

## **Please Note**

**This oral history transcript has been divided into three parts. The first part documents the presidencies of John G. Kemeny and David McLaughlin and is open to the public. The portion relating to the presidency of James Freedman will be open in 2023, which marks twenty-five years following the end of his administration. The portion relating to James Wright's presidency will be open in 2034, which marks twenty-five years following the end of his administration.**

**This is part one.**

**Lucretia L. Martin '51A**  
**Special Assistant to the President, Emerita**

An Interview Conducted by

Mary S. Donin

Hanover, New Hampshire

January 10, 19, 24, 2005

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Rauner Special Collections Library

Dartmouth College

Hanover, New Hampshire

INTERVIEWEE: Lucretia L. Martin  
INTERVIEWER: Mary S. Donin  
PLACE: Hanover, New Hampshire  
DATE: January 10, 2005

MARY DONIN: Today is Monday, January 10, 2005. I'm Mary Donin in Rauner Library with Lucretia Martin, special assistant to the president emerita at Dartmouth College. Okay, Mrs. Martin, let's start out hearing from you about how you first came to Hanover back in ...what was the date?

LUCRETIA MARTIN: It was September of 1954. My husband, Dick Sterling [Richard W. Sterling], had been hired as an assistant professor in the government department. He had completed his Ph.D. at Yale, and had spent a year working for the Carnegie Foundation in New Orleans with the dean of Tulane doing a study of international relations at southern universities. At the end of that year, decided between Berkeley and Dartmouth and chose to come to Dartmouth.

We drove into town with a four-year-old and a two-year-old about September 13<sup>th</sup>, I think it was. And I had never been in a small town—lived in a small town before. When I married him, he was a foreign service officer. We lived in Europe. I was a Washingtonian, had been brought up and spent my life...my father was in the State Department. So we arrived with our four-year-old and two-year-old and as we drove into town, we had one big decision to make.

We were renting a house that was a very large house owned by Professor Ernest [R.] Greene. Professor Greene had been a famous professor of classics, and he had a huge house on East Wheelock Street, which had been moved when Baker Library was built, from Baker Library to East Wheelock Street. And he was renting this house out. He and

his wife were away for a year or two and perhaps weren't coming back. And they were renting it out furnished for \$100 a month.

It was a very, very big house, and the only way we could afford that was if we put students in the top floor. The reason I tell you that is because it was September 13<sup>th</sup>, college was starting and we didn't have any students to put in the top floor. We'd been offered a Quonset hut where the middle school is now, then called Sachem Village. It wasn't a Quonset hut. It was one of the white buildings that had been moved to the current Sachem Village. We had done that at Yale and had turned it down because we wanted to have a third child. So we took this.

As we drove into town, there was a cop, a policeman, directing traffic at the intersection. And we stopped the car. My husband got out of the car, and went to the policeman, and asked him whether he knew anything about getting students to rent houses. The policeman became a very famous person in our lives, but certainly a well-known person in this community; his name was Ben Thompson. He was sort of the guru of policemen. Way after he retired, he always directed traffic at all Dartmouth football games until two years ago when he retired. So Ben Thompson said that he certainly thought he did know -- seeing that he knew some fraternity boys that might be interested and he'd send them around.

We went down to the house to discover we had the biggest, most immense house with a book-lined study. And that has a relationship to our Dartmouth story and the Kemenys because almost everybody at our level, an assistant professor, my husband was then making \$8,000 a year in salary. We had no money, two kids. We'd been living in very small houses, but we had the big one. So we rented the place out, and we paid \$100 a month, and the students paid for the heat, which was enormous. That was probably about \$60 a month, which we thought was very large in those days.

We had the students within two days. They were "gentleman's C" fraternity students who were very nice, two boys who lived with us for two years. And we had a wonderful relationship with them. And as we moved in -- this

is 1954 -- we began to realize that people didn't have the size house we had. Everybody who had kids, people who had kids in those days, and there were a lot of young faculty members, new faculty members, but they were living in smaller places.

So the reason I told you that story is that our place became the sort of place where everybody had potlucks, you know. We had dances, we would clean out the living room and dance. They'd tell dirty jokes in the kitchen and have philosophical discussions in the study, eat in the dining room, and we all lived there for about three or four years—the two years that we lived in that house we had a lot of that going on.

John [G.] Kemeny ['22A] was hired exactly the same year, but he took a sabbatical for a year and came a year later. So he wasn't yet at Dartmouth.

The other reason I told you this story and the salary level is that one of our plans was that I would complete a combined B.A./M.A. that I was receiving from Tulane University in philosophy after I got to Dartmouth because they had agreed to take the credits that I would then send down and apply. I only had a couple of courses left, and I was well ahead on a small M.A. thesis. And so once we got settled...I knew I couldn't do anything for the first semester because we really had to get these kids settled in.

Then after we got settled in the middle of the fall, I went over to find out how I signed up to take a course. Only to find out that in 1954 women were not allowed to enter a classroom at Dartmouth College. You could not take any courses to have the credits transferred to another institution. I should have checked into it. I should have thought of it. But it just never occurred to me. I'd never been in such a situation.

So that was a great disappointment to me. It certainly was the end of my academic career; and as it turned out, the permanent end of my academic career. And certainly it was not in our plans.

The other thing I'd say about Hanover when we arrived is that there were a tremendous number of young people and

young faculty members coming to Dartmouth in 1954, and there was a reason for that. At the end of the First World War, Ernest Martin Hopkins [’01] had had an opportunity to hire a lot of faculty members. And those people were at that moment retiring. And this was a big growth spurt in the time of the college for faculty members.

There was a brilliant, brilliant provost whom I’m sure many other people have talked about over the years, Donald [H.] Morrison who was the person who went out and searched for people in departments. And he was just as creative in other departments, but certainly in the social sciences where there was a huge turnover. So there were a lot of young faculty members in the social sciences and particularly in government, history, and economics, but throughout the college.

So this is an exciting time to come to Hanover, an exciting time to be at Dartmouth for a young faculty member and for their spouses. You had a lot of bright people moving into town. They had a bunch of little kids. It was the fabled ’50s of family growing up.

None of us really...it never occurred to any of us that we would or could work. That really hadn’t hit us. What did hit us, though, quite quickly within really that first year we were here was the fact that we couldn’t attend any classes, and that we didn’t have the intellectual opportunities that we had in our former lives. And many of us, whether we were faculty wives or resident wives or—I don’t think Tuck wives... They were generally very young and they weren’t married, so we really didn’t get to know them.

But certainly some of the resident wives, we were struck by this and upset by it. And we suggested to the college that we would like to have a course that could be taught for us. And I have to say that it fell on completely deaf ears. In fact, I doubt whether anyone’s really talked about it in your oral history project. Because I remember a number of people and I were—there were about four of us who were the ringleaders on this—and it was a complete no-starter.

So we sort of mulled around about that for a while. And we decided that we would do something else -- By now we’d...

by the end of that first year we'd gotten to know other faculty members -- and that we would go to some of the faculty members that we thought were terrific, and that we would see if we could create a seminar that would be given at night, with a syllabus, that would be open to spouses. And that would be something where if you signed up, you had to agree to do the reading, and you had to agree to come to the classes. That it wasn't going to be something you audited. You couldn't audit a class, you couldn't go in a classroom.

So we approached some of our faculty friends, notably Fred Berthold [Jr. '45], who is still with us, and [Francis W.] Fran Gramlich in the philosophy department, and several other people in the philosophy department who moved on. And we approached these people and asked if they would be willing to do this. Of course we didn't have any money. I don't remember whether we asked them—if we said we'd give them money or not—but I know we didn't have any money and they turned it down if we said anything.

So we started giving the seminar. We got a room in Baker Library at night. I'm sure the college never knew we used the room. I'm sure some faculty member signed it up. And we had about two years of courses, a fall course and a spring course, for maybe two or three years. I'm not... And it was a wonderful experience, I think, for all of us because our minds were pretty starved, and it was great.

DONIN: How did you advertise it?

MARTIN: Well, you advertised it by having everybody talk to their friends and decide they wanted to sign up for it. I mean we couldn't take—I think 20 was our max. And I think we had 20 pretty much the whole time. I've always wanted to put that in the archives for Dartmouth because I don't think it's known that even then, the Dartmouth professors were very generous with their time.

DONIN: Speaking of being starved, I mean, you didn't even have a Hopkins Center then.

MARTIN: I was about to say that. We didn't have the Hopkins Center, we didn't have the Hood Museum. You had the Nugget Theater, but it wasn't...it didn't have first-run movies. And

what you see in the Nugget today, with all the influence of the Telluride Film Festival and how the Nugget is programmed, is a very different movie house.

You did have faculty—you had fraternity cocktail parties for faculty members. I don't know whether people have discussed that. But this was something that at least twice a term fraternities would give cocktail parties for faculty members. They would be all dressed up in coats and ties. And they would invite faculty members to their houses, which would be clean as a whistle for the evening.

DONIN: And of course the drinking age in those days was 18.

MARTIN: Was 18.

DONIN: Ah hah!

MARTIN: No, was it 21 or 18? Twenty-one. It was 21. No, it was 18.

DONIN: It was 18.

MARTIN: It was 18, which meant that was easy. And we would then... We loved these faculty cocktail parties, and everybody would invite the professors that they either wanted a good grade from or that they liked particularly, their favorite professors. And this was part of your social life, was to go to these cocktail parties.

Another thing that was important in that very early time were the Dickeys. [Christina Gillespie Dickey '70H] Chris and John [Sloan] Dickey ['29] were very, very welcoming for new faculty members. I can remember in the first year we were here, both my husband and I were in the Dickey's basement where they very often had intellectual evenings of some sort or another. I remember one in particular when Orvil [E.] Dryfoos ['34] of the *New York Times* came and gave a wonderful talk about the current political events. And I can remember John and Chris Dickey inviting us for dinner. Mrs. Dickey, very gracious, made brown betty for dessert. I remember that distinctly because it was one of my favorite desserts.

They were very involved with faculty members in a way that perhaps nowadays we don't think about. [James E.] Jim and Susan [DeBevoise] Wright have re-involved the college in a very serious way that way, but in their own time and in their own way. So those were two sort of interesting things.

Two of the people that were involved with these seminars and were involved with the early days were Jean Broehl, the wife of Wayne Broehl, professor at the Tuck School. And Joan Snell, the wife of [James] Laurie Snell, fellow mathematician of John Kemeny's. The reason I bring that up now rather than perhaps later on while we were talking is that I don't want to forget to tell you that this issue of not being able to audit or attend Dartmouth classes or not to get credits at Dartmouth was a very big issue that quietly, under the table, was a real problem for the spouses of faculty members. And later on I'll talk to you about how we tried to work ourselves into the job market. But this was way before then.

Jean Broehl was trying to finish her degree at the University of Chicago, and she couldn't get a course. And she and I associated a fair amount. By now this is now maybe ten, twelve years later. And we both had young children who were much younger than our other three, my fourth and her youngest. And so we saw each other a fair amount. And she was—she got an arrangement. By then you could audit courses at Dartmouth. But she was the first person to appeal to whomever you appeal, trustees eventually, to get a credit for a degree somewhere else. And she got her degree at the University of Chicago. And she was the first person to have Dartmouth credits transferred from Dartmouth to University of Chicago, certified as Dartmouth credits, gone through the registrar. And I just think that's a footnote of history that we should all remember. And the other piece is Joan Snell. Joan Snell, as John Kemeny was fond of saying, was the first faculty wife to have received a Dartmouth degree.

DONIN: Is that right!

MARTIN: And it's a wonderful story. I remember very well when Joan marched for her degree because it was raining, and we had to be in... I believe we were in... It couldn't have been Thompson. Yes, I believe we were in Thompson Arena. I

think Thompson was built. And somebody someday ought to ask Joan Snell about her degree because it was a wonderful, wonderful moment that this is the first faculty wife to get a degree. I think it was right... It may have even been after coeducation that this happened. I think it was Thompson Arena.

DONIN: So she was actually enrolled in classes?

MARTIN: Enrolled in classes and got her degree at Dartmouth.

DONIN: Wow!

MARTIN: By then I was working and couldn't go back and avail myself of that opportunity. But I was always very admiring of the two women and of Dartmouth and letting that happen.

DONIN: So was that before the Twelve-College Exchange program and all that? It was probably...

MARTIN: I think Joan Snell's degree was, I think it was actually... I think she got a degree after we went coed. I think it was in 1971 or—'72 or '73 that she got her degree. You can check it. But the Twelve-College Exchange was way before that. And I can tell you a lot about the Twelve-College Exchange. I was quite involved with it, as were many others. So that's sort of what I thought you might be interested in.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: On the early years. Certainly there are many other stories of the early years, but they don't really... We became...they don't involve John Kemeny except that we became social friends with the Kemenys quite early. Partly because John Kemeny had been recruited by Donald Morrision; that was a very big part of John Kemeny's story and a big catch for Don. And the Kemenys came a year after we did. They lived near us. They lived in a small house, a college-owned house, on Valley Road, an area where they're all college-owned houses that are rented out to...at that time all faculty members. I think there aren't any faculty members living in them anymore. But they were all faculty members then, and most of our friends lived there. And that was where our large house made a difference.

The postscript on our house is that after two years, they decided to sell this house, but they put a price on it that Robert McLaughry Senior decided was so expensive that he wasn't going to advertise it yet. He'd have to get more realistic on the price. The price was \$30,000. This is now about 1956.

So it wasn't advertised, but this doctor came to town with a wife and some kids, and they asked if they could just have the family walk through the house. They walked through the house—I remember it clearly. Our third child had just been born. He was very, very ill. And it was a very tense time in all of our lives. And I can remember their coming through the house and never opening closet doors. And they bought it two days later for 30,000.

He was a doctor who worked at the V.A. [Hospital]. A wonderful person. They had five kids. And was tragically killed in a car accident on Ledyard Bridge as he was going to work one day. She and I had become good friends and became even better friends after that. I went with the police to tell her.

We were suddenly without a house. And just to complete that sort of Hanover housing scene, we moved to a house on East Wheelock Street that is at East Wheelock and Park Street. It is now a sorority house. It has a big addition on the back.

It was then a house that had been all fixed up and painted and completely fixed up by the college for Dartmouth's first vice president of development and alumni affairs. A man by the name of Justin [A.] Stanley ['33]. He was a lawyer in Chicago and a loyal Dartmouth man and he and his wife moved to Hanover where he became first vice president. She didn't like it in Hanover. It didn't take. It wasn't what they wanted. And after a year or two, they moved back to Chicago.

This house was there, so we went to the college and said, "Look, we're unexpectedly without anyplace to live. We have a third child now who's still quite ill. And is there any chance we could rent this house from you? And you wouldn't have to

do anything. We wouldn't...we'd take all the care of the house, and you wouldn't have to do the lawns or anything." And the college after great...realized they didn't have anybody to put in it, and they said, "Well, on a year-to-year basis you can rent it."

So we moved from one big house to one that had even larger student space and installed students in the top floor of the second house. We've gotten to know many students who have had very interesting careers, and I've kept up with them over the years and enjoyed them a lot.

That second house was an interesting time at Dartmouth because it was really the beginning of Dartmouth caring about international relations. Dartmouth had a government department. My husband was in it. And he'd been hired to be one of their first international relations hires. But they didn't really have a lot going on in international relations, nor did most American universities in the fifties.

My husband, Dick Sterling, became head of the international relations program and major. And that house was wonderful because we would entertain visitors to the college there a lot. I don't remember that we had much of a budget for this operation. I think the food was paid for, but that was about it. But it was a very thrilling time for those of us who believed Dartmouth should make a change in their orientation from domestic to international affairs.

I guess the next piece of that story, the Kemenys, he's teaching in the mathematics department, and he's building the math department. I'm being a mom. Jean's had two kids. Her kids are pretty much the age of my kids. The next stage of this is that Dartmouth decided to build the Choate Road dormitories.

DONIN: What road?

MARTIN: Choate Road.

DONIN: Choate, right.

MARTIN: And when they decided to build the Choate Road dormitories, there was a man on the board of trustees by the

name of Beardsley Ruml ['15]. And Beardsley Ruml felt strongly that Dartmouth really had to make a real change in the way they cared about their residential life. That they were—the college was far too prep-school-y and far too just dormitories. It should be more like Harvard and Yale, and they should have quality of life in what they then called dormitories, we now call residence halls. It was far more broad and had more of an academic basis, it had more of a relationship to the faculty, it had more programming than they'd ever had before.

So when they built the Choate Road dormitories, they decided that they would put two faculty residences in the Choate Road dormitories. They were about to build three more dormitories in what's now known as the River Cluster, and that they would put faculty members' residences in the River Cluster as well.

So they built the dormitories and they built these houses, these faculty residences attached. And then they came to two Yale graduates. My husband was one, and the other one was Norman [A.] Doenges and asked if they would move in with their families to start this off because they'd both had experiences with the college system. Both of them had been undergraduates, B.A, M.A., and Ph.D., at Yale.

So my husband felt this was something that we really, really should do. And I took a look at these residences. If anyone goes down and looks at them now, one is the Women's Center and I'm not even sure what the other one is. But you certainly wouldn't put a family with three children in these. I referred to it as our "adobe hut." And it does look a little like an adobe hut. But he felt strongly that this was something that was an important step for Dartmouth, and it was something that he believed in, and that we should do this.

So we gave up our big, big house on East Wheelock Street, and moved to the Choates. And if I could spend a little bit of time on the Choates, it's an interesting time as we started the Choates. We moved in in the fall, in September, and very shortly thereafter there was a fall trustee meeting. There was a reception in one of the common rooms and I met two trustees. We were brought up to be introduced and they were being shown the Choates and how wonderful they

were. Two trustees were talking and I was standing there. They had no idea who I was. And they were saying to each other, "Well, there's one thing... We're not going to build these faculty residences into the River Cluster because it's just too damned expensive. There's no way we're going to put in those faculty residences." And I remember standing there and thinking, you know, we've moved our entire family, we've changed our whole quality of life, and we've done this for something which has already been abandoned before they've started it? I've never forgotten that particular moment in my experience at Dartmouth. And it was pretty depressing.

Having said that, certainly the living arrangement was very difficult. We found some army bunk beds from my sister which we cut down so that we could put them into one room and put the two kids in one room, and then my daughter had her own room, and we had a room. And then Dick had a study, a very nice study that students could enter without going into the house.

We saw a lot of the students, we did a lot of programming. I think I'll never bake another chocolate cake with great happiness. But we had a lot of dinners. We had a lot of students in the house. We did a lot of programming up in the common room. And they were wonderful students. We had Bissell and Cohen. They were our two dormitories.

The students were just fabulous. They started out thinking that this was going to be terrible, that we were going to be like headmasters in a prep school, and they didn't want that. So we would start every fall and January semesters by telling them, by bringing them up to the common room and saying who we were. And I would give a little talk about please don't invite the children into your rooms. They'd love to play with you outside. They'll always be ready to play, but please don't do that. And that we're not there... The dean's office is where you go for those sorts of things. And it worked very well.

We had a library committee, we had books upstairs in the library. We had programs from Afghan music to Easter brunches because they all loved Easter brunches. Food, fun. And a lot of students got involved with committees that did intellectual programming. I've often thought about that

because it's so like what the college has recently gone through with the East Wheelock Street programming and plans. And I think that in many ways Dartmouth has been trying to think more and more about programming.

DONIN: So if it was successful in the Choates this way, why didn't they carry it on?

MARTIN: Well, I think my story of the cocktail party tells you quite a bit. Because it was something Beardsley Ruml had pushed through the trustees. But once they got it into the Choates, they'd already started the building and started the planning for the River Cluster, and they just thought it was too expensive. And there just was no way they were going to do this, and they just abandoned it.

So that was an interesting time. We lived there for a couple of years. Then my husband had a sabbatical in Washington, and then we came back and lived there another year. And in about 1963, the year we came back from Washington and lived there, we had a fourth child. And I can remember a train table was under our bed. But when the students went on holiday, the children could use the common room for playing. That was a very big deal.

The baby was born during spring break. It's important to remember that because I have a Dartmouth story about the baby being born on spring break.

Before spring break I knew that...I mean these kids were not unaware of my huge size. And this is an earlier time of pregnant women. The spring came, and the baby was born while they were gone. They came back, and after the baby was about ten days, two weeks old, one evening a knock came on the study door. I went to the door. And the baby slept in the study because that was the only place we could put him at night because that's where we put his bassinet, car bed actually is what it was. During the day we put him back in our room. And that's where he was, and we were going to be moving out by the time he was six or seven months old because there was no way we could stay there much longer. We were looking for a house.

Well, this knock came on the door, and I went to the door. And there were two students that I knew quite well, one from Bissell and one from Cohen Hall. I didn't think of that at the time. And they had coats and ties on, and they were all dressed up, and I thought, Oh, dear, something horrible has happened. Because we did get involved in a lot of strange stories. (I'd be happy to tell you some very fascinating short stories if you're ever interested.) They said, "Could we come in? Is Professor Sterling here?" I said, "Yes, he is and do come in."

They came in, and they sat down. I went and I got Dick, and he came in and sat down, and I started to leave, and they said, "No, we'd like you to stay, please." And I said, "Okay." So I sat down. These students had spent—before break, and I had seen the coffee cans, but I hadn't paid much attention to it—all this time collecting money from all the students, and they had a card, each dormitory had a card signed by every member of the dormitory, to congratulate us on the baby. And they had two savings bonds, one from each dorm. And they gave us these bonds.

I was practically in tears. I still get teary when I think of it. They gave us these bonds, and they were so proud of themselves, and they looked at us very seriously, and they said—my daughter's name is Mary, and she's the eldest—they said, "We made Mary the secondary beneficiary because we felt the boys could work." [Laughter] I think that's it.

It's a charming Dartmouth story of the '50s that is just so nice. And I still keep in touch with a fair number of guys from the Choates who remember that time. That is a place they did like to live. They loved living there. It was new, and they remember it because they were all involved in all the programming, and so they remember it with great, great joy.

DONIN: I should think that kids across campus would have wanted to live there at the Choates once word got out of what was going on there.

MARTIN: I don't know. I think I was too close to it. I was just really involved in what was happening. I wasn't involved in the dean's office.

I actually have one other story I should tell you about the Choates because it involves Thaddeus ["Thad"] Seymour [49A]. And "Dad Thad" or "Dean Thad," as he was called by everybody, is a much beloved person. I'm sure he's been interviewed, hasn't he, for the oral history project? If [Charles F.] Doc Dey [52] has, he certainly should. They're best friends.

DONIN: Gee, that's a good question. Maybe Jere [R.] Daniell [II '55] did him in his batch because, you know, Seymour was gone by the time they started this program.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: So I should look.

MARTIN: He comes up here a fair amount. He's around, and his wife...he and his wife were certainly really terribly important people at Dartmouth in many, many ways. They were close friends of ours and we spent a lot of time together.

But in these early years, he was in the English department, and the English department was known as having the best parties. We all went to the fanciest parties in the English department. They had fancy food, too, and there were a lot of people there. Anyway, my story about Thaddeus and the Choates is one that really should be in the Dartmouth history annals.

DONIN: You know what? I'm going to stop you and just turn the tape over here.

**[End of Tape 1, Side A – Beginning of Tape 1, Side B]**

DONIN: Okay. So Thaddeus Seymour.

MARTIN: The story of Thaddeus is that I think it was our first year in the Choates, I'm not quite sure. But you can certainly...it's easy to look up because Thaddeus had just been named to become the dean of the college. He was a professor in the English department. He wasn't going to take that job on for a term...or I've forgotten the arrangement, but it was at least a term before he was going to move over as the dean. But the

arrangement was that he would spend a term as an assistant dean working at that, and then he would move over as dean of the college after July 1 or September 1 or whatever it was.

So he was an assistant dean, and he came to...we had every close associations with the dean's office. Obviously in the Choates we often had very serious issues. We had some wonderfully happy times, but also some very tough times with students who were ill or something had gone wrong. So we always were in close touch with the dean's office. And we sometimes had bizarre experiences with students walking in our house in the middle of the night and having, you know, episodes.

But Thaddeus got in touch with Dick and said to him that he wanted him to know—Dick to know—that he, Thaddeus, was going to make a raid that night on Bissell Hall, the first floor of Bissell Hall. Cohen is the one by the road, and Bissell is the one farther back from the road. And he said...he told him about what time he'd be coming, about nine o'clock or something. And he said, "The reason for this is that there's a poker game that's going on in Bissell Hall. It's been going on for some time. It's gotten really serious. People are losing thousands of dollars. And we've got some financial aid students that are losing their shirts. And this is really getting to me. There is something very bad going on, and we've just got to face up to it. So I've said that..." (And it was going to be a very warm spell, and the windows were always open in warm spells.) "So I've said that I would go, and I'd just walk in on the game. And so I'm going to do it tonight. But you don't have to do anything about it, and they don't know that we're involved. And so after it's all over, I'll come and tap on the window, and I can come in and tell you how it went." We said, "Okay."

So the time came and the time went, and we were just waiting with great anticipation. Pretty soon Thaddeus comes in and sits down in the study. He says, "Oh, God! I need a drink." So we got him some scotch, and we sat there with our scotch, and we said, "What happened?" And he said, "Well, I drove up." What he didn't remember and what he didn't think is that Thaddeus was well known for his antique Ford station wagon, which was a blue station wagon with wood on it, you

know, one of these really wonderful... He was well known for many things: his cars, his magic tricks, his Fourth of July parties, and all sorts of things. But the antique cars were—that was big.

So he got there very quietly, parked his car in the road, got quietly out, and walked behind Cohen into Bissell. Walked in the window of the room, and there were all the guys, and they're all playing Hearts. And what happened was that as soon as that station wagon got to Cohen Hall, the word went from Cohen—you didn't need cell phones—the word went from Cohen to Bissell and they all stopped and hid the poker chips and played Hearts. [Laughter]

So Thaddeus realized that his... He was so sure he was going to be such a smashing good dean but he realized that his first attempt was not really a very great success. But we had many laughs over many years about the day he raided the poker game.

DONIN: Did he ever get the guys to stop playing poker?

MARTIN: Oh, I'm sure the dean's office called them all in and I'm sure that it was resolved. And I don't know why he decided to do this cowboy thing. It was very much like Thaddeus, just some fun thing to do. So it's a great story.

So that was that and then we left the Choates. In fact we moved to Occom Ridge to a wonderful house which had been owned by a Tuck School professor. And I've forgotten his name right now. But when we moved to Occom Ridge, we lived there until our children were through school. And it was a marvelous place to bring kids up and great ball games. The Seymours [Thaddeus and Polly] were there, the Maslands [John W., Jr. and Harriet], the provost, were there. Occom Pond was there.

DONIN: Those were the days when people could still afford to live in Hanover.

MARTIN: Well, we were very lucky. We were the last people to buy a house on Occom Ridge under \$40,000, and we could barely afford it. I'll tell you a story about the house because it involves another Dartmouth story. I think you've...I'm sure

many people know, and you've interviewed Orton [H.] Hicks Senior ['21 TU '22] before he died.

DONIN: I hope so.

MARTIN: I hope.

DONIN: I think Jere Daniell interviewed him.

MARTIN: I'm sure Jerry Daniell interviewed him because he was, you know... My husband, I think, coined the most wonderful phrase about Ort. He called him the "wizard of ooze." And he was. He was a wonderful man. Very difficult, but wonderful. And I certainly had a lot of later relations with him. But at that point he was the vice president for development at Dartmouth and a charmer, and he lived on Rope Ferry Road.

We really could barely afford this house, but Paul [F.] Young ['43], the then assistant treasurer, had assured us that with the G.I. Bill of Rights, the loan component, that the college would guarantee the loan so that we could do this. So with great fear and trembling, we signed up for it, and everything was agreed.

We were about to sign the final papers when we got a phone call from the owner saying that he was sorry but he couldn't sell it to us because he was selling it to Orton Hicks's daughter. We were crushed. We were very upset. The house was not on the market and nobody knew. This was just something that had come up very suddenly. We'd heard about it and had gone to him, and he had agreed to a sale.

So we were very upset about it, but we were ready to sort of face up to it, except there was going to be one more meeting; that was the meeting between Dick and the owner. And we were going to be at a dinner party at the Radways' [Laurence and Patricia] house. The Radways lived on Occom Ridge as well. Shows you the smallness of Hanover in those days.

Orton lived across the pond. And we walked into the dinner party, and there were Orton and Lois Hicks at the dinner party. Orton was on the telephone yelling at his daughter, telling her she had to buy this house. We walked in. He had

no idea we were the people involved. Lois was sitting in the living room downing martinis, very upset because she didn't think that Orton should interfere with her daughter that way.

As it turned out, that phone conversation... We'd already lost the house. We knew that. We were very upset. We were pretty mad because the only way Orton knew about it was because Paul Young had told him. And here the college, having agreed to something on the part of faculty members, was letting this happen on the part of a vice president. And we were pretty angry faculty members.

It turns out that the phone call was that his daughter had thought about all this, and decided that she couldn't face living across the pond from her father, knowing that he would be looking at the lights in her window, and refused to move in. So we got the house anyway, and Dick Sterling left the party, went to the owner, and the owner reinstated it. [Laughter] Unfortunately, we had to pay the full price; we couldn't bargain him down. And we moved in, and it was a wonderful place to bring kids up. So that was my last thing, I guess, before we get to John Kemeny.

DONIN: Can I just interject a question about... People from that generation often talk about the sort of sociability of the Dartmouth community back in those days, where first of all everybody lived in town; virtually everybody lived in town. And there was a lot of socializing within your department. That was sort of the core of your social life -- with all your department mates. And how, you know, that's obviously not...it's not like that anymore.

MARTIN: No, it's not.

DONIN: Is that the case?

MARTIN: Oh, absolutely. That's why I told you the story of the potluck dinners earlier. I mean that was the beginning of it. And by the time...of course we had to stop that when we moved into the Choates. But by the time we moved up to Occom Ridge, we became the party scene again because we were very sociable anyway and people liked doing that. Between the Seymours and ourselves, we had a large group of friends. There was a great deal of sociability. A lot of taking care of

each other's children, a lot of that. And the Kemenys were a part of that.

Again, I think you're correct. The base was your department or your related departments, the social science departments. Although not always. We had a number of doctor friends. We were sort of on the doctors' scene as well. Not as much. I mean the doctors were the only rich people in town. I mean they... That's why Rip Road was called "Pill Hill" because the doctors had the money, and they lived on Pill Hill. We couldn't afford to live on Pill Hill, and we couldn't afford to live on Rope Ferry Road. We could afford to live on Occom Ridge in beaten-up old houses that hadn't been fixed up for years and years. Our kitchen was a disaster. The house hadn't been painted in 30 years.

DONIN: Right, right.

MARTIN: But it was very sociable. And that actually leads me to another thing that I think's important to remember: We're now moving into the '60s. It was '63 when we moved. Well, 'in '62, '63. Two things: When we moved, Dartmouth still had parietals: girls had to be out of the dormitory rooms before midnight. And we didn't have any money. By now I was working. I'll be happy to go into my work background. But I was working for practically nothing at home most of the time. But in this time we, like many other faculty members, rented our children's rooms out to dates on weekends. That was a common, accepted practice of the in-town faculty members, and most faculty members did live in town. You're absolutely right.

Our deal with our children was that we would put all the money from renting these rooms out into a pot. And at the end of a year, half of the money would go to the part-time cleaning woman we had; and the other half of the money would go on the tree divided for ski-lift tickets, and that was a big deal. They would clean their rooms, and we would have...we would pack them in. We'd have four, five, six students every weekend. So did the Radways. So did many faculty members. And our system was emulated by many others because our kids thought it was so cool. And it was a very good way...they were happy to clean their rooms because they were going to get ski-lift tickets out of all this.

The day Dartmouth changed their parietal rules, that day, we never saw another student in our house from then on, ever. [Laughter] But that was a completely different era. You had students bringing dates up and putting them up in houses. That was part of Dartmouth. And they learned about your house through their fraternity brothers, and you went to their fraternity cocktail parties which were beginning to die out; they hadn't yet. I mean the '60s really changed that whole nature of student behavior in a way that we're all very familiar with.

DONIN: Big time.

MARTIN: Big time. But anyway, it was fun, and it was a fun time. There was a lot of socializing. And you didn't do it with a lot of money. So, you know, that was that.

