

David T. McLaughlin '54 TU '55
President Emeritus of Dartmouth College

An Interview Conducted by

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INTERVIEW: David McLaughlin '54 TU '55, President Emeritus

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Hanover Inn
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: November 8, 1996

CARROLL: It is November 8, 1996 and I am speaking with David McLaughlin, Class of '54, and president emeritus of Dartmouth College. I wanted to first know a little bit about your background. Where were you born and raised?

McLAUGHLIN: I was born in Grand Rapids, Michigan. At that time, Grand Rapids was a furniture town, the capital of the furniture market. The family lived in a small suburb called East Grand Rapids. It was a very comfortable upbringing in the sense that this was a small community with an excellent public high school, East Grand Rapids High School. There were perhaps 300 students. 100% of the graduates went to college. So it was a public school, but with a fairly high tradition of private institutional competence.

My family life was not a happy one. My father was an alcoholic which resulted in a divorce while I was in high school. I was the middle of three children and my brother went on to the Naval Academy. So the brunt of the family issues fell pretty much to me at that time. This left an indelible impression on me in terms of the value of a family--the obligations and responsibilities one had.

So I was kind of balancing--on the one side, a lot of ambition to get beyond my family's situation and, on the other side, trying to cope with some issues that were probably a little bit beyond my maturity at the time. Through that period, I always had the great fortune of having mentors. Often they related to what I was doing athletically, so athletics became, even from high school days, a fairly large part of my persona in terms of gaining recognition and expanding my

opportunities, what I was trying to do. It was an environment in which I guess that I did fairly well. I was head of the student body, played football and played basketball. I was captain of the football and captain of the basketball team and was All State. Then I was recruited by the University of Michigan and other schools. Assuming leadership and trying to excel were fairly well driven into me both by family circumstances and by my mentors who were really were wonderful.

CARROLL: Who were the mentors?

McLAUGHLIN: The two were coaches. One was a man named Reid Waterman, who has since passed away and then there was a man named John Hokja. John was both the basketball coach and the football coach and so, as I went through the latter part of my high school career, he was ever present and was really a very strong person.

As I considered my options on graduating, I had some compelling need to leave Grand Rapids and test myself on a broader stage. I was recruited to attend the University of Michigan by Gerry Ford [President Gerald Ford] who became a close lifetime friend. Ford was a product of Grand Rapids, [was elected] into Congress, and was a great University of Michigan football star. My father had gone to the University of Michigan. He was an architect. There were two weekends that I went down to the University of Michigan and walked into that huge stadium and looked at the size of it and said, "This is awesome, but it's not for me."

At that time, there was a fairly active alumni group from Dartmouth and one from Princeton in East Grand Rapids and both said, "Why don't you come east to school." The family did not have adequate money at the time so I really had to have a scholarship. I ended up being admitted to both institutions and both on scholarship. But this small school in New Hampshire I had never seen. It looked like it might be a very fulfilling environment. So really, without ever having left the state of Michigan--in the fall of 1950, I went east and was literally dumped on the corner on the Green. I looked around and said "My gosh, what have I done to myself?" It was "a growing experience."

CARROLL: So you came without having an idea of what this place was like?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I never had seen it. I saw pictures of it. I had never met any of the administration. I came out with an upperclass man for part of

the way but also hitchhiked part of the way until I got dropped on the Green.

CARROLL: When you got up here, what was your first impression of Dartmouth?

McLAUGHLIN: Having come because I had come from a small, controlled environment. It was probably the most beautiful place that I had seen. In many ways, it really hasn't changed--the physical being of the college, its central presence is much as it was pretty much as it was when I was dropped off here.

When you came here, was there still the remnants of the feeling of the G.I. Bill with a lot of older students and families?

McLAUGHLIN: When I matriculated we were at the end of that cycle, but there were a lot of older students, many of whom were married. Also, the '50s were the time of the Korean War time and I ended up enrolling in ROTC partly because of that.

CARROLL: When did you come to know John Dickey?

McLAUGHLIN: My first encounter with John Dickey was when I shook his hand when I matriculated. I was impressed by him then, and I was always impressed by his presence on the campus.

I did get to know John Dickey until--I guess it was my junior year, when I became head of the Student Government and also head of the Judiciary Committee of Students. At that time the administration of the college empowered students with the first order of discipline for student infractions. This was a fairly elaborate process administered by the Dean's Office. We would have to take our recommendations on each of the more serious crimes, offenses, infractions to John Dickey. He had stopped smoking but couldn't resist having a cigarette in his hand, which he proceeded to mangle at every meeting. So John and I became reasonably close during that period of time. He would then come down and watch football practice, and we would visit down there. He just became a trusted counselor and a great mentor.

CARROLL: I have listened to his tapes--his interview tapes--and his mind strikes me, on the tapes at least, as being very clear and focused. He holds an idea and develops it a paragraph at a time, and has a

very clear, sort of legalistic mind. Is that something that communicated itself in his everyday dealings?

McLAUGHLIN: Not particularly. I mean, certainly one understood the clarity of what he wanted to do. He would ask a lot of questions and let you develop your own solutions to problems. Sometimes in some of his speeches, which were paragraph oriented, but they move off into different subjects at different times.

But he had a very clear vision of what he thought Dartmouth was, and was able to convey that quite precisely through all of his personal relationships. More than once, we would talk about values of the institution, as it pertained to the undergraduate body, but also to the faculty and to the alumni. But the college was less complex at the time. It was smaller. The graduate schools were not large and so, from going from East Grand Rapids to Dartmouth was probably just about the right step from my standpoint.¹

CARROLL: What position did you play in football?

McLAUGHLIN: I played end. In my freshman year, I went out for football. You come from high school where, if you have done well, you start to get full of yourself a bit. It very quickly left me here. I found that the football team was bigger, faster, better than I had every seen or that I would ever hope to achieve. At times, I really had to struggle and say, "Is this where I belong?" But I had decided that I had done this before and I was going to stay with it, stick with it come what may.

Dartmouth, at that time, was apparently recruiting fairly heavily into the football mold, because I think about half of our team never came back in the sophomore year. They washed out in the freshman year. You would not find that today; but, at that time, why maybe that was a part of the transition of all of this. Dartmouth had good football teams, but not great football teams; but the upper-class men looked a lot older to me than the four years difference in age.

CARROLL: Who was the coach at that time?

¹ At one point in my senior year, John asked me to lead a student referendum to have the campus vote to eliminate discriminatory clauses in fraternity charters. It was contentious but it passed, with a lot of persuasion on my part. That cemented our relationship. Can you imagine giving that kind of decision making to students today?

McLAUGHLIN: Tuss McLaughry [DeOrmond McLaughry HO '55]. It was in the concluding years of McLaughry's reign and my last year, 1954, I think was Tuss' last year.

I stayed on the campus for a year because I was a Tuck School student and doubled up to get two degrees in five years. So, my senior year, I was basically taking courses at Tuck School, but participating as an undergraduate, both athletically and in extracurricular activities. When I came back for my fifth year it was Bob Blackman's [Robert "Bob" Lyle Blackman '37] first year as head coach. I was asked to help him coach the ends on the football team. It was pure joy.

CARROLL: So you really kept the contacts going.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I enjoyed it. I was drafted by the Philadelphia Eagles when I was a senior. Professional football was not the same kind of game then as it is today. Television has really taken a hold of professional athletics today, but it was a tempting honor and thrill. It would have meant that I couldn't have finished my second year at Tuck School. I was then in ROTC with a year deferral from the Air Force to finish my graduate school. The Philadelphia Eagle organization had made arrangements so that I could finish my education at Wharton [School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania] and would get the deferment that I needed and additional deferments, but I decided that I wasn't going to play football the rest of my life. The only sound piece of advice I ever remember my father giving me was when he said facetiously that I could wear my Phi Beta Kappa key from the chinstrap of my helmet.

CARROLL: Have you ever regretted that?

McLAUGHLIN: Oh, a little. I would have liked to have seen whether or not I could have made it, but it wasn't a huge thing.

CARROLL: Did you make friendships that stuck with you from your undergraduate days?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, although I must say that probably less so than other classmates. I know a lot of the class. We were close friends, but my life at the college was basically relating to academics, extracurricular activities, and athletics. I was head of the undergraduate council. I mentioned I was involved with the

Judiciary Committee. I was head of the Casque and Gauntlet delegation and so my acquaintances went well beyond the normal close class ties. They were much more institutional.

In some ways, I think I probably missed a lot. Even now, as an alumnus, I do a lot with the class, but my role at the college has been beyond the class. But it isn't the core of my memory of the college.

CARROLL: I am curious because you and Paul Paganucci ['53] are the same years and had the same track, going for the five years into Tuck. Did you know each other at the time?

McLAUGHLIN: We did. As a matter of fact, when I came in here as a freshman I needed, on my budget, to purchase used furniture. Pag would gather up furniture that had been picked up by upper class men in the fall and then sell it to unsuspecting freshman when they came in. He conducted his business at the C & G [Casque and Gauntlet] House. Pag had the franchise, and that is how we met and began a lifetime friendship. I became convinced over four years that he did so well with the business that he supported his entire family and probably couldn't afford to leave Dartmouth. [Laughter] He was the first entrepreneur that I knew. He defined the term for me.

CARROLL: That's wonderful.

McLAUGHLIN: We are very close today. He, of course, was a vital part of the administration when I was here and I always benefited from our association.

CARROLL: What was your major as an undergraduate?

McLAUGHLIN: I decided, looking across the options, that I didn't really want to focus on one area. I really wanted as broad an undergraduate experience as I could obtain, The one major (and John Dickey encouraged me this way) that I decided was going to provide me with that exposure was international relations. That doesn't exist today. It combined economics, history, government, and a bit of religion. There was also a geography component to it. So it was exactly what I wanted.

Unfortunately, I never finished the major as I went to Tuck School in my senior year. I do recall when George Kennan was on campus (he was a great friend of John Dickey), I asked Kennan what he

thought was the most important subject he has ever taken in preparing him for his role on the world scene. Without hesitation, he said that it was geography. He said that unless you know the world's geography, you will never understand it geo-politically. From that day, I made sure I got a maximum exposure to geography. Looking back, I think Kennan was pretty close to being right.

So, anyway, my undergraduate years were great. I enjoyed them. I did reasonably well academically. The one course that I never really got my arms around was French. I am a poor linguist. We had the requirement that you had to take a semester or a year of a foreign language. It was a terrific requirement, but it was almost my undoing and probably almost put in jeopardy my Phi Beta Kappa key, which I was committed to earn. But it was great. Except for that, it was a great experience.

CARROLL: Have you ever used French since?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I am frightened to death of it. [Laughter] It was a great error. When I returned to Dartmouth, I always threatened John [Rassias] that I might come into one of his classes. He said, "You've got to do it." I would still like to do that, but I would probably take Spanish and not French, because of the prevalence of Spanish-speaking people in the United States.

CARROLL: Do you remember any one class that stood out as having been especially interesting or helpful during those years?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, we had the Great Issues [Course] at the time and it was one of those experiences that forced students to get beyond the campus, to look at critical issues, to hear firsthand world figures and then force the student to develop his own informed position on critical problems. Maybe it was Thurgood Marshall one week and George Wallace the next talking about segregation. There was a component of the program that required you to read the newspapers. It led me into habits that have been part of my life ever since.

After each of those evening lectures, the students would all gather informally in various spots around campus. This wasn't structured. I spent a lot of time at the C & G House, in these sessions—they would go on for hours dissecting the issues in the most stimulating way. Unfortunately, there weren't many Blacks at the time and

obviously there were no women. But there was a great deal of diversity--economically, socially, religiously. Those were some of the most stimulating intellectual experiences within the student body that took place. This was certainly an important part of my undergraduate studies.

The others were Economics. I enjoyed Economics. I liked its precision. There was a good faculty--a good department. I had very little sense of whether departments were good or not, only which professors were outstanding. One of the deans--I've forgotten which—I believe he became dean of the college and his name escapes me...

CARROLL: Don Morrison, maybe?

McLAUGHLIN: No. It was after Don. He counseled me to not worry about the course. He said, "Pick the faculty member. Get a great faculty member and they will teach you more than you ever could imagine about the joy of learning and in the process you will learn more about that subject. When you leave the college, you won't remember a lot of the courses you took, but you will remember the collective experience. You will remember the great faculty members that you had." Even my French professor--I can still see him. He taught me a lot--but he didn't teach me French. [Laughter]

CARROLL: What do you think makes up a good professor?

McLAUGHLIN: The quality of Dartmouth that I think is so different from almost any other institution is the fact that the faculty here teach and they love to teach. While there are exceptions, the faculty here enjoy the interaction with students. They have an interest in the student, the ability to make the subject come alive, and they make the student think—stretch the student's mind.

As I look back from my presidency and I remember the tenure process, participating with the C.A.P. [Committee Advisory to the President] as they made those very hard tenure decisions. The criteria that I kept coming back to was, "Can they teach?" and "Can they really make the love of learning come alive for students?" Dartmouth is really blessed. We have very good teachers here or we wouldn't be getting the rankings that we do. I do not mean to minimize the value of research. A great faculty member must remain competent in his/her subject through solid research.

CARROLL: When did you decide to do the five-year program at Tuck?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it was in my sophomore year. When I was at the college, I knew that I had to leave here with the ability to make a living. In going back to when I grew up, we were not poor. We lived in a nice neighborhood; we went to public school, but I always knew that it was not the type of life to which I aspired. It was important that my brother went to Annapolis because of the government's payment of education. It was important that I had a scholarship. While these were not disadvantages, I felt that I had to leave Dartmouth with some skill base that would enable me to succeed. Business seemed to be the most attractive to me at the time.

The best way to that end seemed to be an MBA. I always regretted taking the three-two program because I felt that I really lost my senior year in terms of enjoying the college academically and collegially.

It didn't interfere with the extracurricular activities, I still was head of student government. I still played football. I still did all of the C & G activities and everything else, but every day I was down at Tuck School pursuing a vigorous course of study. Academically, it was as high achieving then as it is today, but I felt short-changed on both ends. I am not sure that was a good choice. It did enable me to pursue what was important in my life. It let me enroll in the Air Force. It let me get my MBA degree. It prepared me vocationally for what I was going to pursue later, but it deprived me of an undergraduate year that I would like to have had.

CARROLL: When you look back on this time--the '50s, Dartmouth in the '50s--is there anything that stands out about the spirit of the place or the kinds of extracurricular activities that were open to students that is different than today?

McLAUGHLIN: The academic program was much more limited. There was not the Hopkins Center. There was not the Hood Museum. There was no television. There were no computers. So, the life of the college was very much oriented to the outdoors. It was oriented to fraternities. It was oriented to honor societies like Dragon and C & G. A lot of the weekends were spent commuting down to Smith [College]. Literally, the place would close out on weekends to a large extent. So it was a very different place. I mean, the richness of Dartmouth, its sense of place and purpose, which to me was wonderful at the time, is much the same today.

I think, in a way, it reflects itself in alumni. There was an intensity of alumni feeling, starting, you know, probably through the '50s that I think reflects the nature of the institution. Today the alumni still feel strongly but I don't think they feel as passionately about the college as those who graduated prior to the changes in technology and coeducation.

It also reflected itself in the very conservative wing of our alumni that became a bit of a problem for [President] John Kemeny and for me. But, as I think about it, they reflect the character of the place as it was when they were here; it was pretty isolated.

CARROLL: Were there trains that came through or buses that were how one connected to the outside world?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. There were trains and there were buses, but generally if you were on scholarship, you could not have a car and all freshmen could not have cars. The upper class men did. So, there always seemed to be always enough transportation so that you could get a ride or find your way down and find your way back. It was fairly dangerous. There were a lot of students who were injured in car accidents on those weekends. But it was sort of "this is the way that it was" attitude.

CARROLL: Was Winter Carnival then a more important event?

McLAUGHLIN: It was huge. I mean, it was an event for the whole east coast. It became really central to the social life in the winter term. The statues were impressive and seemed to grow in size every year. It was a big event.

CARROLL: Do you remember the statues that you worked on?

McLAUGHLIN: One was an Indian and then there was another one of Eleazer Wheelock. They were part of the tradition at the college. One night, I remember being out there working on it. John Dickey was there working beside me—a memorable event.

CARROLL: Did you learn to carve ice?

McLAUGHLIN: No. [Laughter] I didn't want to get into that. It was fine, but social life was not a big part of my existence and fraternities were not central to my activities.

CARROLL: Were you a member?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I was a Beta [Beta Theta Phi]. I never lived in the house, but I was part of it. Most of the football team then were Betas. You needed to be affiliated because it was about the only social outlet for weekends. As I recall, probably 70% or 80% of the college was in the fraternity system at the time. But it never was the core in my life. College was the core.

CARROLL: When you got out of Tuck, what was the first job that you had?

McLAUGHLIN: When I got out of Tuck, I went directly into the Air Force because that was my obligation.

[End of Tape 1, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 1, Side B]

McLAUGHLIN: I took flight training between Texas and Florida and Georgia. At that time your ranking in your class decided where you would go. It was your choice of assignments. I ranked fairly high and they offered me a chance to go to Europe and fly in Europe with the United States Air Force. I would have loved to have done it. I had never been to Europe, but you had to extend for another year or two, and I decided that I was not going to do that. So they then stationed me in Montana, Great Falls, Montana, which was part of the Air Defense Command.

It was after the Korean War, the military funds were becoming in short supply and one day the Colonel came into the squad room. It was interesting because the Base Commander in Great Falls, Montana, was my ROTC Commander at Dartmouth. He was Lt. Col. Richard O. Bandlow, USAF]. As I recall he wasn't a lot more effective in Great Falls than he was at Dartmouth. He came into the squad room one day and said, "We are out of money and those who want to get out early can do so." He said, "Is anybody interested?" I raised my hand and I looked around and I was the only one. [Laughter] Because all of the rest of the squadron had decided that they really wanted to make the Air Force a career. Most of them were afraid to get out--they didn't know what they were going to do on the outside.

So I left the Air Force earlier than I would have. I was only in the service a little less than two years. Then I went to work for the Champion Paper Company in Hamilton, Ohio. When I was at Tuck,

I had interviewed with a whole host of companies and Champion seemed to offer what I was looking for. They had never hired an MBA at the time I was interviewing while I was at Tuck School, and so I thought, well, it looks like it could be a good opportunity and I wanted to be in a manufacturing industry.

Interestingly, when I got there, there was one other Dartmouth MBA there. Andy Sigler [Andrew C. Sigler '53 TU '56], who then became chairman of Champion over time and is now a trustee of the college. So the Dartmouth connection continued to influence my life in a very important manner.

CARROLL: [Text deleted to protect individual's privacy]

McLAUGHLIN:

CARROLL:

McLAUGHLIN: Oh, is he?

CARROLL: Yes. It is amazing how everything connects eventually.

McLAUGHLIN: When I went to Champion, the chairman of Champion was a man named Rubin Robertson. Rubin was on leave from the company as undersecretary of defense. He may have been the secretary of defense. There was a man named Karl Bendetsen, who was one of the senior people. Previously, Karl had been secretary of the army.

When I went to Champion, they said, "What do you want to do?" I said "Well, I want to go on and learn this business from the ground up." So they said, "If you are serious, you will have to spend six months in every mill and nobody has ever done that." I responded that this was my decision. Partly to get even, I think, they sent me down to Pasadena, Texas in August. It was the hottest, dirtiest, smelliest job that I ever had. I worked six months down there and then I was sent to spend six months in Canton, North Carolina, which was a little hard on the family. It was important to me to understand the business. As I then progressed in the Champion framework, there was more respect and regard from a lot of the old-timers because I didn't just come in with an MBA and start at headquarters--that I really wanted to understand the business.

As it turned out, when I came back from my tour of the plants, they said, "We want you to become Rubin Robertson's assistant; but he is still in Washington. So in the interim you will report to Karl Bendetsen." Literally, the week that Rubin was coming back from Washington, he was killed in an automobile accident. Karl, whom I had been working with, then became the head of Champion. He was a wonderful mentor. He became a lifetime friend and supporter, and I spent 12 or 15 years with Champion.

CARROLL: I just want to go back to one thing. Do you still fly?

McLAUGHLIN: No. When I left, I was in a class called 56S--every class had a designation. Partly because of financial pressure, the Air Force wanted to see whether it could expedite the training cycle. They took our class and several others and they jumped our class out of progression so we went from one airplane to one two steps ahead by passing the progression of training planes. By the time our class got to Valdosta, Georgia, we all had our wings. We were in all-weather training, but literally, we were losing two pilots a week out of the squadron. The weather was bad. The training had been accelerated too much. It was beyond our capabilities. So it became somewhat of a survival mode and it was a difficult time.

When I was discharged I said, "You know, I've learned enough to know that, if you cannot fly often and you cannot fly with aircraft that are professionally maintained, one should not fly." At that stage, we had two children and I said, "Enough." And, again, there was not a lot of money to devote to this. So I gave up the flying. I loved it. I mean, I really enjoyed it, and I have thought that some day I would love to go back, but it is too late.

What I really would like to do is fly a helicopter. Eventually they will be more cost-effective. You can go anywhere in those. They are just great.

CARROLL: Now, you mentioned several times that you had a family when you were in the Air Force. Where did you meet your wife and when did you get married?

McLAUGHLIN: When I was at Dartmouth, Judy was a roommate, at Pine Manor, of a student whom I had known in East Grand Rapids High School. I met Judy through this mutual acquaintance on a blind date over Thanksgiving weekend, I think in my junior year. She was going out with somebody else and I had an interest in a young lady at

[Mount] Holyoke [College]. So, it was nice but that was about it. And then we saw each other several more times, and by the time I became a senior we became quite serious. We became engaged the end of my senior year, and decided that we wouldn't get married until I finished Tuck School or was on the downward slope of that, because I was, again, on a scholarship to Tuck School.

The world does come around; but the scholarship I had at Dartmouth was from Fred Whittemore's father [Frederick L. Whittemore '27]. I never knew Fred [Frederick B. Whittemore '53 TU '54], except vaguely at the time. I never made the connection. But I came through the college on a Whittemore scholarship that he had provided from his New Hampshire ties with Brown Paper Company. I had another scholarship at Tuck School sponsored by Gulf Oil. As I recall, I would have lost the scholarships if I had been married. So we got married in March of 1955 when I was just finishing at Tuck School. We lived outside of Hanover for the latter part of my second year at Tuck School.

Judy is from a Dartmouth family named Landauer and her grandmother, Bella Landauer, used to spend every summer sitting on the porch of the Hanover Inn. She and Ed Lathem [Edward Connery Lathem '51] were great friends. Judy's uncle, Jim Landauer [James D. Landauer '23], was a very strong Dartmouth alumnus with very enduring ties in Hanover. He had a place up on Pinneo Hill. So, when we got married and were here, we lived up on Pinneo Hill, and I would come down to Tuck School every day. It was a very happy time.

CARROLL: It sounds ideal....

McLAUGHLIN: Our first son [William '78 TU '81] was married when I was in pilot training in Big Spring, Texas, and our second child was a daughter [Wendy] who was married...

CARROLL: Not married. Born. She was born, not married. [Laughter]

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. She was born. Right. Bill was born in Big Spring and Wendy was born in Great Falls, Montana, when I was there with the Air Force Defense Command. When I left the service, we had the two children and then we had our third child, Susan ['81], who was born in Hamilton, Ohio. Our fourth child [C. Jay '85] was born up in Rockford, Illinois, when I was then with Champion.

CARROLL: In Champion, you had, at one point two, and then three children that you were carting around for these six month stints.

McLAUGHLIN: And the fourth was born up in Rockford, Illinois. Even at Champion, we moved from Hamilton, Ohio, to Belvedere, Illinois, to Chicago, and then I was being asked to leave Chicago to go to New York with Champion. It was at that stage that I looked at the family and I looked at New York, and I said, "There must be a better place to raise a family." I was still pretty provincial.

I had an offer to become president of the Toro Company, which had been acquired after the war by a group of Dartmouth people. David [M.] Lilly ['39] was then CEO and he persuaded me to take the job—another Dartmouth tie.

CARROLL: That's when you moved to Minneapolis?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. All through that period, wherever we were, there were strong Dartmouth alumni in the community.

CARROLL: That's what I was going to ask you. Were you active in the Alumni Council?

McLAUGHLIN: I never became part of the Alumni Council. I always regretted it to some extent but was never invited to become a member. But I think it is typical. I was involved with my children and my career. Three of whom graduated from the college. In those early years, one is intensely dealing with family, with profession, with career. I supported the college, but it was not my priority.

