John W. Hennessey, Jr.

Charles Henry Jones Professor of Management, Emeritus
Third Century Professor, Emeritus

An Interview Conducted by

Jane Carroll

Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire

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Dartmouth College

Hanover, New Hampshire

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.
Tuck School, Dartmouth College

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library, Dartmouth College

DATE: September 26, 1996

CARROLL: ...1996. I'm interviewing John W. Hennessey, Jr., in Baker Library. He was the Dean of Tuck School of Business from 1968 to '76. And then the Charles H. Jones Professor of Management, now Emeritus, at Tuck School of Business. He was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center from 1977 to '83. [See Appendix A for a one-page biography updated to 2000]

HENNESSEY: And again.

CARROLL: And again? Oh, really! What years were that?

HENNESSEY: 1992 to 1995.

CARROLL: Okay. Let me put that down. I'm curious-- You came to Dartmouth in 1957. What was Tuck like at that time?

HENNESSEY: I was recruited by Associate Dean Karl Hill in a way that attracted me very much to Tuck. Because Karl portrayed Tuck, which I did not know very well, as a privileged small graduate management school. One that had a tight and felicitous tie to one of the country's elite undergraduate colleges. But also one that had been privileged to concentrate uniquely on the MBA program. As Karl described it, Tuck was the only graduate business school that did not--at a college or university--that did not also have undergraduate instruction in business and/or a doctoral program. So Tuck's focus was not only clear and different from many other schools, but also Karl was able to show me and remind me--because I had known a bit about the history of graduate business education--that Tuck was the original master's program, the very first. And [Tuck] had a long history of commitment to the nature of the program and where it fitted, not only into university life, but where it fitted into contributions to society. And that latter aspect seemed to me to be very promising because of the tie Karl described between Tuck and the College.

I was also much impressed with the recent investment, Karl described to me, that the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation had made in Tuck School. The Sloan Foundation had made a contribution to Tuck that enabled the faculty to propose research programs during the year--and more importantly, during the summers. So that most of the faculty taught during the nine months, and studied and wrote during the summer. In those days that was a relatively unusual model for graduate business schools. The idea of developing intellectual capital for three months of the year, and doing it a way that was generously supported, was very different from the style of the university from which I came to Tuck--the University of Washington, a large, excellent, well-funded state university where summers were spent teaching summer school, if that's what you wanted to do. Or be on your own and going out to consult or do something else.

But the idea of funded research and scholarship in a small setting, with a faculty all of whom knew one another, and one in which everyone occupied a very strong and important place, was very attractive to me. What I mean by that latter comment is that, as I examined the curriculum and faculty activities, it was clear to me that there was a real partnership within the faculty, not a senior-junior, large department kind of setup at all. But every faculty member had a course or courses that were his responsibility. And I pause on "his" because it was all "hises" in those days.

Also Karl described to me that Tuck had looked at other business schools very carefully, and had decided that it wanted to--as a leading school--it wanted to produce a blend of Harvard Business School, and its very particular culture and style of education, and Chicago and Columbia and Wharton, all of which were really quite different from Harvard. In those days [they were] proud of the differences and competing strongly with one another during a period of rapid change and rapid growth in graduate business education.

Business education at the graduate level had been changed materially by World War II and by the development of applied social science. Particularly during and right after the war, an enormous amount of money was put into the translation of psychology and sociology and economics, and political science, too, into programs of examining and doing research on policy, organizations, how they worked. The Ford Foundation developed a whole division that was committed to the human sciences in various ways. It was a very interesting time. And Tuck clearly was on top of that, as I perceived it, and was ready to experiment with understanding reality and using the case method to

expose students to real situations. But also to break paths in the applications of psychology and sociology and economics to modern organizational issues. And that was what I was beginning to feel was the most important thing for me to do because of my background. So I saw Tuck as an excellent small school with high promise, probably more promise than any other place at that time.

And I was interested in some other schools. I came to Tuck thinking that it was probably the best place for me to be, but I was not certain. As a result, among other things, I took a leave of absence from the University of Washington in coming to Tuck. And in my first year I--my first year of Tuck--I was strongly urged by the faculty of the Harvard Business School to go there. And was made an offer they thought I couldn't refuse. But everything came to a head for me at the end of my first year here. I really believe this was--and still believe--this was one of the best of all possible places to make a contribution. And although I could go far more into that than I have, what I'm saying is that after a year here I was very satisfied and pleased and wanted to make a permanent investment. Fortunately at that time I was then offered the opportunity to have tenure and be a permanent part of Tuck. I accepted, and my roots started to go down. I can pause at that point and see which way you want to go. But I would like to talk more about Karl Hill, as you suggested.

CARROLL: Well, I would love to do that. But I wanted to also ask you--as I understand it, this is the time when Tuck made the commitment to look for students outside the Dartmouth undergraduate pool. Is that right? I have it as '58.

HENNESSEY: Karl explained to me in '56 when I was being recruited, that historically Tuck had served the Dartmouth student body principally with what was called the Dartmouth Plan, invented in 1900 by [President] William Jewett Tucker [1861] and Edward Tuck [1862]. The idea was that well-qualified Dartmouth juniors at the end of their junior year could spend their senior year at Tuck, and then spend one more year and get an MBA. Effectively giving up their senior year in the college, although there was an opportunity for them to continue to do some of their work in the undergraduate curriculum under certain circumstances. In the [President John Sloan] Dickey years, the requirement of the Great Issues course became something that was a very important part of the Dartmouth senior's life when the senior came down to Tuck.

Karl explained to me that the way the world was developing-- Although Dartmouth and Tuck were very pleased with this 3/2 Plan at the Medical

School, at the engineering school, and at Tuck, it appeared to Karl that as he--and others, but I always think of Karl as really the motive force--as the faculty was diversified in the '50's, rebuilt and substantially diversified away from Dartmouth ties, Karl expected that the school would be able to attract more and more students from outside the Dartmouth family. He was first interested and concerned about attracting more Dartmouth graduates to come to Tuck.

When I came in September of '57, I think probably in the first class I taught, of--I remember it as about 120 students divided into two sections of 60--I think 80% were Dartmouth 3/2 students. And I think in my second year, '58-59, it was 65%. And as that began to change, and I was not only attracted to changing it but was part of the energy and part of the whole process of making the change, I felt it was an intriguing managerial problem, educational management problem. And one which, if managed well, would produce in a relatively short time a student body that could be compared with any other student body. As you can see, the challenge was to maintain the quality of the entering students, while moving away from this marvelous supply of Dartmouth juniors who were so attractive, and over time had been led to believe that they ought not even to apply to Tuck unless they were really very good and sharp and ready to profit from being there.

By 1962 Karl asked me formally to become part of managing that process when he asked me to become the associate dean. There had been no associate dean until then, under Karl. A strong part of my responsibility was to develop relationships with schools that had not by then yet perceived that Tuck was no longer a Dartmouth captive. It took a long time to convince the Harvard, Yale, Princeton students, MIT students, that they ought to come to Tuck. Because their advisors all said, "You won't want to do that because you understand of course that almost all the students are really Dartmouth seniors in the first year." And Karl asked me to take on the recruiting responsibilities at the schools I named: Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and MIT. And that was a fascinating process for me, explaining the reality of the modern Tuck. And at the same time worrying about this very delicate process of being sure that the students we attract from places like Princeton and Yale and Harvard and MIT would not be those who had been turned down by Harvard or Wharton or Chicago, Columbia, our major competitors.

But Karl had that clear vision that the future of the school rested on our becoming more cosmopolitan. And it took about-- well, it took until about 1974 or '75 before I was really comfortable that we had made the transformation in a complete and high-quality way. But there still

lingered issues of a different kind, issues surrounding the nature of the 3/2 program and what should be come of it. Whether it should disappear or whether it should be maintained. And I remember talking with [President] John Kemeny in the '72, '73, '74 period as he became aware that alumni, particularly Tuck-Dartmouth alumni, were aroused and upset by what seemed to be an attempt on the part of the Hennessey regime to get rid of the 3/2 program, which was not really what we were doing at all.

CARROLL: It may have been bad timing, too, because as you were doing that, coeducation was being introduced. And many alumni felt as well that there were fewer spots for their future children.

HENNESSEY: Yes, that's a story we ought to go into.

CARROLL: That's right.

HENNESSEY: I might just mention now, as a place holder, that when John Dickey asked me in November 1967 if I would be willing to be considered as Tuck's fifth dean and successor to Karl Hill, we had a series of meetings. There were five meetings on five days, I recall really well. And one of the things I said to John was that I could not accept the deanship unless the trustees were comfortable with Tuck's commencement of coeducation. And to my pleasure, John was able to accept that. And indeed the first woman, then, arrived at Tuck in September 1968, when I began my deanship.

CARROLL: I was going to ask you-- That was in '68. That was Martha--

HENNESSEY: Fransson.

CARROLL: Fransson. Do you know what became of her? I'm curious.

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. I know everything about what became of her because I kept in constant contact with her.

CARROLL: What is she doing now?

HENNESSEY: She's now on the faculty of the University of Hartford, teaching policy and marketing in a graduate business school.

CARROLL: How did she know to apply to Tuck when it had no tradition of accepting women?

HENNESSEY: Every year we had a few applications from women. I don't remember how many. And I remember my discomfort as Karl explained how he responded to those. And I resolved that I couldn't do what Karl was doing. Which was really saying, in effect, “Dartmouth is not ready and Tuck is not ready. And it's going to take a little while longer.” And I think Karl's earnest feeling--and he may have been wise in feeling this way, all things considered--was that until the undergraduate body became coeducational, Tuck really ought not to do it. Because some of the best--a very fine source of women for Tuck would be women who were at Dartmouth and decided to pursue the 3/2 program, for example, or some other postgraduate plan for coming to Tuck. I saw that as waiting too long and as being too conservative. But I can certainly understand why Karl felt the way he did.

Karl was a--I think of him first of all as a deeply, deeply committed Dartmouth person. He came to Dartmouth during the Depression in 1934. Graduated in 1938. He, you know, went to Tuck. Got his master's degree in 1939. Was invited back to Tuck four or five years after he left to teach manufacturing and production. He had not been in the service in World War II because of physical disabilities. He came back and, you know, was an assistant professor of production, I think. And rather quickly showed high talent for administrative affairs. [He] was invited to be an assistant dean. And in the period of 1953 to '57, approximately (it might have been '52 to '57), he as associate dean--or assistant dean; I've forgot what his title was--he emerged as the faculty's internal preference for dean, or the faculty's internal dean. The new dean, Arthur Upgren, who came in 1952, seemed to the faculty clearly strongest in his external relationships--in giving talks and-- Not someone who seemed to the faculty to understand Dartmouth or Tuck and their cultures well enough to have much leverage with the faculty in terms of planning and operations.

So Karl became effectively the dean. And when Karl came to recruit me in 1956, he represented that he wasn't sure what would happen to him because he had been, in effect, asked by the faculty and by President Dickey to take on substantial responsibilities in support of a dean who didn't appear to be a permanent part of the place. And indeed did then leave in 1957. In fact, that was a very anxious moment for me because Karl told me, after I had agreed to come, that Arthur Upgren was leaving. But Karl wasn't at all sure that he would become the dean. But John Dickey chose him, and I think chose him quite wisely. Because Karl by then did represent first-class planning for a different future for the Tuck.

CARROLL: What allowed him to have a vision that looked at the future when he had all these very traditional ties to Dartmouth?

HENNESSEY: Karl was intellectually very sharp and very curious. He was, as a human being, forward-looking, optimistic, energetic, warm and wonderful with people. As he began to build a young faculty and associated himself with them--because Karl, I always think of him as a young person--it was natural for him to associate himself with the concerns this young faculty had for this booming, bursting field of modern management science. So it was a combination of a respect for the past, but a feeling that the quality of the past--the high quality of the past--was something that he had a stewardship for that had to be continued in a changing world. So intellectually he took it on as a principal challenge that in a fundamental way excited and interested him. It really became his whole life. He was absorbed by it, really threw himself into it.

CARROLL: What caused him in '68 to--well, in '67 he resigned?

HENNESSEY: Karl and I had a wonderful adventure with each other from '62 to '67 while I was associate dean. And really we treated each other as interchangeable. So I know a great deal about his feelings and perceptions. I really want to pause and tell you that, if you don't interrupt me, I may talk for an hour about that, that part of what was going on. But let me be brief. Karl, first of all, was not well. He had--I'll simply refer to them as internal, stomach-oriented problems. I won't go into more detail. He had had a serious operation in the early '50's that resulted in his leading a somewhat restricted life in terms of what he ate and how regularly he got his sleep. Although that never showed. He was a really enormously vital man. He had an attack in February of 1967. He and I were in New York together, and he had a serious attack internally. And was hospitalized and underwent surgery, serious surgery. And left the deanship temporarily from February of '67 to July of '67, and I was acting dean.

That was a great challenge for Karl. He wondered, as a result of that, how long he ought to stay in a highly stressful, challenging position. But because of the man he was, he was more concerned about other people's perceptions and evaluation of all of that, than he was of his own morale or motivation. I think left to himself, all other things being manageable, Karl would not have wanted to stop being Dean of Tuck School. It was, in a way, I think it would be fair for me to say, that that was Karl's natural fit. That's what he had been spending his life preparing for, and he enjoyed it enormously. Now, what else should I

say to you in this confidential setting, knowing that I can look back over these notes and edit them later.

I think it's important to record the fact that the relationship between President John Dickey and Dean Karl Hill was not one which either man perceived as flourishing. It was full of differences and difficulties. Some of them were, I think, a product of the fact that John Dickey did not understand or care a very great deal about Tuck in the way he deeply understood and nourished and cared for the undergraduate experience. That's not a criticism of John Dickey. That's the way a president of Dartmouth probably had to perceive his total span, that Tuck was doing well and didn't need his attention except when problems occurred. And it was operating in a smaller sphere as far as John Dickey was concerned. A kind of measurable, accountable sphere called "graduate management education." Which was really relatively small and encompassable compared with John Dickey's concept of the undergraduate experience as really having the world as its context.

In fact, later on, when I worked with John in the little more than a year that I did, '68-69, I found him intrigue-able. That is, he, in bringing into what the faculty was thinking of doing in the modern Tuck School, how we conceived of our educational challenge vis-à-vis the students, and what we thought was the blessing in our relationship as a school with the undergraduate Arts & Sciences faculty, I think John's attitude softened a bit. But during the Karl Hill era, he saw Karl more as--not a technician, but as somebody who was presiding over a school that ought not to have--that had a lot of privileges and ought not to have much difficulty in transforming itself from a 3/2 program to something larger. And I think John was a bit impatient with the speed with which it was happening. A little unsure, also, whether Karl could continue to inspire the excellent younger faculty with regard to their scholarship. Karl did not have a doctor's degree. And it was unusual--and still is--for the dean of a first-class school, professional school, not to have his or her grounding in scholarship. There have been notable exceptions. But at that time, most of the graduate business schools were showing their commitment to behavioral science research and quantitative science research by putting in the position of dean people who personified this new cutting edge of scholarship. And so Karl was vulnerable to John Dickey's perception. Although to us inside the school, we thought Karl was the best of all possible deans. He was so bright and so encouraging, that I think--I don't recall that any of my colleagues, not any of them, ever thought about the possibility that Karl would not continue to be dean.

But during the 1967-68 year, in fact early in that year, probably September, maybe October, Karl attended a meeting--

[End of Tape 1, Side A -- Beginnning of Tape 1, Side B]

Karl and I had, as one of our challenges, working with the Dean and the faculty of the Thayer School of Engineering. The new Thayer School dean [Myron Tribus] came on board in about 1966. The opposite of Karl in almost all important ways. And the negotiation between those two deans did not go well. Among other things, we were concerned about our need, our joint need, for new facilities. And my recollection is that in the fall of 1967, probably September, maybe October, we had a joint meeting of the Boards of Overseers of the Tuck School and the Thayer School. I'm not sure of the date, but I do recall that the issue was the relationship between the two schools. And it was clear to me in the meeting that John Dickey was using the personality and the vivacity and the extroverted personality of the engineering school dean to encourage Karl to be more innovative and participative, and perhaps even a little more giving, in the relationship between the two schools. But unfortunately, Mr. Dickey managed that in a way that led Karl to feel that Mr. Dickey was taking sides and was, in effect, saying that Karl's leadership of Tuck in that important relationship was not as strong as, or as attractive to him, as the leadership given by Myron Tribus, the new dean of the Thayer School.