Going just a little bit to women at that period before Dartmouth went coed and before most women were working, most of us were involved in a lot of volunteer activities. I was involved in the school, I was involved in politics, I was involved in a lot of different things, as were many of my friends. And we were pretty frustrated because nobody could work for Dartmouth unless you had secretarial skills which we didn't have. I mean if you had secretarial skills, you could get a job at Dartmouth and I always admired the people who did. And many of the wives and spouses of Tuck students and the medical students did. But we couldn't do that because we didn't have those skills, and we weren't allowed to be administrators.

You could not hire a woman administrator in the '60s. You think about that, that's not very long ago when you think about it. It seems like a long time from 2004, but in historical terms, that's not a long time ago.

DONIN: So there were no female administrators then!

MARTIN: Yes. I wanted to be sure you understood that because it relates to my own situation a lot. There were no female administrators outside of the library. There were librarians, but there were no other female administrators. All administrators were male.

A number of us tried to get jobs without success. We weren't, as we were told, qualified for the jobs. And I guess we weren't. You know, deans weren't qualified either, but they were all male, and admissions officers were all male. Everybody was all male. Alumni relations people were all male. And of course you have to remember that the administration was quite small. The administration wasn't the size it is today, even proportionately. No way.

So this became a sort of sore point with a lot of us over a period of time. And we finally had a memorable event that many of us still—those of us who are either here or alive—still chuckle over. We decided to have a lunch. We thought we'd have a ladies' lunch. None of us ever went in for ladies' lunches, but we would have a ladies' lunch. And we would all get together, and it was going to be a real sort of... We just had gotten ourselves so involved in volunteer activities, we were going to really cut this back. And the first thing we were going to do was to have a ladies' lunch. And the ladies' lunch we decided was going to be at my house, and we had quiche and wine and salad. That's what you had for ladies' lunches.

There were plenty of people who had ladies' lunches, and there were plenty of garden club people, and I'm not putting them down. It's just that we decided this was going to be our future. And I will tell you some of the people who came to this lunch because it was something we've all remembered and commented on many times. Katharine [S.] Stevens, her husband, [James W.] Jim Stevens ['50], was the treasurer of the college at that time, and she lived on Occom Ridge. Lilla McLane Bradley, who lives in Kendall now. She lived on Occom Ridge. Jean Hennessey, who lived on Webster Terrace. Pat Kurtz, who was [Thomas E.] Tom Kurtz's first wife and was very involved in the White church, the congregational church. Ann MacBurney, who was the wife of the rector of St. Thomas Church. I'm probably missing a couple. That brings us up to maybe eight or ten or twelve by the time I was there.

So we had quiche, and we had wine, and we had salad, and we all had a wonderful time talking and visiting. We had a two-hour lunch, and we just felt just terrific. And at the end of that lunch, we had started three new things.

DONIN: Great.

MARTIN: We'd started—at the White church we'd started something which became known as the Teen Canteen which was very important during the '60s time which was a very changing time for teenagers.

Katharine Stevens and I spearheaded the beginning of something which we tried to get the college to sponsor—without success, I might add—which was a survey of the talents of women in the area. We wanted to survey the talents of faculty spouses, Tuck and Thayer and graduate spouses, and resident spouses. And then we wanted the college to sponsor this survey because we wanted this to be a pool of women that you could call on for research jobs. You could get research jobs, and I had some during my time here, research jobs for various departments. But also we were really making this our wedge to see if we couldn't see whether women couldn't become administrators at the college.

We went to John Masland, who was then the provost of the college, to ask him whether this could be sponsored by the college. And I can't remember whether he sent us to human resources or not. I think he just turned us down there. But needless to say, it didn't go anywhere.

So that was the end of that. So we decided, well, we'd do it anyway. So we created a survey instrument, and Jean Hennessey was very involved, and Katharine and I were involved. And we got other people to man booths at the Co-op, and we went to the hospital, and we went to Tuck, and we had this terrific survey.

We had a terrific study. Many of us had had either some background surveying—I'd done some work for Oliver Quayle in surveying—and many of us had some surveying background of one sort or another. And we went to some friends in the sociology department and got them to check our stuff. I mean it was pretty sophisticated! We were pretty proud of it.

We found a heck of a lot of resources. We just found a terrific pool there. I can't tell you that I know whatever happened to the survey. In some ways it doesn't matter because it was really more symptomatic of the time and what was changing in the world then.

On the other hand, I think it did make somewhat of a difference in the pressure that it created and the expectations that it created. I know shortly after that I was invited to come speak to some women at the Tuck School. I think it was the first time I'd ever been invited to speak somewhere. I spoke many times after that to women and talked. But this was the first time I'd had that opportunity.

But the third thing that we created as a result of that lunch—I think there was one other social service thing we created, but I don't remember. But the third thing we created was a “broom ball” team.

At that time Occom Pond... It seemed colder in those days because it was frozen all winter, we always thought. But Occom Pond had a wooden structure around it to make it a hockey rink. So that the pond was cleaned around, and then in the middle was this hockey rink, a wooden hockey rink which was kept clean every day and all fixed up.

So we decided that we really needed to get some exercise, and there weren't any teams. We couldn't do anything like that. You could be a Ford Sayre instructor and work with your children. In fact, I didn't because of my particular family situation: I'd had a late baby and I had too many family obligations and I didn't have the money for baby-sitters because we were...we really were very poor at the time. But other people did a lot of Ford Sayre teaching. You'd get lessons if you taught, and it was a wonderful way to learn to ski. And so many people did that.

But we decided we needed to have something that we did as a group, as a team. We'd all grown up in situations where we'd had team sports, and we believed that team sports were good for women. Now there are some very sophisticated surveys, very interesting surveys that show that team sports can give you a leg up in many ways. And that many women executives have been good team sports

players. We weren't really thinking of that. This was just fun and games.

So we created a broom ball team. And we took our brooms, and we got a deflated soccer ball. It's a Canadian sport. And we went down one... We decided we'd meet twice a week, play Tuesdays and Thursdays; I don't remember when. I think so. And we'd go down to Occom Pond and we'd play broom ball.

So we got our brooms, and we went down. And I can remember the first day the guys saying, "Oh, we're cleaning the ice." And we said, "No, no, no. That's okay. We're down here to play broom ball." "Oh, okay." Well, after a couple of times, these guys got fascinated, and they would always get the ice absolutely perfect for us before we came. [Laughter] And we would start playing broom ball.

After about two weeks, I got a phone call from the athletic department of Dartmouth, and they wanted to know—maybe it was a month or two—but they wanted to know whether we would come at the intermission of a Harvard-Dartmouth hockey game and play broom ball. [Laughter] I said, "Absolutely not!" We were not about to be laughed at, and we would have been laughed at. No way. Of course you have to remember that most of us had figure skates; we didn't have hockey skates.

DONIN: You didn't have hockey skates, no.

MARTIN: So we were having a wonderful time. We played for two hours every morning, ten to twelve. So after about a month and a half of this, one day two cars drove up, and the sports information guy from Dartmouth pulls up, and these people with cameras and... And he had called the *Boston Globe*, and the *Globe* had sent up a whole crew. So they did this huge story, and took pictures of these women who played broom ball. We became a New England sensation for a while.

DONIN: Oh, that's great.

MARTIN: It was a lot of fun. The end of that story was that in the second year, by the end of the second year, we really had a

wonderful time. We got really much too aggressive. We began to suffer a number of bad injuries. [Laughter] After about two years the broom ball dissolved. And almost all the people, not Jean Hennessey but most of the other people involved in that lived through part of the broom ball – most of the other names. Jean [Hennessey], as you know, went on to become head of the New Hampshire Charitable Foundation and had just a wonderful, wonderful career. But Lilla and Jean and Katharine and Ann MacBurney and others and I have often talked about the lunch that was the beginning of a time of change in all of our lives.

It really was probably the time when life changed. That led, of course, to people going to work more. I was working at home. I also was the—depending on what I was doing—my title would change. I was the circulation manager of the *Russian Review*, a magazine that was published in Hanover by Dimitri Von Mohrenschild, a professor of Russian.

DONIN: You'll have to spell that name.

MARTIN: V-O-N M-O-H-R-E-N-S-C-H-I-L-D-T...oh, no T on the end. I may not have that quite right, but it's close enough.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: And he was a professor of Russian here at Dartmouth and a very well-known professor of Russian. And he had a magazine that he put out called the *Russian Review*, which was put out from Dartmouth for many years. He didn't have any business staff, and that business was run by a friend of mine who just didn't do it very well and it fell apart.

It was turned over to me and it was something you did out of your kitchen or your house. And it was as if I'd received a deck of cards thrown out of a third-story window. It was just a mess. But of course I was very successful. It had been such a mess that all of a sudden money... because I billed the University of California for, you know, four years of their subscriptions that they'd never paid for. But I did that for maybe five or six years. At the same time I became a research assistant to Professor [Meredith O.] Mug Clement of the economics department. That was my first Dartmouth-

related job. It's probably the first paycheck I ever got from Dartmouth.

DONIN: The Clement job was?

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm. I think so. It was about '63 or '64. I typed Tuck papers. Not Tuck School papers, but Summer Executive Tuck papers; endless things that would have to be typed up overnight for the summer executives who would come and do papers. And you'd have to have carbon paper when you typed these papers.

It's important to say that because later on...the only time that I know I honestly lied comes up when I was first hired by John Kemeny that involves typing. So I did that.

My husband was emotionally quite ill and went through a very tough period. Dartmouth was wonderful to him, particularly John Dickey and the hospital here. But he went through a very tough period, and our finances were in very hard shape, so that's why I had to do all that. So I was working full time in one way or another and getting just nothing...like \$2 an hour or something or other. And the children were in school.

DONIN: It's been brought up in other interviews that an awful lot of faculty wives also did work for their husbands as professors.

MARTIN: Yes. Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: And never got paid at all.

MARTIN: Oh, absolutely.

DONIN: I mean grading papers and helping with research and...

MARTIN: I never helped with research with my husband because temperamentally that wouldn't have worked. I did type his thesis and then retyped it for publication. And that second retyping was after we came to Hanover, with the two kids, and I was pregnant with the third. And that was just a horrendous job. I did all that. But I never did research for him. I really wasn't qualified in international relations to do the kind of research that was needed. My background was

more economics, sociology, and philosophy. But I think it just wouldn't have worked in our family. But that was true of many people.

I think it's still true today in some ways, and that you see a lot of that happening. Not as much now as it used to be, and people get paid more. But I know of two people now that I know help their husbands with things that they don't really get paid for.

I never heard of wives grading papers for their husbands. Probably it happened, but I never heard about it. One of my first I guess—right up there in the early jobs as a research assistant with Mug Clement—I graded papers for [Eugene] Gene Lyons for the Great Issues course. At the very end of the Great Issues course time when it was required, and I was one of his graders. And he—Gene Lyons considers that he gave me my first job at Dartmouth. Mug Clement considers that he gave me my first job at Dartmouth. John Kemeny thinks he gave me my first job. So I'm lucky; I have three fathers. And John [H.] Copenhaver [Jr. '46] thinks he gave me my first job. Four fathers.

DONIN: Actually that's what I read, was that he was working on some committee, a search committee, I think, and he hired you. That's what I've read.

MARTIN: Yes. That is my 1968 job. That's the first job I was on the Dartmouth payroll. See, Mug, I was paid off his grant. And I don't remember how Gene paid me. I mean I was paid by Dartmouth, but I wasn't probably in any records. But I must have been somewhere. But I wasn't on the Dartmouth payroll as an employee.

DONIN: Uh huh.

MARTIN: So that was probably that. So that was sort of the '60s moved along. In 1967, shortly thereafter, John Dickey announced that he would be retiring and Dartmouth would be looking for their next president.

At that time, there were two committees set up: One was a presidential advisory committee headed by Walter [H.] Stockmayer ['25]. And the second was a presidential search

committee of five trustees and four faculty members. And John Copenhaver was the executive secretary of the search committee as a faculty member. He wasn't head of the search committee; the trustees headed the search committee. And the five trustees and the four faculty members worked very closely together. John Copenhaver was the executive for the search committee. They needed to find a secretary.

Now I should back up and say that about a year or two before this, I had received a phone call one night from John Kemeny. We were about to go out to the theater that night at Hopkins Center. And John said—maybe it was late one afternoon—that he would like me to come over to see him right then because he wanted to offer me a job. And I said, “John, I’m not in the market for a job. I’m on the school board.” (I’d just been elected to the Hanover School Board. I was the first woman to become head of the—chairman of the Hanover School Board. Lilla McLane Bradley was involved as well, but I was sort of the first woman. So that was just the time when women were coming out. All this was in about a five-year period in all this time.) And John said, “Well, I just want you to come over to the house, and I want to talk to you about it.” So I said, “Well, we were going to the theater.” He said, “Then just come over. I mean, have a cognac, and we’ll talk about it, and then you can go on to meet Dick at the theater.”

So, you know, one was like that with John Kemeny, and John Kemeny was like that with everyone. And I turned the kids over to Dick—well, they were older and could get themselves to bed—and I hightailed it over to the Kemeny's house on Hemlock Road at that time. And walked in, and John said, “Here, read this.” And he handed me a three-page document which was a document which he had agreed to which was appointing him head of the foundation effort for the Third Century Fund capital campaign.

I said, “John, why are you doing this?” And, of course, I was too naive at the time to realize that he really—I believe today although he and I never ever discussed it quite this way—wanted very much to be president of Dartmouth, and this was a way that he could get him... Beyond believing in Dartmouth, which he did, and believing in the foundation

effort, which he did, was a way to get him to have a broader exposure.

**[End of Tape 1, Side B – Beginning of Tape 2, Side A]**

DONIN: So he called you over for cognac before you go to the theater, and he hands you...

MARTIN: A document. And it's a three-page document that said...was a description of his being appointed to head the foundation effort for the Third Century Fund, which was Dartmouth's capital campaign. And the importance of this... I believe that he wanted this broader exposure. I think he also really truly believed in this campaign.

At this moment John Dickey had not announced his retirement, at this moment when John Kemeny first spoke to me. I said, "John, I'm not a secretary. I don't know anything about being a secretary. I can't do that."

He said, "Well, I don't want a secretary." In the budget in this paper he could get a secretary. He said, "I don't want a secretary. I'll pay for that. I'll just get somebody. If we need secretarial things, I'll get them. I need somebody who understands the social sciences, and I don't know anything about the social sciences."

I said, "Well, John, I'm not a professional. I don't understand foundations in the social sciences." "Well, you can learn, and you know all that, and you have all that background, you have all those friends, and you have all those people, and I come from a different world. And so I want somebody that can help me raise this money."

I read it some more, and I said, "But, John, this is something that you and your colleagues, professional colleagues... All you need to do is get a committee together of your professional colleagues and administrators who understand the foundation world, and they can help you do this."

He said, "Well, I don't even know who to ask." And I said, "Well, I'd be happy to talk to you about who to ask. But I can't... I've got a dyslexic kid, my youngest is... And I need to spend a lot of time with him, and I really... I've gotten on the

school board and I just can't do this. And I'm not the right person for you."

So we had a sort of unhappy time. But he said, "Well, think about it." And I said, "Well, okay." He said, "I'm leaving tomorrow for five weeks because I'm talking to mathematical associations around the country because we're not getting enough students. We've built this math department, and we need to have more students here. So I'm going for a five-week trip to talk to high schools and association meetings. So I don't need to know for five weeks, but let me know."

So at the end of five weeks, I wrote John a note and told him that I was very sorry but that I really didn't feel this was a good time for me to work. I was very flattered with the invitation." I thanked him. But I couldn't do it. And I may not have been on the school board. I may have that timing a little off, but it's close.

So he went his way. And knowing John...once you've said no, I never heard from him again about it, and I don't know whether he ever hired anybody. I don't really know how it worked. He did a fabulous job as head of that foundation committee. They over-fulfilled their norm, and they came in higher than their goal.

I can remember very clearly when we celebrated—I say "we," when Dartmouth celebrated—the Third Century Fund, this was now during the search. The search was in full swing. And John was lauded publicly, and quite appropriately so, by John Dickey.

So part way into this effort of John's, John Dickey announced his retirement. And that's when this committee that I've referred to was formed. And they wanted to get somebody who would be the executive secretary of the presidential advisory committee, which was going to have large meetings, involving all the campus on a variety of topics, all relating to the future of Dartmouth, and what do we need in the next president? And it was a huge committee, all the deans and everything. And also serve as executive secretary for the search committee, which would be five trustees and four faculty members. And they would be the ones who would collect files on people, conduct the search,

and eventually recommend names to the trustees for their approval.

So John Copenhaver approached me. The faculty members of that committee were John Copenhaver, [Louis] Lou Morton, professor of history, John [W.] Finch ['52], professor of English, and Don [Donald L.] Kreider, professor of mathematics. And John Copenhaver approached me -- I didn't know John very well. I knew Lou Morton very well -- and said that his committee had suggested that they would like me to consider joining them to become this executive secretary of the two groups. And I said...we talked for quite some time, and I said, "You know, John..." And it would be a part-time job. You would do all this on a part-time basis, of course. And the pay was \$2 an hour. I said, "Well, John, let me think about it."

I went back and thought about it for a week or so and came back and talked to him. And I said, "You know, it's a wonderful job, and it's really a fascinating job. And it would be a wonderful thing for me to do. And it's the kind of thing that I've wanted to move into. But I've got several problems: I'm on the school board." I now was on the school board. I hadn't been earlier. "And I can only have a part-time job. But that's not really my problem. I can't take this job. I'm not sure I'm capable of doing the job. But aside from that, I can't take the job because I'm the wife of a faculty member. And while the presidential advisory committee's going to be pretty straightforward, the search committee is going to get very, very complicated. And when you get down close to the end of this effort, it's going to be a very touchy thing. Dartmouth has not had a new president in 25 years." Am I right? Yes.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: "And there's no way that this isn't going to get really political, and it's going to be messy. It's just inevitable. And I don't think you can afford to have a faculty wife. We all go to parties. We all spend a lot of time with each other. And it just isn't going to work."

So I turned the job down. And they went away and looked for some other people for about a month or two. And then John called me back, and he said, "Now, we have all convened

and decided we really want you to do this job. And we will promise you—I mean we understand you're discreet and all that—and we will promise you that this will not be a problem to you. That we will never, ever blame you.”

Of course search committees do get complicated, and that one did get very complicated at the end. And I was, of course, really honored because they kept their promise in every way. So I became the executive secretary to the two outfits. Now the presidential search committee—the presidential advisory committee—was bureaucratic and big and involved and straightforward and produced a report. And it was a wonderful experience.

That's how I got to know John [W.] Hennessey [Jr.]. That's how I got to know all the deans. I mean I got to know an amazing number of people. All of them men, remember. No women on these committees at all—none! I mean it wasn't even an issue, wasn't even talked about. I was the only woman in the room. And I did all the work for them, and of course it took huge amounts of time. And it was enormously complicated. And it was a wonderful experience.

The other side of my life, the search committee, was really just one of the all-time greatest experiences of my life. I've never discussed it with anybody. I don't know what you have in the oral history files on that, do you know?

DONIN: Not a whole lot. Not from somebody sort of on the inside.

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: You're talking about the search?

MARTIN: Search committee for John Kemeny.

DONIN: Yes. No, I mean... You know Don Kreider we've interviewed. And John Copenhaver was interviewed by Jere Daniell. But I didn't ...I haven't listened to that interview. So I don't believe that there's... And I'm not sure that Don Kreider even talked about it. But I can't be certain about that.

MARTIN: Well, there are reports. I mean there's a report that was created and everything. I think...I don't think we need to

spend a lot of time on it. I think there are a couple of things that should just be noted somewhere because they have to do with the Parkhurst takeover, and I don't think any of that's recorded anywhere.

The search committee...my office was in the basement of Parkhurst Hall. It was as if I didn't exist. It was where...sort of the front part of the basement on the left-hand side. My one child who was left in middle school used to come and knock on the window at the basement, and I would be there ready to go home with him. And it was a wonderful experience.

The five trustees were completely dedicated to this, and getting to know them was a real privilege. I had the privilege of traveling the country with these men. They decided early on that they really needed to do two things: They needed to work hard to get a lot of names in the pot in the beginning. But they also needed to go out and interview a lot of people who were educators around the country because Dartmouth hadn't chosen a president for so long. And there were many of the people whom they'd like to interview that clearly they would like to have as candidates. But one didn't do that, and one still very frequently goes out and interviews them for their views of higher education.

We were gassed in Berkeley when we interviewed Roger Hines at the time of the Berkeley riots. We were at Santa Cruz during a very tough time. We had fascinating interviews with [Richard W.] Dick Lyman who was then provost of Stanford. He was stated at the very end of the search in the *New York Times* as one of Dartmouth's top choices. That's when the messy part started.

DONIN: And then he withdrew, I gather.

MARTIN: He withdrew. He and I are fairly good friends. We've known each other for many years and became good friends and are good friends today through me and my second husband. But he withdrew very late in the game.

We went all over. We were very often accompanied by several of the trustees who took it very seriously. Ralph Lazarus ['35] traveled, [Richard D.] Dick Hill ['41 TU '42],

other trustees. Don Kreider was very, very committed and traveled a great deal on these trips.

Then we collected files the way you would for any such thing. They were in this office in the basement of Parkhurst Hall, all the search committee files. They had no backups. They were not on computers. They were paper files. Those were the days. And they were there. And as the campus got more tense and as the society got more tense, I began to get very worried about these files. It was finally...we were getting down to the end of the search. And it was finally decided that I should take the files home. I didn't like that. Supposing my house burned down? Or supposing somebody knew they were in my house? Well, it ended up I did take the files home. I had all the presidential search committee files in my house for about a month, and they were in the back of my coat closet. And nobody knew where they were. [Laughter]

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: Now, I'd taken the precaution of Xeroxing them. Did we have Xerox machines then? I guess we did. I'd taken and copied them anyway. I mean I had duplicates and backups in another place. But they weren't in the library, and everybody was very nervous about having anybody know where they were or see them because it was just getting sort of tense. So that was sort of an interesting vignette of that search.

DONIN: So what was going through your mind when they actually...? Were you in the building when...?

MARTIN: I happen to have been in the building when Parkhurst was taken over, probably the only person who was in the building that nobody knows or remembers was in the building. Because our records didn't exist. I mean I was down there in the basement and we didn't exist. I actually went out of the building very late with John Dickey; we went out together, and he went out late just as they were... We went out the back door just as they were nailing it shut.

My memory initially was sort of a very odd memory because I was sitting at my desk in the building with the downstairs windows that are there, and then the windows are quite close to the ground. And my memory is the sound of the

pounding of feet coming on the ground, this mass of feet pounding and the screaming and yelling. But the reverberation in the ground in the basement. And then, you know, rushing the door and coming in. We'd been expecting something for quite a while. But that was the actual moment. Now I had taken the files out, and I was bringing files in during the day and taking them out with me, in and out, every day. So I think it's a piece of Dartmouth's little, minor historical vignette that nobody has. [Laughter] I think here we were choosing a new president of Dartmouth, and this little woman was wandering around with her briefcase full of presidential search files.

DONIN: The only records.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: The only records.

MARTIN: Yes. It was a part of the past. We would not operate that way today.

DONIN: Incredible.

MARTIN: And that sort of also indicates what it was like to be on the search committee; because since Dartmouth hadn't searched for anybody for so long. In the first place, we were totally ignored, and in the second place nobody really knew what to do about this or what to do when it was over. And we get to the beginning of the end here. But I mean we hadn't appointed anybody, and what was going to happen?

Well, the end was a trustee meeting weekend, and John Kemeny was sitting at home with baited breath, thinking that he might be appointed but not sure. And finally he got the call and came in and met with the trustees. And he had made it very clear from the beginning and all along the way that he wanted to be president of Dartmouth. He was not a coy candidate. This was not a game that he was playing at all. He's a very direct man and very honest—a totally honest and direct guy. So he wanted that job, and he wanted to have it. So he was appointed.

Now that was a two-year effort. I worked for that committee for two years, from '68 to '70; it was really a little before '68, but I think I started getting paid officially in '68. And in that capacity I think my salary went from \$2 to \$3 an hour. I think it may even have gone to four, but not beyond that. There was no other help in the office at any time. They were paranoid about secrecy. And it was a hard thing. I mean I can remember hating to go to cocktail parties because everybody would be talking about the topic of the day. And it was not very much fun that way. But the job itself was fascinating. And it certainly taught me a tremendous amount about working with people; it taught me a lot about organization and organizational needs and skills and office needs. And that was fun. So... And the advisory committee report was a good one.

DONIN: Did you have a sense all along that it was going to be John Kemeny? I mean you worked on it for two years.

MARTIN: Did I have the sense all along that it was going to be John Kemeny? No, I did not have the sense that the trustees had made up their mind prior to the last few months, few weeks. Few weeks. No. I certainly had the sense that John Kemeny was a strong candidate, as was Leonard [M.] Rieser ['44], you know, as were the other distinguished people from off campus. And they were down to about 12 very distinguished people around the country. But it was a prestigious job, and it was a very good job. And it hadn't come up for a long time. So I certainly had that sense.

But John Kemeny did not know he was going to be president of Dartmouth until that phone call came. Certainly the search committee, members of the search committee, had opinions. But they also had to present their recommendations to the full board, and the full board had to decide and vote. So there were conversations with the trustee members, and I think the faculty members were involved in those conversations some, but not all the time.

DONIN: Where was the issue of coeducation as this search was going on?

MARTIN: The issue of coeducation was always there. But interestingly enough—I've thought of this many times—I believe that the

search was not decided on the issue of coeducation. I believe that there are other candidates who would have been president of Dartmouth who would have had the same opinion and the same view that John Kemeny would have had. The issue of coeducation was always there within the trustees. The issue of coeducation was there within the trustees on the committee. On the five members of the search committee, not all of them were in favor of coeducation. They were split.

So it was always there. But John Kemeny was not appointed president of Dartmouth College because he was going to take the college coeducational. He was appointed president of Dartmouth... When he was appointed president of Dartmouth, the trustees knew that he would try to take the college coeducational, that that was his opinion. There was never any doubt in their minds. But there were other candidates who would have taken the college coeducational. He was not the only one.

So it was there. But to say that it was the key thing or to say that it was uppermost in their minds would have said that when they voted him as president, they also voted for coeducation, and that's just not what happened. They were still very split. I'm not even sure you would have said there was a majority in favor of coeducation at that time. There were strong trustees who were, and there were strong trustees on the search committee who were; some of whom were outspoken about it, some of whom were not so outspoken about it. But it was not decided on that basis. And coeducation was another decision to make, knowing that they would have an advocate there.

DONIN: Interesting... He had his work cut out for him.

MARTIN: And he certainly knew where he wanted to go. Now he's appointed. And the announcement is going to happen, but it hasn't happened yet. They haven't told anybody.

He sneaks into my office the next day. He didn't call and ask me to come to his house, which surprised me. I remember being surprised at the time. And he said...or maybe it was two days later...and he said, "I need to talk to you." He had a piece of paper, and on this piece of paper he had about 30

things on the piece of paper, and they were the things he wanted to talk to me about. The first thing, at the top of the paper, was would I be his secretary when he became president? And I said, "John, no. I don't type. I type...I mean anybody can type. But I don't type. You don't understand that you have a wonderful secretary in Ruth LaBombard who is secretary to John Dickey. She is first class, and you need her so much. She understands the college, she understands the president's office, she understands what needs to be done. I wouldn't understand any of that. I would be the worst choice you could make." And he said, "Oh, is she all right?"

He had no idea. He had no... John Kemeny became president of Dartmouth with no knowledge of the central administration beyond very...faculty, faculty committee, faculty working, but very limited knowledge of administrative practices, administration, practically nothing. He was a faculty choice. I mean he was a faculty person.

So that was the first question he asked me. We then went on to talk about all the things on his list. I've forgotten many of them because they immediately swirled up in a lot else. But then we went to the business of the announcement and how that was going to work, and how I would then work with the president's office in the next few days...I think maybe he was even there four hours later, I don't remember. I just know that we only had a very few, maybe two or three days, before the announcement would happen.

So I worked with the president's office to work out how that would all happen. But they had an engine up there. They had [A. Alexander] Alex Fanelli ['42], who was working on the bicentennial. They had [Gilbert R.] Gil Tanis ['38], who was the assistant to John Dickey, who just died last week. I was at his service on Saturday. And they had Ruth LaBombard and they had John Dickey. So all of that was going to be essentially handled there.

But the way they would relate to John Kemeny would be with me. And that was quickly decided because they had to have some way to do that and some way to arrange it. So I was never invited to meetings about the announcement or even a press meeting or anything ever, ever. But they did deal with me a little bit. Not much, a little bit.

So the announcement was going to be made and John Kemeny said, "Is there something else I should be thinking of?" And I said, "Yes, there's something very big you should be thinking of: What is going to happen in the six weeks between this announcement and your inauguration? You don't realize it, John, but there are going to be hundreds and thousands of letters and phone calls, and what sort of arrangement? And you've got to demand that Dartmouth give you money and give you the office space." He said, "Well, would you run that?" And he said, "And will you come to work for me after I'm president?" And I said, "Well, I don't think I'll come to work for you after you're president because, you know, I'm now...I'm very involved with the school board now. And I'm just spending so much time, nights, and I've got this kid, and I have to have a part-time job. I can't have a full-time job. But everybody has to do their thing. And of course I will do this for the next six weeks. There's no question about it. But I can't do it alone. I've got to have help. I've got to have a secretary. I've got to have somebody full time because it's going to be crazy." He said, "Yes! Here are all the people I want to see." And he had about 30 people he wanted to see and what he wanted to do. And I said, "Well..." So we agreed that I would hire somebody. I hired Mary [A.] DeWitt, who used to be married to Gordon [V.] DeWitt ['60], who worked for the college. He's retired now. And Mary's no longer married to him and she was a very good secretary. She was just great. And we spent the craziest...

The announcement came of his appointment and then we spent the craziest six weeks of our lives. I negotiated with the president's office for... We had a secretary, but then, of course, we had to answer all the thank-you letters, thousands and hundreds of letters and things came in. You know, we're talking about the size of this room and nobody having planned any of it because it was a different era.

So that's the pre... We're up to when John Kemeny was appointed. And then comes the inauguration and he works very hard on his speech; we worked on his speech together a lot. And of course, you know, he's constantly asking me to stay on as his research assistant, which would be my title. And I'm sort of saying, No, no, no. Well, of course, it's a very

heady six weeks, and it's almost...it's very difficult to say no to John Kemeny about anything anyway.

So he decides, okay, he's going to announce this effort to rededicate the college to the education of Indian students...not yet called Native American...Indian students. And that's going to be in the speech. [Edward T.] Eddie Chamberlain ['36] hears about it sort of in one meeting and has a fit. I'm not sure he even heard about it more than he heard that it was going to happen. I'm not sure whether they met. I don't remember.

I remember meetings. I remember meetings with the finance people. I remember meetings with John [F.] Meck [Jr. '33]. I remember meetings with all the deans, John [W.] Hennessey [Jr.] and other things in those six weeks. But I don't remember that John and Eddie met. I think Eddie says they didn't meet. And I can't say yes or no about that. But maybe they did. But certainly Eddie's point that he didn't have a lot of buildup for this or a little time to plan was quite accurate.

So John got to his inauguration day, and he decided that he would make that announcement. He also decided that in the press release following—he'd now persuaded me to come to be his research assistant part-time, 20 hours a week at \$4 an hour—he decided that he would make that announcement at his press conference. And that was an important announcement to him because I would be the first woman—this is why I told you the part earlier—in the Dartmouth administration outside of the library. And I would be the first. There may have been some other women in human resources that were officers; I do not believe so. I was to be an officer of the college. There were no women in all my relations.... The library had maybe one or two. Virginia [Lee] Close, I think, was an officer, and I think Barbara [B.] Brown was by then; I'm not sure. And there were a few professors—they were mainly lecturers—but there were a few assistant professors who were women. There was a person in chemistry and a few, but mainly lecturers. But there were no women administrators.

The Twelve-College Exchange program was going—had been going—now for five or six years. That's a whole different subject. But that was not run that way. So I agreed

to come to work. He said he'd make the announcement. And he said, "Now I want you to be very clear about what I'm doing here, Lu, because by this—I want you to work for me anyway. I think you've done a terrific job in these six weeks and I think you're great." And all those nice things and sweet things and everything. But he said, "I'm making a statement. I'm making a statement about coeducation. I want you to understand that." I said, "I understand it, John." "And does this bother you?" "No."

