitting around talking with each other, getting to know each other before class formally begins, and there's a wonderful kid, Chris White, from Berkeley, California, and somehow they're talking—he begins talking about the formal prom that they had at Berkeley that spring. You know, tuxedos, formal dresses,

the whole bit. And I thought, My God, if Berkeley of all places is back to having formals, this world is changing. And indeed it was. I mean, it was just absolutely different. From the fall of '70 on, I think, with the one exception of attempts to get things stirred up again with the Nixon bombing of Haiphong harbor. But interestingly, that was younger faculty who tried to stir things up. They couldn't get students to do a thing to go on strike again. It just—it was remarkable how quickly things changed.

I remember in '75 I happened to be running Alumni College, and we were doing it on the Twentieth Century, and I, in my final lecture, had decided to use both slides and tapes, and I knew that the whole takeover of Parkhurst Hall had been taped by WDCR from the inside. And so I sort of as a--talking about student activism and rebellionism and the whole antiwar movement, I used the takeover at Parkhurst as an example, with tapes. Well, people liked it, and I was asked to give this to undergraduates in the fall of '75. Well, I did, and there must have been 200 there, and it wasn't—you know, it was maybe a 45-minute lecture. I think I was there for two or three hours afterwards; they could not believe that this had happened at Hanover, New Hampshire at Dartmouth College, although they had seen all the slides, they had heard all of this, the encounter of President Dickey with the guy who is attempting to throw him out of the building while in the background there's huge pounding sounds as they're nailing the front door of Parkhurst Hall shut, and they just couldn't believe it. It was just so far from anything that they had ever experienced themselves, and so different from their own undergraduate experience, that five years ago—unbelievable!

BURNS: Yeah, it's really a dramatic and very fast cultural change, a little broader than our topic here. So John Kemeny's decision to have this strike and these events that went on with this: how big of an impact did that have in shaping people's perception of him and his administration, do you think?

WOOD: I think it had a big impact in the sense that it indicated, in all sorts of ways for students as well as faculty, that John was open to listening to other people. That he wasn't somebody who simply made his own decisions. So that if John, for example, held student office hours, students actually came in to talk to him about—and I think that's unusual. I think a college president may well say he's holding office hours, but if I'm a student, who am I to talk to him? That this was not people's reaction I think had a lot to do with a carryover from that strike. And the same way with faculty. I think again it sort of illustrated that John was somebody who listened, who saw something broader than just his own particular reactions or instincts, which I think served him in good stead when he—when tough decisions came up.

BURNS: Which leads me to the next question, which is: if you would sort of broadly characterize Kemeny's relationship with the faculty over the years. We talked a little bit about the last—the last time we talked a little bit about the reaction to his election and how that was sort of mixed. I'm wondering if you could sort of outline how he got along with the faculty, coming from the faculty.

WOOD: Well, I think John was liked by the faculty, but I think initially they were uncertain, because John was a person who was aware of his own intelligence, his own capacity to make decisions. And who in faculty meetings as a simple faculty member was not hesitant about making his views clear, which often included a comment about the lack of logic of the people speaking on the other side of the issue, which is not going to necessarily endear a person to their fellow faculty colleagues. So that it seems to me that that uncertainty, that John I think handled extraordinarily well.

I mean, one of the first types of things he began doing, and this before all of the Cambodian invasion and strike, was beginning to hold informal meetings at his house in the evening. Inviting down, you know, five to eight faculty members simply to sit around and chew the fat about 'whither Dartmouth', what should he be concerned about. Which I think was very effective, because he was clearly listening, and he was drawing in—I mean, how many people in total he met with this way, I'm honestly not sure, but my impression is that he probably, in the course of this before getting swept up in the events of May, probably had had meetings with, you know, 40 or 50 of the more senior faculty members. And I think they were very useful in confidence-building, as well as giving him, I think, a much clearer sense of where senior faculty in fact were at.

BURNS: What were some of the major issues where Kemeny sort of butted heads with the faculty?

WOOD: Well, he certainly, and I think I mentioned it last time, butted heads initially with the Social Science Division on his view of what the Social Sciences should be, which partly involved a re-structuring of departments. And he had—I think in some senses the appointment of the Meadows [Dennis Meadows and Donella "Dana" Meadows] in Environmental Studies was an example of what he had in mind, wanting to bring together Government, the Thayer School of Engineering, a fair amount of mathematical modeling, so on, in a new form of, in effect, interdisciplinary departments. This, I think, did ruffle a lot of feathers. I think this was peculiarly a social

science concern, much more than it was with the sciences or with the humanities. So that that's the one that sticks out in my mind.

Clearly the whole sense of a college which was sharply changing in the sense that the type of faculty that John Dickey had begun to hire as the Hopkins faculty was retiring was a faculty which, I think, was still very much committed to undergraduate teaching, but also was much more committed to and would be judged upon its research and scholarship. Now how these things went together, that sort of scholarship of a research-university variety, with an undergraduate liberal arts commitment, was something that I think was quite unclear. So that that was one which wasn't so much butting heads together as it was a concern, "Would John be able to figure this out or come to the right decisions?"

Where the butting came about was [laughing] a concern that John had that insofar as Dartmouth had expanded in the '20s and hired a young faculty at that point, a faculty which then had stayed and sort of retired en masse in the '60s, the result was you were again hiring a very young faculty, inevitably. And John was afraid that if a high percentage of these people achieved tenure, you then would freeze out the possibility of fresh blood entering the faculty. And he was concerned with this particularly, I think, in the sciences, given the rate of change in scientific research, but overall.

So that he then proposed and then started to implement, or in fact did implement, a very complicated mathematical formula applicable to every department that, given how many people there were in the department, how many of them were on tenure now, what were the ages. You would end up with: You are allowed to have x number of tenure appointments in the next ten years. Which I'm not sure how many of the faculty really understood in terms of the mathematical complexity of the formula, but it was one that John, say circa 1972 or '73 sort of calmly announced in a faculty meeting that if everybody obeyed orders and observed these rules, the faculty by 1996 would have perfect age distribution: there would be exactly the same number of people at every age, say from 30 to 65.

Clearly faculty were terribly troubled about this, that it made life very difficult in terms of making tenure decisions, in making those difficult judgments when you have only a limited number of slots, and you seem to have a very qualified candidate coming up, but he'll fill that slot and where there may be somebody even better than that who shows up after him, and there will be no room for him, this will be . . . So the outcome, I think, was that it may have been [Louis] Lou Morton as his Provost in the beginning of his . . . who recommended that an amendment be made to

the rule, that these rules mathematically will be followed except in cases of exceptional merit, where they may be broken or eliminated or modified, which would be a judgment not just of the department, obviously, but of deans, the Committee Advisory to the President, and the President himself. And once that was passed it gave the wiggle room that I think saved, probably saved John from what otherwise might have been some enormous fights.

BURNS: Is this around the same time that the Flexible Retirement Option is brought in, or is that . . . ?

WOOD: It's related, yes, very much. Three things go together: that is, first you have this sort of quota system limiting the number of appointments you can make; second, you have the Federal government lifting all mandatory retirement, so that people can stay on; then third, you have the fact that Dartmouth becomes a coeducational institution, which is intimately connected to the fact that the faculty began becoming coeducational, having women also. I mean, there were one or two women who were hired before going coed, in tenure track, but it was remarkably few. So that the problem that came up, I think, was that suddenly, having become a coeducational institution, there is a great interest in hiring many more women than you've had before, but if you really follow this quota system, will they simply hit a brick wall when you come up for tenure? So that I think the whole Flexible Retirement Option came up in that context of saying, Well, to try to persuade people to retire earlier than they might otherwise have, either because they can go on beyond 65, or simply try to persuade more people to get out, this opens up more for the women, for minorities, so on, to keep it a much more fluid situation. So that I think all these things went hand in hand.

BURNS: You described kind of—part of what seems like Kemeny's administrative style, which is with his background as a mathematician, it seems like he put things into mathematical terms a lot.

WOOD: Yes, he did. And I know sometimes John and I--particularly when I was chairing the Committee on Year-Round Operation which made the recommendations to create the Dartmouth Plan of Year-Round Operation which became the vehicle for coeducation--that as various models were put forward with different sets of rules of how many summers would a person have to go to school, or so on, John would look at this mathematically and say, "Now, if we follow these parameters that means that Dartmouth will be able to expand from the present 3200 out to 4800 without building any more plant." And I guess my—John's point always was, "If these are the boundary conditions, if these are the rules, if these

are Euclid's sort of formulae, these are the ones you follow." And I said, "John, the problem is, a lot of people aren't mathematicians the way you are; that I come along, a, say, medievalist, and say, 'Why do we have these rules? I want to challenge the boundaries.' In other words, those boundaries which are there in geometry as highly abstract concepts may not, in fact, work out in real life. And whatever we do, we've got to be able to handle that difference." And sometimes John saw this, sometimes he didn't.

BURNS: That was going to be my next question: How successful was Kemeny at looking at problems through a non-mathematical viewpoint?

WOOD: I think, a lot better than a lot of people thought he was. He really—although some problems, surprisingly, he was totally not sensitive to. That is, certainly he was enormously sensitive to the whole problem of educating minorities, very much in favor, in other words, of the McLane Report and opening up Dartmouth. He was very supportive, an obvious genuine leader in the whole drive for coeducation and women on the faculty. On the other hand, Lou Morton who was also an historian and a good friend, told me that when Lou was Provost was precisely the time that the Feds were first beginning to look at things like Affirmative Action, and that all schools should have Affirmative Action Plans. Lou said he had the darnedest time persuading John that this was serious and that Dartmouth had to do something about it. I think John just saw this as sort of nonsense, in a funny way playing around with numbers that made no sense, and so he didn't want to do anything. I think that Dartmouth finally did, and in time to be in compliance, come up with an Affirmative Action Plan: it was Morton's doing, not John's—it was over John's dead body, although they were—they laughed about it.

BURNS: Again, coming from the faculty, what were the strengths that Kemeny got from that—or, how did the faculty see him as a proponent of their causes at all, or did they?

WOOD: I'm honestly not sure on that. I can't—well, take one example, though. As the whole issue of coeducation began coming up or moving on, it was clear John was in favor of coeducation. On the other hand, it was not at all clear whether the Trustees were, and one plan which was floated was that a separate but equal college, to be called "Mary Wheelock College" (Eleazar's wife) would be constructed across the river in Norwich. And it would be kind of a Brown-and-Pembroke, Harvard-Radcliffe, Barnard-Columbia sort of separate--but how much interaction other than in the classroom, would take place, or to what—and it looked like this was the

type of reluctant step the Trustees might be willing to take. This was not well-received in the faculty.

I think John sort of, in his guise as a Trustee, reported on this to the faculty, and with absolute either neutrality or sense that he might be in favor of this as the solution himself. At which point faculty, led by, say, my colleague Marysa Navarro and a few other very articulate souls, just said, "This is just totally unacceptable. It just will not work." And I think that killed it. John, I think, went back to the Trustees and made it very clear that this was something that clearly faced, in his judgment, such insuperable obstacles at the faculty level that there was no possibility of doing it. And I think people recognized that he had done that, that he was initially probably willing to go along with the Trustee compromise, if you will, but then, seeing that faculty was in a different place, he was willing to run with the ball and settle it, that it had to come out a different way.

BURNS: So it's an instance where his experience as a faculty member allowed him to get a decent read on it?

WOOD: Yes, I think that was very important.

BURNS: What was Jean Kemeny's role on campus during John's presidency?

WOOD: Jean was certainly—if John was somebody who seemed a little shy, and I think that was very misleading: he really wasn't shy. He, I think, was somewhat hesitant because he was not the hale, hearty, Dartmouth Outing Club "chubber," is the nickname that Outing Club types have for those who are really all involved in the athletic outdoors and so on. That Jean, as this very vivacious, attractive blonde, in a sense ran social interference for him. She was the one who would always come up with the funny comment, would greet you effusively, so on. So that, I think, she made the social and human side much easier for John, not just with—oh, probably less with faculty than with others, whether Trustees, alumni, other people. And so that I think that—how much Jean and John talked about policy issues at Dartmouth, or how much she counseled him and so on, I honestly don't know. I have no idea. I've never asked and neither one of them ever volunteered.

BURNS: Uh-huh. But you often do hear that they perhaps worked more as a team than was the custom for a president and his wife, perhaps moreso than John Dickey and his wife.

WOOD: I think that's very true. Of course John Dickey was a much older generation, but my sense was that Chris [Christina Dickey], who was very

pleasant, was much more retiring. She stayed at home and worked on her African violets while John ran the College. Where Jean and John, I think, were seen more as a team. And I think sort of coming out of the story of how they had met, at a World Federalist meeting, that they were sort of World Federalists together. That's overstating it, but that they had a cause in common.

BURNS: At one point, later in the '70s, she comes to a faculty meeting; that caused a bit of an uproar. Do you remember that?

WOOD: I had totally forgotten that! I do remember. I have no memory whatsoever, what the, what it was. But I do remember it causing comment, and that "She does not belong here." I don't think it was anti-Jean, it was faculty prerogatives. And I don't remember the scene or the issue at all.

BURNS: I think she came to the meeting, and then shortly thereafter the rules were changed to make faculty meetings completely open.

WOOD: Yes. Yes.

BURNS: Which sort of skirted the issue, but addressed it at the same time.

[End of Tape 3, Side A — Beginning of Tape 3, Side B]

BURNS: So one more sort of summary question about John Kemeny's leadership style. I'm wondering if you could describe sort of what were his greatest strengths and weaknesses as an administrator.

WOOD: I'm not sure I really can. The—that's interesting, I've never—somehow I just don't think of John in categories. Although he could be remarkably persuasive in unexpected ways. I happened to sit in on a number of Trustee meetings dealing with coeducation because I was chairing the committee. John, in those meetings, was remarkably effective in marshalling what he knew to be points or beliefs that all Trustees agreed on, and showing them how they led to conclusions that they as yet did not see. That sometimes involved a certain bending of realities, although I've never been sure whether he knew that or not.

Let me give you an example of this. That is, you may remember last time talking about the whole admissions process. I made the point that, as you work on admissions you accept from the top and reject at the bottom, and you end up with this huge mass at the middle, who are absolutely indistinguishable. That you are drawing the final 100 people of your class,

but because they're right in the middle, if you suddenly took 600 of them it wouldn't change the overall statistics of the class whatsoever.

Now, John knew that the Trustees were very interested in year-round operation. Indeed, I think John and I finally went back through old Trustee notes, out of curiosity—or minutes of meetings, and found that interest in year-round operation had first surfaced in 1914 or '15 under Hopkins. And it had been a continuing thing, but it had arisen, and you can see why insofar as, here you have the plant of a college that so many millions of dollars are invested in that capital, which is then left to lie fallow all summer. You know, you don't keep your factory closed in the summer, do you? I mean obviously, if you can keep going year-round, you lower your per-pupil capital cost significantly, so that this was always a Trustee interest.

Now as year-round operation as a possible vehicle for coeducation began getting fairly serious, John at one Trustee meeting was explaining that the reality of year-round operation was that, if students were going year-round you had to increase the size of your student body. Because if you didn't do that you'd simply have your school sort of underpopulated year-round because people would be coming only three of the four terms, and different ones, so that you had to increase. But, he said, "Dartmouth is a highly selective institution," something in which the Trustees agreed and were obviously very proud of. He said, "That means, though, that to go on year-round operation, and if we increase the size of the student body to drive down the capital cost per person, to make it sensible, that means that we will be selecting more and more people further down the scale and driving down the intellectual quality of the Dartmouth student body, unless," he said, "we can find a new applicant pool." And he said with an absolutely straight face, "And the only one I can think of is women." Now I think that was in fact a very persuasive type of argument with the Trustees, with the exception of Congressman Thomas Curtis ['32], I think, who was inalterably opposed. Very effective. And John was frequently coming up with nice little things like this that frequently were remarkably successful.

BURNS: Let's let that lead us into coeducation and year-round operation then. And I'm wondering: John was on a committee before he was President, to study coeducation.

WOOD: Right.

BURNS: And then from that committee, I take it, the decision—it started to be a debate over whether to do this or not.

WOOD: Yes. There were a number of committees that were created, partly in relationship to the big fund drive that took place in the Dickey years, but more as we were coming up to Dartmouth's bicentennial, which also was, I suppose frankly, looking at the possibility of another fund drive; but taking a big-think opportunity to look at the "whither Dartmouth" question. And one of these clearly was a coeducation issue. So out of that, certainly, increased interest in going coed had emerged, in which John had clearly been one of the people who was in favor of this. I think it also, though, became clear that this was not going to be—it was not an easy issue, and not just because Dartmouth had been an all-male institution for two hundred years. But even assuming you wanted to go coed, that you couldn't just do it, maintaining the same size college, at roughly 3200 people, and simply kicking out 1500 males and replacing them with women. That that sort of thing created too many problems.

Among those problems, I think, was obviously the athletic problem, that you were members of the Ivy League, and that if you didn't have adequate numbers of males then you wouldn't be able to field a competitive football team. And if you couldn't field a competitive football team, suddenly you would be at the bottom of the Ivy League and everyone would suddenly notice that, Why, Dartmouth didn't belong: they're all research universities and here's this funny little college here, and we'd suddenly be just another Bates or Bowdoin. I could elaborate on this sort of fear, because I found it was a very strong one among alumni.

But if you want to expand, then you run into another set of problems. One would be simply, OK, say you want to increase your size from 3,000 plus to 4,000 plus. Well, immediately, through conventional expansion, you find that the cost of building new dormitories, new laboratories, new classrooms, all the rest of it, and I think the cost estimate for conventional expansion to 4,000 plus was roughly twenty-five million dollars at that point. And in the early '70s. And that was a twenty-five million dollars that Dartmouth frankly didn't have. And remember, as I said earlier, you're entering a period of stagflation, of high inflation but no increase in your endowment capital growth through investment. So that the question of "Where in God's name would Dartmouth come up with this sort of money?" And I think everybody assumed that if you attempted to have a fund drive, even if times were better, there were—the years of people who were most apt to have the money to make a significant contribution were the older classes of alumni who were the ones who you could show, through polling, were the most opposed to coeducation and therefore least likely to fund it.

The other aspect was trickier, and went back to, you know, Daniel Webster, and "It is a small college, sir, yet there are those who love it." That if you are a college of 3,000 plus, you're getting a little big to keep on claiming that you're the small college, but it still works as a myth, and something more than a myth. But if you go up to 4,000 or 4,500 clearly that's no longer the case. And indeed I have—some mathematical sociologist who sent me the damnedest study, which was basically, if you are 3,000 students, when classes change what is the percentage of likelihood that you will meet somebody crossing the Green that you know? And it's very high according to this math, as I remember it. On the other hand if you go to 4,200 I think he ends up, you find it suddenly drops precipitously. It hits a wall somewhere in the three thousands, so that the argument was not just, It would become something that was no longer the small college, but the purported advantages of the sense of community and knowing everybody also would be drastically changed. You'd just become a number.

So that you put all of this together and the idea of taking that Trustee notion of keeping going continuously year-round as a vehicle for expanding the size so you don't have that capital expense, but you also don't increase the number on campus that much so that it could still be the small college, had an obvious appeal to it. As well as, you still, I suppose, in 1970, were close enough to World War II and that experience of colleges everywhere going year-round, that this wasn't a nutty notion.

BURNS: So was it Kemeny who proposed year-round operation?

WOOD: I'm honestly not sure. He certainly mentioned it. The actual original recommendation, formally speaking, to the faculty came out of the Committee on Educational Planning, the so-called CEP, who developed a plan, a proposal. But they wouldn't have done it if John weren't, or others, receptive to the idea of looking at year-round as a vehicle. They developed a plan which was—looked on paper to be fairly lock-step. You went three terms, then you were off for two terms, then you were back for four terms, off for two terms, back for four terms. And with this you could increase the size of the student body to 4,800, so the argument went, without changing a thing. And it also had the implication that every student would be going at least two summers to Dartmouth unless they got a special exception.

This led to very hot debate. I know I was one of the ones who was most articulate among the doubters. I guess my concern was, if summers are so traditionally a vacation time, or they are the time in which students go out and get summer jobs and make money to make all of this possible,

that to require them to go to college two summers instead is going to look unattractive enough, you're going to have a horrendous impact on your applicant pool. That to change what you're offering is to change the applicant pool in ways I didn't believe would be desirable. There were all sorts of other things: if the argument on the comeback was, "Well, with this plan we can probably grant a thousand people a year exemptions to be able to break it, and we still have room."

On the other hand, that struck me as unreal. The problem is that if you have a lot of disciplines that offer sequential majors, that you have to know your algebra before you know your calculus before you know your etcetera, you then obviously, planning your curriculum, you have to plan it in terms of when are students going to be on campus? So you plan it around the model of your pattern of attendance. Now if that's the case, that means that the person who is the mathematician or the physicist or so on pretty much has to follow this pattern, while somebody who's a kooky historian like me, where things aren't as clearly sequential, we can do anything we want to. What does that do?

That probably has a very negative effect on your campus, when you find some people are required to do one thing while others aren't, or that simply you get different patterns of friendship, that people are on different schedules and one side never sees another. So that there were all these types of things that got debated, about the practicalities in relationship to the education, as well as to, "Would this be desirable for students?" And I think it was in that context that John decided to set up a committee to review and to come up with a recommendation for all of this, during the summer of 1971.

BURNS: And this is still before?

WOOD: It's before the Trustees had made any decision. And it's an exploration, "Do we want to do this," to make recommendations about the possibility of going year-round, and then also, whether this then would be the recommended vehicle for going coeducational. And John asked me to chair that committee. I think he asked me, this may speak to John's administrative smarts, I think he asked me precisely because I was the leading faculty doubter of the virtues of year-round education. And what this does, then, is put you in a position that you now have the life of the committee--the other committee members being much more in favor of year-round than, say, I was--you have the life of the committee to convince your committee this is a bad idea, or otherwise, practically speaking, you, and if you really were a leader of the cause, your cause, is dead. And so

that—and I accepted it, sort of recognizing that was the kind of situation. Which made it more fun.

BURNS: Were you surprised that he picked you?

WOOD: Yeah, I was, originally, because of, I think that made me think about, “Why on earth would he pick me, other than he knew I was opposed?” But he also knew, I think, that I was a pretty straight guy and that I'd play it absolutely straight, and that I was perfectly prepared to accept the results, and that I would try, in other words, to do the best job I knew how to do.

BURNS: And was Kemeny then responsible for appointing the rest of the members of the committee?

WOOD: Yes, he appointed the whole committee. And he I think probably appointed us in April or May with the understanding we would work in the summer and make a report back to him at some point probably in September. And like most presidents, I suspect, he had a special discretionary fund and I think paid each one of us a modest honorarium for doing it, because it really was a full-time job all summer.

BURNS: And how did the committee go about doing its business?

WOOD: Well, I think I—we had a number of sort of big-think sessions initially, in which we tried to see what were the problems involved in going year-round, and then tried to set up sub-committees that were focusing on each one of those problems. I think we very quickly, at the big-think session, decided that something like the CEP plan with two summers required was simply out of the question, that realistically you had to do it with a one-summer option. And that it also fairly clear you wanted it to be as flexible as possible, with a number of patterns of attendance rather than simply a lock-step. Now, given those sorts of desiderata, if you will, then a number of different questions—I mean, some of them were simply just pure housing—that you will notice—well, you probably can't see it, right? Let me bring it for a second, I will get it. [getting up and moving away from microphone, then returning]. That's my gift from the committee.

BURNS: "To Charlie from CYRO."

WOOD: Yeah, "Seero" it was called. Committee on Year-Round Operation. And for the record, it is a dollhouse double-decker bed with one small girl doll and one small boy doll. The reason I was given this was that I, being of fairly practical mind, was terribly concerned that we would have a flow problem in dormitories. That is, as you look at the model that we were

playing around with, which involved an 11-term degree, one summer in residence, and probably a fair number of off-campus programs like our foreign study and foreign language programs--Now, you look at this, what you find is that in any given dormitory in the traditional academic terms, fall/winter/spring, the turnover of people in the dorm from one term to the next is somewhere between 30 and 42 percent. It's really enormous.

Now, it's also fairly clear that some people may be off campus for just one term and then back on, or they may—or may be on for only one term and then off again, I mean have vacations on either side. “Now what do they do with all their stuff? Someone else is going to be occupying their bed. Do we have the storage space, and is it easily enough available, for students to be willing to move all their crap out of a dorm room and put it into this storage? Because if there isn't enough then we're going to have to build some sort of a storage warehouse out in East Thetford or what have you, at which point it begins getting to be such a damned nuisance, the students may not like”—I mean, part of my point was simply, too much noise in the system, students become discontent, you find, practically speaking, the plan will become unworkable.

So that the problem there was that, as I try and go through these details I'm sure you can see that the bed problem is not one that's apt to terribly interest a group of faculty members. Their reaction is, “Well, that's what you hire administrators for, to solve such problems.” I guess my position was, “Hey, look—it may be that we won't come up with the best possible solution, but we're obliged to be convinced ourselves that there is a solution, because if there isn't, this plan is dead.” [Agnar] Ag Pytte, who went on to be Provost and then President of Case Western Reserve, he was a physicist, finally took pity on me and began doing some actual mathematical modeling in enough detail to demonstrate that this was possible.

Then you have that kind of curriculum question. “Can you have flexibility of patterns of attendance when some or your majors are sequential? Or do you find that different majors suggest different patterns of attendance, if so, segregating people into their own separate specialties?” So you had to have an academic committee. In other words—we tried to get committees to look at this and spend a lot of time on it, or, you know, “What happens if you go year-round; you still have a lot of departments that offer, you know, two-term courses, under a conventional semester thing, sort of full year courses. You're probably not going to be able to do this on this type of in-and-out scheme. Will it ruin everything academically if you begin offering everything typically as one-term offerings, all separate and independent?” So that you had committees that were all out looking

at these practical problems, and sort of then meeting as a full group. Sometimes we were doing it here; occasionally we went over, I think, for two or three several-day sessions at the Murdough Center—or not the Murdough, whatever . . .

BURNS: Minary.

WOOD: The Minary Center, where we really could spend a lot of time on it. At the same time we were doing this, we tried to ask ourselves what's the impact of all of this on the quality of a Dartmouth education? Because one of the points I tried to stress was, "Look. If going year-round reduces the quality of a Dartmouth education, then you're not doing anybody a favor, including those women you're hoping to matriculate at Dartmouth as a result of this program." Which then, at the end of the summer, the committee decided against a mandatory year-round operation. I think John Kemeny and Lou Morton, when we met with them at an evening meeting, I think their teeth dropped out, in a sense that, by God, has Wood won--what they recommended was pursuing the freedom of choice, an absolutely voluntary system, trying to encourage as many people to go to summer school, if you will, as part of a regular schedule, but not requiring it.

The—John, I think, at that point pointed out quite clearly that if we had a purely voluntary scheme, that did not guarantee, you know, whatever the minimum increase in enrollment that the Trustees felt was necessary, the Trustees probably would not approve coeducation. We went back to regroup and think about this. I think my position initially was, I think John's absolutely right, that the Trustees probably would not approve the type of voluntary system we've here put forward. On the other hand, if coeducation has the educational and social and political head of steam behind it at Dartmouth and everywhere else that it seems to, you're going to have coeducation within five years. It's just going to happen. That we're faculty members, so our job is to make judgments about quality of education, and if you really think year-round is going to hurt it, which is your original conclusion, then we've got to stick to our academic guns.

This then got to be a tremendously interesting—not argument, because we really never got tangled in argument—discussion, in which I think the side that we really hadn't explored on this came in, which was the educational value of coeducation itself. And the argument then became, "Well, given the extent to which everybody agrees coeducation is a plus, where there is a potential disadvantage on the year-round side, when we put them together how does it balance off?" And I think the judgment at that point very clearly was that you came out ahead, regardless. At which point, given all of the work we did, had done, it was very easy to put

together quite quickly the plan as it was presented to the Trustees and then approved at their October meeting with coeducation. I mean, it was very clear that the motion that was brought to the faculty was to approve...

[End of Tape 3, Side B — Beginning of Tape 4, Side A]

WOOD: ...so that the motion was to approve, but only as a vehicle for coeducation. If no coeducation, no year-round. And that's the way it went through.

BURNS: So were you the primary author of the report?

WOOD: I had been the primary author down to that first meeting with Kemeny and Morton. Although I think the actual proposal—what I had tried to do was listen to people at meetings and then write up lengthy memoranda of how it would look if you looked at it this way, and tried to be, in effect, that recording secretary, to have something on paper that people could react to. I think I wrote most of the original report, which probably ran to about 65 pages, although the particular lack of any required summer term and why it should be voluntary, which was about a five-page section, I think was written by [Gregory S.] Greg Prince ['63], who was Dean of the Summer School at that point, and now a college president himself [Hampshire College]. And then, when we decided, "No, we will go the straight required one summer term out of a total of eleven," I was frankly so exhausted that I just didn't have it in me, and other people said, "Hey, you're too wordy anyhow, we don't need 65 pages." So that I think a subgroup consisting mainly, or led by Hans Penner, later Dean of the Faculty, and by Ag Pytte, and Greg Prince, I think were the ones who then put it together as a sort of 15-page, as I remember, final report.

BURNS: And the report then was presented to the Trustees for their meeting; was it also presented at that time to the general college community?

WOOD: Yes. It was presented—the full report was presented first to the faculty, because the faculty had to vote on it to recommend it to the Trustees, and it then was also widely available to the undergraduate body, in which a lot of debates around campus took place, and there were huge posters everywhere—I suspect you've got a few of them hidden away in Rauner somewhere—which . . .

[interruption of tape to answer the door]

WOOD: Well, I was saying, there were posters all over campus which simply said, "CYRO means coeducation" or "Year-Round Operation Means Coeducation," and a lot of attempts to get polls of people, discussions, so

on, would people elect this, etc., to provide more data for the Trustees. My birthday is October 29, I think Greg Prince got together a birthday party of the committee at the Hanover Inn and then made this crazy statue. I think with a report to the faculty that there was so much in this on beds, this was the first x-rated committee, faculty committee report there'd ever been.

BURNS: So were the posters put up by the Administration?