I made it a point that every year I would come back to the college. Every year, I would walk the campus because it was almost a touchstone for me to say, "How do I feel? What am I doing right? What am I doing wrong?"

It was on one of those occasions that I ran into John Dickey crossing the Green. That's when they were building the Hopkins Center and John said, you know, "What are you doing this afternoon?" I replied I didn't have anything pressing on my schedule so he said, "Let me take you on a tour through the Hopkins Center." We were met there by President Emeritus [Ernest Martin] Hopkins ['01] and so the three of us toured this almost-completed building. John explained every room and Hopkins didn't seem to have any great deal of interest, but I was awestruck by the

two of them. It was typical of John Dickey. John, Hoppy, and I had dinner that night in the Dickey's kitchen. It was a truly memorable evening. Every time I came back, I felt the draw of the New Hampshire environment.

CARROLL: Did you keep in touch with John Dickey during this time?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. John and I corresponded often. I would always see him at the alumni gatherings. Alumni gatherings were (maybe it is a failed memory) but they always seemed to be much larger than I had remembered them even during my [presidency]. If you were going to a Chicago function, they used to have three, four hundred people come out. It was a major occasion.

John would arrive by train and would go straight to the meeting. It is surprising how well he was in his personal relationships, but he did not deliver a good talk. I don't think he liked to give speeches and it was an exhausting experience for him to go on the alumni trail. Yet, he was always there and always effective as far as I was concerned.

CARROLL: Was he the one who did not like to fly?

McLAUGHLIN: No. President Kemeny.

CARROLL: Kemeny.

McLAUGHLIN: John Kemeny hated to fly. Poor John. I helped him at one point to get on the Honeywell Board of Directors because he wanted the corporate experience and, within about six months he resigned. The chairman of Honeywell, who was a friend of mine said "You know, you didn't do me any favor." So I called John to determine why he had abruptly left the board.

He said "Look. I was losing time. Two days before the trip, I would start worrying about it and I would lose a day of effectiveness. I was gone for a day and then I would have to fly home. I would get there and it took me two days to recover, so every meeting was taking a week out of my life." He said, "It just wasn't worth it."

I don't think John ever got over that fear of flying. He tried all different remedies, but none worked. It may have been that he did not like corporate life.

CARROLL: That would be hard in this world. When you were out in the business world, you say that you kept coming back personally to Dartmouth. Did you do any other services for Dartmouth?

McLAUGHLIN: I interviewed prospective applicants and I was in the Rockford, Illinois alumni club. I was an officer in the Chicago club, but I didn't give it a lot of time because I simply didn't have much to give it. I would come back up to Hanover occasionally for C & G functions.

CARROLL: When did you become an Overseer at the Tuck School?

McLAUGHLIN: I could go back and look [1968]. I think it was during Karl Hill's [Karl Hill '38] term and it was towards the end of his term. I was really thrilled when they asked me to become an overseer at Tuck. It was a transition point for Karl. He didn't want to leave but he knew he was going to be forced out so he politicized the process, and the Board became quite involved at the time. It was John Dickey's term, and he asked me to help smooth the transition, which I did.

Tuck School was small at the time. It was not nearly what it is today. It was still very prestigious and I then moved from being an overseer to become chairman of that board. That is probably what then led me to be considered as a trustee of the college.

CARROLL: I just want to go back a little bit to the overseers. Who invited you to partake in that?

McLAUGHLIN: You know, I can't recall who it was. I think it was Dick Hill [Richard D. Hill '41], but I may be wrong. I am sure Paul Paganucci had his hand in it somewhere. I would have to go back...

CARROLL: Was he an overseer then?

McLAUGHLIN: I don't think so.

CARROLL: At some point--I think it was John Hennessey [John Hennessey, Jr.] who told me--you were chairman of the overseers at Tuck and someone who was also with your company was the chairman of the overseers at Thayer. Is that right?

McLAUGHLIN: David Lilly, who was at Toro, was the chairman of the overseers at Thayer and I was chairing Tuck. At that time, David was chairman of the Toro Company, so I am sure that this led eventually to my joining Toro.

CARROLL: Did you two ever talk about these positions and the issues away from...

McLAUGHLIN: We did. We talked about the need for more collaboration between Tuck and Thayer. Neither were large enough to have a really critical mass at the time, but that the future was going to be institutions that graduated students that had engineering, technical experience but could transpose that into managerial expertise. We determined that the combination of Tuck/Thayer experience would be a particularly strong combination. There was a Tuck/Thayer joint degree that existed previously but not many people took advantage of it because it was quite demanding and difficult. It was, however, in the right direction.

Subsequently, as we saw with the Great Issues course, if the faculty did not feel ownership, it would have a finite future. So it fell by the wayside in terms of lack of support.

Great Issues ultimately, I think, fell for the same reason. It was a crediting course. It carried academic credit, but it didn't belong to any department. It was a big devotion of resource. Every senior had to take it. It was important to them; but the faculty were somewhat unhappy with it because it didn't fall within a division or department. So, when John Dickey was at the end of his term, the priority for Great Issues began to erode. When John retired, there were no defenders of it so it passed on.

CARROLL: When you were on the board of overseers at Tuck, was that during the time that they were building the Murdough Center?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. It was.

CARROLL: Did you have any role in the fundraising?

McLAUGHLIN: Some. I recall that we did spend a lot of time trying to look at the concept of using it as a bridge between Thayer and Tuck School. It was a good resource. It was the first major expansion that Tuck School had experienced. It incorporated the Murdough Center. Tom Murdough [Thomas Murdough '26] was a very good person. I got to know him fairly well through that period of time. John Hennessey certainly deserves a lot of credit, because a good deal of that facility incorporated his vision.

CARROLL: Was Tom Murdough an alum of Tuck?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I believe so. I know he was an alumnus. He was from Chicago and I knew him there.

CARROLL: So you knew him from Chicago. Did you know the Montgomerys, also from Chicago?

McLAUGHLIN: Not until later. I didn't really know Ken [Kenneth F. Montgomery '25] and Harle until I became president. During my presidency, Ed Lathem was very close to the Montgomerys and he was the one who brought us together. I may have first met them when I was a trustee because John Kemeny really cultivated the Montgomerys and did a marvelous job in creating the Montgomery Fellows program. Then, with Ed Lathem being a midwife of the process, the college put together the Montgomery Endowment.

CARROLL: Now when did you become a trustee of the college?

McLAUGHLIN: I was thinking about that the other day. My very first vote as a trustee was for coeducation, so it was 25 years ago that I became a trustee [1971].

CARROLL: That is a momentous thing to have done to come in and immediately have voted for such a drastic change.

McLAUGHLIN: People don't recall it today. If I had arrived here earlier last night, I was tempted to go sit in the back row [of a panel discussion on coeducation]. It was a very contentious decision and John Kemeny showed enormous courage in leading that charge. Charlie Zimmerman [Charles Zimmerman '23] was chairman of the board. I never was convinced that Charlie was for it; but, being a good chair, you never quite knew where he stood on the issue.

There were bitter divisions in the alumni. The practice then was if you were selected to join the board, you could attend a meeting before you were elected. My first unofficial meeting was when the trustees were looking at all the reports and studies and all the pros and cons of coeducation. Is it affordable? It was tied into year-round education because that was the only way to create the capacity to have women without reducing the number of men, which politically, would have been unacceptable.

I recall being considerably more concerned about whether year-round education was a legitimate academic schedule than I was about whether coeducation was the right decision. I was really quite well persuaded that Dartmouth would never be a distinguished institution in its location unless it adopted coeducation. Some institutions needed to follow that route. Amherst didn't have to because it was neighboring three or four very good women's schools. At that board meeting, when coeducation came up for a vote, it was my first official act and I think I was clearly one of the youngest trustees at that time. The average age must have been 69. Literally with tears in their eyes, they proceeded around the table to vote individually on the proposal. It passed, but it was probably the most difficult vote that most of those people ever cast.

I was concerned about year-round education. I am still not persuaded that year-round education is a good thing. Dartmouth has made it work, but at a terrible price, in terms of the faculty, the demands on faculty, the discontinuities it creates. Economically it is so clear that it is positive. Nobody else has adopted it, and a lot of institutions have looked at it. Economically, I don't think you can justify it; but as a trade off for coeducation, it was well worth it at the time.

CARROLL: Do you think it has lost some of the class unity that people used to have when they stayed with their classes?

McLAUGHLIN: I think so; but, by the same token, close to 95%--some very high percentage--of students who matriculated, graduated. I was persuaded that was due in part to the ability of students to come and go, not to be so rigidly constrained within a framework--the ability to have an experience in another institution, or to take a term abroad. All of those things were made possible by this flexible schedule, even though the Dartmouth Plan has some real downsides to it.

Some class unity is lost just because of the diversity of activities and the richness of the program at the college--people go in a lot of different directions. Class unity is important, but it is not nearly as important as the quality of the education.

CARROLL: There were all sorts of fears before Dartmouth went coed. One was that it would affect the alumni fund. Do you know, did that every really come to pass?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it might have for a period.

One of John Dickey's closest friends was a man named Justin Stanley [Justin A. Stanley '33]. Justin was a very distinguished lawyer. He became head of the ABA [American Bar Association]. When I was an undergraduate here, Justin came to the college as vice president of administration. John Meck [John F. Meck, Jr. '33] was the chief financial officer and Justin was over everything else. Meck and Justin didn't get along at all. Justin was from Chicago and so I got to know him both when I was here as an undergraduate and then subsequently in Chicago. Justin left the administration at some point along the way.

The weekend before the vote on coeducation, Justin was back at the college. (John Dickey, I think, was very much against coeducation although, to his great credit, he never tried to persuade me.) [Text removed at narrator's request.] I liked Justin and I respected him. He stood there and he shook his finger at me. He said "If you vote for coeducation, if this college goes coeducational, one, you are no longer my friend and, two, I will never come back to this college."

I said, "Justin, how can a distinguished jurist, somebody who looks at law and can see both sides of an issue, how can you be so unequivocal on an issue that has two sides to it?" He said, "That's just the way I feel."

CARROLL: Did it prove true?

McLAUGHLIN: No. He came back. When I became president, I went out of my way to invite him back and he returned -- reluctantly. He had mellowed out. I don't know if he ever had a grandchild come here. That often happened. The worst critics became quiet when one of their daughters applied...

CARROLL: Or granddaughters. Yes.

McLAUGHLIN: But that was the intensity of the feeling. It was an emotional reaction.

CARROLL: Do you think it was the idea of change that upset them or was it...for example, did the same kind of outrage get voiced when the

school was opened up to Blacks or Native Americans as it was for women?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I don't think it did...I don't recall that reaction. It was from the beginning a Native American school. We never did return to those roots until John Kemeny came and articulated the case.

[End of Tape 1, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 2, Side A]

McLAUGHLIN: Coeducation was different. The reaction of many alumni was different. I am not sure he [John Kemeny] was trusted by them. There was a segment of the alumni who thought he was wonderful, but there were a lot of the alumni who didn't. At the time, there was also an undertone within the alumni that was almost anti-Semitic to some extent. The group he immediately assembled as his provost and senior people were all Jewish. It became a big issue on the Board and, while it was handled quietly, it was never a very attractive thing.

John was brilliant, driven by certain beliefs in what he thought were important to Dartmouth. He and John Dickey had a very rocky relationship. It was not warm. It was not supportive. John Dickey was very much against John Kemeny being appointed President.

CARROLL: Why was that?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it was partly during the period of travail on the college campus when Vietnam was an issue and John Dickey was trying to hold things together. I can appreciate the sense of outrage John Dickey must have felt as they occupied buildings. John Kemeny was never supportive of John Dickey through that period. He was on the other side of the social issues and John Dickey didn't forget those things. So I think he felt that John Kemeny's presidency was a repudiation of the things he believed in.

When I became a trustee, John Dickey and I stayed very warmly related and had a good relationship. But to John Dickey's immense credit, he would never criticize John Kemeny and he would never want to discuss anything that related to policy that was going on that would change the character of the college. It wasn't until later that I realized how strongly John [Dickey] felt. When I became president, even when I was considering the presidency, John Dickey never unloaded about his concerns for the college and where it was and where it had gone and what had happened. We

did discuss the values of Dartmouth to the extent that I appreciated fully his views and his pain.

When I was a trustee, John Dickey and I used to go up and fish in the College Grant. Those were some of the more relaxed and best times for just good conversation.

CARROLL: I am going to ask you a question about John Dickey that I have always wanted to ask someone who knew him well. Did he feel at all betrayed by the students during the Parkhurst takeover and the unrest?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, he did. The primary incident occurred when he felt he had an arrangement that was going to solve this confrontation with Bob Reich [Robert Reich '68]. To his dying day, John Dickey never forgave Reich for what he thought was betrayal of that arrangement. That hurt John Dickey more than the slings and arrows of faculty or alumni, because John put great stock in the student body. He gave students more authority over the judicial process than we have today. He really believed that you develop mature citizens by giving students responsibility and holding them to it. The failure of that trust hurt him badly.

CARROLL: For the first year that you were a trustee, you also continued on the Tuck Board of Overseers.

McLAUGHLIN: The trustees have had, as they do today, a representative of the trustees that was on the board of Tuck. It is a cross-over. So I did that for a period of time. That was during John Hennessey's period there.

CARROLL: And what was the thought behind having someone who straddles both areas?

McLAUGHLIN: There was always somewhat of an uneasy relationship between the graduate schools and the college. They were part of Dartmouth— but in some respects they were independent.

When the change in deanship was made from Karl Hill to John Hennessey, there was a lot of china broken. It was not handled well. Karl Hill politicized it. "Why is the college telling Tuck what to do? We have got our own endowment." The college said "No. You don't have your own endowment. It is all one pot. You may have a call on part of it, but it isn't yours." The tenure decisions at

Tuck were contentious because they came before the C.A.P. [Committee Advisory to the President], who didn't understand the process Tuck used. It was not a great relationship.

I looked at my role as trying to bridge that relationship, to strengthen the sense of mission that Tuck had in relationship to Dartmouth. And John Hennessey was marvelous. I mean he was effective. He knew what to do. He kept the confidence of the Tuck faculty and most of the faculty there. Interestingly, when I was in my second year at Tuck as an undergraduate student, Wayne Broehl and Ken Davis [Kenneth R. Davis] joined the faculty. There were four or five strong faculty who came in at that time. Their very first year was my second year at Tuck School. When the circle came around and I became a trustee, I knew most of the faculty and we had a good relationship.

CARROLL: Did you have to then represent Tuck's interest to the trustees, and visa versa?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I did and insisted that every year the dean of Tuck School come before the board and give a report to the trustees so that they would hear it first-hand. I believe that if you meet with people and listen to their views, you may gain more understanding of their issues. It always fascinated me how strong corporate leaders could be so benign when they had to deal with faculty. They just didn't understand the academic world and they took it as their failing, not the faculty's. I became persuaded that if you had a problem, you had better position your board face to face with the faculty and the administration, so that trustees and academics could find a middle ground.

CARROLL: Was that an idea then that was picked up by Thayer and the medical school so that they too would have influence?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. The medical school was a bit different. I mean, for John Dickey and John Kemeny, the medical school took an enormous amount of time, as it did for me. This was in a little different category, however. Tuck and Thayer were always self-sufficient and reported annually to the trustees. Hutchinson [Charles E. "Hutch" Hutchinson '68A], when he was dean of Thayer, came and gave a very effective report to the board. Carl [F. Long], he was dean of Thayer School before Charles Hutchinson, did as well.

CARROLL: Why do you think the medical school is so different from the other two graduate schools?

McLAUGHLIN: It is structured differently. It had the [Hitchcock] clinic. It had the hospital. It had the medical school. Each had their own boards. Each were interdependent but there was a tension that existed. Even within the hospital there are factions between the doctors. Their interests differ. It is partly financial, but also a matter of control.

The medical school was requiring physicians to be faculty members, and so it took time away from their practice. It was important that Dartmouth Medical School had doctors who wanted to be there because of the medical school. The definition of an academic medical center is absolutely crucial. Dartmouth was the only entity of the three who had enough clout to insist on the existence of an academic medical center because all of the doctors' required faculty positions, which were approved by the college. They had to be academically qualified or they could not practice. So, for the medical school, the issues were quite different than those at Tuck and Thayer.

This issue of governance of the medical center had a long history. Listening to John Dickey, I realized that it was a major problem for him. At one time I think the trustees looked at whether they ought to keep it [the medical school] or close it. What should they do? When I was a trustee, John Kemeny was deeply engaged in the debate. He used to hold midnight meetings at his house between all the principal people trying to craft a relationship. The importance to the college was one of academic excellence. Dartmouth had a very distinguished medical school of long standing...one of the oldest in the country. The funding for Dartmouth Medical School had to come from an inter-relationship between revenue flows from the hospital and through the clinic. Everyone had a veto in the process. Doctors can be as independent or even more than faculty members at various times, and so it posed some unique challenges for every president.

Initially, Dartmouth Medical School was so small that it wasn't able to have a four-year program. For years, it was a two-year program. Harvard would always take [our students] and other schools were delighted to have our students at the end of two years of medical school here. But when the government changed the subvention rules and you had to be four years in order to qualify, Dartmouth

then adopted a four-year medical school. Dartmouth Medical School didn't have enough clientele in the [Upper] Valley for patient care in those second two years, and that led John Kemeny, in an innovative mood, to enter a relationship with Brown [University] so that students could go to Brown in their second two years. It gave a different character to the school, but bought time for the creation of a true medical center.

CARROLL: Was there ever any talk of establishing a law school here?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. About every five years. [Daniel] Webster's legacy was almost irresistible. Law schools are easy to establish. You need a library and you need some faculty, but it doesn't take a lot. If you have a good law library, you generally can set up a school. The number of times that people said, "Well, you've got Webster Hall. We could make that into the law school and what could be more distinguished than a Daniel Webster Law School at Dartmouth College?" Lawyers from all over the country would say that we should do this. The development department weighed in, saying, "Look at how many lawyers write wills and we would be included in all of this."

And yet, when the subject came up during Dickey's term, and in Kemeny's term, as it did in mine, the decision was made based on the fact that there are many good law schools in the country, and that there was little that we could add to the equation that would distinguish Dartmouth and a law school here from any other law school. If you cannot make a contribution by what you add to a profession or to education, then you are better to stay with what you are doing and be happy with it. So each time when the debate about law school got to that point, the question would be asked, "Why would we be unique?" And there was no particular reason why we would be unique to start a law school where there was that much competition.

When Tuck School started, it was the first business school in the country. It was the same with the medical school and with Thayer. Each had a very long, distinguished record of achievement; but you would not have had that with a law school. So in the end, we dropped the idea.

CARROLL: Was Vermont Law School established at that time or did that come later?

McLAUGHLIN: No. It was established. We looked at some collaborative programs with Vermont Law School, particularly in the environmental area where they were very strong. We did agree to pursue a relationship that provided access to certain classes at each institution for the other's students. That never quite took because the faculty of the Vermont Law School were not thrilled by the whole idea. Most of them had had distinguished careers in other institutions and wanted to retire in Vermont. They found that being on the faculty of the Vermont Law School was their entry to do that. At that stage, their offerings were limited as were the ambitions of their faculty.

CARROLL: I am switching the subject a little bit. When you came on to the board of trustees, had you known John Kemeny previously?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I did not, only by reputation. When we first met, it was very clear what was on John's mind. He wanted to know, although there was no litmus test on coming on the board, whether I was for coeducation or not. But John clearly wanted to bring about a change on the board. He looked at the board and was concerned that his agenda was not going to be adopted. He considered the board to be principally a John Dickey board, and it was. There were two of us...in the first wave of new trustees that John Kemeny was trying to cultivate to his vision. He did not select the new trustees but I don't really know how the process was done.

It became a bit of a problem because, at that time, I was at Toro and David [M.] Lilly, the chairman of Toro and Dartmouth '39, desperately wanted to become a trustee at the college. Charlie Zimmerman ['23] called me one night and said, "I am authorized to see if you want to become a trustee." I responded, "Well, I am honored, but I've got to discuss this with the people at Toro to make sure this is not a problem." On doing so, Lilly said, "Well, I guess that's mutually exclusive. That means that I will never be a trustee. I don't think you should do it." And I said, "Well, I feel so committed to the college for what it did for me that I am going to do it. If that means I have to leave Toro, why then, you and I can sort that out with our board."

From that time on, it became a somewhat strained relationship [with David Lilly] and, when I eventually left Toro to come to Dartmouth, that's when it really fell apart. That was probably the hardest decision that I have ever made in my career because, at that particular time, Toro was not doing very well. We had a wonderful management team, but we were very strongly positioned in the

snow-thrower market. A lot of our earnings came from snow removal products and we had had three years without snow. That really upset the balance sheet. The adjustments had been made. The management structure was downsized. I felt that the people that would succeed me at Toro would do it probably as well or better than I could do it, so I didn't feel that I was leaving Toro in serious trouble; but the perception was that it was really the wrong time. It became a personalized event. "I left Toro at that stage, I would be forever blackballed and so on." All this was going on during the interviewing process when I was being considered at Dartmouth. You know, it was really a terrible period in my life, and yet, I never regretted having done it. I always regretted, however, the circumstances under which I left Toro.

CARROLL: When you met John Kemeny, what was your first impression of him?

McLAUGHLIN: Not easy. Early on, it was not an easy relationship. We'd have a discussion, but I always thought John had something else on his mind. I found him to be quite uncomfortable and didn't find him at all like the Dartmouth people I knew. I respected John immensely, but I was never close to him, even when I became chairman, and John and I spent a great amount of time together. It took a long time to get to know John Kemeny, to understand what was driving him, where he got his fulfillment and what he wanted from life.

He was the least athletic person in the world and you never could imagine him out on the trail or building a snow statue. John smoked incessantly. He represented all the things that were not traditionally Dartmouth. And yet, John Kemeny was probably one of the best presidents the college will ever have. He was an incredibly strong president. He brought about change in a way that will benefit this college for generations.

CARROLL: When I read his profile--foreign born, Jewish, not a Dartmouth alum, as you say, non-athletic, a smoker, very much an urbanite it seems to me. I always wonder, why was he so fervently attached to this college? He seems to have been.

McLAUGHLIN: I think he was. I do not know where those emotional bonds developed, but they certainly were there. At John Dickey's invitation, he came here at a young age. He took over the mathematics department. He was part of the faculty rebuilding process initiated by Don Morrison and others. John led an

intellectual revival of this place. He took it into excellence in academic areas where it had not been strong before.

Professionally he nurtured his whole computer language program here with students. He immersed himself in this college intellectually and bonded to it. Where others may have been bonded to it from a sense of place in the outdoors in the North Country, John Kemeny bonded to it because of what he perceived to be really a life of ideas here; ideas he could exercise without much constraint and with a lot of resources at his disposal. So, he developed a love of this institution that I think was real, but it was for different reasons than other people loved it. Sometimes it was hard for people to find that connection.

CARROLL: How would you characterize his leadership style?

McLAUGHLIN: That's an interesting question because in his style he was quite manipulative. He knew where he wanted to go. He was a very good politician and, just as he was emotionally a bit fragile, his leadership style was fragile.

More than once, John would come and say, "I want you to fire Leonard Rieser ['44]" or, "I want you to get rid of this person." Then we would talk it through and I would say, "You know, that really is not the role of the chairman of the board to do that." He disliked difficult situations, interpersonally.

One of the very first things that came up was when I was a trustee; I was not then chair. John Dickey called me and said, "The football coach lives next door to us" -- It was Jake Crouthamel [John J. Crouthamel '60]. John Dickey said, "I don't know what you can do, but that family is coming apart at the seams and it is a bad situation. During the football season, Jake is not balanced emotionally. I am fearful for the family, and am fearful about what is going to happen to Jake at the college. I can't do anything about it, but possibly you can."

So I went to John Kemeny and I said, "I find this to be very awkward. Let me tell you exactly where I am on this and how it came about." I said, "John Dickey feels very strongly about this, but he is not going to come to you. You have to judge, John Kemeny, whether it is right or not." John Kemeny said, "Well, I am worried about it. I agree that something needs to be done, but I am not going to do it." He said, "If you want to do it, that's fine." I said,

"John, how does a trustee do something of this nature?" (And Seaver Peters ['54] was a classmate of mine) I said, "That just isn't the role of a trustee." And he said, "Why don't you have dinner with Jake and see if you can't convince him to step down." So I did that.