That night Karl didn't get any sleep. And he called me about six a.m. the next day and said, "I'm going to resign." I rushed over to meet with him, and we talked at very great length. I felt that Karl was substantially overreacting to the meeting that had occurred. But after talking with him, I came to understand that this was--to use the first metaphor that jumps into mind--it was the straw that broke the camel's back. It was the final insult in his relationship with John Dickey. And Karl imagined that Dickey had consciously tried to give him the signal that he, John Dickey, was no longer entirely pleased with Karl's deanship. Karl was such a proud man, such an open, vivacious, optimistic man, that that stung him. It was very hard for him to deal with. But he also was so selfless, he was such a high-principled person, that he didn't want to stay one extra day in a situation where he wasn't fully wanted. So he resigned, and I resigned with him.

CARROLL: Oh, my heavens! I didn't realize that.

HENNESSEY: We had a faculty meeting, and we both put our jobs on the table, and said-- I did not resign my faculty position, but I resigned my associate

deanship. In sympathy, in the better sense of the word, with Karl's action. And it was a pretty tense time.

CARROLL: What was the reaction of all these young faculty, that the two of you had really recruited? And I'm sure they looked to you for leadership.

HENNESSEY: They were stunned, and very upset. And some of them met with John Dickey. All of them met with Karl and me. And we worked our way through that crisis. I won't tell you more unless you want to know. But the upshot of it was finally John Dickey's invitation to me to be the dean, and that was satisfactory to the faculty. And Karl then told me, with shattering candor, that for two or three years he had hoped that I would be willing to be his successor.

CARROLL: Oh, my heavens!

HENNESSEY: I had never had any hint of that. Nor had it ever occurred to me as something I would want to do. So it was a very interesting period.

CARROLL: So what happened, then, to Karl Hill? Did he continue to teach?

HENNESSEY: Well, we wondered what Karl would then want to do. And it became clear that he was so disaffected, number one, he had closed the door on his Dartmouth and Tuck experience so completely, that he would not stay here. And although none of us-- And he exhibited fairly quickly a feeling that he no longer had the morale and motivation to be much of a part of what we were doing. So he effectively handed things over to me almost entirely, except for certain things that of course he had to continue to do. And although I didn't know he was doing it, apparently he was talking with colleagues around the country. He had been on the board of the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business. And in fact was treasurer of it and was headed for the presidency of that, I'm sure, which he wanted because [William] Bill Gray, his favorite former Tuck School dean, had been president of the AACSB. And Karl was offered the deanship of several schools, and chose to become dean in a very challenging circumstance at Washington University in St. Louis.

CARROLL: Oh, my heavens!

HENNESSEY: And he left in the summer of '68 and went there.

CARROLL: Did he do the similar kind of bringing up to the 20th century job there that he had done here?

HENNESSEY: Yes, he certainly did. I got to know people there well who worked with him. Indeed one fellow who became his--two of them--became his associate deans became very close friends of mine. And he was the same old Karl Hill. I mean he really reinvested himself completely with his special magic. He hired new faculty. He transformed the school. But it was a very different place. It wasn't Dartmouth. It had an undergraduate program, master's program, and a doctoral program. And was not nationally recognized. It was not the high-quality place that Tuck was. So Karl was going to a less-developed institution. And that was not easy for him. I don't really remember the dates. But in the '70's he became ill again, and resigned, and moved back to New England where his roots were. And his wife's roots. In fact his wife was and is an alumna of the University of Vermont.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: Class of '38. And then Karl died, I would guess, 1985 or '86; I'm not sure.

CARROLL: And here you were, then, after--I'm trying to think--just a few years here, about ten years here, you're now dean of Tuck.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: That must have been an enormous responsibility.

HENNESSEY: I didn't think of it that way.

CARROLL: Oh, that's good.

HENNESSEY: Though it certainly was. I became delighted with the whole experience. It was most interesting, most challenging, and in a way that I hadn't anticipated, a natural segue from my teaching. Because my area of special interest was organizational behavior, the application of the behavioral sciences.

CARROLL: What was the largest difference, then, when you moved from associate dean to dean at Tuck? What change did that create for you?

HENNESSEY: Well certainly the largest change was presiding over the making of final decisions, with no one in between me and the faculty and the president and the overseers and the trustees in the process of making final decisions. And in my case, in some instances, making final

recommendations on very important issues having to do with promotion and tenure for the faculty, hiring of faculty. And I learned from John Dickey that he really wanted me to be quite free to propose and innovate in the final stage of the transforming of Tuck from a largely Dartmouth institution to a free-standing, excellent business school in the front rank.

Another challenge for me, another change, was my being, unambiguously and unabashedly, the spokesman for this school in important relationships with the external world. And not only with regard to alumni, traveling the circuit and speaking to alumni clubs and speaking about the new era, the Hennessey era, which I never called it. I never called it that, but that was what I was really describing. Also, foundations, other schools.

In my first year I was invited to be the chairman of a new graduate business school institution put together by the Sloan Foundation, called the Council for Opportunity in Graduate Management Education[1], which was a commitment by nine of the leading schools--we thought of ourselves as the most prestigious of all the graduate business schools--to find and recruit minority students into our MBA programs. And I was asked to be the first chairman of that. So I found myself working with the deans of the other schools in a direct way. And while I had done some of that as associate dean, it was a very different feeling to be the dean and doing it. Similarly, I found my natural interest in the connections between the Tuck School and the rest of Dartmouth to be freed of any restraints when I became the dean. I was now the person who really could be the ambassador in whatever way I worked out in the mutual interest of all concerned, and I cared a lot about that.

CARROLL: What I'm curious is, when-- It seems to me when I read the history of Tuck, they were very much in the forefront of using computers in business schools, probably because of the presence of John Kemeny on campus.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

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[1] COGME=Council for Opportunity in Graduate Management Education, established in June 1969 with a $100,000 grant by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to increase the number of African-Americans in MBA Programs. The foundng Board of Directors included the Deans of the Amos Tuck School of Dartmouth College (John Hennessey was the Board Chair), the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard Business School, the Sloan School of Management of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Graduate School of Industrial Administration of Carnegie-Mellon University, and the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University. The next year the business schools of Stanford, Chicago, and Berkeley were added.

CARROLL: Was that part of what you had to develop as associate dean and as dean?

HENNESSEY: Absolutely. Sure, sure. But Karl had looked ahead in that arena, too. In fact, he recruited in the very year that I came to Tuck a young fellow getting his doctoral degree at Harvard Business School, who was one of those very early computer-oriented, quantitatively sophisticated people. And he became our link with the mathematics department because he wanted to bring finite mathematics and its applications into the curriculum of the Tuck School to replace classical statistics, which was a very modern and scary innovation. And he ran into a fellow named John Kemeny in the math department who was chair at that time of the math department.

As computers came along with finite mathematics and its applications, Tuck became a major spot on the Dartmouth campus for an investment in equipment and in experimentation. Part of my job was to be sure that we did everything we could, as fast as we dared. So we were raising money in the early 60's to help the Dartmouth and then the Kemeny effort to bring about the development of computers and computer technology and teaching and research on this campus. And that's how I got to know John Kemeny, first. He cared a lot about that relationship. And indeed, he asked my colleague, Arthur Schleifer, to co-edit or co-write a book on the applications of finite mathematics during the 1960's.

CARROLL: I see. Okay. And it seems to me also the new courses--and I looked at the catalog--that during the '60's and the '70's were being put in place at Tuck.

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. But as associate dean, my major responsibility was in the curriculum. But tied to that also, faculty recruiting, student recruiting, and concern for scholarship and research. We took very seriously the modernization and changing of the curriculum. We had a strong curriculum committee, and I chaired that as associate dean in the '60's. And indeed we had some funding from the Sloan Foundation to spend some of our time doing research on curriculum. So we were a kind of hothouse and test pilot, we thought, for the nation in curriculum development. We were very proud of that.

CARROLL: I'm fascinated by the fact that it seems very early on they brought behavioral sciences into business management.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: I think that's fascinating.

HENNESSEY: Well, yes, it is. And I didn't describe that as fully as I might. That was an area in which I found myself deeply interested as a doctoral candidate at the University of Washington. In the '50's there was a great surge, as I mentioned before, for the behavioral sciences and the research and application in lots of fields. And I really think it might have been more the Ford Foundation than any other agent that promoted the legitimacy and the momentum of that whole development. They put a very great deal of money into it, including funds for business school faculties and economics and psychology and sociology and political science faculties to get together to hammer out changes in curriculae during the summer. I attended, for example, in 1960, with Ford support, I attended at Cornell a group, a meeting, a one-month meeting, of the leading researchers in the behavioral sciences working, with a selected group of young academics, to promote this revolution and ferment a more rapid change in this whole field. So it was a fascinating time.

CARROLL: Was there resistance at all from more traditional forces in the business school?

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure. A great deal. And there was a substantial amount of resistance from the business community, too. Feeling that we were beginning to turn out graduates who didn't fit in easily, who were ambitious to change things. Who were intellectually very sharp and not simply ready to go to work and ask no questions. It took a time for that to work its way out.

CARROLL: Is that when they developed, then, the placement office at Tuck?

HENNESSEY: We always had been...no, no-- One of the things Karl brought to Tuck as assistant dean was a concern for what happened after Tuck. That had been almost taken for granted until Karl was asked to take that on administratively. One of the reasons it was taken for granted was that Dartmouth students who came into the 3/2 program--I guess I don't know quite how to describe this without going back through some of the records myself. But my impression was that a substantial number of students stopped their Tuck education at the end of their first year and didn't return for the second year. Because they considered themselves ready for whatever was going to come next for them, and simply moved with their cohort, the Dartmouth seniors, into graduate education, professional school education, or into the job market. Tuck was more

concerned in terms of placement with the two-year MBA graduates. But before World War II, I have no idea how that all worked its way out.

But students were almost on their own in making connections. And businesses, realizing that, found ways to find out about Tuck graduates and hired them. Not many business schools formalized and spent money on the placement process prior to the post-World War II era. And that was really when Karl became interested in all these changes and innovations. And he personally took on the task of doing everything, but certainly being worried about the placement process. And breaking into-- You see Karl's concept was that we should begin to compete across the board, including having our students go to the same firms the Harvard Business School graduates went to. Which meant, for one thing, breaking into whole new sectors where Tuck wasn't represented through its alumni body at all.

I should have said, of course, the alumni of Tuck were very much interested in hiring Tuck graduates. And that worked well when the flow was relatively small. But as we insisted that Tuck students come and stay for the whole two years, we almost stopped--and I almost remember the moment when we stopped--saying that it's legitimate to come to Tuck and spend only one year. In fact, we began to exact a promise from students, that if they were really interested in Tuck, they had to be interested in all two--in both two years, in the late '50's and early '60's. But as we did that, we then said, “and we will help you to have your choice of plums on the plum tree of possible careers.” And we then formalized that by actually hiring someone. The first director of placement, other than Karl and me, came--Karl simply brought in, I think, without much consultation with the faculty, about 1961 or '62.

CARROLL: And who was that? Do you remember? I can look it up.

HENNESSEY: Well, the man I remember pretty well, because he also worked with me when I was dean, was George Drowne--D-R-O-W-N-E. But I do believe there was another man, briefly, who was a Tuck alumnus, and came back to Hanover, and spent part-time helping us develop a placement function. And after that--after we realized what that job really entailed, and how vital it was to us, and how much it had to be respected by the whole community, including the faculty--we raised its tone and level and brought in other people.

CARROLL: Isn't it about the same time, too, that the student body is expanding at Tuck so that more students are there?

HENNESSEY: Well, let's take a look at that. Yes, that is true. But it's complicated by two other factors. One was the diminution in the number of students we permitted to come in and stop at the end of the first year. And I don't remember exactly when, as I said before, when that normalized. There was also the strange experience that the Tuck-Thayer program was becoming less and less an attractive option for Dartmouth students. And I have to pause for a minute and say that was a part of the post-World War II era. Tuck developed, before I came, an opportunity for Dartmouth juniors to say they wanted to come to Tuck and Thayer. And to get an MBA and an engineering undergraduate degree in, I think, a total of two years. I'm not sure. I think so. But it was a very popular option.

With the arrival of a new Thayer School dean and other developments, we tightened the entrance requirements and the attractiveness of the program in a number of ways. And that cohort began to shrink. So the number of students in the first year program at Tuck was relatively steady. But the drop in the 3/2 students who were only going to be there for one year, and the drop--the diminution--in the attractiveness of the Tuck-Thayer contingent, or the Tuck-Thayer program and therefore the cohort of those students, those drops were filled. Those places as they were no longer taken by those two categories of people, were taken up by regular MBA students. We did not want the student body to be larger than 120. And we so stated. And indeed in the building of our facilities and the modernizing of our facilities, which was a huge program we began in 1967 and culminated in the dedication of Murdough Center in 1973, we committed ourselves to the idea of a two-section, first-year program of 120 students.

CARROLL: So there would be 240 students there all together, not each year.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Okay. I wonder if you'd go back to curriculum changes for a bit. I noticed that a course began to appear on the books called "Business and Society." And I wondered, what did that examine, and who was trained enough to teach that when it was first initiated?

HENNESSEY: When I arrived at Tuck, I found three junior faculty members who were, roughly speaking, my age. One of them was Wayne Broehl who had arrived in 1954. Wayne was professionally and academically very much interested in the relationship between business and the rest of society. And in the courses he taught, including Business Policy-- You know, I don't remember all of Wayne's teaching responsibilities when I arrived.

I'd have to go back and look into that. But he showed a really keen interest, as we discussed the curriculum and how we might want to change it, in helping Tuck students to understand the larger world: business and social institutions, business outside. I was one of those who responded quickly and favorably to the idea.

But not all faculty thought it was very promising. The economists thought that really the relationship of business to society was defined by economics, and that's all that could really be understood. They also thought that the teaching about business and society would be sort of liberal artsy in nature, and might require that we develop a formal relationship with the history department and other parts of the Arts & Sciences faculty. And indeed might have to recruit someone from history and allied disciplines to do it in the right way.

But as with some other areas of curriculum development, we found ourselves faced with a substantial dilemma. On the one hand, if we went into the discipline of history or philosophy or psychology or economics to find the right faculty person, we would find someone who was well grounded in the discipline, but had absolutely no experience either with graduate business students or with the phenomena of the relationship of that discipline to the applied field of business and management. And we kept running into that. On the other side of the dilemma clearly was the concern that if we tried to develop our own courses and our own faculty member to teach the applied discipline, that person might not be, in important ways, well enough grounded in and respected by the relevant discipline.

So it took a little while for us to work out the right way to handle that dilemma. We had been dealing with it in the behavioral sciences which I represented. And so I was awfully aware of the delicate process of maintaining the highest--the optimal--level of quality, while satisfying the dilemma. Wayne proved that he--proved to the faculty--that it was worth our investing in the experiment of having him teach a business and society course. He put it together, and he called on outsiders to help him. He showed in his own research that he was well grounded as a business historian, as a social institution student. So we turned that over to him and then made it a required course. And I forget what year that happened, but he carried it on with great success. He did a marvelous job.

CARROLL: And you were working in organizational behavior? Is that true?