WOOD: No, various student groups who were most interested. With a lot of public forum discussions. Then there were some also, the Trustees were very concerned about what student reactions would be to this form of a very different pattern of attendance, so that they had very sort of scientific polls made, of which John K—[laughing] it was sort of funny, because John was in fact, at this point, out of town giving a series of lectures at the Natural History Museum in New York. And his staff assistant at this point was the man I've mentioned before, Win Rockwell, now having graduated, and working full-time for John before going to law school. And the idea was that John personally would write a letter to selected undergraduates saying they had been picked at random, which they were, to come in and respond to a whole set of questions about patterns of attendance and whether they would—and find out what their thinking was on this.

So John wasn't around to write this letter. I was. So I sat down and wrote the letter, and John, given his foreign background, had a number of unique ways of expressing himself that were perfectly grammatical but clearly a lot of Hungarian background. And since I enjoy writing and have a certain sensitivity to people's style, I wrote it in John's style to make it clear that this was from John. Win got this, and he called me up and said, "I see what you're doing. I think you put it on too thick; do you mind if I copy edit a bit?" And so Win took out a certain amount of this and put it in standard English. Then he—I think John called him from New York to find out what was happening, and Win read him the version of the letter, at which point that he had arrived at, and John made changes! He changed them back to what I had originally!

But the idea was to—you had to get out all the people you had randomly selected, to make the pattern valid. That, then, seemed to show that there was a very significant interest and people would be perfectly happy to do this and do it voluntarily within the student body. John then also—or the Trustees had hired Ollie Quayle [Oliver Quayle and Company] as sort of one of "the" pollsters of the time to go out and do a pretty scientific and extensive polling of people in high school and what their reactions were to, you know, normal conventional plan; to the plan we had presented; to the

Committee on Educational Planning's plan—I mean, a whole variety, I think those three models. And again found that while a significant number of people said "no" to the CEP plan, they were perfectly happy with, and in some cases much more enthusiastic with, the type of plan we had come up with. It was then up to the Trustees. I wish I had some materials from some of those Trustee meetings to be able to turn over to Rauner [Special Collections] Library. I can tell you about one.

BURNS: Well, we probably have a few of them.

WOOD: No.

BURNS: Taking it a half-step back, the faculty then voted on it before it went to the Trustees, . . .

WOOD: Yes. Overwhelmingly in favor of it.

BURNS: That was my question, was how close that vote was.

WOOD: Oh, very, very few against it. If it was—I don't remember the numbers, but I think it was under ten people who voted against it.

BURNS: Was that largely because of faith in what the committee had done?

WOOD: That—it was both a coeducation vote and that actually was explicitly expressed. Someone—when doubts were raised by someone, another person got up and said, "That's a first-rate committee; I have faith in my colleagues, they have really looked at it." And so I think it was a combination that led to that.

BURNS: So then it goes to the Trustees. How much knowledge did you have of what was going on with their deliberations?

WOOD: A fair amount, because I had sat in on a couple of meetings. And that's where I say I wish I had some evidence, because clearly, as they asked questions of me about the practicalities of this, [Thomas] Tom Curtis really behaved very much as the expert parliamentarian congressional type he was, in sort of raising every sort of objection, delaying, so on, in a perfectly pleasant but determined way. And this, of course, if you think of it, you're now into the fall of '71, and to put it into a national context, it isn't just a time where a lot of coeducation or bills in the Congress from Congresswoman Green of Oregon, for example, to deny Federal funds to any school that won't admit women—you know, you had all this sort of stuff, but also it was the time that President Nixon was having trouble

finding someone who could get by the Senate to become a Supreme Court Justice. He had just had G. Harold Carswell shot down, I think his second attempt, because Carswell, a Southerner, had been a long-time member of some southern country club that did not accept anybody but white males.

Well anyhow, all this meeting is going on, and the Trustee next to me sort of elbowed me, and I looked over and he's passing a note to me. And it turns out to be from down the table, from Dudley Orr ['29], you know, a New Hampshire lawyer and long-time Trustee. And the note read, more or less, "What Tom (i.e., Tom Curtis) doesn't realize is that being against coeducation will look in 30 years' time as bad as G. Harold Carswell being in favor of all-white country clubs." Well, I thought this was a nice comment, and I sort of took the note and I stuck it in my pocket, and the meeting then went on, I think, for another hour and a half. And by the time it was breaking up I had totally forgotten about the note, but as we were filing out of the President's office, who do I see but Dudley Orr sort of standing amiably leaning against the doorway. And as I started out, he said, "Charlie, I'd like my note back." [Laughter] So I had to give it back to him, so it's not over in Rauner now where it should be.

BURNS: Well, it sort of shows that the Trustees knew that they were involved with something of great historic significance.

WOOD: Yes, right, right, absolutely. And so that—I mean, the interesting thing to my mind is that it was absolutely clear to me that they really, every single one of them were determined to do what each one individually felt was the best possible thing for Dartmouth, but within this broader context of what's happening in the world. And that they felt that, and that they had enough faith in each other that that vote still isn't known. I mean, it's reasonably clear to me that Tom Curtis was one of the negatives, and I'm pretty sure there were more than one, but none of those Trustees have ever said one way or the other. No backbiting. They accepted each other's judgment and integrity. That was . . .

BURNS: Yeah, from what I understand it was a close, close vote, and from the interview that Jane Carroll did with Jean Kemeny, right up until the vote I don't think Jean and John Kemeny knew which way it was going to go. So they passed it, and the next fall, I guess, is the first . . .

WOOD: The next fall is the first time that you're admitting people into the College on the Dartmouth Plan of Year-Round Operation, which then meant, I suspect for an awful lot of departments, a great deal of work in terms of trying to work out curriculum. Because one of the questions that had

become clear was that, if people are going to have a freedom of choice of when to be on or off campus, one of the things possibly of educational benefit is that you have to ask yourself, "Why do I want to be on campus at a particular time, and when do I want to be off, and why?"—a question that normally doesn't come up.

Well, you can't educationally make choices unless you know what's going to be offered educationally in the various terms. So that you had to switch to the type of pattern that Dartmouth now uses, in which a catalog doesn't just publish courses for one year, but for two. And we debated, could we possibly do it for three years so that people really could, in terms of planning their patterns, plan ahead. And since that's a type of thing that no department had ever done before, and certainly not under the conditions of the changing patterns of student attendance, this was something that I think all the committee had to fan out, not just to their own departments but to others, to try and help and give them some guidance in how to do this.

BURNS: Did you serve as a spokesperson at all for coeducation? once it happened, having been the chair . . .

WOOD: Oh, yes. Once this had happened, then—or even before it had happened, [Michael] Mike McGean ['49] and Dave Orr in the Alumni Office had me out on the road talking to Alumni Clubs. And in which you learned a good deal. I mean, that is one, you learned that you should, at the end of things, always ask for a straw vote of what people in the room thought. The reason why you learned to do this was that for I suppose probably understandable reasons, people who were opposed to coeducation tended to be much more vocal, both in frequency and volume, than those who were in favor of it or who didn't care. So that you would go to an Alumni Club lunch or dinner and you'd get a discussion going, and to your ear it would sound as though this room was totally opposed to coeducation, but when you asked for a straw poll, you found they were eighty percent in favor of it. And it was good illustrating that to people.

The other thing I learned, and it came from Alan Gaylord in the English Department, was how much people's negative attitudes, if they had them, related to their own sense of their own precious Dartmouth experience. Alan said he would—he had been speaking to an Alumni Club I think in either Buffalo or Rochester, New York, and some alum of, say, the Class of '10, had come up to him afterwards and sort of shook his fist and said, "Never!" And Alan said sort of in a crazy way, sort of off the top of his head, he looked at him and said, "Don't worry, Mr. Burns. No matter whether Dartmouth goes coed now, the Dartmouth of your memories will

never be coeducational." He said this guy sort of stopped and he looked, he said, "By God, you're right! That's been my problem!" And I thought this was so bizarre, and so unlikely, I began trying that. And it really seems to have been, among those who are opposed, and they tended to be in the—I think the break class was something like the Class of '31—every class after the Class of '31 was for coeducation; those older were against it. But as you tried that line it really, it got people discussing, and enormously, and changed some minds, I think, or at least lowered the expectation.

We had no idea, Chris, what would happen. I mean, one of the other things the Trustees had me do was to sit down with the Vice President of Development to come up with our best estimates of, if Dartmouth went coed, how much would it hurt Dartmouth in terms of its Alumni Fund and Annual Giving and so on? Well, George and I—

BURNS: This is George Colton ['35]?

WOOD: Yes... sat down and began going over this. I think at that point, the Alumni Fund was running, 12, 13, 14 million dollars a year for annual giving. And George's best estimate, which I tended to agree, was that if you went coed, probably you should expect to go down to nine or ten million dollars of annual fund, that you would lose two or three million. This was an informed judgment on the basis—remember, Yale had gone coed a year earlier, and that's what had happened at Yale, they had that type of shrinkage.

And that probably they should expect to be in receipt of a number of angry letters, about "Remember I had you in my will for x amount of money and I've just had it taken out!" George wasn't worried about that one, though, interestingly. He said, "If the person who does that lives another two years, you'll find Dartmouth's back in the will." He said, "What's happening is, the person who's decided to leave Dartmouth a million dollars has obviously made a fairly serious commitment. And that commitment, among other things, involves a judgment that his family doesn't need that million bucks, so that, if Dartmouth isn't going to get it, then somebody else should. But then he sits down and says, 'Oh my God, I don't want to give it to Princeton,'" or you know, and sort of, they begin going through a process of what are all the other alternatives, and Colton said, "You know, in my experience, the fact is, having made the commitment for Dartmouth, no other place is going to measure up, so that you're going to find that's back in the will." And indeed that did happen.

Interestingly, though, on the alumni giving, that the shrinkage that Yale had experienced was not experienced at Dartmouth. Alumni giving, in fact, went up. And clearly, while there were some people who did not give who had given before, even more who had not been giving before began giving. So.

BURNS: One of the things along those lines that you hear is that there were certain alumni who stopped giving, but when their granddaughter was admitted . . .

WOOD: Yes. That sort of thing seems to have been—I mean, that sort of granddaughter syndrome of—you know, you have the beloved granddaughter—that, clearly, in the first couple of years we had an extraordinary number of legacy applications from women. And as you talked to them, part of this was simply that, having grown up in a family where the males were so gaga about their blessed Dartmouth experience that they themselves began getting curious about what on earth is it about that place that leads to these sorts of things? Now OK, there's grandfather who loves his granddaughter, but then, dammit, she decides to go to Dartmouth. That may outrage him a bit, but then she comes home for Christmas vacation, or over the summer following freshman year, and he finds, "Hey, she loves the place as much as I do, and loves it for a lot of the same reasons. Maybe it isn't so bad after all, at least if Cynthia can be one of the..." you know, that type of--and I've talked to a number of the older generation who I frequently saw teaching Alumni College, who admitted that this sort of thing had happened to them. So it's not just a myth.

BURNS: It's an interesting phenomenon. Do you think—you were off the Admissions Committee by this point.

WOOD: Yes, I was.

BURNS: Do you think that these female legacy cases, do you think there was any extra added weight to that?

WOOD: I asked Eddie Chamberlain about that once, the first year. And he said, "Well, we had thought about that," he said with a smile, "but we found it wasn't necessary." And I think that probably was the case.

BURNS: Do you have any idea that they were looking for anything in particular from the first women candidates?

WOOD: Not that I can see that was particularly strikingly different from the men, no. And actually, the thing that showed up—the Sociology Department always used to have a continuing study of profiles of freshmen on typical values. And they had a profile of, you know, what was the classic Big Greener. And you know, they found, obviously, that as they went through the later '60s and even into the '70s, that the classic Big Greener sort of just totally disappeared from the charts as far as values as they were reported on these things. Then, when we went coed, and I think it may well be that number of female legacies that hit, suddenly the old Big Greener thing was back, but it was the women, it wasn't the men. You'd have to ask somebody in Sociology, because I'm sure they still have these things around, or that you've got them, or that Instructional Services does, or something, which would illustrate the point.

BURNS: So with the introduction of coeducation, then, what sort of changes did you see on campus, I guess particularly as a teacher? What sort of changes did you see in the classroom?

WOOD: Let me deal with that two ways. One: all the faculty discussions leading up to coeducation had always emphasized, of course, the intellectual benefits of coeducation, because certainly—maybe not in the sciences, but certainly in the social sciences and humanities, that women simply bring a different point of view to your analytical and interpretive discussions than men do. And therefore, by adding to the diversity of points of view in a liberal education things would be vastly enriched, the educational experience would come out—would simply be that much better.

Now if you take that absolutely seriously--I sort of tried to watch this in the first year or two of coeducation in my own classrooms, and I honestly have to say that, if I couldn't tell whether it was a man or woman speaking, from quality of voice or sight or so on, I couldn't see that women added a new interpretive dimension to any of the historical discussions, with one notable exception. That is, I used to teach a freshman seminar called "The Great Richard III Murder Mystery," and was Richard really that nasty guy who killed his nephews in the Tower, which is a wonderful romp through historical evidence and how to interpret it.

Now—there is a very vociferous group of people known as the Richard III Society who think Richard was a person maligned, that really—he was an angel and those nephews were probably killed by the man who killed Richard, Henry Tudor, Henry VII. And one of the arguments presented is that when Richard captures his older nephew and becomes Protector of England for him until he's of age, the mother of the little Princes in the

Tower flees into sanctuary at Westminster Abbey, supposedly scared of Richard. And yet as the Richard III Society people point out, why, within a few months she has left Westminster Abbey and accepted a large pension from Richard, and at the next Christmas ball she and her daughters are all dancing there. Surely no mother could possibly do this if her innocent little babes had been murdered by Richard.

Well, the first year I taught this under coeducational conditions, Sara Hoagland ['76], now Sara Hunter, an ex-member of the Alumni Council, when we got as far as—each person was supposed to do a paper on, “OK, who did murder the little Princes in the Tower?” in which people came up with a nice imaginative range. Sara immediately said, “This is all poppycock. Their mother did it!” And I remember the guys in the class just being horrified at the thought that a mother could kill those innocent babes. Well, they got into such an argument on this that Sara the next day showed up—she was a Dartmouth Players type, too; I think she had written scripts for people of old television shows . . .

[End of Tape 4, Side A — Beginning of Tape 4, Side B]

WOOD: . . . and the Queen's secret [always] turned out that she killed the little bastards herself. Well, that was the one time I saw a different point that a woman might look with more jaundiced eye on all the pieties of motherhood than males. The other thing in class, though, was, I did notice in that same class that we were around a seminar table, which probably held 12 people, but in fact I think there were 16 in the seminar. So there would be four people who would always be out in left field, away from the table. And wonder of wonders, the first two weeks of the class or so, I'd come into class and it would be always the guys who were around the table, and the women would always be out in left field. Well then, after two weeks, I walked in and the women were all at the table. They had obviously got together and arrived early, and guys were off in the left field. No word was ever exchanged, but there was no more tug of war after that, it became open seating.

BURNS: What sort of—did you notice any behavior changes among the males in the classroom with the introduction of females?

WOOD: Very little, the first couple of years. I think there were changes after a couple of years. I think the first—the thing was, I think there had been such a campaign and, Dartmouth must go coed, and this is salvation now or paradise or what have you, that there was such excitement that it was nothing more than a certain carryover of that excitement and happiness to have women there. By, I'd say, the third year or so, both socially you

began hearing at a distance, since faculty members are at a distance, but then also to some extent in classroom, a somewhat more strained sense of it.

I mean, that is, the point, I think that began becoming clear was that, you know, coeducation wasn't bringing in a bunch of women because it would be nice for the boys; it presumably was to be of some benefit and use to the women, and that the women might have their own ideas that had to be recognized too. So that, i.e., you began getting signs of guys who suddenly recognized that the women weren't there just for them, they were there for their own purposes and that this might involve their having to change some of their social behavior, and that they—some of them clearly resisted this. So that you went through, I think a year or two at least of much tougher circumstances, and with horror stories of fraternity attacks on this and that, on women.

BURNS: Almost a backlash.

WOOD: Right, a backlash type of thing, which didn't show up as much in the classroom, although you were aware of a side comment here or there that would, that just hadn't been present before, that clearly was "why don't you go away and leave me in peace?"

BURNS: So overall . . .

WOOD: Which is—I mean, to illustrate it, one of the quirky things was that coming out of the '60s, fraternities at Dartmouth were in sharp decline. The numbers went down enormously, both in numbers of fraternities and number of people in fraternities. That—interestingly, I think, when you went coed, fraternities began becoming more popular. I think there were two aspects that cover both the things we've been talking about, that is: one was clearly, under conditions of coeducation, and we'd been told this by Yale and other things, fraternities become more popular as places of male refuge: "Get away from those people!" It was compounded, I think, by conditions of year-round operation, that if you had such turnover from term to term in your dormitories, that the sense of community was much better preserved under fraternity conditions, that you would always be returning to that valiant band of brothers. Which I think made them more popular. So that, I think, that rise of fraternities after being in such sharp decline in the late '60s and early '70s, I think probably exacerbated then that social tension with women on campus. And I think as I remember, most of the incidents that would hit the Daily Dartmouth, for example, almost without exception they were related to fraternities and fraternity activities.

BURNS: Going into coeducation there had been some consultant studies done by, I believe, Cresap, McCormick...

WOOD: Oh yes, and Paget...

BURNS: ...that looked at coeducation at Yale and what had happened with Princeton, in order so that Dartmouth might learn from these experiences and be able to better tackle it when it happened. How...

WOOD: That did play a part, too. I mean, for example, our model called for purposes of planning originally for a four-to-one sex ratio, four men for every woman. Now as we looked at the Cresap study, and there's some other stuff we had, that Yale, when it went coed, simply decided to do it bottom-up, that they admitted women in their freshman class but no upperclass women. The result was socially very, very difficult that first year or two, as there were no older role model big-sister types, and that this had, in all sorts of ways, made life miserable for those women. So that one of the things we strongly urged was, if you do this, admit significant numbers of women to the upper classes as well, which we did. So that, I think, if we took that first year, say, four—let's see, we would have taken 250 or so incoming freshmen; we took about 200 upperclassmen as well.

BURNS: Which I'm guessing were largely drawn from the exchange program?

WOOD: A lot of them were from the exchange program. A lot of them who had been on the 12-College Exchange and then, having been here a year it made it very easy for someone to be able to graduate even with just one more year at Dartmouth, and so on. So that—and, I mean, simply having found that they liked the place, and so on.

BURNS: And was another part of this to bring in more women faculty?

WOOD: Curiously, I don't think—I mean, you know, that was obviously not part of the Year-Round Operations Committee report. But certainly the idea that more women faculty became important, I think, so that you did find departments rushing out to do more hiring of women faculty. Less pressure in History, as it happened purely by chance, because long before we had gone coed we actually had two women on the tenure track, which was sort of unheard of. The—but that led to some problems, too, I think of long-term within faculty. That is, there were clearly some departments who didn't think very hard about this, and they were so anxious to get women they sort of forgot to apply their normal criteria for excellence,

whether of research or teaching, with the result that sort of three years into coeducation, well, three, four, five years, as people either for reappointment as Assistant Professor or promotion on into tenure level, suddenly a lot of women hit the wall and were turned down. And then again, you had an enormous, you know, "This must be just male sexism." It wasn't. If it were male sexism, the sexism lay in the stupidity of the hiring. And I think once departments began catching on, I don't think since that point there's been much of a problem, although there were long-term consequences of that, of just all sorts of folk memory of departments that were inhospitable to women because they constantly, you know, rejected them for tenure. I think that—I think it was that limited because they'd made a mistake in the hiring.

BURNS: So after coeducation comes in and the move to year-round operation comes in, over the years you again became an opponent of year-round operation. Was that right away, or was that a few years later that you . . . ?

WOOD: I think it was a continuing concern with it, and you know, what effects it might be having on sort of fragmentations that resulted, particularly under that first plan of only eleven terms, in which theoretically there were something like 400 different patterns of attendance a kid could pick. The problem as I saw it was that, while the emphasis always was how wonderful this is because it gives you all these choices, as a matter of liberal education it worried me that you were forced to choose between things that you might want rather than doing them simultaneously. You had to take your choices sequentially, on or off campus.

And let me give you an example. That is, if you are an Earth Science major at Dartmouth one of the requirements of the major is the so-called "Three-Way Stretch," a foreign study program fall term of senior year. Now what that means immediately is that if you are a field hockey player or a football player or you know, any fall term activity, you immediately have to make a decision: are you a football player or are you an Earth Science major? Because you can't be both. Or if you—I began thinking about it in terms of my own experience as somebody who was a football player, but I also was a member of the Glee Club. Now, football, OK, is highly fall-term activity; Glee Club, because the Glee Club happened to have a spring term tour, so it all culminated spring term, spring vacation and spring term with all the big concerts and so on. Well, you know, if you're under a conventional calendar I can do both of these. I probably am not going to be able to do both of them as easily under the year-round calendar, or not as continuously. That kind of thing continued to bother me.

Also, I think the reality was that in the first years there were very few people, either faculty or students, who knew how to use the flexibility of the system to their own advantage. Now what happened, I think, was that in 19—well, there's a certain look at it in '75 again, it was a crisis year for Kemeny. But then at the end of the Kemeny years, just as John I think had told the Trustees that he was going to be stepping down, the Trustees decided to appoint two committees to sort of plan for what was going to be needed for the next presidency, or really looking out into the 21st century. I mean, one on curricular matters that Jim Wright chaired, and in some senses is part of why he's President today; and then a second one called the Committee on the Quality of Student Life, which was to look at all the extracurricular activities. And I happened to be on that committee.

And I think as we looked at it we were sort of horrified by the extent to which the discontinuities in the system was really depersonalizing friendships and senses of community. I think it was sort of underscored to us by a sort of a horrible—a kid in Topliff Hall who had died, and his body wasn't discovered for about four or five weeks, until sort of physical decomposition brought its attention to anybody. And it was clear that nobody in the damned dormitory knew the guy, nobody recognized he was missing. Well, I think under those conditions we as a committee began looking at it, and saying, "Hey, would we in fact be better off going back to a conventional calendar for the sense of community, all the different things that can happen?"

The other factor that was weighing into this was, it was right at that point people began recognizing that there was going to be a tremendous drop at the end of the '80s in the number of people reaching college age. That sort of post-baby boom dropoff. So, that given that type of dropoff there might be something to be said for Dartmouth retrenching and cutting back on its size, which, if you accepted that, then it became very easy to go off year-round.

The other feature of it was that, when we had originally gone coed there was an assumption: you had to have 3,000 men to support that damned football team. That had dropped out. This was no longer an issue. It was partly simply because so many other things were happening, I mean the women were proving to be much better athletes than the men were. But also, realistically, we now had other Ivy League opponents, notably Princeton, who had many fewer men than we did, so that it ceased to be quite the political issue it was.

Well, given all of that, we then made a report to the faculty sort of saying, Hey, there is something to be said for going back to a conventional calendar, and then also trying to demonstrate how downsizing at that moment was possible, not just because of the demographics but also because, I think, something that most people weren't aware of, that as we had increased the size of the faculty as we expanded the size of the student body, none of that increase had come in tenure ranks. It had all been in the form of Senior Lecturers or visitors or so on. So that, given that reality, it became possible to conceive of downsizing faculty some at the same time.

And it was a very interesting and serious faculty debate, of which the outcome, I think, was sort of picked up by Jim Wright's committee, that deciding Hey, probably don't go off year-round, but let's go back to a 12-term calendar. One of the things you find—if I mentioned that the turnover was 30 to 42 percent every single term, you add on that extra term and it suddenly drops to about 12 to 15 percent. It's an enormous change. And that improved things enormously, I think, in terms of senses of continuity among students for their community, but also at the same time more and more people on the faculty, administration, so on, simply were understanding the system better, so it works better than it did.

BURNS: So the faculty took the committee's recommendation and debated it and came up with this other recommendation?

WOOD: Yes, right.

BURNS: And was that kind of the last battle over year-round operation?

WOOD: Yes. No, there certainly—I think Dave McLaughlin when he became President was, he was not totally sold on it, with a strong sense of on-campus community. That there have been enough questions that, as you may have noticed, Jim Wright either in the last academic year or over the summer had David Lagomarsino in the Provost's Office sort of costing out what are the implications if we did decide to return to a conventional calendar, so that—in other words, explorations have taken place in which clearly there are some people who are still interested in that or want to see what it looks like. I don't sense any sort of mob at the barricades on it, and certainly the—Lagomarsino's figures, as I understand it, seem to suggest that it probably financially is not a terribly good idea right now.

BURNS: So, looking back on it all and having played such an important role in the debate, do you feel like it was the right decision?

WOOD: Yeah. You know, in the end—you asked about that faculty debate, and did, was part of it that people respected the committee, so on. That—I know my own thoughts on it at the time, if I continued to have my own personal doubts that at least lasted down to the Committee on the Quality of Student Life, I know I was—you know, came enormously to respect the people on the committee, just as I had an enormous respect for John Kemeny. So that, in the end, I think, in '72, in that debate or decision I think my vote in favor of it was as much or more a vote of confidence in my colleagues and in my President—it was as much that or more than it was in the merits of the system itself, as I saw them.

BURNS: You briefly mentioned that 1975 was a crisis year for John Kemeny. I'm wondering if you could elaborate on that.

WOOD: I'm not sure how much I can elaborate. I mean, that is—my understanding, and it really relates, I suppose, to the process by which Dave McLaughlin became President. That if the Trustees were split on coeducation, I think they were split, and badly split, on a lot of new initiatives or the "new Dartmouth" taking shape under Kemeny's leadership. And that—oh, boy—sort of bits and pieces of stuff. I'm aware that John, among other things, John at that point fired Carroll Brewster as Dean of the College, who had been hired right at the end of John Dickey's regime, and who I think in many ways was in fact an absolute disaster as Dean. But he clearly had a number of friends on the Trustees, and at least the report, as I heard it, was that when John fired Carroll he appealed to the Trustees, and they actually heard the case and upheld John by one vote. That at this point, whoever then (and I've forgotten, it will come back to me) was the Chair of the Trustees was coming to end of term, so you had to select a new Chair of the Board of Trustees.

BURNS: Was it [William] Bill Andres ['29]?

WOOD: It was Andres, it was Bill. And so as Bill stepped down, the Trustees were so badly split (and it was split on, you know, the Kemeny presidency, the Kemeny philosophy, so on) that you actually had two serious candidates standing for president: one who was on a pro-Kemeny stance and the other on a, you know, "if-I'm-elected-we're-going-to-can-the-bastard." I'm putting it too strongly, but just to make the point. And neither one had a majority, they were simply split. And it was in that context that Dave McLaughlin became Chairman of the Board of Trustees. That he was the compromise candidate who had not really taken a strong pro- or anti-John stance, and was as human being and intellect, so on, genuinely admired, accepted by the rest of them, so they all accepted him, and said, "Hey..." I mean, as I understood it, it was really, "He's the one person on the whole

Board we could agree on.” I'm sure that's probably too strong, and yet I think that's the reality and that Dave is a remarkably, both a bright and personable guy, and he's enormously effective in either one-on-one or small group setting. I mean, the point is, Chris, if you were to meet Dave for the first time, in five minutes you'd find yourself having the most interesting conversation you've ever had in your life.

And clearly, within that Board, where it looked very tense for John, was he—he was under—as I understand it on the first appointment he was appointed with an understanding of a review to take place after a number of years, and it may have been coming right at that point that McLaughlin managed to bring them back together again, that “we're all in this for Dartmouth,” you know, and did this very effectively and got them operating together. The one thing that happens, I think, that most people haven't understood, that relates to what we've been talking about, is—when is it Three Mile Island comes up? Is it in '78?

BURNS: '78. '77 or '78.

WOOD: OK. Well anyhow, the point is, it's important because it's at that point—I mentioned that we began coeducation on a four-to-one ratio, which is not going to be realistic over time, although some people would have thought so. Well anyhow, by that point increasing political pressure is growing to try to go to blind admissions or whatever term you want to use, open admissions, no quotas, with also a fair amount of opposition.

BURNS: Is this pressure largely from the student body, or . . . ?

WOOD: Oh, there's a lot in the faculty, and there are students—it actually ends up in sit-ins in Parkhurst Hall, and there are two or three sit-ins which are very heavily women, and women both students and faculty. And I don't think the Trustees were necessarily, you know, chomping at the bit to go open admissions, but then along came Three Mile Island. And John announces he would like to accept the President's invitation to chair the committee, which I guess the Trustees decide, OK, it's going to be hard to say no, as well as obviously it's a great honor to John and then secondarily for Dartmouth College. But Three Mile Island and that committee is all spring, and spring is riot time in colleges. And that's why we lifted—the Trustees—I get this from Dave, Dave McLaughlin, that the Trustees decided to go to open enrollment, blind admissions, as the price they would have to pay and were willing to pay for Three Mile Island. So there you've got a quirky one.

BURNS: That's an interesting trade-off story that I was not aware of.

WOOD: I suspected you wouldn't be.

BURNS: I think that's probably good for today.

End of Interview

INTERVIEW: Charles Wood
INTERVIEWED BY: Chris Burns
PLACE: Charles Wood's home in Hanover
DATE: February 6, 2001

BURNS: Today is February 6, 2001 and I am at the Hanover home of Professor Charles Wood, Daniel Webster Professor Emeritus of History—Professor of History Emeritus. I wanted to begin today by asking you some questions about the increasing diversity among the faculty in the '70s and '80s that we start to see with the advent of coeducation and things of that nature, and I'm wondering if you played an active role in recruitment of faculty members, or whether that was done on a department level?

WOOD: Recruitment was really on a department level. I think the History Department, I think purely by chance, was one of the first to get into the active recruitment of women, which happened, as I say, purely by chance as we were looking for a Latin American historian in the late 1960s, and Marysa Navarro, our present Latin American professor, the Collis Professor, was one of those who applied for the job. And I think everyone was impressed with her. I think there hadn't been any regular tenure-track members of the faculty, women, as far as I know, in Arts and Sciences down to Marysa's appointment.