It was against all of my instincts and, if it hadn't been Dickey and Kemeny, I would have declined. I went through it with Jake and it was a long, difficult conversation. He is a very proud and intense person. We got to the point where, if he should resign, that the college would help him find another place. There was a strong alumni group [supporting Jake]. We concluded the evening without a commitment from Jake as to his course of action. So the next day, as I went in to tell Kemeny how the dinner had come out and the rest of it, Seaver and Jake came into the outer office. They were in the outer office. They came in and Jake submitted his resignation.

John, I think, was relieved because if the thing blew up, it wasn't going to be him. He was afraid of the alumni. He was afraid of the impact on athletics. Seaver Peters never forgave me; but I think that it was probably the right thing to do. It relates to your question about style.

And yet, when John was in his field academically, he was a very strong leader. He was very positive. He would do what he wanted to do. He dominated the faculty. He controlled the faculty. He had no patience with them, and he was one of theirs. So he could do things that a lot of us couldn't do. He had a very strong style with the faculty; but a very uncomfortable style with alumni, with trustees, with the world that he didn't know. He would look at that world and say, "If I have to get something done here, then I am going to find, politically and manipulatively, the way to get it done and work it around." So he survived and got most of his agenda through.

CARROLL: How did he work with Leonard Rieser? How did they divide up or work as a team?

McLAUGHLIN: I think the division was never quite clear because Leonard was the provost. They were personally quite close, but professionally they just simply didn't get along at all. John Kemeny and Leonard each had his own style and a strong ego. John Dickey used to say, "Leonard has to circle the tree five times before he will lift his leg." [Laughter] And that is the way that Rieser is. He equivocates and

he will talk you half to death. So when Kemeny wanted to get things done, he had a style problem with Leonard. But they each had bonds within the faculty.

In the end, their egos could not co-exist, which is why John Kemeny, towards the end of his term, wanted to get Leonard out of there. He insisted, and Dick Hill [Richard '41, TU '42] and I met with Leonard on three or four occasions, trying to find a way to identify common ground for the two of them, because we did not think it was good for the institution to have Leonard leaving.

Leonard was always very sensitive, very prideful with a lot of ego. While we never got it resolved, we did delay any precipitous action. At the end of their terms, both Dickey and Kemeny would have liked to get rid of Leonard if they could have done it. Leonard was equally manipulative in his own style—he was a survivor.

CARROLL: When I go through the history of Kemeny's election, it becomes pretty clear to me, although it is never stated, that one of the other contenders for that job was Leonard Rieser. I have always wondered how they sorted that out among themselves because there is a lot of ego involved in this.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. There is. I was not part of that process on the board. I have heard this more through Zimmerman and the old trustees. They had two final candidates, and the board decided that Leonard did not have the leadership qualities and qualifications. They almost selected John Kemeny, I don't want to say by default, but it was not a strong choice on the part of the board. They did not go through the normal broad-based search process and all the rest of it. The selection was made the same way that Dickey was chosen. It was a little bit more democratic, but not a great deal more.

So, at the end, even the board seemed to say, "Well, I wish we could have done better, but he is here. He does know the institution." John Dickey, at that stage, was really quite discredited and it must have been difficult for him, as he was very much against John Kemeny as his successor. John Dickey's presidency had run the course. A lot of people said that John Dickey had stayed too long and his health was up and down. It was not one of the happy periods of the college's life.

END OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW: David McLaughlin '54 TU '55, President Emeritus

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: West Lebanon, New Hampshire

DATE: February 4, 1997

CARROLL: Today is February 4th, 1997, and I am speaking once again with David McLaughlin, the President Emeritus of Dartmouth College. We are speaking in my home in West Lebanon, New Hampshire.

When we last were speaking, we talked about the impact of coeducation, and I want to really talk now about some of the smaller events during the Kemeny years when you were on the board of trustees. The first event that I have come across that seems to have had a great impact was always called "the financial crisis." Do you recall what that was about?

McLAUGHLIN: It was a period when the inflation index for education was increasing faster than the consumer price index. It is a customized index, but it measured those critical things that involved the cost structure of an institution like Dartmouth. It was mainly salary driven, but there were other factors as well. That index was moving up much faster than the ability of the institutions to recover it. This was particularly true for the private sector. I am not sure exactly how it influenced the major state universities, but for Dartmouth, Brown, Harvard, Yale--all of the institutions, even those with large endowments--there was a major impact. What was happening was that the faculty's salaries were starting to fall behind the critical curve of cost structure. All of the institutions faced a real crunch, and Dartmouth was clearly part of that.

John Kemeny, ever innovative, decided that one way to do this was to create a category of giving, which he called an endowment, but it was an expendable endowment where we raised funds, and then instead of just taking 5% return on those as part of the utilization, John would have a plan to expend those funds over an eight- or ten-year period. So you got a much higher utilization from those monies. John really put that together, and drove the process. The

Trustees supported it. It was probably one of the factors that kept Dartmouth from falling far behind its better-endowed peer institutions.

John was very creative about the whole thing. He and Leonard Rieser, I think, did a very good job. The board was quite supportive. There was a lot of tension and pressure around the campus because everybody wanted their part of a dwindling sum of money. But John was able to keep things in balance. I think he kept the academic excellence of the institution high, even under enormous pressures.

Tuition was pushed pretty aggressively in that period of time, and probably the one factor that wasn't visible, (and, frankly, I don't think John wanted it to be visible) was that we started to be somewhat more discriminating in the application of financial aid. Brown, at that time, I recall, made a conscious choice that the bottom 10% of the class that might have gotten financial aid wasn't a lot different in quality than the bottom 10% of those who could afford to go, and so they subtly made that move and limited their financial aid. Dartmouth didn't announce that kind of a policy; but, in fact, it was practiced to some extent; but not to the point where it really skewed the student body in any way. But it was just one of those practicalities that had to be faced at the time.

Everybody likes to say that they have need-blind admission; but, in fact, even Harvard and some of the others, as I recall in discussions at that time, were starting to question the practicality of a need blind admission policy. Frankly, I think maybe institutions may have to come back and look at it again at some point. But the application of limited financial aid did not change the character of the undergraduate body.

CARROLL: Were there any talks at that point of raising tuition by a larger percentage?

McLAUGHLIN: There was. I recall, when I used to visit with John Dickey, John had the theory that you should raise tuition as aggressively as you possibly could because, he said, "We've got a lot of students who could pay full fare." And, in fact, students pay only about 50% of the actual cost at Dartmouth. Some places, it's higher; but I think most of the Ivy League runs about 50%.

John Dickey said "Why don't we charge those who can afford to come the full amount and then, those who can't afford to come, why, we can deal with somewhat differently." [Interruption] So John Dickey felt that there was a number of people who could afford to pay the full fare, so why not charge them and then offset that with more generous financial aid to those who couldn't afford it.

John Kemeny also picked up the same theme, but we felt that, to be the only ones who would make that break, (and the rest of the Ivy League was not prepared to do it), would, in essence, price Dartmouth out of the market for high-achieving students who happened to be more affluent than others. So, in a way, it was the reverse of limited financial aid and we felt that it wasn't a prudent course to go. But, you know, it is a fact that most people don't realize that the tuition does only cover about half of the cost of your education.

CARROLL: There was also, at this time, the oil crisis. Now, was this the contributing factor to the financial crisis or was it just a contributing factor?

McLAUGHLIN: It was one of many. Dartmouth's location was impacted more than other institutions. Energy costs were a problem. I recall we spent several trustee meetings going out and looking at the Green and seeing where the snow was melting and where the steam pipes were losing energy. It was thawing the ground. We used to say, "We are heating the whole of New England." But it was just one of a number of factors that went into this education index and they all were going the wrong way at that time.

CARROLL: Did the board of trustees, at that point, draw up a set of suggestions on ways in which to offset these financial problems?

McLAUGHLIN: John Kemeny established a Council on Budgets and Priorities at the college which involved a fairly broad scope of the institution. We sat and spent a lot of time asking, "Where are the priorities? What could we cut? What couldn't we cut? What was absolutely inviolate in terms of the quality standards of the institution?" We went about trying to increase the revenue line, while the college was trying to control the cost line.

We got through that period. We also probably used the endowment a little more aggressively through that period, using the scheme of a consuming endowment concept. It was not a fun time in education,

but I must say John Kemeny was very effective in trying to address the problem, and probably was more creative than anybody else in the Ivy League at that time. Dartmouth had unusual pressures because of the location, size of the student body, nature of faculty and a lot of other things.

CARROLL: When they came out of this period, had there been a lot of programs that were put on hold or improvements that had been postponed?

McLAUGHLIN: There was maintenance that had been deferred, and faculty salaries were below competition. We did less deferred maintenance than Yale. I remember meeting with Bart Giamatti [A. Bartlett Giamatti] at one point, and we walked around the Yale campus. There was not a single university clock that was telling the right time. [Laughter] Bart said, "That's one of our problems of deferred maintenance." Dartmouth cut back a bit; but they had to cut back a great deal. So that was part of it.

We did move toward installing a whole new heat control system at that time, trying to mitigate the problem of the oil crisis. There were just a lot of things that took place. It became kind of a consuming effort on the part of the college.

To my knowledge, there were no major academic programs that were cut back. We controlled, to some extent, the capital expenditures, many of which were deferred. We went through kind of a holding period and it was not, as I said, not a lot of fun.

CARROLL: In the midst of all of this though, the one thing that seems to be added is the Native American Program. Did that have separate funding or independent funding?

McLAUGHLIN: It had some separate funding. There were three or four alumni who were particularly committed to that [program] and John Kemeny had made a personal commitment to it. It was probably John's leadership that held that program together, because it wasn't a popular program. A lot of the trustees felt that it was raising a set of alumni pressures from people who were unhappy, and that perhaps [the program was] uncalled for at that time. But John stood his ground. He had made a commitment. The Board supported that commitment, even though there was not unanimous support. Publicly, it was unanimous.

It is interesting because when John was delivering a speech on college policy, the statement on recommitment to Native American education was not in the text. For some reason John penciled it in at the very last moment – an afterthought.

Initially it didn't cost that much. It took separate faculty training and there was certainly more scholarship money devoted to it. But, the numbers on campus were still relatively small. They grew slowly and that was because it was difficult to find Native American students at that time who had the preparation and could enter the college, could compete at the level of academics that Dartmouth had.

CARROLL: Was there ever a program designed to try to bring Native American students up to that level, as there had been for Black Americans?

McLAUGHLIN: There was a support system at the college. Michael Dorris was probably the principal architect of it, along with John. They put an envelope around the students and there was mentoring and tutoring that went on. It seemed right. I think, on balance, it was a very good thing.

I suspect that many of those students did not get to the same academic level as their classmates. Yet, if you go back today and look at the leadership element of most Native American communities, Dartmouth students are populating them in leadership roles disproportionate to any other institution in the country. What Dartmouth did in this arena was exactly what the college should do. It is training leaders. It is training people to take responsible roles in society, and the Native American Program proved the importance of this more effectively than any other program I have seen.

CARROLL: Do you know how they found Michael Dorris for that position?

McLAUGHLIN: No, I don't. Michael was at the college when I became involved as a trustee. He was not married at the time. He had adopted two small children. I can remember Michael teaching class with one of them strapped to his back. He was a passionate voice for that effort and initiative and was very effective.

When all of the problems arose over the Indian symbol, Michael was certainly a proponent of doing away with the symbol, but he was also a voice of reason. He didn't get emotionally excited about

it. He was very calm and very objective and very sound in the way he approached it, and was very persuasive.

I think Michael Dorris probably did more to shape and further that program than anybody else I know. If there hadn't been a Michael Dorris on campus, I am not sure John Kemeny could have accomplished the objectives that he had set.

CARROLL: How did the Indian symbol debate begin? Do you remember?

McLAUGHLIN: It began almost concurrently with the commitment to Native American education and the issue lagged the program by two or three years--maybe a little bit longer. When there became a critical mass of Native Americans on campus (which still wasn't very large), it then became a focal point.

John Kemeny tried to address the issue early on. He had actually negotiated a middle ground that would have kept the Native America symbol, but in a very dignified manner. He had patiently developed a consensus around that argument, and then two things happened. First, the more radical element of the Native Americans started to demonstrate and said that it wasn't acceptable, and there was a similar element in the alumni, further off to the right, who felt that freedom of speech was being encroached upon. So the middle ground crumbled and John wasn't able to pull it off. He came very close.

So there really wasn't any alternative than to try to find another symbol. It was an effort that took about thirty years. I don't think it is resolved yet. [Laughter] When I followed John, it was a perpetual issue--changing the alma mater--the "Men of Dartmouth"--was one such effort and then getting a new symbol was another. It just was time and energy consuming.

CARROLL: Right now, there is a groundswell for the moose.

McLAUGHLIN: The moose? That's all right. I mean, you have to work on some animal, I suspect, as your mascot.

CARROLL: Is it true that the Indian symbol had only become Dartmouth's symbol in the '20s?

McLAUGHLIN: I think that's right. It didn't have a long history; but, for the alumni, it was forever. It was proper to not use it, because you could not

have a symbol that was conducive to unflattering caricature. If you used it properly and proudly, then it could be a thing of pride; but, in this case, it just didn't turn out that way. If you cannot control it, you should just not do it.

CARROLL: How did they end up with the [Big] Green?

McLAUGHLIN: I have no idea. I have no idea.

CARROLL: I want to switch now a little bit to talk about the board of trustees. It seems to me at this time, during the Kemeny years, there are some real changes going on in the makeup of the board. Would you like to characterize those at all?

McLAUGHLIN: When I came on the board, I guess it was in '71 or some time in that period, most of the board had served with John Dickey. It was a group of all men, generally toward the end of their productive careers; but several of them having national prominence. Harvey Hood [Harvey Hood, II '18], Charles Zimmerman, Lloyd Brace [Lloyd Brace '25], Ralph Lazarus ['35] and a number of others who had very distinguished careers, and were deeply committed to Dartmouth and particularly to Dartmouth as they remembered it. It was a board that was confident enough in itself that it didn't worry so much about trying to react to pressures from the campus. They really did work hard to look at the long-term impact of their decisions, and they thought more strategically than they did tactically about issues that were taking place.

The board had alumni representation on it, but it also used charter seats to enhance the wisdom of the board to a large extent. As the college started to change, as coeducation took place, as the campuses were starting to become much more diversified, enriched through the diversity, the expectations of the trustees by outside constituents changed. This was true not just at Dartmouth, but was true at other institutions as well. Constituencies then wanted representation on the board. Inevitably, there was then an effort to have more women on the board, because we were coeducational. There was also a very strong effort from the Afro-Americans who wanted more representation on the board. There were young alumni that wanted representation on the board.

John Kemeny, unlike John Dickey, looked at the board really as a mirror of the campus to some extent. There was a lot of talk about whether there shouldn't be a faculty member on the board, and

there were big debates about this. The faculty wanted their own trustee because everybody saw the trustees as the final authority. Therefore, they wanted to have a seat at the table. So the board changed rather dramatically from being a board of wise experienced men, to a board of a very diversified nature, which became almost a reflection of various constituencies on the campus.

This changed its role very subtly. I don't think people realized it, but to me it was very profound. I watched this take place. It was a board that, I think, became less distinguished. It didn't mean that they were not more representative, but they became somewhat less distinguished in terms of proven leadership and in their knowledge of governance. Some very good people who would have been great trustees decided that they didn't want to make the commitment. So it was not a board of people who looked to the long-term future of Dartmouth as much as they looked at reacting to the pressures on the campus at any given time.

I don't think that John did this with intent; but it was the way that things developed. So I think that your perception that the board changed dramatically during John Kemeny's time is exactly right. But I am not sure that was for the better. I don't mean to be critical of it, but I am not sure that it really served Dartmouth well. We were just not able to get out of day-to-day problems and think longer term.

CARROLL: There was obviously still a core of the prophets left from the older type of alum...trustee. Did they then dominate the newer board?

McLAUGHLIN: It was an interesting table because you were always seated at the table in order of your tenure on the board. So, if you are down at the end of the table, you are pretty new on the board. Except that there were two trustees, Ralph Lazarus, who always wanted to take the end of the table because he could then make himself heard all the way around the table if he was at the end, and Bill Andres [F. William Andres '29] who was then chairing the board sat opposite the president at the table.

There was respect for the tenure and the seniority of those members who were being phased out; but it wasn't a very cohesive group. It didn't think together. There were not a lot of votes where you had split votes, but it wasn't because there weren't split

opinions. It was just respect for the process that brought that result. It was a different board under Kemeny than under Dickey.

CARROLL: Was it harder for the lone woman on the board to have a voice [Priscilla "Sally" Frechette Maynard]?

McLAUGHLIN: No. It happened to be a widow of a Dartmouth alum. She was a New Hampshire lady. She was never very acceptable to the coeducation side because she wasn't a coed. She wasn't a graduate of the college. She wasn't an alumna but she represented a viewpoint. With all due respect, she never took the position of women, and was not terribly effective as a trustee but she was conscientious and loyal to Dartmouth.

CARROLL: How did they choose David [R.] Weber ['65] who was so young and so surprised when he was chosen?

McLAUGHLIN: David was in response to one, a desire to have a younger trustee and [two] to have somebody out of academia. He was at [Phillips] Exeter [Academy] and he was...I don't want to say a trade-off to having a faculty member, but he occupied that seat. The trustee table changed for the first time, because you had an Afro-American seat, a coed seat, an academic seat, a young person seat, so that's why I say it changed.

CARROLL: In 1980, there was a challenge by Dr. John Steel [John F. Steel, Jr., '54] to the trustee elections. Do you remember that?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes.

CARROLL: What were the circumstances surrounding this?

McLAUGHLIN: As the college changed under John Kemeny, i.e. coeducation, Native Americans, year-round education, the right wing of the alumni--the more conservative part--didn't feel that they were being represented on the board. There's another constituency. This one was an ideological constituency, not a gender or a racial constituency. So there was a process, under the rules of the Alumni Council, by which alumni who are chosen or nominated could be challenged.

John Steel, who happened to be my classmate, was a very attractive man, a doctor from California. He was very popular with

the conservative side. He challenged and won the challenge of a seat.

It was so unlike Dartmouth to have that happen that it was a further manifestation, I think, of the way the board and the college was evolving and becoming a bit more polarized. John was on the board as the only person ever elected through a challenge. The board still elected him. There was a lot of debate as to whether the board would seat him, but the general feeling was that to not seat him, when the rules and procedures were established for challenges to take place, would have created a much bigger problem for the college and its alumni than we wanted to see Dartmouth or John Kemeny go through at the time.

So he was seated. I think John was generally constructive most of his time. He would represent the views of the conservatives at the board meeting, but he seldom would directly vote against anything. I think he found that what the governance process really means is the trustees are a consensus management group. You talk an issue through until you find common ground. John Steel was probably helpful in shaping some issues; but I don't think he influenced significantly the outcomes of the board.

CARROLL: In the informal apportionment of seats to different constituencies, have there been any discussions about a seat for the more right wing alumni?

McLAUGHLIN: No. Never. All of that discussion was basically either by profession or by gender or by race.

CARROLL: Everybody, when I talk to them about your time as the chairman of the board of trustees, glows and they say, "David McLaughlin was the best chair of the board of trustees that we have seen." I am wondering what you think it is that makes a good chair.

McLAUGHLIN: Well, first, it takes an enormous amount of time. But the quality of the chair, I think, to a large extent, is the quality of the partnership with the president. John Kemeny and I had a great deal of confidence in one another. I clearly did in John and I think he did in me. John had some significant relationship problems with the board, and he also was, at that point, under the enormous pressures so that he was having some serious relationship problems with his own management.

So John and I would spend hours talking about his sensitivity, what he wanted to accomplish, what his problems were, what might be his personal problems in trying to deal with the issues. I was a sounding board for him and suggested how he might deal with his challenges. None of these confidences were ever violated, but we could then focus the board so that it responded to John's needs. We put a personnel committee together. It was very informal. That never showed up on a document, but John needed a group of fairly senior and reliable people to sit and talk with him about his organizational problems and how he should deal with them.

We would never overstep the bounds, but we would be supportive of John, either in his relationship or lack of relationship with Leonard or other key people, so that he could get through that period.

The other part of what the chair did at that time was basically to work the trustees almost one-on-one to come around to various views on various issues, so that you continued to move the college forward, but never undercut the president's authority. I always tried to pave the way for his agenda to go forward in a constructive, not in a contentious, manner.

Generally, it worked because John had an enormous ego and, externally, he had to be seen as successful. Internally, he was relatively insecure in certain areas, so he needed that partnership and it worked. I think it worked well, but the credit really goes to John Kemeny to a large extent.

CARROLL: Did you have a "second in command" to whom you turned?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, there were several people on the board. Dick Hill was on the board at that time. Dick was really a good person. Ralph Lazarus was still on the board at that time, and he was wise and exceptional. I would spend a fair amount of time with them.

When I became chair, it was a little difficult because Ralph Lazarus was then the senior trustee and he wanted to become chairman. Bill Andres and whatever group that he consulted, decided they did not want him to be chairman. So Ralph...I remember...

[End of Tape 3, Side A - Beginning of Tape 3, Side B]

McLAUGHLIN: ...Ralph then came back and said "Why don't you do it for two years and then I will do it for two years." The board said "no", they didn't want that. I think part of that was the fact that Ralph was Jewish and strong, Leonard Rieser was Jewish, and John Kemeny was Jewish. It was one of those things that never was talked about, but you could feel it. There was a sensitivity there...I think unfairly.

I think Ralph would have been a great chair, but I think John Kemeny was concerned about being able to work closely with Ralph. Ralph was a corporate CEO. It was not only a corporate CEO of his own company that he dominated. So it was a little different attitude. It worked out and Ralph was fine and took it very constructively and we became and still were very close up to his death.

CARROLL: When you began as chair of the board, did you have a philosophy or an approach that you knew you wanted to implement as chair? A way in which to approach the task? Or did that evolve?

McLAUGHLIN: It evolved somewhat. I did not go in with an agenda. I didn't have a list of things that I wanted to get done. I think that is a mistake. I think chairs that do that inevitably come at cross purposes with the CEO, the president.

When Bill Andres was chair, he had gravitated to a very small core of people that he would consult with and then he would sort of drive the process. I took a somewhat different approach. There was not a core group on the board. It was a total board. We worked very hard to make everybody understand that when they sat at the table, they were trying to think long term about Dartmouth's interest. It took discipline.

There were some board members, and John Steel was one, that required a lot of handholding to position an issue so that we were arguing and deciding on the right merits of the issue and not on the inconsequential political influences of the issue. That is probably where I spent most of my time, trying to position the board...one, to decide with the president what were the right issues and then to position those so that the board could really deliberate in a way that was constructive and helpful to the college.

CARROLL: How much time did you spend as chair working on Dartmouth issues?

McLAUGHLIN: I don't know. It may have been a quarter of my time, perhaps. It varied. Then, of course, when John went to chair the Three Mile Island Commission, then it became a bit more. It was a different episode at that time. I would spend maybe a quarter of my time and I think, if you are going to do the job right, particularly with a small board...the value of a small board is that you should run it like a collaborative body. If you had a board of fifty, then certainly you would have a very different dynamic.

CARROLL: Does any meeting stand out in your mind or any debate of that board undertook?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, it was all through the financial crisis at that time. There were perpetual issues because the right wing was growing in influence. The Dartmouth Review was born at that time.

Every meeting was an event. I used to leave Hanover absolutely exhausted after every meeting because it was not just coming there, but it was committee meetings, it was trying to make sure that the process worked. It was being attentive. It was trying to run the meeting so that everybody had a voice at the table, but that we kept it going in the right direction.

I had a son [William R. McLaughlin '78 TU '81] on campus at the time who was an undergraduate and it was probably the only time he and I have ever had cross words. He felt that I was giving more to the trustees than I was giving to him, and it became an issue. He was right.

CARROLL: So you had your own in-house critic, too. [Laughter]

McLAUGHLIN: He represented the fraternity viewpoint. I am sure there were meetings that were more significant than others; but every one to me was a critical meeting.

CARROLL: I had not realized that, while you were on the board, your son was on campus. That must have given you an unusual and a special insight.

McLAUGHLIN: It did. At the end of the meetings, after everybody had broken up, I would go join him and we would sit with some of his classmates and talk about what they thought was going on. If there were a set of issues that I thought were determining for the college at that

time, they were the assimilation of coeducation, which made the fraternity system quite difficult at that time.