I thought it was amazing that he would say that. Because in those days... I mean in the first place he wasn't terribly sensitive to people's thinking. But it was also something people didn't really say or care about. Nowadays you'd expect it. So I thought that was quite an interesting moment in my life with John. And I said, "Well, John, of course I'm honored, and I hope I can help you. You've got a great staff up there. I'm not quite sure what I can do for you. But let's give it a shot."

The reason I go into that detail on that is that the press conference came, and the inauguration was a great day, and he gave a wonderful talk. Just a wonderful talk, if you've ever read it. I think it's a great talk. And he gave his press conference and it was a total non-event.

DONIN: Oh!

MARTIN: My appointment was never mentioned. It was never in the press. It was never—happened! He announced it and it was a non-event. And I was always struck that in the first year or two years that I worked at Dartmouth, now really as an official person, March of 1970... I don't consider the '68 job as working for Dartmouth. It was sort of—they wished I wasn't there, but they had to have somebody, and I'm not even sure I got benefits. I don't think I got benefits 'til I went to the president's office.

I was asked over and over by faculty, by people you would think of as liberals, by alumni—or not alumni; I didn't know alumni—by administrators, by trustees (by now I knew five trustees very well; I didn't know the other trustees) what it was like to be John Kemeny's secretary. They didn't mean that in a demeaning way at all. But it would never occur to

them that there was any other role that a woman would have or that I would have. I don't think it even put it in their minds, we would today think of as a role for women. In their minds they weren't thinking of that as a role for women. They were just... It wouldn't occur to them that I would have another role except as John Kemeny's secretary.

DONIN: And this is 1970.

MARTIN: And this is 1970. Now in only '63 the college wouldn't sponsor our little effort to go do a survey. So we're only talking about seven years when you think back.

DONIN: A huge jump actually.

MARTIN: Actually. But it is 1970.

DONIN: What was your official title?

MARTIN: I was research assistant to the president was my official title. And I started to work. I had an office. I think I—I did not have... Well, let's see. Mary DeWitt came up. Yes, Mary DeWitt came with me upstairs because it was also clear that John was going to generate a lot more paperwork and office things than John Dickey had. John Dickey wrote a lot of his own letters and he did a lot of his own work which John Kemeny had no intention of doing. In the first place he didn't write very well and in the second place he freely admitted he was a very slow reader. It was very hard for him—because he read so slowly—to absorb large amounts of information and write letters. He was a mathematician. And so Mary DeWitt came upstairs with me and I think she was full time because we needed... Ruth LaBombard couldn't handle it all, the energy and the stuff that—still stuff was happening every minute and it was beyond what Ruth could do. So Mary DeWitt moved into the president's office and I think worked for me. Yes, she worked for me.

DONIN: Who else was in that office? Alex Fanelli?

MARTIN: Alex Fanelli was in the...he'd worked on the bicentennial.

DONIN: I'm going to stop you.

**[End of Tape 2, Side A – Beginning of Tape 2, Side B]**

DONIN: Okay. So you were describing the makeup of John Kemeny's office.

MARTIN: Alex Fanelli had worked on the bicentennial and he wanted very much to remain in the office and work for John Kemeny. He admired him a great deal. And Gil Tanis had been the assistant to John Dickey as the sort of major assistant. Before Alex came, Gil was the only officer.

John Kemeny was clearly going to have a larger office. I mean we already had two secretaries now. They had me half time to do research. And I was to do research on his talks and his speeches and national things and things he wanted to speak out on. And on coeducation and on things that he wanted to take stands on.

Alex was to work more on answering alumni questions. Alex Fanelli took every single letter that came into the president's office. He looked at every piece of mail. And he would draft a response to every alumnus. John Kemeny would review that draft and sign off on it. But Alex would draft the responses. And he stood up at a typewriter. He had a standup typewriter. And he would stand there and spend maybe three to four hours a day on drafting letters. And of course we'd have a lot of letters because it was generating a whole... It was a time of great turmoil and it was generating...

This was March of '70, and we didn't know what it was going to be like in six weeks. But we knew it was a time of turmoil in the United States.

Gil Tanis was the assistant who—in John Dickey's time and in the beginning of John Kemeny's time—worked with all the other people around the college in relationships with the president's office. And he had done that for John Dickey for a long time; he was devoted to John Dickey. And actually he had worked—John Dickey had written all his own letters, but Gil Tanis would work with him on that.

So that in a way Alex was taking a little bit of that job, and in a way I was taking a little bit of that job. And I think we were very sensitive to the fact that this might be a tough transition

for Gil, who was a committed, caring man, who believed strongly in Dartmouth. He had strong Dartmouth alumni identification and relationships, and he had strong opinions on things, and he cared about things. So he wanted to be sure that the president knew his view of alumni feelings and his view of what was happening.

The office was always a perfectly happy place. It was never... It didn't become very political. John Kemeny was not an internally political person. He was a very smart politician and he was very smart politically. But he was not an emotionally internally political person with his staff. In the entire time that I worked for John, which turned out to be many, many years, both formally and then even after he was president informally, I never saw John get mad or do mean things within his office. He might get mad about issues. He might get upset about issues. He might have political opinions. But he would never get mad at people.

He treated Ruth LaBombard...respected her, valued her in a way that I think enhanced her job and enhanced her over the years remarkably. She was a remarkable person who was very modest about her skills. And John Kemeny really brought those skills out and helped Ruth become an even more accomplished assistant. So that was what the office was like in the beginning.

Gil Tanis I think found it hard to work with John. He would never say that because he believed and cared. But it was very hard to make the transition from one president to another. And after about a year, John Kemeny had been quite interested in starting something called the Dartmouth Institute, which would be a program for senior executives to come back to Dartmouth and have a liberal arts experience under the auspices of the Tuck School. And John Kemeny and Gil Tanis made the agreement—I've forgotten how long it was; maybe it was less than a year, but it was after a time—that Gil would become the first executive director of the Dartmouth Institute.

Gil just put his heart and soul into that job, loved the job, cared a lot about it, gave it all the caring that he'd given. And I think it was the right decision because Gil was from a different era of presidents and a different era of working with

a president.

Now what was John Kemeny's office like? Quite quickly it became clear that he wanted to delegate things in a way that John Dickey hadn't delegated. And he wanted to delegate... He certainly didn't want to delegate any decision-making or on policy issues he was certainly his own person on that. But details didn't interest him, small details didn't interest him. He wanted to get good people around him and then he wanted them to run it. And he wanted to be sure he set the tone and set the strategy. Now this was sort of moving along in the first six weeks, thinking about his early years. He was thinking about his aims in coeducation. He was thinking about strengthening the college.

All of a sudden in six weeks Cambodia and Kent State happened and everybody's world changed. And they changed really quite significantly. John Kemeny turned into a leader, I believe, at the moment that Cambodia and Kent State happened. That was the moment. Up until then John Kemeny was having a six-week honeymoon. He was already making many, many plans about what he was going to do. A couple of things happened during the six weeks that I'll get back to. But that moment was a defining moment in John Kemeny's presidency of how he acted as president, what he did in reacting to the situation—by canceling classes, a very controversial thing to do at that time. By insisting on seminars and colloquiums being held throughout the campus. And then working very closely with students. He had students in the office all the time. The place was a mass of people all the time.

DONIN: He had several interns, didn't he?

MARTIN: Yes. Well, he was just starting that. But I'm just talking about this particular moment because it was such a defining moment. The decision to stop having, stop paying for all the house party... House party weekend was coming up that weekend. Stop paying for all the house party things. Cancel all the sort of paid parties. And have a huge party in Leverone Field House which would be free to everybody, which John Kemeny would open, and bands would all come there. And they would show their allegiance to the issues of the time.

It was that famous moment and that famous time when the *[Manchester] Union Leader* that morning came out with their story about "Dartmouth picked a lemon." They had been quite kind to him in the first six weeks. They hadn't said too much. Part of my job was to read all the papers and watch that because that was something that was my responsibility. And clearly that moment, because of what he'd said about Cambodia and what he'd done about the period of time in canceling classes, the *Union Leader* just came out with a big assault by saying Dartmouth picked a lemon.

It was Jean [Alexander] Kemeny—not John, Jean Kemeny—who made the decision, or who came into the office, and said, "We should throw lemons out at the party." She was very proud of that. She should have been. Jean and I scoured every store. We went down and bought the lemons that were thrown. And we had baskets at the front of the stage with the lemons. And John gave that moment of his speech, and then he started throwing lemons out, and then Jean started throwing lemons out. And then of course the lemon tree happened from the faculty and all the myths and the folklore that surrounds that moment.

But I think it was a very significant time. It was when John Kemeny got the allegiance of the faculty, the students, the campus. And it was I think crucial to his later initiatives in going coed and doing everything. So that happened.

At the same time he becomes president, wanting to go coed, having many, many plans, and double-digit inflation hits this country and the oil crisis. So you have Cambodia, Kent State, double-digit inflation, and the oil crisis. I mean these were insurmountable issues. How is he going to go coeducational in such a time when he couldn't build dormitories and he couldn't do anything?

But all this you have from other people. I don't think I need to get into the ins and outs of deciding on the Dartmouth Plan, all the reviews, the alumni surveys. I think it's important that anybody who does this oral history project remind each person who listens to their tape that after the coeducational decision, we received in the president's office only 52 negative letters. Now that's a very small number when you

think of all that went into it. And I've always felt that was a great tribute to John Kemeny, to the trustees, to the alumni office at Dartmouth, to all the people who worked on the coeducation decision that it had been so well thought through and so well brought forward that to get only 52 negative letters after the decision...

We expected hundreds. Alex and I had agreed that he and I would pitch in and we'd all work on letters and we didn't have to. I think that's a nice little postscript to that story. I didn't plan to spend a lot of time on the decision itself because I think you have... I mean I'd be very happy at any time if you want to ask me questions about it or if there are things that come up about it. I was very involved in it. I was involved in the surveys for it. I was involved in all that went on within the office.

John Kemeny certainly never waivered in his desire to take the college coed. Felt it was just essential. There were disappointments in funding. I'm sure you have heard about some of them. I think the major one was with Governor [Nelson A.] Rockefeller ['30]. Is that on tape?

DONIN: Not specifically related to coeducation, no.

MARTIN: John figured that even by taking the college to year-round operation and by doing everything else, he needed a certain amount of money. And his early estimate—I don't remember exactly the estimate; it's in writing somewhere in the archives, but my memory is \$3 million, but it may have been more or less than that. It was very modest; I remember that and he needed that much, even doing everything else.

Finally a decision was made that the one person who had pushed for coeducation while he was on the board of trustees all straight along was Governor Rockefeller. That Nelson had wanted Dartmouth to go coed. He'd made public statements about it. He made no bones about it. And so the development office decided that—and the president's office—decided that the thing to do was to get to Nelson. It took forever to get the appointment in the governor's mansion, and it was decided to try to see him at home. Which John did.

John went to Albany to see him. John didn't care for traveling, as I'm sure you've heard. I have many, many stories. I ran all of his travel later on. He went to see Nelson, and Nelson essentially said, "No, no, I've put all my money into art and politics." We asked Nelson... I believe that he asked Nelson for either 750,000 or a million, one of those two figures, because I know it was very large. And it was to work on the gymnasium facilities and coed bathrooms. It was to enable Dartmouth to do the structural things that had to happen to go coed. He said, "No, I've put all my money into politics and art, and the only thing... I can't do it. I can't give you any money for that. And the only thing is that you have a [Pablo] Picasso of mine. I gave you a Picasso. It's in the Hood Museum."

I want to tell this story because I've heard many other versions of this story, and almost every one I've heard is incorrect, and this is an important story. He said, "If you want, John, to sell the Picasso for coeducation, you go right ahead. I gave that to the college with no restrictions. It was an unrestricted gift. And if you want to sell it for coeducation, that's fine with me." And John came back and said, "I'll never sell the Picasso."

The reason I want to be sure this is in this oral history record is that I've heard Leonard Rieser's version or what is purported to be Leonard Rieser's version, which is that John tried to sell the Picasso. I've heard three directors of the Hood Museum tell me that John Kemeny tried to sell the Picasso. I've heard over and over, the lore over at the Hood Museum, a building I helped to build and directors I helped recruit since I was on four search committees for the Hood, that John Kemeny tried to sell the Picasso to go coeducational. It is not correct. I can't quite figure out where this story came from, except I understand what the story was, and I can see why it might have changed. But I feel very badly that John has this reputation of trying to sell art to go coed because it just isn't true. It didn't happen.

DONIN: Well, good. It's now official.

MARTIN: Yes. I think that's important to put on the record.

DONIN: It is important.

MARTIN: And I will probably have to... Two years ago—a year ago I had to say to Derrick Cartwright that story's not true and I still hear it all the time.

DONIN: Isn't that interesting.

MARTIN: So it's a common lore story about John. So that's really that...

DONIN: So Nelson Rockefeller did not...

MARTIN: He didn't give a penny, not a penny.

DONIN: Wow!

MARTIN: It was a great disappointment, very sad. One thing that happened just when John became president that is not fully understood and is terribly significant for John's presidency is that within the first two weeks of his presidency, Harvey [P.] Hood [II '18], then a trustee of the college—and I can't remember whether Harvey Hood was...I think he had already retired from the board, but he may have been on for a year. I don't remember Harvey Hood being on the board when John was appointed. I don't remember. But he might have been. I do remember that Harvey Hood was not on the board when they went coed. But I don't remember whether he was a trustee when John was appointed. Do you know?

DONIN: I'll just look at my list here. No, he was already off.

MARTIN: Yes, he was already off.

DONIN: He was off in '67.

MARTIN: Okay, so he'd been off the board three years. That was my memory as well. At this point I hadn't met him. I became very, very close to the Hood family and remain close to the Hood family and spend a lot of time with them still today. But Harvey, who knew John but very lightly, didn't know him well, knew him as that "smart mathematics professor." And certainly Harvey's background would have in no way indicated that John Kemeny would be any personal favorite of his at all.

He came to John Kemeny and said, “I want to make an anonymous gift to you. You have got to learn a great deal about the administration of the college. You’ve been brought up in the faculty, and you don’t know about the administration of the college. And so I want to make a gift of \$250,000.” It was a very large gift in those days. “And I want this gift to be used to do a study of all of the nonacademic areas of the college. And I think that you need to do this if you’re going to be a good president.”

John accepted Harvey’s gift and started a study which Paul [F.] Young [’49] and I started working on...Paul being the treasurer at the time, or assistant treasurer. No, treasurer. I guess he’d become treasurer. Yes, he had become treasurer. And then I became the liaison for this whole Cresap, McCormick and Paget study which I worked on for almost two years. It was a crucial study for John. I and [Rodney A.] Rod Morgan [’44 TH ’45 TU ’45], who then became vice president of administration, persuaded Cresap, McCormick and Paget—I remember going to New York to persuade them of this—that in addition to producing a report... I was very leery of consultants because they often fleeced universities with a lot of boilerplate. And I was wanting to figure out how this could really be useful. I also knew that John Kemeny didn’t read much, didn’t read a lot, didn’t want to. It wouldn’t work just reading a written report.

So I said that the head of the study, who was a vice president of Cresap, McCormick, and somebody whom John became very close to, had to come up four times a year and meet with John in addition to the regular meetings we’d have, sort of a day and a half of meetings. It would be a private meeting between the two of them, where each one could say anything to the other. But that the study wouldn’t... Whatever happened, that had to happen. And it did. It did for almost two years.

This study turned out to be very, very helpful to John because in a very short space of time, he learned a lot about admissions, about development, about administration, the Tuck School, the dean of the college, everything that was nonacademic. And it was a key thing.

Harvey Hood...I think he was a prescient person. He just was an amazing guy to have thought that all through. So that was also the beginnings. That study, when I took it over, was the beginning of my moving into the more central part of John's office and also the beginning of my working with the various areas of the college.

When Gil Tanis left, we did not—he was not replaced. I moved into his role. And Alex Fanelli took care of all of the work with the trustees, all the work with alumni -- I had no involvement with alumni -- and various other things that were assigned. And I had various things assigned.

I took over all the daily relationships with the internal part of the college, sort of a... certainly not as effective, but the then Sheila Culbert role. And Sheila certainly has a far greater...is more competent and capable and a greater effect. But I had that role. It worked well for us.

I have a Kemeny vignette that we always used to laugh about in the office a lot that's too minor to be recorded in any historical sense. John Kemeny hated mail. He just hated mail. And he figured that the only way to deal with mail was to try to compress it into the smallest amount of time possible. Now the mail that came in and the sort of letters Alex would deal with and the drafts would come to me. I would sort them all through and we'd figure out how to deal with them.

But mail to him meant all the internal memos and all the things from his vice presidents and everything that was communicated to him. Pretty much with the exception of anything between John and Leonard Rieser -- that was different -- that was academic -- that was the faculty.

Now there were memos that I had to deal with with Leonard. They met on a weekly basis for an hour, an hour and a half, at least if not more. There was a presidential executive group that met every ten days or two weeks; it met a lot. I was on that group. I was the secretary of the group; so I sort of convened, you know, as the secretary.

But his idea was that all the stuff that would come into the office would come... Alex would read everything, then it

would all come to me. And then I would sort it out, and we would figure out how to deal with it. And he would have a time slot, and he would say, well... His idea was that in two hours a week, he ought to be able to handle all that. And we would argue with him, and we would fight with him, and we would say, "John, you can't do that. Some of these things you're just going to have to take home and read. And some of these things... But you can't do that in two hours." And he'd say, "I'm spending too much time on mail!" Whenever he'd get frustrated with anything, "I'm spending too much time..."

So I was sort of the bad guy around town. I felt a tremendous responsibility for this because although it sounds like a very small item, it was important that the vice presidents and deans and everybody else not think that somebody was filtering their stuff. You can't get into that. And yet essentially, frequently, they were being filtered. And, you know, it's like you put the page executive summary on, but they wouldn't do that.

It taught me a great deal. I learned probably more from that experience in my entire life than anything else I have in my professional life -- that I had to be totally impartial and I had to be totally fair. And if I had to describe something, it had to be described in whatever voice the person sending it wanted to do. Nothing to do with any opinion that I might have about it.

And, you know, you as a librarian would understand that. But many administrators—people who work in other fields—don't. It would not have ever been fair to Vice President Hicks and then [George] Colton ['35] and then [Addison L. "Ad"] Winship [II '42] or to a dean to in any way alter that. And also of course it had to be completely discreet. It was a tough thing.

It sounds like such a small item. And yet it was probably one of the toughest things I ever did. I spent more time on paperwork and tried to condense it and at the same time persuade John to read things and persuade him to go into some things in greater depth. And he would like to listen to a memo and then say, "Well, let's tell them A, B, and C. Figure

it out." Sometimes you could get away with calling somebody and doing it on the phone, sometimes you couldn't.

Sheila [Culbert] does this very, very well. But it's a very delicate role and one that any assistant to the president has to be very, very careful of. Guess it was about a year or two, a couple of years in, that I became special assistant to the president. I think it was after two or three years.

It was really to give me a promotion. It was about this time—or maybe about a year later, in the four years—that we got an affirmative action officer, and Errol Hill became Dartmouth's first affirmative action officer. And you may or may not know that Errol Hill did a survey of all salaries in the college. When he completed his survey, he asked for an appointment with John, and he came in to see John. And he said, "John, I have a problem. You have an affirmative action issue in your office." And John said, "I don't. Of course I don't." He said, "Well, you do. Lu is tremendously underpaid in comparison to others—the men in the college with the same jobs." So I got a very nice raise because of Errol Hill.

DONIN: Great.

MARTIN: And John was shocked and upset and certainly never intended this.

DONIN: Alex Fanelli has a cute story, and I don't think this is violating any discretion on my part in talking to the tape. But he said he actually had to learn how to speak in sort of John Kemeny speak.

MARTIN: Absolutely!

DONIN: Because of that wonderful Hungarian way of speaking, he definitely worded things differently.

MARTIN: Yes. He had to learn how to speak in John's voice and write in John's voice. And Alex did it superbly. He wrote every one of those letters. And John did edit them minimally and often not at all. The only time there was trouble was when Alex would get mad. And periodically Alex would really get mad at just an outrageous alumni letter. And I think Alex would agree with me that there were times when he just got so mad

that the letter was an intemperate one. And I did see the letters. And if there was such a thing, I would say to John Kemeny that he had to read this letter carefully. It was sort of my code for saying: You really have to read this carefully. And there were a few times when either John or I would edit the letter. But Alex was fabulous. And of course he took care of all of the trustee work. All of the work that is now done by one person, Alex did in addition to everything else.

DONIN: The records that he turned over to the archives here are superb.

MARTIN: Oh, I'm sure they are.

DONIN: Superb!

MARTIN: I'm sure they are. They'd be just first class.

Trustee meetings... Prior to coeducation, I never attended a trustee meeting. But John made it clear to me and to Alex—I think Alex was...it was a little hard for Alex—that when the decision to go coed was made, I was going to attend trustee meetings. And again, it was the symbol, my presence in the room. I didn't do anything. It actually was very helpful in my work because to just be there was an enormous help; but I didn't have a role at all. Now I had known five trustees through the search committee.

Then because I was attending trustee meetings, I began to get to know other trustees, which comes along a little bit later in my change in the '70s, when I began to leave John's more immediate office. Because it was that exposure to the trustees that very much changed my life.

But going back to the early years when Ruth [M.] Adams was the vice president and when John was...when I was running John's office with Alex and Ruth was vice president, Ruth was invited to go to a speech, to go to an alumni speech in Albany. Do you have that on tape anywhere?

DONIN: I've been instructed to make sure that you tell this story actually.

MARTIN:

I see. Well, Ruth didn't...I mean women didn't go out and speak for the college yet at all. And why the alumni office chose Albany, I've never understood.

By now I was meeting with the alumni office all the time because I went to all of John Kemeny's travel events, which I probably should say something about sometime. But Ruth was asked to go and meet with the alumni in Albany and give her—give a talk.

Ruth hadn't been out much and she went to Albany and it was just awful. It was the worst experience in the world. They just beat her up and down. They beat Dartmouth up and down. They beat Dartmouth up and down on coeducation. We really didn't... We had occasionally... Most alumni meetings would have two or three, one or two, questions telling Kemeny what a stinker he was because of coeducation. You have that, and John was used to it. But not a blast.

There was one particular man—a dentist or a doctor—Greenberg [Lyon M. Greenberg '54] from Albany who just was totally offensive. And it was personally offensive, it was an anti-coeducation tirade and ruining the college and what was she doing? And it was offensive to John. It was offensive to Ruth who was—if you ever met her—was a very proper lady and a wonderful woman, a very close friend of mine. And she came back from that speech... She had been just wonderful.

She came back from that speech madder than I have ever seen her. And she pulled herself up, as only Ruth Adams could do, and marched into the president's office and told John soup to nuts, everything that went on at that meeting! And she announced that she would no longer meet with any alumni.

John was shocked and said, "Well! If that's the way it is, you certainly don't have to meet with any alumni." At which point he said, "Get me George Colton!" who was the vice president for alumni. And I began to try to find George Colton. Well, George Colton had been to Hawaii, and had flown in on something like 18 to 24 hours, and had just arrived in Hanover half an hour or an hour before and was

home in bed asleep. And John... I went back, and I said, "Well, George has just come in from Hawaii, and he's home in bed asleep. He hasn't had any sleep for 24 hours." And he said, "You get him here in an hour." [Laughter]

DONIN: Hold it, hold it. Let's turn it over.

**[End of Tape 2, Side B – Beginning of Tape 3, Side A]**

DONIN: Okay. So George Colton?

MARTIN: So I called Ruth Colton, and I said, "I'm terribly sorry, but there's an emergency at the president's office. And we— John just has to see George." "Well, John can't see George, you know. He's exhausted and is asleep." I said, "I know, Ruth, I'm sorry. It's an emergency, and he has to see him. And please tell George to come to the office as fast as he can and have his secretary call me, and I will meet him in his office first."

John, of course, did not tell me to do that. In fact he would have been furious if he'd known I did it. But one did these things occasionally with John Kemeny. I won't dwell on many of them, but there were occasions.

So George came in his office. I went to his office. I said, "We have to be in the president's office immediately. He's waiting for you, and I will talk to you on the way over." I told him what had happened. And George is a lovely man, very much of an old-school man and not effusive like Orton Hicks but just very much of an old-school person. He came in and John Kemeny just ripped him up, down, and sideways. And I always felt very badly about it. I waited. And after he left, I went back... I went out and walked back with him. And I said, "George, this really isn't to do with you. This is to do with just a total frustration. And we'll talk about it. But let's not talk about it now. You go home and go to bed."

That leads to the relationship I had with the alumni office, which was not always a very happy one. It was a very happy one with George. George and I were very close, and we had, I think, a very good working relationship. I probably spent more time than I should've... He liked going to lunch. We had a martini at lunch which he always paid for. We'd have a

martini and he would pay for it. He would want me to have a martini and he would pay for it. Sometimes I would, sometimes I wouldn't. He would be unhappy if I didn't.

I worked hard to keep that relationship because I knew that it was very hard for the alumni relations office and the development office to accept much of what was happening in coeducation, much of who John was and how he worked.

One of my jobs was to serve on the travel committee for his travels. And John was not an easy traveler. He didn't like to travel. He didn't like alumni meetings. He had acrophobia. He was petrified of airplanes. It was very difficult for him to fly. Before a plane trip he took a Valium, drank two martinis on the plane, and then had to have a couple of hours at the other end. They couldn't accept that. Why couldn't he get off the plane, behave, work?

Early in his presidency in Detroit he was booked into the Detroit club which had rules against black people.

DONIN: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: And John... An alumnus, I think, was in Detroit or came to Detroit or heard he was there, and said something and that's the first time John heard about it. And it was after he had been...it was while he was there. And that was actually the impetus for putting me on the travel committee. He said, "You will go to every single meeting of this travel committee. I will never be booked into a discriminatory club."

So the alumni relations people felt very threatened by me, very pushed. And I felt that it was good that George and I over the years could have this relationship. I had heard—I heard rumors at one point that George was a boyfriend of mine. I found that, of course, offensive, but, you know, that's what... But I did spend that much time with him because it was so hard.

I hated working on the travel committee. The people in alumni relations were perfectly nice people, but they had no idea who John Kemeny was. They simply didn't know how to book him properly. We did get a fair number of press things. John was very good at press. But he liked to go to high

schools while he was there, and they didn't want that. They didn't... I'd ask every time, "Is the club discriminatory?" They'd say, "Well, I don't know, we didn't check it." "Well, check it."

It was always a very difficult relationship. And I tell you that because I obviously ended up working in that area on something that I certainly didn't want to do and didn't anticipate, didn't yearn for. But John was firm that he had to have somebody that he trusted in there with his view of what was happening, and help him execute what he wanted to do.

He was very good at alumni receptions. But in the early days—I mean now alumni will all tell you whenever you meet, "Oh, John Kemeny was the best president Dartmouth ever had." That was not true in the early days. They didn't think he was that great. They thought he was a faculty liberal. They thought he was pushing them to places they didn't want to go. Now you would never know that. You talk to any alumnus and the sun rises and sets on John Kemeny.

DONIN: The vision is changing.

MARTIN: Jean was of enormous help. John was terrible at names. Jean remembered every name everywhere. And I think you have all this on tape, that they would travel together, and she would always be with him. I mean there were very few times... And if she wasn't with him, I would sit with him up in first class and I would talk about Jean and the children on the whole trip. And that's how we would get through the plane trip. Because he could get his mind off traveling if I talked about Jean and the children and talked to him. But other than that, he couldn't do any work, and he couldn't... But most of the time Jean was—almost all the time—Jean was with him. She was invaluable. She remembered everything. People loved her. She loved the events. I mean she claims later that she didn't love them that much. But she did love them, and she knew she loved them.

DONIN: And she was good at it.

MARTIN: She was fabulous at it. Until Susan Wright came along, she was just the most extraordinary woman in the world. Jean in her own way was just fabulous. I mean we would... I decided

that as we were getting ready for our campaign in the president's office, we should have lunches in the president's house after the Horizons Programs, which is a way you cultivate alumni on campus periodically during the year. There's going to be one the end of this month. And Jean would have these lunches, and I would work with George Colton on the guest lists, and I would be there, and these people would come.

Jean would say...and she'd sort of come in in a whooping way, and lunch would be served. And dessert would come. And for instance, she'd say, "Well, you've got to eat the pralines! I made them at four o'clock this morning! Well, I made those pralines, you'd better damn well eat them!"

That was Jean Kemeny, you know, the explosive woman who also took a great interest in John's work. And if there was ever... If crises developed, whether they were Cambodia, Kent State, coeducation, or whatever was happening, Jean would become a member of the office. You've probably heard this. She would camp out in the office, which had its challenges. But she...

DONIN: I gather John Kemeny wanted her to go to faculty meetings as well.

MARTIN: Well, they both wanted...that's both of them. John did and Jean did. It wasn't just John.

Jean is responsible for a rule that exists today in faculty meetings. Jean would come to the faculty meetings with her cigarettes and she would sit in the front row or close—usually close to the front row or in the front row, smoking like a chimney, and she would... If there were questions, Jean would turn around and if it was a question she didn't like, she'd say, "Oh, my God!" Or whatever she chose to say at that moment. Or give a terrible face. Or, "Oh, John, you poor thing," or something like that. So this was relatively disconcerting to faculty members in a setting that they considered to be their meeting.

So because of that, after several years, the faculty voted to have an observer section. And to this day, there is a faculty meeting section, and the argument is that those are the

voting faculty; that's why they're there because they're voting. And this is the observer section. But the reason that rule went in—and I was there when it went in—was because that put Jean Kemeny in the back of the room in the observer section instead of up with the voting faculty. Up until then they'd never thought about it.

But I think, you know, John was...he became more and more adept in alumni speaking. In the beginning he was kind of abrupt. Not very good. He gave wonderful talks. But by the end, about the last four or five years, he was just a first-class speaker.

He was always a great speaker. You probably know that he never wrote out a speech. He always wrote the last sentence of every speech. Every speech he ever gave, he had the last sentence so that he could time his speech and then end up giving the last sentence. He never went over. He was just a brilliant, brilliant speaker.

I thought just in the time we have left I'd talk a little bit about when I first got to Parkhurst Hall and the first time that I was on the staff and there was a meeting. When John... The first meeting that happened was a meeting that John Dickey had to introduce John Kemeny to the staff of the college, the administrative staff, all of them. I think there were 40 people there, 30 people. In the first floor of Parkhurst Hall in what is now the treasurer's office -- Adam Keller of the treasurer's office, vice president and treasurer -- was a conference room. That was not offices; it was a fairly large conference room on the first floor on the right-hand side as you go in and that's where the president always met with his staff.

So after John Kemeny took over in March of '70, or after he'd been appointed, but it was at the time he was taking over, not close to his appointment. It was a time close to his inauguration, either before or right after. John Dickey had a meeting. It was right after. John Dickey met with the staff and John Kemeny. And John Kemeny insisted that I come to this meeting. I think that I was the only new person in the room. And John came and sat with John Dickey at the end of the table, and I came and sat in the very, very back at the far end. And I've always remembered that meeting because

everybody in the room turned around and looked at me. It wasn't antagonistic; it wasn't welcoming. It was just odd.

DONIN: You were the only woman in the room.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. I was the only woman in any of those meetings. But it was as if, he isn't really doing this, is he? So in that first year or two years, or soon after that, Marilyn Austin came, after coeducation. But in that early time, it was a very odd situation to be in. It was not... I mean you were always the only person but you expected that. I had been through that through the whole presidential search process so I wasn't unaccustomed to it. But you think back today and you think of situations like this, and you think of the more activist time after coeducation when people began to really object to this and you realize how far this society has come. Because you really wouldn't think of that.

DONIN: Well, the early women faculty that we've talked to talked about that same feeling of walking into a classroom.

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm. Yes. Exactly.

DONIN: And, you know, the sort of charged air...

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: ...existed. The atmosphere was...

MARTIN: I think Colette Gaudin felt it very strongly, of the various women. Of course, Marysa Navarro—Marysa, of course, was the first woman tenured faculty member, and my best friend was a woman by the name of Jeanne Prosser, who would have become a very important figure on this campus but died tragically of cancer. She lived next door to me on Occom Ridge. She was a French historian. And I really admired those women because the faculty—I don't think the faculty, while they were more liberal, the men on the faculty were more liberal than the men in the administration by a long shot...