I think probably what eased it in History, particularly with the few remaining old Hopkins faculty people who clearly [thought] all male was that a year or two before we had had a visiting professor in Chinese history who was a woman, who turned out to be an enormous hit, Mary Sung. And her husband was, I think, a resident at Hitchcock. And the very fact that, I think, Mary did a lot to open the doors for this, so that all of the "old boys" seemed to be as happy with the prospect of Marysa, so she was hired.

And then almost immediately afterwards a woman who, which sort of speaks to the nature of the situation before, Jeanne Prosser, whose husband Reese was in the Math Department. Jeanne who was a PhD in History but absolutely bilingual in French, had been teaching as a non-tenure-track sort of tenure, I mean permanent Lecturer in French, in Romance Languages. And she then expressed some interest in coming

into History, and indeed we then hired her when we needed someone in French Revolution, which was her field.

BURNS: This was a tenure track?

WOOD: And this was a tenure track. In her case, because she had a number of still relatively small children, she worked out a deal that it was a half-time appointment with almost twice as many years before the tenure decision had to be made, sort of stretching everything out. Unfortunately she died before that came up, alas. But then once the College—I think there were just a few like this. And how unusual it was I think is suggested by the experience that I can remember, say, in 19—oh, say, '66 or so, when hiring a Latin American historian we invited a woman who was a lecturer in the Sociology Department, Frieda Silvert, to come to one person's sort of interviewing seminar because they had known each other in Argentina. And I can remember the—I happened to arrive early with Frieda, and sort of as the old boys would hit the door of the seminar room they would stop cold, and then they would come in. And then the next day Jack Gazley ['34], who was one of the nicest, wouldn't-hurt-a-fly people, came up to me and said, "Charlie, who was that woman there yesterday?" And I said, "Oh, Frieda?" and he said, "I guess." And I said, "Well, she's on the faculty." And Jack just looked up with a stunned look and he said, "You're kidding!"

Well, all of this changed very quickly, and as you moved into coeducation in the early '70s, I think every department was anxious to hire women. Indeed I think it caused some of the problems that we experienced during the '70s, but initially my sense is that a number of departments showed more enthusiasm than critical judgment in hiring women, with the result that a number of them simply did not perform well, who probably never should have been hired, so either were not reappointed at the Assistant Professor level or did not receive tenure. So that, beginning three years down the pike, as a number of women began hitting the wall, then there was a great deal of paranoia and worry: "Is this place just flat-out still against women, and this is all window dressing," and great concerns among the women on the faculty. I think the—that probably was not the case, with some notable individual exceptions. Rather, it always struck me that the problem was that people had been overenthusiastic for gender without regard to criteria in the hiring process, in some cases.

BURNS: Now, Dartmouth implemented an Affirmative Action Plan in the—was it the early '70s?

- WOOD: Early '70s, yes. It first came up, and really became a matter of law, after John Kemeny had become President, and it was during the tenure of Louis Morton as his Provost, which would have been, what, 1970, '71, I guess. Lou took it for one year and said we didn't need a Provost, and then the Provostship was cancelled.
- BURNS: And Leonard Rieser just . . .
- WOOD: Yes, right, and then in fact Leonard took over both titles. And the—but I think it was Louis Morton as Provost, seeing the Federal legislation, who saw that this was something that was serious, that did require Dartmouth to come up with an Affirmative Action Plan. As Lou told me, it took a while to get John Kemeny, who was committed to this, in such a way that he really didn't understand why he had to file something with the Feds--so that it took some convincing of John that the wheels should turn, to make sure that a plan was formally done.
- BURNS: He perhaps didn't see the need for the bureaucracy?
- WOOD: Exactly, exactly, that was the problem. And he didn't think that whatever the plan was would in any way affect the way in which Dartmouth was clearly already making a good-faith attempt to hire all of the people who were supposedly put under Affirmative Action.
- BURNS: So with the Affirmative Action policy and with coeducation and with Kemeny's commitment to bring in more of other minority students, such as African-Americans . . .
- WOOD: Yes, his first commitment, I think, was the one that had not been touched originally, was Native Americans, which he mentioned at the time of matriculation.
- BURNS: Did you—now the Native American students, the faculty members that I think would—the Native American faculty members then probably would not have come in through the History Department per se, but more in Native American Studies?
- WOOD: More through Native American Program, which actually was very largely developed by now-President Wright. And they did come—some came in, in fact, via History Department, but joint appointments, that you would have someone—Michael Green I guess was probably the first of the ones with a joint appointment in History and Native American Studies, or Michael Dorris with Anthropology and Native American Studies. Almost all of the Native American Studies people, as they came in, came in with joint

appointments with a disciplinary base, but then also in Native American as an interdisciplinary program.

BURNS: Did the recruitment process for the History Department—how did that change with the effort to bring in more women or more Native Americans or more African-Americans? Did you look to new sources, or was it more of putting an ad out there, seeing...

WOOD: It was more advertising. I mean, in a kidding way people used to say that before the '60s, as things began opening up, that whoever the Chair was of the History Department, the Government Department, whatever department it was, would simply call up their counterpart at Harvard and say, "Hey Joe, send up another one." I think that probably was not true, but I mean that was the image of very much old-boy network. Certainly from the late '60s or early '70s on, you had open advertising in a way that you had never had before.

I think in the case of History, to try to get the largest possible pool we would sit down and sort of say, "What is it that—what sort of a person do we need?" And without--in other words, trying to get the broadest possible definition, somebody who is interested in, for example, in American History, rather than saying, "We want somebody who is in late 19th-century political history, with an emphasis on, you know, large city machines," or whatever, you would say, we were looking for someone who was in American History, post-Revolution, sort of any field other than urban and political. So that try to put as large a thing, and then see who the applicants were. And in a sense let the applicant pools—and that one, I think was pretty close to the job ad we put in, looking, in effect, to replace somebody who had been strictly a social and intellectual historian. That led to Mary Kelley's appointment, now the Chair of the History Department. And I think something like 450 or 500 people applied, of whom we probably—well, I know we interviewed 70 or 80 of them at the American Historical Association convention.

But that gave you quite a sweep to look for new and different people, and in effect I think our assumption was, let the worth and abilities of the candidate sort of drive the way in which the curriculum will develop. I mean, that is, if they are really good and they're into something and quite persuasive, they are going to be teaching us ways in which we can improve our curriculum and enrich it, which I think in fact did happen.

BURNS: Were you looking—because History was primarily taught at the undergraduate level were you looking for folks that maybe weren't so specialized and were more into something like . . .

WOOD: No, not necessarily, because sort of the type of change that Dartmouth went through starting in the Dickey years was moving increasingly toward, not the model of a research university but toward a faculty which certainly had the type of research skills and, if you will, publication record that would mean that we as a faculty could exist in the same room as our counterparts at all the other Ivy League colleges for example, who were teaching at a research university. So that, simply to give an example of this, since I was hired in 1964 I came up for tenure in '66-'67 since I had taught elsewhere before coming here. And I was the first person at Dartmouth who, for whom they had ever sought outside peer review judgments of faculty elsewhere on my scholarship. Indeed, they were so unused to this they finally had to come back to me and ask me who were some of the research people in the field--and heard from Arthur Wilson, who was in the Government Department although he had a history PhD, who happened to be on the Committee Advisory to the President when I came up, but people were amazed because at least one person was from England and another one was from the College de France and, you know, that somebody who wrote a letter in French had actually heard of me! And, or someone you know at Oxford. And, which wasn't me, it was more symptomatic of a type of change from what was basically a teaching but not particularly research-oriented faculty. Arthur Wilson was a distinct exception.

And it was that kind of change which I think was carried through as you stretched out that and said, "Hey, the change also involves new types of research and indeed new people," which ultimately then had its payoff in terms of new types of curriculum. But I think, without question everybody in the social sciences, certainly in the humanities as well, by and large remained committed to undergraduate education, to a liberal education, rather than simply doing it as part of a research university. That was what seemed to separate the new faculty. As I looked at it, it was sort of saying, "Hey, we want people who do this research, who stay fresh with it, who are on the frontiers of knowledge, but who still remain committed to and have an excellence in the classroom." So that certainly when I served on the Committee Advisory to the President in the 1980s, as somebody was coming up for tenure, the first question you would ask, the first hurdle that candidate had to get by, was "strength in the classroom." Then the second question, and it was only the second one, was then "what else does this person have to offer? How strong is he or is she as scholar?"

BURNS: And the strength in the classroom would be student evaluations, primarily?

WOOD: Yes. You got—you had faculty who would sit in, reports; the Dean typically writes to about 40 recent alumni of the College who have taken courses from this person, asking for evaluations. The Department also typically polls people in the classes as they now exist. So you get a reasonable cross-section of students, majors and non-majors alike, either who are in the school now or who are recent graduates, who, interestingly, seem to take this very, very seriously. You get very, very interesting letters from them, thoughtful letters. So that you have quite a bit of evidence, I think, on what a person's teaching skills might be.

So what I'm trying to say is that, in the research university that person who is the brilliant scholar, the Nobel Prize winner, who is simply God-awful in class, has a good chance of getting tenure. That person would have a very hard chance of getting tenure here. You have to have something on the classroom side, typically, before we begin looking at or exploring the scholarly excellence.

BURNS: As far as the quality in the classroom goes, I would imagine that one of the arguments for increasing the diversity amongst the faculty would be to get different viewpoints in and therefore to ultimately increase the quality in a way in the classroom.

WOOD: Yes, yes. I mean, you certainly had a sense that there is, you know, no absolutely one good way to teach, I mean to be a successful teacher. So that the very diversity of people, each of whom--whether personality or background, however you want to put it--had different styles, clearly contributed. And to some extent, and I suspect this is true of almost every department, there are some courses that are team-taught by a variety of people, so that what one person is doing may well rub off on another person. There is that type of aspect of the collegiality, so that new things as they get introduced by one person that seem to be enormously successful suddenly begin to be picked up by others. Classic example of it, I suppose, is John Rassias in intensive language, and then learning languages, although John, I think, originally was doing it very largely from example and then they began making it a model and trying to organize it in a way that other people could be taught to use the Rassias Method of Language Instruction.

BURNS: Can you name, in the History Department, any of the particular successes—we've talked about Marysa Navarro, of, I guess we can call it the attempt to diversify the faculty.

WOOD: Well, it's been a wonderful group over the years. I really—I can't sort of think of, you know, one person with—well, take, in Chinese History

(although this wouldn't fit under any of the categories of Affirmative Action), but that our Chinese historian for years was a man named Leo Ou-fan Lee. And Leo was a wonderful colleague who, among other things, was an amateur filmmaker. So that—and he basically, most of his interests in Chinese history were 20th-century intellectual and artistic, so that in some ways Chinese filmmakers fit in, so on, but he—sort of some of the films he did--or then, as he began bringing in the Department. I can remember one hilarious—in the early, early '70s, where it was after, you know, the great Hollywood druggie film *Easy Rider* that we received an invitation to come to a cocktail party at David Roberts', David being the English historian at that point, and each one of us was told to wear a specific kind of uniform. Well, it turned out that we all were going to be making a movie directed by Leo Lee, called "Hard Rider." And as this takeoff on *Easy Rider*, and in which those who in the movie rode their big hog Harleys, got to ride tricycles in the Leo movie.

Well, you know, this in one sense obviously is not the world's most intellectual sort of thing, except as it brought people with different interests together, and talking and friendship and collegiality, as well as in the process learning a hell of a lot about movie making and watching the results. It was a remarkably positive experience for a department. And I think there were probably a number of things like that that you could cite within History over the period of, I suspect particularly, the Kemeny years. I think it was also the case in a number of other departments, that similar kinds of things were happening that were fun but bubbly-stimulating.

BURNS: A sort of increasing richness.

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: We talked about coeducation a little bit and the introduction of women as students, but I also wanted to talk about the other minority groups that were brought in during the early '70s and in terms of African-Americans and Native Americans. I believe there was also a program to bring rural New Englanders in.

WOOD: Yes, yes. Bootstrappers, as we called them in Admissions, and Northern New England white—I mean, I think as—the problem—I think I'd deal with it more from an admissions point of view than faculty—is that when the McLane Report was accepted by the Trustees, saying over time Dartmouth's student body should reflect the country at large in terms of its ethnic, religious, you know, any kind of profile background, the question obviously comes up, where do you start? And I think Eddie Chamberlain, who was the Director of Admissions at that point, sort of had the sense

that if you really went by percentages and tried to make the student body resemble the country at large, absurdities as well as problems could develop.

For example, if you took that seriously on the Native American side, as the last one to come in, that would mean you ought to admit seven-tenths of one Native American per year. Now, then you sort of looked at it, and I think every experience early on suggested that any minority program you tried was apt to be successful only if you had a critical mass of the minority that you were looking for. Because any people of whatever minority group you wanted to talk about who were brought to rural Hanover, New Hampshire were apt to feel terribly isolated and insecure. So that they needed enough sort of sense of their own community to gain the sort of confidence they needed to be able willingly to go out and become members of a larger or broader or different communities on campus. So that in the Native American case, I think we had the feeling really to do this, you would need a minimum, say, of 12 to 15 Native Americans each year in a class, to have that taking place.

And I think, you know, there was certainly that sense of critical mass that was—so that you then sort of looked at it and said, “Well, if you tried to identify every single minority group in the country to do this, you'd end up with 200% of the class.” So that, realistically speaking, in terms of also Dartmouth's capacity to fund all of this at the financial aid level, we ended up with the view that probably initially the groups that you should target would be African-American, would be the Native American, would be—because we were in Northern New England, and in which if you were living here you become very aware of very bright kids who are disadvantaged in all sorts of ways, living in sort of rural isolation--and of Northern New England disadvantaged.

We didn't initially, for example, do Hispanics. I think Hispanic, the feeling was there really weren't many in this area, and that if you then went through the double-whammy of trying to get basically urban population people and moving them here, or from, you know, more rural Texas, so on, that it would—we simply didn't have the resources to deal with it initially. So that as I say, that initial focus was on others, and certainly not on women at that point yet, either.

BURNS: How successful do you think the College was in, a) recognizing the need for support once the students got to campus, and b) implementing whatever support...?

WOOD: Right. I think we were reasonably good in seeing . . .

[End of Tape 5, Side A — Beginning of Tape 5, Side B]

WOOD: No, I think we saw very early on that African-American kids, for example, typically would have to have a different financial aid package than we had been giving to white kids. A financial aid package typically has a scholarship; it has a loan component; and it has a work component: making money working at the dining hall or what have you. The problem, I think, was overwhelmingly with the loan component, that the African-American community has been so screwed by unscrupulous lenders that loans have an enormously bad sort of cultural freight associated with them. And I think [we] had the feeling that you simply were not going to be able to attract students unless you reduced the amount of loan component from what you had.

Well, all these types of financial things I think we handled fairly well. The extent to which we handled other types of needs or interests in terms of initially building a program of Black Studies, if you will, simply programs that culturally dealt with the African or African-American experience insofar as it differed from other people's experiences, that was probably a little slower in coming. The sort of, the extent to which people—how—to what extent were they—you know, did you assume people would interact socially just with their own kind, to what extent with "other kinds," I think had not been terribly well thought out. Or what people's expectations might be. So that all these types of things being, I think, in many ways seemingly more difficult for the African-American community than, for example, the Northern New England whites who "didn't look any different" from what people you'd had before.

I suspect if you could go back and do in-depth studies of both of those groups, and certainly it has been done in the African-American community, I think you would find that some of the cultural changes, the difficulties that kids found in adjustment, were probably just as severe, if different, among the Northern New England kids than they were as compared to the African-American kids. I have a number of letters in my file that speak to this type of issue, and quite poignantly so.

BURNS: Has the rural New Englanders effort continued over the years, do you know?

WOOD: I honestly don't know the extent to which it's continued as a separate category. Admissions always had a more generalized category known as "bootstrappers," the real type of up-and-at-'em, you know the Protestant ethic is alive and well here, and with ambition and drive. But into which, in

a sense, a lot of the Northern New Englanders fell. The problem in the Northern New England case was that, as admissions works, you may give preferences to individuals but then you always review what's happening in the school of the kid to whom the preference has been given. So that, in other words, if you, as you're reviewing a school, find you have admitted rank in class number 70 in the class, but you've turned down number 6, you'd better have a pretty good reason for it.

And one of the effects is that if you were taking some of these Northern New England kids, who already had something of a geographic priority, that if they were at all down the rank in class from, say, the banker's son, you now have yourself an A-number-one problem. And because it's close to home, what do you do? And it was those types of things that I think made people sort of decide, politically you have to back off from this explicit Northern New England preference, but I suspect in some ways it still continues as, under the "bootstrapper" category. I honestly don't know. I haven't talked to the present Dean of Admissions on it.

BURNS: Yeah, I haven't researched that one at all, but it sort of struck me because it's not one that you would normally think of as part of the whole affirmative action mission, so I didn't know how it was still playing in the admissions process. With the introduction of the Native Americans shortly after that, the Indian symbol becomes an issue.

WOOD: Oh, very much so, yes.

BURNS: And I was wondering how you felt about that issue at the time.

WOOD: I ended up very much on the side of the Native Americans. I think it hit me very early on, because at the point that the Native American Program got going, both academically as well as an admissions program, the faculty was using the Hovey Grill in Thayer Hall as its sort of faculty lunch room. And that is where the so-called "infamous" Hovey Murals are, of the founding of Dartmouth College, with its sort of, if you will, caricatures in a sort of 1930s Disney movie variety, of Native Americans, of women, of Eleazar Wheelock. I mean, they're—you know, in one sense a fascinating period piece. But I can remember going in and taking the first director of the Native American Studies Program down to have lunch, and walking through the door, and as he looked I thought he was going to faint, you know, I mean the impact was so great.

BURNS: Was this Michael Dorris, or prior . . . ?

WOOD: No, it was prior to Michael Dorris, and the name has slipped me right now. And he was doing it more from a Deaning than a strictly academic teaching, which is the way Michael did it. I think I agreed with Michael Dorris, whose position always was, "Look, we are arguing against the Indian symbol on campus now, because clearly it divides people rather than brings them together. If it was a symbol of unity for whoever was here circa 1930, fine. It functioned that way, to rally about all that was best. Now, on the other hand, clearly, demonstrably, it works the other way. But," said Mike, and this was always the position of the Native American Council, "whatever we say now can never take that beloved Indian symbol away from the member of the Class of 1930. It will always be part of his Dartmouth. And we have no intention of trying to."

I think if the College had picked up on that we wouldn't have had half the fight over the Indian symbol we did. I think somehow that kind of "we're not going to take it away from you," it's kind of a counterpart of Alan Gaylord's telling that alum, "Remember, the Dartmouth of your memories will never be coeducational," that it's that kind of reassurance, "We're not after you and we're not after the symbol on your jacket, so on, in your place, but not on campus now." I think that would have—still, but somehow it got lost, and God, it created hard feelings. Although I was always struck by the enormous number of people who didn't care, who would say, you know, in the Class of '40, "Well, the Indian symbol was not a big thing in my day." So—

BURNS: Do you think it was a vocal minority?

WOOD: I think it's a vocal minority, but also my sense is, it clusters in different periods. That the early '30s, where the football team was a powerhouse in the country, to what extent all that went together into making a strong Indian symbol--it certainly, in the classes immediately after World War II, who were an extraordinary throwback, I think, to all of the most sort of mountain-man aspects of what was the Dartmouth Man, and to what extent that's the war, to what extent that's the period in which Dartmouth was not demanding any College Board scores—I mean, there are all sorts of things that seemed to feed into it that make the classes, oh, say from '46 to '48 or '49 or '50 very different from those just before and just after.

BURNS: Yeah, you definitely have some older students mixed in and—that's interesting to trace the differences in classes over time, and especially their relation to how successful the football team was.

WOOD: Yes. Well, the football team, I guess I always argued, related to sort of, could Dartmouth go to blind admissions on women and not worry about

sex ratios. The—I think among the old traditional Dartmouth people, much as they loved the College, there are two points. One of them was, for an extraordinary number of them Dartmouth in fact had not been their first choice. They had applied to, say, Harvard, and they had been turned down. And that was really the basis of the enormous Dartmouth-Harvard rivalry, at least from Dartmouth's point of view, that “By God, you know, those God-damned aesthetes down there, those pointy-headed intellectuals,” you know, “we're going to come out of the hills and just clean their clock, physically, athletically, show them who”—but with a kind of sense that maybe we're not up to them intellectually.

That you think of it of, sort of from the formation of the Ivy League on, that here you have these seven research universities and Dartmouth College. And that in effect forming the athletic league suddenly enormously elevated the intellectual status of Dartmouth, but—and it was all based on geographical proximity and the fact that given that geographical proximity we happen to have played all these places in sports, and had been quite competitive with them. With the feeling then, among a lot of alums, our ability to remain in the Ivy League and to have our intellectual respectability depends entirely on having athletic teams, male, that can go out and clobber, especially, Harvard, Yale, Princeton. And if they don't, if they can't, then suddenly people will see we are the classic Emperor with no clothes, and see that in fact we're just another Bates or another Bowdoin, and off we go.

And so the connection, in other words, with the need to have the men and the athletics and the intellectual all were tightly tied up until it all blew apart in the '70s as they found they rather liked having women. I think we talked about it briefly as the “granddaughter syndrome.” And, or as Princeton went to blind admissions and had many fewer men than we did, so therefore we ought to be able to beat them even if we went to open admissions, when faced with the pressures to do so at the time Three Mile Island came along. And I think by that point people felt comfortable or it wouldn't be the end of the world if we did lose, as indeed we're doing—we're doing about as well as Columbia used to now, in football, and the end of the world doesn't seem to have happened.

BURNS Do you think by that point that Dartmouth had in some respects caught up academically?

WOOD: Yes. And I think that's part of it too, is the sense that somewhere—I think when I first arrived on the faculty in the mid-'60s, whenever a policy decision came up you had the feeling in a faculty meeting everybody was turning their head and looking south to “what do they do in Cambridge?”

And then decide. That somehow you had the feeling that by the '70s people had got confident enough in what they were doing on their own, which included very much a foundation of publication and research, that they stopped looking south to Cambridge.

Curiously, it also happened in Admissions. That is, I'm sure if you look at the Admissions statistics (and we do try to keep an eye on what are the other colleges, insofar as we can find out, or what do people turn down Dartmouth for, or what colleges), that where Dartmouth used to be a favorite second choice of the Harvards, if you will, that as I said it was a place where very few people, or much smaller than you think given the intense loyalty of those alums, really had applied to it as a first choice, now it is a first choice. And you find that you aren't constantly sort of going neck and neck and neck competing with Harvard or with what-have-you. And that it's a choice that's much more positively made.

BURNS: Do you think that's because Dartmouth has somehow managed to realize its niche there and to create, to market that identity as an undergraduate-focused institution?

WOOD: I think it has. I mean, that is, I guess the way I've put it, that, you know, with Jean Kemeny's book, is, "It's different at Dartmouth." And everybody said, "Hey, this is an undergraduate place." Well, what makes it different? I mean, why don't you want to be like Bates or Bowdoin or Amherst or Williams, but you don't want to be like Harvard-Yale-Princeton either? I guess the way I've looked at it is that Dartmouth is a place that really is committed to undergraduate education. And insofar as that's the case, it is a college, not a university.

On the other hand, what it wants to do and what it thinks it needs to do, given the quality of the students it both has and hopes to continue to attract, is to offer the resources of a full research university but place them at the disposal of the undergraduates, who typically, at the research university, can't take advantage of those resources. Whether it is faculty members working with them closely who are researchers who are known, and have those international reputations and properly so, or whether it is simply the richness of the library collections or of the range of computer facilities, of, you know, Hopkins Center—of everything you look at, it simply is much more than you would find at an Amherst, a Bates, a Williams, a Smith, you know, whatever purely undergraduate liberal arts place you want to talk about.

BURNS: Do you think this is a vision that's largely been shared by the last several administrations, and do you think that it's a vision that started to focus with Dickey?

WOOD: I think it started, clearly, with Dickey; and I think it started with Dickey because in a sense—I think there were two aspects. One, coming into the presidency in 1945, right at the end of this horrendous world war, surely emphasized that we were entering a very different world, a different age, with America in a very different position from anything that we'd had before. And I think as I understand it John Dickey and Morrison as his Provost and Dean, I think clearly saw that after that war--and with the types of emphasis on, if you will, educational research that go into things like radar and atom bombs and napalm and you name it--that clearly a greater emphasis on research, a greater emphasis on the world community and not just on the United States and Western Europe, was going to be necessary.

And what he faced, of course, was knowing perfectly well that Hopkins, having hired a faculty in the '20s that had stayed, it was all going to retire en masse, beginning in the late '50s and then through the first half or first two-thirds of the '60s. So that what sort of faculty were you going to hire? And at that point, given the fact that it was not particularly a research-oriented faculty, presidents and deans had much more role in what sorts of people were you going to hire, than probably they do today, where, given the strength of the faculty, one of the strengths shows up in the extent to which the faculty really has a much more dominant voice, or important voice, in educational policy, including the nature and quality of faculty recruitment, than it had before.

So that I think it all begins with—well, to give you a crazy example from a student point of view. The first year I was here, '64-'65, I think by that point this—the Dickey phase of this had gone on long enough that, you know, people like me were showing up who seemed to be doing research as well as teaching. That it was known—*The Dartmouth* ran a whole series of articles about the two Dartmouths that it was a contending force between Big Greener-ism, the old Dartmouth, and what was known as "creeping weenie-ism." [laughter]

And the—and I remember people—someone stole the bell out of Rollins Chapel, I guess. It may have been—there may be a bell in Dartmouth Hall—one or the other, some sort of precious Dartmouth relic was stolen, that apparently in the old days used to be stolen, then you'd have big class fights looking for it, and trying to revive Big Greener-ism. And all this publicity and nothing happened; nobody sort of went out to look for this

damned thing. So you had the sense that, you know, creeping weenie-ism had won, only, you know, I think realistically speaking, I'm sure I wasn't alone hoping that whatever was winning or coming as the new phase would prove to have more facets to it than just creeping weenie-ism; that you wouldn't sort of toss out the baby with the bathwater. And I think on the whole the College has been remarkably successful in that.

BURNS: And is it your impression that the Kemeny administration and the McLaughlin administration continued this?

WOOD: Oh yes, yes. And I think with a sense that probably that a change was occurring, becoming much more apparent, particularly with Kemeny, and therefore being associated with him. In the McLaughlin years it gets harder to tell, insofar as David himself was not a scholar-academic, and a lot of what he put a great deal of effort into related to, you know, physical renewal of plant and building, and alumni relations, community repair, so that he didn't really speak to the--as a spokesman for the intellectual vision. But certainly if the faculty and McLaughlin had sort of their tensions and fights, I think they were a sign that this certainly was continuing and had not been in any way ended.

The curious thing to me, with the exception of McLaughlin, is that in recent years there's been the perception, it all starts with the most recent guy. It really started with [President James O.] Jim Freedman, because Freedman was the guy who said, "We ought to have people who march to a different drummer, knowing Catullus and playing the cello." Well, I mean, it—that it had already started if Freedman sort of said that at the beginning. At Class Day of Jim's first year—you always have class historians, and after coeducation a man and a woman to review the events of the last year, and so the class historians turned out to be a woman playing the cello, and playing it both rather well and rather well to the point that she could play it badly and you laughed, and this guy up there reciting sort of meaningless Latin phrases. And so, just sending up the whole Catullus and cello, that they already had people who knew their Catullus and their cello. They were there before McLaughlin had—I mean, before Freedman had arrived. It was very nicely done, and terribly funny. So they were McLaughlin products.

BURNS: I want to step back to the '70s a little bit. We talked a little bit about athletics in the '70s, and I think you had mentioned to me in the letter that you wrote that you were the Title IX officer for the Dartmouth College Athletic Council, and Chair of its subcommittee on Affirmative Action. And I was wondering, first off, how did you get involved with the Dartmouth College Athletic Council?

WOOD: Well, I had played football in college, which I think was known by a number of the coaches. And indeed I belonged to a luncheon group here which is mainly faculty, but it did include Tuss McLaughry, who was the football coach during the '50s here. And--but I then also had children who swam in an age-group swim team that Ron Keenhold, the coach of the Dartmouth Swim Team had formed before he became the full coach. And as a result Ron had recruited me to be a stroke judge and timer and things that Dartmouth needs. So that I, you know, that I had a variety of connections with the Athletic Council already there. So somebody, I think, said, Hey, you know, as you look around for who are faculty members who might be willing to serve and have some interest in serving on the Athletic Council, I met that bill, and then, having gone on the Council, suddenly you had a need for an Affirmative Action person or a Title IX person, and I got tabbed.

BURNS: What were the big issues that you faced during your time?

WOOD: Well, they varied. At the sort of Affirmative Action level it was looking at recruiting, and that committee would have a wonderful time looking at coaches, and to what extent could you expect to hire coaches from the different Affirmative Action categories for the different sports. And, I mean for example, in those days you could fairly quickly decide—you probably would not expect to have women coaching the football team. But could you have a black coaching tennis, which was always very much a white person's sport. But remember Arthur Ashe, you see. But usually tennis goes with squash. Do you have—well, you've got all those Indians who seem to be world champions at squash. So you had an awful lot of, "Are we really reaching out and getting all of the potential pool for each of the sports?"

So that I found that other than these wonderfully sort of, "Who can be most imaginative about who has played a particular sport?" one of my main roles in the Affirmative Action chair's job was serving on the search committees for all of the coaches. So that I guess I was on the committee that hired a football coach, hired a basketball coach, hired a hockey coach, etc. Title IX was much more: "Is there an equality of opportunity as well as equipment?" In which I think Dartmouth, in fact, tried to do a superb job in making things absolutely as open for the women as they came in as for the men. Unlike, say Brown, which has had endless difficulties on this, still is in the courts on it. And, but initially, for example, it looked as, I got a complaint that, on swimming, that the men's team...

[End of Tape 5, Side B — Beginning of Tape 6, Side A]

...so the complaint was that the men got to use the Michael Pool while the women were forced to use the Spaulding Pool, which is much—it's older, it's narrower, it has shallower parts, it simply isn't as good a pool, you won't get as good times, etc. Found that these were in fact very easy to resolve: the second they came up, then people would adjust. The—some of them, though, were—got funnier, where you found that seeming equality had had unequal impacts.