We also had a daughter [Susan McLaughlin Jangro '81] who went to the college. She only overlapped one year with my son. He was a senior and she was a freshman. So, at a certain point, I had two of them to look after and they represented two very different views of what was going on; it was good. I mean, it was helpful, but I was probably tougher on my son than I was on anybody, because I think he was sensitive to the relationship and my position. So he probably didn't do some things that he might have done. I always felt that maybe I inadvertently deprived him of the full value of that education. I look at him today and I look at his love of the college and his wanting to get involved and all the rest of it, so I don't really think that it was a permanent thing. He is a marvelous young man.

CARROLL: Were you president when your daughter was on campus?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I was president when my third son [C. Jay McLaughlin '85] was there and that was always interesting because also Rob Kemeny [Robert A. Kemeny '77] was on campus at that time. So we would have had this underground system of people giving us ideas. I used to tell my son Jay, "You know. I'd love to see your name in The Dartmouth, but I don't ever want to see it on the dean's list for discipline." [Laughter] I said, "Don't you ever get in trouble."

CARROLL: Good advice. Did they find it hard or did he especially find it hard to be on campus with their father as the president?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it was a little awkward, but he was pretty independent. I don't think it really phased him one way or the other. He was pretty heavily into the fraternity system at the time, as most of the kids were.

CARROLL: That sort of brings me to the question of fraternities, which is a recurring issue on almost every board of trustee minutes, that they did always return to it. Were the fraternities always such a problem?

McLAUGHLIN: They were always a challenge. We had established during my presidency a set of standards that fraternities had to meet [Minimum Standards 1983]. They related to the condition of the house, the safety of the house, the conduct, academic standing and

we really disciplined against those and it worked. But you had to stay with it. It's not something that you could say, "Okay, it's in," and walk away from it. You had to be there and live it. It took an enormous effort just to keep that system from sinking into the ground.

I used to go into every fraternity house and the condition of some of those houses was really awful. I mean, it was unsanitary. It was unsafe. So, over the period of time and even today, I really came to the conclusion that probably the fraternities needed to be eliminated and that the whole system should be redesigned.

It was going to take a very large investment. I went to the board when we were really looking at it. One of the four areas that I was concerned with when I became president was the quality of the undergraduate life outside of the classroom where real learning does take place. The dining hall was not structured to have constructive interaction. The faculty no longer were going to the dining hall, which I thought was an important part of what that experience should be.

We forced people into the fraternities because dormitory living didn't have much quality to it. There was a whole series of things to be done. The one that probably would have maybe hastened the change would have been to have stood to the task of buying out the fraternities, putting in a whole new central educational system. Probably of all the things that the right wing and The Dartmouth Review did was to slow that process of examining the fraternities--it would have been enormously contentious.

It was fairly clear that John Kemeny didn't have the heart for it and didn't want to engage the issue. He wanted it to take place, but not during his tenure. So one of the things about which I had long discussions with the trustees, was trying to get them to decide whether or not we should take on the fraternities, and whether we had the funds to do it. I mean, about a third of the students lived in the fraternities. If we were going to alter the role of fraternities, we either had to build more dormitories or do something else. We probably could have done it and done it early in my term. But the board simply wasn't ready to stand to that.

As we moved along, with the whole [agenda], the hospital and the medical center and all of that became time consuming, so we never really got back to it. I still think it needs to be done. I have talked

with some of the trustees who have approached me and have asked me if I would take a lead role in this effort. I have said, "No, I wouldn't, because it really is the president's position to do that, and I never would do anything publicly or privately that would undermine my successor's leadership."

CARROLL: Walter Burke ['44] said to me that he was sure that the fraternities in the '40s and the '50s as he knew them were not such a problem and not so outrageous in their actions or their physical upkeep, and I wondered, if that also is the way you remember? Is this rose-colored glasses looking back or is this indeed true?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it is true. The houses...even in the '50s. I think the '60s is when it changed. But in the 1950s the houses were well kept. The alumni were very strongly committed. The faculty were often there. I never was a strong fraternity person, myself. I was a Beta, but my principle activity was with the senior honorary, the Casque & Gauntlet. While I would go to the fraternity, it never was a central part of my life.

CARROLL: I wonder what changed then in the '60s that precipitated that change in attitude.

McLAUGHLIN: During the latter part of John Dickey's years and into John Kemeny's years, the nature of the campus did change. I mean, the student body and attitudes changed. Vietnam changed how people looked at the world. The faculty changed fairly dramatically through that period of time.

The fraternities, I think, just started a downward slide where they became less prideful of what they had and the administration seemed to turn their back on them. There was a part of the campus that said, you know, "Fraternities are part of the problem around here." It just unraveled. I can't be more specific. I don't know, but it was through that period that it changed. It really did move downhill.

We tried everything--different forms of coeducation units. We had non-residential houses that were for different kind of students that had a much broader based interest. But it was all done on the margin. You really have to deal with it structurally to change it.

CARROLL: During Kemeny's administration with the financial crises, were the funds just not there?

McLAUGHLIN: They were not there and, for reasons that I am not quite sure, the alumni started to not support the fraternity system. It became much more a center for the right. The campus was divided ideologically and the right wing side was in the fraternities, and the coeducational side, the women, were in sororities, but not really in sororities. It was tough for women in those days. It was tough for my daughter. You had to be a pretty strong person.

CARROLL: Did she come away with an overall positive feeling at that time?

McLAUGHLIN: Very. Very. I mean, but she is a survivor. She liked it. She loved athletics and started the women's [ice] hockey team. She went right at it. She loved the place. I think part of that was that she had an older brother who went through it, I went through it, and she was going to make a success of it and she did.

CARROLL: Has she kept up with women's athletics at all?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, she is. Her husband was a class behind her at Dartmouth. He was captain of the hockey team and so they stay right with it. They are still active.

CARROLL: That's wonderful.

At the end of Kemeny's time, he was asked by Carter [President Jimmy Carter] to head the commission looking into Three Mile Island. Before he accepted that, did he talk at all to you and the Board of Trustees?

McLAUGHLIN: We talked. I don't think he talked to the board initially. John and I talked about it at some length and we discussed how the college would be affected. One, there was no question but that he should do it. That was not the issue. He wanted to do it and it was great for Dartmouth to have its president in a prominent role.

The issue really was how do you structure the college during this three-month period or four-month period when John was not going to be there every day. John was unwilling to have an interim president, an acting president. He refused to have Leonard in that role. This was at the point in time when Leonard [Rieser] and John's relationship was tender and there really wasn't any other logical person on campus to do it.

So we agreed that we would set up a small operating committee to take care of the college. John would check in on issues or would be available on issues as they arose. The college didn't go on autopilot, but it functioned without a sitting president through that period. It worked fine. I would try to come up once a week and sit there and just see what the problems were, but never tried to sit in the chair. That wasn't the role I was trying to fill, but I spent a little more time just trying to audit the systems, to know what the issues were and what was taking place. I think everybody was so pleased that John was in that role that everybody was on their best behavior. We didn't really have any major problems through that period. I think Leonard wanted to act like he was president, but the system kind of took care of that.

So it worked, but it was a very emotional time because it was really heady stuff for John and even more so for Jean. She is the one who insisted that it be called the Kemeny Commission instead of the Three Mile Island Commission. And that's fine--John did a pretty good job.

CARROLL: Absolutely. I had a friend here who was an undergraduate who talks about him coming back and explaining his findings. Were you there for that?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. When he came back, I suggested to John that we have a full scale gathering and that he should give a major address on what the process was, findings, and the rest of it. I will never forget introducing John and almost introducing him as, "The President of the United States" instead of the president of the college. [Laughter] I paused and I just caught it in time. What a faux pas that would have been.

John was a consummate lecturer, teacher. He laid it out. He was exhausted, but he did it very well. It was a real event. I always felt that that was part of a student's education to see how government works and that it was also a great example of how people who have leadership roles should stand to those roles. John did it and did it very well. So I was immensely proud of him and proud of the college.

CARROLL: You have spoken several times about the working relationship between John Kemeny and Leonard Rieser. Many people have spoken about it. I would like to sort of push you on that a little more. They are not personalities that seem to me that would easily

mesh together. Both are very strong willed, very strong personalities. What kind of working relationship did they evolve?

McLAUGHLIN: It started out to be a very strong relationship. Leonard had more time in the upper reaches of the college than John did. I think Leonard really aspired to be the president when John Kemeny was selected. Both of them are manipulative, but Leonard takes it to an art form. He really knows how to deal with it.

It got to a point where he and John would agree on something and then Leonard would very subtly kind of weave his own web around it and deal with it as he wanted to. John felt that he was being undercut by Leonard; but, whenever he would get into a discussion, John would lose his temper and Leonard would know how to play it, and so it was not a good working relationship.

It got to a point where John Kemeny said that he was going to fire Leonard. I may have mentioned that before. Dick Hill and I and, I think, Ralph Lazarus sat with John Kemeny one evening and said, "it would not be good for John Kemeny, it would not be good for Dartmouth to have this happen and have it happen that publicly." So John agreed that I would talk to Leonard about the problem and get him to understand that he was subordinate to the president in terms of responsibility...which I did.

Leonard never accepted that, but at least visibly, it became a better working relationship so their differences were always under the carpet. When John Kemeny decided to step down, he wanted to be absolutely certain that Leonard left with him or before. Leonard, in his inevitable way, managed then to find his way into the Dickey Endowment and I ended up appointing him to head the Endowment because he was then still a force, but a declining one.

It was a strange relationship. They were both brilliant people. They were both scientifically oriented. Both were highly emotional and they knew how to use academic power in a way that I never learned. You would understand. There is a method of academic governance and if you come out of a different tradition, it is very difficult, no matter how hard you may work, you never quite understand the academic dynamics of the campus.

CARROLL: Were you surprised by John Kemeny's resignation?

McLAUGHLIN: No. He was part of that to some extent. Not because we didn't think John was doing a good job; but, about a year before he resigned--it was almost two years--it was about his eighth year, the board felt that it was time for John to step down, that the pressures of the campus and the resentments were so strong, and the alumni was starting to unravel, that John's effectiveness was limited, his agenda was pretty well done.

John had publicly said that he was going to stay ten years and his pride was not going to let him leave before that. Yet, he had finished his agenda in about eight years...Native Americans, coeducation and a lot of other things he had started. The issues that were coming up were going to have a longer time frame. The hospital was a principle one of those. So I suggested to John that maybe, in his own interests and in his role in the history of the college, that maybe it was getting time for him to think about it. He said that he really wasn't ready to do it. I said "Fine. Then I will support your time table, but you need to know that there is this feeling--it is out of all respect for you, John, that you really ought to think about this."

So, when he crossed the ninth year, we had a session and I said, "You really need to step out of here on top because something is going to go wrong and you are going to leave then, not with all the credit and flags flying that you deserve." So we agreed that the ten-year period was right, and we put things in motion to begin to deal with that.

CARROLL: What was your role then, as chair in the search for his successor?

McLAUGHLIN: Walter Burke chaired that effort...we essentially split the board and I said "Walter, you run the search process and I will continue to work chairing the board and work on the operating side of what the board does." So, the board would meet together, but there were two, very distinct, separate activities. Walter went off and chaired that effort and I worked with John to keep things together through that period of time.

CARROLL: Was it hard for him to be a lame duck?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. He never really was. Where he backed off quickly was on the alumni side. He didn't like going out and meeting with the alumni. He didn't like any part of it and so, as long as he didn't have to do it or felt a reason to do it, he backed away pretty quickly.

CARROLL: Did he feel uncomfortable in those social situations?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. John was not a comfortable socializer. He was always better giving a talk to five hundred than to fifty because he had that great ability to be a teacher. But, the more intimate the audience became, the more uncomfortable he became. With one-on-ones, it was almost painful at times. A lot of the fundraising that would take place during that period, he would step in and do the final ask after someone else had cultivated the donor. We would play on John's great mental ability, prestige and the rest of it.

It worked. That's what partnerships are. You find what people do well and then you fill in where they don't do it so well.

CARROLL: When you were talking about fundraising, it reminds me that one of the big coups of his administration must have been the Rockefeller money for the Rockefeller Center [for the Social Sciences]. Were you part of the fundraising for that?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. There was a fellow named Bobby Douglass [Robert R. Douglass '53] and David Rockefeller and Laurance [S. Rockefeller]. Laurance was the one that lead the effort to have a center established in Nelson's [Nelson A. Rockefeller '30] name. Rod Rockefeller [Rodman C. Rockefeller '54], who is Nelson's son and a classmate also of mine, was the one who took the lead in putting all of that together. It was very tough going because, when you put (it was a great lesson) when you put somebody's name and particularly a wealthy family's name on a building, nobody else is going to give to it. The Rockefellers put up 60% of the cost of that center and it was very difficult to raise the other 40%.

CARROLL: I never thought of that, but it makes perfectly good sense because you feel swallowed up.

McLAUGHLIN: I became convinced that I would never do that again. We needed at least 70-80% of the funding from the family or you should give up on it.

It came together very well. I don't know if John Kemeny was very comfortable with the concept. The concept of the Rockefeller Center is based on highly interdisciplinary policy-oriented work. The faculty had a tough time with that, particularly the departments in the social sciences. The economics department was always

battling with the government department. They were both always battling with somebody else. The role of the head of the Rockefeller Center was a mediator. I felt sorry for the first director, Frank Smallwood [Franklin Smallwood '51], who did a good job, because everybody respected him, but it has always been a trouble spot. The concept of the center--as good as it is--doesn't fit the strict academic structure of a liberal arts college. So John was obviously pleased with it, but I don't think it was nearly as much his baby as the mathematics building with its computers.

CARROLL: We strayed a little bit away from what I really wanted to ask you about which was the search for his successor. How did you throw your hat in the ring as a possible contender?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, actually I didn't. Sandy McCulloch [Norman E. "Sandy" McCulloch, Jr. '50] and a number of trustees said, "Would you become a candidate?" I said, "I don't think that is a good idea."

I was CEO of the Toro Company at the time and Toro was going through a bad time. We had built our business around snow throwers and lawn mowers. Snow throwers had gone through four incredible years and became 70% of the earnings. Then it stopped snowing for several years so the company was under some pressure.

I kept saying, "There are better candidates out there. You ought to look to do that." They came back and said, "We have got four other candidates, but what we really want to look at is something out of the mold. Would you consider it?"

I had been offered at that time the Secretary of the Air Force position and was seriously considering going down to Washington and doing that. I felt that, after some twenty-five years in industry, I really thought I should do something else because the kids were all grown at that time. But the trustees kept coming back and I have always felt an obligation to Dartmouth, because of what it did for me. Finally I said, "All right. I would consider it."

[End of Tape 3, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 4, Side A]

McLAUGHLIN: I said that all things considered, if it was what the board wanted and the community wanted, I would do it. But, at the time, the problems at Toro were there, and I had to make a decision on the Air Force position. So we concluded first that going into the bureaucracy in

Washington probably wasn't what I really wanted to do anyway. So I turned that down.

The search process narrowed. They had some good candidates. I must say, it was probably one of the most difficult times of my life. My candidacy clearly was contentious in parts of the faculty who didn't want somebody coming from outside academia into that role, particularly somebody out of business. The board, partly because, I think, of my chairmanship and the effectiveness that may have gone on at that time, felt that this was the answer. I wasn't sure that I really ought to be leaving Toro at that time because there were problems there.

The result was that the interviewing process was not terribly successful from my standpoint. I was preoccupied with Toro. I had a view of the college that was quite different than the faculty's view in terms of...not of the academic excellence or the fundamentals, but in terms of really where I thought education was going to have to go in terms of its accountability--along with the financial pressures that were going to be on all institutions. What it was going to take to be successful.

I don't think I really appreciated how little authority the president had. [Laughter] Even working with John, I should have seen this more clearly; but, when you really cut through it all, there is very little authority. You can move certain things. You have the power of appointment and the power of the budget; but you don't have much else. You use these powers very sparingly and in a focused way if you are going to move the institution in one direction or the other.

In the end, I sat with the board and they said, "You know, the faculty really don't want you as president." I said, "Well, then I don't think it is a good idea." And they said, "Well, we really don't have anybody else. All of the others that the faculty wants, we will not accept. So we are faced with either trying to make this thing go and asking you to make it go for us, or starting the search all over again." I said, "That's a choice you have to make."

John Kemeny, at that time, said, "I think it will work." He said, "I have worked enough with Dave that I think that, if you have a strong provost or dean of the faculty, it will be fine and I think that's what we should do." Probably John swayed the board more on that decision than most people realize.

But it was not the right way to begin. Even at the announcement to the faculty, there were a lot of questions. The announcement took place in a full faculty meeting. Immediately, there were a number of people who said, "I don't understand. The faculty committees were not for this." So it got off to one of those difficult beginnings. While it was contentious, Dartmouth has succeeded periodically in taking on different personalities. It was clear that whoever succeeded me needed to be out of a different mold, and I think, because John had been so strong in some ways in his mold, the board said they wanted to go a different direction. It was also the first time that the trustees had engaged an open presidential search so the faculty felt a new sense of empowerment.

CARROLL: I wouldn't call you a weak character as his follower.

McLAUGHLIN: No. But I was not from academia. The trustees felt that it was needed to reestablish some budgetary discipline and accountability. The right wing thought I was going to be more sympathetic to them. Also, most folks thought there would be an emphasis on the undergraduate side as opposed to the graduate side; all of which turned out to be not true. The circumstances create your agenda. You don't necessarily create it yourself.

CARROLL: When you met with the search committee, I am sure that one of the questions, because it is always one of the questions, was, "What is your vision for the college?" What was your vision for Dartmouth at that time?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, I think that was probably part of the problem because the vision was not a major change. It was to assimilate the advancements under John Kemeny and to move Dartmouth forward in a changing environment. The college had just gone through a remarkable period of change and I felt it needed a period to assimilate that change, to build on the strengths that John Kemeny had put in there. It needed to emphasize excellence in the undergraduate side, but to have some accountability for performance. There were a lot of faculty at the college that simply, even in the estimation of their departmental colleagues, were not pulling their weight. I came out of a field that said, "If somebody isn't pulling their weight, you either strengthen them, improve them, or else you figure out how to retire them."

I felt very strongly that the undergraduate side needed reinvestment; that it was terribly important to do that; that we were falling behind in terms of the quality of what Dartmouth did best, which was having an excellent faculty, but with as much learning going on outside of the classroom as there was inside the classroom. I felt that the financial structure of the institution needed to be strengthened, mainly by really pumping up alumni giving to the endowment.

We had just finished a capital gifts drive at that time and I was persuaded that you didn't need to fall back. You could just keep that development program ongoing. In essence, that's what we did. We raised a lot of money and that was part of the vision of what I saw my job as being able to improve the resources of the college and to go back and re-emphasize the total learning experience as the basis for residential, liberal learning.

So it wasn't anything dramatic. It certainly wasn't dealing with law schools. It wasn't dealing with hospitals. It wasn't dealing with any of that. I am not sure what the faculty wanted to hear, but they clearly didn't want to hear that there was going to be more accountability and recommitment to excellence, which they thought was pretty well in their hands.

CARROLL: They were part of it.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I think you know, but probably at the end of the day, whatever pressures there were between the faculty and me, it was influenced by my coming from chairing the board to the presidency than it was from coming from outside of academia to the presidency. The faculty always looked at the president as their representative on the board. He was the on-campus authority that represented the issues to the board, none of whom were on the campus. When I became president, it was as if the board came into their domain as opposed to the other way around.

CARROLL: That's really interesting. I like that.

McLAUGHLIN: I've tried to think that through and I've talked to a lot of folks who I respect greatly on the faculty. At the end of the day, that seemed to be more of a difference than I would have realized at the time.

CARROLL: Did you have a kitchen cabinet among the faculty...people you could turn to and sound out ideas and find opinions?

McLAUGHLIN: I did but it was informal—otherwise it would have violated all of the faculty roles, Frank Smallwood [Franklin Smallwood '51] was one. Jim Wright was one. There were five or six people there. Hans Penner was certainly in that category. John Hennessey, to a little lesser extent. John, I always thought, had a pretty wise head.

But the faculty were interesting. There were some there who were part of John Dickey's era, and they always wanted to go out and have martinis for lunch and sit and reminisce. It was a wonderfully rich experience--but it is certainly different than any other environment that I have ever been in.

CARROLL: Were any of your former professors still on the faculty when you became president?

McLAUGHLIN: No. One classmate was on there. David Sices ['54, Professor of French and Italian], who led the charge to get rid of me. [Laughter] Which I always thought was wonderful. He was kind of an unhappy soul in any circumstances.

CARROLL: When you went around and decided to accept their offer, did you speak to your family at some point and were they behind this?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, but not really. The kids all thought it was fine. They didn't have a big problem with the whole thing. Judy was much more hesitant. It was a change in leaving the corporate life, a life that she enjoyed and a big home and living in Minneapolis. Going off and doing something that was contentious in a not very supportive community did not look inviting. Judy got along fine, but she didn't enjoy it. She just looked at it as a tough job, so why go do it? To my discredit, there probably wasn't as much consultation as there should have been. It was a decision that probably in my heart I felt that I had to make.

The only one I really took close counsel with (I talked with a lot of people, but the one that really influenced me most) was John Dickey. I went up and spent a day with John, and we talked about it--whether it made sense or not. John Dickey had never had a great relationship with John Kemeny. John Dickey said, "You simply have got to take this job. It is important to Dartmouth and it is important to me that you do this." And I talked about all of the problems that I saw...getting along with the faculty, coming from outside, the concerns that I had. John Dickey said, "No. You

simply do not have a choice." So I left there and I said, "Well, maybe the sense of obligation dictates that I don't have a choice." So I did it.

You know, and I have thought about that a lot. I didn't go to the job because I had a vision that I could really bring an enormous change in Dartmouth. I thought I could bring some leadership to it. I had been successful in what I had done up to that point, but I also did it more because I felt an obligation to do it, and that isn't like Dole [Senator Robert Dole] saying, "You owe me the Presidency because I have served the country all of these years." I never felt that. But I did feel a sense of obligation to Dartmouth. If they asked me to do this, then I was going to do it. And I am not unhappy with my decision. I still think we accomplished a great deal; but I didn't go into it with the view of most academics that it was a career-enhancing move.

CARROLL: It strikes me when you say all this...I have been listening to John Dickey's tapes and he had a sense of duty that you are talking about. It is coming out in what you are saying, too, that you owe something back to those who have given to you. For him, it was country and it was this institution. It is very similar.

McLAUGHLIN: I still have that same feeling today. I don't think there is enough of that sentiment in the college or in most institutions. I don't quite know how you regain that—maybe you don't. There is sort of a cynicism that comes over leadership today in ways that I find to be very unappealing. I don't find Dartmouth or other places addressing this issue very effectively, which is why I think that the Rockefeller Center really could have been and can be a much greater asset for the college. Unfortunately, it is not quite able to realize its potential because of the structural impediments.

CARROLL: I think the last thing we will talk about is this transition and how the transition was facilitated from one administration to the next and then, if it is alright with you, we will start with your presidency the next time.

McLAUGHLIN: Sure.

CARROLL: When you decided to accept the presidency then, did you and John Kemeny become a team in trying to pass the power?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, because we had had a good working relationship, it was not an uncomfortable situation. There was a transition period between March and June or something; it was about a three-month period, and I was trying to unravel and transfer the Toro side of it to my successor--not a happy time because the company was under some pressure. On the one side I needed to be respectful of the fact that John was still in the chair. I had an office there and John started to include me in the C.A.P. meetings and in other things that were going on. So I sat at his elbow instead of as chair of the board, which I guess I still was at the time. He was forever the teacher. He had his blackboards in his office. He would chart everything out.

It was not a difficult transition. I took the time to meet over breakfast and lunch with groups of faculty members to talk to them about what they thought the issues of the college were. Where they felt the opportunities were. Also to start to develop some relationships in that area that were important. I think that it was a helpful period in terms of beginning to understand more about the inner workings of the faculty. So the transition really was not difficult, not awkward. I went out of my way to make sure he [John Kemeny] was getting all of the credit and applause that he richly deserved, and so it worked out fine.

CARROLL: When a new administration comes in to Washington, it is understood that they are going to start to establish their own administration. What happens in academics?

McLAUGHLIN: It is less abrupt. There were a few people...there was a fellow named Rod Morgan [Rodney A. Morgan '44 TH '45 TU '45] who was a business manager. He was a great favorite of John Kemeny's, but everybody else really did not think highly of him. He was one that left early.