If you look at the recent controversy about athletics on this campus, you could see the same division of feeling between administration and faculty today on a different issue. But I

don't see that the—I'm sorry about that division. I think it's bad for the college to have that sort of taking sides and coming into two distinct camps.

But in the last two or three weeks, I've certainly felt that on the Dartmouth campus as I happen to go to the gym three times a week. So I spend some time down there, and I talk with the athletic director, and I have a lot of friends in the administration and a lot of friends in the faculty because my background is faculty. So I'm one of the few people who's been able to see both sides of that.

If you look at this controversy in the last few weeks, I see that it's not that different from the controversies that I saw over coeducation. Now it's not women and men. But it's two different world views, two different views of how the world is constructed, how it should move forward, how it should be created, how it should happen. And I'm sure that the faculty members who feel strongly that Karl Furstenburg's position was not only the right one but it's a very good thing have a world view that—and I know that it doesn't match the view over here with some of the administrators—and I think that that is exactly what we saw in those days. The faculty had a different view.

But at the same time, I think, some of the faculty were just as antagonistic to women as the administrators were. Not as antagonistic. I mean nothing could have been quite as antagonistic. But they were pretty antagonistic.

So it was an interesting time. It was a very different experience to work as... You had to take it... I was lucky and fortunate, one, that I was a faculty wife and had kids in the school system, and I was known in the community, well known in the community. And I was young. But also I was lucky because my role is that of a helper role. It was never that of a policymaker. So I really was—my role was to help John Kemeny be the best president he could be. And that's the only role I had. I didn't have any other role.

DONIN: Well, except that...

MARTIN: And that's very...so that I was always in a position where whatever I said, I had to be sure that it reflected, as much as

I could reflect it, John Kemeny's public views on any issue and no more.

DONIN: Well, I think you probably had other roles imposed on you without necessarily wanting them; i.e., you know, a pioneer here.

MARTIN: You did, but you had to be very careful about that because you couldn't get... Whereas my faculty friends, Marysa and others, could play that role, I really couldn't because John Kemeny had to play what role he had to play. Personally, of course, that was very difficult because they got quite angry sometimes or they didn't appreciate, you know, I was a copout and all of that. So that wasn't... That goes back to my daughters, "It's so hard to work at Dartmouth." But that was my problem. That wasn't their problem. My role was not that role.

DONIN: No.

MARTIN: And we did have a women's group, an administrative-faculty women's group, about 12 or 15 of us that met frequently. So I was always in touch with that. I don't think there was any doubt in their minds where my heart was. I don't think...maybe because of all the things I'd done before in my outside life. But when I started working for John, I knew that had to be—it had to be a very defined role. Well, look at Bob's role. Your husband is the counsel for Dartmouth College. That's his role. Is that any different? I mean it's different because he speaks for the college. I didn't speak for the college. John spoke for the college. But is it any different in his having to make sure that his role is that of supporting the policies of the president and the trustees? No.

DONIN: Right. Completely unbiased and never showing your own personal opinions.

MARTIN: Exactly. And I think in a funny way that helped me—it taught me an enormous amount when I later began to work with alumni. It taught me many, many professional lessons. And I'm totally indebted to John Kemeny for teaching me really the most important professional lessons about honesty and about loyalty and about understanding limits and about understanding roles and policies. He taught me an awful lot

about policymaking. He was a very smart, insightful, quick thinker. Leonard Rieser always used to say, "John moves very quickly," in a rather eyes-to-the-ceiling way. And Leonard was, I think, very good for John because he did slow him down. On the other hand, John used to feel just as antagonistic about Leonard never coming to a decision! And they had a very good relationship. They were very close friends, and they had a very good relationship. Neither one of them would have been as good without the other.

DONIN: But very different. I gather from a number of people saying that they had very different styles in terms of decision-making.

MARTIN: Totally. Leonard Rieser to every administrative meeting would come late, particularly at budget time. We would refer to him as the "late Leonard Rieser." That was his... We would often refer to him as the "late Leonard Reiser."  
[Laughter] And he was brilliant. I mean he would come in, and this would be the final budget meeting where everybody... Crunch time had come, and, after all, everybody was cutting back. It was very hard. And crunch time would be there. And Leonard wouldn't have had any meetings with his staff yet. Or he wouldn't have gotten those things back from somebody yet. Or "Those decisions aren't made yet, John. Pretty soon." You know. It was brilliant. And everybody knew what was going on. But he was brilliant.

DONIN: But they worked well together.

MARTIN: Yes, they worked well together. They were wonderful for each other. And they were personal friends. John was not a personal friend in the social sense of having a strong personal friendship out of the office with very many people. I think with Laurie Snell and with Tom Kurtz. But Laurie Snell and Tom Kurtz and John were all the same. I mean he didn't have personal friends. John's life was his wife, his children, and his job. And he was enormously loyal. And yet that was his life.

John and I never discussed personal things in all the years I worked for him. We had rules; they were unspoken rules, but they were rules. If I knew somebody was getting divorced, I would tell John. I would never tell him until it was official or

until it was, you know,.. But I would always tell him if somebody had a personal crisis.

There was a small fund in the president's office that's still there which we used for personal emergencies. And we would be very careful to make sure John knew if somebody had illness problems or something, but even personal things. We would never tell him gossip. He wasn't the slightest bit interested. He would have been offended. And if we'd come in and said, "Do you know somebody's sleeping with so-and-so?" He would have been... "It's none of his business, it's none of yours, it's none of mine." That would never have occurred to anybody. There were plenty of affairs on campus just as there always are in any institution.

DONIN: But any number of people have remarked that he just didn't engage in small talk.

MARTIN: No, he didn't have small talk. Unless it was about Jean or the children or anecdotes about—mathematical anecdotes. John and I talked about his childhood. I probably—we had more small talk than anybody else in a way. But that was always understood that was just kind of a release time, but it wasn't long, and it wasn't major. Most of it was getting the job done, getting it done. You know, little things about how he'd be so mad if somebody had a meeting that they scheduled for nine o'clock or eight o'clock. Eight o'clock was out.

DONIN: I guess that was forbidden.

MARTIN: That was forbidden. And the alumni office would pound me and pound me, and I'd just say, "No." And they'd say, "We have to do it this way! This is terribly important!" I'd say, "I'm sorry. Can't do it." They'd consider I was so unreasonable just as they did in those travel meetings. God, they were awful! We didn't have a very happy relationship. And the only thing you could do is to stay calm and try to never get roiled up or riled about it. And I was there to do what John wanted. But Sheila [Culbert] has the same situation.

DONIN: The thing that's interesting is why the alumni office thinks that their schedule should take priority over the president's office.

MARTIN: Well, I think it wasn't their schedule so much as supposing Nelson Rockefeller came to town and said, "I'll have a seven-thirty breakfast with the president." Well, the alumni office is bound and determined to call you up and say, "We've got to have..." I mean it was Nelson Rockefeller. "You've got to have a seven-thirty breakfast." And the answer would be, no.

DONIN: Hmm. That's awkward.

MARTIN: Very. [Laughter] And I would try to work something out extra early, you know. I dealt with his schedule. Ruth kept the schedule, but I was the keeper of John Kemeny's schedule. Now that's a very powerful position to be in. John was his own person. There was never any question about it. He'd put a meeting in anytime he wanted to. He hated to meet with things.

But another funny little anecdote about John, that I don't think is very well recorded, is that if somebody got a great big gift... Let's say you gave me \$2 million for Dartmouth, and you said, "And I want John Kemeny to know about that right away." That would be a big gift. It would be very important. We'd have to deal with that right away and everything. But if John was off on vacation or it's a weekend or something, he would expect that he would hear about that on Monday morning. He would not hear about it Sunday night or Sunday afternoon or if he was on vacation, which was sacrosanct time and very involved, he was not to hear about it until he got back.

Now, if it was an emergency, if it was something he had to do something about, that's different. And that was something that we pretty much tried to hide from vice presidents and the people around because they would feel offense with that. And yet I can remember trips that John and Jean would take where they just couldn't believe I wouldn't call him on something. Now obviously you called him if there was ever a college reason.

DONIN: So this policy of, you know, all Dartmouth all the time, he didn't buy it.

MARTIN: He didn't do it, he didn't buy it. And, see, David [T.] McLaughlin ['54 TU '55] bought it. He was all Dartmouth all the time. And [James "Jim"] Freedman didn't buy it and Kemeny didn't buy it. And people couldn't understand that, and so they got mad about it. They just couldn't understand that it couldn't be all Dartmouth. And, you know, you beat up on the person closest to you and the person dealing with it. And that's fine.

But, you know, I think John had the right... He had a lot of other interests. He kept up with some of his mathematical research and he loved to play football on his computer. I even have people today who say, "Oh, did he like sports?" And I say, "Did he like sports!" I mean I was an honorary member of the math department. My husband, Peter [B.] Martin ['51], and I are—we're honorary members of the math department for football games for 20 years. We bet martinis on the outcome of various plays. [Laughter] And that was one of the great joys John had.

But he was a very direct... And people say, "Well, he wasn't very complicated." He was egocentric, and he was direct. Yes, he had a very healthy ego. John Kemeny knew that he was smarter than other people, and he made no bones about it, and he made no bones... You know you often didn't repeat exactly what he said because sometimes that's offensive to other people. But he was a very complicated man. He was direct, but he wasn't a simple man. You know, he... The Three Mile Island Commission, which you have all the information you need on it, you know he turned it down unless he was to be chairman. You know that?

DONIN: Ahhh.

MARTIN: They called him for the Three Mile Island Commission. I took the call. And we talked about it. And they called him, and he said... Actually I wasn't in his office then. I was over in alumni affairs. I happened to be there at the time, and he called me in, and we talked about it. And he turned it down when they first called because he said, "Unless I'm chairman I will not serve on that commission because that would be a waste of my time." And he became chairman with that understanding.

DONIN: Ahhh. Interesting.

MARTIN: And that was true of everything. The last thing on honorary degrees that John got... John did not serve on any boards. He was constantly being asked to serve on foundation boards or corporate boards and he had a rule. He did once. Honeywell. He served on the board when he first became president. And within seven months, he said, "I'm getting off that board. That's it. Lu, from now on: no boards."

DONIN: Well, the travel would have killed him.

MARTIN: The travel would have. But it wasn't that. It was the time and the conflict of interest he felt. That was it. He would serve on no boards. And he absolutely determined that when he stopped being president, he would never go and work at a foundation, be head of a foundation. And he had a standard phrase; he said it all the time, which is that, "I've gotten down on my knees for Dartmouth for 13 years, for more than that, all the time I've been at Dartmouth. And I've been proud to do it, and I have not minded doing it. And I would do it again. But I'm never ever going to have anybody get down on their knees to me. And I don't want to be a foundation director, and I'm not going to be one." That was an absolute rule for him. Everybody thought he'd go to a foundation, and there was no question in his mind.

DONIN: Teaching was his real...

MARTIN: Teaching was his calling and it was his love. And we protected that. And you've all heard the story of golf. "Some people play golf. I teach." But we protected time for that for all those...

DONIN: He taught all the way through his presidency, didn't he?

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm. He taught at least one term, one course a year. I think occasionally twice, but always one, even after the Campaign for Dartmouth started. Now where are we on time here?

DONIN: We're done. We're at the end.

MARTIN: Because we really just move from that, I think, into the Campaign for Dartmouth. Did you have any other Kemeny questions?

DONIN: Well, I think what we'll do is turn off the tape.

MARTIN: Okay.

**[End of Tape 3, Side A, Tape 3, Side B is blank]  
[Begin Tape 4, Side A]**

DONIN: Today is Monday, Wednesday, January 19, 2005. My name is Mary Donin, and I am with Lucretia Martin for session two of our oral history interview. Just following up on some of the stuff that we talked about last week, I wonder if you could... I know you were here when the Twelve-College Exchange Program started, and you did mention that you had some comments that you could make about that. So maybe we could start there.

MARTIN: Yes. You would have to go back in the records to find out the year that the Twelve-College Exchange started, because I frankly don't remember. The Twelve-College Exchange started under John Dickey. It was before John Kemeny became president. And while it wasn't officially a precursor to coeducation, of course it was a precursor because then women were taking courses here. They did not get degrees here. But they were taking courses and transferring those credits back to the colleges that they came from.

DONIN: Did they spend a year or a term or...?

MARTIN: Generally they spent a junior year here because most of the colleges were on semesters, two semesters in a year, and we were on year-round operation before then already I think. Maybe we weren't. But anyway they spent... Sometimes I guess some of them spent a semester. My memory is, and my memory could be faulty on this because I was not working for Dartmouth, but my memory was that they spent their junior year here. And this was sort of the way it worked. But it may well be that some of them spent a semester rather than a whole full year. I don't have the answer to that. And I don't know when it started, and I don't know how many years it had been going on.

My involvement with the Twelve-College Exchange really comes when John Kemeny became president. And there were, my memory is, that there were maybe about 140 to 150 students on campus taking courses from these 12 colleges. They included the Seven Sisters and Connecticut College and some others. And their credits were transferred back.

Well, John Kemeny became president in 1970. And when the decision to go coed was made and we would be admitting people in the fall of '72, right? That would be the first class we admitted. Obviously the Twelve-College Exchange students were a very important piece because John Kemeny was absolutely convinced that we shouldn't just be admitting freshmen. He felt very strongly that we should be having upperclassmen, as we had the juniors of the Twelve-College Exchange, that we should be having upperclassmen on the campus as role models. And that this provided a way to have women in all classes, even though they might be small numbers, along with the freshmen. That that would be important for this college, it would be important for the freshmen.

So in the first place, Dartmouth agreed to take transfer applications. And if you like, I'll get into an admissions story of when we went coed and how Dartmouth hired the first woman admissions officer. Maybe you have that story. Andrea Fisher [Van de Kamp] was her name. She became Andrea Van de Kamp. Do you have that story on her?

DONIN: She's been mentioned but I'd love to hear your version.

MARTIN: She's a close personal friend now, too, and I knew her very well, so I'll be glad to. So they were going to take transfer students and at the same time admit a certain number of freshmen, always remembering we couldn't have fewer than 3,000 undergraduate men. That was part of the agreement of coeducation, that we would not drop below 3,000.

Then the question was: Where would we get these transfers, particularly for the senior year? And some sophomores. We could probably get some sophomores, and we certainly could have the Twelve-College Exchange come in with a lot

of juniors because we already did that. So we could have 150 juniors as exchange students anyway. But what were we going to do?

So when the applications were announced, the Twelve-College Exchange people got extremely nervous and very upset about the process by which Dartmouth would decide who, if they applied, these students who had been here for their junior year, if they applied for their senior year, who Dartmouth would accept and who they wouldn't. And they made their views known to President Kemeny and said that they really wanted to have a conversation with him about this because they were very, very nervous.

So the decision was made that there would be a meeting, and the meeting would be held at [Thomas C.] Tom Mendenhall's home—he was president of Smith College at the time—in Northampton. And that all the presidents of the Twelve-College Exchange population would come to President Mendenhall's living room. And John Kemeny would come to President Mendenhall's living room. And they would have a conversation. And they would tell him their concerns, and he would talk about how Dartmouth was going to go coed.

Well, as it happened, he asked me if I would attend that meeting to be sure -- although you couldn't really take notes -- to be sure that we had a record of everything that went on. We could take informal notes. They didn't want it taped. We found out why later. And we were on our way to New York where he was giving a speech. I don't remember the speech, but some speech. Maybe it was an alumni speech or he was doing something or other in New York.

So we drove from Hanover and went to President Mendenhall's house. And we went in and it was quite tense. And each of the representatives from the colleges, mainly presidents, they went around a table and said what their concerns were. And their concerns were that when we were going to go coed, they were quite sure that many, many, many of the 150 students we'd had here would be applying for admission. And they were very worried about what that would do to the individual academic departments of their institutions. And they told us in graphic form how angry they

were when Yale and Princeton went coeducational, and how many students applied to those schools, and how whole juniors and seniors of departments were wiped out, particularly in the smaller departments, classics, art history, some of the languages, philosophy. It just destroyed a whole group of people for them for their majors. And they wanted to be sure Dartmouth wouldn't do this.

So John Kemeny listened to this as they went around the room. And it kept getting repeated in different words, but that was the central theme of what they had to say and what their concern was. And he listened. And they got to the end of it. I could tell he was quite pleased with himself because he had his twinkle. And he said, "Well, I have a very simple way to solve this. You each tell me how many we can take from any one department, and we'll promise that we won't take more than that. And you just give us a quota, and we won't take more than the quota that you set. And we'll just tell the admissions people that—because by now you know what the majors are going to be—so we'll just do that." And each of them said, "Oh, no, no, no. We wouldn't set a quota. We couldn't possibly set a quota. That wouldn't be right." And I sat there and listened to this whole thing, taking my little notes. And it was just one of the most fascinating meetings I think I'd ever attended. Because on the one hand, they wanted to make sure they didn't get messed up; and on the other hand, they absolutely never wanted to get in a position of telling Dartmouth that they couldn't take whom they wanted." And John just couldn't believe this. He just...but it was very logical. It's no problem. Why couldn't it work?

So it ended up with John looking somewhat exasperated and feeling quite exasperated. But finally saying, "Well, we'll work something out, and we'll get back to you." And we swept out, got in the limousine, and drove off to New York. I don't remember luncheon being served. It was a meeting. I think it was a sort of late morning meeting. That was it. And off we went. I think they had lunch, but I don't think we did. And we got in the car. And John said, "Well, you heard them. Figure it out." [Laughter] We -- all the way to New York -- we got a chart out, and we figured out, you know, what we would do. We didn't know, but we would make sure that everybody knew what the major—that the applications would be a little different. That we would make sure we knew what the

majors were. And that we would talk to the admissions office about not taking too many majors out of any one department.

In fact that's exactly what happened. We had meetings with the admissions office, and the admissions office was very sensitive not to denude departments...and the various ways they could find out how many people were left in a department.

I think of all the universities that went coeducational at that time, we probably did the best job. Now whether we would have thought of it if we hadn't had the Yale and Princeton experience, who knows? But John was very sensitive to it and very careful. And I don't remember a single complaint. Now it's not that we would necessarily hear those complaints. But I don't remember a single complaint.

But while we're on the Twelve-College Exchange Program, I have one other story which I don't know whether it's been related. Probably...I don't think anybody was there, so they couldn't. And this was the story of what happened when these students were admitted. Do you have any background on that?

DONIN: The Twelve-College Exchange students?

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: I don't know actually.

MARTIN: Well, the admissions process came along, and the day came when you got your letter saying whether you were or you were not accepted. And we accepted—I don't have the exact figure in my memory; it'll be in the archives—but I want to say it's between 80 and 90 of those students were accepted. That may be high, but that's my memory. It seems high in light of how many people I remember in the room, and this story is about... But it is—statistically I think I remember that number. Maybe not all of them were on campus.

When we admitted them we were busy with all the other admissions, you know, freshmen and some transfers from other schools. So that was just one of the pieces of the puzzle, and we weren't really paying much more attention to

it than that. And about 12 hours after the letters went out, Britta McNemar, who was assistant dean in the dean of the college office who had just come in that year. Her husband, [Donald] Don McNemar, was a professor in the government department. And Britta was a wonderfully capable—really marvelously capable—assistant dean. And she came to see me, and she said, “We have a big problem with the Twelve-College Exchange kids.” And I said, “What’s the problem?” She said, “Well, I mean everybody is miserable, and we’ve got to do something.” And I said, “Well, what’s wrong? I think we were very fair, and we really paid a lot of attention to this, and we really talked to each of the colleges, and I must have called each of the colleges before the admission.” I mean I spent a lot of time on it. She said, “No, no. It’s not that at all. It’s the students. What has happened is that everybody-- almost everybody—applied to transfer.” Which I knew that almost everybody in that cohort applied. “And the students who didn’t get in are miserable, and they’re on the phone, and they’re crying, and they’re talking to their parents. And it’s awful. And the problem is that the students who did get in are so embarrassed that they got in, being girls, they’re just hiding out. And here they got in, but they’re just... I mean it’s terrible, and we’ve got to do something.”

So we decided that we’d have a party, we’d have a tea. Dartmouth certainly didn’t go in for teas in those days except at Sanborn House, the English department. We would have a tea and the tea would be actually in the home that I had lived in in the Choates earlier. Somebody else was in the house then. In fact I think maybe the McNemars were living in the house. I can’t remember who was living there. But we would have a tea in that living room, and we would get John Kemeny to come to the tea, and we would invite everybody who got into Dartmouth from the Twelve-College Exchange, and we would congratulate them all in getting in. And that would give them a chance to sort of whoop it up. You have to remember that this was in 1972, and everybody wore dungarees, and they all looked kind of scruffy all the time. Nobody got dressed up. Nowadays students get dressed up. But not then, ever.

So I went and got John Kemeny, and I said, “You know, you’ve got to go to this tea.” And he said, “What tea? Mmmm mmmm.” And I said, “No, you have to do this. We have to.

It's tomorrow afternoon. We have to do it very quickly. We're having a tea tomorrow afternoon, and we're inviting all the Twelve-College Exchange students." He said, "Okay." So we went down to what I think was the McNemars' apartment in the Bissell-Cohen complex. And there is a door there through the master study that you can go directly outside so you don't have to go in the rest of the house. And all the students started coming in this door.

It was just one of the most moving afternoons I've ever spent at Dartmouth. In the first place, these girls were all dressed up. They all had dresses on and they looked so cute. And in the second place, they all—as soon as they would come in the room, they would see somebody else and say, "Oooh!! You got in!" And everybody in the room was crying, and they're so happy. And they spent the whole afternoon crying and hugging each other and happy. And John looked at all this, and... "Oh boy, this is pretty terrific." So he sat down on the floor in the living room. And they all crowded around, and it was many too many, and we all sat on the floor. By then all of us were crying. And everybody was so happy and we had this great tea. And Britta McNemar and I were the tea ladies, and they had a tea. I think it's such a great...

DONIN: Wonderful!

MARTIN: And John always remembered it as one of his very happy coeducational moments at Dartmouth.

DONIN: I'm sure.

MARTIN: I don't think you probably have that.

DONIN: No, no.

MARTIN: It's a great Twelve-College Exchange story.

DONIN: Can you back up and just tell...now that we're sort of on admissions, can you talk about the first woman who worked in admissions?

MARTIN: Yes. As soon as the trustees made the decision to go coeducational, John announced that we would be having a meeting over at the Minary Center to plan coeducation. And

that meeting would be happening—my memory is it was within a month. I mean it was in a very short time. And that we had a lot of planning to do and that all the senior -- it was really his senior advisory group, which was like Jim Wright -- as executive council. This is his senior advisor. I was the staff to that group. That was part of my job. I think it was the President's Advisory Committee was its name. I was staff to it.

So he arranged to have this meeting over at the Minary Center. And Eddie Chamberlain, who had had his moments of concern about coeducation and some people feel was not entirely in favor of having Dartmouth go coed, prior to the decision by the trustees—and it's very important that people understand that it was prior to that decision—Eddie Chamberlain had been scouting the country to decide who he could hire to help us go coed. Whatever his feelings were, he really was totally professional in that.

He found this woman at Columbia. Her name was Andrea Fisher. Her name is now Andrea Fisher Van de Kamp, and I'll get to that. And he found... She was an assistant director or associate director of admissions at Columbia. She had a degree, Ph.D.... She had an M.A. degree. I don't know if she had a Ph.D. but she had an M.A. She was extremely knowledgeable. She'd worked with women at Columbia so she'd worked in a male setting. Of course they had Barnard. But they had a lot of back and forth between men and women at Columbia, much more so obviously than at Dartmouth. And he persuaded Andrea Fisher to come to Dartmouth and be the person—higher level than the usual young assistant admissions officer—in the office who would help Dartmouth go coed with the admissions issues. Ruth Adams had not yet been hired. This is prior to her coming, which was later.

So Andrea Fisher was hired, and we all went over to the Minary Center and spent three days—literally in three days—mapping out how Dartmouth would go coed. And in John's inimitable fashion, he asked everybody to do work ahead of time, and he devised an agenda which I'm sure you'll find in his archives. I think it's a very important weekend.

It was an important weekend for Dartmouth that we did this. And John was not one for a lot of games. So you didn't do a lot of playing of games or taking time off. But he didn't get started early in the morning, so you could sort of sit around in the morning. But he was perfectly willing to go all night. So you'd have a morning meeting that would start at about nine-thirty, and then you'd have an afternoon meeting, and then you'd have an evening meeting. And then you'd go to bed, and you'd start all over the next day. And I think Dartmouth literally laid out the entire blueprint for going coed at this meeting. And Andrea, who had not come yet, hadn't even been there, came up from New York and came to this meeting. I think—I can't remember whether Ruth LaBombard was there, the president's then called secretary; now would be called assistant. I don't think she was. So that I think Andrea and I were the only two women in the room. I had never met her.

It was an amazing weekend. It was just an amazing show of John's insightful and planning kind of mind. He was an extremely good planner. He could look ahead, way ahead. And he could also come down to very particular things. He didn't get tied up in long discourses, but he didn't get tied up too badly into details. Eddie Chamberlain did an excellent job at that meeting. I remember that very well.

DONIN: So this must have been putting the meat on the bones, so to speak, of the plan that the Charlie Wood committee [Committee on Curriculum and Year-Round Education "CCYRE"]...

MARTIN: Using the Charlie Wood committee, which was the faculty committee. The faculty, you see, was in much better shape because the Charlie Wood committee had a blueprint for the faculty.

But what did you do administratively? What did you do about bathrooms? What did you do about athletics? What did you do about if classes get too full? What did you do if... where women wanted to get into something? What did you do about registrars? I mean there are so many things that you don't think about until... And nobody really faced up to this.

Bathrooms was a big issue, obviously, because we didn't have very much time to get some of those renovations done. And they had to be, at least some of them, done quickly.

The admissions was a huge issue. Admissions took a lot of that time. And you had just Eddie and Andrea, and they just mapped out the admissions plan. Eddie had thought about it a lot beforehand. But it was a very impressive weekend.

Andrea Fisher, if I could just give an aside on her, she stayed at the college for I don't remember—I would say three or four years. She was a terrific admissions officer. She became a very close personal friend of mine. We were the only women. I mean Marilyn Austin came along in another year or two. But we really were the first two women, and it was so nice to have a colleague there after having been alone for a year. And she was quite a bit younger than I was. She's 15 years younger, I think, than I am. And we had a lot of fun together at work and out of work, including her living in my house for a week after she had appendicitis. She probably had more energy than any ten people put together. I was exhausted when she left. And she held court every afternoon. I would come home from work and see cars there where she held tea.

She went out to California where she worked for a non-for-profit. And then she was admissions director of Occidental College in California. And then she worked for another not-for-profit. And then she fell in love and married John Van de Kamp ['56].

John Van de Kamp is of the Van de Kamp Bakeries, Van de Kamp family. He's a Dartmouth graduate. He graduated from Dartmouth when he was 19 years old. He came to Dartmouth when he was 16 years old. He was a student of my first husband's in international relations. Brilliant, shy kid. Went on to be—when she married him—the public defender for the city of Los Angeles, which is the largest public defenders' office in the country. Then went on to be lieutenant governor of California. Ran for governor, lost. He came back to Los Angeles. And has been a distinguished lawyer in Los Angeles ever since. Been head of the California Racing Commission. Is currently—just about two

months ago—has been elected as president of the California Bar Association.

Andrea moved from one career role to another. And about 15 years ago became the vice president of Sotheby's for the West Coast, and has just retired from that and has her own consulting business. But more importantly, she's been a major figure in California in the not-for-profit world and in the volunteer world. She has been on the Disney Board. She was part of the recent Disney controversy surrounding that board of directors because Michael Eisner and she had an argument about four years ago, and she was taken off that board. She's been head of the Music Center. Campaigned to raise money for the Gehry building in Los Angeles. And has been...

I think the best story about Andrea Van de Kamp is that when John ran for governor, [Herbert] Herb Kane, a famous columnist for the *San Francisco Chronicle*, said, "If Andrea Van de Kamp was running for governor, she'd get in in a minute." So this woman who was our little person who helped us go coed has gone on to be a major figure on the West Coast.

I see her every year. We have breakfast in April every year in Pasadena. And John and Andrea come to my husband's dinner that he gives in Pasadena at the Athenaeum there every year. It's very, very warming. But she's a big thing in California. And Dartmouth should be very proud that they were in on the beginning of her life.

DONIN: Great.

MARTIN: John has been very loyal to Dartmouth as well.

DONIN: Among the tasks of the admissions office was to also identify transfer students, in addition to those who were coming in as part of the Twelve-College Exchange program.

MARTIN: And freshmen.

DONIN: And freshmen. They reached out to women's colleges for transfers or... ?

MARTIN: Well, I think they reached out around the country. They didn't take very many because those people hadn't had any background at Dartmouth. But they took some. And I think that's when Joan Snell—I mentioned her in an earlier tape—enrolled at Dartmouth and she became the first faculty wife to graduate from Dartmouth.

At the same time, a woman then named Kate Stith [- Cabranes '73] became a transfer student from the University of California at Berkeley. Her husband -- recently married husband -- Jeffrey [L.] Pressman. Jeffrey Pressman was a brilliant assistant professor of government. Probably one of the most brilliant assistant professors the government department has ever hired at Dartmouth. He then went to M.I.T. because she got into Harvard Law School and he went to M.I.T. for that. And then died tragically in Boston.

Kate is now married to Jose Cabranes. And Kate Stith-Cabranes was Dartmouth's first—or second—woman trustee that was an alumna of the college. So she was one of them. But there weren't many. I mean most of the seniors were exchange students. And then you had that next group of Twelve-College Exchange. We didn't stop the Twelve-College Exchange program. You had that next group the next year. So you had 150 juniors anyway coming in as Twelve-College Exchange.

DONIN: Ahhh.

MARTIN: So you ended up with, say, 90 to 100 or a few more seniors who'd been here or some of them transfer students, not very many. Then you ended up with a whole chunk of juniors. And the sophomores were a bit thin. We tried to pick up a few sophomore transfer students. And then a good chunk of freshmen.

DONIN: Where did they house the exchange students before coeducation came?

MARTIN: I don't remember. I wasn't...I didn't work at the college, and I just don't remember. They must have had a dormitory for them.

DONIN: They must have devoted some floor in a dorm.

MARTIN: There must have been a dormitory. Well, it wouldn't have been a floor. In those days you wouldn't have had men and women in the same dorm. They must have had a dormitory. Must have had. Some one dorm was for the women. But I don't remember which dorm it was. I'm sure they were on campus in the dorm.

DONIN: Sure, sure. Great. Okay.

Something else I sort of wanted to back up to, that we touched on last week, was the bicentennial. I don't know how involved you were with it. 1969 obviously. The planning must have been going on for years at that point. But this was taking place at the same time as the search for a new president, the chaos that was going on on campus, John Dickey was tired and looking forward to getting finished. It must have been difficult to pull off the bicentennial with, you know, royalty coming from England and trying to celebrate the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this place with so much going on campus.

MARTIN: Right.

DONIN: Must have been hard.

MARTIN: I was not involved in it at all personally because, as I told you, my little search operation was sitting in the basement, and everybody ignored it completely. Alex Fanelli was really the architect and the staff person who ran the bicentennial. When you look at bicentennials or something like that today, and you think that one person was just sort of assigned from the president's office. I mean he was hired for that purpose. He had not worked at the college prior to that.

DONIN; Ahhh!

MARTIN: His job was to come in and create, run and operate the bicentennial. He was hoping to stay on in the president's office afterwards. But he didn't know whether he would be able to. Of course he did and became a key person for John Kemeny. But the bicentennial was... He was the chief staff person for it and I think there were very few other people. So

it was run out of Parkhurst. I was not involved with it at all. We were certainly all aware that it was going on.

John Kemeny, at the time of the bicentennial, the capital gifts campaign, which was Dartmouth's first capital campaign, was completing. And that was the job that, you know, he asked me way, way back to help work on the foundation part of that campaign. He had been the foundation and corporation person for that campaign—really the foundation person. And in that role he was involved and presented and was involved in the sort of public moments of the bicentennial. And it was really those public moments which gave the trustees an opportunity to see John Kemeny.