For example, Seaver Peters as Athletic Director, under enormous pressure to cut his budget as everybody was during the inflationary period of the '70s, decided that one way to save money without hurting the program, or save a little bit of money, was that in the locker rooms for both sexes there was a towel person who, as kids came out of the shower, that person was the one who would hand the woman, the man, their towel. And Pete had the feeling that probably you could eliminate the towel people and, while you might have a few more towels wasted if kids were allowed to pick up their own towel and therefore might take two rather than one or what have you, that he'd save the salaries and he'd be money ahead. And it was even—Steven. Male and female alike, no more towel person.

That one hit me from the women's coaches, because the problem in shower rooms and locker rooms is that gunk, with fair regularity, tends to plug shower heads, and therefore when that happens you have to have plumbers to come in and clean the shower heads. Plumbers, alas, tend to be male. Now, as long as you had a shower person, when a shower went in the women's locker rooms a plumber would show up and the towel person would take a look and say, "The coast is clear, you can come in and clean the showers." But once the shower person was removed, the only women who were around were the varsity coaches, people of eminent status who had a lot of work to do on other more important things than looking to see whether the coast was clear. This, of course, was not happening in the male rooms.

So you had to—I had to go to Seaver Peters and say, "Hey Pete [laughing], we need a woman's shower person." Well, we got her back. But—so that—in other words, it was those types of things, all done, I'd say, with remarkably good spirit. I think the only problems that showed up that I didn't really have to deal with, it was John Kemeny. And I think you asked about Kemeny in terms of his commitments or what sort of a person he was. In the late '70s Dartmouth was in contention for the title for Eastern Hockey Champions. And we . . .

BURNS: This was men's hockey?

WOOD: Men's hockey, yes. And came down to a game, I think against Brown, that if we beat Brown here on a Sunday afternoon, we would be in the finals. Well, as it happened two or three kids had been kicked off the varsity the week before, sent down to the junior varsity. And they were filled with stuff and wanted to get the College going, and so to--enthusiasm to make sure that team would go and make it, and so on. So between periods, suddenly out skated these three guys, in breechcloths and sort of this mock Indian gowns and tomahawks and all, skating around, and Wah-Hoo-Wah'ing, and crowd going wild. I'm sitting there with my hands over my eyes saying "Oh my God," you know. Well, it stirred everyone up and our team, we went on to the finals. God help us all, we then went to the Nationals and found ourselves—it's irrelevant, but it turned out we had to play [laughing] North Dakota for the national championship. They are the North Dakota Fighting Sioux. The Dean called up the "D" and said, "If you mention their name you're all out of school."

So there was a certain amount of humor, but the point is, those kids—every member undergraduate Native American was in John Kemeny's office the next day. There were forty of them, about, all with letters of resignation, leaving Dartmouth College. And John at that meeting was incredible as he spoke to his own love and commitment to Dartmouth College, as an open Dartmouth College which included people like the students in his office as well as it included him. That's why, actually, the Hovey Grill murals were covered up. It was at that point John agreed that, to cover them up.

But in terms of the type of intensity of emotional love for place, and that he was a person of emotional as well as intellectual and rational commitment, I think came through very loud and clear on that incident. It was one that, when you had asked me about it earlier it had totally sort of slipped my mind, and then it came back to me. But as you looked at it, I mean, that was one. Another was--John was the one who had to solve that; I did not have to do a thing on that one.

BURNS: But he was able to convince the students that there were other reasons to stay. Which sort of brings me to the question of what John Kemeny's relationship to athletics was during his presidential tenure. And I'm not sure there's that much to say about it, but you think of him as so much as an academic.

WOOD: Right. He always—he wanted to make sure that he saw Dartmouth as a place, given its location up in the mountains where you would expect the

hikers, the climbers, the physically engaged, that he saw athletics as being important. That's why I think—and some games I think he genuinely enjoyed. He himself did play tennis, as a matter of fact. But he wasn't basically an athlete. But he always—there were differences or distances that, you know, he would try--At the time we were hiring a hockey coach—obviously any coach who comes in always wants to meet with the Admissions people, and how much trouble, and hockey is always stereotypically the dumb, the people with "hockey verbals" and so on. And I could remember [Alfred] Al Quirk ['49], who was the Deputy Director of Admissions at that point, saying to me afterwards, howling at that, that John had met with one of our hockey coach candidates and had assured him there were no problems, and he would be happy to see people who came in who had—and Al refused to tell me what the scholastic aptitude test score that John had mentioned he would take them as low as this, you know. And Al sort of said, "We haven't seen a single hockey player with a number that high!" And we took anyhow.

To come back to it, though, a different way, I left you once with the vision of Seaver Peters as Athletic Director after the—as we were going on Kent State strike, waiting for his interview with John Kemeny to get Astroturf into Leverone Fieldhouse to make it more flexible, and John just saying, "Get out! Get out!" You know, May of 1970 wasn't the time for this. Well, at the end of the summer of '71, when we had submitted the final report on year-round operation, and then in the fall at the October meeting where the Trustees had approved coeducation, clearly one of the things that was done immediately was sort of meetings everywhere of what types of physical changes or needs did different parts of the College have to be ready for coeducation? And I made damn sure that John Kemeny and various of the administrators in his part of the campus went over to the Minary Center with Seaver Peters and his people so that Pete could sort of sit down, finally meet with him, and explain why he needed Astroturf and why it became double important under conditions of coeducation. Which was when he got his Astroturf, and I can remember one of the people afterwards sort of coming back from the Parkhurst side of things and looking at me. He said, "Hey, that Seaver Peters is a real professional, isn't he?" And I said, "Yes, he is." And so you finally had this sort of coming together of John with his Athletic Director, after which, I think, relations in fact were much smoother.

BURNS: Part of why I ask about Kemeny and the athletics is, you hear with the year-round plan of how that helped coeducation come in, and how that reduced the need for physical plant improvements. Jane Carroll had interviewed [Agnes Bixler] Aggie Kurtz for this project, and one thing she spoke of was that with the introduction of women onto campus you had all

these new women's sports teams, and you had to budget for facilities there, although they shared some facilities, but equipment, new coaches—it seems like it's one area where there was a significant . . .

WOOD: There was a real squeeze. It—but in a sense I suspect you have to put that in historical context of the '70s, of that period of so-called "stagflation," that you had the double-digit inflation with a stock market that either was not increasing or was actually decreasing, which put enormous pressure on the College budget, all of the College budget. So that finding money anywhere to do anything—that's why I think it was so important for McLaughlin coming in to begin putting enormous amounts of money into renovating buildings which had been allowed to decay, deferred maintenance. So that I suspect what Aggie is reporting is very true.

What do you do with pressures, though? I mean, on the one hand you need the things for the new—for the women. But then take—go back to the Indian symbol: that precisely because money is short, as the Trustees vote to drop the Indian symbol they do say that the Indian symbol as it appears on athletic jerseys, so on, can remain until the jersey's worn out. You know, we don't want to waste a lot of money having to buy a lot of new athletic jerseys when we've got all these other demands. Seemingly sensible.

Unfortunately, Ulysses J. Lupien, Tony Lupien our football coach, I mean baseball coach, was about as diehard an Indian symbol man as you will ever encounter. He's a baseball, if not Hall-of-Famer, pretty close. And so, you know, without being able to prove it, I've always had the sense that Tony went out, and he must have bought himself five thousand baseball uniform tops with Indian symbols, you know, so that every other team had run out of Indian symbols but Tony was still going strong. And I think he was still going strong at the time that skating incident came along in '75, '76, whatever it was. And people let him do this because he had the damned things and because of the expense involved. So that it was really only when you got to crunch time, as related to the Indian symbol skating around Thompson Arena, that not only did you put the money into covering up the Hovey Murals, but people said, "Hey Lupien, get rid of those, and you are now having a Dartmouth uniform that doesn't have it."

And I think in a sense Aggie and the women's athletics was caught in something of the same kind of thing, of, only they had to start from scratch. And so that what circ—the problem—part of the problem, too, intensifying it, is the curious way, or curious from other people's point of view, in which athletics is budgeted. That is, it operates on what's called a "net budget." The College agrees and tells the Athletic Department each

year how much money it's going to give it. And it may give—I'll put it back in the terms I was dealing with it in the '70s, say 700, 750 thousand dollars. But the actual budget may be two million. So you have a deficit of one million two hundred fifty thousand. Now, how you meet that deficit is up to you.

I mean, that is, you have, for example, revenues from football games and so on. All of those revenues go for that budget, so that you can—in other words, you can either generate revenues if you can from ticket sales. You can do a certain amount of fundraising from Friends of Dartmouth Football, or Hockey, whatever it is. You can cut programs or refuse to buy new uniforms for something, or you can begin charging the faculty rental for their lockers when they come down to play squash or swim. I mean, there are all—but in other words, clearly that deficit that had to be met by the Athletic Department grew a bit during the '70s as you were undergoing this kind of inflationary squeeze, which I suspect made it that much more difficult for—as the women's teams coming in, they didn't have, as far as I know, any sort of separate provision for meeting, you know, sort of new funds to make sure that every single need was in fact met. So that as far as I know, and certainly everyone I saw always had a uniform, but what sort of fights people like Aggie had to go through to do that, I don't know. They never reached me as Title IX officer, but that's all I can know.

BURNS: OK. I want to talk about another of your activities in the '70s, which was the Comparative Literature Program, which you served on the Steering Committee starting in 1972, and then as Acting Chair in '77. I believe we had talked earlier about the Comparative Literature Program and that it had some precedents at the College, but it also came in, I'm guessing, as part of this move in the '70s to have these other academic programs.

WOOD: Yes. I think what happened, in a sense, was that you had had an old Comparative Literature Program which wasn't Comp Lit at all, it was kind of classics of world literature in translation. As Comparative Literature came back in as a new program at the tag end of the '60s, it was to be with people majoring in and having at least two languages other than English, and writing a thesis, etc. As a, effectively, an honors program that really took advantage of foreign languages, and in a linguistic and literary critical way, was to take advantage of those language skills and to push students.

I think there were two sides to it. One was that, coming out of the '60s, Dartmouth, and it had a lot to do with John Rassias as time went on, had extraordinarily successful language programs with very high expectations. I mean, the type of level of not just reading ability but fluency in spoken

language and listening abilities that Dartmouth expects of all of its graduates are extraordinarily higher than any other college I've ever seen. And in effect, insofar as this was the case, and it seemed to be popular given the new ways in which John was doing things, or with the new sort of foreign study programs as they were coming in in the late '60s, to build a program that offered opportunities for kids in those languages seemed to me a natural as part of the greater intellectual challenge that was hitting Dartmouth.

The other side of it was that, if you go back and look historically at the development of language studies, whether in English or foreign languages, sort of the advent of new literary criticism, of literary critical theory, was something that first emerged in comparative literature. It was the comparisons that led to the theoretical constructs of understanding how language functioned and worked in a novel, in plays, in you know. And so that—and I think from Comp Lit it moved into—you know, it started in one language, I suppose in French, the most, but the—it sort of moved into the foreign languages; I think French and Italian first, then German, much less in Portuguese and Spanish. That's why you have—we used to have a Romance Language Department. Now it's the, you know, French and Italian versus Portuguese and Spanish—it really relates to this literary criticism—and least of all in English. Now English does it too.

But the argument initially, I think, to [Lawrence] Larry Harvey, who was the Dean of the Faculty and himself in basically French and Italian, when it was approved, was that it was a program that was not apt to attract many students, that indeed you might not economically be able to justify it in terms of the number of students taught in particular courses for the number of professors required. But that it was absolutely justifiable in the way in which it would teach or renew, refresh, expand, enhance, the literary critical abilities, the literary theory abilities, of all the foreign language faculty who were caught up in this program. So that, in other words, the justification internally at least, with the Deans, was very much at the "this is to train faculty, to enhance, to stretch faculty," much more than it is necessarily to be there just for students.

BURNS: Now did you teach courses in the program?

WOOD: Yes, yes. I guess [Stephen] Steve Nichols ['58], who was the first person, French and Comparative Literature, who was sort of hired from Wisconsin to set this up or lead it--Steve happened to know that I had taken as many literature courses, both as an undergraduate and as a graduate student, as I had history courses, and in that sense it was sort of a fluke I was a historian, not a literary critic. And Steve also, in a comparative literature

sense, was very interested in the whole comparison of literature, novel, versus history. So that he talked me into it. Was I willing to do a course, I think called open-endedly, "Classics of the Middle Ages," which would be a comparative course in literature, but also what was the difference between looking at these things as literature as compared to looking at history. And so that I did that and a variety of other courses in Comp Lit. Actually ended up publishing things in comp lit.

BURNS: And the students that were in the program: was it kind of an honors program, or was it more by . . .

WOOD: Effectively, yes. Dartmouth always sort of said, "Oh, we don't have any honors programs around here." But effectively, at that point, particularly at Dart—it was an honors program. So that you couldn't just, you know, fill out a study card, and here you meet the requirements, and OK, you're automatically in it. You had to select the courses so that there was a certain amount of a self-made major. There were certain requirements you had to take, particular criticism courses. But then you also had to write an essay on why you wanted to make this as a major, and what you saw as being your culminating senior project: your mandatory, in effect, honors thesis.

And then this was reviewed by the Steering Committee and bounced back and forth, and you weren't—and you still aren't let in unless you can get by the Steering Committee, which may well turn things back to you two or three times for further thought or re-doing or so on. So that—and with a requirement that used to be full-scale honors thesis; now it has—it's eased off this, as, I think, the need has gone down. So that it can be either a thesis, or there is a so-called "two-paper option," if you take two seminars with lengthy papers, that those lengthy papers can qualify as your culminating senior experience.

BURNS: Was there a set number of students in the program, or was it just...?

WOOD: No, it was—yeah, it was whoever you could get. And initially—oh, boy, in terms of majors, we probably didn't have, through most of the '70s, we probably ranged from six to nine or ten majors at most. It then went up some in the '70s, more in the '90s, which also reflects some changes in the major. As literary criticism became of a post-modern, Lacan deconstructionist variety, to simplify it too much, became the norm in more and more literatures, there was less need to have this as a program that was designed mainly to train the faculty. Which allowed you to open up various alternatives that stretched undergraduates but didn't necessarily stretch the faculty as much, which then brought in more students. So that

you can now do English and one foreign language rather than two, or you can do literature and an auxiliary discipline: literature and art, literature and history, I mean, comparing that that way, so on, which clearly, the more alternatives and options you offer with courses to match, the more students you tend to attract. So that now, I'm not sure what the numbers are now. I think when I stepped down from the Steering Committee in '96 or whenever it was, we probably had about 20, maybe even 25 people majoring in it each year.

BURNS: And is this generally the way the other academic programs work, where you would apply to a steering committee?

WOOD: No. I think if you are, you know—certainly not in departments. In departments, typically, you just go and get a study card and then you go see some member of the department as sort of your ad hoc advisor. In other programs, I think you've got sort of, you don't have that absolutely required thesis, and that you have to get the topic in what you propose to do approved as being, you know, challenging enough to be worthy of a thesis. Which is tough to do when you're a sophomore, where you're going to be as a senior. So that my impression, although I don't know for sure, is that most other programs, you can go in and you'll talk to anybody in the program, or simply with the Chair, that the Chair of the program has to sign off on it, but there isn't a sort of steering committee review of what it is you plan to take and why you're planning to take it. I think most programs, they don't ask you that.

BURNS: So the Comparative Literature Program is really unique?

WOOD: I think it's unique in that, yes. A lot of programs, too, there are others that don't really offer majors, that simply you can get a certificate that you're in it, or have only recently begun offering majors.

BURNS: You've also been very active with the Alumni College over the years, and I'm wondering if you can sort of describe and define the Alumni College and talk about when you first became involved.

[End of Tape 6, Side A — Beginning of Tape 6, Side B]

WOOD: Well, Alumni College began in the middle '60s and grew out of a program which had been offered at the Tuck School to bankers who had wanted a program of renewal in liberal education.

BURNS: This was like executives?

WOOD: Yes. And they found that this was enormously popular, and I think [Michael] Mike McGean as Secretary of the College simply said, "Hey, I think this is something that might be very popular with alumni in general." So I think initially he signed up a man named [James] Jim Cusick in Economics to be the Academic Director, to put together a program of two weeks in the summer, come back for alumni liberal education. I think initially Jim simply put together three or four lecturers, two of whom would lecture each day in the morning, followed by a discussion group, and then basically afternoons and evenings were entirely normal summer vacation.

Then I guess [Harold] Harry Bond in English took over from Jim, and Harry began having themes each summer. That you would take, in effect, one of those big-think issues such as the ones that John Dickey hoped would be addressed in Alumni—I mean, in Great Issues, and have it as the theme for the summer. And then have lecturers from different disciplines who would discuss it, discuss it from their point of view with reading, and then after those two lectures then about an hour and half of discussion. Increasingly, I think, if possible you might have movies or plays or other things in the evening that might relate to this program, but still the basic idea was sort of flexibility in the afternoon and evening.

What you found was, I think, enormous response from alumni, who—you know, it seems to me a liberal education, it seems to me, operates in two ways: one, it trains you how to think, how to learn about something, regardless of what it is, in a hurry so you can operate with it effectively. So that as you're out on the job learning about what is the job I now have, or as new things come along you're able to learn how to learn about it in a heck of a hurry. So that it has a practical element. But the other side, I suppose, is also, it's fun. That it can be stimulating, enjoyable, so that the night the TV set breaks down, you haven't got anything else to do, you can happily pick up a book and find it's worth reading.

Now clearly it was—it's that side that clearly appealed to alumni. Found it all sorts of different ways depending, to some extent, on who they were, but to some extent on life stages. Because in some ways a liberal education is partly concerned with "Who am I, where am I going, what's the meaning of life," etc. So that you could well get people in their forties who were going through that mid-career crisis, type of, "I want to get away," and sort of almost in the shipboard, not connected with my normal life, to sit and think about things. You know, "all these things that have happened to me, all these facts, all this experience I've got, what does it mean? I don't have a chance to think about it."

And I think again and again—interestingly, I think when we began people thought the lectures were by far the most important thing, and “why the hell do you have these damned discussion groups anyhow?” As you—the more we went on, the more—“hey, the discussion groups really are the heart of it, aren't they?” Because you'd sort of get people who had started with pure data of experience, who then began seeing what some of the meaning of that experience might be for them. So that I think it's all those types of things that have tended, over the years, to make it a very lively thing of continuing interest. And why there aren't—I think there are still one or two people who have been to every single one of them.

BURNS: Really?

WOOD: Yeah.

BURNS: So the courses differ that much from year to year.

WOOD: Right, right, yeah.

BURNS: And what, sort of from a teacher's perspective, what do you think you've gained from teaching an older audience as opposed to the undergraduates?

WOOD: I guess as I—you know, during the years I was the Academic Director and therefore in charge of recruiting the faculty, and you need up to ten to fifteen faculty members a year, was sort of an argument that, “Hey, all of us as academics, in our academic work are making models of reality, and we're claiming that our models, our interpretations, you know, are the best thing there is for understanding reality, and in a sense we want our models therefore to be as close to reality as possible”. Now that's one of the points of having bright students, because those bright students are the ones who, in a sense, challenge you, and insofar as they're challenging students, they keep on forcing you to refine and make your model better. The problem, though, is that students lack experience, and so they can challenge you on sort of the basic principles of whatever your discipline is—they know all that backwards and forwards—but that's what they're challenging you on.

I said, You know, part of the fun with alumni is, you'll find they're awfully bright too. But they haven't, most of them, been to school for some time, so they're not as good on that type of ch—but they've got something that the students don't have, and that's experience. And so you're going to be disconcerted sometimes, when someone sort of looks at you and says, “God, that's crap. Now in my company here's what happens.” But you

listen to the facts coming at you: they are facts based on experience that do, in some ways, challenge the point that you're making. It is wonderfully stimulating as a result, as well as, most of them are terribly nice people.

So that—the other aspect, I suppose (it partly relates to that sense of Hey, Dartmouth changed only in Freedman's years if you're right now; Oh no, it changed in Kemeny's years; oh no, it changed in Dickey's years) is, I think, every faculty member, and I suspect this may be true elsewhere too, I think has the instinctive feeling that (wherever they are, but certainly at Dartmouth), that the place was an intellectual disaster area before they themselves arrived, and that everything you saw Bluto do in *Animal House* or something is absolutely true, that all Dartmouth alumni by definition are a bunch of beer-guzzling fanny-pinching animals. Well, in fact this is not quite true. And so therefore, again as part of the come-on, but sometimes not saying it because I thought it would be better for people to learn on their own, that that sort of discovery of these alumni who in fact turn out to be terribly nice and quite intelligent and sometimes remarkably informed people, is a real revelation and maybe this place has more going for it over a longer period of time than they would have thought. So that it—that aspect always has struck me as worthwhile and fun.

BURNS: To what extent did alumni input drive the curriculum, or did it?

WOOD: Of Alumni College itself?

BURNS: Yes.

WOOD: Each year I think we'd always ask, Are there particular topics that you're interested in, in terms of filling out evaluation forms at the end of the session. And I honestly can't tell you. That is, I know that a couple of times specific things were put in by alums, or a thing kept on coming up, that I'd say, "Hey, this is something that I want to respond to." Other times, most of the time, no. You always asked, but lots of times, I think partly because of that phenomenon of, they're very good on experience but they're less good on abstracting and conceptualizing from the experience to be able to say, "The theme should be such-and-such." Although sometimes I know I'd try and look for a theme that tried to deal with both sides.

I know one year I tried—God help me, it turned out to be the summer of Watergate, I picked something like "Law and Order: Who Needs It?" And I guess part of the reason I picked a law thing was, law tends to come down to an awful lot of nitty-gritty facts, the first thing they were damned good at. But it also has the conceptual side of it, at which they weren't

very good. And therefore I thought, Hey, bringing the two together might lead to a lot of sparks, as indeed it did! It was quite a summer.

BURNS: So many of the issues we've talked about: coeducation and the Indian symbol and some of the other things have had, have provoked a kind of a strong alumni reaction, and I'm wondering, did the Alumni College try to sort of stay away from these types of issues in the Alumni College, or did they just . . . ?

WOOD: No, not necessarily. Let me give you an example from that Watergate summer. In fact, you tried, in a way, to show how, with (I'll try and make it as pompous-sounding as possible) *proper academic distance and perspective*, many of these issues become discussible, and therefore much more interesting and potentially ones with which you can deal. I mean, that is—the problem I faced with "The Law and Who Needs It?" was that I had picked it a year in advance, to select people, before Watergate had emerged. All you had were sorts of arguments about strict constructionists on the Supreme Court, etc., which I planned to use. But you know, then, you know, over the course of the academic year Watergate looms up and is totally unresolved as Alumni College comes along, and, but clearly people's passions are up. So this group, which will have, you know, many liberal Democrats but many very conservative Republicans, you know, would they all end up shooting each other? And you knew you were sooner or later going to have to talk about Richard Nixon.

Well, luckily I had put Magna Carta on the reading list as sort of the first reading, and so I gave an opening lecture called "Magna Carta: Seventh Crisis of John Plantagenet" (or that was the title that it was given afterwards. It had no title as far as they were concerned), in which I looked at the growing powers of government that happen in 12th and early 13th century England, and how John comes in and abuses them and, you know, basically gets knocked off. And—but I did it entirely in Nixonian vocabulary, which people did not pick up on. It was the first lecture I'd given, as far as they were concerned—until about halfway through the lecture (I've got a tape of it, it's pretty funny)—as sort of—by the end of the lecture they are rolling in the aisles. At first it's nothing, it's only halfway through when I guess John sends his troops in to shoot down the radicals at Oxford University, and the others flee to found their own free university, which turns out to be Cambridge, you know. It's all fact. And I think it's at that point they begin catching on.

But the point was, they loved it. I didn't go too far over the line, but what that meant was that during the first week of Alumni College they could talk

about King John and the problems of law and order, law and how it worked for him, and didn't have to deal with Nixon. But they were dealing with Nixon. By the second week they had got to know each other enough and had developed, in a sense, their own academic skills enough, so the second week we spent talking about Nixon. And it's that kind of—and, with, you know, some very interesting comments and perceptions and understandings being arrived at and made. And I think that's how a liberal education can or should work very nicely. And I still hear comments about that.

BURNS: So the program was largely set by faculty?

WOOD: Yes. Yes.

BURNS: And did the Development Office play any role?

WOOD: No. The interesting—Michael McGean, I think, initially set it down very clearly that—I think Mike's feeling was, this is simply another contact with Dartmouth. And I have the feeling, he said, that this kind of program will attract a very different kind of person from the ones who go to normal sort of Alumni Club functions. If that really happens, we're making more contacts with more alumni. But the way to kill the program is to get the Development people in any way involved. This is liberal education for its own sake. And so Mike really insisted from the beginning that Development and Alumni College be kept as far away from each other as possible. And on the whole, that's continued to prevail.

I think all of us have anecdotal information that shows that Alumni College in fact leads to giving. I can remember sort of in '75 giving something on the Twentieth Century, which had, um (it will come to me), one of our more popular astronomers, who also works very well as a "mad scientist," as one of the lecturers. Well, I commented, "Here for the first lecture," — here's a guy who I'd met at Alumni College years before, [Gerard] Jerry Bayard Swope ['29]. His father had the same name as the Chairman of the Board of General Motors or General Electric—you know, multibillionaire type. I said, "Jerry, how are you?" "Ah, fine." Well, it turned out Jerry's sister is an astronomer, but anyhow he was coming for [Delo] Dee Mook's lectures. And he sort of smiled, and he said, "You know, I know it's gonna cost me a fortune," he said, "but I've just got to come."

Well, by the end of it he had bought a new telescope for the observatory here on campus, but basically he gave all the money for our half of the one down in the Southwest, to a huge observatory we've got, that we

share with—what, Michigan as I remember [McGraw Hill telescopes at Kitt Peak, AZ]. And so Swope was the one who did that. And it clearly was sort of, as his enthusiasm for all this was rekindled by Dee Mook in Alumni College. So that—but the point is, I think if we had had Development people there, saying "Hello, Mr. Swope, how good to see you," you know, "Great Class of '31" or whatever he was, you know—he would have walked out the door and gone home.

BURNS: Two questions then: in your role of recruiting faculty was it a) easy to recruit them for this, and was it easier because the Development Office wasn't involved and it was . . .

WOOD: I don't think Development Office really came up with faculty. The—and on the whole it was easy to recruit. The tricky part of it is—and why you keep on—well—is, you've got to get the right type of faculty member. I mean, that is effectively, when you're dealing with people who are your peers in terms of age or for a lot of people it will be older than you, that discussion groups, you really are the M.C. but they are the people doing the discussing. And that, I think, is frequently difficult for some academics to learn, that they themselves want to talk too much; or even if they let the others talk, their idea of a discussion group is starting out with everybody all over the map and by the end of the group they all agree with you. That, with this type of group, is absolutely disastrous. So in other words, I suppose, as you're looking for people to do Alumni College there are some teachers who are, you know, very popular with undergraduates who have some sort of quirk of this variety, that you have the feeling they may not be able to do as well with the alumni group, of people their own age or older. So that that kind of judgment call is a tricky one.

BURNS: I'm guessing that your continued involvement with the Alumni College was because that you found it very rewarding.

WOOD: Yeah, I found it enjoyable. I mean, as I think I said early on, I came to Dartmouth or decided to stay at Dartmouth because I was committed to liberal education and not just pre-professional training. And clearly, a lot of that kind of liberal education goes on at Alumni College, and it can be fun as liberal education for a faculty member too, insofar as it's much easier to get into fields that you sort of wanted to explore or that are hobbies that might not—you wouldn't be able to do as formal professional academic.

I mean, so that, a week and a half ago, for example, [William W.] Bill Cook and I were giving an Alumni Seminar here to the Dartmouth Club of the Upper Valley, called "The War of Words: Turning Point at Gettysburg."

So that I, even though I'm a medievalist doing something on American history, the Civil War, looking at the change of language and concepts, as you move through the war, and sort of really turning with the Gettysburg Address. Wonderful stuff from a liberal education point of view, but I'm not properly certificated, as they say in the ed biz, to do that sort of thing as a professional within my classroom with people working for formal degrees.

BURNS: Was—during your time with the Alumni College, was this a similar reaction that you found among other faculty, that they kind of grew attached to it?

WOOD: A lot of them did, yes, yes. And some who did it for years and years simply as discussion leaders. They just loved both the people and that kind of function, and never really expressed any desire to lecture. And so it—interesting that way.

BURNS: And you hear that John Kemeny taught a class a semester, or two out of three semesters, as President. Did he ever teach in the Alumni College at all?

WOOD: No, although that year that Swope came, which was—it was an Alumni College on the Twentieth Century in 1975, sort of three-quarters of the way through the century, where have we been, where are we going? And obviously, given John's role in computers and BASIC and timesharing and so on, he was a logical person to lecture. So I went to John, and I said, "John, are you willing to lecture?" and he said, "I am willing to lecture, give a lecture, as long as I can talk on nothing but computing, timesharing, BASIC, so on. My academic skill—I don't want to say a damn thing as President of Dartmouth College."

And so, OK, he agreed to give this afternoon lecture. I introduced him. So I introduced him in terms of the various things he had done, starting with his Princeton career and his mathematical help to Albert Einstein and so on, and introduced him as Adjunct Professor of Mathematics John G. Kemeny. And he then proceeded to give a marvelous lecture. I remember one person afterwards coming up to me and sort of looking at me and I still don't know whether he was a Dartmouth alum, or (we get a number of people who are not alumni who've come with friends)—he said, "That man is President of Dartmouth, isn't he?" I said, "Yes, but he wanted to go as a teacher." So . . .

BURNS: And his . . .

WOOD: Oh yes! And then again also, we did it as an Alumni Seminar in Cleveland, where John—hah!—I can't remember what the hell the topic

was we were doing together, but John, as I've mentioned earlier, was a notorious night owl, and so it was quickly agreed I would give the first lecture, and kind of that I would have to go on lecturing until John appeared, which you didn't know how long—luckily he showed up at a sort of reasonable time. But he enjoyed them. I mean, John—the curious thing, John was committed to a lot more than mathematics. His claim that he really wanted to retire, not to go to work for some foundation or necessarily to go back to teaching math; he wanted to go back to teaching Plato. Interesting sort of in that—which—he had taught Plato and straight philosophy at Princeton before he came to Dartmouth.