Alex Fanelli [A. Alexander Fanelli '42] played a bridge role as chief of staff. Ruth LaBombard was very helpful. Mona Chamberlain was in the office at the time. So there was a core of people that were very important in terms of bridging relationships that worked very well. Then, slowly, it evolved. But for colleges and universities, change is incremental. It is not like the government, fortunately.

CARROLL: Did John and Jean Kemeny give you and Judy any specific advice?

McLAUGHLIN: Jean didn't, particularly. John gave me a lot of advice about the faculty and I think that John felt it was good advice. In retrospect, it may have been better advice if I had come out of academia. It wasn't necessarily good advice for a businessman.

He had very little regard for the faculty--he had almost disdain for them. His advice was, "Don't bend to them. Don't let them get the upper hand. Be more political than you normally are and really orchestrate the faculty in a way that keeps them from being able to make many decisions." He really did believe that. He came out of the faculty, so he could have the luxury of that feeling. But, if you don't come out of the faculty, you can't do that.

CARROLL: That's right.

McLAUGHLIN: So in the end, the advice John gave me proved not to be terribly helpful; but not because he didn't mean it to be helpful.

CARROLL: The last thing that I wanted to ask you was what it was like for your wife because, to come in as the president's wife, is to put yourself...you have no peer group. How did she go about making friends and adjusting?

McLAUGHLIN: She is pretty adaptable. I mean, most of her friends became people who were not part of the college. They were people who lived in Hanover. She loved flowers and she liked those kinds of activities. She wasn't fighting to become part of the academic community--she did what she needed to do. It was not an easy transition for Judy. She hated the open contentiousness of the academic community. We did open up the house. All new faculty members were given a tea and a reception at the house. I don't know if they still do that.

CARROLL: I remember doing that with you folks.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. Judy enjoys people—she is very open that way. But she is not very political. One of the things that probably was a mistake...the house had been scheduled during the Kemeny administration for some major renovations. I mean, there were no showers in the house or anything else, so they did all of that. It was a dedicated gift that funded the renovation but the perception was wrong. At any rate, there was a style adjustment. I think she did it probably better than I did.

CARROLL: I think we will end it there.

McLAUGHLIN: Okay.

END OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW: David McLaughlin '54 TU '55, President Emeritus

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: October 23, 1997

CARROLL: It is October 23, 1997, and I am speaking with David McLaughlin in his former office in Baker Library [Rm 235]. We spoke last time about your election to the presidency and I was curious what the transition was like to move from the corporate world to an academic one.

McLAUGHLIN: It was not an easy transition. No matter how much I had thought I knew about Dartmouth through the board of trustees and the chairmanship of the board, when you actually are in the chair, it is quite different. I can recall, right after the election, John Kemeny and I were visiting and, because I didn't come out of the academic mode, some of the trustees said, "Well, you know, we would expect you to have a strong provost who essentially would be the academic officer." John took me aside and said, "No matter how strong your provost is, the fact is, you are still the chief academic officer of the institution and don't let anybody take that away from you." So that was sort of an opening warning as I came in to this.

But the differences are quite striking. In the corporate world, you have a bottom line and you can measure it quarterly or monthly or daily or however you want to do it. In the academic world, it is less specific. The measurements of success of an institution are less quantifiable. They are more subjective, and they evidence themselves over a longer period of time. So there is a very different set of criteria that you develop as you come into this.

The other factor, I think, is that the president of a university or college has considerably less power than most people think that person has. If you are a CEO of a corporation, then, you know, you do have an authority that goes with that job. But the authority of the presidency is more nebulous, and it derives itself from many constituencies--not the least of which is the faculty; but it also comes from the alumni. It comes from the students. It comes from a lot of different people who have a stake in the institution. So it is more defused and you have to develop a more collegial kind of a

system of governance than you would in a corporation. That took me longer to learn than probably I thought it would take; but it was not easy. In academia, process is more important than the end result.

I think one time when we were visiting, I went through Robert McNamara's chart about putting authority on a vertical line and your time in office on a horizontal line. Every time you make a critical decision, you give up some authority. So, eventually, when you leave office, you should have used up all of your line of authority on worthy causes. I have thought about that and it is really just the opposite in the corporate world. The more decisions you make, the more authority you get; but in the non-profit world, and particularly in the university/academic setting, every time you make a critical decision whether it is moving the hospital or it is getting rid of fraternities or whatever it is, you give up a certain amount of authority as you have alienated some set of stakeholders, the constituents that you have, within the institution. It is a very different kind of a management system.

CARROLL: You moved, too, from being a private family to being the "first family" and from a home which was probably rather secluded in a suburb to being in the middle of Fraternity Row. Was that hard?

McLAUGHLIN: No. That part wasn't difficult for me—it was for Judy. I always felt that if you were part of the college and if you were particularly in the administration, you ought to be on campus. You wake them up in the morning and you tuck them in at night. You feel a sense of accountability to the students and to the community. You can't do that by being divorced from it.

We were fortunate to have a place down on Lake Sunapee so that on weekends, you could retreat for a day or two. John Kemeny had his place in Etna where he could get away. But, if you didn't have that, the constancy of being here on the job every day would wear you down over time. But I loved being here. We liked living on Fraternity Row. I can see where a lot of people might not; but it was really...we felt part of it.

CARROLL: It was never a problem with the noise from the fraternities and the parties?

McLAUGHLIN: Occasionally, but we had an understanding that, when we had a function going on at the President's House, the decibel level was

down. When the last guests left, you could hear the decibel level go up. Judy used to bake for them and do other things. So they were pretty good. There were a couple of days where it got a little wild and there were too many cups in the front yard and that kind of thing, so we would have to go and talk about it. But they were not a real problem.

CARROLL: When you walked into the office, did you have a hero that you looked at that you saw as your model for what a president should be?

McLAUGHLIN: Probably John Dickey. John and I were quite close. He was the president when I was a student. When I was an alumnus, John was always in contact with me. We stayed close to each other. When I was considering the presidency, he was the one I sought counsel from. So I think that there are a lot of people I admired, but if there was a single mentor, John Dickey was probably it.

In some way, because of the family situation that I left when I came to Dartmouth, which was not a happy situation, John became almost a surrogate father to some extent while I was a student. I admired him immensely and suffered with him as he left office in those traumatic and tumultuous days that he had during the latter part of his presidency. I just felt very strongly about him.

CARROLL: You talked about the advice John Kemeny gave you. Did John Dickey give you any advice as you stepped into the role of president?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. He did. John's advice was interesting because...John Dickey and John Kemeny (again, I think I covered some of this), they did not have an easy relationship. I am sure that tension occurred due to the fact that John Kemeny was an activist when he was in the math department and an agent for change in the campus. John Dickey was more of a traditionalist. He wasn't about to see the change take place, unless it was led by the trustees. They differed fundamentally on coeducation.

John felt quite alienated from the college when John Kemeny came in. It was never an easy relationship. The only advice John Dickey gave me was to go back and remember the roots of the place. Go back and know why Dartmouth is here. Know why it is distinctive. Go back to the value system of Dartmouth. It was a little awkward

because I didn't think that Dartmouth really had left its value system.

I admired John Kemeny. I worked closely with him and found him to be brilliant. I found him to be headstrong on certain things; but I didn't think that John Kemeny compromised the values of Dartmouth in the same way John Dickey perceived it. So John Dickey's advice really was well intended, and I certainly took it seriously, but I didn't think that the college had drifted that far from its anchor.

CARROLL: Do you remember the first major decision you made as president?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, there were a lot of decisions that were made because they related early on to putting the organization together. The dean of the faculty was up for renewal. The provost was in change. Leonard Rieser was leaving. So those were the early decisions.

Some of them, I think, were made well. Some were made not so well. I think Ag Pytte [Agnar Pytte] as provost was a very good appointment. I struggled with the dean of the faculty appointment. I interviewed a number of people. Jim Wright [President James E. Wright] happened to be one of those; but Dwight Lahr was in the math department and was a fairly prominent Afro-American on campus. It was probably the only time that John Kemeny really came to me and said, "I want to give you some advice and counsel. I think you should appoint Dwight Lahr." He went through his attributes and essentially lobbied for him. Out of respect for what Dwight was and also for John Kemeny's advice, I went that way.

In hindsight, it was probably not the right appointment; not because Dwight isn't a good person, but he had a motivation which was to basically please people and to be accepted. Consequently, particularly since I wasn't coming from academia, it was not the best combination that one could have.

Hans Penner, who was in the deanship when I came, was very good and did a terrific job. But deans burn themselves out over a period of time and Hans had sort of reached that point. I think it was starting to wear on him in ways that were a little difficult for him physically. So we then turned reasonably soon to Dwight who then was the candidate. As I say, I think that probably was not the best appointment. Those were the early decisions.

The biggest issue that surfaced early on and became more of a determining issue than I thought at the time was the resumption of ROTC on the campus. I think every president goes through a major watershed incident with the faculty or the institution. This one didn't come as early as it probably should have. In hindsight, I think that, when a president has a major issue early in his or her career and is willing to lose it as well as to win it, it is probably a healthy thing because it takes the edge off the relationship. You get to know one another a lot better. This one didn't come as early as it should have in my career.

When it came, it probably, in hindsight, was not the right decision to go forward with it. We had gone through all of the process that the faculty had prescribed. We went through long sessions with the faculty. The trustees had said, "This is something we'd like to have happen and we think it is important. It is part of Dartmouth's heritage. It was a legacy from the Navy period. The military is part of the leadership quotient of the United States. It is going to be there. We shouldn't just have our military leaders coming from the military academies. Some ought to have a liberal arts background." The rationale was logical and very clear to the board.

The faculty, on the other side, was still a faculty where some of them had come through the Vietnamese period. They had a very different view of the military and of that structure. Consequently, it was not a popular idea. The faculty said, "We will consider it if, one, ROTC instructors don't have any faculty status. Two, ROTC gets no academic credit." And they went right down the list, saying, "This can be like an extracurricular activity and, if you do that, then it will be successful. Then we will accept it." So we entered a long negotiation with the Navy that went all the way up to the secretary of the Navy. The secretary of the Navy, who was [John] Lehman at the time, said, "Yes," he would subscribe to that. Then, at the last minute, he said that he could not sell it to his admirals who were in charge of manpower development within the Navy.

We turned quickly then to the Army, and the secretary of the Army, Jack Marsh, said that he would embrace it. He did it. To try and accommodate the fact that there was concern on the faculty here, we attached the program to Norwich University so that we, in essence, rode on their commission for ROTC, but had the unit here with no faculty status. There weren't any other obligations that went with it.

We then took it back through the normal faculty process. It became quite contentious in the faculty meeting and despite the fact that all of their criteria had been met, the faculty voted it down, about 80% to 20%, or some very large number. So I took it to the board and said, "Here is the situation. We have a decision to make. You can either go forward with it or you don't." The board then said, "Well, the question really is: Who is running the college?" I said, "That's right. If you want to make that decision, I will stand with it and defend it. If you decide that it isn't worth the battle, then let's find a graceful way to put this aside."

I don't know whether it was alumni pressure or the fact that most of the trustees were people who had also come through the ROTC period, but they were great believers in it. They said, "Yes. We think we should go forward with it." I recall the discussion in the board meeting. Two of the trustees said, "You know, this will probably shorten your tenure here. Is it worth it?" I said, "It depends on how important you think it is to signal what is the governance system of this college and where the authority lies." They decided that they wanted to go forward with it and so we did.

The faculty was a bit stunned over the fact that they had taken a position and then didn't dictate the outcome. ROTC came back. It did what we intended which was to give a lot of middle-income families a chance to send their children here who wouldn't qualify for scholarship aid, but could get ROTC help. The program had low visibility on the campus. They trained way off in Leverone Field House.

But it did set in motion on the part of certain faculty members, a commitment that they wanted to see a change in the administration and to evidence their rightful role within the institution. In various ways, that was a governance issue that you could feel at various other times relating to other issues. So, in hindsight, it probably wasn't that important an issue to have lost that much capital on—using the metaphor I mentioned before.

The other major issue was the medical school and it came towards the end of my tenure. That one was worth losing capital over because it did change this place forever for the good. It opened up that whole north end of the campus and enabled the college to do some things that couldn't have been done before.

CARROLL: I am curious...to go back to ROTC and the board's decision to not listen to the faculty when it was a pretty strong vote. How close was that board to the faculty members?

McLAUGHLIN: Not close. There were two trustees--Lisle Carter [Lisle Carter, Jr. '45] and Mike Heyman [Ira Michael Heyman '51] (maybe my timing is wrong, but I think they were on the board at that time) and they were two of the ones who felt that it was never a very good thing to do--to go against the faculty.

The other side of the board represented a conservative element. There was John Steel, but there were a number of others who felt pretty strongly that this was a key decision. They [the faculty] laid down the gauntlet and it was time to make your stand. I had been a product of ROTC, so I had a great deal of sympathy with it, but was certainly prepared not to go forward with the plan. There were not commitments that were made at that time; but the Board evidenced itself in that direction, so that's the way that we went.

CARROLL: In your administration, people came to see you and Paul Paganucci as a team. How fair is that an assessment of the way you two worked together?

McLAUGHLIN: It was fair. Paul and I were close. We were close as undergraduates. I have an enormous respect for him; but, on the academic side, Paul had very little input. On the business side of the institution--the finances, how we handled the finances, the capital expenditure program, the development program, the investments, Paul had a major influence—a positive influence.

I think people perceived us as a team in a way that was not helpful at times because neither of us had come out of the academy. So it looked like two business people trying to run an educational institution. Part of that was not detrimental to Dartmouth. Paul did a great job of running the endowment and building up the business side. Together with the development side, we raised a lot of money for Dartmouth, which I think is probably all to the good. But it almost looked like it was a preoccupation with the bottom line as opposed to developing the intellectual capital, the intellectual side of the institution. I don't necessarily think that was the case, but it was the perception.

CARROLL: When you came into office though, the endowment was minimal and, when you left, it had been...

McLAUGHLIN: It increased substantially. I think the endowment came close to quadrupling during that period of time. Frankly, I don't think our business background disadvantaged the college at all. When I came into office, the board and I had a long set of discussions about where the priorities of the place should be. It was clear that John Kemeny had left the faculty, on the intellectual side, in a very strong condition. It was a good faculty. It had a high priority on teaching and research. It did all of the things that Dartmouth should be doing.

But, if there had been an erosion, it probably had been in the quality of the residential life that took place. That is something that I felt fairly strongly about. I think you always run the risk of saying, "It was important to me when I was here; therefore, it's got to be important today." Things change a great deal; but the basic principle of a residential college still is as valid today as it was when I was an undergraduate. The quality of the dormitories and the condition of the fraternities, the dining experience (which used to be an intellectually exciting activity...discussions would go back and forth)—were influencing the quality of the dialogue on campus outside of the classroom--all of those things seem to have deteriorated somewhat under the pressure of other priorities. Ironically, with coeducation they were more important than ever.

This is not a criticism. Institutions go through cycles. So we set about refurbishing the dining hall, trying to straighten out the fraternities (and I will come back to that), building new dormitories, putting in the Asian house, the Native American house, trying to develop a much more diverse campus and to give that diversity its security, but also bring it into the mainstream so that there was a mutual learning experience taking place. By and large, a lot of progress was made, but it is an ongoing process—one cannot start and stop. I can look back today and still see some of that new structure still there—it was a right priority at the time.

The whole [Dartmouth] Outing Club experience was given a priority. We put in snowmaking and refurbished the Dartmouth Skiway. There were just so many things that went into that out-of-classroom learning package and we raised a good bit of funds to support this. It was money well spent because it was really directed at what is the underpinning of undergraduate education outside the classroom.

But, where we didn't make enough progress was fraternities. We expended an extraordinary amount of effort. Ralph Manuel ['58] did. Dean Shanahan [Edward "Ed" Shanahan] did after that. We set minimum standards for the houses. We leaned on the houses. We put in an account billing system so that we could keep track of what the financial condition of the houses were. We worked closely with the Inter-Fraternity Council trying to raise their sights on acceptable behavior and physical condition. We were promoting more sororities so that they had an equal weight on leadership development. But, in fact, all we did was slow or halt the deterioration of the system. We did not find a lasting solution.

I left office feeling that it was worth the effort because they do develop leadership systems within fraternities and they do certain things socially, but as they existed then, the negatives of that system, particularly with its heritage in an all-male institution, outweighed the positives. We should have gotten rid of the fraternities—that's a reluctant conclusion. The downside at a place like this is much more than the potential upside. It is easy to say, "Okay. We should get rid of them." You have to raise more money for dormitories and living. What nobody has really thought through, and we didn't get it right either, is, "what are the options? What are the alternatives that you establish for Dartmouth that provide a socially enhancing experience outside the classrooms." We are not as isolated as we were in the 1950s, but there is a sense of place here because it is away from Boston and large cities. The college has to have something in its place and we didn't get there.

CARROLL: There was a Committee on Residential Life which you established and I think Jim Wright headed it up.

McLAUGHLIN: That's right.

CARROLL: It came back with a whole list of possibilities of ways to do that, most of which you were able to enact.

McLAUGHLIN: We put in most of it. We didn't quite get all of it, but we avoided the fraternity issue. I don't recall Jim's report. I don't think it recommended abolishing the fraternities. It may have come closer than we did.

CARROLL: It condemned them and suggested that there be alternatives provided that would hopefully wean people away from them.

McLAUGHLIN: This is something that still needs to be done. Jim Freedman and I talked about it at one point. Some of the trustees came and said, "Would you lead this effort now that you are out of office?" I said, "No. Only the president can lead that effort. I will not do that. If he is not committed to that course of action and is not prepared to lead it, it is not right for me to interject myself into that issue."

But it always comes back to the point of determining what other forms of residential life do you put together to accommodate the absence of fraternities as we know them? It is difficult because there are activities that go on in the fraternities, particularly as they relate to alcohol and alcohol consumption, which, if it was under the college's auspices, would be more difficult to monitor and control because of the drinking age. It is not that fraternities get away with it; but everybody kind of turns their eye away from it. There are things that go on there that are not necessarily bad. Part of learning is how you handle alcohol responsibly. So it really needs to be thought through.

CARROLL: I would imagine, too, that the president who decides to do this, if you use your idea of expending capital, will expend quite a lot.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I had hoped that maybe Jim Freedman would do this in his final period of time; but, for reasons (and this is not a criticism) he just decided that he didn't want to go out dealing with that—much as John Kemeny did. It will be somebody else's ROTC someday. [Laughter]

CARROLL: What do you think the alumni response will be when and if it is changed?

McLAUGHLIN: I don't think it will be as bad as they anticipate. It is a matter of how it is explained. It is a matter of what the options are. It is a matter of showing people what the values of Dartmouth are, how they are being supported and enhanced by the way that the residential life is being structured. It will take a very strong dean to do that. There have been deans like that in the past. Thad Seymour [Thaddeus "Thad" Seymour '49A] was that kind of a dean. Ralph Manuel was that kind of a dean. It will take an uncommon bonding between the president and the dean to bring that about, but it can be done. My sense is that, and I don't know the tenor or the temperament of the younger alumnae or alumni on this, but I would guess that it would be supported.

CARROLL: I don't know if you have every heard this story, but I was told by Leonard Rieser that, when you were president, there was so much building going on that John Kemeny one day walked by one of the buildings that was going up and sort of patted it. Leonard was with him, and Leonard said that he said, "I always wished that I had the ability to do what David McLaughlin is doing for this campus." Did he ever express any of that to you...his desire to refurbish and renovate parts of it?

McLAUGHLIN: Not as specifically as that incident; but I know that John aspired to a lot of things at Dartmouth. His agenda was fairly full; but, when he was able to bring coeducation to this institution...that was probably the biggest thing that John Kemeny will be known for. That perhaps, and restoring the Native American traditions here. I think John wanted to build on that. That was an early decision in his tenure and so he was looking for the next step. But that next step was hard to achieve. He would have liked to have seen the reconstruction go on, but it required raising a lot of money and John was not up to that.

[End of Tape 5, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 5, Side B]

McLAUGHLIN: The capital campaign [Campaign for Dartmouth] was finished as we were crossing terms, but, basically, it was John's success. The capital campaign was his. He brought it about; but there wasn't a lot of money in there for construction because it was tough economic times. So we took a strategy that said, "Let's assume that this campaign never ends...that it just goes on but we just don't call it a campaign for a period of time." You build on the strength of the momentum of a campaign and you just keep the development line going up.

I saw some charts last year when I was here. Lyn Hutton or somebody was showing me the revenue flows and you could see from that campaign that John Kemeny finished that the line just kept going up and that is because it was a conscious strategy of Paganucci and others to say, "Let's just keep this momentum going." You always finish a campaign with more prospects than when you started. That is how the money then came in to do the construction. We also took out some bonding debt, which hadn't been done previously, to accelerate this process. It didn't encumber the college or its financial rating at all.

I don't think John Kemeny was against the kind of reconstruction that was going on. He might have put a little more emphasis on academic buildings as opposed to the residential life buildings, but John and I didn't really see the college differently at all.

CARROLL: When I spoke with Mr. Paganucci, he explained that, during your time as president, there was a decision to invest quite a bit of money in venture capital. I spoke to Walter Burke [Walter Burke '44] about this as well. Were you part of that decision?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. It was a decision that Pag had promoted. There were some people on the board that felt that we should be more conservative, more bond oriented. I felt pretty strongly that Pag and Walter [Burke] were right, that we should take the gamble. I mean, we could play it safe and be mediocre, but, if we were aggressive, we might really do well. We weren't going to lose it all, there was no chance of that. So I supported it strongly and they were absolutely correct in what they did.

It is interesting, when I came to Aspen [The Aspen Institute], we had a much smaller endowment, but we took half of it and did the same thing. We happened to hit it just right on time, and it was up 70% a year for a period of time. So we restored Aspen in the same way. So I am philosophically a risk taker and believe under certain circumstances you should use the endowment aggressively.

CARROLL: You had an amazing time building. I just look around this campus and your imprint is everywhere and, I wonder, is there any one building that, when you look at it, is your favorite or has the best stories attached to it?

McLAUGHLIN: Probably the Hood Museum was the best. Rockefeller Center was very good. John had started that and it finished on my watch. That's a great building—it does certain things.

But the Hood Museum was the most enjoyable project, partly because of Charles Moore being the architect, partly because it was in position with the Hopkins Center, which was a wonderful statement, and it said something about the importance of the arts in a liberal arts setting. That one was probably, of all of them, was the more enjoyable.

CARROLL: This is an aside, but when I look over at that corner with the Hopkins Center and the Hood and Wilson Hall, I think those are

three of the most architecturally-interesting buildings on the whole campus. They make that corner complete.

McLAUGHLIN: Well, we spent more time looking at Bartlett Hall and how it was going to fit...not Bartlett...

CARROLL: Wilson.

McLAUGHLIN: Wilson...and how it would fit. I remember, we got down to picking the right bricks so that it blended and all of the lines had to be just right. Charles Moore was just brilliant. But he needs somebody to say, "This is the way I want it, Charles. You don't have a free hand in design here."

CARROLL: Who selected him as the architect?

McLAUGHLIN: I think Leonard did. There was a committee, but Leonard was active in it. Leonard was very active in that building, and he did a great job with it.

CARROLL: He did. It is beautiful. It has just been renovated. Have you looked at it?

McLAUGHLIN: I haven't gone in. I noticed that they had it shut down last summer.

CARROLL: It is looking pristine again. It is just wonderful.

You also...there was a decision at some point to put the senior masters...faculty masters in buildings like the Choate. Was that a successful program?

McLAUGHLIN: It was mixed. Don Pease [Professor of English] was part of that. There were some other faculty members...I don't think they are here now...

CARROLL: I think David Lagomarsino might have been.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. He was one, right. Where you had the quality of commitment of a David Lagomarsino or Pease or some of the others, it worked. But it didn't work quite as well as we had hoped it would and I am not sure exactly why. I know that there were advocates of it and there were people who really thought it was an intrusion into the residential system. I think the concept is right. I am a great believer that there ought to be mentors for the undergraduates, and

maybe it's a faculty member or maybe it's a dean or maybe it's a resident in the residential complex, a master, but I think students need to have that relationship. It is part of the intellectual growth that takes place. Now that the faculty have to live farther away from Hanover because of the real estate cost, it is hard to have that proximity.

It is asking a lot for a faculty member to teach all day and then come back and be part of the residential system in the evening or various other times. So I think finding a way to build the mentorship; be it through a master or others, is a very good concept; but it takes a bigger investment than we made. You have to give faculty a real incentive to do this, and you probably have to make it quite remuneratively attractive to them to do it so that they can then justify taking the time and making that commitment away from their scholarly work to devote it to the undergraduate side. But the concept is right. It may be one of those options to fraternities that has to be built into the system.