We were all very aware of the bicentennial and what was going on there because John Kemeny was certainly... He was an avowed candidate. He never made any bones about the fact that he wanted to be president of Dartmouth. He was a candidate. He was not coy about it. It wasn't that I'll put my name in the ring, but I may or I may not. Or somebody like... Dick Lyman who had a lot of other things—at Stanford—who had a lot of other things on his plate was far more circumspect. But John Kemeny was very direct: I would like to be president of Dartmouth. Leonard Rieser was quite circumspect. He was clearly a candidate in everybody's mind. So John, I think, enjoyed that platform that the capital gifts campaign gave him. And then he became a part of the...

**[End of Tape 4, Side A – Beginning of Tape 4, Side B]**

DONIN: So this was the completion...

MARTIN: Now I may not be right that this was the Bicentennial, was the completion. It came at around that time, but I... You know I don't have really a lot to add to the Bicentennial because I was totally separate from it. I was a faculty wife who had a part-time job. And the faculty was not particularly involved.

DONIN: In the bicentennial, no. No.

MARTIN: [Edward] Ed [Connery] Lathem ['51] and Alex Fanelli were the key people.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: Ed Lathem was very important to that.

DONIN: So this first campaign was called the Third Century Fund, is that right?

MARTIN: I'm trying to remember whether that was...yes. That was the Third Century fund. Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Because I've heard it said—and you can certainly tell me if this is folklore, I'd guess you'd call it, or whether it is true—that these campaigns are always planned so that they end in the administration of a next president. So that those who are unhappy with the previous president could feel that they could now give to the college with the new president. Is that just folklore, or is that true?

MARTIN: That is folklore. It's not...it has happened at Dartmouth several times. And it's certainly something that when presidents change during a campaign, the people who are running campaigns take full advantage of that presidential change and foster that feeling. But it isn't that they're planned...you said planned for that reason. I don't know of any campaign that is planned for that reason, so that you can pick up the people who were unhappy. But certainly when circumstances present themselves, there's no question that they are used and acted upon. But that's folklore.

DONIN: Okay. Good. I'm glad we covered that then.

MARTIN: I think people who don't know anything about campaigns often feel that it's that way. But it's not in the planning process.

DONIN: It's been raised in a number of interviews, and I always had it in the back of my mind that I had to pin you down on that one.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: Because it did sound more like folklore than fact.

MARTIN: It is. It is folklore. But you use it.

DONIN: Right, right.

MARTIN: But just quickly on that first campaign: I was not working at the college; and the alumni office, as you know, was then all male. And there's one piece of that first campaign, though, that has a relevance to future campaigns at Dartmouth and to the finances of the college. That first campaign was under John Dickey. But the decision was made when they launched that campaign that they would eliminate the annual fund.

The annual fund giving is a very big thing at Dartmouth. Annual fund giving and reunion giving is something Dartmouth has excelled at in its fundraising enterprise throughout its history...history of formal funds. Yet they cancelled the annual fund campaign during that first campaign.

I have used that experience on many, many occasions when I do consulting, when people ask my advice, that it's probably one of the worst decisions Dartmouth ever made or that any school can make. You don't cancel something which is just an ongoing yearly thing. You do that every year, and capital campaigns are on top of that.

I think capital campaigns are most successful when you count both the annual fund and the capital in the whole total, as we do now and as we have for the last three campaigns. But you never would cancel an annual fund. And what it did was to sort of drop down all the regular annual giving, and that all had to be built back up again at the end of the campaign. It was a very modest campaign, and it was a very hard campaign to achieve.

DONIN: What led to that decision to drop the annual fund?

MARTIN: I don't know because I wasn't involved. I mean it was at least probably three or four years before I became involved, and I didn't know anything about fundraising. I didn't have any...I was a faculty wife who just didn't even pay attention to campaigns. You weren't very aware of them at that point.

The campaign also was run by a consulting firm. It was not run by the people in Hanover. It was run by a

consulting...there are consulting firms who run campaigns for smaller institutions. And Dartmouth didn't have staff that they hired that ran the campaign as we do now and have for a long time. And they hired a consulting firm, and the consulting firm had a person in Chicago and a person in New York and a person in Hanover, and they ran the fundraising for the capital part.

DONIN: Ah hah.

MARTIN: They used alumni, you know, and participated with things. They obviously got John Dickey involved. But they were the staff for it. Which the small schools still do.

DONIN: But they've never done that since.

MARTIN: No. No, we've built our own staff.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm. Okay. So did you want to say anything else about that Third Century Fund? Okay. I'm still sort of backing up on stuff that we talked about last week. You mentioned your work on the advisory committee that was formed to search for the 13<sup>th</sup> president of the college. What was the profile of the type of president that the committee came up with?

MARTIN: You know, I got so involved in the individual stuff, I don't really remember it. These advisory committees are widely representative. There was a representative from Tuck. The deans of the Tuck School, the Thayer School, and the medical school were on the committee. There were many representatives from the faculty. There were—I don't think there were students, but there may have been one or two. I can't remember.

My memory is that we had about 36 people in the room at meetings. And what they did was to spend two years having people come and testify to them about what we need in the next president. And then they wrote a report, which is on file. And, of course, you end up with Jesus Christ would be the only person who could fulfill the role.

But I think they felt strongly that the next president—and, you know, these things tip in small ways, and that's the only

place you can find a difference—but I think they felt strongly that the next president had to look at the issue of coeducation and make a decision. And obviously the faculty was strongly in favor of Dartmouth going coeducational. I think the professional schools were less adamant on that, one way or the other. It wasn't as much their thing.

They felt strongly that the college had to choose a president—and this was the blueprint for choosing a president—had to choose a president who had strong academic credentials and could lead the college in this sort of post World War II now--I'm talking about hiring—but post World War II now Vietnam era. They felt that Dartmouth had to continue its efforts to address diversity, which John Dickey had started, particularly with the issue of Jews on campus. I don't remember a strong statement about minorities in that report.

I don't remember the report very well. I have not read it for many, many years—I mean a lot of years. I've read some of the other reports, but I haven't read that one. The faculty wanted to be heard, and you were dealing with deans and faculty members, and there were alumni in this group, too, the head of the alumni council, a number of alumni.

The faculty should be a primary focus. You were still in that—you were over the phase of the post-World War I retirement hirings. You were well over that. But you were into the Vietnam War phase. So that the whole question of becoming more international and caring about the world was much on people's minds. But generally, you know, they wanted a good administrator who cared about academic excellence. They wanted somebody who related well to alumni. And pretty much what you'd expect from that group.

I think the advantage to this, and the really primary importance to this group—of this group—was that Dartmouth had not searched for a president for 25 years. And it was very important to have all these constituencies on campus thinking about this, and thinking about what qualities you needed in the next president.

So the real advantage was not so much in the report as it was of the education of the people involved, the deans of the

school, the dean of the college was on the committee, the dean of the faculty. This is a very distinguished committee and forced them to think about the next period of Dartmouth's history.

DONIN: And it was the process that was as important as the outcome.

MARTIN: I think very much so. Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: I'd like to say a little bit going way back to when I first came on. You had down here, "response of faculty, staff, and students to my role." I mentioned staff members in the very beginning, that it was a little odd.

I found that at least in the first two years, people who were not close to the workings of Dartmouth and the president's office at that time frequently thought that I was his secretary. They could not believe that I wasn't. And it was a—you know, it's just something you had to live with. I mean I would constantly say what a wonderful secretary he had in Ruth LaBombard, and that I was a research assistant in the beginning, and that I was an assistant in his office trying to just help him carry out whatever his goals and aims were. But it was not...people just couldn't believe that I would have the same role as a man would have. I mean they just couldn't believe that. They didn't see Alex Fanelli as much because he was involved with trustees more. And the senior staff very quickly knew exactly what my role was because I was the staff for the senior group that met once every two weeks in the president's office. They all knew me. And I just had to prove my credentials. Either I was going to prove that I did a good job or I wasn't, and that was really going to happen just on the basis of day to day. But outside of that it was not. I was not a particularly visible figure in the early years.

The faculty had a mixed feeling about John Kemeny. It depended sort of where you were in the faculty. Were you in the sciences, were you in the humanities, were you in the philosophy department, were you in the social sciences? I was a faculty wife, and I was a fairly well-known faculty wife

because I had four kids by now, I was on the school board, I was known in the community. I'd early on been very active in Democratic politics in Hanover in my first five to ten years in Hanover so that I was known as a political activist. I'd pulled back from that when I went to work for the search committee. But I was known as a figure in the Democratic party.

So the faculty should have accepted me the way they always accepted me. They knew I worked for John Kemeny. They didn't have any idea what I did. I was pretty accepted by the faculty, but not about John. And they would, as they would always do because faculty are very independent people and they're not dependent on a president for their tenure, they would complain and criticize John probably more to me than to other people because I was there, I worked for him, and I was in their social settings as a spouse. So I probably got more criticism of John Kemeny than most people. Which is actually helpful because it's always good to hear what's going on and what was going on.

Students, on the other hand, were, you know... I was one of those people in the president's office that they could come to, that they could get through to, and they kind of liked me because my door was always open, and they liked to come in. And I worked with John's interns or they were my interns—they were sort of intermixed. We always called them John's interns, but most of them worked for me. So I had a lot of students in the office all the time. And they just accepted... I never felt—I mean I did with some students—but I didn't feel the gender bias with students nearly as much as...

Faculty just thought I had a job to make money. My husband wasn't well and they probably knew that, although I never discussed it, they probably knew that finances were tough. I had four kids, and faculty members didn't make much money in those days. Nobody was very rich. So you needed to do whatever you needed to do. But it was interesting to see the division.

DONIN:

But it was... What was the reaction of the female staff? There weren't any administrators at that point.

MARTIN: Well, there weren't female staff. It was female staff people. And I was very sensitive to that. I felt...I was worried about that. So I spent a fair amount of time, I hope, showing my respect for the role and jobs that they did. So if there was resentment there, I didn't see it. But I'm not sure I would've. In general people were very, very kind to me, the female staff. And in a way I think maybe they were kind of proud. I don't know. But I mean I never talked about myself; it wasn't my role.

But I never felt a resentment. In fact I felt a lot of support. I felt a lot of support particularly from the female staff who would sort of see that men, some of the men staff, did not treat me very well. And that just went with the territory. You had to accept it. It wasn't something you could spend your time arguing about or spend your time protesting against because that wasn't your role and your job. You had to make a decision: Am I going to be an activist? Jean Hennessey and I used to have many conversations about this and why I wasn't more of an activist when I had been such an activist before. That was an interesting transition for me.

DONIN: You'd mentioned that last week.

MARTIN: Mmmm.

DONIN: What about the trustees? I guess you didn't have as much interaction with them.

MARTIN: I did as soon as we went coed.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: I didn't have interactions to the extent that Alex did. But I was in trustee meetings. I was in social occasions with the trustees. And I began to—I knew five of them very well.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: And then I began to get to know the others quite well. In fact, it led to things later in my...to the start of my development career.

DONIN: Okay. I'm glad we recorded that. Kemeny's speeches. We touched on this briefly last week as well. But did he have help writing them? Or was it all...?

MARTIN: I did a lot of research for him for speeches...as did Alex. That was something we shared.

Alex was an amazing researcher. I mean he'd had a lot of experience in that. And we would both research for speeches, although I probably did much more of it than he did. In general, it would depend on what John was speaking about. If he was speaking to alumni, we would always ask the alumni office what points they wanted covered. We would frequently have—I would frequently have—meetings, not Alex, but I would have meetings with the alumni people and talk, have brainstorming sessions on what they wanted covered.

John Kemeny didn't always agree with that. He didn't always agree with what the alumni office wanted covered, which was sometimes a sticking point. And then feathers would get ruffled. But as far as the more serious speeches were concerned, if they were scientific speeches... If they were mathematical speeches, he did them. I mean I don't know... John was quite sure of his mathematical grasp, and I don't think he did a large amount of research. In fact, Leonard Rieser would claim that he didn't do very much at all. He gave speeches about what he knew in mathematics.

Now he gave some very famous speeches at the American Museum of Natural History later on with the Scribner speeches then. Those he researched and worked hard on. But he did it pretty much himself.

So his alumni speeches would be a combination of points to be covered, which I would give him. Then he and I would often talk about them, sometimes not. I would suggest topics, usually in writing so that he could take it home.

He liked... John did a great deal of his background work sitting in the bathtub. That was his favorite thing to do. In the morning he would sit in the bathtub and read his briefing papers. And it was just what he liked to do. So it was

important to him to have things written out, so that I would have lists of topics.

He would not have speeches written out in the sense that you see them by many people, because he didn't like that anyway. He would have topics on a page or a paper on almost all of his speeches unless they were serious scientific speeches. And then, as I mentioned to you, he would sometimes write out his first sentence or first paragraph, and he would always write out his last sentence, always. He never, ever gave a speech without having his last sentence written.

That's important because I used to have running battles with every place John Kemeny spoke that we had to have recording equipment, and they had to be recorded. And I would routinely talk to people about the recording, and later on my assistant would routinely talk to people about the recording equipment, was it going to be recorded? And as soon as one didn't ask, it wouldn't be recorded, and then whatever he said would be lost. And the alumni office used to get really quite tired of me—and the development office—quite tired of me because they said, "Well, just give us the speech." And I would say, "I can't give you the speech. You've got to record it. We'll transcribe it, but you have to record it." So that was sort of a funny undercover battle that went on all through his presidency.

I did a lot of research for his speeches, and I did a lot of covering of national press, you know, things that today you'd be reading in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, magazines. I did a great deal of that.

The first two or three years I was not working full time, technically. I was working three-quarter time, I think. And, of course, that never happened. But I had a fairly young child. And again, I was buying flexibility. But I always worked long days.

DONIN: Long days even though you were...

MARTIN: For sure.

DONIN: ...technically three-quarters time. You mentioned last week that you joined—and this may be later on—but there was a group of administrative and faculty women that formed a group?

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Was it a support group?

MARTIN: It was really a support group for women.

DONIN: Did it have a name?

MARTIN: I think it must have had a name. Marysa would remember the name.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: Has anybody talked to Marysa Navarro about it?

DONIN: Mmmm mmmm.

MARTIN: Well, Colette Gaudin would remember the name if there was a name, and Marysa would remember the name. And Britta McNemar might remember the name.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: Marilyn Austin might remember the name. You could ask Marilyn. I don't remember. But we met. We met generally in the evening. We'd meet in a departmental lounge or a... We were usually somewhere between 15 and 20, 25, depending on what year. In the beginning it was smaller. And gradually, as more faculty members came and more administrators came, there would be more people there.

I felt that the faculty played the leading role in the group, and at that time I felt that was very appropriate. This is a time when the faculty was coming to grips with coeducation and their role in coeducation and their role as role models and their role as underdogs often in departments. And often as lecturers and not getting promoted with the same criteria or

regularity as the men would be. And they were in a very tough position, as were the women in many cases. But they were in a very tough position, particularly in departments that you might not even think about.

Actually I think—I don't know whether the women would agree to this or not—but I think the sciences were better than the humanities. And in many ways you'd think it would be the other way around. Scientists don't get very political. I've worked with many groups of scientists since, and I'm always impressed by the lack of political intrigue that seems to happen, or less of it anyway.

One of the hardest departments was the art department and art history. They were just very tough on women. They were tough on women and people who were enrolled. The professors themselves were chauvinistic. Often sexist, often inappropriate. We probably had more complaints from art history and art from women than any other single department. I'm sure other women could tell you from different departments. But it was something that certainly in John Kemeny's office we were very aware of. Of course part of it was the sheer pressure. With more women here, you had more candidates signing up for courses in art history and art than you had when it was an all-male school. So that those departments were experiencing enrollment pressure that maybe some other departments weren't experiencing. The sciences were not experiencing as much enrollment pressure as the art and art history were. So that's understandable from that point of view.

On the other hand, there really were some very bad experiences, women that I know well who are alumnae now have had in class, being discriminated against in class, not getting into classes, not being able to take classes that you needed to take for your major. Classes would be full. They would not be full to men, but they'd be full to women. And they really had a very bad time.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm. These were the early classes?

MARTIN: The early classes, yes.

DONIN: So not only was it the faculty that was experiencing these problems, the women faculty, it was the students.

MARTIN: Students, yes. And there were very few women faculty, and studio art didn't have any women faculty for a while. I don't remember when art history got their first— was Joy Kenseth early on there? But they had very few women.

DONIN: Okay. I think this is the last question sort of backing up to last week. You talked about the contribution that Harvey Hood made specifically to have this consulting group hired, Cresap, McCormick and Paget, to study the college before—the administrative structure of the college. What was the outcome of that report? Did John Kemeny act on it?

MARTIN: The outcome was that... There were reports plural rather than report singular. There was a report on admissions and a report on development and alumni relations. A report on the administration of the Tuck School, the Thayer School.

DONIN: Oh, so they were all broken down.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: So that it wasn't a single report. And I think I mentioned last week that there were really two outcomes: I think the most important was the personal conversations that Leo Kornfeld, who was the senior partner who ran the study for CMP, had with John Kemeny.

Cresap, McCormick and Paget had a very small not-for-profit arm—it was mainly a for-profit consulting company. Leo was head of that not-for-profit arm, and he and John became very close friends as a result of this. As did—Leo and I became very close friends as well. Saw each other many times.

So I think the first thing was that in private conversations, Leo was able to talk with John about some of the individuals who were working in these various entities and help John assess the efficacy of these individuals. So I think that's the unknown, crucial result of the report, which was wonderful.

I think I may have mentioned that my—I felt that my role... I had a very healthy disrespect for consultants. And I felt that my role was to try to see whether we couldn't help Cresap, McCormick and Paget to lose money on the job; because I felt that generally they had so much boilerplate that they made a lot of money on all the jobs. And I always felt very happy because CMP—they were very proud of this job—but they said they lost more money on this job than any job they could remember.

There were a multiplicity of reports; they're all on file. And they pointed out areas of improvement needed or additional staff needed and admissions processes that needed to be changed. They went down to the secretarial level, and what papers do you do, and where do they flow to and everything. It was a very detailed study. So there were improvements suggested in the registrar's office and the admissions office, in development, in alumni relations. And I think those... That was just enormously helpful to John because it would tell him what to do in budget times. Where to put the money, where his priorities should be. And I know all those reports are on file.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: It'd be interesting someday for somebody to take a look at what Dartmouth was like then, and all those reports, and see what weaknesses were being pointed out to a new incoming president. Because I think you could see them all there.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm. Did he change—did he have to change the structure of the administration? I mean did he add layers or take away layers as a result of their recommendations?

MARTIN: He changed the structure of his administration as he went along, partly because of their recommendations and partly because of his own decisions of what he wanted to do. I guess the most famous way in which he changed it early on—and one of the most controversial; turned out to be one of the most controversial—was his conviction that Dartmouth needed a vice president for student affairs. And he felt strongly that student affairs—that you had a dean of the faculty and a provost, and that was an academic model that was appropriate to the academic side of the college. But that

the dean of the college wasn't high enough visibility, that you should have a vice president for student affairs.

So he early on created the position of vice president for student affairs. And this person would have the dean of the college reporting to that person. But also have all student affairs: registrar, admissions, the Tucker Foundation, anything that involved students. COSO, athletics, they would all report to the vice president of student affairs. And John was very proud of this because he felt it was high time that you had this kind of visibility that went along with the provost/dean structure that was more academic.

Within a year or less of the time—maybe even less—of the time he did this, he then named his good friend and an old colleague, Don Kreider to be Dartmouth's first vice president of student affairs. Don Kreider was a professor of mathematics, and had also been on the search committee as a faculty member for the search committee to select a president. He named Don to this position, a young man at that time.

The faculty absolutely nailed John Kemeny on this. That we had this president who was coming in, and he was proliferating the numbers of administrators at the college, and that this was the worst thing he could do was to get all these administrators. They would just get all the money, and they'd be spending all this money on administration. And we would be taking it away from the faculty. And we wouldn't be spending the kind of money on faculty and faculty programs that we should. We'd be diverting this money to administration. And this was part of his ego, and that he was just trying to build up a big administrative structure. Have you heard those stories before or since? And he just got nailed in faculty meetings. There are some very angry faculty meeting notes of his... And I think it came as a complete shock to John, that this thing which he thought was so good and so needed and so appropriate...

**[End of Tape 4, Side B – Beginning of Tape 5, Side A]**

DONIN:

Okay. So...

MARTIN: And because of that, Dartmouth was extremely sensitive and John Kemeny was very super-sensitive to naming any vice presidents. He had this idea that he would have sort of a vice presidential structure. He'd have the vice president of student affairs, and he'd have the provost, but that would be a vice president. And then a vice president for finance, and then a vice president for administration which was Rod Morgan. So he put in the vice president for administration, which was a new position, and the vice president for student affairs. And he had—John Meck was vice president for finance. But instead of one vice president, he had three vice presidents.

DONIN: And he had Ruth Adams as well.

MARTIN: And then Ruth Adams. He had four vice presidents. That's right. Then he brought Ruth Adams in as vice president. So that was just too much for the faculty, and they just killed him—killed him! He was very hurt by this. He really was hurt. I think he didn't see it coming. He just didn't realize what hit him. And it was a theme there of many, many faculty meetings. And you would hear faculty talk about John Kemeny and just getting a lot of big administrators he was paying a lot of money to. Didn't care about the faculty anymore now that he'd become president of the college. So, as I said, it was an undercurrent for a while.

DONIN: So this happened before coeducation. He couldn't use that as an excuse for building up his administration?

MARTIN: He certainly said that Dartmouth was woefully behind—because of what Cresap, McCormick and Paget said, that's how we started this conversation. And they had urged him to increase the size of his administration. They said: You're so under administered you can't possibly do the kinds of things that a modern university needs to do. You need more help.

In the first place, you need a vice president for administration that deals with all the administrative areas of the college; I mean everything from buildings and grounds, as it was then called, FO&M now, to everything in the financial structure needs to be over here. And then you need a vice president of student affairs. You need to pay more attention to that. And student affairs. You've got the dean of the college. But

then you've got admissions, and these people can't all report to you. That's not appropriate. You just can't have that. You've got to have these people under somebody who can really pay attention to them.

Well, now, of course, Dartmouth has many more administrators than we had then. But at the time, it was considered an empire-building exercise on John's part by many faculty members who grumbled. The faculty went through a period in the early years where they weren't entirely happy always about John Kemeny as president. At the end--as with anybody at the end of their tenure if they've been reasonably successful, they become much more godlike than they are at the beginning of their tenure.

- DONIN: Mmmm hmmm. Which certainly happened to him.
- MARTIN: Absolutely.
- DONIN: Okay. I'm done with backing up. Now we can move forward?
- MARTIN: Okay.
- DONIN: I think you wanted to talk about...well, I don't know if you want to get into development yet.
- MARTIN: Did we talk about COFHE? You and I had a personal conversation. But did we talk about...?
- DONIN: No, we didn't do COFHE. And I also wanted to ask you about this council on budgets and priorities that he established. I don't know if you had anything to do with that also.
- MARTIN: Right, right. Okay. Let's just do COFHE and get it out of the way, and then we'll go to the council.
- DONIN: Okay. And COFHE stands for what?
- MARTIN: The Council On Financing Higher Education.
- DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN:

When John became president... I mean he was a great student of statistics, as you might expect. And he was very frustrated with the Ivy League presidential organization—if one could call it an organization. The Ivy League presidents met once a year, and John went to the first couple of years. And I've heard this from many other Ivy League presidents since. I've talked to Ivy League presidents about their lives. And he would come back, and he would say, "This is ridiculous! All they do is talk about athletics. That's all they talk about. We don't talk about anything else." And he would say, you know, "We need to share budget information." Remember we were in double-digit inflation and an oil embargo crisis. It was a very tense serious time.

He was beginning to think how he could establish a council on budget & priorities for that reason. He said, "But I can't tell whether Dartmouth's spending too much money on this or too little money on any particular thing because I don't have any comparable statistics. I need to know how money is spent in higher education, and I just... And anyway, the Ivy League, some of these schools don't relate to us at all. Harvard doesn't really relate to us. And the statistics I get from them don't break down the way ours do." And it was just very frustrating.

So early on—I don't remember the date; you can find that out—but he, with the Ivy League presidents—spearheaded the idea of having a council on financing higher education which would be a group of public and private universities that would share information on a host of problems. And that they would do this in a systematic way.

This was eagerly endorsed by the Ivy League presidents. It was eagerly endorsed by the public, who generally couldn't get Ivy League information easily. And within a very short time this was formed. He was the first chair of it. He hired Richard Ramsden, a Brown graduate who had been an administrator at Brown, to be the first executive director of COFHE. Dick Ramsden and his wife, Sally, moved to Hanover, put their kids in the local school system. And Dick Ramsden, who is brilliant, proceeded to organize... I'm sure he had help, and I'm sure he had staff.

Every university chipped in a little. They would in a very short time have 33 universities. So that you didn't have to chip in a lot for 33 universities to get a pretty nice chunk of a budget. I don't remember what the beginning was, but let's say \$25,000, \$35,000 a university at the beginning.

Dick Ramsden, he could explain who he got involved. But he then put together benchmarks, he put together statistical tables, he put together categories that then they could go out and survey all these universities about how much they were spending in what categories and what percentage of their budget and how it related. And because you had publics and privates, and because you had schools that you hadn't necessarily lumped together, it was extremely helpful on a number of grounds. It was a help to the administrative side. But it also became quickly helpful in faculty salaries. Because it was very hard for Dartmouth to... Dartmouth did not compare itself only to the Ivy League. And even today, if you look at the comparison figures of faculty salaries that the dean of the faculty office uses today, they use some other universities. They may use the University of Rochester. I've often seen them use the University of Chicago. They've used Williams. So that the COFHE—University of Chicago is one of the COFHE members and may still be.

The idea was that COFHE would rotate from one school to another for its chair over a period of time. But it started in Hanover, but its chair might be located elsewhere after a while. And different college presidents would take their turn as the chair, just as the Ivy League presidents all take their turn as the chair within the Ivy League. It developed very quickly into a key tool for both administrative and for faculty management of budgets and understanding budgets. And understanding where you should invest your money.

I can't prove this, and I don't know if it's just my memory, and my memories can be very faulty, but I think one of the impetuses for this and one of the reasons it became so important was John's hurt and unhappiness about being so criticized for his vice presidents and the size of his administration. I think that was one of the things that helped him want to move quickly into something new. And the other really was the inflationary times and the oil crisis.

Dick Ramsden did a brilliant job. COFHE has produced some of the best reports and is now hailed as just a wonderful organization. Dick was the executive director for quite some time. I don't remember how long. But I want to say maybe as much as ten years before he went back to Brown, first as their vice president for finance, the job that Paul Paganucci ['53 TU '54] had here. Then he retired from Brown and became the personal advisor to three or more Brown trustees on their own personal financial matters. And he has now retired to Lyme, New Hampshire.

DONIN: Were these reports made public, or were they just to be shared among the members of the...?

MARTIN: They were shared among the members. The universities were—in many cases if not all... Say you had these reports of 33 universities. The universities identified as A, B, C, D, E, F, G. They were not identified by name. But your university, you know, it's like most consulting jobs. You'll see Cambridge Associates does this all the time. Where you stand in that and your university is Dartmouth, and that shows. And then if you're the University of Chicago, it's Chicago, and everybody else is A, B, C, D, E, F, G.

DONIN: I see. Did they share things like...?

MARTIN: And I think they were private to the members.

DONIN: Right, right. So the trustees could use these.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

DONIN: Did they share things like admissions information and financial aid?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Uh huh.

MARTIN: In those days you didn't have the federal sensitivity that you have today.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: You weren't being criticized for being—having collusion or...

DONIN: Right, right. That came later.

MARTIN: It was a very important tool. And John Kemeny was the instigator of it and was known in the academic circles as a giant because of it.

DONIN: And it still exists today.

MARTIN: I think so. But, you know, I don't know. I'm assuming it exists, but I don't know. I'm embarrassed to say I've never asked Dick, whom I see fairly frequently.

DONIN: And so segueing into his Council on Budgets & Priorities.

MARTIN: Yes. So then he set up, in response to, I think, again, in response to, early on, as he was getting his Cresap, McCormick and Paget studies... John was a very methodical guy, and he was so brilliant. He's a brilliant administrator. Most people view him as having taken the college coeducational and having increased the academic stature of Dartmouth. And I think he did that.

But I think few people really understand the depth of his administrative excellence. And one can say, "Well, you'd say that because you worked for him." And maybe that's true. But I've watched a lot of administrators since and a lot of presidents in various different settings, and I really think this man had a grasp of priorities and a grasp of cutting through to how to get organizations that became relevant to what issues he had to deal with, that was quite remarkable.

The council on budget and priorities was the natural way that he found to deal with the budget crisis that he found himself in very quickly into his presidency. And that council also had representatives from the professional schools and the undergraduate. That was not something which I staffed. That was staffed by the treasurer's office, as it should have been.

[William P.] Bill Davis [Jr.], who died just within the last several weeks, was a key—key!—staff person for the council on budgets and priorities. So I did not work directly with that. I sat in on some meetings for informational purposes, and I

actually sat in on the kinds of meetings where they were reporting things or they were reporting to the trustees or they were reporting on their work. But I didn't participate in the workings of it. That was a financial thing. It was a wonderful tool for John.

DONIN: I gather it was. There have been all sorts of positive things said about how it...since he pulled in all the constituencies on campus, including students, apparently.

MARTIN: Yes, including students. And, you know, if you talk to [James C.] Jim Strickler ['50 DMS '51], who was the medical school's dean at the medical school at the time, there was a freeze on hiring. And for a medical school dean of a very small, small struggling, going-bankrupt medical school—figuratively it was—that was extremely tough. But because there was a Council on Budgets & Priorities and because he could say that he wasn't the only one, that this was true throughout the campus, and prove it and have that imprimatur, it made it better. And it also meant it had to stick. You couldn't have people swinging around corners because every constituency was involved in facing this crisis. But then they all had to play the same game by the same rules.

DONIN: Right, right.

MARTIN: It was a very powerful tool. And certainly, again, John Kemeny's idea. And I think it came from the Cresap, McCormick and Paget study and from the crisis and just evolved in his mind.

DONIN: Okay, moving along, I guess we're finally ready to...unless you've got other stuff you want to still touch on while you're still in his office. Or whether you're ready to move on to the development piece of this.

MARTIN: Sure.

DONIN: Okay. So when did you first start having a hand in the development side of things? It was while you were still, obviously, special assistant to the president.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: How did that...?

MARTIN: And in Parkhurst, and I didn't leave Parkhurst for some time.

Two things happened. Dartmouth was planning for a comprehensive capital campaign to be—which then became called the Campaign for Dartmouth. Ad Winship was then the vice president and George Colton had retired. Ad Winship had become a vice president for development and alumni affairs. I'd worked with George very closely during his time. I had worked less closely—much less closely—with Ad because Ad was the director of development under George Colton and he was a peripatetic traveler. Ad was on the road all the time. He was out visiting with alumni. Ad probably knew more alumni than anyone, including Orton Hicks Senior, the guru. So I didn't know Ad Winship very well.

So Ad Winship, with his team of development people—and I can't tell you the exact number, but we're not talking about more than four or five people literally in development—planned Dartmouth's first comprehensive capital campaign. It would be a campaign that they would not cancel the alumni fund; it would be part of it. The alumni fund would continue, and the results would be counted as part of the campaign.

In preparation for Ad's plan on the technical side, John Kemeny, through his council on budgets and priorities, through his presidential advisory group, began to plan, with Ad there but with the provost and others, began to plan the goals for that campaign. And Dartmouth then, as any school should and as Dartmouth has ever since, sets its goals for a capital campaign through the provost's office or through the academic side of the college. It's really up to the fundraisers to raise the money for the goals which are set by the administration under the president.

You have some questions later about that, and I think that's a very important philosophical point that many people don't understand. I mean people say, "Well, can I go see Lu Martin, or can I go see [Carolyn A.] Carrie Pelzel, because I want to raise money for X?" Well, it's not the point. The point is that if you have a capital campaign, Lu Martin or Carrie Pelzel are raising money for the goals for the institution as set by the president and the provost Lou Morton—we haven't

mentioned Lou Morton—who was provost for John Kemeny for a number of years. He was involved in this.

So the academic goals for the campaign were being set. I was not particularly involved with those. Just like the council on budgets and priorities, it was another major, major initiative where you had to have all the actors. And you had to have the dean of the faculty and the dean of the college. Because as is true of every campaign, your eyes are much bigger than your purse. And you usually come up with needs that far outstrip the resources that you can use to fund them. In fact it's not uncommon for those needs to be two and three times the amount of money you think you can raise.