BURNS: Right, I was going to say, he came out of the Philosophy Department.

WOOD: Yeah, right, mm-hm.

BURNS: So it sounds like—you've already alluded to the answer to this question—but it sounds like John Kemeny was one of the teachers who not only was adept at teaching undergraduates but it translated to the Alumni College.

WOOD: Yes. Yes. Very much so.

BURNS: The last sort of topic that I want to cover today, then is the Trustees' Advisory Committee on Investor Responsibility, which you served on from 1976 to '78, and then again in 1986, is that correct?

WOOD: Mm. I served more than that, but you know, it wasn't one that I put down on my vita that often.

BURNS: I'm wondering, you had been—I think we discussed last time you had been in investment—

WOOD: Yes, I'd started as an investment banker, and—before I went to graduate school, yes. And then actually the first year I was in graduate school, at the end of it I worked at First Boston Corporation, sort of since I had passed all the SEC exams and so on, I could fill in for anybody going on vacation, as sort of a way of supporting my way through graduate school.

BURNS: And how did you get involved with the committee, then?

WOOD: I'm honestly not sure, you know. I think faculty members are appointed to that committee, or were appointed to it, by the Committee on Organization and Policy or something. So I assume that some—I mean, in other words, a faculty nomination is made, I think. And so that I think someone must have known that I had an investment banking experience, thinking that,

you know, stocks and bonds, investment banking, might be relevant to the committee, which in one sense it is, although the committee's real purpose was to advise the Trustees primarily on motions that would come before stockholders' meetings, of stocks in which the College was invested, relating to social or religious or, you know, sort of political issues rather than ones of strict economic viability of the investment in question.

BURNS: And the main one you hear about is obviously South Africa.

WOOD: Yes. I mean, although when I was on the committee South Africa was, by the time I went off, or I guess when I was the vice, or the chair of it—and I think I'm the only faculty member who ever was the chair of it. By that point I guess South Africa had begun to be a big issue. Early on of that kind of divest from South—any company dealing with South Africa, it was much more Arab boycotts of Israel. So that, you know, insofar as Coca-Cola, for example, has bottling companies or plants in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia is boycotting any company that does business with Israel, let's divest from Coca-Cola. So you had those types of ones. Environmental ones would come up. I mean, so that, you know, a coal company that we had had stock in from way back, which had been a normal underground pit operator which then went to open pit, and...

[End of Tape 6, Side B — Beginning of Tape 7, Side A]

WOOD: ... Well, so the company that switches from regular pit mining to strip mining, and clearly is not observing much, many regulations about putting the land back into shape insofar as you get, "Should we be invested in that?" Or if there are specific motions from stockholders at a stockholders meeting against management policy of some variety, "Should we support that? Or should we do something different?" Should the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, for example, write a letter to someone who may be his buddy who is the CEO of this company, saying "Hey George, we're not voting against you but we're very concerned. Is there anything you can do?" So that it was all the—and it was created by the Trustees precisely—I think it didn't come into existence until the 1970s, but clearly arose out of all those issues related to Vietnam, so on, that "What is this company doing, do we want to be invested in this company that makes napalm, or so on." So that there were certainly all sorts of background of that.

And it was a committee that typically would have one or two alumni, typically living in the area but not necessarily (we had, I know, one that used to commute over from sort of upstate New York for meetings), alumni who tended to have an investment banking background, or Trustees

themselves. I think I first met [Richard] Dick Hill ['41], for example, on this committee. It may have been before he became a Trustee and was simply First Bank of Boston. But--and then faculty members, and then there may--there were a student or two. I can't remember whether there were always administrators on it or not. It was a fairly—it was designed to be a fairly broad cross-section of Dartmouth.

And then beyond, beyond normal investments like Coca-Cola or so on, you then had the other ones that--Dartmouth, for example, was with the Society for New Hampshire Forests and, I guess, the First National Bank of Boston were all three together the developers of Eastman, the sort of second home community just south of us. And various questions came up about Eastman or, you know, people who were, who had bought into Eastman who were objecting to types of policy. That they claimed that whoever the management directly running it were attempting to build new apartment buildings sort of blocking their view of the lake, where you know, they were told when they bought their places that this would always be open space. You know, buck buck buck. So we got into some of those types of things.

BURNS: Eastman was the development area that was supposed to kind of adhere towards a green development?

WOOD: Yes, right—sort of showing what responsible green development —this is why you have the Society for New Hampshire Forests, and so on. And I think it looked like a nice, you know, public relations thing, I suspect, from the First Bank's point of view. And, on which they, you know, were probably going to make money. Probably not as much as they might in some other development, but it would make them look good. I don't mean that cynically, but I'd assume that was part of their thinking.

BURNS: Now this field of socially responsible investing, then, is fairly young. And I'm wondering—clearly I think...

WOOD: Well, yes. Yes. It is certainly as—the funny thing about it: I got interested in this, Chris, because you say, “Hey, this is new.” That it was only in the '70s, so on, that colleges began challenging and disinvesting from companies or writing proxy things to get them to change their ways, or— not just colleges, pension funds, so on, were doing the same thing, typically teachers' ones. And yet it's got a long background. I mean, curiously, Dartmouth for example, as a matter of policy, I believe has never invested in—I think it's both distilleries, alcohol, and tobacco. And it sort of—and I think it goes back to kind of the Eleazar and ministerial days, that these things are sinful.

Also there—you know, one of the wonderful apocryphal stories floating around Dartmouth (I'm sure it's still out there somewhere) is, this alum from Seattle dies, and he leaves Dartmouth, you know, a piece of property in Seattle. And so the Trustees take it, and before they have the opportunity to sell it or do anything else, they're absolutely stunned by the amount of income that this property is producing. You know, it's one of their better investments. And so they get curious, so that, you know, one of the Trustees says at one of their meetings, they've been going on this thing, "Well you know, I've got to be out in Seattle next month on business; maybe I'll take a look. What's the address?" And so they all wait expectantly, and then next month a letter comes in: "It's a whorehouse." At which point the Trustees disinvest very quickly.

And I guess—I talked with Trustees in general about this sort of thing, because—some of whom obviously were grumbling, just as they grumbled about coeducation, about going on with this new goddamned radical, you've got to have these committees like this, to advise us on—and you know, all this new stuff; we've always invested entirely on the return, and you've got to do it on the return. And there are lots of reasons why you do. And saying, "Hey, as a general rule yeah, you're probably right, but Dartmouth has in fact always had limits." And that was a beautiful story to sort of illustrate it, because it got everybody laughing, you know. And once they laugh at it, and then you say, "Hey, but what about the tobacco or alcohol thing which is there?" So that then as you sort of begin looking, then you've got I think greater understanding of it.

And the doubt was always, What do you do? Do you just—because I think everybody recognized that voting "no" might be nice symbolically, but even when all of righteous academe, all pension funds, everything, are all voting "no," that's probably seven percent of the vote. I mean, you haven't got a prayer of winning them. So what are the effective—I guess it's two things: what are the effective ways of making your views come to bear, and beyond that, at what point do you as an institution feel this is serious enough that you want to disinvest? And I'm not sure that Dartmouth has ever fully resolved that. But it has, in fact, it did disinvest from the coal company, for example. Decided that that was hopeless. But you know, I'm not sure you could point to a definite rule, because each case is so damned unique.

BURNS: Well, that gets me kind of back to my question that I was heading towards with the field being young, and I sort of mean it being young in the sense of, I don't anticipate that there were a lot of people out there doing research on this type of . . .

WOOD: Actually, there were a couple of places that we subscribed to that were—and I wish I could give you the names right now, but that sort of specialized in doing research into these types of issues to advise.

BURNS: I think Wayne Broehl or Hennessey mentioned one of them, which might have been the IRRC, Investor Responsibility Research Center. I'm guessing that when you were making these decisions that you would look for some of this research . . .

WOOD: You'd look for it, but in lots of the cases you didn't have it, no.

BURNS: And . . . I forgot what my second question was.

WOOD: Well, the problem that you come up against, too, that—I was trying to think, there's a wonderful guy at Tuck who came on after Wayne Broehl from the Tuck School, whose wife is the executive secretary for Peace Studies here, and he's a very conservative Irishman[Dennis Logue]. I can't think of—I'd have to look in the—but anyhow—wonderful guy—but he always would raise, whenever you were dealing with South Africa and types of oppression, he would raise Ireland or Northern Ireland. And God, there [are] awful lot of this stuff going on without the black/white divide. But an awful lot that was going on in South Africa, you could equally apply to types of issues in Northern Ireland. And you know, the funny thing is that on the whole, no one was wanting to do that in this country. And you know, to what extent are you, in other words, imposing or insisting on a uniform standard? And in this type of proxy morality, that type of issue comes up, I suspect, again and again if you want to really push it, and raise it.

BURNS: Now the charge of the Investor Responsibility Advisory Committee, I would assume, was not necessarily to set policy?

WOOD: We made recommendations, yeah. Right. And most of them were directed toward specific questions, I mean of specific companies and specific proxies. We may have made—and I think there—I know, I can remember vaguely trying to draft two or three sort of policy principles to sort of try to tell the Trustees, you know, what were the principles on which I thought the committee was operating in arriving at the specific decisions: which things seemed to be most important for us. I can't remember whether we approved that or not.

BURNS: Do you remember how well the committee was received by the Trustees? Because at this point, in the late '70s, the Trustees had some pretty powerful investment folks, Walter Burke. . .

WOOD: That's right, that's right, yeah. Right. They—as far as I know we were perfectly well received. I don't think the committee—because I think the Trustees had enough input into its selection, I don't think the committee was perceived as itself being a radical activist committee, but that it was a committee of people who had more time to spend on these issues and perhaps more interest than a lot of the Trustees. The funny thing about Trustees, Chris, in my experience, is that a lot of them, as you say, may come from, you know, very involved in high-up, you know, industrial manufacturing capitalist, you name it, range of jobs, who, you know, in the visions of the late '60s were clearly sort of the enemy. The funny thing, though, is that even—I mean, people who may in fact be very tough customers in their own business dealings and decisions typically, insofar as they get involved with a Dartmouth College and agree to serve on their Board and spend a lot of time—have an idealistic side that is kind of, “Hey, while I know out there in the ‘real world’ it is messy and you've got to be tough and so on, but thank God there are places like Dartmouth where the ideal still prevails.”

So that—I mean, in a funny way sort of with this wonderfully idealistic, and where they can express it and help cherish and nurture it, so that things that, if they were suggested in their own business the person's head would be chopped off, is the only thing to do because it's for Dartmouth. Bill Andres was absolutely that way. [inaudible] Bill almost wept when he talked about it, it was such a religious experience. And that's, you know, I suspect that's where some of the difficulties in the coeducation decision came for some of them, that, you know, that somehow this Garden of Eden, and there aren't any snakes in the Garden, you know. And somehow introduce sexuality and all that's—and I can remember back then, “God, No,” you know, “Save them from it!” I think was—I mean, quite seriously, I'm sure that some of that sort of thing is there, which, you know, a place like Dartmouth has been able very effectively, and, you know, thank God that they've had it. And I suspect, you know, most schools of a variety like Dartmouth have that sort of thing in their Board of Trustees, or the most active of their charitable alumni, so on.

BURNS: Well, there's that dynamic; and I guess what I also sort of meant was, it seems like that group of Trustees in the late '70s and early '80s also had a significant amount of investment experience and knowledge. And I'm wondering if there was ever any hint that they just didn't feel they needed the input because they already knew . . .

WOOD: I think that's why Dick Hill went on the committee. My impression is that he wasn't sure the committee was needed. And I think he also wondered, you know, what sort of people did you have on the committee anyhow? Maybe we shouldn't be. And then found himself in fact being forced to go to these meetings and listen to the discussion and so on, sort of coming into it and responding positively to it, is my feeling.

BURNS: OK. Well, I think I want to save any further discussion on investment in South Africa for the next time, when we begin to talk more about David McLaughlin's election to the presidency, because that will become a big issue during his era. Let's wrap it for the day.

End of Interview

INTERVIEW: Charles Wood

INTERVIEWED BY: Chris Burns

PLACE: Charles Wood's home in Hanover

DATE: February 13, 2001

BURNS: Today is February 13, 2001 and I'm speaking with Charles Wood at his home in Hanover—Daniel Webster Professor of History, Emeritus. I wanted to start today by talking about the end of John Kemeny's presidency and the beginning of David McLaughlin's, or more importantly the beginning of the search for John Kemeny's successor. I wanted to ask you how aware you were of what was happening with the search for John Kemeny's successor.

WOOD: I was very aware of it, in a double sense. That is, I think at the time John's resignation was—before it became public knowledge, it so happened that he needed to a—that we needed a new Dean of the Faculty. And so that search was conducted under John's presidency. And apparently, even though I was not at all interested in the job (I had by this point decided I never really wanted to be an administrator, that I was a historian), apparently my name had been mentioned frequently enough to the committee and by the committee, John felt he had to interview me. We had a funny time, in which he then told me that he was—that he had told the Trustees he was resigning. I mention that partly because the first person who occurred to me as a possible replacement for him was Dave McLaughlin, even though it seemed highly unlikely insofar as he was Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

But if that was in the spring of 1980, I guess, the next year I was on sabbatical and out of town, in fact living in Cambridge, Massachusetts doing research at the Harvard Libraries. And I think because I was out of town and therefore out of the rumor mill loop on campus, I became a sounding board, or somebody that people on the search committee would call up to ask one thing or another, or to report one thing or another, or ask me did I want to be a candidate. I said, “No, I did not.” And so that I was very aware of this as it proceeded.

BURNS: Were these faculty members that were sounding you out on the search committee?

WOOD: There were two different—there were two or three different varieties. I mean, that is, really faculty probably called me most frequently. Probably the most interesting one, however, was a phone call from David Lilly, Class of '39, who at that point was the Chairman of the Board of Toro. In fact, I suppose, after World War II, although Toro had existed before that point, Dave effectively had become the second re-founder of it. And I should explain that the Lilly's were very good friends of my parents in Saint Paul, Minnesota—that is Dave's parents. Dave was, probably still is, the, probably my oldest brother's best friend. So that there had been this long connection with Dave and his wife which I think had somewhat intensified when I began teaching at Dartmouth. And Dave probably—Lilly—called me in Cambridge, probably the day that Dave—or the day following—Dave McLaughlin's going to the Toro Board to tell them that he was on the short list of candidates for the presidency, and that if he were selected he was going to take the job.

BURNS: Dave McLaughlin was president of Toro at this point?

WOOD: He was president of Toro at that point. I had—I should explain, I had known him long before he'd become president of Toro. I think I first ran into him when he was working in the Chicago area and was Chair of the Chicago Alumni Club, oh, circa 1970 or so, and met him because he was one of the great pushers for an Alumni Seminar in Chicago. And so [I] saw him each year as those Alumni Seminars were taking place in Chicago, the same thing in Minneapolis, when he moved to Minneapolis to become the Chair of Toro, that he very quickly established an Alumni Seminar in the Twin Cities, and then--this all before he went on the Board of Trustees at Dartmouth.

And in any event, Dave Lilly called, not having talked, apparently, to anyone on the search committee, and clearly, as the conversation, which must have lasted two or three hours, went on, clearly anxious to talk to Dick Hill as the person most in charge of it. That is, it became very clear, although Dave did not specifically originally talk about Dave McLaughlin, he clearly put the case that he was terribly disturbed that, given modern educational institutions and the nature of their scholarly being, it was inappropriate for a businessman to be president of one. And he went on at great length. And I can remember arguing with him, because it seemed to me there were so many different types of questions that academics get so hung up on that an outsider had the neutral judgment to deal with, that I thought that in fact a businessman might be very good in terms of, for example, the types of issues that Dartmouth had, which in some senses revolved around questions of, "Should we continue on year-round education; how best is Affirmative Action to be implemented," so on. That

in some senses it seemed to me business had in many ways done rather better than academe had in addressing or facing up to some of these things.

And it—well, as we went on, I think at the end of it Dave Lilly said, "Well, you've made me feel better, but I'm still not so sure." And in turn, then, I called up, and I can't remember—I think probably [David] Dave Baldwin, one of the faculty members of the committee, in Hanover, to report this conversation. And that clearly Dave Lilly was anxious to talk to Dick Hill, which as Dave told me after the event, Yes, that he had had an even longer and much more candid conversation about Dave McLaughlin, and that while he had not obviously persuaded Dick that Dave McLaughlin was not the candidate, he was satisfied that his word had received a full hearing.

Interestingly, because Dave McLaughlin one-on-one is probably one of the most personable people I've ever seen and enormously effective in small groups, one of Dave Lilly's concerns as he expressed it to me was that he was terribly afraid that Dave McLaughlin in fact was not a people person, and that this would be a great problem for him as the president of a college in which the personal relationships were so very important. I think in some ways that sort of observation about Dave certainly does speak to some of the problems he had while being President.

BURNS: Now, at this point David Lilly had been on the Thayer Board.

WOOD: He had been on the Thayer Board of Overseers, and he certainly was somebody who, I think, both himself wanted to be a Trustee and was frequently mentioned as a candidate for it. But then Dave McLaughlin, becoming President of Toro, was elected as an alumni Trustee, and I think it really sort of undercut the chances of Dave Lilly as a Trustee. He, though, in fact, went on then to have a very significant academic career, because he, while continuing to be the Chair of Toro, went on to be first the Dean of the Business School at the University of Minnesota, and then its Academic Vice President, and did quite a job.

BURNS: ... When the faculty sounded you out about this search, did they sound you out particularly about McLaughlin as a candidate, or was it more general?

WOOD: No, they didn't. There really were relatively few—I mean, they were really sounding me out about potential candidates, academic, either at Dartmouth or elsewhere, that they thought I might know. And right now I'm sorry to say that none stick with me, with one very large exception.

And that is the person who ultimately was the academic candidate of the faculty portion of the committee, and I believe also of the Trustees on the committee. It certainly was true of [Norman] Sandy McCulloch ['50]: that is, if David McLaughlin hadn't been picked, I mean if he had said "no" and they decided to go academic, it would have been that person, and that was Jim Wright. Totally—I think this is probably the best-kept secret on campus.

BURNS: Yeah, I've heard a few other names that were involved with that search, but that's the . . .

WOOD: No, he was the ultimate candidate on this, and I know the interesting thing about it was that that year, or at least during the spring of it, when much of this was going on, Jim was also on sabbatical in Cambridge, and at the Warren Center at Harvard. So that Jim and I (I was one of those who hired him in the History Department, we've always been very close friends), so this was something that we talked about at some detail, both in terms of what he thought about the possibilities or, you know, what should he do when the selection went elsewhere. And what he did was keep his mouth very shut, which allowed him to become Dean and ultimately then to remain a viable candidate here rather than elsewhere.

BURNS: Had he—this is sort of off the topic of the general Oral History Project, but had he done—was he involved with administrative positions . . . ?

WOOD: Yes. He had been the Associate Dean for the Social Sciences, but that was all. In other words, it was a relatively limited experience other than chairing a number of high-profile and highly successful committees. That is, I suppose, that in one sense a small and in another sense very large, the committee that created the whole Native American Studies Program and really made Native American Studies, either as an academic enterprise or as a human one on campus, work; Jim was clearly the person who took the leadership in that.

Then I think I've earlier mentioned that I had served on the Committee, the Trustees' Committee on the Quality of Student Life. Jim chaired the counterpart committee that the Trustees set up, which was on the curriculum. Again, looking ahead, knowing that John Kemeny was resigning, and what would they need in the next president, or out into, you know, looking towards the 21st century. And clearly that committee made the recommendations that ultimately flowed into the type of reform that continued on in the Freedman years, that really was probably the most significant reform of degree requirements in the last forty or fifty years. And I think that was something that cemented the sense that Jim was a

strong academic candidate for this. But not part—that's after your oral history ends. But it's relevant, obviously, to the sort of background of the beginning of the McLaughlin years, so.

BURNS: And it also gives us a little bit of a better picture of what the search committee was looking for in terms of candidates.

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: Which sort of leads me to my next question, is what did the election of Dave McLaughlin signify in terms of what the search committee was looking for?

WOOD: It signified different things to different people, unfortunately. That is, let me put it this way. I think, in terms of the positive side and why I thought immediately of Dave, and why I'm sure that the Trustee members of the committee picked him, had a lot to do with what they saw as the tensions and divisions within the Dartmouth Community broadly conceived, that had been caused by the changes during the Kemeny years, by year-round operation, by coeducation, by Affirmative Action. All the changes of the '70s, whether John was responsible for them or not, clearly, inevitably since he was the President, got laid at his feet.

And so that, as I think I mentioned earlier, this led in '75 to a real split in the Trustees as they were looking for Bill Andres' successor as Chair. And that Dave McLaughlin had come as the sort of compromise candidate that both sides liked, and that apparently from a Trustee point of view in the next five years Dave had done a remarkable job bringing the Trustees together and working together because it's for Dartmouth. And so that my sense of it was that they were so impressed with what he had done with them as a group was so impressive that if he could do the same thing with the alumni body, or the alumni body in relationship to the student body, to the faculty, then maybe to heal the community again, this was what was needed. And I think that was—so that was I think very much the positive sense of what Dave could bring to this.

The negative, I suppose, on the faculty's side (faculty could be enormously sort of narrow-minded and arrogant, it seems to me), where it was—well now, you know, one, I suppose: "Who the hell is this lawnmower salesman?" I suppose is the sort of fairly blunt way to put it. Or as Dave Lilly put it in a rather different way as he was talking with me, he said, "You don't really need a businessman as president, unless you're in real trouble, and I mean financial trouble, so on. And Dartmouth doesn't suffer from those types of troubles." So that what—and I think that kind of

sense—Hey, the businessman, the person who has nothing to do with academe, the person who really is presumably a money man, and, you know, with nothing more "imaginative" than lawnmowers or, you know, all those snowblowers that he's losing his shirt on because it didn't snow last year, that was sort of the faculty one.

And certainly it wasn't helped, I suppose, because, initially, because initially Dave clearly, while a wonderful warm person one-on-one or in small group, was not an experienced public speaker, and in fact spoke quite awkwardly. And he worked his tail off for the next few years learning how to do it, which I don't think he's ever adequately received credit for. But I think that inability to express ideas easily or comfortably in the sort of large setting in which typically faculty communication took place probably intensified that type of concern about him, initially.

BURNS: Had there been any difficulties between the faculty and McLaughlin's performance as a Trustee?

WOOD: Absolutely not, no. No.

BURNS: It was McLaughlin as President . . .

WOOD: Yes, right, exactly. Exactly.

BURNS: And . . .

WOOD: See, I think the coming—going back to the Dickey days, and I think probably very much continued by Kemeny, as for example—most of the knowledge that most faculty would have of Trustees would be as it was conveyed by the President, as the President would report to a faculty meeting what had gone on or what decisions had been made and why, in the most recent Trustee meeting. And I think the type of message that had come through and which I think was generally the case, is that normally there's a sense of a division of responsibility between Trustees and faculty, that faculty basically most of the time make the basic academic decisions. They may technically take the form of recommendations to Trustees, but nine times out of ten Trustees will simply approve what the faculty has recommended. The one joker in that, which gets at the Trustee role, is assuming that it's within the financial capacities of the institution to undertake and do. That is, put it a different way, that the responsibility of the Trustees is to provide for the financial well-being, to make decisions on, "Can we afford this or that?" We are the people also who take responsibility for maintaining the physical fabric of the institution, etc.

Now, where all this begins to be relevant is that the '70s, as I think I've mentioned, were a period of stagflation in which there was a great deal of inflation but no particular growth of economy, or in particular of value of the Dartmouth endowment. Indeed, it went for many years down in value. So that you had a squeezed period in which to try to keep the cost of tuition, of education, as low as possible, we, like everybody else, tended to defer maintenance on our plant. Now what that meant is that, I suspect if you went back and looked at the sort of decisions or initiatives of the McLaughlin presidency from relatively early on, you had an emphasis on physical plant, that we must renew it, that we have to re-do the dormitories, we have to add social space to them, we have to have a decent place for the Admissions Office; the whole of Thayer Hall, of the Dartmouth Dining apparatus needs to be redone. All of this at quite significant cost.

Now from a faculty point of view, if there was deferred maintenance during the '70s it was also true that faculty salaries had not been, had not kept pace with the cost of living, with the inflation rate. So that faculty salaries here and elsewhere had fallen well behind where they had been ten or fifteen years before, so that as you could imagine, from a faculty member's point of view, the chief thing that needed addressing were faculty salaries. You know, not fixing up Thayer Hall. And so that you can see how immediately you have a problem that, when the President says "We need to do something about Thayer Hall," the faculty say, "But what about my salary first?"

So that it seems to me there were these types of things. Another one that came up: in this period, of course, was the Dartmouth Review, which had begun under John Kemeny, and certainly was doing very well raising the hackles of a very high percentage of people on campus. And John Kemeny had basically decided to keep a very low profile with the Review, that it was clear, or he knew that a new president would be coming in shortly. No real crisis emerged with regard to it during his presidency, so it was much better, basically, to leave this to the new guy. So what to do, if anything, about the Dartmouth Review, was left to Dave McLaughlin.

And here you have, you know, one of the toughest types of intellectual problems, of an institution which is by its nature committed to freedom of inquiry and free speech, and yet having this newspaper which is ridiculing and sometimes viciously attacking individual members of the Dartmouth Community, whether administrators or students or so on. And what do you do, if anything? And which also clearly is supported by some

members of the alumni community who had not liked the Kemeny presidency.

I mean, in a sense, my colleague Jere Daniell, who you may be interviewing or already have interviewed, always took the line that the curious thing about the Review is that it so flourished at Dartmouth where its counterparts elsewhere didn't. The irony being that Dartmouth was clearly the most conservative of all the institutions. Why, if it was the most conservative, did it have, did the Review have the greatest support, where, you know, radical pinko Harvard, its Dartmouth Review clone went nowhere. Jere's view of this, and I think there's something to it, is that when you looked at all the changes which had taken place at Dartmouth during both the Dickey and the Kemeny years, that they had a lot of things to complain about, that would resonate with old alums, where, since those changes had not taken place elsewhere because they had always been this way. Dartmouth was merely becoming more like these other places; there wasn't that type of resonance. And I think there's something to it.

Well, the point is that Dave McLaughlin, I think, caught between wanting to bring alienated alumni back into the fold and not quite knowing how you dealt intellectually with these issues, or how to communicate on it at the faculty level, seemed to be totally waffling and indeed, "was he a supporter of the Review?" I think was the negative. So that that was again one of the unexpected problems or difficulties that I think he had.

BURNS: Was McLaughlin thought of by any of these communities, particularly the alumni, as kind of the answer to the Kemeny years?

WOOD: Yes, I think that was part of what some of these people clearly thought, that this was a—and I think in a way they may have expected more from McLaughlin, of turning the clock back, than in fact happened, because there was very little turning back the clock, if any.

BURNS: Which sort of stands to reason, if you think of McLaughlin as the Chair of the Trustees who worked so closely with Kemeny to implement a lot of these.

WOOD: Yes, correct.

BURNS: At the—I guess it's the faculty meeting where McLaughlin is announced as President, there's almost an immediate outcry at that meeting.

WOOD: That's what I understand. I was still in Cambridge at that point. I think I—I came back the week of his actual installation as President, which would have been somewhere in June or July.

BURNS: Was your sense that that outcry was pretty widespread amongst the faculty?

WOOD: I think relatively was, but how deep it was I don't know. I mean, sitting here, you know, not quite a month after George Bush's installation as President, clearly there are a lot of things you can read in the paper of people who you would have said before January 20 were Bush-haters, who say, "Hey, the guy at least in the first few weeks is doing a lot better than we thought he would." I think, in other words, my bet is that if there were a lot of McLaughlin, if not haters, doubters, so on, their doubts weren't that deeply rooted. That if he had suddenly done whatever they conceived of to be the appropriate thing to do . . .

[End of Tape 8, Side A — Beginning of Tape 8, Side B]

WOOD: If he had been able to show them that he had ideas that were even better, or even more exciting than the ones they had themselves, I think they would have very quickly turned around. But clearly that didn't happen.

BURNS: Were there voices of support in the faculty for McLaughlin?

WOOD: There were a few. I don't think I ever was in a position where it was [inaudible] for me publicly to say I supported him, but others clearly did. I was caught more often in positions where I clearly did not support him.

BURNS: What were your initial thoughts and impressions of the job he was doing in the first year or so?

WOOD: Well, it seemed to me he didn't understand a lot of the way in which academe functioned, which meant that he didn't have the background, it seemed to me, or the data that he needed to make good decisions. Let me give you an example, because it was at this point that I, or fairly shortly thereafter, that I went on to the Committee Advisory to the President. And relatively early in that, at a sort of meeting in which Dave really wanted to get to know the members of the CAP and so wanted to do this informally, at a dinner, I remember on the terrace of the Hanover Inn, and simply talking with us about what was happening on campus, and were there things he ought to understand?

Well, it was at this point one of the first sort of minor, seemingly, crises that came up was related to Dave's decision to fire Dennis Dinan ['61], the editor of the Alumni Magazine. And it was one of these sort of tangled free speech issues about an article, I think it was having to do with birth control information and stuff on campus; it was something dealing with sex, that Dave did not like and felt was inappropriate. Dave—Dennis, on the other hand, felt strongly his editorial right to publish it, all, of course, blurred by to what extent is an alumni magazine really the organ of the institution and therefore doesn't quite have the—the editor doesn't have quite the freedom that the editor of the New York Times has.

Well, the problem, I think, was that it wasn't just, "Was this heavy-handed suppression of free speech?" It was that Dennis in fact had worked in Blunt Hall and had for years been the director of Alumni College, the administrative director, and therefore had a lot of faculty friends who liked him and respected him. So that one of the things that struck me was not just that you had a very tricky freedom of speech issue that Dave didn't quite know how to deal with, but that precisely because Dennis was known, liked and admired by a significant number of faculty, the consequences of firing him were apt to come back to haunt Dave in all sorts of things later on that were totally unrelated to it, and that he didn't quite see and understand that.