CARROLL: The Wheelock Cluster has that faculty master system with the house...an independent house.

McLAUGHLIN: That's right.

CARROLL: That seems to have worked well for those students. It's a very popular dorm. It is the hardest dorm to get into.

McLAUGHLIN: That's great. I mean, that says it is working.

The other things that tells me it can work is, when I look at the success of the Aquinas House or some of the other religious organizations. It is a statement that students want some life beyond what they do in the classroom. It ought to reinforce every academic principle of the institution and carry it forward. The absence of that easy kind of discussion period or informal discussion between faculty and students that we try to bring into the residences, just as it is promoted at the honor society, C & G—it is very much a part of this place.

CARROLL: When you were an undergraduate, that kind of outside-the-classroom interaction, where did that happen?

McLAUGHLIN: It happened...well, we didn't have as many distractions [laughter] as there are today and then it was an all-male institution. A lot of it

took place in the fraternities. We always had faculty members in and had discussions in the fraternities. It was a very accepted thing, but the fraternity houses looked well. They were well furnished. They were cared for. They had pride in them. A lot of the Great Issues discussions after the Great Issues programs, would go on at the C & G House, which was opened up to anyone who wanted to come. These opportunities were not fabricated—they took place around the campus at various spots.

That's the real shame of the fraternity system today. I went into a few several weeks ago and they were just awful, they were just awful! The house I was in, Beta [Beta Theta Phi], has now been shut down. I guess a sorority is going to rent it for a year, which makes good sense. Somewhere, there isn't a sense of responsibility that the student undergraduates have that are part of the fraternity system. It really is a shame. It doesn't speak well for the institution.

CARROLL: You know, I would not have understood what you are talking about except that last night my husband and I were invited to the Native American House for dinner, and it was an amazing experience because they were a family there. Those students had formed a very accepting unit that welcomed and invited professors in on a continuous basis. It was one of the most stimulating dinners I have had in a long time.

McLAUGHLIN: That's exactly what you need to have happen. If we can just figure out how to make it so that the Native Americans or Blacks don't, in their own way, become isolationists themselves, but are open to the rest of the institution. I mean, that's the goal and the Caucasian community has a responsibility as well. But you are right. The experience you had is exactly what occurred more often when I was an undergraduate for circumstances that were quite different. It won't be replicated exactly the same way today...and it couldn't be when I was here in the presidency, but you can get close to it.

CARROLL: Yeah. I can see it.

Now, when you came into office, the first year, you had a minor heart attack. That must have been out of the blue because you seem to be such a healthy, vigorous, outdoors person. How did you react to that?

McLAUGHLIN: Not well. But I just didn't believe it really was going to happen. I can recall, I had been invited by one of our alumni who was then the ambassador to the Court of St. James. He had said, "Once a year, I always have dinner and the Queen comes and would you come and be the guest academic." I said, "I would love to."

So I was steaming around campus trying to get ready for that. When I crossed campus, I really started to feel poorly and I perspired and I was hot and uncomfortable. I would go and sit down and have a meeting and then I would start to feel better. Then I would do the same thing. So finally I said, "If I am going to go to England, I have got to get this checked." So I came up and saw, I forget what doctor, and I described it to him and he said, "Let me give you an EKG." The next thing he said was "You are not leaving here." So I said, "Well, you know, this is crazy. I've got things I've got to do." [Laughter] He said, "No you don't." He said, "You have two options. You can take it easy or you can have a bypass." He described the bypass and I said, "I'm not going to go through that." But one of the other younger doctors said, "There is a new procedure called angioplasty. We don't do it here, but they do it down at Mass General [Massachusetts General Hospital] and it is far enough along, enough people have done it, that it is not totally experimental anymore. You ought to think about that."

So I went down to Mass General. I saw Dr. Block (a great name for a heart surgeon) [Laughter], and he said, "Yes. I can do this." He said, "You will have it done and you will be out in two days." I said, "Well, what is your chance of success?" and he said, "Pretty high." But he said, "We prepare you for a bypass in case it doesn't work." So I entered the hospital and had all that done. Literally, I think it was the next week, we were back on the alumni trail. I felt great and I never turned back on it. I had smoked before that period and immediately had no desire for that, had no desire for butter, eggs...[Laughter]...and a couple of the alumni gave me some exercise equipment and said, "This is what you need to do." So I just changed my routine and have never had another incident. Today, they say, "Don't even declare it. You can't find it."

CARROLL: Wow. That is a real success story.

McLAUGHLIN: Well, yes. The demands on the president, I don't care who it is-- socially, fund-raising, the pressures of the campus, things that go on--you do need to be energetic, and being healthy is an essential part of it. I am sure Jim Freedman [President James O. Freedman]

experienced that when he went through his bout with cancer, because they had talked about whether he could continue once he got his energy back, which he fortunately did. But it is a demanding position. It is not for sissies. [Laughter]

CARROLL: I have one question that has just been on my mind, as I have been reading the minutes of faculty meetings. From the beginning, when you stepped into the first faculty meeting, there was a lot of animosity toward you. Where was this coming from?

McLAUGHLIN: In the beginning, I don't think it was personal. I think, as my tenure moved along, it became somewhat personal. Again, the board had (because of the close working relationship I had with the trustees) a predisposition on their part to want to move toward my election. So, in the course of that, and Walter probably knows more about that because he chaired the search committee, but there was a sense among some of the faculty that it wasn't an honest search. They felt that the other candidates...that the field that was developed wasn't a particularly strong field. Also, in the interviewing process, when I met with the faculty and the search committee, I was not terribly successful.

I was struggling, trying to decide whether I wanted to leave Toro, whether I could leave Toro. It was going through a difficult period because we had built a lot of the business on snow conditions and snow blowers. It didn't snow for two years, and so there were pressures on the company. It was the wrong time to leave from my standpoint and, yet, I felt an enormous obligation to Dartmouth. I had passed up going to Washington for the secretary of the Air Force position, because I didn't think it was the right time to leave Toro. So I was really torn, and I am sure that pressure was part of what led to the heart problem later on. But it was a very difficult period personally for me. I think that reflected itself in the interviews and the other interactions that I had.

I can recall, when I finally met with the search committee, they said, "We are prepared to elect you as president, but you need to know the faculty committee doesn't support this, but they are not going to implode over it. They are not going to go public on it; but you need to know that you are not coming in with their support." John Kemeny said, "What went wrong in the interviews?" I explained to him the same thing. I said, "John, do you think I should take it?" John said, "Yes, I do." But John, at that point was at odds with the

faculty, too. I mean, he had sort of said, "I've had enough of you guys." So we talked about it and I finally said, "Okay. I will do it."

So the relationship with the faculty was not easy from the beginning. The faculty committee didn't support the nomination. You can't keep a secret. I mean, it wasn't publicly done, but it was known. So there wasn't a feeling that this was really a legitimate search in a sense, on their part. It is interesting as the search that led to my election was the first external presidential search in the college's history.

CARROLL: How did you deal with that animosity, personally?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, before I even took office, I came back and I met with groups of faculty at luncheons. I listened to them. "What do you think is needed?" I talked to them, tried to set up some systems within the faculty to communicate.

I remember one time, Bernie Gert [Bernard Gert] came in. We talked a lot. He said, "You will never be accepted here." I said, "Why?" He said, "You dress differently than we do." [Laughter] I said, "Bernie, if that is the criteria, then I'm not going to be too worried about it." But there was a feeling that I was different. I remember they used to say, "You can't use those words in your talks because they are business-type words." I said, "But that's what I mean."

I still have a lot of very good friends on the faculty; but, collectively, there was a small group that really found me to be anathema to their vision of an ideal president. As Jim Wright pointed out to me, it was almost the same group that were the ones who attacked his being named provost because it didn't go through the right process.

CARROLL: That's right.

McLAUGHLIN: Jim said, "I'm going right down the list. Those are exactly the same people that were against your presidency." It's too bad. I understand where they are, and I respect the process and I respect the faculty's right to feel that way, but I also think they need to respect the institutional interests. In Jim Wright's case (I will leave myself out of it) it was wrong. It was dead wrong.

CARROLL: Now, Leonard Rieser stepped down as provost in '82, after having the post for twenty-three years and...was that, from his side, what he wanted to do?

McLAUGHLIN: No. He didn't. But it was a decision made before I came. John Kemeny made that decision. John came to the board and said that he wanted to fire Leonard. He and Leonard were just totally at odds. Their egos, or whatever it was, had clashed. Dick Hill and I, at that time, (I may have mentioned this earlier) met with Leonard and we kind of worked out, on behalf of John Kemeny, a plan that he would step down within a certain period of time. John said, "That's longer than I want, but I will agree to it because I am not going to be here after that. But I want to make sure that Leonard is out of here before I leave." So that was all done.

From the time the arrangement was made, Leonard started to fight it, trying to figure out how to get around it, to deal with it. But the board said, "No. That's just the way it is." So that was a decision that John Kemeny made before I ever came into the presidency. But Leonard would have liked to stay forever.

CARROLL: One of the first small curfluffles that sort of came up was when Dennis Dinan ['61] was fired as head of the [Dartmouth] Alumni Magazine. What was the story behind that?

McLAUGHLIN: Dennis personified the classic issue of whether the magazine is independent of the college and therefore free to say whatever it wants, or is it really an organ of the institution that ought to be promoting Dartmouth within the alumni. It became an editorial freedom issue versus what is the purpose of the magazine. Dennis said, "I clearly believe in the freedom of the press and we are going to write whatever we want." And I said, "No, you are not. This is a magazine of the institution. You can be critical if you want; but you are not going to turn the magazine into your vehicle. It is going to be the college's." Dennis said, "Well, I am not going to stay on that basis."

There were a number of people in Dennis' camp, Fritz Hier [Frederick "Fritz" Hier '44] and a number of others. So, when Dennis left, we then had to go about finding a new editor, and all those issues came up in the search with the alumni. The [alumni] council got involved. They were kind of split because a number of them liked Dennis very much. To me, it was very fundamental. I still think that the Alumni Magazine ought to address Dartmouth

issues and portray the richness and the interesting things that go on here. It ought not be a vehicle for controversy and polarization. We had a lot of that [polarization] at the time. The Dartmouth Review and all of the rest of it fostered that divisiveness. It was a fairly polarized campus and we just didn't need to aggravate it further. It was a philosophical difference, I guess, more than anything.

CARROLL: Whatever happened to Dennis Dinan?

McLAUGHLIN: He stayed in the area and I think he did some free-lance writing. I saw him occasionally. It was always kind of awkward but he is a good person. I like Dennis very much. I respect him; but I also... Pag and a number of other people, it wasn't just myself... A number of others said, "This is right." So that's how it came out.

Now, in a different day, somebody else would have been delegated to make that decision and that was probably a failing of my presidency in that I didn't lay off some of these things to other folks. I felt that there was a responsibility of the office. If you can make a hard decision like that, then you should stand behind it.

Jim Freedman talked about some of this and he said he would never make that decision—he would let others stand in the line of fire. He would have the head of the alumni council or the head of the alumni relations be the fall guy. He didn't put it that way; but he would not be the one who did that. And Jim is probably right. You can take the presidency and get it too immersed into issues on the campus and lose credibility just as what happened in that case. You can make your point and still have it come out the right way, but have somebody else in the lightning rod position.

CARROLL: You came from business, though, where it was the man at the top who took the heat.

McLAUGHLIN: That's right. That's where the buck stopped. Again, maybe that is part of your first question on philosophy. I really felt that, if there were hard decisions to make, you didn't lay those off on somebody else.

CARROLL: I can see that. We have talked about ROTC. That was the next thing I was going to talk about. I want you to talk about...the two major things that I have left to talk about a little bit were South Africa and divestiture, and then the hospital building. Let's do

South Africa, since it is the least pleasant one and the hospital is the most pleasant one. [Laughter]

The Sullivan Principles had been signed onto in '78 and then there comes in '84, Thomas Csatar [74]...

McLAUGHLIN: That's not quite right, but he is the lawyer.

CARROLL: Right. In his report, he says that Dartmouth is not upholding 100% the Sullivan Principles, and that really seems to start the whole debate. Were you taken by surprise by this whole issue or did you see it coming?

McLAUGHLIN: No. It is an issue that first surfaced in the Ivy group presidents' meeting. It was discussed at some length. We brought in some of the chief advocates for both sides on the issue. Princeton and Yale, I think...I have forgotten...but I know that Bill Bowen and I think Derek Bok and I said, "We think that it is irresponsible to divest of companies that are doing business in South Africa if, in fact, they are abiding by the Sullivan Principles and if they are a positive influence. A wholesale divestiture is emotional, but it is not rational and it is not serving the purposes that were intended...to change the society of South Africa."

So we took a position and Bowen, I know, was the leader on that issue. He said, "We are just not going to divest. We will divest selectively if we think somebody is not following the Sullivan Principles, but we are not going to do it wholesale." Dartmouth took the same position. It went to the board, it went to the investment committee. It was discussed all the way through the process. Bill Morton [William Hanson Morton '32] was on the board and was pretty influential at the time for that decision. It was very strongly felt that it was just wrong to divest for the sake of divesting. It was a wrong statement to make. There were lots of outcomes including the shanties and other things; but I don't think it was a wrong decision. I don't today.

CARROLL: The shanties were going up all over in the United States. Why do you think that Dartmouth became the one whom everyone talked about?

McLAUGHLIN: It was partly The Dartmouth Review. They had a high visibility media vehicle due to their sources and their funding. Bill Simon [William Simon] and a number of others supported them. [A.

Bartlett] Giamatti and I talked about this at great length because he said, "Hell. We had shanties right outside my office. It was just one of those things that we always have in New Haven, so it is not a big thing." He said, "Up in Hanover, it's a big thing." He said, "It is so visible and they are so well-funded."

When the shanty went up, we left it on the Green for a long time. We said that we would respect it as a freedom of expression as long as it is constructive and creates dialogue on the campus. Then I talked with both [Derek] Bok and [A. Bartlett] Giamatti about that, and they said, "Yes, that's the right thing to do." It was, up to a point, and then it just collapsed when the symbolism became too appealing to the conservatives. It became more of a negative for us than a positive for us.

CARROLL: How can you tell when that happens, though?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, you can always tell after the fact. [Laughter] You can't tell ahead of the fact. We debated whether to remove the shanty during the holiday season. There weren't very many people here. It would have been an easy thing to do; but I said, "Well, that is not necessarily right either, if you believe in freedom of expression." But then the right wing said, "It is our right to..."

[End of Tape 5, Side B - Beginning of Tape 6, Side A]

McLAUGHLIN: ...oppose divestiture...I don't think that our policy on the shanties was a wrong decision at all, but also not to divest.

I can remember, after I left office, Jim Freedman called and said, "We have decided to divest." He said, "I know you won't like it." I said, "Well, I think you just built the last great railroad station in the country, because the trains have all left." I said, "This thing has changed. It is not even an issue down there anymore."

Because Mandela [Nelson Mandela] had done great things. It was interesting because (this is off the subject) at Aspen, we have a program for the United States Congress to educate them on various issues; South Africa was one. We brought Mandela and de Klerk [Frederik Willem de Klerk] together and met with senior leaders in the Congress. We did it off shore. One of the questions that came to Mandela was, "Do you think divestiture was helpful?" He said, "In retrospect, I think we lost more as a country than we gained."

CARROLL: That is interesting.

McLAUGHLIN: But he said, "I can't judge the political impact on the United States." But he said, "As far as South Africa is concerned, it was not good because we lost a lot of companies who were doing very good things there."

So...anyway. I still think that our divestiture policy was the right decision, despite the outcome. Like ROTC, I think they were both morally correct decisions. But I think that not divesting was probably more worthwhile than the ROTC decision.

CARROLL: You were out of Hanover when the shanties were torn down...

McLAUGHLIN: I was down in Florida on the alumni tour.

CARROLL: Did they call you frantically with this?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. They did. And they occupied the office at the same time.

CARROLL: I forgot that. Yes.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I remember Mona Chamberlain, who was running the office, was in Parkhurst. I was on the phone with her trying to figure out what was going on with the shanties and she had unlocked the president's office to go in and water the plants and had forgotten...when the phone rang, she didn't lock the door and that's when they came pouring in and took it over.

CARROLL: Poor Mona.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I think she will remember that day for the rest of her life. [Laughter] Yes. But it was a very difficult time. There was a lot of tension. It was less student-driven than it was faculty-driven.

CARROLL: I am curious to hear you say that because, when they interview in The D...the people who were commenting on the shanty, it was far more faculty than students there.

McLAUGHLIN: When I walked into the office to discuss the situation with those who were occupying it, there were certainly students there, but it was mainly young faculty and that complicated it. It is one thing to try and bring about a disciplinary system or correcting the system

when you are dealing with the students; it is quite another when you are dealing with your faculty.

CARROLL: Why do you think that issue was able to ignite such a fairly significant number of people?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it was an issue that goes back to the Vietnamese war reactions. There were people who still possessed anger and alienation in some ways. It had nothing to do with the ROTC. This was a set of issues that was divorced from the personal relationships. It was more campus-oriented. I just think it touched raw social nerves for a lot of people. There were also some very talented student activists who were good politicians. They really knew how to disrupt things. Consequently, I think they were able to manipulate this scenario and orchestrate it pretty well.

CARROLL: I want to talk about the hospital move, which really began in '85. Who first mentioned the idea that a new hospital building should be built? Do you remember?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, that started almost from my first day on the job. This was an issue that was John Dickey's. It became John Kemeny's and then it became mine...the challenge of this triumvirate between the clinic, the hospital and the college to establish a new academic hospital center. How do you deal with it? How do you perpetuate it?

The college felt very strongly that we had to have an academic component of this medical center and that it had to be integrated with the rest of it. The hospital was saying, "We are cramped for space. We are not able to deliver services the right way." The clinic was saying, "We are not making enough money because we can't expand our businesses in these facilities." So we went through fifteen different iterations--even taking the golf course and relocating it and building it somewhere else to expand the hospital to the north. Each one had problems, and it was very hard getting the three parties to all agree together. The whole funding of the medical school was integral to that, because it was done through a recovery system, involving the hospital.

So, finally, Pag and I were walking around and Pag said, "We ought to move this thing out of town." I said, "Pag. Look. If that's what we are going to do, it will be my last act at Dartmouth." He said, "No. I think this is something that we ought to consider."

Separately, we had been working on another project...Jack Nelson had left Trumbull-Nelson and had assembled a large piece of land in Lebanon. He got into financial trouble. I think he had bought it for \$800 an acre. It was a small amount relatively and Pag came and said, "You know, I think we have got a chance to buy this enormous piece of land out here at a price that is going to be very good." So, almost independent of the hospital decision, we said, "Let's do that because it makes great sense. It will protect the college to the south. That is something we ought to do." Belatedly, after Pag had committed the college, we took it to the board and to the investment committee. Some trustees thought it was not a great idea, but they said, "Well, if that is what you think we ought to do to protect the college, not for an investment return, then we should do it." So they confirmed an action already taken. We took Nelson out and put this huge plot of ground into the college endowment funds.

As we started then to think about the DHMC move, we said, "Well, we've got the land. We have already paid for it. It will do nothing but enhance the value of that land. More than that, it will free up the north end of the campus." So I went to John Kemeny and I said, "John. Here is a possible solution. You have worked with this problem. What do you think?" He said, "That's the craziest idea I have ever heard. We can't do that." He said, "Do you know how much it would cost?" John had all of the rationale and logic. I said, "Well, I don't see any practical alternative here."

So I went to the Lebanon [City] Council and the Hanover Council [Board of Selectmen], and I said, "If we relocated this complex from Hanover to Lebanon, what would your reaction be?" The Hanover Council said, "Good riddance. We don't care." That was not a smart thing for them to do because they lost a lot of business. Lebanon said, "Under certain conditions and if you do certain things and would commit to certain things, they would welcome it." I remember going over to the council in Lebanon and going through this whole plan with them.

We finally assembled a plan. Pag did a lot of this. We put the financing together and it was going to take a commitment by the college...we had to put \$25 million down to buy the old hospital. The faculty then said, "This is our decision. (The arts and science faculty.) We need to be part of this decision." This was at a time when my authority was not the strongest. I didn't have a lot of capital left, and so we had some really tough faculty meetings.

John Hennessey was great. He stood in there because he was representing the hospital and also had a voice on the faculty.

I had represented to Varnum [James "Jim" Varnum] that the college would support this whole thing if we could get the necessary approvals, both through the board and through the internal constituencies. So Varnum, on that assurance, bullied his board into taking the step. It was a big step for the hospital, too.

So finally...the last piece of capital that I had in my pot went out the door to get this thing done. I spent a lot of time with small faculty groups, trying to talk with them about why it made sense and all of that. I think most of them were convinced that the money that was going into this was coming right out of their salaries; that it would deplete the college. Frank Smallwood was very much against it. A number of people thought it was a crazy idea, but the more I lived with it and the more I dealt with the doctors...because the hospital and the clinic said, "You have to go sell this to the physicians."

So I was trying to sell it on that side and sell it to the faculty on the other side. Our board was reluctant. It looked like an enormous commitment. They said, "Why are we doing this because we are not a medical center. We are a college, a small undergraduate liberal arts college, and we are devoting all these resources to this. It is crazy." But Walter [Burke] was very good and a few others, and we got it through...a lot of grumbling and I think that was what probably sealed my fate finally as president. Anyway, we got it through and, if there is one thing for which I was prepared to give up years of being in Hanover, it was that decision.

It certainly was right. I felt it was right at the time and I was willing to fight for it; but, in a place like this, whether it be fraternities or something, unless you really believe in it and are prepared to go to the mat with it, it is very hard to get a major move done. John Kemeny did it with coeducation. He was just terrific. But, if he hadn't championed that, it just wouldn't have happened. I think the Hospital move was of similar magnitude.

CARROLL:

When you approached the faculty, one of the fears that they seemed to have, that the \$25 million was going to really deplete the arts and sciences budget for a long time. But Mr. Paganucci explained to me, at one point, how the financing of it actually...it never really affected their budget.

McLAUGHLIN: We didn't touch it.

CARROLL: I don't think they ever understood that to this day. I don't think they do.

McLAUGHLIN: No. I don't think they do because we did it with bonding and we got the bonding done under a provision that was at a very low rate and the income that came back from the arrangements, both from Lebanon and out of the medical center, covered the interest rate, so it was risk-free for the faculty.

CARROLL: That was the part that amazed me in his telling of the tale.

McLAUGHLIN: And that's his brilliance. He put it together and he did it very well.

CARROLL: I came across a fact that I thought was just wonderful. That was, in 1985, there had been a push in Black enrollment on this campus for undergraduates that brought the numbers up to 9%, which made Dartmouth the most of any Ivy League institution in terms of minority enrollment. Had that been your instigation and your desire?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, it had. There were a number of people that made it happen. I didn't do it alone, but it was a high priority. I thought, because of location and because we were more diverse with women on campus, that we were simply not representative of where mainstream American leadership was going to be.

The most successful thing that we did is that we held, during the enrollment period when people were trying to choose their college, we had special weekends here for Blacks. Ngina Lythcott was here as part of the dean's office and was very helpful. I can recall meeting with those groups and their parents. We funded them to come here. We bused them up from New York, from Boston, and put them up in the dorms. We put them up at the Inn and covered the whole expense. We got a grant from Ken Montgomery [Kenneth F. Montgomery '25] to support part of it. It was very successful because Dartmouth was not in a city and so it was not where they normally were going to go to look at institutions. I am glad we did it when we did it, because the competition then became increasingly more difficult for the kind of Black student that would qualify at Dartmouth under our standards. We didn't lower the standards at all. We really made sure that we were not going to

diminish standards. We really needed to attract the kind of students that we wanted.

CARROLL: I think it was a stroke of genius to bring the parents up.

McLAUGHLIN: It made all the difference in the world because I don't think people realize that within a lot of Black families, those who have a normal family structure create an environment for achievement.

CARROLL: Has it turned out, do you know, that those Dartmouth Black alums have gone out and recruited other candidates?

McLAUGHLIN: They have. We got them together and said, "You have got to help us with this." So the system perpetuated itself. I don't know what is being done today, but it was an effective marketing effort. A lot of parents helped us.

CARROLL: I'll bet. Amazing.

In 1986, then we have the Yukica [Joseph "Joe" Yukica] situation. Everyone always called it the Yukica situation. Do you want to talk about that a little bit?