Well, that was certainly true then; it has certainly been true for Jim Wright and what we're currently involved with. We're now in \$1.3 million campaign. And as I remember the first list of needs that Jim Wright faced was \$3 million...billion—billion dollars. So, you know, it's mind-boggling.

Well, of course that was true with John Kemeny and the Thayer School was in difficulties. It was a real question about whether the Thayer School could continue. The medical school had its goals, and it was having a tough time. [William H.] Bill Morton ['32], our trustee, had become involved. By now I'm becoming very involved with all the trustees. I know them very well. And Bill Morton really, really was a key figure in saving that medical school.

As this developed and as the money needs were being developed, at the same time Ad Winship was developing the structural way that you would hire people and run the campaign. It was decided not to have an outside consultant for the Campaign for Dartmouth. It would be run internally, and people would be hired internally to run that campaign. And I was sort of watching. I wasn't paying an awful lot of attention to it. I mean I had a very busy job, and life was moving along, and it was just one of the millions of things John Kemeny seemed to be involved with.

We were dealing with coeducation, and we were dealing with some issues with the dean of the college. And there were just a lot of things going on. (We didn't talk about that, did we?)

Pretty far into this, Ad had completed his blueprint and had presented it to the president and certainly it had gone through all it went through in his office. John Kemeny kept looking at this, and he just wasn't...he wasn't satisfied that it was the best use of the monies that would be allocated to run the campaign. He didn't think the proportions were right. He didn't think that the monies were being allocated to where the biggest return would come from.

One of the things Dartmouth has fussed with all of its life that I know of it in fundraising is that we're a very heterogeneous school, far more so than Princeton, Yale, Harvard, or any of the other Ivy League schools. We get more money in smaller gifts from more people and fewer larger gifts from the top percentage. And all the fundraisers, even then, would be telling you that you'll get 80 percent of your money from 20 percent of your people. Now they like to say you'll get 90 percent of your money from 10 to 20 percent of your people.

But Dartmouth had always—had never gotten large gifts. They've had very few million-dollar gifts in their history. And John Kemeny felt that we really had to pay more attention to the top of the pyramid, but he really didn't understand how to do this or how to deal with this structural thing. But he knew that the one school that had had a comprehensive capital campaign—there had only been one in the United States of significance at that time, only one—was Stanford University. And he'd gotten to know the president of Stanford, whose name was Richard Lyman.

So he decided that what he would like to do would be to send me to Stanford, and for me to then analyze—to look and see how Stanford had run their campaign, how they structured themselves to run it, analyze the results. They were not finished with their campaign, but they were well into it. It was a five-year campaign, and we were talking about having a five-year campaign. Again, a first. We'd had a three-year campaign before.

So for the first time—I had not traveled for Dartmouth since the search days—and for the first time I got on a plane, and I went out to Palo Alto, and I spent a full working week in Palo Alto. You think about it now, and you would hire a consulting

firm tomorrow and do a huge consulting job to do this. Well, you didn't have consultants that did it much then. And nobody really ever thought about it. But it's typical of John Kemeny -- when they were talking about COFHE as we've talked about this afternoon, or the council on budgets and priorities -- to figure a technical way to get at this problem and then come up with some... But his gut feeling was he wanted changes.

So off I went. Needless to say, I hadn't the vaguest idea what I was doing. I had never done anything like that before. I was totally unprepared. You'd be shocked today to think that you'd send anybody off doing something like that. I mean it was ridiculous. And when he was setting it up, he decided he would call the president of Stanford, whom he'd met through COFHE or through some various things. It wasn't through the Ivy League, but he'd met him. And he said—he told his secretary to put through a call, and he said...

John Kemeny, just to give you a sense of how he worked, frequently did a lot of calling with me sitting in the room because we'd be doing something. And then I would just go on getting things tee'd up for the next subject. Because in an hour we could get through more work than you could possibly believe because his mind was like a steel trap. So if he'd start on the phone or something, that would give me about three or four minutes to get lined up the next three things to bring up, and I tried to bring them up in order of importance and in order of time. And I did this day after day, week after week, and that was part of what I did. He hated to work alone. Unlike I think most people that I know and how they work, it was truly a unique arrangement and certainly a privilege that most people wouldn't have ever had that I had with him. And [Ramona H.] Mona Chamberlain had after I left and Elizabeth Dycus for a short period of time with the Three Mile Island Commission.

So he picked up the phone and he started talking to Dick Lyman. And he said, "I really would like—wonder if I could send my special assistant." (By then I was special assistant to the president.) "If I could send my special assistant out to Stanford and whether you would open the doors. I know you're not finished with your campaign and I don't want to

know anything about the money or donors. I just want to know about the structure and I don't know where else to turn to and I wonder if I could do that." Dick Lyman listened to him, and he said, "Well, John, is it still Lu Sterling?" And he said, "Yes, well, yes, yes, it is." He said, "Do you know her?" And Dick said, "Yes, I do. I know her pretty well." And John said, "Oh, well..." "We'll do it. No problem. But could I speak to her?" "Yes, she's right here."

So there we were, sitting in the president's office, I picked up the phone, I said, "Hi, Dick." He said, "Hi, Lu. Glad to know you're still there. Of course you can come out. Now there are two things that I insist upon. I want to see you first before you start. And we'll make sure you see everybody. And then I want you to spend at least an hour, hour and a half with me at the end because I want to hear what you think of it all. And anyway we need to visit."

Now what John didn't know was not only—I mean if he thought about it, he knew Dick was a candidate for the... Well, not a candidate. He was a person who was a "candidate" for the presidency of Dartmouth. But what he didn't know and had no way of knowing was that when I visited Stanford with John Copenhaver, Don Kreider, and I think one other—two trustees—we actually visited the Lymans on a weekend because Dick Lyman did not want anybody to know we were there, and we visited them at their house. They had loaned me a bathing suit, and we had all gone swimming. And then we'd all spent all day there, and then we'd all spent a lot of the next day there. And his wife and I have become good friends -- Jane Lyman -- as a result. We're all still friends today. And John Kemeny had no way of knowing that because I've never, ever discussed the search. And even in these interviews, I haven't very much. So it was really a funny moment.

So off I went with my little yellow pads to Stanford. And I spent the most fascinating week of my life, really looking at an entire development operation that was far more sophisticated than Dartmouth's, had triple the amount of money, was raising the largest amount of any capital campaign in the history of the United States at that point. I think it was \$300,000 which was a huge amount of money at that point in five years, including the annual fund.

The vice president was wonderful to me. He and I also became good friends later on because when I ended up in development, I would see all these people. And I met with their foundation people and their major gift people and their individual giving people. They had people in categories that nobody else had ever heard of. Dartmouth certainly wasn't planning any of that stuff. And

So I came back from California and I just worked like a dog on a report. And I realized the report was getting longer and longer, and it was about 30 or 50 pages. I had a wonderful time with Dick, and we had some really frank talks about what was going right or wrong or what he liked or didn't like. So I put that separately, but I told John all that, too. And I gave this report to John, and gave him an executive summary, had it summarized for him, and he took it home, and he read the whole thing, cover to cover. He came back and we sat down and talked about it. And he said, "Well, we've got to make some changes. This is just not right. We can't run this campaign this way."

Now the embarrassing and the tough part about this was that I was not qualified to do this. I knew nothing about fundraising. But also I don't believe, when I went out, John Kemeny had shared with Ad Winship that this had happened. And this was...I mean obviously I worked with the development people all the time, and it was a very embarrassing situation for me. And I insisted that John do share that. It just had to be shared. It may have been shared as I was leaving. But the arrangements of my going were all set. And remember by now...we're talking about much later in his presidency. We haven't talked much about that.

But by now I'm meeting regularly with the development people. I'm on this travel committee. I'm over there all the time. I'm the "no" lady. They don't like me very much. I'm the one who says you have to do it this way and that way. And, no, John Kemeny won't get off the plane and do this. And, no, he won't do that. And, yes, he will do this. And we need press time. You've got to allow for press time. You're not allowing for enough press time. He wants to meet with students. He wants to meet with high school students. You're now allowing for any of that. He can't meet with that many

alumni. He can't meet with that many prospects. He can meet with some prospects, he can meet with some alumni—you didn't even call them prospects then—but we have to have a proportion here. He has to have press time, and he has to have student time, and we'll arrange that. But you don't get the whole visit. And, no, he won't do more than 13 alum...

**[End of Tape 5, Side A – Beginning of Tape 5, Side B]**

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: And, no, he won't do more than 13 alumni clubs in a year. And, yes, we will set them up in July, and we will have a long-range planning day. And then we will stick to that. You've got to come in every July, and we will have these meetings. And I sat in on those meetings. So I was not a very popular person. Now I didn't do it the way I'm saying it in this interview and in so aggressive a way. But these were the messages that they were getting. So this is not a very good situation. So we did this.

As a result, John sat down with Ad Winship at great length and said, "You have too many people that you're hiring at the middle level to get middle-level gifts in. And you don't have any structure for higher-level gifts. You need to have a structure for the top-level gifts. You need to have a person and probably two people—one person or maybe two." Nobody had ever heard of a major gift director or a major gift office ever. "It'll just be for the top people. They'll be the people I'll be involved with. They'll be the top people. But they'll be the people with the greatest capability."

Ad explained to him that you didn't need that, that the vice president did that. That he, Ad, would be doing that. John didn't have a lot of confidence that Ad Winship would always go to what they called the top of the pyramid, meaning the people who had the greatest capability. He felt that Ad would go to the people who were closest and the people who were most involved, but not necessarily the people who were the wealthiest. And he thought that we just didn't sort of focus on that.

I'm going into this in some detail because it's a theme that I think that John Kemeny struck. It's one that David McLaughlin struck. It's one that Carrie Pelzel, when she first came here, struck and has been working very, very hard to change Dartmouth's perceptions. And I think Carrie has... I think I made some fairly significant changes over the years but Carrie really has completely revamped Dartmouth's development office into a very different kind of an operation and understanding the need for cultivation at the top level. I certainly understood the need. It's not that. It's that she's devoted the resources in a way that Dartmouth has never been willing to do before. But at this point you had no resources devoted to that because they felt that was what the vice president would do.

So this is a pretty tense situation. So Ad Winship went back to think it over. And just about this time, we were already embarked, we were just—we were about to embark on the nucleus fund for the campaign. The nucleus fund, now usually called the "quiet phase," then called the "nucleus fund," is where you go to the people who are nearest and dearest to you, and you get a pre-campaign announcement amount. So that when you actually announce your campaign, you've already raised quite a lot of money for it. You don't just announce a campaign, you raise a lot of money. Even in those days.

Now, of course, it's a very big operation. And the current campaign that Dartmouth's engaged in right now, the quiet phase lasted for two years. That never happened in those days. It was a one-year effort. And the decision had been made to go to the trustees, the members of all of the advisory committees of the professional schools, the councils and advisory committees, they're called different things. So the Tuck School, the Thayer School, the engineering school...

DONIN: This is like the board of overseers then?

MARTIN: They're all boards of overseers; and they weren't all called boards of overseers, but that's what they are. And you didn't have boards like the Rockefeller Center and the Tucker Foundation then. But you had boards of overseers at the schools. And then to all former trustees and to all former

overseers. That would be the nucleus group for the nucleus fund. Now that decision was being made sort of simultaneous or just around this time. I don't remember which came first, which chicken, which egg came first, but it was right around this time.

The trustees were about to come to town, and it was decided that it was very important that a trustee head this effort. Now Dartmouth had never done anything like this before. Now it's routine, and we know exactly how to do it, and every school in the United States has done it. But this was pretty new. Some did. Many schools had done things like this, but Dartmouth hadn't done this. And they decided that they really needed a trustee to run this. And so they decided that the trustee they would ask would be their wealthiest trustee, who also had an understanding of corporate behavior and could really be that guy that people would say, Well, if Ralph Lazarus is running this... Ralph Lazarus was a Dartmouth trustee and head of Federated Department Stores then, a major—more major than it is today—department store, family department store chain, in the United States. And that if Ralph Lazarus would take this job on, that it would work.

Now I have to backtrack and say that I don't think George Colton had quite retired. I think he was maybe still there. At this moment he was still there. I think Ad Winship was planning the campaign because Ad Winship was development. And George was going to retire. But I don't think George had retired yet. I don't think I have my timing quite right. What year did George retire, do you know?

DONIN: I think about...

MARTIN: 'Seventy-eight?

DONIN: Something like that...'79.

MARTIN: Okay. So he hasn't retired. He's a year away from retirement. So you have to picture the trustee meeting. Ralph Lazarus is in the meeting, and John Kemeny had spoken to Ralph prior to the meeting. But he spoke to him so informally and so quickly prior to the meeting, that nobody has heard what Ralph's answer is.

George Colton and Ad Winship are sitting along a wall. I'll never forget it. It was the wall toward the door as you come in. I was sitting at the end of the room right near where the president's desk is. The trustee table was in the middle as it always was when you had trustee meetings in the president's office.

Ralph Lazarus always sat at the far end of the trustee table. He always sat in a swivel chair that leaned back, and he always sat there rocking back and forth. He was a very prominent trustee, and he had been a member of the search committee. So I knew him quite well.

John had asked him to be the head of this, but nobody knew what the answer was. And so John, with his puckish smile—he loved to play these little jokes and have these little surprises at trustee meetings—said they'd been campaigning, and George made a presentation and referred to Ad, and then Ad made a presentation about the campaign. So that was all going on. They didn't get into the detail structure with the trustees, but what they planned to do, and they planned to have a nucleus fund.

Then John said, "And I'm very happy to announce that Ralph Lazarus will be the head of the nucleus fund. He will take on and raise the money, and we are going to raise—" I think it was \$20 million "--for the nucleus fund." This is a lot of money for Dartmouth, and that would be a big deal because our trustees weren't necessarily the wealthiest alumni. They'd been there forever. Now terms were being rotated and that change had happened. I was involved with that change, too, although Alex was more involved. But, you know, they'd been there a long time.

So everybody beamed, and everybody clapped, and thanked Ralph. Ralph beamed and we all sat there. Ralph said, "Yes. And I'm going to put the best man I have at Federated. My own top man. He's a young man, but he's just very bright. And, George, he's going to work on this for me because he's going to be the person in Federated and he's going to work with Lu Sterling. And that's how we're going to raise the money for the nucleus fund." I mean, you just froze. Ralph had no idea what he was saying. He's a corporate guy. It was his business. You know in business you tell people what

to do. He had no understanding that in academia you don't do that. John looked at me. When John Kemeny was nervous about something and didn't want something to happen, he had a very funny tic. Have you heard about his tic?

DONIN: Uh huh.

MARTIN: Well, he always had a tic. He just went like this. It was just a very quick, rigid tic, sort of in the lower part of the head. Sort of felt that his chin was moving back and forth. And he had that tic his whole life. I mean I'd always known that tic. And it was not terribly noticeable, and you didn't notice it much unless you were looking for it, and then you noticed it a lot.

He looked at me with a funny sort of blank look, which means, "You keep your mouth shut," and went tic! I looked at him, you know, "What have you done to me?" Clearly he hadn't heard this before. He knew right away that while this seems like a teeny little thing, no big deal, it would be a very big deal. Because no woman had been involved in alumni relations and development or alumni relations for that matter. I mean, staff women, [Elizabeth G.] Betty Ely, Nancy [L.] Elliott, all these people were not officers of the college. And I was an officer of the college.

Ralph sort of went on and sort of said, "Lu! Lu! You're going to do this with..." And he named this guy. I'd never heard of him before. And George just looked at me as though, you know, "You stinker. What have you done?" Ad looked crushed. Ad was not—one would have said in those days without fear of contradiction that he was probably one of the most extreme male chauvinist pigs one ever met. And I can tell you stories about the kinds of phraseology he would use that would just—it would curl your hair today. I mean you couldn't imagine anybody talking like that, as he did later quite often about me. Sometimes he meant them complimentary. But anyway...

I was crushed. I certainly didn't intend to do this. I mean there's no question about that. I didn't know anything about it, couldn't possibly do it, and that was the end of that. So we started, and the trustee meeting went on, and everything went fine, and they all went away. And Monday morning

came, and I went into John, and I said, “Now, John, you know this is not in the cards.” And he said, “Yes, I know, I know it’s not in the cards. But Ralph’s pretty firm about it. And Ralph just thinks you can do anything. He’s worked with you on the search. He told me over the weekend that he worked with you during the search period, and he thinks you just can...” I said, “Well, that’s because, you know, he didn’t know, he’s a trustee. He just saw a little bit of it. He doesn’t know. But I can’t do this. No way.”

So it was decided that the guy would come to Hanover. He said, “I’ll send him there next week!” So he decided he’d come to Hanover. So he came to Hanover. And he met with George, and he met with Ad. And then he came over to the president’s office, and he walked into my office, a very, very nice young man probably in his early thirties. And he said, “Who are these people? What is this? This is not... I’ve never... I’ve just been in business. I don’t understand any of this. I’ve never raised any money. I don’t understand what this is all about.” I said, “Well, they’re really good, and they’re professionals, and Dartmouth is known as having one of the best fundraising groups in the United States. And we were and did raise, you know, from a large number of alumni; we just have such a loyal group.” (And you have some questions about that later.) “But they were terrific.”

But people didn’t understand capital campaigns the way they do today. They weren’t part of the fundraising lexicon of colleges particularly. But Stanford had paved the way in a very unusual...and we’d gotten very large gifts. I mean a \$100,000 gift was considered huge, just huge. And it was in those terms. I mean that translates to a couple of million today. But immense, and you didn’t have gifts of that size. So 50,000 was a very big gift. And so away he went, and away we all went. And I guess at one point John talked to Ralph on the phone, and Ralph said, “Well, it’s just got to be done that way. I mean that is the way it will be done.”

Well, to make that long short story...to end that long story—and I felt you should hear it because it’s so like what John would do or so like what would happen at trustee meetings. And John was not loved by the alumni and development folks. He wasn’t loved at all. They felt he catered to the

faculty, and a lot of alumni didn't like it that he went coed. Not all, but some.

But the staff here was probably more conservative than even many of the alumni out there. So it wasn't always a happy relationship, although George Colton did very well with John, and they worked up... And George always felt—and George is alive today, I just saw him the other day—always felt that he had a great rapport with John and felt accepted. But I don't think Ad felt that way. So this is not the hero we now hear about in that way.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: So needless to say, it had to be run the way Ralph wanted it to run. So the decision was made that since it was just the nucleus fund and it was just that piece and it was very defined, that we would run it out of the president's office. And it had a logic to it, and we would explain that the logic was that the president would have to be involved in many of these solicitations, and that these were all trustees and boards of overseers. And so it really wasn't that the development office was that involved in it. It was more a presidential thing. And so that we would work up a system, and it would be run, and that I would keep in close touch with Ad and with George. But that I would be the liaison with Ralph Lazarus's office. And then when this guy came to town, we'd all meet and stuff.

So I started a fundraising campaign for \$20 million with a blank piece of paper. I didn't know anything about fundraising. I didn't know how you organized fundraising campaigns. I didn't know how you asked for money. I didn't know how you recorded asking for money. But I figured, well, let's just get a record system, and just logically let's figure what it should be. And I got something together and showed it to John. He liked it, and we showed it—the guy and I showed it to Ralph, and he liked it. And so about once every six weeks or every month, I would fly to Cincinnati, or he would come east, and we would chunk away. And in a year we raised \$22 million and created a nucleus fund. And we felt pretty proud of ourselves.

In the course of that year, we worked hard, and John was really great about this. He participated in many of the solicitations. But also he was great about working with Ad and George to make this a more collaborative operation. I felt that was very important. And I think I was more aggressive privately with John than I've ever admitted, that this just had to be—this just couldn't be superimposed. This had to be something that you participated in. So that's how I got into fundraising.

DONIN: Mmmm.

MARTIN: And it's a story that I don't think has ever been told.

DONIN: Good!

MARTIN: No, the trouble is, you see, all these things are going to be unlocked in the spring.

DONIN: No, no. Well, a year from now.

MARTIN: Yes, a year from now.

DONIN: A year from now, '06.

MARTIN: Well, Ad is gone, and George is out of it. I mean they were both wonderful people; they were just in a different time.

DONIN: Right, very different.

MARTIN: Well, they were in a different time. And they never understood John Kemeny.

DONIN: Did this set a model for how the quiet phase of campaigns is now run? They're more a function from the president's office than the development office?

MARTIN: No, no. Quiet phases are run out of the development office. That didn't set that model at all. It certainly set a model that you had to have close presidential cooperation and participation. I've often been asked to talk about that. I don't tell this story. It's not a useful story. It's a time in the past, and it's not the way things happen now, so I never tell this story. But I often explain the importance...

Everybody says come tell us what should the role of the president be? And when you talk theoretically like that, it doesn't end up to be the same story. I mean the role of the president is crucial in all fundraising. In fact if you look at fundraising studies, they will say that respect for the leadership of the institution is the number one reason why people give. They don't give to needy things. They give to strong things and they give to institutions where they respect the leadership and the financial health. They don't necessarily give to...I mean you say a local thing. They wouldn't give to the Listen Center because the Listen Center needs money. They give to the Listen Center because they believe that the Listen Center's doing a good job in delivering the services that it delivers.

I go and talk to groups. And when I'm asked to come consult -- and I do a lot of *pro bono* consulting now -- it's one of the key things you have to begin to explain to people. Because they say, "Well, if we can tell the needs, people will care about the needs so much they'll respond." Now that's true of the tsunami, and people respond to needs. But people respond to the institution and give them money to solve the needs if they think that is a viable, strong institution. And so except for a disaster...

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: ...you really talk about strengths. Anyway, that's a whole different thing. But I would not say that created a model. I don't think it's a very good model. I think it really has to be integrated into that development process. It's too complicated, and there are too many demands. I mean nowadays you don't go after just the overseers and the trustees. You go after your top people, and there are too many other demands: athletics may be interested, the Tucker Foundation's interested, international people may be interested, the faculty's interested. Somebody's got to mediate that whole constituency. And you really can't have it operated somewhere else. It was not an ideal model.

DONIN: Well, speaking of models, at that point the development office and the alumni office were all the same thing?

MARTIN: Well, Ad Winship was a development officer. He was the director of development. The vice president was a vice president for development and alumni relations.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: And that was true up until only six years ago. So it's been the model that Dartmouth has had a long—five years ago, four years ago, five years ago, yes—it's been the model Dartmouth has had for a long, long time. And a model that Ad firmly believed in, George Colton firmly believed in. I firmly believed in. That Dartmouth was unique in that its alumni relations was not separate from its development. That when dealing with development, you were dealing with the caring of alumni and the love that alumni had for this school and the relationships that alumni had at Dartmouth. And you weren't dealing with just two separate entities.

Stanford has had a separate alumni association that was not even under the president. It was outside the college. And they just fought for years to bring it into the college. They've succeeded now. But it creates all kinds of tensions and difficulties to have them separate.

DONIN: Maybe this is lore, but I keep hearing repeatedly that Dartmouth has one of the highest participation rates by its alums in terms of giving.

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Maybe not huge amounts, but in terms of participation.

MARTIN: Dartmouth has always had one of the very highest participation rates. And it isn't lore. Maybe it's lore, but it's also true that it has been the school, with the exception of a little teeny school in Kentucky or something called Center College, Dartmouth has, of all of the major colleges and universities, has the highest participation rate. That has been slipping in recent years, and trustees will periodically sort of push the development office to work on the participation rate and get it up because they think that this is Dartmouth's strength, and they don't want to see that gone. Traditionally the younger classes have a lower participation rate. And as you get older, that participation rate rises to 70 or 80 percent

by the time they're elderly alums. And that continues to be true. Our participation rate is now under 50 percent; but all these days we're talking about, the participation rate was 70, 65, 70 percent, which is very, very high.

DONIN: Did you see a blip when you went coed?

MARTIN: We didn't see much, no. You would have thought there'd be a big blip. But, you know, you saw some of it go down maybe a point or two. It wasn't a significant thing. And then right away you began to have women who would be the ones to push the younger classes to contribute to keep the participation rate up. But you had a lot of people who were in that younger cohort that wanted Dartmouth to go coeducational. So you had these people ... The smaller number of people in the older cohort and a much larger number of people in the younger cohort because Dartmouth admitted larger classes. So you didn't really see a significant change.

DONIN: Now you alluded to this before. But in John Kemeny's 18-hour interview he did with Alex Fanelli, he said the alumni fund was...

MARTIN: John Kemeny...? Oh, Alex interviewed him, right.

DONIN: Yes. He said the alumni fund was the "lifeblood" of the college--I'd put that in quotes—because there are sort of no strings attached to the money as it's given.

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Once the college had learned its lesson with that Third Century Fund, the alumni fund...

MARTIN: Has never gone away.

DONIN: Has never gone away.

MARTIN: No. And it is definitely the lifeblood of the college. It's unrestricted. It balances the budget. It's precious money. And that's true of any institution, particularly if you can keep the parameters as broad as possible. There's no question.

I mean, we're now raising over \$20 million a year, and that goes directly to the bottom line of the college budget. And it is definitely the lifeblood of the college. As it is for most. I mean I don't care whether you're the Montshire Museum of Science or Howe Library, it's just crucial, the annual giving. And we don't call it the alumni fund anymore. We call it the Dartmouth College Fund.

DONIN: Right. Well, I'm going to get to that, all those name changes.

MARTIN: Because it includes parents.

DONIN: Oh, it includes parents. Because I was going to ask whether it was called the alumni fund because the alumni are the ones that raise it, or because it's money from them?

MARTIN: It's from...the alumni fund has traditionally been money that comes from alumni, primarily through the class structure, through the classes. They do a lot of the fundraising.

DONIN: So members of the class do the fundraising.

MARTIN: Up until recently. Staff is doing much more fundraising now, and staff is much larger, much more competent, much more professional. But up until very recently the alumni raised most of that money. And in the older classes, that's still quite a bit true. The younger classes less so, although you still have alumni very actively involved. There's an alumni fund committee; they're very actively involved. Alumni spend a lot of time being class agents. Paul Paganucci had a wonderful story about his class, the class of 1953. Did Paul get on tape?

DONIN: Yes.

MARTIN: I don't know that he told this story. But he used to say that the class was a nerdy little class. [Laughter] He said, "Our class was a terrible class. The class of '53 was—there was nothing when we were undergraduates, just nothing. But," he said, "when we graduated, we made every second person a class agent. And we became one of the strongest classes." And '53 is one of the strongest classes. It's one of the strongest classes on participation, on size of gift. It's an amazing class, and it's because they got everybody involved

the minute they graduated. I used to tell that story a lot because it's a great story.

DONIN: That's the way to do it.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: Good for him. Well, there's so much more to do. But I think that'll probably... We're almost at the end of this tape.

MARTIN: That'll finish. Okay.

DONIN: We should call it a day for today.

MARTIN: Oh, sure.

DONIN: I'm going to turn the tape off.

**[End of Tape 5, Side B, Begin Tape 6, Side A]**

DONIN: Today is Monday, January 24, 2005. My name is Mary Donin, and we are here for Session 3 of our oral history interview with Lucretia Martin.

So first of all, let's start out our session today following up. Last week after the tape was off, you mentioned the story behind the portraits of the presidents that are upstairs. So I'd love to have that on the record.

MARTIN: Upstairs here in Rauner?

DONIN: Exactly. The one of Kemeny, and there's a lineup of all of them. But the ones we're interested in today are the ones of John Kemeny and Jim Freedman.

MARTIN: Well, actually, the story of the portraits is really a story of all of them in a sense. For many, many years, the previous presidential portraits have been in the president's office. And when John Kemeny became president of Dartmouth, John Dickey's portrait, the portrait that's here in Rauner, was on the wall and looked down on him. When David McLaughlin became president of Dartmouth, John Dickey's and John Kemeny's portraits were on the wall and looked down on him. And when Jim Freedman became president, the

portraits of John Dickey, John Kemeny, and David McLaughlin were in the office looking down on him. The portrait that is here of Ernest Martin Hopkins was in Parkhurst Hall, actually in the reception room outside of the office. So that was not... It was in the office off and on. It may have been in the office for some of the Kemeny years, but it didn't stay.

When Jim Wright became president, there would have been four presidential portraits looking down on him. He expressed an interest in having some art from the Hood Museum of Art displayed in the president's office and in the president's reception room, and not having the reception room and the president's office be the major repository of these presidential portraits. The museum was perfectly willing to do that and interested in doing it because Parkhurst Hall hadn't yet been renovated. But even since renovation, it doesn't have the kind of climate control that the museum has.

Jim Wright spoke to me and asked me whether there was anything that could be done about this. And I talked with Ed Lathem, and Mr. Lathem and I both thought -- Rauner was then well along in its construction -- that it would be wonderful if these portraits could be upstairs in essentially the lobby of Rauner. And the other good part about this was that [Stephen] Steve [L.] Waterhouse ['65 TU '67], Class of '65? What's the class? 'Sixty-five?

DONIN: I think so.

MARTIN: Had spent almost four to five years raising money so that the class could dedicate the upper second-floor reading rooms on both sides of the front part of Rauner. And this would become—this whole area on the second floor—would become the 1965 Gallery. And they'd worked so hard. And since I was in development, I had people that worked for me that worked with them. But several people had been changed. People had come and gone from the college. So they'd had about two or three development officers working with them, and they were a little bit frustrated.

But it was coming along, and I finally took it over in its final year and ran it with Steve to try to keep them feeling that

there was really high-level attention. And just as an aside, that class did a wonderful job, and Steve in particular, and they're very proud that at the time they dedicated the Class of '65 Gallery, it was the largest amount of money ever given for a facilities project by a class in the history of the college. So that was kind of a special moment.

Getting back to the portraits, the normal way you talk about presidential portraits is that the head of the Hood Museum of Art is sort of the head of a committee, that is already named and is an ongoing committee here at the college, that selects locations for portraits or selects artists for portraits. And so clearly this was something that was going to have to be decided with the museum. So Mr. Lathem and I had a meeting with [Timothy F.] Tim Rub.

At that time Cary [P.] Clark ['62], who was the college counsel and others wanted to see some portraits of Daniel Webster and other college counsels here in Rauner. But the idea had never come up before that maybe presidents could be here, and we would have a little presidential portrait gallery. So we brought this up with Tim Rub, and Tim Rub thought it was an excellent idea. And he came over and talked to [Philip N.] Phil Cronenwett. They decided that this would be the best way to display presidential portraits, and that the general philosophy would be that the portraits that would be there would be portraits of presidents if there were living alumni who would know of them. And that's why it starts with Ernest Martin Hopkins.

DONIN: Oh.

MARTIN: Currently. And goes through now Jim Freedman. There is enough room for one and perhaps two more portraits there. It's been designed that way, and we know how that would work. And depending on how long Jim Wright is president, one would presume his portrait would go there, and then at some point Ernest Martin Hopkins's portrait would go elsewhere, and they would all move down one, so to speak. So that's the story of the presidential portraits.

The addendum to that is the story of President Freedman's portrait. President Freedman had a childhood friend, and he wanted that friend to paint his portrait. And the usual

arrangement at the college is that for portraits commissioned for the college, that there's this committee that I mentioned oversees the selection of an artist. I think almost all the presidential portraits that you'll see here or coming, this committee would oversee the selection of the artist, and then the artist would make the arrangements, and the subject could sit for the portrait.

But President Freedman didn't want that. He really wanted his childhood friend to paint the portrait and insisted upon it. So President Freedman's portrait is painted by—I don't remember the man's name; it's on the portrait—but a friend from Philadelphia who had known him for a long time. That's the postscript to the portrait gallery.

DONIN: Uh huh. Now has the committee already chosen who's going to paint Jim Wright's portrait?

MARTIN: No. And generally you don't do that until... It's considered bad form to do that until the person has announced their retirement.

DONIN: I see. Okay.

MARTIN: So this is not on the table.

DONIN: I see. So it's a not a plan-ahead kind of thing. You wait until...

MARTIN: No. When Jim Freedman first arrived at Dartmouth, he spent several days sitting in his office sitting for the portrait artist who was painting his portrait for the University of Iowa.

DONIN: Oh, I see.

MARTIN: That's quite typical.

DONIN: Oh, I see. That's standard procedure.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: Okay. Before we move on to development, I just wanted to cover one more event in John Kemeny's presidency which I think took on some prominence when it was going on. And

he actually talks about it in his interview that he did with Alex Fanelli in 1986.