Well, as, you know, a member of this senior group, ultimately—I mean, recommended by faculty vote but specifically selected—the individuals selected by the President to be his advisors, I and others on the committee sort of talked about this in a very friendly and, in a sense, informative way. And I thought (I think we all thought) this had been a positive and probably very helpful meeting for the President. Well, I guess a week or so later I ran into [Agnar] Ag Pytte, the Provost of the College, and Ag said, "What the hell did you people do with Dave last week? You were all so attacking him! He's very upset!" I said, "Ag, we weren't attacking him, we were trying to provide information that he needs to understand things." And I think it's there that the Dave Lilly "he's not a people person," that he doesn't necessarily understand this sort of thing, began emerging. And it certainly was something that hurt him.

BURNS: Now the caricature of McLaughlin during this time that you hear from some of his opponents is that he's a business person coming to an academic environment, and he didn't understand how the process worked as far as personnel decisions and things of that nature. Is there truth in that?

WOOD: There is and there isn't. I mean that is--I have trouble with it--is that he was wonderful and wonderfully imaginative working at the level of Alumni

College. You look at him since the leaving Dartmouth, in terms of his Aspen Institute things, as in effect this glorified kind of liberal education, continuing, you know, quasi-Alumni College type of thing for business leaders, etc. He's been very successful with that. In other words, at least as I saw him, the idea that he was committed to a liberal education, very enthusiastic about it, could pull other people in, that at the theoretical level was what—but the details of management, how to make this work or what decisions should he have, what decisions should he leave to others: that he wasn't as good on.

Curiously, I think people who worked the most with Dave as an administrator, and I've got this both from Toro people and from Dartmouth ones, is Dave hated to make big decisions. On the other hand—I mean, he was scared of the consequences of them. On the other hand, because he was so aware of the importance of decisions, he himself became an incredible micro-manager. Counterproductively so. And let me give a couple of examples. Things that more or less came up when we, when I was chairing the committee to evaluate the job of the Dean of the Faculty, or the consequences of splitting the Deanship from the Provostship in—I guess that would have been 1984.

And we have the question, for example, of what became known as "Tamara Northern's Door." Tamara was one of the curators in the Hood Museum, and before that, dealing mainly with Native American things. And she lived in one of the College houses, I can't remember whether on South Balch Street or on Valley Road. And those houses, if you look at them, are all white; they all have black doors and shutters also. Tamara, as someone associated with the museum, with sort of aesthetic sensibilities, did not like her black door. She felt it made the house look cheap. So she painted her door red.

The Department of Buildings and Grounds, as it was then called (now Facilities Operations and Management, I guess), were outraged. By their schedule these doors were to be black. So they came down and painted the door black again, and billed Ms. Northern for the cost of the painting. Tamara, of course, went off like a skyrocket. And she not only repainted it back red, but you know, protested all around. Well, as this went on, suddenly the end of it all was that the President of Dartmouth College came down gravely to look at her door and to decide in the end it was all right with him if the damned door was red.

Well, you know, again and again you got this sort of—where he was sort of intervening, checking at people's—sort of undercutting people. Which is part of why administrators began leaving. One of the interesting

things—you do expect, inevitably, a turnover as a new administration takes over. But in Dave's case it really was quite remarkable. There were no huge blowups, but administrators kept on leaving. And it was this type of phenomenon, that as Dave would make decisions—I mean, why—for example, at the level of elegance and style which Dave was quite sensitive to, he felt it was terrible we didn't have a doorman at the Hanover Inn. So somehow Dave himself decided to create this post, charging it to the budget of the Hanover Inn, which was running a deficit at that point. And since his, at that point, either son-in-law or future son-in-law was a hockey star, somehow this became the sinecure of the hockey team. The hockey players were out there in uniform to open doors. When people found out about this, that this was totally Dave McLaughlin's thing, they hit the ceiling.

Then, take one a little more serious, that the then Dean of the Sciences and Dean of Graduate Studies, a man named Bruce Pipes, went over one evening back to—he was a physicist, and . . . so Bruce went over one evening to attend a lecture of some visiting physicist from, you know, of very distinguished variety. And as he entered the physics building here were all these trash bags lining the hall. And he thought this was a terrible impression to make on visiting professors. So the next day he called up Buildings and Grounds to say, "Why the hell do we have that trash around?" And they said, "The only person who can answer that question is the President."

Well, Bruce finally called up the President's office, and the ultimate story was that the person who hauled trash, a man named Orvie Beauchene, for the College at this point, had been using dumpsters around campus. Just as Dave felt that it was inelegant not to have a doorman at the Hanover Inn, properly dressed, that he disliked dumpsters intensively. So he announced that all dumpsters should be removed from the Dartmouth College campus, and when it was pointed out that this might create a trash problem, then announced that he and Paul Paganucci ['53, TU '54], the Treasurer, would come up with a solution.

Well, as I say, Bruce pursued this and found that ultimately Pag and Dave had decided that the solution was that you would simply leave these bags out with sort of assorted into their various recyclable components, and that the College would buy a large dump truck which then would drive around and pick up all this stuff. And so all these bags were out for the dump truck to come around and pick them up. And this came up when Bruce and I were doing an alumni seminar in New Jersey, and it had come up because, by this point, there were enough sort of public noises of problems that McLaughlin was having on campus that Bruce decided to be

an honest Dean and give some examples of this. And I can remember as we drove back into Hanover at two in the morning, and he was driving me up to pick up my car just parked behind Dartmouth Row, as I got into my car to drive off, here came this dump truck with piles of sacks up to the sky, filled with—well.

So that there were these things that, you know, clearly they really did create administrative problems, but they also, obviously, as they became known, were subject to some ridicule. Two aspects, though: one, you seemed constantly to undergo crises but then they would disappear. You know, whether the person involved, or the incident involved, had passed, and you'd say, "Hey, I must be out of my mind." So that, were these serious or weren't they?

Now at this point, and I know you've interviewed Fred Berthold, and I don't whether Fred talked about this or not. Somewhere, Fred had a grant of some variety, that was to, you know, for worthwhile improving of campus communications or what have you. And he—I can't remember whether he was still Dean of the Humanities at this point or back home in the Religion Department—but he was hearing enough of these rumors that he decided to have a sort of unofficial secret sort of dinner of, he thought, important faculty members down at the Sheraton Plaza, whatever it's called now, in West Lebanon, to talk about this, and were there any problems? And the interesting thing about that meeting, and I can't tell you—it must have been somewhere in that kind of '83-'84, somewhere in that period, and [phone ringing]—OK . . . [break]

WOOD: Well, at this dinner, clearly people again and again would sort of talk about concerns, but they were concerns that were gone, so that, was there a crisis? No one really knew. There was sort of, in the end, I think, an agreement that there was nothing that any of us felt really required immediate action, but that we should keep on watching and possibly meet again in six months.

Although one thing that did come up was the extent to which all of us, most of whom by the nature of our relatively senior appointments had a number of friends on the faculty—on the Trustees—the extent to which our connections and relations with Trustees simply had disappeared. That we weren't seeing them around anymore. That they didn't seem to be coming to campus just to visit and look around and so on, as they all traditionally more or less had done. I think in the long run it became fairly clear that Dave himself had been somewhat discouraging this type of connection, and the other side of it, at least as I've had it from a few Trustees after the event, was that they were themselves so impressed with Dave, the type of

thing that had led to his election, that they stopped doing their own homework and let him do the homework, so to speak. So that I think they were genuinely surprised when finally all this came welling up, and came forcibly to their attention.

BURNS: I was going to ask you what McLaughlin's relationship was with the Trustees in those first few years, because you can sort of see that there would be a natural kind of . . . he's coming from the Chair of the Trustees to the President, so the communication lines were already there, and he's already been in a leadership role . . .

WOOD: Right, right. And they trusted him. Yes. So that apparently, as far as I can tell, there was initially this sense that "we really don't have to keep our own watch, that if there are any problems Dave will tell us." I think the first sign probably, the first sign they got that there might be problems would have come in '84, I think it would have been, in the fight over R.O.T.C. And I think it speaks to the nature of some of the problems Dave had dealing with academe, quite independent of R.O.T.C. That is, certainly I think a majority of the Trustees at that point felt strongly that now that Vietnam was over all the passions had died down, everything else, that we were a, you know, good upstanding college, and we were patriotic and all the rest, and we ought to have, that R.O.T.C. ought to stage a comeback.

Now Dave looked at this and clearly, himself, initiated discussions with the various R.O.T.C. programs. And he then, I think, arrived at the conclusion that if we were to bring R.O.T.C. back, the program that ought to come back first, if not exclusively, should be Naval R.O.T.C. Now the reason I think he wanted the Naval R.O.T.C. was that, objectively speaking, it was and is the "most academically respectable" program, precisely because it's interested in a lot of navigation problems, because you were interested in ships that sink and also have engines and so on. The amount of technology, of physics, of chemistry, so on, mathematics, so on, that are required as part of the Naval R.O.T.C. program is extraordinarily high, a type of requirement that none of the other R.O.T.C. programs has.

Now the flip side of that, though, is that precisely because it does have a fair number of quite specific and unshakeable or unchangeable academic requirements, it becomes very—it begins to reduce the amount of option and flexibility a student has to select the program they want to take, particularly under conditions of year-round operation. Further, I mean for example, it becomes very difficult to switch from one major to another because a lot of what were normally your electives get used up by these credit courses for R.O.T.C., so that they're—in other words the thing that

makes it a strong academic program also, in a liberal arts context, can create problems.

Dave didn't see that at all, and brought this to the faculty in which, obviously, there was a very hot and heavy discussion. Many faculty members simply against R.O.T.C. in general and will always be against it, go to the barricades; some who, like my colleague Jere Daniell who in fact had been a Navy R.O.T.C. person here as an undergraduate, and who is himself pretty conservative, Jere got up and spoke quite tellingly to the academic problems that it had. Now Dave didn't catch any of this, or if—so that I guess the next thing that happened was that Dave wrote the Trustees a letter after this faculty meeting, which had ended up with, you know, a vote of 200 to 17 against Naval R.O.T.C.—he wrote them a letter reporting that he had heard nothing seriously negative against this program, simply the usual anti-R.O.T.C. stuff, so that they could proceed to implement it without any fears, at the next Trustee meeting coming up in three or four weeks. At which point Dave left town to do some fundraising.

Now that letter was sent to the Trustees, but unfortunately the—whoever was responsible in the President's office sent it to the normal list of those attending Trustee meetings, which included the Dean of the Faculty, Hans Penner. So Hans got one of these, and since he had seen a quite different faculty meeting than Dave McLaughlin had, Hans called me, because at this point I was the Vice-Chairman of the Committee Advisory to the President. I was the faculty member who was elected to be the Chair of it in the absence of the President, and who basically has no function or power other than, that person in case of crisis has the power to call a meeting of the CAP independent of the President. Well, as I say, Hans said, "What will we do?"

Well, I thought long and hard about it, and finally said that this was something that I had to call a meeting of the CAP to talk with the President about this, to make him, try to get him to understand that he had a real crisis here, that the problems with Naval R.O.T.C.—Oh, another one, if it's difficult to change majors, you also were prohibited, if you were a Navy R.O.T.C. cadet, you were prohibited from majoring in art or—I can't remember what the other was. It was from the Navy's point of view, these were the two clearly sort of "gay" majors. And that's the only way you could put it. And so that, again, something that's going to get a faculty just up in arms, that, the idea that you are prohibited from majoring in art. Well, OK. Anyhow, I then checked with the President's office to find out exactly when he was coming back, and then scheduled a meeting of the CAP.

Then I sat down to think about that meeting, and had the—I was pretty sure where everybody was at. But that Dave doesn't seem to hear things awfully well, I figured the way to do it was ahead of time, put everything in writing. So I wrote a memo to him, laying out all the reasons why, precisely because it was seemingly so academic, there were real academic objections to it, and that people felt so profoundly that if this went through, I was absolutely certain that the result would be a faculty revolution and outrage and revolt, and a vote of no confidence in the President, buck buck buck. And then at the meeting, sort of said, "Look, I'm going to say these things, but other members of the committee may disagree, and we want to fully participate, so Dave, can I give this to you, what—so that—but I also would like to give copies to everybody else so they can look and so on, and add their participation." "Fine," he said.

Well, the net result of this, I think, was that he now had things in writing that he couldn't duck from under because he knew a lot of other people had them in writing also, and that he was forced to share with the Trustees as a result. My knowledge of the Trustee results, other than Navy R.O.T.C. simply disappeared from the map, comes only indirectly from John Hennessey, the former Dean of the Tuck School, because I think I was having lunch or dinner one day in the Hanover Inn and John walked by and said, "Charlie, I understand this College owes you a great debt of gratitude." And I said, "What the hell are you talking about?" And he then cited, "Well, it was really only when the Trustees got the copy of your letter, and saying that they suddenly saw that there really was a real academic problem, and that was the end of it." And John said, "I just hate to think what would have happened if that hadn't happened."

BURNS: But the faculty in general had some idea of how McLaughlin had handled the situation?

WOOD: No, the faculty did not know about it. Hans was not about to tell them, and I sure as hell wasn't either.

BURNS: So it didn't . . . ?

WOOD: Yeah, so it did not.

BURNS: . . . necessarily cost . . .

WOOD: No, no. And you clearly didn't want that to happen, because you clearly, I think everybody, or at least those in positions of responsibility, and Penner certainly was one, I certainly felt I was, or that, you know, Fred Berthold was in calling . . .

[End of Tape 8, Side B — Beginning of Tape 9, Side A]

WOOD: Well, I think all of us sort of saying, "What is it we can do to make him, or to help him become more effective, to realize the potential that he clearly has?" And I think in the long run, curiously, Dave after the event seems to have understood that, that at least I know I got a long letter, hand-written letter from him, six months or a year after he had stepped down as President, thanking me and sort of saying, "Hey, you know, of all the people," he said, "you were one of the good guys—I think of you as being one of the good guys on the faculty." Well, that sort of made me think, Good God, then all the rest are black hats? But you know, it was well-meant, and I accepted it as such.

BURNS: Just to sort of compare and contrast the two presidents that are the main area for this project: how would you compare McLaughlin and Kemeny in terms of faculty senate meetings and handling those?

WOOD: Well, the—certainly John talked more, so that when a question was asked, so on, he was much more apt to participate. You know, perfectly comfortably as equal or logical superior to someone, and did it very well. Dave sometimes would duck—not duck, but ask other members of the administration to answer in his stead, or, you know, would hold off responding, that he really very seldom entered into a discussion-debate with the faculty, which Kemeny was perfectly prepared to do. So in that sense it was more distant or less was being communicated.

BURNS: And you had mentioned how McLaughlin . . .

WOOD: I think the one time he really did, because it was something he knew a hell of a lot about and the faculty didn't, was the decision to buy the hospital and allow it to move out to what had been faculty, I mean Dartmouth, property. Which was an enormously important decision, a very difficult one, because it involved a great deal of financial commitment, and one, certainly, that I'd say ninety percent if not more of the faculty just did not understand, and, given their uncertainty about McLaughlin's track record and other things, were very uncertain whether they should accept his judgment on this even though it was within much more the realm of what they would see as being that of the smart businessman.

And there, as the debate went on, as it went—and it was a long and agonized meeting in which there were a couple of angry faculty members who said, you know, "We thought we'd have a vote of no confidence in you before, but now's the time," buck buck buck. Dave pitched right in and

there he, I think, performed splendidly, actually, in his capacity to try to explain this in ways that a faculty that, on the whole, lacked types of financial skills could begin to understand. And clearly that's been a very important decision for the long term development of the College.

BURNS: Was he successful in persuading a number of faculty at that meeting?

WOOD: I think he genuinely did. And he—otherwise, I think he both persuaded some and then persuaded a larger number, enough—to the extent that they decided to remain neutral or not to, you know, shout against him, give him the benefit of the doubt.

BURNS: You've mentioned McLaughlin as somewhat of a micromanager in getting involved in some of these little events. Was that a large change from Kemeny? Was Kemeny less—more of a delegator?

WOOD: Yes, Kemeny was much more a delegator than McLaughlin was. You know, and it wasn't just, you know, I couldn't conceive of John Kemeny sort of intervening to attempt to fire his football coach the way McLaughlin did. And it isn't—I don't mean that as John as non-athletic where Dave had been a football star. It rather is much more, "Hey, who the football coach should be is not my administrative responsibility."

BURNS: What do you—you've mentioned the hospital as one of the things that came out of the McLaughlin era that really benefited the College in the long run. What were some of McLaughlin's other greatest strong points during his administration?

WOOD: Well, I think the general refurbishment of plant certainly was there, whether—and building of new plant. I kiddingly refer to the new dormitories across from Alumni Gym as the "McLaughlin Group." But you know, things that genuinely were needed. I think, in it, the general sense of Dartmouth community did improve, that you—I think the extent to which you had a significant group of alumni who, far from just distancing themselves from the College, "I won't have anything to do with it," but who were fighting hard to try and change it, that group, I think, went down in both size and vociferousness of its opposition. So that, at the time, by the time that McLaughlin resigned I think you had a much more peaceful harmonious College than you had at the time that Dave had first become President. And by College, I mean the total of those who in some senses see Dartmouth as a focus of their community and allegiance.

BURNS: What would you attribute that lessening of tension to?

WOOD: Well, some of it, I think, literally partly related to types of changes in the country at large, that these were, after all, the Reagan years, in which you think of how Reagan starts or campaigns on, you know, Here we have this country that's totally out of control and buck buck buck buck buck. And then, you know, We're going to have a—what was it, That better tomorrow, or sunshine—"It's morning in America." Well, somehow that type of sense of "it's morning in America" was something that also, I think was part of the change in mood here, that it's morning at Dartmouth, that things are in fact looking up. And so that, without any huge, you know, thing that Dave had done, other than sort of helping with the finances, the physical plant, all of this sort of thing, and with at least some aspects of the alumni relations, that he deserves credit for. No doubt about it.

BURNS: Was he receiving credit at the time of his administration?

WOOD: From people like me, yes. But no. I mean, from the faculty, from those who were disaffected, who doubted the man's intelligence, his intellect, his suitability, so on, no. I don't think the—to what extent they, looking back, have changed their views of the way in which—you know, the people who disliked Eisenhower and would cite his seeming incompetence at news conferences, have become more mellow about Eisenhower. I just don't know, I really don't. Curiously, the McLaughlin years, in my experience at least, don't come up that much in conversation; or, you know, where there always used to be a fair number of McLaughlin stories that would be circulating, and did for the first few years of the Freedman presidency, but then I think sort of pleasantly disappeared.

BURNS: Are there still Kemeny stories? Did those stories last as long?

WOOD: Mainly with—you know, there's been a fair faculty turnover since then, so it would have been more the older generation, and thinking back to the Kemeny years. And—how many—it would be interesting, I'd be curious, I really have no idea how many Kemeny sort of faculty members, administrators, so on, are still at the College or living in the area. I suspect it's a relatively small number, but I honestly don't know for sure.

BURNS: Yeah, it's pretty small, when we look at, for the project, the people to interview that were highly active during the '70s. Not that many are still affiliated with the College.

WOOD: Yeah.

BURNS: They're still around, and a lot in the Hanover area, but not that many affiliated with the College.

WOOD: Right.

BURNS: And that's not necessarily the case for the McLaughlin years.

WOOD: No, one thing that clearly has changed that I can see, sort of looking from the Dickey years through the Kemeny through the McLaughlin, is that I think when I first came in the '60s the extent to which sort of the primary allegiance of a very high percentage of the faculty was to the College, was still there. That part of the change that Dartmouth has been through and that many other institutions have been as well, as the rise of research and all the other types of senses of, "We must be the producers of knowledge as much as the conservators of it," has tended to make faculty members much more conscious of their disciplinary colleagues all over the world as being their sort of focus, and not just the institution. So that I think people are probably much more willing to consider the idea of moving on elsewhere, so on, than they used to be, that it's really "me as historian" or whatever the discipline is, that counts most, not the institution at which I teach. I'm in a sense clearly overstating it for some people, or probably for most people, and yet I think that is one of the things that changes the way in which a college operates, or the sense that one gets from it.

BURNS: More factionalized?

WOOD: I'm not so sure that it's increased the amount of faction or fighting. I think one thing that has happened, though, is that for whatever reason, and it's a complicated one, the faculty as a total collegial body probably senses itself or sees itself much less as a community than it used to. That you used to have a strong feeling that you knew people and were part of the faculty, who were in quite different disciplines. Some of this relates to the fact that you don't have a place where faculty from all fields eat together any more, in ways they could get to know each other. Part of this is year-round operation, and so therefore since you're not on campus at the same times, it tends to undercut sort of continuing friendships. Part of this is much more the professionalization: the only people who count are my fellow historians, not, you know, some wimp over there in, name whatever department you want to sort of make your put-down in the comment.

So that—and when I first came, for example, I think an awful lot of faculty too knew a lot of the administrators. The Deans. I suspect very few faculty know many of the Deans of College or of Faculty any more. The same way I suspect many more coaches were known by faculty members than are now. Some of this, too, is simply changing living patterns. That if in the 1960s 90 percent of your faculty, and the same thing with

administrators and everybody else, lived in Hanover, the chances of getting to know each other because they were your neighbors or you had school children who went to school together, I mean all of this was much greater than a situation now where, what, 35 percent of the faculty live in Hanover. That you have a much more dispersed and therefore less cohesive group.

BURNS: And the faculty's dispersed because of transportation and because of real estate costs?

WOOD: Yes, right. I mean, it's—as well as, I suspect right now probably there is a greater sense of, “It's nice to live in the country,” than there probably was in the 1960s.

BURNS: So how would you say these changes have affected Dartmouth on the whole? Has it made it stronger in some senses and weaker in others, or is it . . . ?

WOOD: It's certainly much stronger academically. You get a sense of a much greater confidence with which things are pursued. I think in many ways probably the classes are better too. I mean that the teaching has not gone down. On the other hand, that type of Mr. Chips, if you will, type of student-faculty relationship clearly has been distanced by all of this, so it will be more formal, with many notable exceptions. And the College is fighting against it in a number of ways, whether it was with the Freshman Seminar program as it was introduced to get people closely involved with students in small group teaching situations and not just the English Department during freshman year. Or whether it is with the Presidential Scholar program, with a sort of student—faculty-student mentoring situation, both junior and senior year, that establishes that type of closeness, that in a sense was being lost. So you're trying to, it seems to me, substitute new things, some of which, in other words, came in, if you will, overwhelmingly in the Kemeny years; some of which came in after McLaughlin had stepped down.

BURNS: You had sort of alluded to this earlier, but I was wondering if you could talk—in 1983-84 you chaired a search and evaluation committee for the Dean of Faculty, and you had mentioned in your letter that the role of Dean of Faculty and Provost had kind of intermingled and changed over time. I'm wondering if you can talk about that.

WOOD: Yes. It was a strange one. I mean, that is, Dartmouth had never really had a true provost job, so that when John Kemeny became President he asked his friend, and at that point my Chair in History, Lou Morton, to

become Provost, simply for a year, and that Lou was to look at it and make a considered judgment, "Did Dartmouth need a Provostship?" Well, I think Lou, as he looked at it, and this would have been in '71-'72, thought the answer clearly was no, we did not. That the Provost really wasn't sort of the President's inside man who really ran a University on the inside while the President was speaking to the outside and raising the money. That the Provost as the job had evolved here was really the person in charge of those things that didn't neatly fit under one faculty. So that he was in charge of Hopkins Center, of Baker Library, and I can't remember what, I mean sort of these oddball—so that he really had no authority. So Lou took one look at it and said, "No, we don't need it." So it was abolished.

Well, sooner or later I think John found that you needed someone who was your person, who was your ear to the inside. That's one of the things a Provost does. A Dean of the Faculty is a little harder to do, because a Dean of the Faculty is also the spokesman of the faculty, looking up, even as he's the person looking down making decisions about the faculty; but he's caught in the middle. The Provost, no. So that John decided, OK, that the Provost job probably should be reinstituted, but he did it by making Leonard Rieser both Dean of the Faculty and Provost. It then, for whatever reason, and some of it were doubts about Leonard that led at one of the reappointments to a re-splitting of the job of Provost and Dean, in which Leonard ended up being the Provost and Hans Penner became the Dean. And then at the time Leonard stepped down as Provost as well, then finally Ag Pytte was elected. Now, and it's right before—this is relatively shortly before or right at the time, if you will, that Dave McLaughlin is becoming President.

Now, as I've earlier indicated, there were all sorts of things about Dave's management style that, in terms of his reaching out and making decisions, even for minor people in the administrative hierarchy, that tended to make relations between and among administrators tough. So it became clear there were all sorts of problems between Hans Penner and Ag Pytte. Now, it was unclear whether it was simply personalities, because Ag is a fairly pit-bull bulldog type of aggressive character, however Hans distinctly is not. Was it a difference in personality between the two; was it the difference between, or had the jobs been sort of misdefined in a way that their responsibilities overlapped in a way that were guaranteed to make difficulties; what was going on?

So that the committee which consists of—let's see, the Committee Advisory to the President, the Chair of it picks three members of the Committee on Organization and Policy. The Chair of the Committee on

Organization and Policy picks three members of the Committee Advisory to the President. These six people, all senior tenured people, then pick one untenured member to sit on this committee. That's what the—and I chaired it. So that we, our job was to evaluate how Hans Penner had done, or how the Deanship more generally was going, and to make recommendations, i.e. two or preferably three candidates, forwarded to the President to pick one of them as Dean of the Faculty.

We went to Dave and said, “Hey, given all of the difficulties that clearly have been taking place between Hans and Ag, can we also, or do we have our permission to enlarge it to evaluate the relationship between Dean and Provost to figure out what's going on? And what things do you need to know in order to make your selection? Or possibly to set in motion changes in the nature of the two jobs at the same time.” He said, “Fine.” Well, as the committee went on, it was at that point that the committee itself became very aware in detail of the extent to which the difficulties between Provost and Dean really lay in the President's administrative style. And so as tactfully as we could, but also as straightforwardly as we could, we put this into the report as an attempt to, again, to try to show Dave how best to function within this academic context. And given the nature of the whole thing, we recommended that the report be distributed to every member of the faculty. Dave took our recommendations for the Deans, I mean he did pick the new Dean from among the candidates we had put forward, but he sat on that report, I suspect—and tried to make sure that there were no copies of it anywhere, so that I don't know—I assume a copy probably resides in the President's office, but, or now a new--but if it doesn't, the only copy of it—well, I know the only copy of it, with all the supporting evidence that went into this (some absolutely fascinating letters) is in the papers I turned over to Rauner.

BURNS: So had Hans Penner—was he up for the Dean of Faculty at this point, or had he decided . . .

WOOD: His term (it's a four-year term which is renewable)—and Hans decided at the end of that four years that he did not want to stand for reelection. I think he felt, with some justice, that a couple of Trustees were not happy with him as Dean, and that they had probably persuaded Dave McLaughlin, if Dave hadn't arrived at that judgment himself, that he should not be reappointed, so that it was not worth standing as a candidate. I've never really talked to Hans about it, though, so what he would have to say about it I just don't know.

BURNS: Did the committee look at whether there was still a need for a Provost and a Dean of Faculty, or at this point was it clear that there was?

WOOD: We didn't really look at whether there was a need, although I think our assumption was that yes, there probably was a need. And in the McLaughlin case, to have someone who was an academic as his inside ear struck us as a good idea, even if Ag Pytte was not always diplomatically the subtlest of people in terms of his own faculty relationships. And so—so that I don't think we ever really questioned it.

BURNS: How would you characterize Ag Pytte's working relationship with David McLaughlin?

WOOD: I think quite close. I mean, as far as I could tell, Ag saw his job as sort of being Dave's bulldog, and running of a strong offensive defense for him. And clearly, in my relations with Ag (and I'd known Ag pretty well before he had gotten into administration), that sort of the things that he sort of knew or reported about what Dave's thinking was, was clearly of a close enough and personal variety—or, not personal, but confidential enough variety that clearly Dave was sharing pretty fully with Ag, and I assume using him to some extent as a sounding board.

BURNS: You spoke briefly about Leonard Rieser, and his career at Dartmouth parallels John Kemeny's in so many ways, both coming at around the same time and sort of chairing their departments around the same time in physics and math. And I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about their relationship as President and Dean of the Faculty.

WOOD: Curiously, I can't. I really have no sense, except that one difference in the—you asked about, you know, Kemeny and McLaughlin running a faculty meeting, which I tried to respond to. But the real difference was that John would call up faculty members he knew at ten at night and say, "Come on over and have a drink, I'd like to talk about some things." And sort of as old friends, just sitting down and having a nightcap, two or three people, John would do this. And he clearly maintained a lot of relationships and learned a lot of things as a result of this. That would be inconceivable with a Dave McLaughlin, that that sort of interrelationship simply didn't happen. I can't remember how I got off on . . .

[End of Tape 9, Side A — Beginning of Tape 9, Side B]

WOOD: But curiously, with Leonard and John I never really had any sense of what their relationship was. I mean, partly because while they both were scientists, they both had been involved in one sense or another with the

whole Manhattan Project and atomic bomb, John was a person who liked to solve problems, to come to conclusions and decisions about them. Leonard, on the other hand, was someone who, in a sense, liked to solve problems by looking at the imponderable difficulty of solving it. That having a conversation with Leonard, sort of each thing you would raise, starting as a simple problem, he would raise every possible contingency until it had become so damned cosmic you suddenly recognized that it was insoluble and therefore you had to live with it. And OK, you know, there are a lot of problems in academe [where] that's probably the case. But sort of to put the problem-solver with the cosmic problem-maker, how they operated personally, other than, I think, sort of away from having to make a decision, I think both of them did really understand the complexities of things and could talk about it.

And they certainly [laughing]—the only time, the one I really remember the most, Chris, is sort of a stupid one, and yet illustrative, was when Lou Morton was Provost and Leonard Rieser was Dean, and John was early President, they called a fall faculty meeting which, as the faculty meeting opened, all three of them got up to give endless apologies for having called this faculty meeting, but thanking us for being there, because even though all three of them were Jewish, not one of them had realized it was Yom Kippur. Well, you know, it was sort of wonderfully engaging about a particular generation of human beings, I think is what you're talking about, and there was something about that generation that I think tied Leonard and John together with a sense of sharing, that probably in any explicit way they never talked about, but that made them close.