HENNESSEY: The field that I was in was really the application of the behavioral sciences to the art and science of administration, the internal organization and the processes of managing a formal organization--public or private. At Tuck that was called "Administration" when I arrived. When I studied it at Harvard Business School as a master's degree candidate in the 1948 to '50 era when it was really just a booming, bursting seed rather than a plant, and that was what enchanted me. I mean I became just enormously attracted as I studied this field at Harvard Business School. At Harvard it was called "Administrative Practices," and there's an interesting history to this nomenclature. At Tuck after two or three years of teaching the "Administration" course, singlehandedly--I was the one teaching all of the students for a time--I became interested in elective second-year work. I convinced the faculty that we should hire some additional people to--

[End of Tape 1, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 2, Side A]

HENNESSEY: ...in that way that you've spotted that as you've looked at the history of Tuck. Because for me that was one of the major transformation processes...away from the historical business school that was giving a degree in commercial science to an applied behavioral science school that was interested, above all, in preparing the students for an unknowable future. Preparing them to cope with dramatic changes in their careers. That, in this clear way, meant that our purpose, our philosophy of education, was quite similar to the purpose and philosophy of the undergraduate faculty. I personally felt that so strongly that it became my way of working, my way of understanding myself in my position at Tuck.

As we began to recruit new people to come and join me in the behavioral science realm, we thought of various ways to signal that our emphasis was not so much on administration, as it was on the application of behavioral sciences to organizations. And we adopted--I don't think we invented it--but we adopted the phrase "organizational behavior." And in doing that, joined ourselves with similar colleagues--in other words, colleagues doing similar things--in most of the other major business schools. When we chose that term, I don't know. But it was my responsibility to worry about that.

CARROLL: When you went to graduate school, did you bring with you any undergraduate courses in psychology or sociology that helped or influenced you?

HENNESSEY: Oh, sure, sure. In fact, I guess it's fair to say that I felt in going to Harvard Business School that my strongest interests, my strongest commitments, had been born in my undergraduate experience and would guide me the rest of my life. And indeed they have.

CARROLL: That's interesting.

HENNESSEY: So I, in effect, turned the MBA experience to my major consuming interest, and found a very great-- I went to Harvard Business School at just the right time because I found a number of faculty there themselves concerned about the transformation that was going on in the world, and the vastly different nature of leadership positions in formal organizations that they saw coming along. That became tied to the concerns that I'd developed as an undergraduate.

CARROLL: Is this an outgrowth at all of the experiences of World War II?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Well, yes, I think in multiple ways. I mean, again, Jane, you're taking us back into areas where I've never had a chance to comment at great length, but I'd love to talk and write in more detail. Because I think for my generation the World War II experience was pivotal. Let me just quickly say what I mean in my own case. I began my undergraduate experience in September 1941 as a callow, very young 16-year-old novice in the field of education, not knowing much about the world at all. Pearl Harbor occurred in December of my freshman year. I became old enough to go into the service at the end of my sophomore year, and did so. And had three and a half years of a very different experience in a highly-heated, dangerous, threatening, exciting new life.

When I came back to my undergraduate experience and recommenced it in February of 1947, I was a different human being. I had been utterly changed by this experience in every conceivable way, including my concept of what the world was, and what my place in it and my country's place in it might be. So my attitude toward my undergraduate learning experience in '47 and '48 was utterly different. And I found it changing me and changing my life in very exciting and really quite profound ways. And my choice of a business school was not so much to go into business. I never was clear that I wanted to do that. But that's a different story. I'll stop there.

CARROLL: Fascinating! What I'm curious about, too, is that there seems to be in the business world after World War II, the understanding that corporations are people, and people have to be managed in some way.

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. Or inspired.

CARROLL: Inspired, yes. That's a little bit better word. And I'm wondering how much of that came out of having to work with a set of people during World War II in fighting and understanding that group dynamics is so important?

HENNESSEY: It developed rapidly out of World War II in lots of different ways. Including the research the Army and Navy did on these issues, knowing that the old style of command and control way of "getting the most" out of people was probably not the most effective way to think about the superior-subordinate relationship. It's just that simple.

CARROLL: There's another little later development that I saw in the catalog, and that is a reference to what was called the "Tycoon Simulation Game" in 1974. What was that?

HENNESSEY: Along with the development of computers and the ability to create pretty complex situations in the computer, and then the ability to model the firm in a computer program, fairly quickly in the early '70's came the idea of moving away from printed historical cases to simulations of real behavior in a business setting. The first simulations were relatively circumscribed, and they were somewhat small, few variable types of situations. And I don't remember the year--it was probably '72, '73, or '74--when a team of faculty said, you know, “why don't we challenge the students, perhaps in their second year, at some point, to live through several years of a business simulation in a two-week period. And force them to make decisions, the results of which they would see very quickly. Because their choice of selling price, or of costs versus profits, all the variables that went into policy-making for an enterprise, can be cranked through the computer in a very quick way. And they'll know the result of the decision they made.” And we had students teamed up, playing against one another in different simulated worlds. And we were one of the first schools, because of our computer sophistication, to be able to do that. It's now old hat. It's been done for 20 years, and it's worked very well. But I don't remember why we called it "Tycoon." Oh, I think because the student newspaper was called The Tycoon. The students invented that term for their paper in the early '70's.

CARROLL: Okay. That is fascinating. When you were dean, were you also responsible for fund-raising for Tuck as well?

HENNESSEY: Yes. At first I was urged not to be too eager because Dartmouth's fund-raising experts, who were among the best in the world, felt they could

manage the challenge a lot more easily and effectively if I simply participated when they wanted my help. But I discovered, because I'd never really spent much time in that part of Tuck's life as associate dean, I was so busy on the other matters, and Karl enjoyed very much the working with Parkhurst and working with the treasurer and the fund-raisers… Beginning to work out our quasi-independence in that area, I became aware that a key issue for us, a principal, debatable issue, was whether we would be permitted as Tuck School to go out and solicit funds annually from our alumni. And I battled that, and I got permission for us to approach those of our alumni who were not also Dartmouth alumni, which of course was a very small group. But we began to do that and show that we could do it in a professional and careful way.

And then there came the wonderful moment when I went before the Board of Trustees of Dartmouth over in the Hanover Inn one evening, and said, "In the best interests of Tuck and Dartmouth, it's time for you to allow us to approach our Dartmouth-Tuck alumni. And trust me, we will show you that Dartmouth, the Dartmouth approach to Dartmouth alumni who also went to Tuck School, will not result in less commitment. We've done our market research, and we're sure that both Dartmouth and Tuck will be winners. It's not a zero-sum game." They were very skeptical, but finally agreed to let it happen. And we went after it in a full-blown way.

CARROLL: And rather successfully, too, as I understand.

HENNESSEY: Very successfully. From the start we were very successful. I was very proud of that. We not only launched a very successful alumni fund, which beat all records in terms of percentage of participation; we were better than any of our colleagues--other schools. But also we started a Tuck Associates Program. We started a program of asking business firms, corporations, and professional groups to give us substantial amounts of money each year without really much of a quid pro quo. And that went very well, too. So we began to be financially very successful in a way that fed our growth and development and faculty recruitments and expansion--site expansion and student body--and then finally our total investment in the brand new plant.

CARROLL: What had been the fiscal relationship between Dartmouth and Tuck up to that point?

HENNESSEY: There had been what was called a "subvention." The Dartmouth Trustees had agreed to subvene--a word that I hadn't even understood until then--all of the professional schools. Which really meant that they

gave Tuck each year $150,000, approximately. And when I asked for an explanation, I got various explanations. One was, "Well, that's approximately how much extra we think we're getting from Tuck alumni in the Dartmouth alumni fund, because they are able to give more because of the value of their Tuck education. So we're going to give a little bit of that to you back." That sounded a little hokey to me, but it was an explanation. And then secondly, when I really pressed the point, they said, "Well, look, why don't you think of it as the income on an endowment that you don't have. One of your problems is that you haven't been able to raise endowment the way that Harvard and Wharton and Chicago have. But not to worry. $150,000 would be the income on $3 million, wouldn't it?" "Well, yes. I suppose so." But again, that wasn't terribly convincing, as a reason for our not going out on our own. In effect, what we said was, "we'll give up this subvention, and you cut us free." And that's what happened.

CARROLL: And is that the time when you then started founding the alumni magazine from Tuck?

HENNESSEY: I thought it was terribly important that we establish not only an alumni magazine of high quality, one that we would subsidize and be very proud of; but on the recommendation of some very strong senior faculty members, that we start a Tuck Executive Program [TEP], and offer to the great corporations of the world a summer experience at Tuck that would be the equivalent of the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School. So we were doing all of these things at once.

CARROLL: And this was Kenneth Davis who did the TEP?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Ken Davis chaired the committee that made the recommendation. And he was deeply committed to it and much interested in it, and he wanted to run it. And he did.

CARROLL: Was it successful from the first?

HENNESSEY: Yes. From the very first, it was highly successful.

CARROLL: And then the alumni magazine, the Tuck Today, would be sent out not just to your graduates but also people who had participated in this TEP program?

HENNESSEY: Oh, sure. We sent it out very widely.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: I became a drum-beater for the new reputation of the new Tuck School, and I took it very widely. I was the director of the AACSB and became its president in 1975-76. Traveled the country, and wherever I went, recruiting students, recruiting faculty, dealing with the challenges of the presidency of the AACSB. I took the modern products of the Tuck School, including the magazine.

CARROLL: I do want to put for the record that the AACSB is the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes.

CARROLL: What did you have to do when you were elected president of that? What was your duty?

HENNESSEY: Multiple. We were the gathering of deans. We were the deans of the 116 accredited business schools. And we were very much interested, as a group, in promoting the welfare of graduate business education--and undergraduate business education. Almost all the schools who [were] members of the association had undergraduate instruction as well as graduate. Indeed at that time, I think there might have been only 16 schools in AACSB that had only graduate education. And we were the only one of that group that did not have a doctoral program.

So my job as president of AACSB was to preside over the board. The board's job was to worry about the future of business education, its relationship to the rest of the university world, to foundations and fund-raising, to the government, and to the professions--accounting and other professions. And also to the challenge that business schools were beginning to understand of becoming different in important ways. One of them was in becoming more diverse, in the faculty and the student body. And that was a major challenge for me in my year as president. I traveled to different campuses to meet with faculty around the issue of recruiting and promoting the thriving of minority students in our business schools. It happened that during that time I also was very much tied up in the COGME [Council for Opportunity in Graduate Management in Education] organization. So that became a major preoccupation for me during the '70's.

CARROLL: I'm curious about the ability or the techniques used to try to recruit minority students and women students at this time.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: There were really very many people competing for that same pool of students.

HENNESSEY: That's right. Karl and I began the recruitment of minority students in 1964, right after the Civil Rights Act in 1964 was signed and promoted. We decided we had an obligation to begin to understand and dramatically take an affirmative, active stance to make all this happen. Our belief was that-- I don't know how to say it in a short way--

CARROLL: You can take the long way.

HENNESSEY: Well, thanks. I appreciate the opportunity. I guess both Karl and I felt that the soul of America was on the line. I mean we were tremendously excited by the fact that the nation had finally made this unusual, clear commitment--after an agonizing period. I won't pause to describe that. But there were some very tough times up to the dramatic and sudden realization that the nation was ready for a true civil rights act. Karl and I felt that professional schools, let alone the undergraduate institutions which we were less involved with and less clear about with regard to minority students--but it seemed to us that, as quickly as possible, America needed to find a way to build on its new commitment to the level of rights and privileges and responsibilities, in opening the doors to the professions, to people of all races.

I've always felt, in thinking through that intellectual challenge, that there was a strong similarity between opening those doors in a healthy, strong, true, valid way for minorities in the nation, and opening them to women. I was much in conflict in my own mind about the difference between the similarities in those two cases and the differences in those two cases. And I'd love to talk about that sometime.

But with regard to the minority students whom we met with-- Oh, let me back up. Karl and I believed that in order to recruit minority students to Tuck and open Tuck's door for those students to come on in to our family and our experience, and then have their choice of excellent jobs in American business and management, we would have to convince their faculty and advisors on their campuses that the time had really come for this. That we weren't simply trying to showcase blacks at Tuck to show our good intentions and that our deeper commitment would not be there.

So Karl and I decided to go to the historic--to ten of the historically black colleges, on the advice of some black advisors we contacted in New

York. And I went to five, and Karl went to five. We met with faculty and administration first, and we invited faculty and administration to come to Tuck and to spend a week, and we funded that week. So they would really be able to talk through this with us. And advise us on how we might be able to recruit students. Then we began to talk to students in terms of the opportunity we wanted to offer. But also describe the challenge that the students would face culturally. But maybe more important in terms of their everyday life, because they were pretty strong students whom we thought and they thought could adapt to the cultural challenge--more importantly, the intellectual challenge. Because we were recruiting students in institutions, the academic standards of which were very different from those we were accustomed to. And so we convinced ourselves that there would be students in these schools who had maximized their ability to learn and be productive in those settings, and would also have those habits of thought and learning that would allow them to accelerate their learning in a very different, more challenging, intellectual setting.

That was a hard decision to make as a faculty. Did it make sense for us to lower our academic standards to bring in black students? Well, it didn't. But what did make sense was to change our concept of standards, and to say that what we owed the entering student was a prediction that the student would benefit from the work and be able to survive and thrive in our academic setting. And that our old way of measuring that, the readiness of the student to profit from our experience, which was fairly sophisticated and which depended heavily on undergraduate grade performance, and the quality of the undergraduate experience, and recommendations from faculty members in our feeder schools whom we knew well, that that was not available to us with respect to these students. But that really it was too narrow. That potential, stick-to-it-iveness, persistence, ability to grow and thrive is a product of a wider set of forces, and a deeper set of forces. And that we should find a way to select students who could [come] in and be the trailblazers and survive. And that was what we worked on.

CARROLL: How many of the students that were then recruited managed to make it through and get their degree? Was there a large dropout rate?

HENNESSEY: It was horrendously difficult to achieve a large healthy cohort of minority students, for a lot of reasons. You mentioned one of them: The better the student, the more the student in those years was being romanced by medical schools and law schools and graduate schools of all kinds. And by industry. Wherever we went to recruit students, we found a

recruiter from Xerox whispering in that student's ear, "Why would you want to go to Tuck School right away? Why don't you come with us? And you'll succeed. You'll make an awful lot of money, and then you can make the decision later whether or not to go to Tuck." And Karl and I were in deep conflict because we were by then rather convinced that the students that we were recruiting to come to Tuck, who had two or three or four years of experience, were better students. We even began to feel that ethically it was probably better for us to admit, and even promote with students, with applicants, that they ought to wait.

So for these-- For black students, those we admitted were typically students who had interrupted their experience, had considerable job experience, were mature beyond their years. And we simply wanted them to have the opportunity, with their eyes wide open, to think about going to Tuck. So that the number who came was small. The success rate was pretty good. I could say more about that. But my memory is that we denied the opportunity to enter the second year to about 20% of the black students who came along. Those were very difficult cases, (just yesterday I was corresponding with one of those students) and it became part of their lives. That they came to Tuck, and they saw what was possible, and they were denied the chance to go on and get their MBA.

CARROLL: What has happened to that person since who was writing to you?

HENNESSEY: That student has been in denial ever since, that he should not get an MBA from an Ivy League school. And he has applied and reapplied and reapplied to Harvard, Stanford, and Tuck and Wharton every year since 1967, 30 years. And has worked. Has done odd jobs--not odd jobs. He has had jobs. But he was so--it was such a tearing for him, such an unwillingness and inability to accept this failure, that he has continued to say, "Now I'm ready. Now I'm ready. You've got to do it." Every year he's persisted, and every year he's been turned down.

CARROLL: Oh, how hard that must be.

HENNESSEY: Awfully, awfully hard.

CARROLL: Was it different with recruiting women?

HENNESSEY: Very different.

CARROLL: In what way?