The way he brought it up was that he said that there were only two occasions during his presidency when there was a chance that he was going to resign. And I think we talked about this during your first session. One of them, of course, was the coeducation vote. The other event was basically the power of the president at that time to be able to fire top administrators. And the reason this came up was the situation that he had on his hands with the dean of the college, who, in his words, was not supporting him in the move to make Dartmouth a welcoming place for women. And I didn't know if you wanted to add to it or expand on that situation with the dean of the college.

MARTIN:

I don't know what John said in his interview with Alex, obviously, since the files are closed, or how he described it. But it's interesting that he brought it up as a crisis point in his presidency. And it certainly was.

Carroll [W.] Brewster was very close to [F. William] Bill Andres ['29]. Bill Andres was a trustee when John Kemeny was named as president. And Bill Andres was very close to John Sloan Dickey, as was Carroll Brewster. So that there was a sort of Dartmouth history with Bill Andres, a long-time trustee, before we had terms on the board. I can't remember, but I would say Bill Andres was a trustee easily 15 or more, maybe 20 years, and was chairman of the board when we went coed, if I'm not mistaken. And Carroll Brewster was very close to Bill Andres until Bill died.

This made for a fairly awkward situation for President Kemeny because Carroll Brewster was involved both with John Dickey and with Bill Andres. And yet John Kemeny was the president and the plans for coeducation had happened, and now we were going coeducational, and we had made that decision, and planning was going on, and the first few years were happening.

Repeatedly John Kemeny would have women coming in his office, students coming in his office, administrators coming in his office, Vice President Adams coming in his office, making the claim that Carroll Brewster was not welcoming to women

on the campus. And was actually not just an unspoken detriment to making Dartmouth become fully integrated as a coeducational institution but actively working, particularly with fraternities and with certain sort of male groups on campus or male groups that he knew well, to—downplay is too weak a word, and downgrade is too strong a word—but to eliminate or not to include women in decision-making and not to include women in what was going on.

I guess the most outrageous occurrence that women pointed to—and I'm sure it comes up in many interviews—was a famous time when the HUMS were happening over Green Key Weekend, and Carroll Brewster was one of the judges for the HUMS. And this was the famous "Cohog" song which was sung at the HUMS, and was given a prize at those HUMS that Carroll Brewster participated in the judging. And that was considered sort of the most visible slap and affront of all.

As you've probably heard, when we had celebrations about coeducation, we had some very stirring moments in Rollins Chapel where groups of women singers have come back and sung the Cohog song to indicate to young women how bad it was. And if you read the words of that song, it's just a disgusting, devastating song. And even the fact that that could happen with the dean of the college here was an outrageous event in John Kemeny's mind, of course, and in all of our minds.

Yet Carroll Brewster was not interested in leaving. John Kemeny did have conversations with him, I think, earlier on about whether he wanted to remain at the college and Carroll didn't show any indication that he wanted to leave. And so this was really tough for John Kemeny. I don't think, as I look at his presidency and I look at the various top administrators, it certainly was the hardest decision, I believe—I'm sure he believed—that he had to make. Because there was no way to do this without telling Carroll Brewster that he had to leave. And that's just something John Kemeny temperamentally found very difficult to do.

I think his worry was—one of his worries was—that his board might not back him in this because of the description I've given you about the people involved. And he made it a board

conversation and a board... I mean he demanded the backing of his board before he took the action. And that's fairly unusual if you think about it. Most administrators— since all administrators at Dartmouth serve at the pleasure of the president, that's part of the understanding at the college. Most administrators of the college, if the president wanted to fire somebody, they'd fire somebody, and then they would tell the board. But they certainly wouldn't go to the board first.

I think John realized that politically he just simply had to make this an issue with his board. He didn't like it, but he did it. And the board, as you know, did back him, although I'm not sure unanimously. And he went ahead. He was criticized for it. He was criticized by men particularly and some male alumni. But not as much as you might think. It died down fairly quickly. It just was hard to have it all happen and have Carroll leave. I don't know, were there any other particulars you were...?

DONIN: No.

MARTIN: I mean it's a... That's my version of the story, and I think it's a fair one.

DONIN Mmmm hmmm. It's curious that somebody like Carroll Brewster could have been hired in the first place because I assume his views on coeducation must have been evident even when he was hired, even though the college hadn't approached that in a formal way yet.

MARTIN: What is the timing of when Carroll Brewster was hired as it relates to the change from John Dickey to John Kemeny?

DONIN: About 1969 he was hired.

MARTIN: That's my understanding. Okay. My understanding is that Carroll Brewster had been here one year when John Kemeny became president.

DONIN: If that.

MARTIN: But he was hired by John Dickey.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: He was not hired by John Kemeny.

DONIN: No, no. I understand.

MARTIN: And nobody will ever know John Dickey's views, I suppose, on coeducation. But certainly at the time he was hired, I think it's fair to say that Bill Andres was not a strong proponent of coeducation, and he was chairman of the board. So hiring Carroll Brewster—and you didn't know who the next president of Dartmouth was going to be—all happened before John came in.

DONIN: Right, right.

MARTIN: And before any decisions had been made on coeducation...and I'm not sure Carroll Brewster was ever quizzed on his feelings about coeducation.

He used to sit in his office and openly to students and to people whom he believed agreed with him—his office was directly below the president's office; that's where the dean of the college still has an office and had been—and point his finger to the ceiling and make derogatory remarks about the president. Even on those grounds one wouldn't have...one could have understood why John Kemeny would not want to have him continue. How much John Kemeny knew about that...I'm sure he knew some of it, probably not very much. That's the kind of thing you don't tell people.

DONIN: Right, right.

MARTIN: I was very aware of it, and I know Ruth Adams was as well. And I think we all... I mean really the issue was carrying out the policies that had been voted on by the trustees and that the college was moving toward. He would never say that he was against coeducation. I never heard Carroll Brewster say, "I'm opposed to coeducation." It was more in his behavior and what he said to men about women.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: He was a male chauvinist in that sense. But he wouldn't say,

"I oppose coeducation at Dartmouth." He was more subtle than that. It was a very tough experience and heartbreaking for John Kemeny. I think he found it very, very, very emotionally tough.

DONIN: And this policy that the trustees had that you couldn't fire your administrators during the first year of your administration, that's what...

MARTIN: That was the policy?

DONIN: Apparently so.

MARTIN: I don't remember that.

DONIN: No?

MARTIN: That you couldn't fire your administrators during your first year?

DONIN: The first year, there was a...

MARTIN: Well, that must have been some agreement with John and the trustees then. See, I was coming in as a research assistant. I don't think I've ever known that as a policy.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: And John Meck was leaving. And John Kemeny right away, as he came in... In fact I can remember we had six weeks, I think I mentioned to you, between the time he was named and the time he became president. And all these people were in the office. And it was during those six weeks that John Kemeny made the decision to hire Paul Young as his treasurer. A decision that I think in retrospect he probably would have been smarter to wait a little bit of time until he understood the job more and understood the players more before he did it. But he did it.

DONIN: And perhaps that's the background for this lock on letting administrators go.

MARTIN: I don't think so. I don't know. There was nothing controversial about that. Paul Young was John Meck's

assistant. It was an internal promotion. So if the trustees had a policy with John Kemeny, it's perfectly possible. And since it was in that first year, it was probably the time I knew the least about that. Alex would know much more.

DONIN: Right, right. Okay. So now we're moving on. We seem to be stuck on this first page of questions. It's amazing we've spent six hours on this first page.

MARTIN: Well, I think the rest can go quickly. [Laughter] Since it involves John Kemeny, do you want me to talk about Kemeny Hall now, or would you rather I waited?

DONIN: No, great. Let's hear it.

MARTIN: John Kemeny during his presidency—all during his presidency—he would often say... Because it was John Kemeny that made the decision about the Hood Museum of Art. It was John Kemeny that went to the Hood family. I was very involved in that, and I became very close to the Hood family later, to all of the Hood family, and remain close to them. And we'd talk about John Dickey, we'd talk about how do you honor people? And John Dickey, of course, wanted to honor with an endowment to support international relations, which is how the Dickey Center got started. And we went through many things a little bit later on about that.

But John Kemeny always had one statement, and that is: "I never, ever want to have a building named after me." And he didn't make that publicly. He made it to his wife, and he made it to us, he made it to me. I think he probably told Alex. But he was absolutely adamant that there would never... "When it gets time to do something for me, I don't ever want a building. I want it to be something that's alive. I don't ever want it to be a building."

Well, when we began to really delve into the issues of the tremendous overcrowding in the math department, math and psychology having waited for 15 years to get decent space and being very unhappy with Bradley-Gerry, math in Bradley and psychology in Gerry Hall at the college. And psychology was now split into five different places, and math was split into three. And we were desperately trying to figure out what to do about it. Moore Hall, of course, became what is now

known as the brain science and then psychology building.

Mathematics had to have a building. Jim Wright is now president, and Jim Wright really wanted to name the new mathematics building after John Kemeny. But we had this problem because I told Jim Wright about John Kemeny's views, and I knew that Jean felt—Jean had certainly heard them many, many times.

So Jim Wright and I decided that we would invite Jean Kemeny to lunch in the president's office. She loved lobster sandwiches. We would have lobster sandwiches, and we would have lunch. And Jim Wright would explain why the pressing need right now is for the mathematics department to have a new building, and why it would be a prominent building on the campus, and what it would be. And, of course, you're dealing still with Laurie Snell. And although Tom Kurtz is retired, Laurie is very much a part of the math department, as Tom—all keep in touch with these people. And many others that John had recruited and hired to come to Dartmouth.

So we invited Jean to lunch. And we went through the plans for the Kemeny building. They were just rough sketches then. As a matter of fact, the whole thing was going to cost \$15 million tops. Jim Wright kept saying 11 million, and I kept saying, "Don't say anything less than 15." We all know now that that was a fairly optimistic—very optimistic—view. And we went through where it would be. It was then going to be near Moore Hall, across from the old hospital property next to the computer center, and attached to the computer center so that both the theoretical and the computer mathematicians would be together. Which seemed logical. And told Jean all about it. And Jean said, "Well, John said he never wanted a building named for him." And we said, "Well, we knew that." And Jim Wright, who was fairly new as president then, said, "Yes, Lu's told me about this. And we appreciate that. But, Jean, you know, this is going to be a major, major facility, and it's for the math department. And we can't see that anybody else's name should be on this building. And we just want to have a conversation with you about it."

Well, by the time we'd gotten finished with lunch—we hadn't

even left the building... Jean and the Kemenys were not religious. Jean looked heavenward and said, "John, I think if you'd known that it was going to be for the math department, you would have thought a building would be okay, don't you?" [Laughter] And it was settled.

DONIN: That's a great story.

MARTIN: Absolutely did. And only Jim Wright and I know the story.

DONIN: That's wonderful.

MARTIN: It's a great story.

DONIN: Wonderful.

MARTIN: That's my last Kemeny story that I can think of. I'm sure I'll think of others.

DONIN: Yes. From all the stories that one hears about Jean Kemeny, that sounds so like her.

MARTIN: Oh, it was very like Jean, yes. Very like Jean. Jean was an amazing woman.

DONIN: That's great. So it's still not built?

MARTIN: Well, the ground was broken last fall, and it's being constructed as we speak. I think it will be open in another year and a half.

DONIN: That's great. But in that location that you were describing?

MARTIN: No, it has been moved, and Jean was in favor of the move. We kept Jean very involved with the building as we went along. I introduced Jean to the architects. We had meetings here—she liked to come sit here with the architects—and went over all the plans. And we explained why. I mean the location now is at the end of Webster Avenue next to the Carson building. And there's really one building but with two entrances, one is the Haldeman Academic Centers building, and one is the Kemeny building, and the two buildings are combined.

We explained why this move was changed and why the campus planners and Jim Wright and the architects—both campus planning architects and the architects for the north campus who were going to do the Kemeny building as well as the residence halls—felt that this location allowed Dartmouth, and by putting the two together, allowed Dartmouth to have a far more significant building. And also it was a much better location: It was more central to the campus.

Jean completely agreed with that and was very happy. She was a little concerned about Jeffrey Sudikoff ['77] since the Sudikoff building is the computer science building. And she, Jean, knew that Jim Wright and I had had many conversations with Jeffrey Sudikoff about giving some more money to Kemeny Hall, with the understanding... In his mind, he wanted the two to be joined. So she... Her only worry was what are you going to do about having the two buildings together? Because Jeffrey Sudikoff really wanted the two buildings to be able to have people walk back and forth between the two buildings. He felt there'd be a synergy there. And we assured Jean that we were talking with Jeffrey Sudikoff, which we did at great length during this time, and we got his agreement as well. Although he wasn't willing to give... He made a gift to Kemeny. He wasn't willing to make an additional gift. And then within two years made a significant additional gift to allow for an addition on Sudikoff. So that's all worked out very well. But she was very happy with the move. I think she saw it as a much more central location.

DONIN:

Okay. Let's see, we've got room still on this side. Now we talked briefly about whether we want to go into this sort of development 101 session here to introduce just the general themes and actually some of the language of development. I think it'd be helpful for future researchers, etc., to hear your description of the different categories of giving; and, as I say, introduce some of the language that I think is frequently used. And describe the various giving opportunities that exist. Could you do that in a, you know, sort of brief way?

MARTIN:

I could do that. The question is...let's see. I'm trying to think of these tapes. What's on these tapes is that I'm sitting in Parkhurst Hall running a nucleus fund. I'm not in development. I'm hired by the president, and I'm paid by the

president's office. I'm not in development at all. So I haven't moved over to development yet. I could give what I think—and it's not very good because I'm not there yet.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: Give you some understanding of what development looked like then. There'd be others who could do that far better than I. I don't know whether Orton Hicks was interviewed or George Colton was interviewed.

DONIN: George Colton was.

MARTIN: Because he was vice president at that time. Just briefly for Dartmouth... Dartmouth was always a pioneer and a leader in development and in fundraising. You didn't say development much; you used to just say fundraising. In those days—this is now back in 1976 and '77 as we were just planning to start a new campaign for Dartmouth—your major part of development was the alumni fund, which was really the lifeblood of development and the lifeblood of the college and continues to this day. And I think always will be the lifeblood of the college. I really believe that strongly.

DONIN: Is that specifically to Dartmouth?

MARTIN: The alumni fund is just... No, it's really to any eleemosynary institution. Annual giving is just irreplaceable because it is unrestricted or—you can try to make it as unrestricted as possible. Some schools have made other decisions, or some institutions. And it goes directly to the bottom line of balancing your budget every year.

I'm very involved in the Montshire Science Museum across the way, and without the \$250,000 a year that we get in our annual fund, there's no way that we could be offering the kinds of programs and keep the museum open. It's not just to educational institutions. It's to any institution that wants to become...or let's say an organization that wants to become an institution, a robust annual fund and a strong—both from participation and from the point of view of the amount of money raised—annual commitment year after year is just invaluable. You have to remember that every annual gift, every dollar you get, is like having \$20 in your endowment.

It's a 1 to 20 ratio. So if you have an endowment of a million dollars, you'd have to have a...

**[End of Tape 6, Side A – Beginning of Tape 6, Side B]**

DONIN: So just to repeat what was lost...

MARTIN: Well, if you had an... You'd have to have 20 million of endowment to equal a million-dollar gift. Or a million to equal 100,000...50,000 really. And even that is modest. It's a very, very important form of giving. The reason Dartmouth's so well known about it is that we've had, one, a larger participation from our alumni body than many, many other schools. In fact we've always consistently been one of the highest in the country. We have a higher number of people participating than, say, Harvard, Yale, or Stanford. I don't know what the Princeton figures look like right now...even though they may raise more money. And secondly, back in those days—we're talking about 1976—annual giving was the major source of your income from development. Annual giving was where the most money came from.

There was a bequest and trust office, and you had people being urged to make bequests and trust gifts. Dartmouth was in the forefront in the nation of that. But there was not a strong effort on the part of many other institutions. There was no such thing in 1976 as a fully-dedicated foundation effort or corporate effort. They didn't have people in development that did foundation or corporate giving. The annual fund people were the major fundraising arm. I mean that's where the staff was. Ad Winship was the director of development, and he worked on getting gifts from annual fund, capital gifts, corporations and foundations. But that was it. You think today of how many people are segmented into how many ways of helping people become philanthropic, and it's a very different proportion.

So that the start of this campaign, Campaign for Dartmouth, was in some ways very threatening to the annual fund office because all of a sudden, both because of the campaign itself and the Colton-Winship decision to go and have five regional offices around the country that would raise capital gifts and the part that John Kemeny pushed, which was to have a major gift office in the campaign that would concentrate only

on gifts of 100,000 and above. The regional effort was primarily on gifts of below 100,000. I mean it was entirely on gifts below 100,000. They thought 50,000 was a big gift then. So to have an office of maybe only two people and one assistant was huge. You had no foundation office. And to put that into a development structure was a real change. And to be fair, Stanford had led the way by creating a large effort at the higher levels. And both Yale, Princeton, and Harvard and Cornell were just beginning to come along and say, Oh, my gosh! Look what Stanford's done! Let's all begin to think about that. So it's a very different development picture than we have nationally today. So that was...the key was the annual giving.

The campaign came along and this was the first time Dartmouth would be doing a campaign which would continue annual giving for its five-year duration, you would have no diminution of that. You would try to actually increase it, but not increase it too fast. But to make a major step to get capital gifts as well. And John Kemeny felt very strongly about this campaign. I mean as we've mentioned, there was double-digit inflation, we had an oil crisis, we were in financial difficulties. There was a whole hiring freeze. It was very difficult for him, and he committed himself to going out and raising as much money as he could from this campaign.

So we started. I was working on the nucleus fund in these early days, and we talked a little bit about nucleus funds from the last tape and why you have them. And our goal was to... And I'm not sure of my numbers anymore because it's been so long, and they seem so tiny. But I think our goal was to raise \$40 million in the nucleus fund. I know our goal was to raise 35 percent of the overall goal. And so we did raise whatever it was we said we were going to raise, \$35 or \$40 million. But it was very difficult, and we achieved it from our trustees and our overseers. And it was a year-long effort absolutely nonstop.

The president was very, very generous with his time, both in traveling and meeting with people. And that was the first time I think John Kemeny really understood what fundraising was going to be like in the latter part of his presidency. Where he would be on the road. He would be asking people directly for money. As he often said, he never minded asking anybody

for money for Dartmouth because he believed in it so strongly. But he never wanted anybody to...he never wanted to be a foundation head because he didn't want to have people on his doorstep asking for money. But because he believed in Dartmouth, he didn't mind at all. He was a very good fundraiser, and he worked hard at it.

DONIN: How did the decision get made who he was going to see versus, you know, Ad Winship, for instance?

MARTIN: Well, the decision was made... In the nucleus fund it was easy because you had a list of people who'd been trustees, and so that part that first year was easy.

Once the campaign started, then a major gift office was established. If you like I'll tell you why I moved into that office. It was my entry into development. And at that point the decision of who John Kemeny would see was clearly run by George Colton and Ad Winship and me. And we would meet, oh, every week or every two weeks. And the whole point was that he should be seeing the people who had the greatest capacity to make a gift to Dartmouth, whether they would be in the greatest... Whether they would be pre-cultivated or not was not as important as that they have the greatest capacity.

He also had to travel to his 13 alumni clubs in a year. But we would always have space in those trips so that he could make individual calls. And that's pretty much what still happens with Jim Wright today, that you mix up various things. But if he's due to go and speak in San Francisco, he'll set aside a day where he will have...calls on people who could make a difference in making gifts to Dartmouth. And it's a development office decision whom he goes to see.

DONIN: Was this part of the model that you all had learned when you did your research at Stanford?

MARTIN: Yes, yes. But that was a nationally known thing. You just had to have the president there when you're going to make those kinds of calls. And we would meet with John Kemeny about every six weeks and go over the top prospects, and go over where he needed to be, and what he needed to talk about. And this was in addition to campaign meetings. We called

them top prospect meetings, where we would review our top donors. The major gift effort...

The campaign was headed by [Norman E.] Sandy McCulloch [Jr. '50], a trustee, was chairman of the campaign. And the major gift effort was headed by Richard [D.] Lombard ['53 TU '54], also a trustee and a wonderful man. He'd been a law partner of Paul Paganucci's in New York at one point. And Dick Lombard was the major gift chairman, volunteer chairman, through the entire campaign.

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm. So he always traveled with John Kemeny?

MARTIN: Not necessarily.

DONIN: No?

MARTIN: He certainly did a lot in New York. But he would travel. He wrote letters. And he would come to Hanover for campaign executive committee meetings which happened four times a year. I... Very shortly after the decision—about six or eight months into the nucleus fund experience—I was asked by John Kemeny if I would become the major gift director for the campaign. And I explained to him that we still had the same situation: I didn't know anything about fundraising, and this was just ridiculous, and that there weren't any women officers in Blunt. I also explained that I didn't—then called Crosby Hall—that I didn't really see how I could possibly move over into that situation. I'd been through that once. But it's now six years later, and I'm older, and I just didn't see how I could do that, and this was—the alumni would not welcome having a woman run that, the Dartmouth alumni.

John was quite unimpressed with that argument. And he and Richard Hill, who was a trustee, and Bill Andres, a trustee, and David McLaughlin, a trustee, all got together and invited me to dinner at the Hanover Inn. I went to dinner at the Hanover Inn, and they all sat there and explained why I had to take this job. And I was not happy about that, didn't really want to do that. But there was no question that that's what they wanted. And after a while—it was David McLaughlin who then spent quite a bit of time with me convincing me that this had to be.

So I moved over to Crosby—Blunt. I didn't right away because Blunt was being built so that the development office was in five different locations. It was spread all through the campus trying to start a campaign. It was really a huge challenge.

George Colton by now, I think, had retired just about into the first year of the campaign. So I stayed in Parkhurst Hall, and other people... Ad Winship was in the basement in the back of the White Church, the Congregational Church here. Other people were downtown. They were just spread all over the place. And that went on for about a year and a half while Blunt was being built. When Blunt was built, I moved into Blunt as head of the major gift effort and became the first officer in development. And shortly thereafter, two other people, Betty Ely and Nancy Elliott, were promoted to officers.

DONIN: Well, did it create any waves of...?

MARTIN: Resentment?

DONIN: Well, reaction of one kind or another.

MARTIN: I had been Kemeny's person in these travel meetings, the "no lady" for so long, that I was hardly popular in the alumni relations and development. And Ad Winship and I had had many conversations, and George Colton and I had had many conversations, and we'd come to a... Ad and I had come to a real, I think, open relationship by saying that I knew that he didn't want me there, and that I didn't much want to be there either. But here we were. And I guessed that we had a pretty powerful team: I mean four trustees and the president of the college insisting that this happen.

And this dinner was just the most amazing thing. I mean I went to dinner thinking that I was going to go to something that I would serve as secretary for and found out that the dinner was to tell me that this was, you know, to convince me that this was something I had to do. So it was obviously high-powered treatment for a very low issue.

But it was very difficult for them. I mean this was not something they wanted, it wasn't something they had sought.

You run development offices, and you run campaigns with your own people that you select because you know that they will be most effective. They didn't see that the older alumni, who were all male, could possibly handle this very well.

So it was a very rocky beginning. It was not a happy one at all. They were always very polite to me. I mean I guess they kind of had to be because of the backing. And the campaign lasted five years in its total.

I think one—to skip way ahead—I think probably one of the most moving moments I ever had was at the end of the campaign. Ad Winship wrote a long piece in a book that [Russell A.] Ron Boss ['61 TU '62] actually gave money for the college as the present to everybody at the end of the campaign, the big donors. It's *Remembrances of Dartmouth*. It's a very beautiful book. And Ad wrote this long piece in a copy that he gave me saying that "You've always said this was my campaign." I always said it was Ad's campaign because it was. Sort of like this current campaign is Carrie Pelzel's campaign. That was Ad Winship's campaign. But he said, "There's no way that we could have achieved this without what you did in major gifts." That "we've never ever raised over \$100 million in large gifts before in the history of the college. And that just never would have happened." So we ended up as good colleagues, and I think we did very well together.

But it was not a happy beginning, and it wasn't really a very productive way to start things. But they just didn't feel that there was any way that the development office could see—John Kemeny didn't feel and the trustees—could see their vision.

David McLaughlin was a key person here because he was not yet chairman of the board but he considered himself a good fundraiser. He was. And he considered himself very knowledgeable. So he was not about to walk away from this.

They felt that Dartmouth was too tied to the annual fund giving mentality and that they needed to have larger gifts. And that's an ironic statement for me to make because I think today we still in this campaign that Dartmouth is launching now—and it is 2004—the current development

leadership thinks that Dartmouth is too tied to smaller gifts and needs to have its sights on much larger gifts.

So I'm not sure that isn't true throughout history. It's interesting for me to watch because I'm not sure that's just that isn't the way life is. That each generation says we've got to reach higher and get larger gifts than the last. But the difference here was that the president and the trustees saw a different method of getting them than what they perceived the current—the method that Dartmouth was. Even though we were known as the best in the country.

DONIN: Right. What were your personal experiences when you were on the road once you were in this new position? What was the reaction among the alumni clubs?

MARTIN: I started traveling in about 1977-78. I didn't travel for Dartmouth before that at all. And I traveled...I mean I did travel with the president occasionally, although very seldom, very seldom. But I began to travel to all of the alumni club events. They were campaign events really that were run by the clubs. And I found it awkward and hard. I wasn't used to traveling. I wasn't used to traveling alone certainly.

I found that there was always a core of alumni at each stop... I would go to the events, but I was far more involved in the luncheons that we would schedule for the president, usually of about 20 people or 15 people, where he would outline his goals for the college. And then we would follow it up with individual calls. But this is how we started was with luncheons at almost every stop and then some individual calls. And I would always be at those luncheons. They would be quite surprised. I would always be the only woman there.

But I found a core of people who were extraordinarily welcoming and extraordinarily supportive from the very beginning. I did not find personally—I've never said this—but I didn't have a lot of support from the development people in that first year or two, obviously. But when you got there...

A perfect example would be in San Francisco when Peter [H.] Zischke '52, a very well-known Dartmouth alumnus, and somebody who ended up being chair of the West Coast for this campaign... Ad Winship very kindly had me come and

have a drink with Peter in San Francisco to meet him. And we went to the St. Francis and had a drink, and Peter said, "Well, so I'll see you at the luncheon tomorrow." This was one of the very first luncheons, and Ad Winship had not invited me to the luncheon. And Peter said, "Well, she's coming, isn't she?" And Ad said, "Well..." and sort of stumbled around. He said, "Well, of course, she's coming because we're having it at the Bohemian Club, and you know what happened, Ad, two weeks ago. They said that women could come to private luncheons in the Bohemian Club. And she'll probably be the first woman who's ever been in the Bohemian Club. So we've got to take her."

So I went to the Bohemian Club the next day. Peter Zischke insisted upon picking me up and taking me. He said, "Now when you walk in the door, be sure not to look toward the living room because you're not allowed in any of those rooms, and they're going to get very nervous." I knew the Bohemian Club had an outstanding collection of art, and I did look toward the living room, and the people standing there got very nervous, and we went up to the function rooms. Had our lunch. And I was taking a train down to Stanford that afternoon. And Peter Zischke came over to me at the end of the lunch, and he said, "I think you need to go to the bathroom before you take the train. Let me come stand outside because there is no ladies' room here." So I was the person who integrated the Bohemian Club in San Francisco.

It was awkward, but very quickly with this core of people I would immediately go back to that city and bring lists of names. And say, "Well, I'm new. And here are some lists of names that we think are people who could help significantly in this campaign. And could you look them over and tell me, you know, who they are, or how we could approach them, or what you think?" And in a very short time it was just amazing the number of people that came up. We had a San Francisco trustee, David Parkhurst Smith [35], who was sort of the head honcho, along with Peter Zischke, in San Francisco.

Then we had one person in Chicago who was very welcoming. And explained to me that the Chicago Dartmouth alumni were split between the Jews and the gentiles, and that they very seldom mixed. And I noticed that because John Kemeny would always be invited to one luncheon

where there'd be all Jews and another luncheon where there'd be all gentiles. The gentile head was John Sheldon, a wonderful man, class of '32. And the Jewish head was Robert Engelman who ran Spiegel & Company, another wonderful man. And those two men would make sure when I would come to Chicago that I would never be alone for dinner. They would either take me out to one of their clubs or do something. And they would spend hours helping me understand who people were and helping me get dates for John or for myself or...

In New York we had Dick Lombard, who was key, and [Robert E.] Bob Field ['43 TU '47], who then later moved to Hanover, who was the New York major gift chairman. And we ran quite a number—probably two, two or three—a year of large luncheons and then individual calls. New York always has probably more money for Dartmouth and for most east coast colleges than other schools.

So that sounds like a very sort of simple, loving hands at home way of looking at development. But that was the beginning of what became a major gift effort for Dartmouth.

Actually that year I went to an Ivy League meeting, my first, of development people. And we had a group of major gift directors that met. And when I walked in the room, there were two women there, myself and a woman from the University of Pennsylvania. And they said it was the first time major gift directors had ever met. So this is the first you'd had these kinds of offices in the country really. And that's only 1978. So you didn't have this kind of fundraising in America until just about that time in an organized, formal way.

DONIN: Just in higher education or in any...?

MARTIN: In higher education. I don't think in... I don't know much about the museum world, which is where you'd look next. But then in those days I don't think I knew enough people. I think it was formalized. It's become very formalized. I mean major gift offices are routine. But I don't think it was then. I mean I would consistently be told that we were one of the first, and I would be asked to speak around, and I'd be asked to consult for other institutions because they were trying to

figure out how to start something. So Dartmouth did a good job because we're a much smaller school than Stanford and some of these other schools to get in on the ground floor.

DONIN: You said John Kemeny was good at fundraising.

MARTIN: He was very good at fundraising. He always read his briefings. He always insisted that they be complete, detailed, and concise. And since I'd worked for him for so long, that wasn't very difficult for me. It was difficult for me to convince the alumni folks what John Kemeny needed. They didn't get it sometimes. I mean he'd like financial information, and we didn't have much. Although we had research records, we didn't have what we have today. And he'd also like to understand who they knew and who they were and why we thought the gifts should be... And he would like to know, how much should I ask them? In those days people said, "Well, I don't know." You ask them what you think would be a good idea. He said, "Well, I don't have any idea. It's not my business. It's your business to tell me how much I should ask them for."

DONIN: So they weren't sending you figures?

MARTIN: Well, they began to. But it was—it's really done... Annual giving, which was all run by volunteers, was really what Dartmouth had and many other institutions had had. See, this is '78. It's about 28 years ago—28 or 38?

DONIN: Twenty-eight.

MARTIN: Twenty-eight years ago, and fundraising has come a long way since then.

DONIN: Did they script out what they wanted him to be saying?

MARTIN: I usually did, in some modest way, what points needed to be covered. I mean if it was about a building or a space or a professorship or what, you know, you'd give them as many statistics--or financial aid—you'd give them as many statistics as you could about what our situation was at Dartmouth. But he already knew them. I mean on the faculty side he knew everything.

DONIN: Sure. Right.

MARTIN: So you didn't have to do much of that. But certainly what is the gift for. And then the big thing was to figure out how to thank people and follow up and keep them involved. Which is the key in future giving, I think.

DONIN: Is that what's called stewardship?

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm. That was all just done out of our offices.

DONIN: So let's talk about these opportunities for giving, I mean whether it's a building or, you know, a chair. Who decides that?

MARTIN: When a campaign—or when an institution needs money for capital purposes—it's really the provost's office that makes the decisions about how much is going to be raised for what capital purpose. Every institution has needs that far outstrip the amount of money one can raise to fulfill the needs. And somebody has to make those hard choices.

So prior to the Campaign for Dartmouth, and prior to the capital campaign, the next one, and then prior to the Will To Excel Campaign, prior to this campaign, Campaign for the Dartmouth Experience, there are many, many meetings of high-level officers evaluating all the requests that come in: the deans, the provost, the heads of all the divisions and departments. It's really up to the provost and ultimately the president to decide how much is going to be allocated to what area.

Now it's up to the development office to say how much can you raise. It's up to them to evaluate that, and there are various ways you do it. You can hire somebody to go out and do a lot of interviews for you and do a pre-campaign sort of evaluation of that. You can do it yourself. You can look and see what the historical background is of giving and where you think it's going to go.

In general, campaigns happen within every ten years. And in general you try to double the amount of money that you raised in the previous campaign. Now that's up to today. But then when we raised—in the Will To Excel Campaign, we

had a goal of 425 million that we raised to 500 million. And we raised 558 million. Now that's the campaign where I was running it.