BURNS: My readings of the McLaughlin administration seem to point to Paul Paganucci as being one of the most important administrators . . .

WOOD: Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. Yes. I wouldn't be able to document it that much, except my story of the goddamned pickup truck, that, you know, Paganucci and I will solve it. That's an interesting comment. Although I did at that point have a lot of conversations with Pag, because I had just become the Treasurer of the Medieval Academy of America and wanted to pick his brains about the philosophy of investment of endowment. And he was sort of charmed that some faculty member actually knew about this sort of stuff, so we did. But exactly how they worked—they were classmates, of course; they went way back. But I think there were—and, you know, both had spent most of their lives in "the real world" of rough-and-tumble. So that there were many shared things, I suspect, that the two of them—and both with just enormous love of Dartmouth College. That's the sort of thing that I think a lot of people never really understood about Dave or about Pag. That both of them really felt that something

very important in terms of the development of who they were and became and the successes they had had, or etc., was very much Dartmouth. They never forgot it.

BURNS: I'm wondering—it seems that McLaughlin really never gained the trust of the faculty.

WOOD: True.

BURNS: And I'm wondering, when you look at some of these other people on his administrative team, what the faculty relationship was with, say, a Paganucci or Ag Pytte or Hans Penner . . .

WOOD: In the—the curious thing—I think in the Paganucci case I think it basically was nonexistent. I mean, insofar as the Treasurer had a function that was so far removed from anything that the faculty had to do, I suspect even if you got to the level of, you know, the Faculty Committee on the Economic Status of the Faculty, whatever it's called, I don't think they ever had any dealings with Pag, even though Pag's operation in the endowments and what—obviously had some things to do with the economic status of the faculty.

Ag Pytte, older faculty had known very much, you know, as a Professor of Physics before he entered administration. And Ag is a person with a very good sense of humor, but he, as I said, can also be a tough pit bull. Now I suspect most faculty, and particularly younger faculty who had come in after Ag had already made the decision to become an administrator, only saw the pit bull side and didn't know quite what to do with it and felt bowled over by it. Now, where, you know, I never lost my friendship for Ag, and I can remember sort of, you know, trying to help him at the time that—take the Navy R.O.T.C. CAP meetings, which Ag attended as Provost, because Dave, interesting, always had his Provost sit in on the CAP meetings, it had never happened before. And I think he wanted his academic ear to be there.

And Ag certainly, loyally, and in his most fierce bulldog fashion, fought for Navy R.O.T.C. and the rightness of the McLaughlin position. After which I sat down and I wrote Ag a stinging letter--I can only call it a stinging letter--as, I said, an old friend: "that you are sort of—you may not be aware of the problems Dave has got. And how much, you know, you could do in other ways to help him, but you certainly—you know, you could end up in a potload of trouble heading this way." Well we then had a long conversation, . . . ended quite amiably and so on. And I think after that, Ag became a little more mellow, and he sure as hell was as the President

of Case Western Reserve, where I take it he was an enormous success. I haven't really talked to him since his return, but he is back, if you're not aware of that.

BURNS: He is back.

WOOD: Yeah, mm-hm.

BURNS: So I guess the overall question is, did the people in the administration have any effect on McLaughlin's relationship with the faculty, or . . .

WOOD: I don't think so, no. I mean, that's the curious—I think various people tried, and you know, whether it was people within the faculty trying to get his ear in helping him to understand, or whether it was people within the administration, clearly no one seemed to have much luck in this. I mean, it genuinely seems to be a kind of blind spot or difficulty he had. Whether it was a sense that he could do it alone, or whether he didn't trust people-- to have the confidence—it's a mystery to me. I mean, how somebody who could be as nice and, in a sense, as sharp as Dave could have this, I don't know. I mean, one of the jokes that used to circulate, whether true or not, was sort of the comment of (hypothetically or apocryphally, I assume), of Dave's minister in Minneapolis, who saying, "You know, regardless of how mad you get at the man, you can't really hate him, he isn't really evil."

And that, you know, that people told that, it seems to me was sort of funny that it was people who, you know, clearly were opposed to and thought—to Dave as President, who felt he was doing badly, contrary to the interests of Dartmouth, so on, but that he wasn't evil. That—but no one could ever quite pin down, because I—you know, Dave Lilly's "he isn't a people person." Well, he is and he isn't. Or, he's the micromanager who repaints doors, but he hates taking big decisions. See, everything comes at you as sort of opposing. I mean, it's hard to put them all together. I guess I just stopped trying.

BURNS: Well, it's interesting to look at him in contrast to some of the other icons of that era that did polarize people, like Reagan or, on this campus the Dartmouth Review. And he certainly didn't get the same kind of reaction as those two.

WOOD: No.

BURNS: One other question on sort of McLaughlin's administrators which may not elicit much of a response, but in terms of Paganucci, one of his last acts,

then, is at this faculty senate meeting where they present the hospital move.

WOOD: Right.

BURNS: And, did his testimony to that, did that give much weight? Because that's seems an area where he was . . .

WOOD: I think it helped. Because, you know, whether people understand finance or stock market or endowments or total return concepts or betas or whatever you want to talk about, they all were confident that Pag understood them, even if they didn't, or even if they weren't sure that Dave did. And also, I think people, even though they may not have known Pag that well, I think they knew him well enough to have the sense that he was the type of guy who was fully prepared to stand up to Dave on a financial matter if he thought Dave was crazy. And just as I think they probably assumed Pag—that Ag Pytte would have done that too. So that when Paganucci came into the debate and made positive things that we were not about to face bankruptcy or we couldn't sail off the end of the earth on this one, I think that probably helped the cause enormously. I can't remember specifics on it, though, to illustrate the point.

BURNS: I want to take up the issue of South African divestment, then, again, which we talked about a little bit in your role on the Investment Committee of the '70s, but then which comes back to play a big role in the '80s with the shanties that are built on the Dartmouth Green. Do you remember how that protest came about?

WOOD: Yes. They—you know, simply, I think, in my experience on the Committee on Investor Responsibility, the sort of greatest problem that you had, say, with South African divestiture, well they were double. One is, very few of the companies that, say, Dartmouth was investing in were, you know, overwhelmingly or even primarily devoted to South Africa. They were classically the kind of Johnson and Johnson Band-Aids, or Coca-Cola or General Motors or what have you, who, a very small percentage of the business was there. So that when you're really dealing with multinational corporations, as inevitably you're going to have to deal with as investment instruments if you have an endowment as large as Dartmouth's, finding ones that didn't have some dealing, some relationship to South Africa would be tough.

But over and beyond that, as you looked at most of these companies and what their own internal policies were in relationship to apartheid, they sure as hell were better than—I mean, you looked at General Motors, for

example, which can be a very tough outfit. But it was pretty damn clear that if General Motors was, for example, to leave South Africa, which was one of the things being advocated, well, presumably you would sell your factory to, say, Toyota. It was pretty damn clear that Blacks and coloreds in South Africa did a hell of a lot better with General Motors than they would with Toyota. So that sort of thing gave pause.

Now, the—certainly as it arose in terms of leading to the shanties, there really wasn't that much discussion on the campus community before the—it was simply a particular group of people who were interested in apartheid, and I think interested in relatively simplistic, just "out of South Africa," I mean, terms. And therefore, you know, build the symbolic Soweto shanties on campus. And they were built specifically when they were, it was sort of the week before the Trustees were holding their October meeting, so that this was something to, visually to greet the Trustees, to, in effect to encourage them to do something about Dartmouth's investment policies in South Africa. And so it started that way.

Nothing happened at the Trustee meeting; it continued on. It actually got to be kind of fun by Christmastime, as sort of the tree went up on campus, on the Green, and then as the first snowfall came, you know, you'd walk by them and say, "When are you going to put on your Arab gear, you all look sort of as if you belong in this Christmas crèche scene." So there really was a—which I think pretty much went on until the "Committee to Beautify the Campus Before Winter Carnival" showed up. And as I understand it from some of the people who had been involved in the shanties, that insofar as they were attracting less and less attention they had decided, as well as it was getting cold in those shanties, that they themselves were about to abandon them. That if the Review-related types hadn't taken the sledge hammers to them they probably would have moved out within a week themselves on their own initiative, that was the crazy part about it.

BURNS: Where did the faculty stand on the issue of the shanties? Was it a mixed response?

WOOD: Oh, I think mixed in terms of, if you came right down to the divestiture, the, probably you would have had very strong support for divestiture, but not--but I think in terms of the shanties themselves, probably either, "Hey, this is getting to be kind of fun," or, you know, on a more serious level, "OK, here is a perfect example of symbolic free speech." Again, though, you did have some discussion, and I tried and I can't remember how, to try and

get some formal, you know, with an audience to be reported on discussion of symbolic free speech.

Because again, one of the quirky things that struck me about it, Chris, was, you know, in terms of, you know, this issue, divestiture, which clearly polarized people, that people who just thought this was terrible, that isn't how you invest, and those who, you know, moral forever, that what struck me was that an academic community, while it believes in free speech, it's free speech that assumes debate. And debate that works itself towards a goal of resolution and "truth." The problem is you can't debate with free speech, I mean with symbolic speech like those shanties. I mean, if you were one of the Review types, for example, I guess the only way I can put it is, if you feel that passionately, here's—you can't really go out and debate with the shanties, they're just there. They're just there saying "fuck you," you know. And that, I think, helps to explain why the heck they took after them with sledge hammers.

I mean, it—and that, within an academic context of expectation of debate, really got me wondering where do you go, or how do you explore how free speech really works within a symbolic free speech context. That I was just wanting to hear some Supreme Court Justices give me a little legal wisdom on this, because it seemed to me that was the one thing that I've never heard anybody talk about. And yet, as you saw it right there, "right here in River City," that was the thing that struck me as needing debate.

BURNS: So were there debates between any of the Review students and . . . ?

WOOD: No, no, not at all.

BURNS: But there were—I don't know, . . .

WOOD: Oh, you had huge debates and discussions immediately following the shanty, because Dave McLaughlin immediately called a moratorium on classes, so that you had one day in which there were no classes but endless sort of large campus meetings, which then sort of led to the submission of all sorts of ideas that had come up in them, which was part of why he created the Committee on Diversity, not just to directly address the shanty-bashing, but to speak to all the issues that had been raised in the moratorium, of which, I—God, I can't remember. They sort of ended up being typed up. And we had to go—I think there were 350 of them or something. So that I think the first, getting to know each other as a committee, was sitting down with this thing and saying, "Hey, which ones are important, or which ones duplicate each other, and how do we get

down to a list that's manageable and coherent, and yet an honest sort of dealing with the issues that were raised.”

BURNS: I want to come back to this Council in a minute, but I'm wondering if you could—what your opinion was of how McLaughlin sort of handled the whole shanties crisis from the time they were put up. I believe the story was, he was out of town when they were put up, and [Edward] Ed Shanahan said they had to come down by nightfall or the next day, and then McLaughlin comes back and said, “Let's wait a second, and let's leave them up.”

WOOD: That's true, that's true. And I had totally forgotten that type of, that particular sequence, but now I do. And in the sense that I think Dave saw there was a greater sort of symbolic free speech thing than Shanahan did, I think initially, where Shanahan, I think, was, tended to run a little scared. And basically I don't think until the shanties were unexpectedly taken down in January--Dave, after the initial decision, “Hey, they can stay”--I don't think there really was an awful lot of discussion one way or the other that I can remember, that, in that sense, just live and let live. And so that in a sense they became very low profile, precisely because he wasn't making an issue out of them after that.

It began to be more of an issue in January, I think, as people began wondering, “What do you do to get rid of them?” I mean, tentatively even the town began coming into this with the, you know, the question that's technically up in the air as to who owns the Green, the town or the College? So, could the town sort of say, “Hey, these must go,” and insofar as people were sleeping in them and so on, they had to meet zoning, which clearly they did not, buck buck buck. So I'd say Dave got fairly good marks on this until they came down.

Then what you do, you know: “Do you leave the remains on campus or reconstruct some of them?” That then I think gets pretty murky, leading down to the ultimate decision, take them all away. Which, as I remember, was a very tense day, a very tense time, in which a couple of faculty members as they saw the cranes approaching said, Hey, you know—and I think it may even have been Ed Shanahan who told me that the way it was handled on taking them off—there was something about the way they were taken off that made Ed so mad he claimed to be—he himself had been tempted to run out and join, get in one of those shanties and be arrested and so on. Now, you know, I just don't remember the reasoning, but he—something about it offended his particular sense of civil liberties. And I don't remember anything of why.

BURNS: Yeah, I haven't heard that story. I haven't actually read too much about the day they were taken down. So then the outcome is, the Dartmouth Review students come and take it down; McLaughlin calls this moratorium; and out of the moratorium is this President's Ad Hoc Council on Diversity, which you were asked to chair. Do you know why you were picked to chair?

WOOD: Well, Dave had worked with me for some time at this point, and even though he may have felt that my views on Dennis Dinan, I was attacking him, I think he, as I said, did see me as a faculty member who genuinely had the best interests of the institution at heart. So that I assume that had something to do with it. And he was willing to take chances on it. I mean, the funny part of it, I think, as Dave originally saw the committee, it was to have four faculty members, four administrators and four students. And he then—[inaudible]—he then went to the Student Assembly and asked the Student Assembly to recommend to him four students who would speak to the diversity of Dartmouth, to deal with this. And the Student Assembly took one look at this and with an absolutely straight face replied to the President that indeed the student body of Dartmouth was so diverse, they couldn't possibly adequately represent it with four people: they would need at least nine.

Now, as I've said, Dave may have had shortcomings in an academic context, but he sure as hell could add. And he could see that nine students were more than the eight adults he had in mind, so he came to me and he said, "What do I do now?" And I said, "Dave, fine. Accept it." I said, "I don't see any problems." And he said, "Are you sure?" And I said, "Yes, I'm sure." And well, he did.

And as you could imagine, I don't have the list here, but if you go, you will see it's—the nine students are drawn from, you know, the Women's Issue League, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance, the Black, you know, African-American Society, the Native Americans, I mean it was sort of—you go through eight this way, and then, Oh, yes, one member of the Interfraternity Council. And all I could think of was President Eisenhower and his first Cabinet, in which his Secretary of—I mean, Labor, was one Martin Durkin, an actual union man, and which the crack then became that the Cabinet was eight millionaires and a plumber. Only things had been reversed here, that you had eight of the diverse, marginalized, are new to the Dartmouth community groups and one of the traditional Greeks.

Well, that committee really worked hard, and it was fun to work with, and I think that they ended up writing probably the best report I've seen, and I've seen a lot of them, on handling diversity on campus. And I remember

when we handed it in Dave read it, and he said, "How the hell did you do this?" And I said, "Dave, it was easy. We never took a vote." I mean, what had happened, and I guess what I sort of assumed, was that for all...

[End of Tape 9, Side B — Beginning of Tape 10, Side A]

WOOD: Well, my operating assumption was that for all the shouting and seeming differences and high passions between and among the various groups associated with the committee, that the truth was that all of these people loved Dartmouth; that they might be madder than blazes about some aspect of it, but that the striking feature of it was that "Dartmouth is really a wonderful place. If we could only change X, it really would be perfect. But by God, now I'm going to work like hell on X." So that once we had pared down—and that was an interesting process, where you found that as they thought together as a group, which of these 350 things are really important, I think pared it down to about 15—that you began seeing the sort of commonalities between them, and therefore as you began going through seriously in depth on these fifteen, what did you do, or what could you recommend, I just sat there and tried to listen. I said, "What are these people saying, and what do they in fact have in common?" And that then I sat and simply wrote out what I thought I had heard, and then brought it back in to them as a draft [I think that may be my wife]—that you know, I sort of, having listened to the discussion and taken notes, sort of at where did consensus, and not just lowest common denominator, seem to lie. Because it was considerably more than that.

I then drafted up propositions on recommendations as well as analysis on the fifteen points or whatever they were, and then brought them back in and said, "Hey, is this sort of what you're trying to say?" And on most of them, they said, "My God, yes!" And then some, "No." You sort of continued, say, "OK, why not?" But then you had this thing down and you were able to maneuver and sort of change, and I think relatively imaginatively so, so that . . . and I think that some good things then came from it, as a number of the recommendations in fact were implemented.

BURNS: You sort of answered a large part of this, I think, but the way the committee or the council worked then was just the members discussing the issues? It wasn't really a calling in outside experts and a lot of research?

WOOD: No, there was a little bit of that, but not much. It was much more talking among ourselves, or having the sense that there was enough looking at outside experts either in person or in print or what have you to decide that they didn't know what they were talking about. Or it wasn't right for

Dartmouth, because it's different at Dartmouth, as Jean Kemeny... Which was fine. I mean, that is, that was part of what got the committee going, I think, was saying, "Hey, you know, we're common ordinary crazy folk, but we know more about it than these people." And then also, I think, as it went on, as people began finding that they shared views with people who they thought were in quite different groups, and then sort of the humor of the oddball nature of what had been selected began hitting them, and that they began enjoying that. So that they genuinely had fun together. And I know a number of them who otherwise would have nothing to do with each other are still very much in contact with each other.

BURNS: Do you remember some of the main recommendations that came out of the report?

WOOD: Well, sure. It started in the beginning with Freshman Trips, which have always been a very important part of the introduction to Dartmouth and to the North Country in which it sits. And a very high percentage of kids go on those Freshman Trips, except that when you looked at it, a significant number, for example, of Black kids did not, and then why? And what could you do in changing them or, to put it most generally, you had the feeling that what kids were being introduced to in the 1980s was still kind of a mythic view of what Dartmouth had been like in the 1950s. Still sort of monosexual, still very homogeneous white Anglo-Saxon WASP, and that if you began thinking about it and saying, OK, what can be done here to try to introduce and to get people operating together and, you know, beginning to make friendships across the sorts of boundaries or into new territories that they haven't been in before? And I think if you look at Freshman Trips today they are wildly different and very much involve this type of introducing you much more honestly to the Dartmouth that is, or to the ideals of the Dartmouth that is, rather than the one that was.

BURNS: And was that the sort of focus of a lot of the recommendations?

WOOD: Yes, a lot of the recommendations were of that variety. A certain number, though, too, were sort of ones—bounce this back to the students. Because student initiatives—I mean, for example, I can't remember it, I haven't gone back to look at the report—there were a number that we really were trying to build on student experience from the type of road-show travelling—I can only call them travelling vaudeville shows that arose out of Dick's House to—I don't think were directly connected to coeducation although they simply flourished after that, in terms of basic information on birth control and contraception, so in which, God knows it might involve some guys playing basketball with blown-up condoms, for God's sake! But clearly that had become funny enough that they

genuinely had become popular, and remarkably effective in getting word out on sorts of things that a remarkable number of kids entering college simply know nothing about, even today.

And that, so that we were trying on this type of model, and partly based on our own experience of saying, "Hey, as we have got to know each other, what sorts of thing could we put on that might be effective as attempting, for example, to take advantage of the sort of linking of dorms together into larger residential units," which is part of what was done in the McLaughlin restructuring or renovation of dormitories. That led us to say, "Hey, here are things we can do, or types of things we can celebrate and honor or be sensitive to." I mean, that—which might be, you know, if no one in the administration knows when Yom Kippur is, well, you know, this is true—think of all the various holidays of different groups that you ought to be sensitive to in some ways. Well, I mean, the Tucker Foundation now puts out a calendar, it was a hell of a job to figure out what to do in a number of these movable—but that's had its impact. So that really sort of, "How do you disseminate the awareness on which sensitivity ultimately has to depend?" And we had a variety of, I think, pretty effective ways.

BURNS: If you look at sort of a rough starting point of the effort to increase diversity at Dartmouth as being the late '60s, how far had it come by this point?

WOOD: Oh, it really had come quite a distance. The question really that was there was, as you had a very significant African-American community that was beginning to approach what the percentage of African-Americans in the population at large might be, or as you were still in the, I suppose, high 30 percents with regard to women, so on, was, how much confidence did each have in the other to be able to make a genuinely community decision? And I suppose that's part of what we were testing. And most of the time we found that the groups sort of out of our experience had a fair amount of confidence—there were some things that no, you know, we've talked about sort of, it seemed to me, the enthusiasm for the first few years and success of the first couple of years of coeducation for both sexes. Followed, I think, by a period in which women felt very much oppressed by patriarchy, if you will. Well, where the heck were you in this period?

Now, one of the at least symbolic features was the fact that "Men of Dartmouth" was still the College Song, and with all of its words unchanged. And clearly there was a lot of strong feeling against it, enough so that the whole question of the school song became one of the fifteen issues we were going to deal with. Well, someone on the committee said, "Hey, look." Sort of as the Native Americans said they

were never going to try and take the Indian Symbol away from the alumni because it had been the symbol of their College you couldn't take it away, that the same thing was true with "Men of Dartmouth," that you couldn't take it away. Also, though there was a good deal—you know, you still had all sorts of uncertainties: was non-sex-based language something that really had a future? And, or would it disappear as one of those quirky, you know, someone insisting that we have Freshpersons rather than Freshmen, for example.

And, well, it was pointed out that, you know, as you look, for example, at graduation, that the only alumni who are officially there in reunion capacity at graduation are fiftieth reunioners and older. Now, what that would mean, in effect, is that until the year 2022, all of the fiftieth reunioners would have gone to an all-male school in which "Men of Dartmouth" was eminently appropriate. So that, why don't we have some fun? Everyone sort of agreed, "Hey, look, people can go around and sing to themselves anything they damn well please, you know, including "Men of Dartmouth." But at formal occasions like graduation, never." Well, so someone said, "Hey, what if at graduation, when it comes to the time to sing, the senior class get up, turn around, and they sing "Men of Dartmouth" to the fiftieth reunioners, saluting them? And then if the "Men of Dartmouth"—if the fiftieth reunioners want to sing back some new song, fine, but—that that basically would give us fifty years to figure out whether we had a serious problem or not."

Well clearly some members of the committee thought that was a nifty solution, that it really would be fun, and I think it would have been fun. You might be able to do it now, but clearly, as you discussed that, I think crucially as you talked or as the women on the committee talked, I think it was clear that they felt they had had enough garbage tossed on them that they didn't have the confidence to have this kind of fun, so that at that point then you sort of edged off that kind of recommendation, and said Either get rid of the damned song or change the words—which we did, over the dead bodies of the English Department, who en principle as non-sexists were all for it, but as literary critics, even though they don't think much of Richard Hovey as a poet, you don't change a poet's words. Only he can change them.

BURNS: Overall, you've remarked a little bit about McLaughlin's response to the committee's recommendations. Were the majority of them that could be implemented, implemented?

WOOD: No, no. I'd say probably a quarter of them were implemented. That, which is partly function of sort of the administrative structure of the College, that,

which I think is true of sort of any type of report like this, when you—it comes in, regardless of its merits or demerits, there very seldom is somebody who is in an administrative role who genuinely is committed to or interested in implementing the total package. And because there isn't, I think most reports, that's why they get so spottily and incompletely, incompletely implemented.

BURNS: Was that a debate among the Council, to have the President appoint somebody?

WOOD: Yes. We did make a recommendation for a continuing committee, with that type of thought in mind. And it, that was not implemented.

BURNS: And—McLaughlin wasn't around for too much longer after this, was it a year?

WOOD: Two years, I think.

BURNS: So plenty of time to . . .

WOOD: Yeah, right, right.

BURNS: One final question on diversity, which is kind of a general one. In looking at these issues, how were Dartmouth's efforts to create a more diverse campus affected by the fact that they were in Hanover and they were in New Hampshire, in New England?

WOOD: Right, right. Certainly you probably had to do more conscious active recruiting of minority groups who were used much more to urban and not necessarily such a snowy and cold climate. So that I think the conscious recruiting and, to some extent, hiring of outside experts in recruiting in the case originally of the first few years of African-American recruiting, was necessary.

Now flip it the other way: you know, how successful—I mean, I can remember hearing, I think it was simply a radio program, of a couple of African-American students being interviewed about the problems they saw, you know, being at Dartmouth or in Hanover in this sort of northern New England community. And, you know, the number that just, you know, might not occur to a white guy, that “if I have very Afro hair, does the barber know how to cut my hair? It's a very different challenge from cutting the normal white person's hair. And I worry about this.”

So all of those types of things certainly, I suspect, are all part of, you know, everybody goes through a type of cultural insecurity, adjustment, when they go off to college or any strange place on their own; certainly they're different, and much more complex it seems to me, when you come to the minority kid who's moving into what he or she perceives as, you know, a very different type of community from ones they've been in before.

BURNS: That's all I have on that issue. Shall we stop for today, then?

WOOD: It may be a good place to stop, I think, yeah.

End of Interview

INTERVIEW: Charles Wood

INTERVIEWED BY: Chris Burns

PLACE: Charles Wood's home in Hanover

DATE: February 20, 2001

BURNS: Today is February 20, 2001 and I am speaking again with Professor Charles Wood. I wanted to begin today by talking a little bit more about the Committee Advisory to the President, which we spoke about in relation to the N.R.O.T.C. debate last time. Just before we started the tape you were speaking kind of the differences between John Kemeny as President and Dave McLaughlin as President, and their involvement with the CAP, and I was wondering if you would talk about that.

WOOD: Yes. It in some ways reflects sort of differences of presidential style or differences of presidential interest. That is, while the CAP has some operational responsibilities, in that the Committee Advisory to the President has to review all recommendations from departments and deans for promotion, for tenure, for picking people for faculty fellowships, etc., the normal things that a so-called "tenure committee" elsewhere would do. It also is set up quite literally as the Committee Advisory to the President to offer advice from senior faculty to the President, normally speaking, on those subjects that the President would like to have advice or guidance.

And John Kemeny, even though he was a very quick logician who seemingly would arrive at very quick decisions, in fact was a person who wanted to explore those decisions. So that in a whole variety of ways John, on the CAP, would use it as his sounding board, that he wanted to hear what respected faculty had to say about some of the broad issues of "whither Dartmouth?". And so CAP meetings under John Kemeny tended to be rather long, and not terribly necessarily focused. You had the business that had to be done, that would get done, and yet you would have these discussions on things that no action was needed, giving the President advice. With the result that meetings, which typically started, under both Presidents, at say 3:30 in the afternoon, or 3, and then that you would expect to be over at, say, 5 or 5:30, or certainly by 6, in other words before dinner, in John's case frequently would go on until 9:30 or 10 in the evening.

In Dave McLaughlin's case, on the other hand, he very seldom asked for that type of advice that involved the broader discussion of general philosophy or principles upon which action should be taken or guided; that his concerns, as they came to the CAP, were specifically those concerns on which the CAP was supposed to act. Occasionally that would lead to some, if you will, broader discussion when some intractable decision about some impossible academic eccentric would come up: what was the best way of handling it other than the just simple yes or no, black and white decisions. Then we might have them, but otherwise no. So that in the McLaughlin presidency the CAP typically was finished by quarter of 5 to 5:15, say, rather than going on.

BURNS: Is this sort of indicative of a larger difference between Kemeny and McLaughlin in terms of decision-making and how much input they sought from outside sources?

WOOD: I would think so, yes. I mean that is, I think, John, who always used to claim that when he retired he didn't want to go out and become a president of some foundation, as many college presidents do, but that he wanted to go back to teaching. And that it wasn't necessarily math; he wanted to go back to a philosophy department and teach Plato. And John, with that view, I think very much had the dialectical discussion of Plato in mind. I think it came very naturally to him, even though many Platonic dialogues end up with long speeches from Socrates, followed by "Yes, Socrates" being the dialectic. And that was sometimes true with John, too, no doubt about it.

But on the other hand, I think he genuinely wanted to hear other people, to debate with them, to test his own judgment on it. I think he knew that the particular interest that he had, and background and strengths, were not the strengths that necessarily were needed for some types of decisions which had to be made as a president, and that therefore—I mean, math being a very, you know, abstract kind of discipline, that, let's get into those sloppy social sciences, that he needed that too. And that he relied, I think, on close friends and members of the CAP to provide him with that type of insight and advice.

BURNS: How do you think the transition went for Kemeny, from President to teaching?

WOOD: He certainly enjoyed being back in teaching. I assume that John, like anyone, would find it very strange no longer, suddenly, not being in charge of things, being able to do them or expected to do them. Although I think that's why, typically, at the end of this sort of thing you have at least a

sabbatical year, and John certainly did this, getting away and attempting to do some writing, sort of and then coming back into the teaching. I think he found it, though, after that being away, quite easy.

I don't know whether the oral history will take in some of his fellow mathematicians, but if you think about it you can see that the Math Department, who, you know, was strongly in favor of or greatly admired and loved John Kemeny, on the other hand viewed with a great deal of alarm the vision of, "Good God, what happens now when he comes back after years of being President and becomes a simple ordinary professor in the department?" And I think they worried about this, would this create problems in terms of decisions that the department would have to make? And found, in fact, that no problems arose; that John was as good a colleague as he had ever been, and that this type of clash that could, and frequently does, arise when a person with a presidential experience in a place becomes a member of the faculty.

BURNS: Do you think he had been able to keep up with the math over the time he [was] President?

WOOD: That's an interesting question. I honestly don't know, I really don't. He certainly knew enough about what had been happening in the world of computer sciences to have a very good sense of what types of problems had arisen in the evolution of BASIC, the language of which he was the co-inventor and therefore, you know, was interested in seeing whether he and Tom [Thomas "Tom" Kurtz] could come back together and recreate a True BASIC that could deal with all of this. I think he thought he could, that they could, and in the end I think, practically speaking, they found they couldn't. Now whether that's a measure of not fully keeping up, or whether it simply was inherent that it looked easy but proved to be just too complicated for the nature of BASIC as a language, I just don't know.

BURNS: Another comparison question between Kemeny and McLaughlin: I was reading in some of the articles in The Dartmouth from when McLaughlin resigned, that one of the issues the students claimed that they had a problem with McLaughlin with was his accessibility to the students. And through a lot of the interviews we've heard that Kemeny was more accessible to the students. Do you think that there's some truth to that?