McLAUGHLIN: Joe was a good friend. It was a situation where the director of athletics, Seaver Peters ['54], was also very close and supportive...but while Joe is a lovely man, he wasn't a very effective coach. The pressures for having a more successful football team were as evident then as today. It became fairly evident that the students weren't really getting the fulfillment and success they needed under Yukica. I went to Blackman [Robert "Bob" Blackman], who I knew well and asked him for his counsel or advice. He said, "I think he has got to go."

Seaver was not prepared to take the brunt of it. I mean, it is the same story that we had with Dennis Dinan. I said, "All right. Let's do this thing together and let's get him out." There were some contracts and Joe said, "I am not leaving." So it became more public and more difficult. We finally worked it through. But, again, I lost some capital over a situation where the president should not have been involved. So, it was my error. I put too much of myself into those kinds of situations, figuring that the students weren't getting the break they needed.

CARROLL: But what I don't understand though, is that here is a man with a losing record and, as kind and gentle and nice as he is, is not getting the job done. Where is his support coming from?

McLAUGHLIN: It came mainly from, I think, the athletic department.

CARROLL: So the colleagues who liked him. I see. Okay.

McLAUGHLIN: And the whole situation—John Kemeny talked about, but also John Dickey, was that the athletic department was a fiefdom of its own. It had its own budget, its own revenue sources. It had its own value system. John Dickey said, "I had to bring in Red Rolfe [Robert Abial Rolfe '31] from outside in order to really bring athletics back into the college in a way that was important." Seaver and all of his cronies from Pat and Mike's [Pat and Tony's General Store], if they are still there...

CARROLL: They are still there.

McLAUGHLIN: They thought they were independent of the rest of the place. My sense of what the athletics should be is that it was part of the undergraduate experience. You should be able to "walk on"—you should have freshman football. It doesn't matter whether everybody is getting recruited or not. What is important is that the mind, body and spirit experience be there and be reinforced. It wasn't just football. It was across the board.

It was very hard to get Seaver to believe that. We were classmates. So when that termination took place, it was the right thing for Dartmouth, but it was at a high personal cost. Again, all of these things get played back. In each case, it was trying to stand in and make the hard decisions for the college and, at times, they got a little messy. I did not visit Pat and Tony's store very much after that.

CARROLL: That's the nature of life, I suppose.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes—perhaps not necessarily so, but it was my sense of institutional responsibility!

CARROLL: At one point in '86, you made a speech where you talked about how the campus had become polarized. I was wondering if you could talk about that a little bit—what you saw as being the problems on campus.

McLAUGHLIN: Part of the problem was The Dartmouth Review. It was this right wing/left wing problem. The diversity we had created on campus wasn't being integrated into residential life. The Blacks were in one place. They lived down there together. They all ate together. There wasn't the sharing of experiences that should be part of the learning process on campus.

And the faculty, I didn't think, were an ally in trying to bring the place back together and really celebrate the kind of learning that goes on here and the strengths that Dartmouth has. I felt that they were part of the problem. They were polarized as well. A lot of the older faculty, whom I had known a long time, would come and say, "This isn't the same faculty. Our young colleagues aren't talking to the older ones. There is not the collegiality within the departments." The French department was taking on John Rassias, trying to rail him out of the campus at that time. The effort to remove John Rassias was led by the same David Sices who was a classmate of mine and who was the one who led the charge against me for malfeasance in office, or conduct in office, or whatever.

So it just seemed to me that it was a more unhappy place than it needed to be. There was a value system to Dartmouth that should prevail over the normal self-interest of individuals or groups.

CARROLL: You also said, in the same speech, that you thought there needed to be a new definition of Dartmouth's purpose. I thought that was a really wonderful kind of call. Did you have in your own mind an idea of what that new definition should be?

McLAUGHLIN: John Kemeny and I had defined it as educating men and women to make a positive difference in society. I didn't think that was wrong. I did think it was pretty general, but I thought that the purpose needed to include "What is a civil society?" and "How do you teach men and women, who are leaders, to be citizens within a civil society?" It was more in that vein. It was partly a reflection of what was taking place on campus. I mean, I would have taken anything that the faculty would want to define at that time, if they could just agree on something and had said, "This is really where Dartmouth ought to be going."

It was partly the result of my experience with admissions. I was becoming more persuaded that if part of the role of this college is to develop good citizens and good leaders, constructive men and

women who were going to contribute, then it wasn't just the smartest students who were going to do that. Students obviously had to be intellectually rigorous; but they had to have a special dimension of being able to evidence commitment, leadership, dedication and to apply it. The Phi Beta Kappas, when we brought them into the Society in the [President's] House, I always checked their S.A.T. scores and they were not necessarily the brightest students in that class. But they always had been the head of [the] band, captains of teams, leaders. They were achievers and they just kept on achieving.

So I started to work with Al Quirk [Alfred T. "Al" Quirk '49] and say, "Are we measuring the right things here?" That added a complication to Al's life that he didn't really want because SATs were a very easy measurement. You could deal with it. But I still to this day, think that we don't always measure the right things. We have become too preoccupied with the statistical intellectual achievement, but not personal achievement. They are not mutually exclusive.

CARROLL: The Tucker Foundation was working at Dartmouth at this time and they started this new program about providing administrative interest in the Peace Corps. Do you know how that came about? I think it is a fascinating add-on. [Peace Corps was brought to campus by the summer programs at Dartmouth, not the Tucker Foundation.]

McLAUGHLIN: No, I don't. I am trying to think where that did come from.

CARROLL: Dartmouth was the first college to do this.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. Great. And it was a good idea at the time. Doc Dey [Charles F. Dey '52], I think, was part of that dialogue. Whether he was champion of that idea, I don't know. It's a great idea. It wasn't mine. It was somebody else's.

CARROLL: One of the things that I wanted to talk about, too, is The Dartmouth Review. Although they were not founded in your term as president, they certainly did get their largest audience during your presidency. When you look at The Dartmouth Review, how would you characterize them?

McLAUGHLIN: They were bright. They were politically astute. They were basically cruel and there was nothing collegial about the group. They had a

single-purpose interest and it wasn't the college's interest. It was to promote a particular ideological position and to do it through any means that they wanted to use, whether they be moral or immoral.

They had enormous support within a large part of the alumni. We took the position that we should probably try to figure out how you bring them into this society as opposed to casting them out. It wasn't possible to do that with the crew that were here. I think those efforts to try to be inclusive, to break down the polarization of the place and to bring them in, were interpreted as a sympathetic view to The Review, which clearly I didn't have; but I also felt that we could have made the situation much worse by trying to man-handle them off of the campus, because they had just too many legal rights and financial strings to do that quickly. But they were not a positive force in any sense.

I think they started to peter out towards the end of my administration. It gave Jim Freedman a chance to do what I don't think he could have done if he had been there at the same time I was there, because of their relative strength. But, I think the extremes to which they went began to finally discredit them in the eyes of their supporters. But it took a long time.

CARROLL: Do you think they reflect at all the age or the time in which they were created? I mean, it was sort of the Reagan '80s and the conservative quality of so much of life?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it did. A lot of people associated with them because of the philosophy, but I don't think they understood just how negative a force and how really nasty these folks were. I mean, they would sit up for hours trying to contrive some way to be cute about how they did it, regardless of whose feelings they hurt. Jeffrey Hart ['51], and a number of other people, just fed that, because they didn't have any more concern for the college than they did.

It was really a very unfortunate thing. I don't know if it could have happened with the same impact anywhere else, at least within the Ivy League, because other groups like that existed at Princeton and other places, but, here they just got enormous visibility.

CARROLL: And financial support, which I think is the key to their longevity.

McLAUGHLIN: They were so well funded that they could have given away every newspaper they had. Also Dartmouth Review editors were offered

political futures when they left here. It became a fast track to fame and glory—but without any responsibility tied to it.

CARROLL: Under your time as president, part of what came out of the great fundraising was an incredible boost to faculty salaries. It goes up, at some point, on some levels to 33%. Why were the faculty not more grateful?

McLAUGHLIN: I guess you don't do that expecting gratitude. You probably can answer that better than I can. We were convinced that, if we were going to compete for the very best faculty and retain the faculty, we had to raise levels of compensation. We were going into a period of competitiveness. If you looked at the number of young people coming into the faculty ranks, and the needs of all the institutions for the really top-flight people, you had to be more competitive. We had fallen to the bottom side of the scales. So we made some fairly aggressive moves there.

I don't think they were appreciated by the faculty. I mean, it's not why we did it. We thought it was good for the institution.

[End of Tape 6, Side A – Beginning of Tape 6, Side B]

McLAUGHLIN: ...The faculty didn't want to be sidetracked by having to recognize the positive aspects of this. Anyway, it was the right thing to do. It was a difficult economic period because, on the one side, we were pushing tuition at very high rates. It was almost getting unproductive because we still had need-blind admission. Every time you raise tuition, why you raise the financial aid budget, so you don't realize as much of the increase as people think you would. But, to have held tuitions would have necessarily meant that you had to hold your salary structure. We couldn't do that and be competitive we didn't think. So we took the tuition increases as an offset on the salary side. I think it was probably all right. It didn't skew the student body too much.

CARROLL: No. It didn't seem to. The next thing went in and out of my mind. I'm so sorry.

There also is the Thayer School expansion at this time. A huge federal line item grant and all of this adding on to the Thayer School. Was it time to do that? Thayer School seems to have had a kind of a stagnant period. Then it seems to have gotten that

boost. Was that the thinking behind that or did they bring that to your attention?

MCLAUGHLIN: The Thayer School was getting to a point where it was almost sub-optimal in size, to be competitive and to be a first-class institution. We looked very hard at the option of bringing Thayer into the undergraduate college, and doing away with it as a separate professional school—to make it a department in the sciences. We looked at how we could accomplish that physically. We concluded, because arts and science said they really didn't want to incorporate it, that we then had to address Thayer as an independent professional school. To do that, it had to be a larger institution than it was.

Carl Long was part of that process and a number of others. We had to get a major grant to accomplish that. [New Hampshire Senator] Warren Rudman has been a good friend and somebody I had seen a lot and respected him, so I went to Warren and said, "We need some help here. UNH [University of New Hampshire] got a big grant. Can't Dartmouth get one?" So we worked it around and he put it as a rider in a bill. Getting a federal grant as a rider on a bill represented all of the things that I think are wrong. But we did it because we needed the money. [Laughter] Warren got it through. It was totally his. He was the architect. He was the one who put it together. He did it and he did it so well—it gave Thayer a platform to do what it is doing today. It really restored that place to health. I think we would have lost Thayer and a proud tradition and heritage if we hadn't made that move. It was either that or bring it back into the undergraduate side.

Several years later, we gave (Warren's daughter went to Tuck School, and I think it was the year she graduated) Warren an honorary degree [1987]. Here is this tough lawyer out of Concord. He stood up and as I read that citation, I looked at Warren and tears were streaming down his face. He said afterwards, "All my life, I have wanted a degree from Dartmouth. I have never told anybody. This is absolutely the proudest moment in my life." It was just heart-rending. When you go into his office, here is this honorary degree right on the wall.

CARROLL: What a great story. I like that. We covered most of the points I wanted to bring up. I wanted to ask you about your decision to retire when you did.

McLAUGHLIN: It was a decision that was certainly encouraged by the board. They didn't say that I had to leave, but there were scars from some contested trustee elections. The incumbents won, but not by as much as they felt they should have. I think they felt that part of their being put at risk was because of the contention on the campus and that it was my responsibility to have protected them from that. As we made the tough moves, all the way from the hospital on through, there was a price...and the board had become not the kind of board that it was when I first joined the trustees.

It was a board that represented interest groups. They had to have a certain number of minority on there and a certain number of faculty, so while it was a relatively cohesive board, it represented constituencies in a way that boards before never had. They were starting to get lobbied by their constituents. Lisle [Carleton Carter Jr. '45 HO '79] and Mike Heyman ['51], I know, were being lobbied by the faculty. Some of them were being lobbied by the alumni and some were being lobbied by...I don't know. They came from a lot of different directions.

So I looked at it and said to myself, "We've done the hospital. I could stay, but it is not going to get a lot better and, if you are going to serve the place well, then you ought to leave before getting too far behind the curve." I wasn't going to leave ahead of the curve, because I had already gone beyond that point. It was not an easy decision because I still felt very strongly about Dartmouth. I felt very strongly about everything that we had tried to do. But I knew it was the right time to go. So, when we met in Minary [Conference Center], I told the board that I had come to that conclusion.

I think that there was a sigh of relief from the board that they didn't have to fire me. It was Kerr who said, "I leave the same way that I arrived. Fired with enthusiasm." [Laughter] I thought probably there was a lot to that. So it was my decision, but it was certainly one that, I think, was the sentiment of the board, the majority of the board at the time. Not all of it. I think it was right. As I look back, I had used my capital. I didn't have any left. Some of it was not used as well as it should be. Some of it was great. So, that's the way it is.

CARROLL: How hard is it to go from one day hearing everything about the institution and having it pass through your hands, knowing everything, to being on the outside?

McLAUGHLIN: It is difficult because you always want to relive it. It is exactly why presidents and chief executive officers should never stay on the board when they leave, because, inevitably, places like this should change. With the presidents coming to Dartmouth, there has been the wonderful institutional ability to have complementary styles and aptitudes. John Kemeny was quite different than John Dickey. I was different than Kemeny. Freedman was very different in orientation from me. I am sure that Jim's successor will be different in the same sense. But it is hard when you leave, because you never leave if you love the institution. A good bit of you is still there. But, if you believe in the institution and you believe in the presidency, then you know that you have got to walk away from it at some point and just leave it.

CARROLL: Is there anything else that you wanted to cover?

McLAUGHLIN: Not today. I would like a session to talk about general principles of where I think governance is...

CARROLL: I would be glad to do that.

McLAUGHLIN: It would span a lot of different things that we have already covered.

CARROLL: Okay.

McLAUGHLIN: We will do it another time.

END OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW: David McLaughlin '54 TU '55, President Emeritus

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: December 10, 1997

CARROLL: Today is December 10, 1997, and I am speaking, once again, with President Emeritus David McLaughlin.

We were talking sort of in a very strict chronological fashion about your time here at Dartmouth, and I thought we'd take a chance to talk in general some about the institution and some of your thoughts looking back. You had mentioned starting with the role of the trustees and how they work at this institution. Would you like to talk to that?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I think the role of the trustees at Dartmouth is perhaps different than the role of most trustees at other institutions. It is a very small board and there is always the debate about should it be a bigger board or a smaller board. That debate is going on again right now. But there is real value in having a small board that is committed and has real ownership of what the institution is and its future.

When I came on the board, and then when I was subsequently chairing the board, I was impressed by the quality of the people who were trustees at the time. There was Ralph Lazarus ['35], who ran Federated [Department Stores]. There was Dick Hill [Richard D. Hill '41], who ran the First National Bank of Boston. There was Lloyd Brace ['25]. Harvey Hood [II '18] had left the board, but was still very much present. There was Charlie Zimmerman [Charles Zimmerman '23], who ran Connecticut Mutual [Insurance]. Bill Andres [F. William Andres '29], who was an attorney and a classmate of John Dickey, but very strong in his own right. This was a board who really had a sense of the future of Dartmouth. They knew it. They knew the issues. They knew governance. They knew how to act on a board. They didn't get pressured by the constituencies on campus. They looked down the road and tried to say, "What are the strategic options for Dartmouth in the future and

how do we work towards making that possible?" It was really a very outstanding board.

It was a board, essentially, that made the hard decision to go coeducational. That took a lot of courage, but the board was supremely confident in itself to be able to deal with these issues because they had dealt with issues much bigger than that in their private lives. Bill Morton [William H. Morton '32], who ran American Express, was on that board. It was a very good board.

But, unfortunately, in an effort to try to make the board more representative (and I think that can be a mistake) they put in a set of procedures, as I was leaving the presidency, that, I think, diluted or prevented the ability to select a board that was of the quality of the board that was there when I first joined it. The alumni now have a ballot and they vote for a number...three or four candidates. When that process was put in place, I went to the chairman at that time and said, "I think this is a real mistake." I went back and I talked to Lazarus and Hill and some of the others who are still alive at that time and said, "Would you have run if you had to be put into a national election?" They said, "No way." I mean, they didn't need it. When asked to be a trustee, they did it out of love for the institution; but they were not prepared to go into a political popularity contest to find out whether they would be elected or not.

So I think that the board today is probably as weak a board as I have seen. Individually, they are lovely people, but three of them come out of the media industry. They have no sense of what governance is, or a sense of what this kind of a place should be. The trustees are not a position to have on-the-job training. They ought to come to be able to contribute, especially with a small board. I think that the whole method of selecting trustees is wrong-headed at the present time, and that the quality of the board reflects it. How you get back, I don't know. It is very tough to unwind one of those things.

Harvard is run by a five or six person governance committee. Hannah Gray, who I know very well, is on that committee. She obviously didn't go to Harvard. She got her Ph.D. there, her graduate degree. But they meet twice a month and it is almost a full-time job. But they really intensely, and in a very undemocratic way, go about making the hard decisions on where Harvard is going to be in the future. Now they have a number of other boards that are there at the university, but the core for the decision-making

body is very small. I think (it sounds awful to say) that you can be too democratic in your governance system, and in doing so I think we have diluted the qualities of the trustees that I think are important.

CARROLL: Do you think that the people who are on the board now tend to be younger than in the past and have less experience?

McLAUGHLIN: It's not so much age anymore. At Aspen [The Aspen Institute], we run a program focused on people in their late thirties or early forties, and they have enormous accomplishment. They are really good people. So it isn't so much age; but it is experience. You want to take people who have been in a system, on a board, where they understand what the role of a trustee is. You don't want somebody coming on the board who is representative of a particular constituency, a single-interest group. When John Steel came on representing the conservative alumni, he felt committed to his constituency to take their viewpoint. He was less effective than he should have been. John is a very able guy. I have known him a long, long time; but, when you are part of a single-interest, special interest group, it is just very hard to function in the breadth that this board needs, given the vision and future of Dartmouth.

CARROLL: Do you think that there is a problem now in the way in which people are elected, that it becomes a popularity contest?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. At one point, charter trustees were appointed using a different criteria than today. These were appointed by the board. You would reach out and take a Ralph Lazarus. You would take some of the best leaders in the country who were related to Dartmouth. But then, in the '70s and '80s, it started to change, so that the charter seats were there to select a woman, to select a Black, select somebody that the alumni probably wouldn't have elected through the alumni system. I can't say that I think that having diversity on the board is bad. Obviously, it is very good. But the system didn't reach for the very best in those categories. So we diluted and weakened the board along the way.

CARROLL: Dartmouth has always had a tradition of their trustees being alumni from Dartmouth, where Harvard does not always.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes.

CARROLL: I wonder what would be the pros and cons of branching out in other directions.

McLAUGHLIN: I think it is fine to branch out. As a matter of fact, I think Sally Frechette [Priscilla Frechette Maynard] was not an alum.

CARROLL: No, but she was the wife and mother of alums.

McLAUGHLIN: She was related. But I don't think you have to be Dartmouth people necessarily at all. That isn't the issue for me. I think that it's important that they know what undergraduate liberal arts education is about, through their own experience, whether it is at Williams or Amherst or someplace else. But I don't feel, because they are alumni, that makes them any smarter or more attached to the college than anybody else would be.

CARROLL: Do you think that other alums would feel that way?

McLAUGHLIN: I think if you had a majority of the board that was not Dartmouth alumni, you would have a reaction. I don't think there would be any reaction, right now, to including some prominent non-Dartmouth leaders on the board. The people I talk to within the broader Dartmouth family are so disillusioned about this board—so despairing of its quality. The board has lost its critical role of being a respected, leading element that is making decisions that people can buy into for the future of the college.

CARROLL: And has the nature of the chairman then changed with this change in the board?

McLAUGHLIN: The nature of the chairman really depends on the nature of the president, to a very large extent. When John Dickey was president, and I think Lloyd Brace and Charlie Zimmerman were chairing the board. John was a very strong president and the chairman, therefore, was in a much more supportive role. Plus there wasn't a lot of fundraising going on at that time.

When John Kemeny came in, John and I had a particularly strong partnership that John defined. It wasn't for me to define. He defined it. He defined it around the grounds that he had a board that was not necessarily supportive of him. A lot of that board was a Dickey board. There was a lot of contention on the board. There were some meetings early on when I joined the board as to whether they should terminate John Kemeny early in his term. I took the

position that that would be an enormous mistake. So John was a realist, among all other things, and so we worked together to bring the board around. I spent an incredible amount of time working with individual board members, and then working with John. We worked with the core of our board who understood good governance. There was Lazarus and Hill and Morton. We were a committee for John Kemeny to talk about his personal issues, his organizational issues and the other things on his mind, because this was not a strong period for John Kemeny. John was confident enough, though, that he could rely on trustee counsel without putting himself at risk; it was a very unique relationship, but defined by the president and the chairman, with the president's lead.

This board, if I understand it, from what I can tell, is much more involved now in the day-to-day decision-making of the institution. It does things that would not have taken place on my watch. I think that they are inappropriately involved in areas where they really don't understand what they are doing. You can't understand it unless you are sitting in that Parkhurst Hall office. Jim Freedman, I think, is very comfortable with this. He isn't one that really likes a lot of controversy, so he will keep his distance from issues that are of this nature, and will put the board into some of those slots where the board should not assume that role.

There really is no one answer, but the board [members] are the ultimate owners of the institution. They protect the legacy and the quality and everything else. If immersed in too much detail, they really lose their way.

CARROLL: I am curious...I want to go back just a little bit. You said that you had the role, when you became chairman, of helping to persuade people to accept John Kemeny, really. I am wondering, here are all these men who are so powerful, secure, sure of themselves, how do you go about persuading them to change their mind?

McLAUGHLIN: To get them to appreciate John's strengths, look at his agenda. Focus on the agenda as opposed to the personality. John had a pretty aggressive agenda. There were some pretty tough decisions that had to be made...coeducation, year-around operation. We got the board to focus on those things that were really important to John Kemeny and to Dartmouth. If they weren't important to Dartmouth but they were important to John, to work with John and say, "Let's not pursue that one because it is not going to make a difference." So it just took a lot of handholding.

CARROLL: What were the issues that you had to persuade John Kemeny not to pursue?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, I think at one time he wanted to manage the endowment in a different way. John could look at the mathematical formulas and say, "If you were all in bonds, you would know what you are going to get at the end of the day."

CARROLL: Right.

McLAUGHLIN: So he started down a road to convince everybody that bonds were the only investment that we were going to have. We had to say, "John. This isn't what we are going to do. You have got to back off of this."

Another time, he wanted to reorganize the college. That was when his problem with Leonard Rieser was prevalent and we had to step in and say, "We don't think that's good for you and we don't think it is necessarily good for Dartmouth."

There was a lot of contention about the Indian symbol. That's one where we said, you know, the president is right and we will support him. If you can't support him fairly consistently on issues, you should leave the board because the institution's credibility is at stake. You should never undercut the credibility of the president. Whether you agree or don't agree, you simply can't do that because the president has to live on the campus every day, and the trustees don't and shouldn't. If the trustees have an agenda that is different than the campus, the president can get caught in the middle of it and it can be, you know, very difficult. Trustees can and should challenge proposals through the process of civil dialogue.

CARROLL: How would you rate the chairmen who worked with you when you were president?

McLAUGHLIN: Dick Hill was a superb chairman. He was really good. Walter [Burke] was as lovely a man as you can imagine, but he really didn't know how to chair a board. The board ran away from him on various occasions, and it was not a great partnership. I think he always felt bad about it, but I don't think he really understood what a chairman was to do. Walter has given away a lot of money to Dartmouth, and is very supportive of many projects, but he had never really run anything. Even at Fairchild [Sherman Fairchild

Foundation] he didn't really run anything. We probably both felt that it was a disappointing partnership in many ways.

Sandy [Norman E. "Sandy" McCulloch Jr. '50] was a different chairman in that he had his own personal problems. He was an alcoholic and at one point I committed him into an alcohol center at his family's request, so there was a relationship that was awkward...not entirely awkward...it was a close relationship. It wasn't a matter of Sandy trying to be a good chairman. He was trying to get his own confidence back. You don't use the chairmanship to do personality development and personal rehabilitation. It was a very fragile time. So I can't say that on balance he was a great chairman.

By the same hand, I can't say that I was a great president either to work with [Laughter] because I was quite hands-on. I felt strongly about issues and respected the board's right, obviously always. But Dick Hill and I got along fine because he had run a corporation and he understood what was a good governance system.