HENNESSEY: Well, the most obvious ways were that women interested in coming to Tuck were prepared culturally and academically from the start at a very high level. And the challenge for us was very different. The challenge was to create a community in which the relationship between the men and women was a mature relationship in all possible ways. And to increase the size of the female cohort rapidly enough, all things considered. Then to help those women to break through the barriers with recruiters, that were still pretty substantial. And to some extent didn't disappear until the late 1980's and early 1990's. And of course to a certain extent haven't totally disappeared today. Managing all of that, being part of the women's revolution, was a very interesting commitment that Tuck made, and I think went very well. I think in fact we-- I don't know that we brought about--

[End of Tape 2, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 2, Side B]

CARROLL: [Did Tuck, like Dartmouth, experience more alumni acceptance of the women students when the daughters of alumni were admitted?]

HENNESSEY: There is research on that, and I could almost quote it. But my quick answer would be, yes and no. I think the experience that men have as fathers of daughters has been of very long-standing. I mean it's always been there. And even today in 1996 the attitudes of men toward women in the American culture are not vastly liberated, simply by the fact that they have daughters.

CARROLL: That's true. It's a point well taken. When women began to appear at Tuck, you must have had all sorts of constraints to take into consideration: the dorm thing, the space in which they studied. Who was in charge of seeing to all those details?

HENNESSEY: Well, in a sense we all were. But I guess very importantly I was. Because I had said that we were going to admit women, right? And the faculty said, “okay.” I mean it didn't germinate from a faculty study or a committee or anything else. It just happened that when I was asked if I wanted to be dean, I said, "I wouldn't be comfortable being dean if we couldn't accelerate this." And so we did. So a lot of the onus was on me to show that we could do it. Martha Fransson was the only woman in that first year. What we said to Martha was, "Look, you certainly don't want to live at Tuck. That's unthinkable. But there are some women in the Medical School program, and they're living together over by the medical school in a college building (I think. Maybe it was a private house.) Wouldn't you like to live there?" And Martha, in her tough-

minded way, said, "Whatever you want. It doesn't matter. I'm coming to study." So she lived with the Medical School students.

CARROLL: That was nice. So she actually had a cohort group of her own.

HENNESSEY: Yes, she did. But then she very quickly, in her open and generous way, developed relationships with men. Became part of study groups. But it was tough. And Martha would be the one to testify to that, that it was not easy. And since she was the only woman there in her second year, too, I think-- I don't think we successfully recruited any women for the next year, but I don't remember. I could look all that up for you. But fairly quickly we two, three, four, six, eight, ten, 12.

CARROLL: It seems to have gone fairly quickly after that.

HENNESSEY: Yes. It was bit by bit in its first two or three years. And then suddenly there were four and then it went.

CARROLL: Did you have the same, similar, commitment to Native Americans that the undergraduate institution did?

HENNESSEY: We didn't understand that as well. We were almost blind to it in 1964. The overwhelming dramatic need in America was to be fairer and to do right by blacks. The issue with regard to Native Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans was almost not visible. We devoted all of our effort to blacks. Feeling, I guess, somehow that if we did that well, everything else would follow. And that's really what happened.

However, Dartmouth's historic interest in Native Americans--and at the undergraduate level Dartmouth's creation of a special program to recruit Native Americans--resulted in Tuck's involvement in that activity in an interesting and dramatic way. The first group of Native Americans who came to Dartmouth under a new and expanded program--and I think this might have been 1970, I'm not really certain; John Kemeny was involved in it--were older, more mature students who were not interested at all in the follies and the materialistic fooling around of the undergraduate experience. And made that clear in being recruited. They were more ready for...They were older than their years would let you think. They had been through, many of them, a couple of years at Andover or Exeter. They were older students when they entered Exeter or Andover or other prep schools.

So my memory is that there were maybe eight or ten Native American students who came to Dartmouth about 1970 or '71 in the first wave.

And they didn't want to live in the undergraduate dormitories. So I talked with John Kemeny about their living at Tuck, and they came down to live at Tuck School. And I came to know them, and worked with them, and became a counselor to some of them. I remember visiting one of them in Dick's House or in the hospital after he had tried to commit suicide.

CARROLL: Oh, dear.

HENNESSEY: Because of his culture. Extreme pain and anguish in managing the cultural transformation. Very different, very different for Native Americans. Because they went back during vacations to, for the most part, a reservation experience, where what they were doing was denied by their elders as having legitimacy. Very different from the black students going back into a community where economic development was a very strong part of their urban experience. These students were wondering who they had become in going off the reservation, literally, and coming into these privileged circumstances. And going back with a very different mind-set, with a very different concept of development or what they might do and what they might become. And alcoholism and suicides were not uncommon for those students.

We became interested at Tuck in recruiting the Native Americans. We didn't know--we were determined, same as Dartmouth, to include them. And we did some recruitment of Dartmouth students, Dartmouth Native American students, coming into Tuck School. But we found it was not a large program, and we were much more in conflict about the legitimacy of our invitation to those students, to compound their cultural anguish and difficulty by adding the business school experience on top of this other cultural adventure of theirs.

CARROLL: And when they got done with this degree, did they then go back to the reservation?

HENNESSEY: Those that went on and got an MBA had their choice either of going back and becoming entrepreneurs or going on to law school and going back as helpers. Or simply vanishing into the white world, which many of them did.

CARROLL: It must have been very difficult for them to decide at that time.

HENNESSEY: Extremely so. About then, some of the tribes were coming into the possession of large amounts of money from the federal government in settlements of lawsuits. And we recruited-- As a matter of fact, we

recruited into Tuck older Native Americans in about 1974 or '75 who, on the reservation or on a set of reservations, were the chiefs or the principal person in their political structure. And had decided, with the encouragement of the tribe, to get an MBA in order to be able to go back and manage the transformation of the tribe into a more economically sound enterprise. And we did that for a time.

CARROLL: You also introduced, while you were there, the Honor Code into Tuck.

HENNESSEY: Yes, I did.

CARROLL: They had never had one before?

HENNESSEY: Well, I think Tuck faculty and students felt that they were as honorable as any human beings. And the whole idea of having to profess or swear to your honesty was not entirely appealing.

CARROLL: So why institute it?

HENNESSEY: We had no choice. Let me explain. Without thinking much about it, Tuck School in examinations until my deanship, had proctors in the room. Had faculty members or other people who were there presumably to preside over the experience and to insure in that way that there would not be any cheating. It was a very common university phenomenon. I don't mean cheating. I mean presiding over--I mean proctors, proctoring over examinations. And I don't think anybody had given very much thought to it. I think the faculty at Tuck and the students did not take the proctoring terribly seriously because I think everyone felt that we had a kind of bond of trust, and we were in a professional school, and cheating wouldn't take place.

Well, in the early '70's several...Well, one thing that happened in that era was that at the Dartmouth undergraduate level, after much backing and filling, an honor code--an honor principle and an honor code--was established for the undergraduate experience. It was a learning experience for the entire community. And everyone was very proud when it was finally designed and put in place. And some of the students we were beginning to get at Tuck in the '70's had been through that transformation process, or were coming out of a Dartmouth undergraduate experience where they had been pleased to have this honor principle observed. And so they asked, why not have a similar new commitment or contract between the faculty and students at Tuck. And my feeling about it was that it was a legitimate and useful topic for the students to take up on their own and to present it to the faculty after

they had chewed it over. And for a couple of years the student government sponsored debates and analyses and visited other schools. And finally they did, in fact, propose an honor principle and an honor code that I thought was excellent and so did the faculty. And so we adopted it.

CARROLL: You also began, then, the Edward Tuck Scholars. And what were they?

HENNESSEY: Out of my Harvard experience, I was aware of the fact that one of the motivations in the academic experience at Harvard was to be called a Baker Scholar at the end of the two-year experience. What that really meant was that you were in the top 1 or 2 percent. It was a version of Phi Beta Kappa. We had at Tuck various honors: distinction, high distinction, and highest distinction. But I suggested to the faculty and the student body that there might be some advantage in our having a program that identified students at the end of the first year, showing them our appreciation for their scholarly achievement. And that could extend, then, to our enlarging the group at the end of the second year. And it was a very simple program. At the end of the first year we had a banquet and honored those students, and spoke about the history of the school, and asked them to become part of carrying on traditions. And then the second year we had some experiences that those students engaged in, and then added students at the end of each term of the second year. And it worked very well, and as far as I know, continues today.

CARROLL: About this time, too...I have to say. You came into office and just went at it tooth and nail. I've been going through year by year. There also began to be created the student loan corporation, TELCO [Tuck Educational Loan Corporation].

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes.

CARROLL: What brought that about?

HENNESSEY: Our tuitions were going up pretty fast. We were much interested in continuing to diversify the student body economically. And in fact, as we weaned ourselves away from Dartmouth, we became more concerned about that than we had been when we dealt mainly with Dartmouth students, 3/2 and otherwise, coming into our program. It was also a part of our recruiting minority students, although that was not a major incentive for elaborating our student aid program. We wanted to be sure that students could come to Tuck, ignoring the economic cost of coming, and only concentrating on the economic benefit of being there.

So an important part of our response to students was the development of a relatively manageable loan program. The medical schools and law schools were engaging in a similar technique for helping their students as their tuitions were going far and fast upward. And as it became pretty clear that it was legitimate in our asking people to give us more endowment so that we might have more scholarships for students, it was legitimate for those people to say to us--foundations and wealthy donors--"Oh, wait a minute. Your students are going to use this experience to be in the top 2 percent economically and could pay it back. Why don't you concentrate more on loans?"

Well, we [Tuck administration] studied the possibility of doing it in a way that would be attractive, could be added to the government programs that were available. And the Tuck associate dean at that time, whom I recruited in 1972 [Paul Paganucci '53], was a financial expert and a very wise man. He invented a way of using our endowment and some borrowing and the money markets in a fashion that would create a loan program with a certain amount of nest egg of endowment that would be able to lend to students at just a little bit above the prime rate of interest. Which was a much more advantageous loan program than would be available to students in other ways, unless they were really eligible for almost full financial aid. So this loan program of ours, the TELCO program, we envisioned, would be open to students without their showing us substantial need. It would be open to all students, in fact. And that widened its appeal, and meant that we could--it helped our recruitment of students in a variety of ways.

CARROLL: Now was this Paul Paganucci who set this up?

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: And did you find then, too, that you could bring people in who would ordinarily not be able to come?

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. Sure. Sure.

CARROLL: Did you have a bad default rate?

HENNESSEY: I don't think we had any defaults.

CARROLL: A good return.

HENNESSEY: It was inconceivable to us and to the student body that anybody would default because that would be such a dishonorable thing and such a blot on their record. No, we didn't have defaults.

CARROLL: If it's all right with you, we're almost to the end of this second side. I think it would be a good time to take a break.

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure.

[End of session one]

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.
Tuck School, Dartmouth College

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library, Dartmouth College

DATE: October 3, 1996

CARROLL: October 3, 1996, and I'm speaking once again with John W. Hennessey, Jr. This is the second of our interviews, and we are going to begin by talking about the election of John Kemeny to the presidency. Had you known him before his election?

HENNESSEY: Yes. I had known him relatively well because we interacted a good bit around his interest in what was going on at Tuck School. John was, as you know, chair of the math department, and a founder of computing--particularly time-shared computing--at Dartmouth. And there were people at Tuck who were natural allies with him. In addition, he and I got to know each other socially for two reasons: One, our wives were major movers in the Democratic Party locally and regionally and beyond, and we saw each other socially for that reason. In addition, we were both Princetonians. And although we hadn't known each other, our careers did overlap at Princeton. He was Class of '46, I was Class of '45. And we both had odd times at Princeton because of World War II. I know at one time I tried to recruit him as a person who might help to raise funds for Princeton from the graduate alumni--which he was in addition to his undergraduate days there.

So, yes. We knew each other. I had formed views of John. As a matter of fact, when I think about his emergence as a candidate for president,

during the important fund-raising that occurred for the Bicentennial [Third Century Fund], 1969 Bicentennial, John chaired the committee in charge of foundations and corporations, major fund-raising. And at that time I was associate dean of the Tuck School, with a great deal of interest in Tuck's benefitting at least, if not putting itself into the conversation with foundations and corporations for major funds. As we discussed last time, Tuck wasn't independent in its fund-raising until later during my deanship. But as associate dean, I was pushing against the edge of our boundary.

And so I remember having lunch with John, talking about the future of Dartmouth and the future of the professional schools because of his need to understand those things as he chaired that committee for the Bicentennial fund-raising. And that did make him a more credible candidate for president. Because the book on John, among those of us who were here and were interested, deeply interested, in what would happen after John Dickey retired, the book was that John was a very bright fellow who had done marvelous things in math. That he was a protean force because his faculty position had cut across the three divisions. He had done things in the social sciences and the humanities, as well as the sciences. And yet he was seen as not a likely presidential person because he was so different from the Dickey model. He was not a politically smooth, attractive, promising person. As a matter of fact, one wondered how, if he were president, how in the world he would deal with the diplomatic side, the external relations side, of being president. Because he didn't have the personality for that. So I think all of us thought of him by saying, “isn't it too bad that the presidency has to involve the non-logics of political behavior and spending a lot of time at parties and conventions of alumni where the talk will not be about mathematics, physics, chemistry, psychology, computers. But will be about the things that common people talk about.” John, we thought, might not be very good at that.

CARROLL: And the fund-raising had proved that this is not the case?

HENNESSEY: I really do think that that showed a side of John that no one would have predicted. No one was quite aware of his ability, in interacting with corporations and foundations, to talk the talk. And show a capacity to absorb into his person the needs, the requirements, of a situation. You see he seemed to be somebody who imposed himself on the situation. He re-ordered things the way he wanted them. He was seen, in a sense, as being rather self-centered and self-directed and powerful. So that he put his imprint on things. Well, he showed, when he needed to do it, that he could react effectively and get results. And I think that

might have been the major test for the Trustees, of John's fulfilling their criteria. Even at that, he was out of balance. He was not someone who was seen as a possible president, as being comfortably in charge of all the requirements of the presidency. He was tilted on the side of being too scientific and too intellectually presidential. And perhaps risky as a full person taking over the responsibilities, not just of the presidency of Dartmouth College, but the mayor of a small city, the manager of an important business, the chief person in a complex human organization that needed a lot of humanity which John Dickey had supplied very well.

CARROLL: Of course John Dickey had a kind of diplomatic background that he brought into play.

HENNESSEY: He did. He did indeed. And he was...I spent a lot of time with John Dickey in a lot of settings. And he had a rather deep sense of the comedy and tragedy of life. A sort of humane responsiveness with a sense of humor. And occasionally with a sense of self-deprecation, which we all knew John Kemeny didn't have and would never have and probably shouldn't have.

CARROLL: You knew John Kemeny so well I'm going to ask you a question that I would love to ask him if he were here.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: He came here as someone who was the antithesis of what was then the Dartmouth ideal. He was foreign, he was Jewish, he was not an outdoorsman. He was highly intellectual and had a very developed intellectual life. What do you think it was about Dartmouth that won his affection?

HENNESSEY: Do you mean won his affection? Or do you mean, really, why did he come here?

CARROLL: Well, both, I think. Why did he come here? But then once he got here, according to Jean he could have gone away to several other institutions.

HENNESSEY: Oh, sure. Sure, he could have.

CARROLL: But he elected to remain here, and he really tied his loyalty to this institution.

HENNESSEY: I would love to talk about that, Jane. That's a very good question. It's a fundamental question. First of all, I think he was attracted--if I may comment on that for a minute because it's not too different from my own situation. I was attracted to Dartmouth with no clear expectation that I would stay here. But I was attracted because of a particular blend of circumstances. And I know John was, too. He came earlier--I forget the year he arrived here.

CARROLL: '54, I believe, '53 or '54.