Now today, to double that is really a very big challenge. And that is what we're trying to do with the Dartmouth Experience. Its goal is 1.2 billion. And if you look at it, it's you know, kind of right there in the doubling range. So it's daunting, but we thought 425 million was a lot of money, and we certainly thought 500 million was a lot of money. So it always looks like an awful lot in the beginning. Then one has to hope that you'll get some wonderful gifts from people who are close to you and that you get some happy surprises as you go along.

DONIN: Now what happens...

MARTIN: So you set... Let me just go back to how do you decide.

DONIN: Okay.

MARTIN: I mean the president... I mean in the case of the current campaign, the Dartmouth Experience, Jim Wright knows that he needs to raise money for buildings because right now in the history of the college we have a need for residence halls, we have a need for Kemeny Hall, we have a need for some classroom buildings, we have a need to renovate the Thayer dining hall. We have a need for buildings—building needs in the arts—and we have a need for buildings particularly in the biological sciences and in the medical center. Knowing those needs and, you know, this is the time in the history of this institution where they're the paramount needs. He has to say, "Okay, that's what I'm going to do," and that's... There are a lot of other things he said no to. But he's agreed that enlarging the Tuck school and having the Thayer school building and having the Thayer dining hall renovation. All these things are key to him. So that's one big goal.

The faculty of arts and sciences says, "Well, we need so many professors." And they say, "Well, we can't have that many," but Jim Wright has decided, yes, we really do need to enlarge the faculty of arts and sciences professorial staff by 20 percent. So that's the goal.

Then financial aid, the more that you can raise money for financial aid, the less you have a drain on the budget of the college because this college does not have a lot of endowment monies. The Will To Excel was the first campaign that really made a dent in that. And that's money that is really unrestricted money by the time you spend it because you're going to spend it anyway. I mean if you're going to spend 23 million out of your budget to get some for endowed, it's going to save you money right off your budget. So then you have to decide what proportion that is. But that's a provostial decision.

DONIN: I see.

MARTIN: Not a development decision.

DONIN: Not a development...right. Right.

MARTIN: Now when you say here different departments within development, as you can see, they've changed. Now you have a department of stewardship, you have a department of donor relations, you have a department... These are all today things. In those days you just did those things on a very small scale back 25 years ago.

What does fundraising cost? was another one of your questions. It's very hard to make comparisons between one institution and another because each institution puts different costs in or out of fundraising. Does the fundraising cost include the cost of alumni relations, or doesn't it? Does it include the cost of programs that we have on this campus, the Horizons Program, four or five times a year, that brings people to campus, or doesn't it? We say, yes, it does because most of our guest lists come from development sources. How much of the provost's time and the president's time are spent in fundraising? Is that included in the costs, or isn't it?

There are formulas people use, and there are some guidelines that most institutions follow so that they can have comparative figures. If you use these guidelines, then the costs vary according to the institution and according to the kind of fundraising you're doing. Medical center fundraising is always more expensive, undergraduate fundraising is less

expensive. It's sort of understood in the Ivy League—and I may be a little out of date—but it's understood that costs between 12 cents on the dollar and 15 cents on the dollar are pretty reasonable and in line with what you should be spending.

DONIN: On undergraduate?

MARTIN: On, well, for the Ivy League. Or more than the Ivy League. Just in general. I work with a refugee organization in New York, and we have a cost of ten cents on the dollar, and we're considered one of the best refugee—best NGO's in the country in our fundraising costs per dollar spent. So when you get down to eight or nine cents on the dollar, you're really good. So those are sort of the range of costs.

**[End of Tape 6, Side B – Beginning of Tape 7, Side A]**

MARTIN: In the Will To Excel Campaign, we ranged between 12 and 15 cents a dollar, depending on where we were in the campaign. It was fairly consistent, and it's not unlike most people's ranges were.

DONIN: Is there a group that the Ivies belong to that share this information among themselves?

MARTIN: The Ivy League plus Stanford have a fundraising group that has yearly meetings where they share information. And early on, when I moved into major gifts for the first campaign, we started having major gifts groups that would meet in addition to that. So that we would meet...this is usually done in the fall. The Ivy League group meets as...the development folks, the heads of departments. Each institution decides how many people go. So it's really now up to Carrie Pelzel to decide. Usually the smaller group entities, the annual fund, major gifts, bequest and estate planning, gift planning have one other meeting a year where they share information. We share a lot of information. It's not illegal to share historical information.

DONIN: I'm sure it's valuable.

MARTIN: Very. Mmmm hmmm. Very valuable.

DONIN: So what happens when...

MARTIN: Let me just say... You wrote what's the easiest and the hardest? I need to say something about athletics because athletics is—athletics always feels they don't get a fair shake in fundraising, and often I think they don't.

It's interesting to see what people give to. We've been talking about the priorities of an institution. But what do people give to? Very often an athlete will give to another area of the institution. They'll give to a library, or they'll give a professorship, or they'll give to financial aid. And so whereas you'd think, well, it's got to be pretty easy to get money for athletics... And there are notable exceptions. Anybody who's been in crew can find that people give to crew purposes very well. But it's hard for the athletic department to have the kind—they get the annual kind of giving through their sponsor groups, sort of annual giving. But the large capital gifts that people make to colleges and universities often want them to go to things other than athletics. So I think that this—we bear a special responsibility to decide where our athletics are in the place of our institutions. And then decide how we're going to help guide people to supporting them.

DONIN: Why is it harder for big gifts to go to athletics?

MARTIN: Donors want to be remembered less for the—this is traditionally true—less for the sport they played than for what they perceive to be is prestigious in the institution. And a professorship is prestigious in their minds more than endowing a coach.

It's not always true. I mean we've had some wonderful gifts, and we've just endowed Bob Blackman's football position. But that's... Boy! We've been trying to do that for 25 years. It's hard.

DONIN: Because it's...?

MARTIN: I don't know why. I mean what is it? What is it about an individual that...? I mean John [W.] Berry [Sr. '44] did end up giving money in athletics. But where he first wanted to give money was a professorship in honor of his father. And then

he really gave the money to athletics because Ad Winship, who was absolutely brilliant with John Berry and was a very key person and a key reason John Berry gave money to Dartmouth, just wonderful with him. Ad Winship literally argued him into giving the gymnasium when John Berry didn't want to particularly do it. And they sat with David McLaughlin, and John Kemeny was helpful, too, and argued John Berry into doing the Berry Sports Center. And it was really Ad's deciding...Ad's guiding John Berry to that what they euphemistically call "gift opportunity" that made it happen. [Laughter] And Young [P.] Dawkins [III], who worked for me in what we then called capital giving, really guided John Berry into the Berry Library, which was very exciting for John Berry. So, why do people? I don't know.

DONIN: Is some of it the chemistry between the fundraiser and the donor?

MARTIN: I think more often than you realize. And this is the sort of hidden strength of a good fundraiser. I'm sure that the fundraisers overemphasize that and overstate their role. In a way, you have to if you're going to keep working year after year. But I personally have some really very moving experiences, personal experiences, in fundraising where the donor and I came to something that wouldn't have happened, as Young did with John Berry.

In my most recent case it's Carson Hall, which is something that the donor and I created. And he gave a very moving talk about that when we dedicated Carson Hall. So, yes. Because the person working for the university is very close to what's possible at the university. Usually, of course, it's the president and should be the president. I've raised a lot of money where I'll say the president really wants to talk to you about X. And we're going to talk through X, and he's going to come talk to you. Or in one case in London recently we couldn't really do that. He's going to write you about X. But it's the president that you defer to. But it's a collaborative effort. But the person here really knows what's happening at Dartmouth and can talk about why we need professors.

The president—this president, Jim Wright—is just brilliant at being able to talk about why we need to have strength in the faculty and what the need is at Dartmouth. And he's a

brilliant fundraiser because of that.

You put down maintenance on one of your lists. You mean maintenance endowment...endowment for maintenance? Or maintenance for—what was the word?

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: Raising money for maintenance?

DONIN: The issue came up with various buildings and then I think David McLaughlin was saying you've got to raise money not just for the building, but...

MARTIN: Oh, I see. Within the "gift opportunity."

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: John Kemeny, more than any single person, changed fundraising at Dartmouth because he was shocked—very upset and shocked—by some of the buildings that came on line when he was president—I don't know if he talks about this in his tapes, but I'm sure he does—came on line when he was president. They came on line, they added to his budget, but nobody had figured out how to pay for the heat, light, and power and the maintenance of the building.

The example he used to like to use was Murdough, the Murdough Center, which is, by the way, a very poor energy-efficient building. You can just see the heat escaping from the Murdough Center in infrared pictures if you take these kinds of things.

He was very upset about this. And he said, "Alright! That does it! We're never going to have this again. We're going to have a formula. And when we raise money for a building, there's got to be a certain amount of money that's going to go to the maintenance of that building. And that's going to be part of the fundraising for the building. And we're going to work out a formula." And John loved formulas. And he worked forever working out the formula.

Now this is fine until you get to an academic building of, say, of today's laboratories, where you couldn't possibly raise all

the money. And even then you couldn't. So he said, "Well, of course, it isn't quite the same for academic buildings. For an academic building we ought to contribute 10 or 20 percent to the maintenance." He would sort of fudge it.

But what he came up with, which I think was brilliant and which Dartmouth has followed ever since—and he was the architect of it originally—was to say: If the building is what we call for auxiliary services, it's not for the core teaching area of the college—I mean that could be the Hanover Inn, it could be the Hood Museum of Art; I mean it could be for the rugby clubhouse or the Boss Tennis Center or Thompson Arena—then you need to raise the money to build the building and all the money that is needed for the maintenance of that building. So that when it comes on line in the budget, there's no incremental cost to the building...to the college.

If it is an academic building, then clearly, you know, you can't raise all that much money for it. And there will be some form of formula. And I think—I don't know quite what it is today. They can tell you. But when he first put that in, I think he was talking about 10 to 20 percent.

I thought you meant raising gifts for maintenance, which is a longstanding joke among fundraisers. Lyn Hutton, who was treasurer of the college, and I used to have a running joke about the fact that we couldn't—we would've loved to have raised money for what we referred to as the Lyn Hutton steam tunnel. Because it was her steam tunnel. It became known as the Lyn Hutton-Lu Martin steam tunnel for a while. That was because Lyn Hutton, in her brilliant way, assessed what became Burke Hall, within the Fairchild Center, about \$2 million that we weren't expecting in the budget. And it was in the renovation of Steele and Burke Hall.

It was all very complicated. It's not worth talking about. But \$2 million showed up that just didn't seem right for me there. And so we fought about it back and forth. (Lyn and I were, and remain, very close friends.) And I said, "You know, Lyn, that's that damned steam tunnel you're raising that for." And she said, "Yep!" I said, "I'm raising \$2 million for Burke Hall; it's going to that steam tunnel." She said, "Well, I can't get it any other way." And we did. We raised all the money for

Burke Hall.

DONIN: That's the tunnel that goes under the green?

MARTIN: Yes, the one that has all the cables and things. It's the Lyn Hutton-Lu Martin steam tunnel.

DONIN: [Laughter] That's great.

MARTIN: How do you deal with gifts in kind? Gifts in kind can be just wonderful, and they can be very difficult. We were offered gold teeth. Actually the medical school was offered gold teeth, which we ended up accepting. We were able to extract the gold, and it worked out. We've been offered tigers, which we've turned down. Way, way back, way back, before the campaign, when I was in President Kemeny's office, within the first two years that I was there, we were offered a museum as long as—they would construct the museum, and we would take an enormous armor collection, and it would be in the museum.

There are times when you have to just say no. You turn them down. The armor collection was one and that museum was one. And we had some very angry people. It was unfortunately my responsibility because it was in the president's office, and people were very happy to have me deal with it. But we did turn that down.

On the other hand, we've been offered gifts in kind for construction purposes that have been very valuable. And you value them according to what it would have cost—I mean what the cost of it was. Then everybody agrees with an outside appraisal, and then that person can take a charitable deduction. Not unlike a work of art, a painting. A painting comes to the Hood Museum, and it has to be evaluated by the donor. The museum may not have any involvement in that for IRS rulings. It's the same as equipment and computers that would go to the Thayer School or the mathematics department.

DONIN: It's like the books that are given here.

MARTIN: Or the books for Rauner that have to be appraised. And they're wonderful if you need them and if you can have them.

But the hard thing is to maintain your integrity and make sure that you don't take something that you don't want. I've worked with a lot of situations where we've turned down gifts in kind. And I've worked with a lot of situations where we've turned down a gift.

About eight years ago I personally turned down a million-dollar scholarship fund. It broke my heart to turn it down. But the restrictions on that fund were so great on the part of the donor. They wanted to participate not only in the investment of the fund, but in the use of that fund for merit scholarships which is against the rules of the Ivy League, and we don't give merit scholarships at Dartmouth. And once we got through that and even worked through some new wording that they agreed to, they wanted to say that in perpetuity a member of the family would oversee the finances of that fund. And that if they didn't like the way we were running it, they'd take the money back. And this was just about the time the Bass Family took their money back from Yale, and I said we just can't take money under that rubric.

DONIN: What about real estate?

MARTIN: Again, Dartmouth, it depends whether we need it. We have been offered many estates around the world, particularly Italian villas. I don't know why we seem to love—they love to give us Italian villas so that we could run a program. Or even apartments in London. But you have to be very careful because that can be a huge financial drain on the college. So we tend to turn them down.

Now I say that when you're offering me a piece of real estate that we then have to use for a purpose and keep it for that purpose. However, through our gift planning office, which used to be called bequests and trusts, we take a great amount of real estate. And there are many easy ways and formulaic ways to do this, where people can give you a house and have a life tenancy in that house. Then when they die, the house belongs to the college. We have many occasions of that. Give you property, which you then can sell.

That's quite a different matter...that kind of real estate is a gift vehicle. And it's very different from talking about the book

that comes to Rauner or the painting that goes to the Hood Museum because the gift vehicle is so they can make a charitable gift to the college. It's understood by the IRS. Everybody's got that very clear.

However, the painting for the museum or the book for the library is very different because that's not like the real estate. That should be taken only if we want it. And you might be able to sell it three or four years from now. But you can't turn around and sell it immediately. And that does create some problems, particularly—primarily—with the museum, where people want to give us art to take a charitable deduction and then say, "Well, I don't care if you keep it," you can turn around and sell it.

We have committees that decide whether we're going to accept that art. I have served the Hood Museum's acquisition committee for many, many years. And if our committee says this is not a piece of art we need for the collection of the museum, then we're not going to accept it. So you have some negotiation then, some delicate relationships with your alumni. Seems to happen less with books than it does... Sometimes it happens with collections, but I haven't noticed any lately.

DONIN: No, I should think art would be much more common.

MARTIN: Yes, yes.

DONIN: Common medium that you would have to deal with.

MARTIN: Right, right.

DONIN: Working down our list here...

MARTIN: I think we've talked about the alumni fund pretty much. Class agents and volunteers. The class agents work for the alumni fund. That's all alumni fund structure. There are volunteers in the capital campaigns.

DONIN: Class agents, yes.

MARTIN: In the capital campaigns up until this campaign, we had volunteer committees for major gifts. We had volunteer

committees gifts for what we call leadership gifts. Part of the staff responsibility was to work with the volunteers. I started when...the first major gift effort and the first capital campaign for Dartmouth, I had a volunteer committee for major gifts national, which I built up; that was part of my responsibility. That was one of the reasons I was running around the countryside.

Obviously when you become a volunteer for a major gift committee and the bottom level's 100,000, you either give first or you're expected to give that amount. And you're bringing somebody closer to the college, and you want their gift as well. I mean that's an important part about being a volunteer. I can't say those volunteers asked for a lot of money. It wasn't like the alumni fund where they would be the agents and ask for money. They would be much more... On the major gift committee we would send them a newsletter every six weeks. I had one person—it was a two-person office, myself and a young man named Grant [E.G.] Healy ['75] and we would send them a newsletter every six weeks signed by Dick Lombard; Dick Lombard didn't write them. And we would have meetings around the country and then bring them to Hanover periodically, not terribly often. And yet those volunteers would very often host events in their homes or in their offices or in their clubs for us, and that would be their service to the committee. And sometimes ask for gifts with the president or on their own or with me. I had to learn to ask for gifts because that was all new to me. But we did that, but primarily with the president or with a trustee or with a dean. So that was a very heavy use of volunteers in that campaign and in the Will To Excel Campaign where you had major gift volunteers, and you had leadership gift volunteers. Very much like the Campaign for Dartmouth. That's not true in the Campaign for the Dartmouth Experience. This is a staff-driven campaign. They do not have volunteer committees for the various levels of giving. It's not the same?

DONIN: Why is that?

MARTIN: I think that—Carrie Pelzel would have to be the person to answer that definitively. But I think the feeling is that—giving at these levels now, the large, even the leadership level, is at 250,000 and above; and then the principal giving level, which

is their top level, which I introduced for the Will to Excel Campaign, is five million or above, or a million and above certainly—that you really need to be intimately involved in the college and what its gift opportunities are. That you can't ask a volunteer to go out and ask for that money. You need the president, you need a trustee, you need the vice president for development. You need people or a dean or a professor—that you need people who are involved closely. Whereas there are still volunteers in the alumni fund, although that is even more staff-driven than it used to be as well. So you don't have quite the volunteer involvement now that you had in those earlier days of fundraising. I'm not sure that's true at all schools, but it's certainly true at Dartmouth.

DONIN: When you've got a new family with a child first coming to the college, how quickly do they get looked at by the development people?

MARTIN: One of the wonderful things that we began to develop sort of about 1980, '85, was to have one person as the parents fund staff person. And when we did that, we could begin to process information about parents in a way that until then we just didn't have any way.

If I go back 25 years to 1978, '79, and 1980, what I would do would be to take names of families from an area. And when I was going to visit alumni—I was always visiting top-level alumni—I would bring names with us. I'd really do it by neighborhood or if they looked hopeful. I really didn't know an awful lot or maybe you would've heard something. You very often would have heard something. And I tried to get them to identify. I might show them a hundred names and get them to identify people in the area.

We still do some of that although it's far more sophisticated now. Because the first thing we do is that when you matriculate at Dartmouth, you fill out a... One of the forms you fill out—you fill out lots of different forms, and one of the forms is your parents' name and address and your grandparents' names and addresses. And those forms go to the parents' fund person. So that almost immediately after your child has enrolled—actually I think it's done before they come—almost immediately after your child is here on campus, you get a newsletter from the parents' fund;

everybody gets that. And there is a parents' fund committee; that's an annual fund function primarily. The parents' fund committee with chairs and vice chairs and members in various parts of the country.

So that we get in touch with them quickly. I've pushed hard for Dartmouth to do this and to get in touch with them as quickly as possible because you have only four years. And after four years, the kids are gone. And while some parents are Dartmouth graduates, and we may know them very well; many parents are not. So I would say within months, I mean very fast. We have parents' events, particularly in New York and in California. We have them in other parts of the country. We invite parents up here; and, of course, you have parents' weekend which occurs in the spring of the freshman year. By then you pretty much have done a lot of research on parents.

Our research office gets to work in August, July and August, on the names of matriculating freshmen and their parents, trying to look at zip codes and public information that might give us a clue about assets. Even by the time they get on campus, we're trying to identify those parents that might help. The annual fund this year—this last year, 2004—for the first time got a million dollars from parents in the annual fund total. And that's a big milestone. We've been trying to hit that milestone for a long time. Should have hit it earlier, I think, but we were very happy with that.

DONIN: It requires research. I mean you've got to find out what these people are capable of.

MARTIN: We put two or three researchers on in the summer that work on parents. But then start soliciting them in the fall.

DONIN: Now I read this in the *D*, so I guess we have to take it with a grain of salt. But did Dartmouth—did they institute this idea of having students do fundraising, you know, current students do calling? I don't know if that's accurate or not.

MARTIN: Oh, it's absolutely accurate. And it's a national program. Many, many, many schools do it. We've done it for years and years and years. We call them the Green Corp\$, C-O-R-P and then a dollar sign instead of an S. And for years we've had students, oh, back into the '80s, '70s and '80s, we've

had student callers and student calling campaigns for the annual fund, primarily with the smaller donors to help increase and keep up our participation.

Recently, in recent years, we've done something we didn't do until about six or seven years ago. We have in the fall students will call to say thank you for gifts at all levels. And alumni really love that. And then they'll talk about what they're doing on campus. And the Green Corp\$ are paid; you get paid for being in the Green Corp\$. And so a lot of financial aid students use that as a job opportunity.

DONIN: Uh huh. Of course. Right, right.

MARTIN: That's been very successful.

DONIN: Right.

MARTIN: Many, many schools don't do it that way. Many schools do it with paid callers. I mean we pay the students. We used to have just volunteer callers in the old days. But they just have paid callers who aren't students. Just paid companies that come in and call. And you can spot that pretty quickly, and Dartmouth has never done that. We've not outsourced it to paid companies. But many schools do.

DONIN: Do donors ever get feedback from... Well, I'm thinking of the financial aid students. Do they ever give feedback about what their experience is like because they're able to come here because of some financial aid package that's been provided to them? Is there a way to use that information?

MARTIN: All donors who have named endowed scholarships get a letter each year from their scholar.

DONIN: Oh!

MARTIN: So if you had the Donin Scholarship, you would receive a letter from the Donin Scholar each year, telling you whatever the Donin Scholar wants to tell you. Some of these letters are very moving. They're beautiful. Some of them are okay. But you would hear from your scholar. In addition to that, you'd hear from the college each year the book value, that's the amount of money you gave, and the market value, what

it's worth today, of your fund. You get a letter that tells you that and a little bit about your scholar, and how he did in grades that year, and how it went. So there might be a paragraph on that. So you really hear twice in a year. And then when a scholar graduates and a new scholar is selected, you get a letter telling you who the new scholar is and a little bit about their background.

DONIN: Great.

MARTIN: So that's very important. We feel strongly about it. If it's not a named fund, if it's just not from a named fund, you don't get personal letters from the students. But you do get a letter. I think it should be every year. It seems to be a little periodic about the scholarship then.

DONIN: Update, right. The relationship that you had with a lot of these trustees must have been sort of—I don't know what the word is. You were working with them as trustees of the college obviously. And yet weren't you also looking at them potential—not potential—as obvious prospects for donations?

MARTIN: Mmmm hmmm.

DONIN: Was that hard to keep that relationship separate?

MARTIN: Well, I think all trustees understand that, if you're a trustee, you need to support the college in proportion to your ability to do so. And Carrie Pelzel, for example, has done a brilliant job of making sure that she is the contact person for all trustees.

Some vice presidents in the past have not always done that. It's been done by area or who lives where or stuff like that. But she really makes sure that she writes the trustees. They all expect to make a gift.

Now some of them are of modest means, and their gift might be a gift to the alumni fund. Others are of substantial means, and it's not unlike what the president has to do.

The president has to call on those people of substantial means, to raise their sights, and ask them for significant

gifts. And that's part of his job. So for those trustees who can make significant gift, the president and the vice president are the two key people who are going to be talking with them. They'll also be talking to deans.

I think a good example would be [William H.] Bill Neukom ['64] who has made a significant, wonderful gift to a computer center—computation center. And he's met with the people in computing, he's met with the dean of the faculty, he's met with the dean for sciences, he's met with Jim Wright, he's met with Carrie Pelzel. Carrie has been out to see him many times. Jim has been out to see him. That's really understood, I think, when you become a trustee. I don't think it's difficult at all. It's part of the world.

DONIN: I see. It comes naturally.

MARTIN: Yes.

DONIN: It comes naturally. Now did you want to talk about the next campaign that you were involved in?

MARTIN: Campaign for Dartmouth?

DONIN: Yes.

MARTIN: We talked about that a little bit. I mean Will To Excel?

DONIN: Mmmm hmmm.

MARTIN: Sure. Will To Excel Campaign was started by...let's see, when did Freedman become president? What are Freedman's years?

DONIN: Well, '87 to...

MARTIN: Right.

**[End of Tape 7, Side A – Beginning of Tape 7, Side B]**

DONIN: Okay. Go ahead.

MARTIN: But talking about campaigns, the Campaign for Dartmouth was started by John Kemeny, completed by David

McLaughlin. David McLaughlin was brilliant in completing that campaign as chairman of the board—which he wasn't when it was started, but he was part way through. He was extremely supportive. I went to see David McLaughlin when he was a trustee and then as chairman of the board many, many times to talk about high-level prospects that he should be involved with, and he always followed up, always on those calls.

DONIN: There's a wonderful anecdote—and I'm sure you know this—about John Kemeny when he was at the end of his presidency, giving David McLaughlin a list of prospects of all the people that couldn't stand him and urging David McLaughlin to go after them.

MARTIN: Yes, we prepared that list. [Laughter] It was a joint preparation. I prepared the list actually. That was touchy because the end of the story, which John loves to tell, was fine. The beginning of the story was a little more difficult because it's kind of hard to tell a president that some people don't like you, and he doesn't know it. Now some he knew. That was no problem. I mean some who had been opposed to coeducation or just had been obviously writing him angry letters. But there were some other people on that list of people whom he didn't know didn't care for him that much. And I think John Kemeny was a little bit hurt by some of those names. But he managed, and he did give the list to David McLaughlin, and then David and I followed up with those people afterwards. And David was great.

The Will To Excel Campaign started under Jim Freedman and completed with Jim Wright. And, of course, Jim Wright was acting president during Jim Freedman's time, and that was in the middle when we were just completing the middle part of the campaign. I seem to get into development situations in strange ways. And the Will To Excel Campaign was not any less strange than the Campaign for Dartmouth. The Campaign for Dartmouth, you remember, I started a nucleus fund, I moved over, ran a major gift office. And by the way, maybe I should stop there to say that when the Campaign for Dartmouth was completed, everybody in the annual fund and in bequests and trusts assumed that the major gift office would go away.

DONIN: Oh.

MARTIN: Because once the campaign was completed, you didn't need it anymore. And David McLaughlin was by now president, and he made it very clear that the major gift office would remain. And he also made it clear that we had—by now we had done some studies with other institutions, and he and I had worked on some studies—he made it clear that it would continue, it would double in size during the non-campaign period which was a big surprise, so we would double it. And it would be renamed—I did not want to continue to name it major gifts—it would be...I wanted to name it capital giving.

The reason we named it capital giving is that that's what it really was all about. They were gifts to capital, but we wanted to say capital giving because giving is an ongoing process. We didn't want it to be gifts. We wanted it to be a giving. So we named the office capital giving. We're very happy with that name. In fact I was very happy because my closest friend at Harvard, who was head of their major gift effort and became head of their principal giving effort at the same time I moved over to principal giving, called me up and said, "Would you mind if I used your name?" And I thought it was so nice that Harvard wanted to use our capital giving name.

So that office continued during the non-campaign period. And if you look at the charts of fundraising, we continued to gain capital gifts during that time very actively.

So then we became the Will to Excel Campaign. And at the time we started planning for that campaign, we began to see that we really needed to differentiate between major gifts, capital giving, and the really, really top gifts—principal, what they call now principal gifts, which would be gifts in that case of a million dollars or more. Now about five million or more. I, at the same time, was very interested in seeing... I now had an office of about five or six officers—so it had a significant size—three or four associates and one or two assistant directors, officers. And I wanted to see some chances for career advancement in those offices. And also I'd been now sort of shifting into a very full-time management role and wanted to get back to...

But I hadn't given up a lot of my involvement with individuals, and I wanted to get back to full-time work with individuals. So we created an office of principal giving, and I became its first director. And interestingly enough, we were mentioning the Ivy League, M.I.T., and Stanford annual meetings, and by now there were four principal giving offices. We went to one meeting, and we had our first meeting of principal giving offices, and the four of us got together in a room, and we looked around the room, and all four of us had been there when we'd started the major giving. And all four of us were now doing principal giving. So I think it says something about our personalities and about the fact that we wanted to be in a one-to-one situation with potential donors and working with individuals, rather than the more traditional route of moving up into having more management responsibility.

That's been a quandary for development and development people of what do you reward? Do you reward management responsibility or do you reward individual giving? It remains a quandary. So that was in itself interesting.

So we started the Will To Excel Campaign and at this point David McLaughlin had decided that he really needed a new vice president. Well, I should backtrack. He had decided previously that he needed a new vice president, and he had—Ad Winship had retired—and he had hired a man by the name of [John] Jack Harned ['50] as his vice president. I had turned down the job of director of development which was offered to me at that point. [Josiah] Joe Stevenson [IV '57 TU '58] had become director of development. But David McLaughlin didn't really think you needed a director of development. He was not—he didn't really support that structure very much. And Jack Harned, whom he knew and had faith in, started the planning for the Will To Excel Campaign. And as you may know, after a few years that relationship just didn't work out, and David decided to make a change. He decided this quite quickly and quite unlike most academic institutions. He called me in one day and informed me that he was going to be making a change and he would like me to take over on a temporary basis until he had hired a new person. I'd been...

He and I had talked before he'd hired Jack Harned and unlike that time, this time I said to David that I'd been in

development now for some time, and that I knew that people didn't feel that a woman could run a development office, and that we didn't have very many in the country, but that I really felt that wasn't necessarily true. And I was interested. That unlike the first time when I felt I wasn't qualified, that I'd now been—I'd run the development office periodic or temporary times, and I really felt that I would like to be considered to be part of that pool.

David explained that he wanted me to take over on a temporary basis, that I would run development and [Michael] Mike Choukas [Jr. '51] would run alumni relations, and the two of us would share an acting—essentially sort of an acting vice presidency for a few months. He also said at the time that he didn't think Dartmouth was ready for a woman. I think that today you couldn't say that in a meeting. But that was then, and this is now. This is really, when you think about it, it was in the late '80s or mid-'80s, '82, whatever it was.

He said that he'd named Jim Wright as head of his search committee to replace Jack Harned, who had only been there about three years or so. And he said that he didn't think that would work, but that he would like me to become director of development when the new person was named, and that we were going to start planning a new campaign, and, you know, who's better to plan campaigns and so forth.

I explained that number one, I did not want to become director of development when a new vice president was named. That I'd like to either be considered as a possible candidate for vice president or return to working with individual donors. I had a second reason for that, aside from my own desires, and that was that I felt strongly that just like the Campaign for Dartmouth, that Dartmouth really needed to evaluate its development operation, and that it was time for them to look at other schools and maybe get somebody from the outside to be the architect of the Will To Excel Campaign. To plan that campaign, to figure out what its construction should be. And that I felt that I would be mired in the past, so to speak, because I'd already been there, done that. And that I didn't have the breadth to do that in a way an outside person would do it.

David disagreed. We had an argument about it. After about three months, Jim Wright and I met and Jim Wright made it clear to me that, as he always does in as nice a way as possible, that it would be probably not advisable for me to be a candidate for that job. That the president was probably not going to select a woman. He didn't say a woman. I probably would not be selected. And I did not apply for the job.

By then Dartmouth had moved along, and one could have applied, it was a perfectly open... We were way beyond the situation where you didn't have women around. But I made the decision not to apply. I'd had enough time, and I really wanted to stay with individual donors. I'd been recruited to go work for the hospital and the medical center and had turned that down. But I felt that I really was very happy working with individual donors. But I certainly wasn't going to become the architect of the new campaign.

By now campaigns are incredibly difficult to plan. They're far more complicated than they were in the old days where John Kemeny divided up the pot the way he felt it should be. Now there are meetings and meetings and all these questions you have above that we haven't gone down each one of, which I don't really see the need to. All have structures, administrative structures, that make you decide. And I really thought it would be best if somebody came from the outside.

So my couple of months turned into a year and a half that Mike Choukas and I shared this responsibility. It was a very interesting time. I think we both learned a lot. We are good friends today. I don't know how, but we are, and have remained so. We had dinner just the other night. And it worked. I don't know why it worked, but I think we each respected the talents of the other in a way that let us manage to do this really well. Mike wasn't particularly interested in the development side, and I wasn't particularly interested in the alumni relations side. So we each ran our little shop.

So I had my period of time running development, and it was sort of fun. We hired John [C.] Hays, who was from Stanford, to be the director of development and to plan the next campaign, which he did. So he was the architect of the Will To Excel Campaign and really was the person who started it

off. So all of the structures—John and I worked closely together on that—but all of the structures were structures that he really put in place. And I think he did a brilliant job organizing it.

## **End of Part One**