WOOD: I think there is. Curiously, even though John as a very high-powered mathematician, and then add to that sort of the distance or the awe-inspiring nature of the office as President, John somehow did not scare students off. He had a wonderfully ingratiating aspect to him, that he could sit down and begin talking with them, and somehow bring them to

life. I can remember one of my students talking about it, for example, who was in a Freshman Seminar with me, called "The Great Richard III Murder Mystery," did Richard really kill those little princes in the Tower? And John apparently came up to this kid in Thayer one day, sitting down, and said, "May I join you for lunch?" and began talking, and began, and found out that the kid was in this seminar, and John said, "Oh, my," he said, "You know the little princes in the Tower used to be my greatest interest, and solving this mystery." And then he apparently sort of smiled and said, "But of course you know, with my Hungarian background, when I saw that 'princes' I thought that was 'princess,' I didn't realize you needed another 's.'" And he said, "You know, when I found it wasn't one princess but two princes, I stopped being interested."

OK. Now this is going to be something that I think is going to relax a freshman and begin sort of being able to talk. And so—and Dartmouth is still a small enough or cohesive enough campus that word of this sort of thing, I think, gets around. So that John used to hold office hours specifically for students, an hour, hour and a half a week as I remember, and any student who wanted to could come over and without making an appointment come in and talk to the President. And they did. It was not such a crush that it became an impossible system in which appointments were needed, but they came and were happy to.

Now with Dave, no, and I'm not quite sure why, because, I mean, in a way Dave certainly met and meets people very easily, and is the kind of person who typically, within a minute or two you're having a wonderfully warm conversation in which, in effect, he's drawing you out. But he didn't seem quite to do this with students, or, I think from a student point of view or from a lot of students' point of view he certainly incarnated, I think from their point of view, the best of a particular kind of Dartmouth of the past. I mean, that is, as this, you know, All-League or All-East athlete who is, you know, the star of the Beta house who was also on student government, so on. I think by the 1980s Dartmouth has become, in its more diverse and coeducational way, enough of a different institution that I think from the kids' point of view they didn't quite know how to deal with Dave's Dartmouth, in a sense.

BURNS: Do you think Kemeny's conversations with the students, in these office hours, was it mostly academic topics that he was talking...?

WOOD: I honestly don't know. I really, you know, have never heard—I think most of the student comments I've heard usually related to some academic thing, but not necessarily. Because I don't think there was a sense that it had to be academic that you go to see him. I mean, I'm aware of students

who certainly went to see him more with kinds of social concerns, if you will, or moral dilemmas, so on, that weren't in any sense academic in the normal sense, more the type of thing that a freshman advisor, so on, type of person would be the person you'd see.

But you wouldn't see Dave McLaughlin for that, it seems to me. I mean, it's—I suspect part of the problem would be, you know, “What reason do I as a student have to see and go see the President?” You know, “Who am I to bother him?” I think that was more a real dilemma with, I think, some notable exceptions, that is, my impression is that, for example, members of the Beta house, of which he had been an undergraduate member, felt much more inclined to go see him or to invite him down to the house or what have you, as a fellow brother. And so that there—I don't mean that in a negative sense. It could be taken that way, and I don't really intend it. It was simply that there—the connections, the possibilities, the sort of, in a sense, low-key possibilities of talking with the President, and interacting with him, were more apparent to them.

BURNS: I asked the question about Kemeny kind of leading towards an assessment of how he handled some of the difficult kind of student social life questions that came up during his era with the introduction of coeducation and some of the things that went on with fraternities during the 70's.

WOOD: My sense is that John, in terms of those social life questions, tended to delegate the responsibility and authority to his deans, and hoped that they were the ones who would come up with solutions, that they—that that was their specialty and responsibility. And this was kind of interesting, because I think John had to spend some time trying to find who were the best people to function in this deanly capacity; that, for example, one of the first Deans of Student Affairs and Vice President that he picked was a colleague of his in math, Don—I've gone blank right now on last name.

BURNS: Kreider?

WOOD: Kreider, [Donald] Don Kreider. And the, I think—I think he picked Don because Don's specialty in math was conflict resolution, which, you know, coming out of the '60s and getting into the '70s, that looked like a nice type of specialty for a Dean of Students to have, only Don's was very abstract, and based entirely on rationality. So that if you and I were having a conflict of some variety, Don would sit there and try, through questioning of us, Socratic method, for each one of us to sort of work down to where we saw what the logical contradictions were on which either my case or your case rested. Once we understood that we could rationally then come

to some agreement on the problem. Well, most human affairs don't work that way, and I think Kreider very quickly found that this was not going to be entirely successful.

On the other hand, take another example that we briefly discussed, the first Dean of College whom he had, who he had inherited and come in just at the very end of the John Dickey regime, clearly was of a totally different point of view in which his idea was that you sort of worked to meld and keep community going by becoming just one of the boys. With the idea that all you had to do was go down and drink with them at the friendly frat, or show up doing outrageous things, sort of helping the cheerleaders at football games, and that, as I think I mentioned, led ultimately to John actually firing him, with a something of a fight on the Board of Trustees.

I think after that John was much luckier, or more fortunate, when he appointed Ralph [Manuel '58 TU '59] as Dean of the College, who was a very savvy guy, both as a Dartmouth alum, someone who had worked in Admissions and really had a sense of what a Dean could and should do. That things suddenly, when the tough questions came along, very much got answered, and I think very much as Ralph Manuel as Dean recommended to John if John himself had to step in. Because his—actually, I can illustrate the problem. John wanted to step in very much. And he did initially. And the Trustees told him to cut it out.

That is, I was involved in a couple of these which were in fact student cases which had gone to the College Committee on Standing and Conduct, in which I thought rotten outcomes had taken place. And John actually overturned one of these decisions, where the—you did have the right to appeal to the President. And, you know, the Trustees of then, I think, indicated to him, “Hey, you know, if you begin intervening and trying to impose your rationality, you're going to get caught in this all the time. There will be nothing but appeals to you, you won't be able to do anything else and there will be all hell to pay. We've got to change the rules so that this kind of appeal to the President simply is no longer allowed, and you've got to keep your hands off.” And I think after that, and that would have come in, oh, '71 I think, fairly early on, he then did tend to keep his distance from the specific student problems that tended to focus on particular cases.

BURNS: And how would you characterize McLaughlin's dealings with student affairs during his time?

WOOD: I really can't think of any way in which he got involved directly with student affairs, except, you know, in terms of his determination, in a sense, to—he

was determined to "clean up" student life. So that, although as I say he was himself a Beta, and a committed fraternity person, he was appalled by some of the student antics in fraternities. And I think made it very clear, both in his public statements and in directions to Deans, that he didn't want this any more, which was part of why he worked so hard to insist on improving the physical plants of the fraternities, insisting that they live up to certain codes on that, as well as codes of conduct. I think part of his thinking was, "Well, if you live in a pigsty you act like a pig." So that, you know, clean up the house while you're also insisting on decent conduct and taking, being prepared to take hard action if they don't live up to what you're saying.

BURNS: We talked about the N.R.O.T.C. debates, and I believe, and my timing may be off on this, that shortly after this there is a faculty Ad Hoc Committee on Governance?

WOOD: Yes.

BURNS: And there's a report that comes out of this?

WOOD: Yes, there is, which clearly, you know, never explicitly came to a vote of no confidence, but what they were saying was, "Watch it." And certainly in the faculty debate that went on as a result of the report, various individual faculty members would say, "I will move that we have no confidence in you, Mr. President, if . . ." You know, right now I do not remember any of the specifics, because it was a report which clearly expressed all sorts of concerns about the President's effectiveness, but they really were not that concrete and certainly there were no sort of concrete solutions being predicated that the faculty was expected to vote on. So that it was clearly a message being sent to Dave McLaughlin, but not one that in any sort of way that you say, "Hey, gosh, I do remember because this A, B and C specifics."

In other words, it wasn't something that was terribly angry because he had decided to put all this money into moving the hospital and buying the hospital plant, or, you know, all the other particular concrete decisions you could point to. I mean, it wasn't that--I can't remember when it came in, whether—I mean, N.R.O.T.C. had disappeared, but whether the acceptance of Army R.O.T.C. off-campus had happened yet. That I don't remember, although it didn't create as many, as much flak, because it was totally extracurricular, so therefore the faculty, I think, had the feeling they couldn't put their fingers on it.

BURNS: I'm not sure on the exact dates. So were you surprised when Dave McLaughlin decided to resign, or was it in the air at that point?

WOOD: I think by the time he decided to resign it probably was in the air, that sometime—that—you had the sense that a significant number of trustees now were really aware of the nature of the problem, and that the problem was real. I mean, they weren't going around saying anything, but for example, I mentioned earlier that in the early years of the McLaughlin presidency Trustees seemed to disappear. That the types of sort of back-channel informal relationships that many faculty had with many Trustees seemed simply to disappear and you just didn't see Trustees on campus, and you wouldn't just sort of bump into them and say, you know, "Hi, Sandy, good to see you, been a while," and sit around and talk. They began appearing again, and more unusually, you began seeing three or four Trustees sitting in the observer section of faculty meetings. And they, you know, in some ways, I assume (I can't give specifics now) that some of the debates in which they were sitting were ones that clearly were ones the Trustees were interested in, but you had the sense, "Hey, they're also looking not just at, you know, the particular issue, but, you know, how are the faculty handling themselves in relationship to the President? Are they nuts?" Or, "How is the President handling himself? What's going on here?" I mean, I think you had the sense that this type of collection, and that what they were seeing and hearing was of a variety that would disturb a Trustee in terms of, you know, a long-term continuance of that presidency.

BURNS: Did you have a sense that they were getting, I guess, messages of some lack of confidence in McLaughlin from other bodies like the alumni, and the students . . . ?

WOOD: Certainly from individual alumni, and I think some of the things that would happen—I can remember sort of Alumni Seminars around the country, in which, oh, you know, some, you know, crunch had happened on campus, and it wasn't—I'm not thinking of the destruction of the shanties, things. It would be more things that raise questions about, "How's McLaughlin doing as President?" That the discussion period in the Alumni Seminars, instead of being purely on the subject of whatever the seminar was on, they would be asking for very frank opinions from the faculty about what we thought was going on, and then frequently with dinners and then evenings in one, you know, alumni person's house or another—I mean, I can remember one in Princeton, New Jersey, for example, in which this took place. I think I was doing the seminar with Bruce Pipes, who at that point I guess was Associate Provost or Dean of the Sciences and Graduate School . . .

[End of Tape 11, Side A — Beginning of Tape 11, Side B]

- WOOD: Well, going over to the house of Stan Smoyer, Class of '34, who was a former President of the Alumni Council, and certainly a very active participant in the alumni life of the College, and certainly a very significant figure. And as Bruce and I talked to Stan it was pretty clear—I think there were a couple of other alums there, that this wasn't just a conversation that was apt to end there, that Stan was clearly thinking about what sorts of appropriate action could he take in reaching out or talking to Trustees whom he knew. I never asked Stan after the event whether he did it, but my bet is he did. And I think that's illustrative of types of things that I think were happening; that as contacts, or as a crisis would come up, which would lead some alum groups to look and get disturbed themselves, and begin expressing it.
- BURNS: Did turnover on the Board of Trustees, do you think that had anything to do with more active participation by the Trustees with the College?
- WOOD: It could have. I think there was—at the time there was, at least among my more paranoid faculty colleagues, there was an enormous nervousness or assumption that Dave was himself enough in charge of the Board of Trustees that he was selecting the candidates who were being appointed, and that it was just going to be his rubber-stamp people. That in fact did not happen. But it was a measure that the Board was changing and a lot of new people were coming on, and you really didn't know, and I don't know to this day how much the change of the Board's attitude was the new people coming on with fresh eyes, saying something is strange, or whether it was some of the older people saying, “My God, you know, we haven't been doing our homework here, we've gotten out of hand.” I just don't know. As compared to what it was like four years ago, or, you know.
- BURNS: But essentially, at least it sounds like your impression of McLaughlin's resignation is that it was an agreement he came to with the Trustees.
- WOOD: Oh, I would think so. I . . . I've always assumed by the nature of it that it was more an agreement that was pushed by the Trustees. That is, if Dave McLaughlin had simply resigned, then I think he would have simply resigned, and there might have been some, you know, modest payment beyond whatever his retirement package was. But in this case, where you were going on paying him for some period of years effectively full salary, and also giving him rent-free the use of a fairly nice house, all suggested a type of golden parachute that Dartmouth, or typically, no other university had ever typically had. That it's the type of thing you say, “OK, we will give you this if you will leave town.” I mean, or put it the other way, “Leave

town,” and someone says “No,” then they say, “Well, leave town and we’ll”—in other words, I think the arrangements that, you know, were perfectly private and confidential except for the change in the federal law, and that Michael Roberts [‘87] as a very sharp editor of the Daily Dartmouth, went to the trouble of sort of finding out. Because while the federal law allows you to find out who the four highest paid people are at any college or university, it's a very tricky process to do so, and Michael figured out how to do it. He's a very successful New York lawyer today, and I'm not surprised. But I think it was thanks to what he did that it became very clear that some sort of arrangement which suggested that Dave had not gone gently into that good night. And so.

BURNS: What would you say are the strengths of McLaughlin's years as President?

WOOD: Well, I think, as I said at the beginning, certainly Dave faced up to all the deferred maintenance, the physical needs of Dartmouth College which had been accumulating over the past previous at least ten years and possibly longer, simply because of the sort of curious stagflation that we went through in the '70s. Over and beyond that, for all the sorts of fights or difficulties or foul-ups that characterized the McLaughlin years, by the end of them when he left certainly you had a much more harmonious Dartmouth community than you had had when he arrived, which is kind of curious. I mean that is, somehow I think some of the hopes of the Trustees as I understand it in appointing him as a person they thought could bring the community together, alumni and faculty and students, as he had brought the Trustees together, that while in a sense all the fights during the presidency suggested that wasn't happening, certainly in other ways it seems to have.

Although some of that probably, too, is simply distance from the Kemeny presidency. That the types of fights that people had been having that were dividing the community, whether of the sort of silly Indian Symbol variety or over the curriculum or over coeducation or whatever it happened to be, that were all blamed on John Kemeny, those were clearly receding, and so there was a greater sense of peace. How much McLaughlin had to do with it, I think he had something to do with it. But it would be very hard to pin down.

BURNS: I'm trying to think what else went on during his administration. Certainly there was a lot of dormitory construction and refurbishing, and the endowment certainly . . .

WOOD: Endowment certainly went up. I mean, part of that was, of course, simply a very good market from '82 or '83 on. And some was clearly very effective investment, and, you know, he did raise, without any major fund drives explicitly, he certainly from individual people was able to get significant numbers of funds for particular projects.

BURNS: Having talked last time about David Lilly's comments to you about bringing a businessman into the Dartmouth presidency and having witnessed McLaughlin as president, did you look back and think that there was some truth to that?

WOOD: Well, there certainly, in terms of David Lilly's point, I think, with regard specifically to McLaughlin, yes, clearly there was point. On the other hand, personally, I really was not fully convinced that it necessarily was because Dave McLaughlin was a businessman. I mean, Dave Lilly himself, during the same period, having said this went on to be first Dean of the Business School of the University of Minnesota and then the Academic Vice President of the University, and did splendidly until it blew up in a fundraising scandal. But, you know, he had a—he seemed to be enormously effective at this. And, I mean, he was and still is a classic businessman.

So that I suppose, though, in general, I think the person that I've talked to the most about this would be [Norman] Sandy McCulloch, who, OK, a businessman. But who certainly, I think, has the view that the nature of the complexity of any college like Dartmouth these days, and the expectations that we have, whether of the students, of the faculty, of the administration, are of a variety that you need someone in charge who understands a very wide range of what's going on in a university. And that probably nine times out of ten if not more, given the cutting-edge research that's expected these days, that someone who was an academic is probably going to be needed, both for the understanding, for understanding well enough that that person can enjoy the confidence of the faculty and of the community more generally.

The problem, I suppose, with any institution of higher education is that an awful lot of the problems that they face are in one sense or another insoluble. And so you've got to have some sort of confidence in the person who is the leader in charge, to be able to put up with the extent to which a number of these problems just don't seem to be getting solved. They're never going to be solved, but as long as you're confident that it's somebody who is making a good-faith effort, who is minimizing the consequences of some of these types of problems for the benefit of the whole community, then, you know, that's the person who's apt to be

successful. And that's a person who may need a mind that works in kinds of ways that are more apt to be an academic mind than it is to be a businessman's mind.

That it's—all I mean by that is, there are all sorts of types of creativity, and what strikes me about a businessman is that the successful businessman is typically very creative, but creative in ways that you can measure. I mean, that is, so that you say, "Look, I am the President of General Motors, and last year we turned out x million cars, and let me—as compared to the year before, where it was x minus 500,000 cars; I mean, we're doing better, but look at all the things that those cars make possible." And then you get this wonderful dream of it, or, you know, a Levitt building his new suburbs in the '40s and '50s, creating a whole type of thing that—but it's concrete. Where, you know—and I think it takes one particular kind of mind to see why the concrete is important—or what it takes to make sure that those concrete things happen, as opposed to another kind of mind which is worried about, you know, So-and-so's theorem which nobody has been able to prove correct in the last 300 or 400 years, so I'm going to sit down and solve it. And you know, which tend to be of the Who-the-hell-cares variety. Well, you know, I care about this terribly and this is part of the creativity, and by God if I can communicate that to students and get them worrying about some of this, they're learning to think in ways that may in fact be very, very successful [telephone rings]

BURNS: So, I've lost the train of thought a little bit.

WOOD: Well, I've been talking about sort of the businessman and the concrete versus the more indefinable, more abstract conceptual problems that academics tend to deal with, that you've got to get somebody who has the ability to deal with those more indefinable conceptual problems, and not just the concrete ones; or that, who projects to the faculty and other people with whom he or she has to interact, that they've got that type of capacity, and—because there is, in a sense, a certain "confidence game" in all senses involved in this. That insofar as you'd never fully arrive at truth, so to speak, you never are able fully to solve whatever the problems are of a college or university, that people have to have confidence in you, and yet you know in some senses that you are engaged in a kind of confidence game, in saying, you know, I will deliver where you can't. I'm overstating that too, to make the point.

BURNS: Is it more important at Dartmouth than at other colleges and universities to be able to articulate that academic mission of the College?

WOOD: The funny thing—I think at Dartmouth, for whatever reasons arising out of its history and its location, so on, there is a type of immediacy that has more people feeling that they and their views are or ought to be involved in decisions about the direction of the College and the policies that you make, than is characteristic of other schools. I mean, the extent to which, around Dartmouth, you hear people constantly talking about the Dartmouth Community, the Dartmouth Family, that all of us should participate; that my impression from a range of presidents over the years is that upon taking office they have been amazed by the sheer number of alumni, for example, who feel that it's their, you know, their God-given right to call up the President and be given instant immediate access to, so that they personally can tell the President what he ought to be doing. And that kind of thing, which shows up in another way with the sort of passionate letters that appear in the Alumni Magazine, etc., I think is something that, if not being unique to Dartmouth, because it clearly isn't, is sort of, in its frequency and intensity, something that does set Dartmouth apart from most other, if not all other institutions of higher education.

I've heard it argued that part of this goes back to or was really started by Ernest Martin Hopkins, that the argument went, and I really never sat down to try and wrestle with it or what validity it's got, but the argument goes more or less that Hoppy was the guy who, on becoming President, sort of recognized that Dartmouth was very different from many of the other colleges that it liked to compare itself to, insofar as it strikingly was not a place of inherited wealth. Insofar as it is more now, that's a very recent development. That, for example, when I was on the Admissions Committee in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Dartmouth stood out in the Ivy League (I don't think anyone knew it; we did), that it was the college that had the highest percentage of undergraduate students neither of whose parents had ever gone to college; that it was the place that was a real step up on the ladder both intellectually and, if you will, economically/socially.

And that--but part of what this meant was that not being a place of inherited wealth, it also was a place where it was very difficult to raise money, because you didn't have the people who had that trust from which you could draw a million dollars and give it to—that what Hoppy's bet was that the annual Alumni Fund, if you could get everybody, a highest possible percentage of people giving, that Dartmouth people by and large were successful at what they did, and so drawing yearly from their salaries, if you will, was one way that you could create an income that was equivalent to a much larger endowment than Dartmouth had.

Then, as part of the whole strategy then, the emphasis, or great emphasis which was placed on the existence of this Dartmouth community and Dartmouth family, that it's not an accident (I mentioned just recently Stan Smoyer as head of, President of the Alumni Council) that the Alumni Council has no particular function; it's not a Board of Trustees; that it effectively is a fundraising outfit, that itself helps to raise funds for Dartmouth. But originally I think was that the propaganda about it was, Here was this large sort of consultative body where people from all over the country could come in and participate in these important policy decision-making process. So that they, in a sense, were the tip or the symbol of something much bigger about the whole "once Dartmouth, always Dartmouth" and always participating in that 'Whither Dartmouth' question, which I think does—and I think there's something to it, that it began, or some of this really starts with Hopkins and is related to the financial exigencies or the financial problems that the College really did face.

BURNS: Certainly some of Hopkins' first tasks here under President [William Jewett] Tucker [1861] were Alumni Fund-related. I think the Alumni Fund continued to grow when he became the President. Which sort of leads me to another question that may be slightly off the topic of this oral history, which is: It seems to me that Hopkins really did a lot of things that stress Dartmouth College as Dartmouth College, and not a university. Do you think—I think that that kind of clearly translates through Dickey to a certain extent, although the PhD's started to come in the late '60s. Did that continue to be the mission through Kemeny and McLaughlin?

WOOD: Yes. Although there were some notable dissents. If you want an interesting oral history person to interview, it would be Agnar Pytte, who now is—having retired as President of Case Western Reserve is back living in town—as somebody who came here as a physicist and ended up as a Provost. The reason I say that is it goes back to the committee we talked about last time, the committee to evaluate the Dean of the Faculty and to make recommendations to the President on Dean in 1984, in which part of our job was to evaluate the relationship of the Deanship and the Provostship. And in the course of that, inevitably, we had interviews, lengthy interviews, with both the then Dean of the Faculty and then the Provost, who was Ag Pytte.

Pytte, I should make clear, is a Princeton undergraduate and PhD. And he was fascinating to talk to, because he wanted to talk about the whole problem or issues in the context of Dartmouth history. And you can't move two inches around here without someone raising the image of Hoppy, and, you know, Hopkins as the great Dartmouth president. Interestingly for Ag,

Hoppy is the villain. He's the one where it was the wrong turning, and as he looked at it he said, "Look. As you look at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, Princeton and Dartmouth are very similar, overwhelmingly undergraduate places. And it's at that point that Princeton makes the decision to become the small, excellent research university, PhD programs all the way. It's at that point that Hoppy says no. We are the undergraduate college, and I'm not interested in research; I want people who are damned good teachers."

One of the greatest in my department was a guy named Al Foley ['20], who retired just at the time I came, and the story in the department always was that Al, who had arrived in the '20s, would be walking across the Green and would encounter the President, and Hoppy would say, "Ah, Al, how are you," you know, and "How's that PhD going?" And Al was theoretically doing one at Columbia but never finished, and would sort of hem and haw and say, "Well, not very well, Mr. President," to which Hoppy would say, "Good, good, good!" you know. Well, so anyhow, Ag Pytte was picking up on all of this, and it was all within a context of, just think what Dartmouth would have been and could have been if only Hopkins had come down on the other side the way Princeton has. The interesting thing is, I'm curious—I haven't really talked to Ag about this since he's come back, and just say, "Hey, Ag, fifteen or now seventeen years later, and as you look at how Dartmouth sort of, where it's at now, what do you think?" I think he might have a somewhat different reaction, or that it didn't make as bad a turning as he thought it had at that point.

BURNS: Did you have a different take on it at the time?

WOOD: Yes, I—my problem, I think—I thought Dartmouth in many ways had made the right choice; that—as I had experienced the research university, the problem as I saw it was, it tends so to take over the undergraduate. That if you are a history major, all you're supposed to be doing is taking pre-professional school training to become a professional historian. This isn't my idea of a liberal education, or the same thing in English or physics, whatever the field. And as I watched that happening at Harvard I wanted to get out and be in a place where an undergraduate education in a liberal learning way still existed. And I think that's the case at Dartmouth.

The interesting thing to me is that what Dartmouth seems to be trying to do is to insist on that type of liberal education for its own sake, but that part of that education is to place as a resource for every undergraduate, or at least those undergraduates who want to take advantage of it, to place at their disposal the kinds of resources that the research university has. You know, an awful lot of undergraduates won't take advantage of it, but by

God those who do, so that, you know, OK, I as a medievalist can, you know, with not hopeless conceit, sort of say, "Hey, look, the reality is, I probably in my day was one of the top ten medievalists in the country, and could have taught damn near everywhere, but preferred doing it here." And that I can look at countless colleagues in all sorts of different departments where that's the case. And that creates an enormous richness, and it isn't just that. I mean, you know from your work in Rauner and what sort of resources it's got, or the resources that Baker-Berry have got, so on, they just aren't characteristic of the undergraduate college, and what an opportunity it can present.

[End of Tape 11, Side B — Beginning of Tape 12, Side A]

BURNS: So, does this tension, then, between—however you want to say, the college and the university, that continues to arise over the years?

WOOD: It continues to arise, and I think on the whole it's been a fruitful tension. And, I mean, you—I guess I hope that in a sense it never goes away; that if you have constant pressure to measure up intellectually with research and publish-or-perish or, you know, all of that sort of thing, that you keep on fighting and saying, "Hey, but part of the point is, or the real point is ultimately those kids in the classroom." And that that type of relationship is part of what this college is about, and thinking about that.

And I guess I've always kiddingly said, you know, when people talk about, Well, you'll never be Dartmouth University, which historically, thanks to the Dartmouth College Case, probably you can't, I've always said, Well, you know, effectively we are in terms of what's being done, although you look at degrees, OK, you don't have degrees, PhD's, except in the sciences with a few exceptions. That—I think the solution might be sort of the mirror image of, say, the Harvard-Yale-Princeton where, as undergraduates, you have Harvard College which exists in Harvard University, or Yale or Princeton, same thing. you probably here ought to have a Dartmouth University that exists within Dartmouth College! I think it would be a wonderful idea, and that—because that's in effect what you've got now, and sort of to recognize it with a certain sense of humor and fun would be the way to go.

BURNS: So, maybe we've already charted some of this, but if we look at the major developments of this debate as being Hopkins kind of pushing away from graduate programs and then Dickey bringin in the scholar-teacher for the faculty, what would you characterize as the major tension points during the Kemeny and McLaughlin years, or is it that easily definable?

WOOD: I'm not sure it's that easily definable. I mean, that is, in the Kemeny years initially, I think at the very beginning simply because John was such a distinguished scholar in his own right in mathematics, computer science, and because, after all, he had, before he had become President, led the charge to create a PhD program in mathematics, I think the greatest sort of fear with John when he became President was that he was, like Ag Pytte, having also come from Princeton, going to try and transform Dartmouth into Princeton, that it would be the university. And very clearly the real challenges that John faced, in terms of coeducation, in terms of year-round operation, in terms of student and faculty diversity, were of a quite different variety; and I think, you know, within two or three years at most of his becoming President, the university thing had disappeared.

I suppose with the McLaughlin presidency the fear of some was that he was going to sort of lead the charge to turn this back into some sort of mindless unthinking return to Animal House, if you will, of nothing but the undergraduate and undergraduate only and that kind of beer-guzzling, fanny-pinching kind of image. Clearly that was not what Dave McLaughlin expected or wanted, but I suppose that was the sort of challenges understood, where I think from Dave's point of view the challenge was saying, "Hey, I'm taking over as the economy is beginning to recover, and we have all sorts of problems that had been left over from the last ten or fifteen years that simply need to be addressed." And problems that, I think, many members of the community, and not just faculty, didn't understand.

BURNS: I guess at this point I want to ask if you had any other additional comments on the Kemeny administration, McLaughlin administration, or any further comparisons or contrasts between the two, or any . . .

WOOD: No, I've really—I think in one form or another we've covered most things, yes.

BURNS: Kind of a more general question, then, would be, you came in 1964? What would you say are the most profound changes that you've seen at Dartmouth over the years that you've been affiliated . . . ?

WOOD: Well, I think two, I think clearly, academically. It's not just that Dartmouth has become significantly more a home to people who perform and function well as scholars, and who naturally assume that they exist in an international scholarly community. That's something that didn't exist when I first came here. I think that, certainly, has been one of the largest changes. And I think on the whole, has been for the good. In many ways it's part of what, simply put, makes Dartmouth a much more confident

community or institution from what it was thirty, thirty-five years ago, where no one wanted to make any decision without, as I think I've put it earlier, looking over their shoulders to see what they were doing at Harvard. No one really worries about that any more, for better or worse, because you could argue it either way. But the point is, people on the whole aren't worried about it, where they were.

On the negative side, I still worry about some of the fragmentation which has hit Dartmouth as a result, inevitably, of its year-round operation and its off-campus programs; that each one of them has clear benefits to the institution, but for someone like me who is interested in that continuing sense of community, of groups pursuing knowledge as best they can—groups, not just individuals—I constantly am struck by how much more difficult it is for those group activities to exist in a community in which there's a constant in-and-out process randomly rather than as a pattern. I think it's been a—there's been much less negative impact as a result of that than I feared in the 1970s. On the other hand it clearly is there. But there have been benefits too, so that it's—that's one of the more interesting things to try and balance out. There's—there, I don't think, is an absolutely clear answer.

BURNS: Do you think year-round operation will continue?

WOOD: Right now I—it certainly looks that way. John Kemeny always argued, and was very clear at the time, “Hey, consider this well, because once you go on it you'll find it's almost impossible to get out of it.” So that the proposition of returning to a conventional calendar was costed out over the last year, and I don't know what the particular assumptions were that were placed on it, but I think, whatever those assumptions were, clearly it came out at a kind of price that was not one that anybody was willing to pay. So that—and I certainly don't hear a lot of people, as you did twenty years ago, saying, “Hey, I hope—or, I'm chomping on the bit, and so on, to return.” So there doesn't seem to be a huge bunch of rebels out there.

BURNS: I think that's all the questions I have. Unless there's anything you have to add?

WOOD: No, can't think of anything. OK.

End of Interview