HENNESSEY: First of all, there is what John Dickey accomplished, and almost the elegance of his description of the special opportunity at Dartmouth to combine tradition, history, family, comfort, with change. He was beginning to personify--and indeed he did personify--a bringing of Dartmouth into a different relationship with times, with the post-World War II times. And John [Dickey] did that through saying, “Dartmouth should be part of the conversation about great issues.” That was a simple way for him to say: “We're going to be on the leading edge.” And the leading edge needs a first-class liberal arts undergraduate entity, with enough graduate work, enough professional school work, to keep it sharp and honest, in a way. Not simply theoretical and engaged in the undergraduate enterprise. But always challenged by the realities of the dilemmas presented by the professional schools where people try to use their liberal learning against very tough dilemmas, at a time when the Soviet challenge was a huge, awful challenge. Where the nuclear weapon development meant that some kinds of old-style arts concentration might be almost beside the point. Although anything that engaged the mind and expanded it, of course, wasn't beside the point. John talked about conscience and competence, as you know. So that was attractive.

In addition, he [Dickey] brought here people who were able to link John's vision and his energy and his persona with other universities and with the future. And the major person who did that was [Provost Donald] Don Morrison, a marvelous, wonderful person. How I wish he were sitting here instead of me talking with you. And Don Morrison, for John Dickey, was the young--38, 39, 40, 41, 42--person who went out and found people like John Kemeny and said, "Come here. Be a partner with me in the transformation of Dartmouth into a leader in the Ivy League. Probably having a law school. Maybe reinventing the MD program for the medical school, but based on real strength in the sciences. And probably starting some doctoral work.

"If we can do that well, fulfilling certain kinds of criteria, Dartmouth will change and be a separate kind, a different kind, of Ivy institution. And we'll no longer be seen as the one Ivy institution which is really a little bit more like the Amhersts and the Williamses. You know, we are poised on a very uneasy time here where Dartmouth, in order to fulfill its destiny, probably has to decide to go beyond the comfort of being like Amherst and Williams and perhaps Smith, and be a different sort of university. And let's even use that word." And, "John Kemeny, let me tell you, in the math department, a very, very important department, we need a brand-new vision. And we need a young leader who will have the authority to transform it, to reinvent it. We'll give you enormous power and authority, beyond anything you would ever have if you'd stayed at Princeton or went to Yale or whatever you might go."

And John bought that. Not just to come here as a mathematician, but to come here as a putative chairman who had a lot of respect and power. And could do a lot more here than he could do in more traditional and larger place. Particularly in places that already had a large, impressive Ph.D. program.

Well, when John got here and began to see that Don Morrison really meant it, and that Don, as the provost and (who knows?) the future president, had a vision that made sense. John bought into that, and would have described at that time the possibilities at Dartmouth the way I just described them, and the way I began to see them and feel them. In my first year I was romanced, as I told you last time, by Harvard, in a very attractive way, to go into the Harvard Business School and do what they needed done there in a way that I could make some contributions to. But by then Don Morrison had captured my imagination and my loyalty. I really wanted to sign on and see what would happen. And Don's death was a terrible shock.

CARROLL: Now, he was the one who died when he was down in Princeton?

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Rather unexpectedly.

HENNESSEY: Very unexpectedly. I mean we were all stunned by that. Just stunned. He was only what, 45, 48? And he was the future of Dartmouth. We all came here thinking of him as the magician who, working with John Dickey as the patron and the great powerful person who could make this happen and hand it over to him in person, that the team was it. By then there were some other people who were visible. John Masland

was a most important of those. John Masland was my next-door neighbor, and I knew him awfully well. And because of John and John's very close relationship with Don Morrison--they were both government department people. They were both political scientist persons. John, I think, was a bit older than Don, but I'm not certain of that.

CARROLL: There was a whole generation that was brought here after World War II, you being one of them, John Kemeny, Leonard Rieser, Agnar Pytte, Don Morrison. All those people brought in who really seemed to signal a new spirit on the campus.

HENNESSEY: Yes. And I would certainly mention [Thaddeus] Thad Seymour in that group. We came to know each other. And the morale within that group was just tremendous. I thought Thad was a larger-than-life dean of the college. And I remember going, in my first or second year here, going to Don Morrison's house for dinner--Don and Betty Morrison--with the Seymours. And the six of us excitedly talking about this grand adventure. And laughing and enjoying the bonding that was taking place, with the promise that we were going to be Dartmouth's future and Dartmouth was going to be unique. It wasn't going to be the old Dartmouth, but the transformation was going to be a great adventure, and it might even involve coeducation. And the world had no boundaries for us.

CARROLL: How hard was it for the alumni at that time to accept these changes? We know how hard it was for them to accept coeducation.

HENNESSEY: That was the enormous question. And a very, very legitimate, valuable, dignified source of tension. I used that word before last week when we talked. But I think of creative tensions as being extremely important in the life of organizations, leading to debates and disagreements and decisions, marginally, how to move forward in a crazy way. You never leap forward. You move forward continuing to work on these tensions and issues. And the challenge was not to accept the alumni as "they," but to accept the alumni as part of the body politic, part of the future. And engineering...The job of the trustees and the president was to engineer consent and sense of meeting and consensus in the total body, including those alumni in every way. That was another reason why John Kemeny seemed, as I alluded to before, seemed not to be quite right for the presidency because we thought he would run right up against the alumni and want with great logic and persuasiveness to change them, without realizing that he was going to have to change with them. We were all going to have to change in the management of this great and delicate process.

And the alumni body was--and I say "alumni" rather than "alumnae" because it was all male, and that was the anglicized pronunciation that we used instead of the Latin "alumni." The alumni body was a boiling, changing, living organism in itself. There were young alumni, old alumni. There were conservatives, and there were liberals. There were communists and Albanians. There were all kinds of people in the alumni body. And out of that alumni body was going to come the future board of trustees. And so that was simply part of the total system.

CARROLL: When Kemeny stepped into the presidency, this was right on the heels of quite a large era of--a time of tumult. There had been the Schockley Incident under Dickey. And there had been the Parkhurst Takeover.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: And so these were very troubled times.

HENNESSEY: Well, yes. They were very troubled times. That's right. And we have to talk a bit about that, what that meant in Dartmouth's seeking a president. Not to say there were not troubled times in 1944-45 when Dartmouth sought a president. Things were moving very fast. The Schockley Incident I'd rather set aside.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: I was not part of that. I did not know much about it at the time. But became quite aware of it later on when it became important to understand Dartmouth's history and Dartmouth's commitment in the interracial situation.

But more important to me was to watch the development during the time of the '60's of a real debate and a real argument--a cultural argument led by articulate young people--over what America was going to do with its need to transform. Do you mind if I take a long-winded time to say this?

CARROLL: Please do. It's all right.

HENNESSEY: Okay. I find it so engaging to think of the '60's. And they really started--the movement began--in the early 60's when on college campuses young people said, "Enough already with this paternalistic business. This requirement of uniforms we'll wear to class, and the old style of benign paternalism. Those days are no longer acceptable to us young

people." And the Free Speech Movement was the first epitome of that on campus. The Berkeley extravagant expression of the need for power in the student body, and free speech, and not trusting anybody over 30, that all developed around the use of drugs and the discomfort with simply continuing the ethic and the ethos of the Eisenhower years into the '60's.

On this campus I saw it around the growing resistance to the idea of requirements. You know the young men in the student body were told that to come to the Great Issues Course [required for seniors], they would have to wear a coat and a tie. Because that was the old-style uniform for going to class. And even though some of them were beginning to show up in classes around the somewhat disrespectful attitude in a failure to wear a jacket and a tie--of course the faculty were all properly dressed. My generation coming up as young faculty had worn uniforms with pride in the service. And believed in that part of the world as being easy to cope with. And there was no reason to rebel. I mean that would be foolish to rebel in terms of outward style. It would be a more thoughtful challenge to the old-timers over other things.

But students began to say-- I remember going to Great Issues (in fact I was on the Great Issues Committee) and students in 1963-64 would come with a coat and tie and no shirt and Bermuda shorts. And the question was, how was John Dickey going to respond to that, having invited the world's great, noble, wonderful figures to come here to lecture in the Great Issues course?

Then-- My mind is flooded with images of then the assassination of Mr. Kennedy in '63. Our reaction to that. The reaction to Lyndon Johnson and his style, and what he represented. The momentary revival of idealism and hope around being true to the legacy of John Kennedy as we interpreted it, and getting on with the promise of the Great Society and conquering poverty. As I mentioned to you, the 1964 Civil Rights Act saying “we are going to do good. “

But then the realization that all of this was really not happening. It was all being very slow, and we were getting bogged down then in arguments over foreign policy, and the Vietnam War debate occurred. And it became-- There was a strong Berkeley-founded belief that older people, the Old Guard, probably didn't know enough to manage things anymore. And that really the younger people ought to have the chance to blossom, and take over sooner, and push some things out of the way, and break down some of the structures and processes. And a lot

> of ugly things happened. And so there were unheard of protests and demonstrations. And then some takeovers.
>
> The takeovers occurred around a lot of issues. But on the Dartmouth campus they were concentrated around politics, and all politics are local. The local issue here came to be focused on ROTC. And I remember going to a meeting I think in--it was in Dartmouth [Hall, Room] 105, which was one of the largest classrooms, where there was to be a debate with John Dickey chairing the faculty. It was a meeting with the faculty of Arts & Sciences because we didn't have then a way to gather all the faculties together. We just didn't; that came later, when the [John] Copenhaver Commission brought forth a general faculty, which all of us, I think, felt very awkward about the absence of earlier on--

But at that meeting there was a very strong difference between the majority of the faculty, arguing that it was inappropriate to push ROTC off this campus, because of the developing concerns we had around Vietnam and around the powers of the federal government to control our lives in what we were beginning to think might not be in acceptable way. And to push ROTC off the campus was focusing our energies on the wrong issue for the wrong reasons. That we really ought to save...That issue can be resolved in a sane and productive and progressive way by being a little slower about it and by shifting the debate to the future of this university in the time of the Cold War. Well, a significant number of students and some younger faculty strongly protested that we older folks were wrong, and that one had to take advantage of whatever political issue surfaced to express a bundle

of strong feelings about what was happening to this country. That under-- I mean, by then-- I'm trying to remember dates here, and I wish I had some notes with me. But the first ROTC debate, I think, was in '68. Am I right?

CARROLL: That's right.

HENNESSEY: Well, '68, by then we had come to a very special year with the assassination of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy. And passionate feelings of that. Vietnam was really sick and a sour, sour chapter that wasn't going to get any better. And that it embodied old instincts in a very bad way. And by '68-- I don't remember when John Dickey had stated that he was going to retire, but I think it was by then. I think it was during '68 that he had announced that.

CARROLL: He announced that he would be here for the Bicentennial and that would be his last year. He wanted to see the college through the Bicentennial in '69.

HENNESSEY: That's right. Do you remember when he said that that would be true?

CARROLL: He announced it in the end of '68.

HENNESSEY: Right. He was thinking it. He was approaching 25 years in the job. He knew that the Bicentennial was the right time. And even though he hadn't announced it, many people were already looking ahead and thinking about presidential transition. So it was an itchy and difficult time. But it was a time of great challenge and great potency. So things got-- The issue over ROTC--

[End of Tape 3, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 3, Side B]

...and I'd like to try to contribute in my own way, to bearing witness to what was happening in '68.

Looking back now, it's very difficult to remember the context of 1968 even though it's been written about and talked about by a great many people. But on the Dartmouth campus I think there was a very important sense of incredulity that these things were happening. We

read about Berkeley and said, "That won't happen here." We didn't think of Berkeley as the canary in the mine, you know, predicting things that would happen--were indeed happening. We thought of it as a bit wild and crazy, and an extreme version of something that we could manage here. That we were rational, polite, debaters. And we had always been able on this campus to come to reasonable decisions about matters in a fair way, in a valid and fair way. In a gentlemanly way. We're Ivy League. We're not some California modern craziness. So the debate over the ROTC was managed pretty well. And I think reasonable views were expressed and respected back and forth.

But then there was the [Parkhurst] takeover, and the takeover was powered by some--I want to say in the best and non-prejudiced sense of the term--by some fringe groups who were expressing an exaggeration, an almost caricature of one of the shivering lights that had been present as we talked about ROTC, coming from the outer world. But it stunned all of us. We couldn't believe it. And then there was the shaking of the heads about the indignity of going into Parkhurst and carrying people out of Parkhurst in their chairs. And how could anybody countenance that? That was clearly done by some outsiders.

CARROLL: So there was a sense of shock that this was happening.

HENNESSEY: Well, shock. But also a-- A combination of shock and a sense that “we can deal with this. And John Dickey is the ultimate facilitator of our managing this the way we've managed lots of other things. We can deal with it.” And sure. Some people carried Thad Seymour in his chair out of the building, but Thad joked about it, and Thad was on top of it. There was no sense of panic at all. There was almost a sense of excitement that, you know, “we are part of the real world. This is a Great Issue, and it happened here.” I mean before that it was hard to get people excited about what might be happening in New York or San Francisco or Berkeley or somewhere else.

So we weren't yet a real part of the debate about civil rights and the future of women in our society. Those were still being talked about in a very cool way; there was no warm engagement. Or perhaps there was, but because by that time down at Tuck we were visiting black schools and all that. But that was still marginal to the average student and faculty member. “We will get to those things in our time in a slow and excellent, high-quality way.” This sudden drama in Parkhurst was a portent of things to come, but not something that we couldn't manage in our own way. And John Dickey was still in charge; and the trustees, they were still in charge. And yet there was change ahead. “So let's

celebrate our Bicentennial in a very dignified way." But realize that under the next president, we didn't know what might happen. As we became more modern, more engaged, and more part of the national conversation. However, there was some real confidence, I think, that we would do well in that new situation.

CARROLL: So they were looking for a president, a new president. Do you know any of the other names that were considered along with John Kemeny?

HENNESSEY: I have to pause for a minute and think, because it's easy for me to confuse the 1970 with the 1981-82 search. And also I don't know the extent to which I can speak appropriately about candidates I did know. I guess I'll take the risk of saying some things that I'll want to delete. May I do that?

CARROLL: You may certainly.

HENNESSEY: I thought it was an excellent search. I knew the people on the committee. At one time early in the search my own name had popped up, and I've talked about that. I had put in some names. One of the most attractive external candidates was someone I knew very well, Richard Lyman. I'm going to say the name--I hesitated because it's going to be on the tape, and I'm responsible for that. But I think his name eventually became well known. But let me tell you a little bit about that. He was at that time provost at Stanford. I knew him very well because we lived in the same house together as graduate students at Harvard in 1948 to '50. He and his wife and my wife and I shared a bathroom for two years in an old house in Cambridge that had six graduate school couples in it. We ran it, it was our cooperative house, and we made the rules.

So we got to know them extremely well, and they became close friends. And Dick, I thought, would be a very fine candidate for the Dartmouth presidency. He was a Swarthmore alumnus, but he knew Dartmouth. He was a Harvard Ph.D., an historian, British history. But a grand student of politics and public affairs. And he was provost on a campus where he had had to deal with many of these same dramatic happenings, in a somewhat more heated environment. Because Palo Alto is only 11 miles from Berkeley, or whatever it is. But it was up on a hill above the streets where the conflicts and rude conversations were taking place at Berkeley. And they were very proud of their Ivy identity on the West Coast. Dick managed that whole time, I thought, extremely well. And I thought he was a marvelous candidate for the presidency here.

He came to visit. I know too much about that, but I'll tell you what I can. He called me to talk about his political problems. Because if he came here to be interviewed for the Dartmouth presidency, and it became known on the Stanford campus that he came here and was a candidate for the Dartmouth presidency, he would deny it. Why? Because he felt he was a strong internal candidate for the presidency of Stanford. And he wasn't at all sure that, in his own mind, what he would say if both presidencies were offered to him. And he began to think that the only way in which he would be a candidate for the presidency of Dartmouth, would be if he were offered the job with the assurance that he was it, and then it became public. That would be fine. But he could not allow it to become public before the trustees had made the decision.