CARROLL: In speaking to you and in speaking to Paul Paganucci, both of you have very strong business backgrounds. You both have spoken about the frustration level of trying to work in the decision-making process within the academic community, which grinds so slowly. There is no doubt. Can you see, looking back on that, things that could be done differently to hurry it along or must one just accept that this is the way that an academic institution works?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it is both. I think you can make the process more effective. When we did the hospital move, it was done at, by academic standards, a fairly accelerated pace. One thing that I think you can do is, to not have too complex an agenda. You can't have six things that you're trying to do at once. You have got to say [this is the one]. John Kemeny did this with coeducation; we essentially did it with the hospital. That is the most important thing you can do, because the system, an academic system, is process-driven and it cannot get overloaded. It just falls apart when it gets overloaded. Jim Wright, I think, found out when he was dealing with CYRO [Committee on Year Round Operations]. This committee was charged with looking at the calendar, faculty schedules, cohesiveness, and all the rest.

CARROLL: The curriculum.

McLAUGHLIN: ...and, at the same time, we were assimilating coeducation and there were a lot of other things going on. The faculty just threw up their hands and said, "We don't want any part of that." For all the good work that Jim did and was finally adopted later, he was very frustrated because it didn't go through when presented. I think it was an overload problem at the time. I do think you have got to keep your agenda fairly straightforward so that people can look at it, understand it and then cultivate support around it to get people to buy into it. You can't do too much at one time.

CARROLL: It's a slow process.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. It is a slow process. It is a good process; but, if you try to hurry it, sometimes you get a backlash that becomes much more negative.

CARROLL: Does the very process and the fact that it takes so long mean that people with a lot of energy and a lot of drive are ground up doing it?

McLAUGHLIN: I think their tenures are shorter. [Laughter] No. I think they are. I go back to my chart...you use your capital faster when you try to hasten, when you try to move this system faster, you start to move down the line faster.

CARROLL: I was wondering...when you were just looking back...I want to ask two things. Looking back upon your presidency here, what are you most proud of?

McLAUGHLIN: Probably the medical center move. I think that that will have a positive influence on the institution in the long term. I don't have a doubt that freeing up the whole north end of the campus, moving that hospital and the medical school and the medical center out of Hanover will probably influence Dartmouth more positively than anything else that was done during that period. That probably was the high point.

CARROLL: If the north had not been freed up...the northern part of campus... where would they have expanded?

McLAUGHLIN: At one time, they looked at expanding the hospital to where the golf course is. That was a possibility. I'll bet you there were twenty different models of how you could shoehorn the hospital into limited space and do various things with it; but none of them made sense.

When I look at what is out there now and if you transpose that back to the footprint of the old hospital, you just couldn't do it.

CARROLL: You couldn't. It would just take up more space than they ever would have.

McLAUGHLIN: So that was probably the most important thing and, over time, it will be great for Dartmouth.

CARROLL: Oh, I think it is starting to be praised more freely. What about your life, if you look back over your life up to this point, what are you most proud of?

McLAUGHLIN: Oh, I don't know...

CARROLL: That's a hard one.

McLAUGHLIN: I have enjoyed every career I have had. The decision that was probably the most difficult (because I left Toro at a time when I really didn't want to leave it; it was coming out of a difficult financial period) was when I came to Dartmouth and yet it was probably the one set of experiences that still means the most to me. So, as difficult as they were, I still think it was right. I would do it again in a minute, despite all of the pain and the pressure. I would have done some things differently.

CARROLL: What would you have done differently?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, we didn't handle the shanty situation as well as we should have. It became much more politicized and the process began to run the institution as opposed to the president's leadership. We were reactive—not proactive. We should have defined the ground rules more specifically. That was a disappointment; but I think on balance, it was fine.

But going back to the governance issue, in thinking (and I have had a lot of time to reflect, both at Dartmouth and then at Aspen) and standing back to look at non-profit institutions and how they changed as society is changing. It is impressive to me that almost every major institution, the church, the government even, certain corporations, have had to change their structure rather considerably to deal with the global world, to deal with technology, deal with economic realities that are taking place.

The one institution that hasn't changed is higher education. It simply is done pretty much the same way that it's always been done. It is not efficient. If you just extrapolate the rate of inflation of tuition to where it will be in fifteen to twenty years, it is going to be frightening what it will cost to attend an Ivy institution. There is no concerted effort to really take apart the institution and say, "When a student matriculates, what should that student's experience be? What should that student learn when he or she goes out the door in terms of mental growth, in terms of intellectual curiosity, in terms of leadership development...whatever those criteria should be." Really do almost a bottoms up re-look at the institution and say, "How can you position this place so that it is responding to what is required to be a leader in the next century."

I don't say this just about Dartmouth. I say this generally about higher education because it has to be more productive. I don't mean to put it in business terms; but it does have to be competitive...competitive for the dollar, competitive for people's time. When somebody takes four years out of their life and comes to an institution, it isn't to be socially acceptable. They have got to grow geometrically in that period, and come out with the potential to be great leaders and very solid citizens—people who are going to contribute. They ought to contribute in all different walks of life and they ought to contribute from all different political viewpoints and whatever it may be.

I am not trying to stereotype a Dartmouth alumnus; but trustees do need to re-look at this. Is this place doing what it should do and are we spending the resources of the institution in the best manner to achieve our outcomes? I look at the number of courses that are offered here and that is a reflection of the faculty interest in having a course, as opposed to, "Does the student really need to have that course?"

I look at the whole merit system, or lack of merit system, in terms of rewarding great faculty and making it so attractive for really good faculty to come here and grow and develop. We worried at Dartmouth at the time I was here, I am sure they do now, about how do you recruit great young faculty into the system? How do you keep energizing the place with bright minds and a faculty that is committed to teaching? There are certain things that you do. You put a lot more resources into the faculty, probably in their training and development, and there is plenty of money in the system to do it, if you just stop the proliferation of courses and the complexity of

the process. The academic budgets are a maze and I defy anybody [to truly understand] because they won't let anybody look at them—so you never really get at them.

CARROLL: They are all mini-corporations.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. I just think there is a lot that can be done. The whole interdisciplinary development that goes on here, because that's what life is today. That will require collegiality in the faculty that is sometimes lacking. There is an enormous opportunity for higher education generally to readdress itself to these issues and to look at where it should go.

CARROLL: And does liberal arts continue to have a role, do you think, in a world that is increasingly scientific and technical?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it is even more important. The whole message and vision or purpose of Aspen was to take people who had specialized all their lives and finally, at too late an age, start to give them a liberal arts background...Plato, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau. And we should do that here.

They will have plenty of opportunities to specialize; but they don't have plenty of opportunities to get the broad-based system of values and intellectual curiosity and learning that goes on here. And they learn it. Students don't get it from the courses. They get it from the faculty.

I think I mentioned it. I used to advise a lot of students. I would say, "Identify the very best faculty you can find, and go and get their courses because it doesn't matter if this is a subject that you don't even like. Go with the faculty." The religion department is a great department...was...I don't know if it still is. Probably still is. Boy, I would advise anyone to become a major in religion just because they are going to get immersed with the joy of learning. It is just great.

CARROLL: And being confronted with ideas that make you think.

McLAUGHLIN: That's right. So you don't lose that dynamic when you are engaged in other pursuits. As a matter of fact, you enhance it; but you don't continue to invest in the status quo when it is not necessarily responding to what the college is going to need to do in the future.

CARROLL: This institution is constantly changing. That's the nature of a college, but often times in a slow fashion, I think we would have to say. What directions do you think that it should take in the future? What is going to be needed?

McLAUGHLIN: Well, you don't add to your base. Dartmouth is different in that it really is a university within a college and I wouldn't see a law school coming in here. I wouldn't see more professional schools being developed necessarily. Thayer has a great opportunity to take technology and deal with it. Tuck has a great tradition in the liberal arts and business education and management.

I worry that the medical center needs to be put into perspective with the college. When I look at Duke and I look at a number of other institutions, like Johns Hopkins, the medical center is much larger than the basic undergraduate program budgets. It could happen here. It doesn't have to happen here. It depends on how you structure the medical center and the college hasn't stepped up to that. Jim Wright and I have spent some time talking about it. I would hope that the president and provost would lead the college to take a very strong leadership role in defining what that medical center needs to be in the future, what the college's role should be. It may mean separating it and giving them some land as part of the process so that the college doesn't get immersed into the governance of the medical center as opposed to being separate and apart. That's what worries me down the road—the dominance of DHMC to distract Dartmouth from its mission.

There will be more interdisciplinary work within the undergraduate side. There will be a whole redefinition of what the fraternity/social life system should be. It doesn't mean that you are going to get rid of the fraternities; but it does mean that they have got to be totally redefined, and play a different role within the college....

[End of Tape 7, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 7, Side B]

McLAUGHLIN: I think every fraternity corporation that I know, [would respond] if you have a rational plan that didn't say, "Our whole intent is to get rid of you." But it is to redefine the system and to make sure that these are healthy, intellectually vibrant places. Certainly they have a social function and they have a leadership function; but they have to have an intellectual component. You probably can't do that unless you take control of that system.

CARROLL: So holding the physical plant allows you to have the kind of control needed.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, to some extent, because then you would bring those fraternity corporations into the residential system and buy into what Dartmouth is about.

CARROLL: And then they would lease from the college. That's clever.

McLAUGHLIN: The college then might do all the maintenance and charge it back into the system.

CARROLL: Has that idea ever been circulated?

McLAUGHLIN: We started to look at it. It would take some money, which is fine because somebody is going to have to invest that money. But, at that stage, why we had too much on our plate. We just couldn't do it all. I don't think the cluster idea, which has certain attractions is really going to be the answer. I know that they have great hopes for it. It is better than nothing because it does bring faculty into a different environment with the students. It's not just in the classrooms. But it is not easy in a place like this—it is too structured.

CARROLL: Part of the problem I think when I look at this, and I want to know what your read would be, is the fact of the Dartmouth Plan and the fact that students move from dorm to dorm to dorm from term to term. There is not that orientation or identification with place. Could that be changed at all?

McLAUGHLIN: Yes, I think it could. Jim Wright and I discussed at one point what it would cost to go off the Dartmouth Plan. If you looked at redefining your fraternity/social system, your residential college experience outside the classroom and you did that in the context of also looking at the Dartmouth Plan, it would cost some money to build some dormitories and do some other things; but I think that money is available. I think you could do that. So you are right in that the Dartmouth Plan is a divisive kind of...you know, it does break down the solidarity of the place. It has some wonderful attributes to it, too.

CARROLL: Yes.

McLAUGHLIN: There is a positive side but you need to look at the whole thing.

I suggested once to Jim Freedman that he really ought to (if he was going to stay longer, which he decided he was not going to do) put a commission together, not just of the deans, but bring in some really thoughtful people and take a hard look at the Dartmouth Plan, what an optimum calendar would look like and what it would cost. But, if you did that and had the faculty support, you could really think about it and work on it. You could come up with some very innovative ideas and some great solutions. I would hope that the next president would do that.

CARROLL: That brings us sort of to talk about the nature of the presidency here at Dartmouth. How would you define it as opposed to perhaps some other institutions?

McLAUGHLIN: Dartmouth is certainly different from a major research university because it is very much of a hands-on education. The president should be on this campus and should understand the issues and feel the temper of it. One of the great complaints that I heard about John Kemeny, but I hear more so about Jim Freedman, is that he is invisible. Students don't see him. He is not around and that is not my view of the job. This is a place where you put your arms around it and you care for it. You can care for it too much, and you can put your arms around it too tightly; but you really need to be here and understand the temper of it--not just from a student's standpoint, but more so from a faculty standpoint.

So the president needs to understand the nature of liberal arts education and generally in a place that is like Dartmouth. A person who graduated from a place like this or has taught in a place like this or has been involved with it. But the tendency of the past, because nobody wanted to take faculty members as presidents, they all went to deans of law schools. In the Ivy League, at one point or another, the presidents had almost all been deans of law schools. That model of the presidency is changing.

I don't know where the next president should come from or his background, but I do know that that person has got to have had intimate exposure to what liberal arts education is, and hopefully had an exposure to what the role of education or major institutional development in society is, so that they are not myopic and bring an experience that is much broader. It is not going to be easy to find that person. I would hope that that next president would have a

good ten to twelve years to be on the scene and to deal with the issues.

It's complex. The structure of Dartmouth fosters a certain contentiousness. You have some departments with Ph.D. programs. You have some professional schools. You have all of this going on and yet the core of Dartmouth...it is still the undergraduate program. We were criticized soundly because we spent so much time on the medical center. It wasn't that the medical center was more important than the undergraduate side. It was that, if you didn't move the medical center from where it was, you wouldn't have an undergraduate program of the quality that you needed here in the future.

CARROLL: Dartmouth has this mix that is alumni, faculty and students, which I assume that any institution has. They each have their own agendas. How do you get them to work together here?

McLAUGHLIN: You go to the alumni. We did it certainly when I was here, and it wasn't to involve them in the intellectual side of the place. It was to raise money for a common cause. No matter how you did it, you were bringing them into the college so that they were more inclined to give money to Dartmouth. I think that we missed some opportunities to really bring them back to celebrate with the faculty and the students without making it a fundraising event. To do that, not in groups of a thousand or five hundred, but to bring them back in some programmatic way so that they are immersed into what the place is. Because the faculty could learn from some of our alumni if you get the right mix of people. I know that the alumni could have learned from the faculty and would look at Dartmouth differently.

This is not a large undertaking. If you took, over the course of two or three years, a hundred alumni a year and somehow immersed them into the college, you would soon have three, four hundred leaders out there who appreciated Dartmouth more fully. That has a big wave effect within the alumni organization and I think it could help the institution as well. It has to be structured in a time sensitive manner but it could be effective.

I haven't really thought through how you would accomplish all of that, but I do know that you don't do it with only fundraising as the goal. I think you do it by trying to get cross-education going on and an appreciation of what it is about.

The students, I think, find their own way. You need to give them opportunities, but they are bright enough that they are going to do what they need to do. They respond to a strong faculty member. I observed John Rassias this fall, and [Vincent] Starzinger used to have the same kind of an effect. Great faculty. I mean, the students just flocked to them. That's what makes it so terrific and, if I had to spend money around here, I would spend it to bring in more of that kind of faculty at senior levels or mid-levels or whatever it takes.

CARROLL: Do you think that there are being made in graduate schools today the kind of scholar-teacher-professors that one needs here today?

McLAUGHLIN: Probably less so today. One, because the opportunities for these people are not as great as they used to be, so you don't really get necessarily always the best and the brightest gravitating in that direction. But they are out there. We are not trying to hire a thousand people. If we got ten to twenty good people a year in here...and there are people out there...[Robert J.] Fogelin was a faculty member at Yale and he came to Dartmouth during my term here. We had a long conversation and he said, "I wanted to come to Dartmouth because I want to teach." He said, "There are not very many places that really celebrate teaching and do it and really mean it. Princeton is one and Dartmouth is one." So you can get some really good teachers who are also good scholars. I don't think they are mutually exclusive at all.

CARROLL: They don't have to be.

McLAUGHLIN: You are right. You would be in a better position to know this than I would.

CARROLL: I mean, in graduate schools today, so much of the emphasis is on producing scholarship for the field rather than teaching in the classroom. I think it is almost something you learn on the job, rather than before.

McLAUGHLIN: That reinforces the fact that Dartmouth should be spending more money taking incoming junior faculty and helping them learn how to teach. You are not born with it—it is part of it, I expect, but you can also learn it.

CARROLL: Exactly. There used to be a mentoring program here that has sort of petered out a little bit. I am hoping that they are going to revive that. It was very helpful when you came here.

The presidency, itself, can be, as you say, a high profile or a low profile institution. No matter what they do, they have to be a fundraiser. How important is that today at a university?

McLAUGHLIN: It is important. Dartmouth is not well endowed even with the terrific performance that Lyn Hutton has done with the endowment. It has crossed a billion dollars, which is terrific, but it probably ought to be close to the two billion—you always want to mitigate against unforeseen costs. You have to address the operating side of the institution and start to redefine its cost structure without giving up the quality of what the college is delivering. Or you have to have an endowment that is significantly larger so that you can afford the luxury of having the kind of inefficiencies that are ingrained in, even more than they should be, in the institution. It is probably somewhere in between.

So fundraising will follow a rational reason for giving. It follows emotion, but also Dartmouth must take the lead in redefining what liberal arts education is in the decades ahead. If it had a really exciting initiative that needed to be implemented, the funding is out there. I have not a doubt. There is tons of money out there. It won't come because people sentimentally think that Dartmouth deserves it because they went here. I think donors need to have a reason to give.

The presidency needs to lead the institution in shaping the initiatives that will make that possible. The alumni, interestingly, supported strongly, financially, coeducation. There were a number of dissidents. John [Kemeny] made a great case as to why that financial support was needed to go year-round and to do the things that were necessary for that. John Dickey got a lot of funding for the Great Issues course because people could understand it and it was part of what Dartmouth was. It was a great initiative. I think that the money is there. Redefining this whole north campus...if you tied in a program on what fraternities should be, year-round operation, what the core curricular strengths of Dartmouth in a redefined liberal arts program should be, both for faculty as well as students...if you have a vision of the future, it is going to cost a lot of money. The president has to lead that. He has to rationalize it. People want to deal with the president when they are going to give

a multi-million dollar gift--and they should. The president has got to lead. It isn't just a matter of going out with a tin cup; but it is defining the programs that are Dartmouth and then selling those to the community and the foundations and those people that have to fund it.

CARROLL: When you have a president who is outgoing as Freedman is, is there naturally a dip in giving because no one wants to sort of give to a president who is a lame duck and then, of course, there is a kind of a slow rise when there is a new president as they get to know him?

McLAUGHLIN: I think to some extent that is true. When I was taking on the presidency, John Kemeny and I reviewed many things. It was in the transition. One day, John came and gave me a long list of people and he said, "These are people who have a lot of money and they all hate me." [Laughter] He said, "They are all going to give right now because I am going out the door." And about three-quarters of them did. [Laughter]

CARROLL: Oh, my gosh. That's a wonderful story!

McLAUGHLIN: I started to prepare a list for Jim Freedman. He said he really wasn't interested in fundraising. Nobody will stop giving to the alumni fund; but, if there was a major new building going up or planned to go up, I don't think you would get someone to give to it unless the donor knew it was important to the next president. A good example was Walter Burke. I was retiring when he said, "I really want to hold my final decision until I can talk with your successor." I said, "That is exactly what you should do." It is natural.

CARROLL: Who are the good presidents, college presidents, university presidents, out there today in your opinion?

McLAUGHLIN: I am really not as close to that. I thought Bill Bowen was a very good president at Princeton and I think [Harold] Shapiro is doing a very good job there. Certainly Vartan Gregorian did a good job at Brown. He has moved on now and I don't know his successor. I thought Frank [H.T. Rhodes] at Cornell was excellent. He was there for a long time. He did a very good job. I thought one of the best presidents I knew, who grew to dislike the job intensely, was [A. Bartlett] Giamatti.

CARROLL: Oh, really.

McLAUGHLIN: He was quick. He was innovative. He was passionate about what he was doing; but he was ground up by the system and really became disillusioned. That's why he resigned when he did and took over the baseball commission. But they were almost all good. But I don't know today who is at Williams and Brown and the Ivy group.

CARROLL: What makes a good president?

McLAUGHLIN: Probably the ability to lead. Each of those people, though they were not uniformly liked, were uniformly respected for having a vision of their institution, and the ability to lead constituencies who wanted to share that vision and then to make it possible.

CARROLL: What do you think we need, or what should they be looking for in the search committee for the next president of Dartmouth?

McLAUGHLIN: When I went through the interviewing process when I was being considered, the question is, "What do you see as the future of Dartmouth? Where do you think education is going?" I always thought that it was the reverse process. The board should have been saying, "These are the criteria that we think are important for this institution. We own it. We ought to define what kind of people we want." Really. They ought to have thought through carefully enough with the faculty and the constituencies on campus, where are the priorities for this place down the road. They shouldn't bring in a president and expect him to define what is their responsibility to do.

When Jim Wright and I talked about whether he should be a candidate or not, I said, "You should wait until the board decides what they want. If they have got a model of what they think is needed to fulfill the next ten years of this college's future, what its opportunities are, and if that model doesn't fit you, I wouldn't try and do that." But I said, "If it does, then surely you should be a candidate."

The board has got to do something first before the president can say, "This is what I think the place ought to look like." I do think all the things we have talked about are going to be important. Being able to help define the value of a residential college, what learning in a residential institution is...that is a big challenge for the next

president. Really looking at the whole structure of the college is going to be important. Taking some resources out of what we now do and recycling those into faculty development, teacher development. Not trying to cut tuition, but slowing the growth of tuition to a reasonable level will be increasingly important. There is a lot of strategic work that needs to go on. But the board has got to say, "These are important things to us." Unless the trustees stand up...and I worry because my sense is that this board hasn't got the faintest idea of where they want to go.

CARROLL: For the last thirty years at this institution, there has been a burgeoning of administrative positions. Is that necessary, do you think, in this day and age to have so many administrators?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I don't. When I went to Aspen, we did a lot of benchmarking, not just with similar institutions, but a whole series of organizations, and concluded that the administrative cost shouldn't be more than 12% of our revenues. It was around 20%, so we cut it down. I don't know what it should be for a place like this; but I do know that the more layers you construct, the more you lose the quality of what Dartmouth is because you lose that personal relationship.

It is easy to justify more positions but I think a reexamination should be part of this overhaul—of really looking at the institution and saying, "What are we trying to do at the end of the day? What do we want students to learn? What kind of people do we want coming in? What do we want to give them as they are going out? What is the value of what we are adding to this process?" Then that would have to be very much a part of this look.

When corporate America downsized, they took out layers and layers of middle management and found that they were much more effective, not just efficient, but much more effective because there was a stronger unit with a common sense of values. Aspen took a role in this...trying to get the people at the bottom of the organization and the people at the top to share the same values. Now there was nothing in the middle to interfere in the translation of those values. We have the same vision of this place. We all believe in it and we don't have to go through ten different redefinitions as you traverse the middle bureaucracy to get there. So there is not just an economic reason to cut the bureaucracy. There is a very strong institutional reason to consolidate.

That would not be easy to do unless you do it in the context of a much broader redefinition of what the college is today. That really is too bad. The board should be leading this kind of initiative. It should have preceded the selection process for the next president but it just didn't happen.

CARROLL: This is perhaps a little more specific than we have been, but I look at this board right now and we have a chair who is going off to be an ambassador to Korea [Stephen W. Bosworth '61]. How is he going to be chair when he is ambassador to Korea?

McLAUGHLIN: I don't think he can. I have told him that. At first, he wasn't sure he was going to get confirmed, so I can understand that. But he is now confirmed and the problem is, he said, "Well, I don't know who would be good to succeed me in the chair."

CARROLL: That is an awful statement.

McLAUGHLIN: Yes. It really is. Bill King [William King '63] is chairing the presidential search committee. He is a terrific guy and I am not unhappy because I think he is not going to come with a preconceived view of what the presidency should be. He is going to have an enormous learning curve, politically, to get everybody on board, to get a consensus. They could say they want a small search committee and they could say they only want so many faculty people; but it isn't just the faculty represented. You have to get all of the college constituencies to buy into the proposition.

CARROLL: The last question I really have for you is: What advice would you give to this new in-coming president, whoever it may be?

McLAUGHLIN: I think it would be to stand back and not get immersed in the small issues of the college which are important on any given day. But to think through, with the board, where should this institution be ten years from now? Then to set up the commission, study groups, whatever it takes to guide that strategy and to involve the critical constituencies. This needs to be done. It is part of the process to analyze the structure of Dartmouth, the whole social structure, the extracurricular activities structure, etc. This is a process that will be take five, six years to accomplish--to really redefine what Dartmouth should be in the future.

Unless the president does that early in his/her term, the president could get immersed in too many day-to-day problems. I had that

tendency and it is not a productive thing to do. But there is enough opportunity right now at Dartmouth to say, "Let's take the next step in defining Dartmouth as the premier liberal arts institution in the world—a place that possesses the optimum learning environment." It needs to be a comprehensive statement.

CARROLL: Is there anything else that you wanted to add?

McLAUGHLIN: No. I don't think so. I have enjoyed it. You have been terrific.

CARROLL: It was fun, I have to say. Thank you.

McLAUGHLIN: Thank you.

END OF INTERVIEW