Well, he came to Boston, and a number of us went down to talk with him and his wife, Jing, about-- Trying to be sure that all questions were answered for them before they would know whether they would want to take it if it were offered. And that became known. And he was asked, when he went back to the Stanford campus, "Are you really? Did you go there to be a candidate--are you a candidate? Are you a candidate?" He made clear in his conversations with us that he was not willing to be a candidate. Yes, he was willing to talk about common interests, but he would not be a candidate until he was the final candidate. So he could say to the press in Palo Alto that he was not a candidate when they asked him. And that killed it. And he was the best of the outside candidates. My concentration on him is so fierce that I can't now remember who some of the others were. There were strong possibilities inside this community, and Thad Seymour was one of those. Leonard Rieser was one of those. John Masland was not because I think John by then had died. He died at a very young age, too.

CARROLL: And Don Morrison as well?

HENNESSEY: Don Morrison had died.

CARROLL: I thought he died under Kemeny. I thought he was working for Kemeny when he died. Because Kemeny, John Kemeny, had--Jean told me John had to go break it to his widow.

HENNESSEY: Wow. I can't believe that. Have we got a book where we can look it up as to when John--

CARROLL: No, I don't. That's a good question. I'm trying to think what it would be in.

HENNESSEY: No, no, no. That isn't accurate. I said John Masland was my next-door neighbor. I remember John Dickey walking down the walk to our two houses to tell John Masland he was going to have to be provost because Don was dead. And I think that had to be '61 or--

CARROLL: Or '62, yes.

HENNESSEY: That's why it was such a shock. I mean John Dickey had pinned everything on Don Morrison. And suddenly--

CARROLL: The succession was gone.

HENNESSEY: Gone, in the early '60's. Don wasn't part of anything that happened during the '60's. John was alone, and he was dealing with a new provost. He was dealing with John Masland who was very different, very different, from Don Morrison. None of the-- Certainly a fine person, but none of the extra pizzazz and promise that Morrison had, in my view.

CARROLL: So then Masland became provost, and then did he die as well? And then Leonard Rieser took the job?

HENNESSEY: John Masland became provost and served until he was lured away from Dartmouth by the Ford Foundation to become head of the Ford Foundation office in India. And John and his family moved to India. And Leonard became provost. Why John Masland left to take that job, I'm not entirely sure. I can speculate, and I remember talking with him, and I remember talking with Leonard, and Leonard can tell you. But John took that job and left in the mid-'60's, and Leonard took over as provost.

CARROLL: Okay. That makes much more sense, actually, to say it that way. So that during the actual push for the presidency with Kemeny, those two candidates, it may have been more logical ones were out of the picture.

HENNESSEY: Yes. And John Masland was either dead by then, by '68-69. Or he was so marginalized in our memory because he had left, and he was in the Ford Foundation, and he had not been a person who seemed presidential. That's cruel to say, perhaps.

CARROLL: No, I think not everyone is.

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: Were you surprised that they decided to choose Kemeny?

HENNESSEY: Very. I think everybody was. First of all because it took a great deal of courage. It was a courageous, breathtaking appointment. We all felt that way. But we were very pleased by it. I mean, could the Trustees really do that? This conservative group of people who had to come to a center of gravity over something, could they really decide to accept the recommendation of the more progressive trustees? You almost have to see it that way. “I mean this man is Jewish, for one thing. And much more than that, he's not a Dartmouth graduate. I mean how can you do that? Come on!”

CARROLL: I know. It was really shocking, it must have been.

HENNESSEY: “This new president's going to lead us into coeducation. How is a non-Dartmouth person, with a lack of the credibility that John Dickey, had-- What we want is a new John Dickey.” Thad Seymour was seen more like that although he, unfortunately, was not a Dartmouth alumnus. He was a Princeton alumnus, but had taken some courses at Dartmouth or something. I mean it wasn't so-- And Leonard Rieser was a Dartmouth alumnus. But he spent part of his undergraduate time elsewhere. “And where is the new John Dickey?” Dave McLaughlin wasn't visible because he was too--

CARROLL: Too young at that time.

HENNESSEY: Yes. He was visible--and stop me if I shouldn't get into this-- But when John Dickey asked me in '67 to be the dean of Tuck School, we talked about Dave McLaughlin as a future leader because I asked about the Board of Overseers and some young people who might be able to come on that, and John Dickey described David McLaughlin in a way that he would be describing a future president of Dartmouth.

CARROLL: That's fascinating.

HENNESSEY: I could tell you almost the words he used. '67.

CARROLL: That man had vision.

HENNESSEY: Yes, he did. But Dave by then-- Dave then was-- Well, he wasn't too young.

CARROLL: He would've been in his forties, though, I guess.

HENNESSEY: Not--! Thirties.

CARROLL: Thirties still!

HENNESSEY: Well, I'm thinking about '68-'69.

CARROLL: Oh, you mean that time. I was talking about for the presidential search.

HENNESSEY: Oh, for the presidential later.

CARROLL: Yes.

HENNESSEY: But the presidential search that produced Kemeny was in '69. And at that time Dave McLaughlin was probably 36 or 37, which is not too young because John Dickey was 38 when he became president. But Dave McLaughlin at age 36 was not as visible and obvious a candidate for the presidency as John Dickey was in 1945. Okay. So I don't know other candidates. I could go back and try to reformulate that. But John Kemeny was a most dramatic and, I said, meaning it, breathtaking choice, really.

CARROLL: What was the reaction--do you remember?--among faculty and among alumni?

HENNESSEY: I think the alumni body were universally surprised and shocked. But immediately ready to support-- I mean the Bicentennial spirit was abroad. The trustees had done their thing. That's what they're supposed to do. It is supposed to be partly a mysterious process. The college is now in the hands of this man during a very troubling time. Because things were getting worse on college campuses and the majority said, "Let's gather around this man and make it work." I think that was the spirit. “But still, wow, are we taking a risk! We're on a high wire here because this fellow--we don't know what he'll be like. It is unpredictable. You've added one more uncertainty at a time of lots of uncertainties about the future of Dartmouth.” So what John did right away-- It became very important how he was perceived, and he knew that. I talked with him about that, because he asked me to come to talk to him in his office in the basement of Parkhurst after he was elected and before he took over. And I'll get into that as you want me to.

CARROLL: Please.

HENNESSEY: Should we do that now?

CARROLL: Yes, why not.

HENNESSEY: Because we were talking about the choice.

CARROLL: That's all right. We can move ahead with that. I think it would be interesting to know how he made the transition from professor to president.

HENNESSEY: That was extremely important, and he knew it was. Well, he talked with lots of people. But in talking with me, he said, "Listen, one thing I do not know anything about is management. And part of my job is going to be managing a complex enterprise, right?" I said, "Right. That's true." Particularly these days. It might have been all right in Dr. Tucker's day for him to have no managers around, and everything was done by him. Which indeed was how he did it. He didn't even have a secretary in his early days. But universities are more and more complex enterprises. We'd gone through the Carnegie Commission's Study of Universities and Higher Education, and everybody was beginning to understand we had to take a closer look on how you managed these, in the best sense of the word, how you managed these places.

So John and I talked at two or three conversations about management science in the nonprofit public sector and the private sector, and what wisdom there was out there. John was so bright. And he was so confident that there were geniuses in every field who could write about how you do it in a way that he, as a very bright man, could consume and could then decide to adopt, that he wanted books, he wanted me to load him down with books and articles. He wanted me to take him through an MBA education in one week. “Maybe it takes your students two years, but just try me. I can do this at super speed.” So we had those conversations.

CARROLL: And did he do it at super speed?

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. Oh, he really did. Amazingly bright man. And an amazingly philosophical and broad person, beyond what I ever dreamed when he became president. I didn't know him as the wider person he became. He's the only person I've ever known, ever known, who--he reminds me a little bit of Jimmy Carter in this respect--who determined that he would get on top of everything intellectually. And almost did it. Carter almost almost did it, but John Kemeny almost really did it. But part of his ability to do that was that he knew this place very well. He had been here for

17 years. He knew the people. He knew from close study the nature of the problems.

CARROLL: Is it unusual to choose somebody to be president who has never held an administrative role?

HENNESSEY: Well, in earlier days it wasn't terribly unusual. But by the mid- and late '60's, it was coming to be more and more of a really highly risky thing to do. Why would you do that? Princeton had done it, rather persistently. They picked [Robert] Bob Goheen and then [William] Bill Bowen, and John knew that. Both-- And I forget when Goheen handed it over to Bowen. I think Goheen was still president at the time Dartmouth was searching for--in 1970. But there was still abroad within the deeply-rooted, proud, Ivy-like liberal arts colleges--whether they were universities or not--the idea that very intelligent, wise, seasoned, attractive, Renaissance men would be able to get on top of these situations and bring financial people and business people and registrars and deans together and make it work. I thought so, too. But I thought it took a lot more than just intelligence. It did take--

My description of it, Jane, and I still believe this, would be: It is too risky to choose a president of any important institution who has not been tested under fire in some relevant circumstance. I think John had been in the math department, in this university, in various things that he had taken on and managed. And his relationship with faculty affairs and chairing committees, he had shown himself not to be an Einstein who would be an other-worldly type. But he didn't mind engaging in public affairs. He was difficult and prickly and impatient, and that seemed to be a high risk. But he could be worked on by the necessity of the larger political system, we all felt. And I felt that in talking with him about management. He understood that no one pushed buttons and made things happen. He hoped maybe that could happen. But he became--as I described to him the wisdom of the best philosophers in the field of management and administration in all kinds of enterprises, he said, you know, "That makes sense to me."

I remember almost with laughter one of the first times in which his belief that he could manage the trustees fell apart. I think the trustees were awed by John when they brought him in and said, okay, you're the president, and John began to describe, with enormous persuasive articulateness, the nature of the modern Dartmouth and what we'd need to do, and things he wanted to get done and all this. And what his role, what the board's role would be. And he was just so very articulate. And one of the things he said was, "You know, in bringing me into the

presidency, there are some things that you can't change that I am. I'm going to try to change to fulfill your expectations, but there are some things that I can't do. I'm a night person, and I'm not going to attend any early meetings anywhere. I mean I start my day at ten a.m. And of course I smoke, and I'm a chain smoker, and I'm always going to be."

I remember talking to a couple of trustees after the meeting in which John made that pronouncement, saying, "You know, this is weird. This is weird, weirdsville. How are we going to deal with this?" And they had their first trustee meeting. I'm sure it was the first one when John was president. It must have been May. I don't know when it was. April in '70. And sure enough, the agenda said the board meeting will start at ten a.m. And they had come up the night before, and they'd had dinner, and they were ready to go. And the only reason for starting at ten a.m.--and these were compulsive types who get up at five a.m. and start--the only reason is the president. And they called him that morning. My memory is--and I may be gilding this a bit--they called him and said, "Mr. President, we have gathered, and we're ready to start. And we want you here." They woke him up. That was a rude shock to John! And after that he adjusted.

CARROLL: Oh, did he!

HENNESSEY: He didn't adjust to the rest of us. He would not meet with me at eight a.m. But he adjusted to the world. He adjusted to the trustees and to other people who were going to say to him, you know, the business starts at eight a.m., if not before. So different from Dave McLaughlin, who of course came in saying, “the world starts at six-thirty. And what are you faculty doing at six-thirty? Why can't you come to a meeting?” But that was, I thought--I think that's an interesting anecdote about how John Kemeny thought he really took control of it.

CARROLL: That illuminates a lot. When he came in, one of the first major changes he made was the announcement of coeducation.

HENNESSEY: What was the date?

CARROLL: He comes in in '71 and announces there will be coeducation next year. And so the first class that gets admitted is in '72.

HENNESSEY: Jane, your dates are wrong.

CARROLL: Because the first class who graduates is '76.

HENNESSEY: Yes. Your dates are wrong, though. He was inaugurated on March 17, 1970.

CARROLL: Right.

HENNESSEY: You said '71.

CARROLL: No, the announcement for coeducation was in '71.

HENNESSEY: Oh, pardon me. I thought you said-- You said he came-- I see. You didn't mean he came in to the presidency in '71. No, the announcement came in '71.

CARROLL: Yes.

HENNESSEY: Yes, but he didn't come into the presidency with the decision made.

CARROLL: Though he had chaired, as a faculty member, the committee which looked into coeducation, if I'm correct about that. But he was on the committee.

HENNESSEY: Probably.

CARROLL: So he had done, I think, a lot of the work ahead of time.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes. Oh, yes. He was certainly familiar with the issues. But when the president was announced, and when the alumni said to the trustees--the most vocal, powerful alumni--said, "Are you signalling something here? Has this decision been made?" they had to say, “no. It hasn't been made. And John Kemeny is going to be president however we make this decision.” And John had to understand that.

CARROLL: Now, the first thing he suggested--or they suggested--is an associated school for women. Do you remember that debate?

HENNESSEY: No, I don't because it seemed to me then--and it seems to me now--so silly. I don't recall that that was really a-- I was not party to any serious discussion of that.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: I'm amazed. Was that discussed seriously by the trustees?

CARROLL: Yes. It was placed out, and it was placed before the alumni. And there's a whole series of letters in the Dartmouth alumni magazine--

HENNESSEY: I forgot all about it.

CARROLL: --debating that question of whether an associated school would be appropriate.

HENNESSEY: Is that right!? My gosh! I want to deny that. I don't remember that.

CARROLL: That's all right. My real question is-- Then they do make the announcement in '71 that they are going to admit women; it's going to become coed the next year. And I'm wondering, among the faculty, was that hailed as inevitable? Or was this seen as a breakthrough? What was the attitude?

HENNESSEY: I'll be glad to comment on that. But you're pulling me ahead because so many other very difficult, important things happened in 1970 before you get to that decision.

CARROLL: Okay. I'll back up.

HENNESSEY: Not necessarily. I mean I want to do it in your order.

CARROLL: That's all right.

HENNESSEY: You're sure?

CARROLL: Yes. Absolutely. What would you say, then, were the issues of 1970?

HENNESSEY: Well--how to say it? The issue of the organization of Dartmouth College and how we were going to make decisions was a first-order priority, and the Copenhaver Commission was terribly important. Another issue, however, that took over completely, dominated, and changed our lives, was the May 1970 series of events which I remember as if they were yesterday. The Cambodia/Kent State/Jackson State tide in the first week of 1970 dramatically challenged John Kemeny and his presidency in a very fundamental way.

CARROLL: You're right. I was jumping.

HENNESSEY: There was a tremendous focus on: “What was going to happen? How is Kemeny going to react? How is the faculty going to react? How will the students react?” I was on the West Coast at a professional meeting,

and Leonard Rieser called me and said, "You'll have to come back because of what's going to happen. There's going to be a terrible split in the faculty of this campus and with the trustees, and we don't know what will happen next." And I caught the plane that came back on which I got no sleep, but--

[End of Tape 3, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 4, Side A]

HENNESSEY: I rushed back to campus. And before even being able to talk with John or talk with Leonard, I was asked to--as the Tuck School dean--to go into a meeting of the Tuck School students, who by then were very aroused and very angry and very eager. Because they, like most students in this nation, rose up in horror at the killing of the students at Kent State. I mean, National Guard soldiers shot and killed students who were protesting the actions of the Nixon administration, the Nixon-Agnew administration, which they had been watching warily for some weeks. I mean, it was in--I believe it was about March of 1970 [that] Kemeny was inaugurated.

Agnew made that awful speech, in effect saying that what was happening on the college campuses was beneath our respect. And both he and Nixon talked about the bombings. And they mistook what had been happening in the earlier era, in the 60's--the Berkeley business, the nudity and obscenity and all that--they mistook that for a fringe element that was now the central [one]-- Those were the only people they had to care about. The protesters were not part of the body politic of the American universities and Dartmouth College. They were totally wrong in their reaction to the way in which students and faculty were protesting the Vietnam War after the '68 deaths and '69 happenings.

CARROLL: And the bombing of Cambodia.

HENNESSEY: The bombing of Cambodia happened in April. And so by March, April, May--May, there was a fire ready to be lighted, and dynamite ready to be exploded, and the Kent State shootings did it. Then there were the shootings at Jackson State, a predominantly black school, a few days later. Then that, plus the Cambodia business, and, I mean-- The professoriate and the student bodies all recoiled in horror. And it happened at Tuck. The Tuck students--some of them in tears--asked me in that meeting, "What's going to happen to us in this nation? Because it's gone too far. The president of the United States and his administration and the people who are running this country are going to destroy us in this insane, destructive war." And then they're feeding young people into the maw of this military machine. These are young

people who are being drafted, who are being sent there, who know people who've been killed. It was a high moment.

So I then went immediately from there to John Kemeny's office where he gathered us administrators in an emergency session, and we talked about the crisis of the moment. Out of that developed the understanding that something dramatic had to happen. Business as usual was unthinkable. And out of that then developed meetings of the general faculty. And we deans reported what was happening in our faculties. And we all agreed that we would declare a moratorium on classes. And that we would use the time--for the moment--in philosophically, soulfully searching for a way to understand what was happening, and understand how it was best to respond on the part of America's colleges and universities. We then legislated options for students of various kinds, and lived through a time when...

The alumni then immediately--the alumni of all sorts of places, including Smith--were asking the presidents, what in the world is going on here? Because the alumni began to feel that somehow the colleges that they were depending upon had been taken over by the lunatic fringe. And nothing that they held sacred, in terms of process and in terms of values, was really steady anymore. “Is this going to mean that we're going to let black students take over and women take over and protest? Are there going to be more moratoriums? And this is a moment of horrible change.” And of course by then there were real questions, I think, sending shivers throughout the nation about the Nixon presidency and what would happen. And the Soviet threat, and there were all sorts of other things happening. So it was a very, very interesting time.

When you want me to, I can tell you more about talking with John during those weeks in May and with Leonard, what happened at Tuck when-- Our alumni, particularly were a more conservative and more concerned body. “I mean it's okay for Dartmouth to close down for a month, and think about these things, and give students freedom, for heaven's sake, even to graduate those who hadn't completed courses and all that. But not Tuck!” But Tuck was part of it. In fact, we led part of it. And at one point I personally was a spokesman for what was going on in a national context. And I talked a lot with John about my doing that. Do you want me to talk about that?

CARROLL: Yes, I do. I was sitting here thinking, what was in those meetings, when all the administrators got together? What were the issues that were debated, besides the moratorium? Clearly they ended up thinking the moratorium was the right issue.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: What other options did they consider?

HENNESSEY: We considered all, all available options. One, of course, was to go back to work. Our momentum, our natural instinct, was to say, “This is a big issue, but American colleges and universities can manage great issues, after all, in normal stride. And we'll appoint committees and commissions, and we'll still have our classes.” I mean the argument there is, “look, with the students, you have to learn, you are learning, as part of the Dartmouth community. But one of the things you need to learn is that adults deal with crises along with everything else. Things don't stop. You don't shut down the Congress. You don't shut down the Supreme Court. You don't shut down the places of learning. And we'll simply bring to the campus the learning experience that can be represented by these things that are going on outside. But we'll go right on with it. Business as usual.”

And we examined that with great care. And John wanted to go that route. We all did. “Wasn't that going to be the right way to go?” And it was only after we more deeply understood in that first week, as we met with faculty and students and with ourselves, and explored our own feelings, that we understood that this was a different moment. This wasn't the moment like the day Martin Luther King was killed or the day that either Kennedy was assassinated. It was somehow... A very important bubble had burst. The world was never going to be quite the same. And it was a bringing into focus, for the first time for us, all of the energies of change that were boiling and brewing since 1960--all of them, including the challenge to the way the universities do things. Were we any longer relevant? I mean that word "relevance" had been a terribly important challenge even to the curriculum during the '60's. And students were suggesting that maybe they ought to take over and be part of designing the curriculum.

All of that was part of what we thought of as we thought of this tectonic plate, earthquake-type of shift. It was that, and we knew that. We weren't sleeping nights ourselves, for the first time. We weren't sure we could manage this, for the first time. And so under Kemeny's very wise, careful, caring, thoughtful leadership, we decided what to do. And that helped John to emerge suddenly as the powerful president who could manage change in a creative way. He consolidated his position with all of us during the May-June 1970 time. And we were ready to represent his presidency with strength to the alumni and to the trustees and to

others. We defended him and defended us, ourselves, in public ways, and it made us different. And that, I think, strengthened us to deal with coeducation.

Coeducation then seemed less of a defining issue for us as a university. I personally felt that we had already decided it. Because if we were willing to take on these other issues of conscience, and recognized that the world had changed and there were new rights and entitlements and responsibilities all around us, then it would be easy to say that of course that's true for women. Anyway, that was, my goodness-- That was a very, very important part of what made John strong.

Just as a sideline--I don't want to come back to it--but I got into terrible trouble with the Tuck alumni because the Tuck students asked me to be a witness to their conscientious concern about what was going to happen, by going down to Wall Street for an outdoor rally of business school students from Harvard and Columbia and Wharton and Tuck. And the students wanted to take me with them, to show the new nature of this whole student protest, administrators. And they asked me if I would go as the Tuck dean. And I immediately said yes. And the Harvard dean said, "No, I'll send the associate dean." And so did all the other deans.

And so in that wonderful moment in the Wall Street canyon, with thousands of people around and the press and microphones, I became the spokesman for the schools. And nobody quite understood that. They hadn't caught up to the fact that the business schools were part of the campus, not part of the business world. And that that's what excellent professional schools are. They're a bridge between the two. But if you really push them hard, they are part of the university. That's what they really are. And they're developing students to deal with unknown futures. They're not preparing students to walk into first jobs like some sort of a trade school that's an adjunct to the university. And of course I got involved everyday in that as the new dean of the Tuck School, explaining and trying to be sure that my fellow deans around the world would agree with me that we had a new role on these university campuses. And it was more being part of the university, not part of the establishment on the outside.

CARROLL: Did you actually have alumni, irate alumni, calling you on the phone and berating you?

HENNESSEY: Powerful alumni doing that. I have a book that thick. I told myself at one point I would write all that out because it deserves it, and I have not

done it. I must have had 200 letters, significant letters, of criticsm and protest. And my first challenge was to engage the board of overseers, all business tycoons, in helping, and understanding and helping--and many of them were deeply offended by what had happened. And the apotheosis of this for me was the time in June of 1970 when I was summoned to New York by the CEO of a Fortune 100 company, a Dartmouth alumnus, who if he could have done it, would have seen to it I was fired. But lacking that ability--because Kemeny, of course, protected and defended Tuck as part of the university--lacking that, he wanted to tell me that in all good conscience I should resign. And he brought me down to one of the men's clubs in New York. And without telling me, he brought to that meeting a Tuck overseer who had not told me he would be there, and another powerful CEO who was a disappointed candidate to be a trustee of Dartmouth.

And I want to tell you a longer story because, I mean, that was the reason-- I took the risk of getting down there on the day I was due, which I usually did in going to New York. And I had the terrible bad luck that the planes weren't flying, and I went crazy. And I finally got there one hour late. And these people were standing up walking around in this private meeting room in the Union League Club. And I came in, and this guy just read me up and down, read the riot act. “What was I, a Communist? Why would I”-- Well, I by then had been-- I mean what triggered him was my going to Wall Street. I had—“A public meeting is a meeting of the wild and fuzzies. It's the revolutionists. And how dare you be present at a public meeting? What were you thinking of? If you had wanted a private meeting in an auditorium, we could have brought you an auditorium. And what you did was”-- And I'm trying to explain to him what the protest was all about. It was a protest of conscience. It was trying to bring to the attention of the America we knew, that there had been this moment, and that things were not the same. We weren't protesting the war, we weren't protesting the Defense Department, we weren't protesting anything but the moment of conscience that we wanted to bear witness to. He didn't listen, and he didn't care. And he tried to get me fired.

But I received one-- I received a difficult, conscientious, strained letter from Karl Hill from St. Louis. And I answered all of them, and I answered all the phone calls. As Kemeny did. We were all doing nothing but explaining, reacting, talking, meeting. Prayerfully trying to understand this great change that we had allowed to happen, and our own feelings and perspectives and definition of the university and its place and its role in what was happening. Knowing that there were going to be lots more changes coming. So it was a feisty time.

CARROLL: Did you get also letters of support and calls of support from alums?

HENNESSEY: Yes, amazingly so. There were people whom I would have defined as crusty old establishment-types who were wonderfully supportive. Because they were tuned in to the real nature of what was going on in America. And they were not demanding that everybody simply salute the president and say the Vietnam War can't be criticized. “You cannot criticize that.” Which some alumni were stating. And which I had felt in the mid '60's myself. I really had strongly felt that, that these criticisms of Vietnam and that war were stupid and wrong.

CARROLL: What changed you?

HENNESSEY: I changed in 1968. I changed when all those things happened, including the announcement by Mr. Johnson that he would not be a candidate for president. My wife was Johnson's chairman in New Hampshire. And I was, and she--we were both loyal to Lyndon Johnson. You have to go back to the context to understand that. But of course we were troubled, and we were searching, and we were worried. And when he said he wasn't going to run, and when our loyalties began to shift more then toward other--instantly--toward other people, and we made our choices. And there was the assassination of Martin Luther King and of Bobby Kennedy. Then we challenged the war. And in an unpatriotic way. I mean as a veteran of World War II, I had a hard time believing that this nation would fight a war to which I could not be loyal. My son was going to become a conscientious objector. I couldn't believe that, but then I began to understand it. So yes, it was a time when all of us were tortured.

And when Karl called me on it, I tried to explain it to him, and we never agreed on that. I was deeply troubled by that. I felt almost guilty taking over his deanship, knowing that he was more of a Dartmouth- and Tuck-respected person than I could become because I had such different roots. I wanted him to be comfortable. I wanted him to be happy with my deanship. I wanted him to praise it. And here it was suddenly, just two years into my deanship, this awful business. So it was tough. Remember, by then Tuck had become coeducational. And I didn't frankly know how Karl felt about that.

CARROLL: It was a completely different institution by this time from what he had left.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Well, now I think we will move on to coeducation as the next issue. And with the announcement of that, of coeducation, were you prepared for that by Kemeny, how to deal with the alumni who might come to you? What will then need to be done? Tuck, in a sense, was in a special position.

HENNESSEY: Well, yes, that's right; we were. One of the things that happened was, John called me into his office one day, I think in 1970. And I can't find this, but there would be ways to pin it down. And I can't remember whether the decision had been made formally or not, but I think it had. So it must have been '71. The trustees made the decision in what, in September '71?

CARROLL: I think it's even earlier. [Final vote – November 1971]

HENNESSEY: June?

CARROLL: I think it comes out in June before then, yes.

HENNESSEY: Okay. I by then had come to know the chairman of the Dartmouth board very well. I knew both chairmen that John worked with. Now let me see. Or all the chairmen he worked with. I'm not sure when Bill Andres handed over the chairmanship to Charlie Zimmerman. I wish we had the timing there. The chairman of the board of Dartmouth, when the decision was made, was Charlie Zimmerman. Charlie Zimmerman was chairman of the board of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, had been the CEO and chairman of Connecticut Mutual for ten or 15 years. And in 1967 I was asked by Charlie to be a consultant on organizational development, management succession, and governance for Connecticut Mutual. I became a consultant. I designed an executive training program to take place on the Dartmouth campus.

I had much interaction with Charlie and with his executive vice president. And then I was asked to join the board of directors of the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company in 1971, while Charlie was chairman of this board. So I had-- And I watched with great interest, because Charlie was obviously not in favor of coeducation. But he was a deeply diplomatic statesman, chairman of the board, and he knew that John Kemeny was going to be a very difficult president for him to be the board chairman working with.

So what I'm thinking is, what I'm wondering, when it was that Charlie made the switch to saying, "If we say yes to this, I will continue to be

chairman of the board." Because he had to have that comfort, and John Kemeny wanted him to be comfortable. Because one of the bad scenarios was--there were a number of them--one was that the board would split on it and be 51/49 percent in favor of not doing it. Which all of us knew was simply a delay; it didn't mean we wouldn't go coeducational. Because by then the model of Princeton and Yale made clear that we were going to do it. And had to do it. We had to be quick and strong about doing it.

But another scenario was that it would be 51/49 in favor, or three to two or four to one in favor, and Charlie would resign. It was very, very, *very* important that that not happen. Charlie was “Mr. Dartmouth”. He was a famous alumnus. He was a healing person. He was a marvelous companion piece on the chessboard with John Kemeny. Because he had everything Kemeny didn't have, and Kemeny had everything Charlie didn't have. They were a terrific team for the moment. So when the decision was made, it all moved ahead really very smoothly. And Charlie was able to present it, explain it in multiple ways.

What I was trying to remember was when John called me into his office and said, "One of the most important people, a former trustee, a distinguished elder statesman of Dartmouth, has now decided to join us. And is going to express his support for this coeducation decision. But he has given us $100,000. He wants to remain anonymous, but he's given us $100,000 to bring in the world's best, most famous consulting firm to help us do it right." And John said, "Would you find the consultants for us to use the $100,000, manage the process?" [2]

So I then did, after talking with him some more, and talking with Charlie a bit, and knowing by then who the alumnus was and knowing him and knowing how he would want it done, I then interviewed--I went at the process--and interviewed six or seven firms, narrowed it down to three, had representatives come here to talk with John and talk with Charlie. And we then did retain Cresap, McCormick & Paget as the right firm. And that was a very interesting year while they, working with John, very closely with John, did the right work and came up with marvelous recommendations. And helped Dartmouth, I think, to do a better job in those first years than anybody else did.

CARROLL: Do you remember any of the recommendations that they gave?

[2] JWH Note, “I recalled incorrectly the focus of the initial consultation. My notes show that the original $100, 000 gift was a study of the administrative organization of Dartmouth, which was conducted by the Cresap consultants. Later, John Kemeny asked the Cresap consultants to help in a number of other ways, including preparing for coeducation.

HENNESSEY: Yes. But, Jane, you know, to go back to that, I almost have to be reminded. I'd have to go back to the documents. In oral history it's interesting to discriminate between what people remember unguided and un-reminded and with no preparation.

CARROLL: That's right.

HENNESSEY: And what they can tell you if they have an opportunity to go back to look it all up. But I'll be glad to tell you what I think were their primary recommendations. The recommendations were in various categories. One had to do with explaining it and being sure how we would respond to questions and how we would--what missionaries we would send out, where they would go in the alumni body to explain it. And how we would also take on, as a very rich opportunity, the necessity to explain to high schools and teachers and prep schools and their communities what coeducation at Dartmouth was going to be like. So that their stereotypes, their fears, their thinking that somehow we had done this and expected the schools, encouraging students to come to Dartmouth would know how to encourage them and explain it well.

We thought, among other things, that Dartmouth might be at a really serious disadvantage--and the consultants told us indeed that was right--if Dartmouth would have more of a male, macho, hard-drinking fraternity, football, up-in-the-woods image, it might make coeducation seem like not as good an idea to women who might think of [us]... We would like women, we said, to compare the Dartmouth experience favorably with the experience of Smith and Vassar and Princeton and Yale, to name only a few. And not to say, “Well, we'll wait for ten years and see how coeducation develops at Dartmouth because it probably won't work. It'll probably only... Females who want to be on Dartmouth's football team will want to go there.” So they did a very good job of recommending, not just the need to create an image, but the need to bring these parts of our system along with us and get their advice.

The women's colleges also. You know one recommendation they made was that very, very quickly there be evident and visible in the administration and in the faculty, senior women. And that we think hard about the possibility of jump-starting the whole process by retaining here as degree candidates, women who were here on what had been an exchange program. And I knew some of those women. They intended, after their junior year, to go back to Smith to get their degree there, or wherever they were going to go back. That was part of the deal. I know you know we had these exchanges going on in the '60's. It

was not just exchanges-- It was exchanges, is what it was [Twelve College Exchange]. And so with a great deal of scrambling and a great deal of care and a great deal of management, we made that option available to students. And very good, strong students decided to take that option and graduate. In '72, I believe it was, they got degrees.

CARROLL: Did you also look at Princeton and Yale to see what they had done and what mistakes they had made?

HENNESSEY: Indeed. Sure. The first question was, what mistakes did they make? And we had trouble... The consultants wormed it out of them. We couldn't have done that as easily. But, yes. “Don't make the mistakes of pandering to women. Don't make the mistake of talking to them as the weaker sex, as the girls. I mean get with it, get with it. And understand that equality and egalitarianism are going to be very important from the start. And it's not going to be a we-they relationship. And don't worry, it's going to be from the start-- If you can handle the absurd reactions of the upperclassmen--and you've got to move in on that right away. We made the mistake at Princeton,” they said, “of thinking that the seniors and the juniors and the sophomores would be—“

[End of Tape 4, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 4, Side B]

CARROLL: ... would be generally welcoming.

HENNESSEY: Well, no. I mean what Princeton said was, "We have student government here, we have the leaders of the world of the future who have bubbled up to be the leaders of their class. And we just have to take them into our offices and confide in them in a gentlemanly way, and we'll know how to welcome this freshman class." What they did not understand was the emotional, deep-rooted macho feelings of all the male students that had been bred into them by the Princeton or Dartmouth experience. And although they were the leaders of the future, they were--and they were wise presidents of Paleopitus and of the senior class--they weren't ready for an initiation of women into that experience. They thought they were, but they weren't.

Nor were the faculty. There, too, Dartmouth was given the advice to be ready for these feisty young faculty, who've said they want coeducation and are all ready for it, are going to be sexists in class. You'd better be ready for that. They'll be sexist without knowing it.

This process of change was one of the most interesting things that the nation went through. And the idea that it can all be done with good

intentions and with the "good old boys" simply being gooder, isn't going to work. And you're going to have to listen to wise women. But another funny thing that's going to happen is, the women are going to be part of the senior councils of the faculty, and of the administration. You're going to-- Princeton and Yale deferred to some of them, saying, "You'll know how to do it. Tell us, and we'll do it." Without realizing that they were a product of these older experiences, too. In a sense, no one was ready for this transformation. Definitely, you're going to have to be, in a word, more thoughtful. And you're going to have to find change agents within the faculty who are going to be willing to have consciousness-raising sessions about all of this, which faculty are not very good at. The best of them are not very good at this.

And John Kemeny was amazed by that, too, because he was not ready to think that the best and the brightest couldn't make these changes very quickly. He was ready to be a defender of the women. His stance was, “my God, they're going to come in, and we're going to have a very good group of women in the entering class--women like my daughter,” who would have been eligible, was eligible, and ended up coming here. As did my daughter, finally, after experimenting with Vassar for a year. “We're going to know how to manage that in every respect.” But he didn't realize the extent to which he was being paternalistic and fatherly.

CARROLL: It's almost inevitable, I believe.

HENNESSEY: I think it was basic. I don't think you're going to escape that. So he, John Kemeny, had to recognize--which he always found it hard to do, I think--that he didn't know quite how to get this off... That he had to rise above some of his own instincts and passions. And John was never easy about those things. He didn't want to be part of a problem; he wanted to be part of the solution, always. He was a very modern man in that respect. But he had a certain solipsistic quality that the questions and answers really started inside his brain. And that he would come up with the right way, using other people well. And so often he did that with great brilliance even on this kind of issue. He had trouble really accepting advice from the consultants, even. He would not have hired consultants if this $100,000 hadn't been forced upon him and he had to do it. He became close friends with the senior part of that team. In fact they remained friends until John died.

CARROLL: That’s wonderful.

HENNESSEY: A wonderful man named Leo Kornfeld who was a principal in Cresap, McCormick & Paget. And became so interested in higher education

through the brilliant and warm affection and relationship that he and John Kemeny developed, that he decided that he wanted to become an administrator. And I think he went to the University of Massachusetts as chancellor or something. He ended up in the Carter administration in the Department of Education running the student loan program, designing it and running it. And he's still extant out there somewhere.

CARROLL: Oh, what a wonderful story.

HENNESSEY: Oh, it was something, really. That was important to John that this very bright guy, coming in as a consultant, could inspire him, and they could invent things together. Take on issues together. And John used Leo for other things after that.

Well, there were other recommendations, but you can see I've only started to pull it apart. One recommendation that was interesting to try to manage, I felt, was that there be someone in the senior administration right away. And Ruth Adams became that person.

CARROLL: And were the faculty in any way given workshops that talked about--or were guidelines written--that were for them on how to incorporate women into their classes? Or was this the great experiment?

HENNESSEY: It was the great experiment. The faculty wanted no guidelines from the stupid consultants or from Parkhurst. I mean we're talking values here. "Are you telling me I will not be fair to women? Are you telling me I won't respect their brains? Are you telling me I'll get enmeshed in love affairs with women in my classes? What are you getting at here? Back off. I'll handle this."

CARROLL: Were any of the older, more entrenched faculty against coeducation?

HENNESSEY: Certainly.

CARROLL: And how were they persuaded?

HENNESSEY: They weren't persuaded.

CARROLL: Oh.

HENNESSEY: They had tenure, and they argued against it [coeducation], and they lost, and they continued to do their thing. Some of them were terribly sexist in their classes. Some of them *overtly* discriminated against women.

CARROLL: I'm sure there was soon a grapevine for the women--

HENNESSEY: You bet. You bet.

CARROLL: --to tell them which ones to avoid, yes?

HENNESSEY: There were faculty that said in class, "You don't belong here, but you're here." Well, that's the real world.

CARROLL: Yes, it is. Unfortunately. With coeducation in place, at a certain point it seems to me, as I read the files, it becomes more mundane, the things they're working out. In the beginning it's the big issues. It becomes pretty soon how many bathrooms and how many bedrooms and where we're going to put them. How much detail did you get involved in in trying to prepare the campus?

HENNESSEY: As a member of the President's Council, I was involved in all those things that came to his office. A lot of things were managed very well by very good people in the dean of the college's office: dormitory arrangements and what kinds of bathrooms. “And will we have to have an all-male dorm, an all-female dorm? Or can we have all mixed dorms right away?” All that got solved, I thought. I was pretty proud of the way it got solved.

But there was a serious, difficult issue boiling along continuously under the surface. And although it might have been expressed from time to time in things more mundane, where it became a more serious issue was around the quality of student life, writ large. And I did get involved in that. And at one point wrote a strong letter myself which ended up being given to--being put on the trustees' agenda, because of my own concern for how we were dealing with the balances that had to be struck between student freedoms and autonomy on the one hand, and respect for modern values on the other. Around the black students, Native American students, and all of that. And then most especially around women and how they were treated.

And what we were going to do with the...almost the crisis we began to feel about the future of Dartmouth. I'm struggling to say it in a way that encompasses everything. But it was the future of Dartmouth on the issue of the Kemeny presidency and where is it taking us? Is it taking us to be one of the most-- We were very visible, and we knew that. We had started Ph.D. programs self-consciously. Kemeny was a part of making them really work. And we were going to become a different Ivy,

but maybe really a small university that was better than the rest in certain very important ways. We had never thought of it that way before. Now we were thinking about it.

But in that conversation, we had to come to grips with the fact that we were still being described on the outside through the “Animal House” image. These fraternities and the drinking and the drugs and the licentious behavior seemed to say, that's the old Dartmouth. And everything is going to have to revolve around and be defined by that eventually. And Kemeny's years were really, I thought, saying in multiple ways, you know, “we're going to have to manage that. Because that is a minor part of the modern Dartmouth. And it may be true of certain traditions of the past. But all that is going to have to change very much in the Kemeny presidency and in what Dartmouth is going to become. And coeducation, the equality between men and women, may be one of the more driving visible ways in which we're going to act all of this out. And, you know, it's looking as if we're being--some of our ideals here are not being lived up to. And maybe we're trying to do too much too soon. Because now we have people asking for women's studies, and we have women coming onto the faculty who may be lesbians. And, I mean, what is happening here?

“And what about the quality of student life, really? Are the fraternities going to bring everything down to a common denominator? Or is the common denominator going to get rid of the fraternities and create a different kind of experience and an arrangement for the nature of commonality on the campus among all these disparate parts?” By then my daughter was a student. And I watched through her eyes the acting out of these dramatic changes.

So there were crises of conscience. And from time to time, groups of students went to see John Kemeny during his office hours--those wonderful office hours, fully free and open to students--and expressed themselves. By then, interestingly, out of the Vietnam and the free speech and the boiling, changing of student-faculty, student-administration relationships, and the giving to students considerable power to shape their own destiny, even in the curriculum, out of which came experimental programs and women's studies and everything else.

You know, there was a time when there was an experimental college in place here, that the students put in place. And the chairman of it was a very interesting, bright young student named Bob Reich [Robert Reich ‘68], who's now the Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration. And Bob Reich blew our minds, is the fact of it, because he said, "We're

going to have our own underground college, and you faculty are just going to have to let us do it." And they put together new courses, and the students went to them, and they had to do with all these very modern things. And I wish I could remember when Bob graduated. But I think he may have graduated in 1970, and went on to become a Rhodes Scholar and all that.

But he was one of a number of student leaders who accepted these challenges, and came into Kemeny's office and said, "You know, we have to do this differently." The faculty then voted one year to abolish the fraternities, out of their anxiety, that we couldn't have a healthy, working women-and-men community and have to put up with this craziness over on Fraternity Row. And so the faculty voted to get rid of fraternities. And that was a big issue. I think that might have been under Dave McLaughlin. [Epperson Proposal 1981]

CARROLL: I'll have to look that one up. I never knew that they actually voted against it. I know there were many commissions voted in to try to deal with the fraternities.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: And to try to change fraternity life. None of which seems to have ever been completely successful, unless this has been degrees of success.

HENNESSEY: You're right, and I'd like to comment about that at some point: The idea that Dave McLaughlin was the perfect president because we went too fast. “It was a dizzying speed in all these crazy American experiments, all this that young people are forcing us to do. And now let's have it all settle down. Let's stop talking about getting rid of fraternities and realize that it's all going to work somehow. And Dave McLaughlin, the former football star, Phi Beta Kappa, deeply-rooted Dartmouth person, he will capture the benefits of this feisty experimenting of the Kemeny time. And he'll be just perfect. After all, he's even chair of the board, so he knows what it's all about.” So yes, it was impossible to have it all happen in a neat clean way. And there were very bad things happening under the surface in terms of men-women relationships. Dartmouth was not an easy place. But, because we had prepared well for it, and we had a determined president and other administrators and faculty who were convinced that even in the marginal decision-making we had to make everyday, we knew how to be sure we did no harm. And we'll probably do it better than some other places.

CARROLL: Well, when you look at the faculty who get hired in this time period, too, there are increasing numbers of women, and there are increasing numbers of blacks who get hired on. And it seems-- I was curious. I was told this was like the tenor of the times before this. But did they come in to mentor these new additions, these diverse additions, to the student body?

HENNESSEY: We certainly hoped that some of that would take place, although we didn't even know what mentoring meant. And we were worried at the thought that those of us on the faculty, believing we could be mentors to women, men, or anybody else, would find ourselves displaced by women brought in somehow to do this. So there was unease there throughout the system about whether we needed women on the faculty to do some special thing. I think we felt we needed women on the faculty because the time had come when women should be present in equal numbers in everything we do: in law, medicine, the professoriate. But getting it to happen, in a healthy way that wouldn't set us back but would get us forward, was a counter-intuitive and very difficult process. One of the best people on the Dartmouth campus, in living through that and providing leadership, was Leonard Rieser. By instinct, by skill, by philosophy, by ethics, he was terrific. He, too, ran into some frightful problems.

CARROLL: With what?

HENNESSEY: With what happened when he did not grant tenure to a woman.

CARROLL: Oh, yes, you told me...several classical cases that always get mentioned.

HENNESSEY: Yeah. One of which I later got involved with myself.

CARROLL: Did you have a harder time at the Tuck School finding qualified women or blacks to hire? And I'm wondering when the first of those were hired at Tuck.

HENNESSEY: We had a much harder time because qualifications for teaching at a graduate management school that prided itself on being in the top rank, qualifications included education in a field where women had almost been excluded. Same for law school, same for medical schools. They were having a very, very--and still are--somewhat slow... And it almost seemed as if we were going to have to wait until our students got their MBA's, and with our encouragement got Ph.D.'s, got some experience. And then came back and got on the faculty. So yes, it was very hard.

CARROLL: Do you remember the first woman faculty member at Tuck?

HENNESSEY: Very well.

CARROLL: Who was that?

HENNESSEY: Well, we tried and struggled very hard for quite some time. And then in 19... I'm going to go back and put on my Tuck hat, which I had on last week.

CARROLL: That's not unfair.

HENNESSEY: Not unfair. But I have to change where I am. Which means, really, almost physically picking myself up and zooming myself down into that other drama, and try to remember. Because it was part of my felt responsibility as dean to see to it that this happened fast. And I brought onto the Tuck board of overseers a Wellesley faculty member [Carolyn Shaw Bell, 1973] who was chairing--who chaired--the newly-appointed, newly-invented Commission on the Status of Women of the American Economic Association. The most visible person I could find to help us bring on change. She was wonderful. But her advice was to be very, very sure that in bringing faculty on board, we brought faculty who would make it and who would be ready. Not faculty who would be in the front window, but who could make it on all counts. That meant that we moved more slowly. We did not bring on--although we thought about doing it--we did not bring on a senior faculty member at Tuck, a woman. Which some of the schools did.

But there were very, very few women who would have been possible at that time as senior faculty members. So we never did that. We then decided as a faculty we'll do it at the entry level. And that meant that the first female faculty member came along in 1972, '3, '4--I'm not sure of the year. I remember the recruitment. I remember the recruitments that failed. I remember the woman we brought in. I remember her extremely well. And I remember all the things we learned from that experience.

CARROLL: What did you learn?

HENNESSEY: Do you mind turning it off, just for a second?

CARROLL: Sure. [Pause]

We were talking about-- You were saying that you would feel comfortable talking about Ruth Adams and her job.

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure. I was delighted when she appeared with the deans around the president's table. I knew about her by reputation. I thought Dartmouth was very fortunate to have her come here. We knew from the consultants that that technique of bringing on board a very distinguished older woman on other campuses had not worked terribly well. We weren't sure if it would work terribly well here because it wasn't clear exactly what she would do. Was she simply a model, or would she take on some very important responsibilities that heretofore had been handled by somebody else? Part of the bringing her on board was to be sure that she was seen as a faculty member, as well as an administrator.

And from the start she was a creditable faculty member, a mentor from the start for administrative and faculty women. And she was a delightfully wise person, for me as a dean, around the decision table in advising the president. I always found her catholic--with a small c--[in her] interests and understandings. She had been an important, impressive college president. I liked her, I liked her freshness, I liked her candor.

CARROLL: She seemed to be very forthright when I talked to her.

HENNESSEY: I'm glad of that. I've not known-- I've never asked her to be forthright with me about her experience. I don't...

CARROLL: But what I'm curious about as well is in these first years, the kinds of problems that you had to deal with that you didn't expect you would.

HENNESSEY: I think the major ones were around the quality of student life on the one hand. The dealing with the fact that we continued to have discrimination and unfair practices within the faculty of a pretty serious kind. And then, managing our conflicting feelings over having women simply come in as equal, as doing everything we've always done, and being accepted in every other way; and then finding them, the best of them, making demands on the situation that we didn't expect them, and certainly at first thought were unacceptable. Like having courses dealing with female subjects, like changing our vocabulary, like, you know, all these things.

CARROLL: Was it a similar situation when the number of blacks increased on campus?

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: How was it different?

HENNESSEY: I think the differences were profoundly more important than the similarities. But whenever I've argued that, I have found friends wanting to say that I am wrong because the root similarity is so profoundly important: which is the equal rights, civil rights, completing the American Dream similarity. I know that, and I very much respect that. But in my dealing day after day after day with the phenomena of the life of Dartmouth College, or my own life, or the life of the nation, I thought it was terribly important to see the differences. And they were profound. They had to do with, number one, human sexuality. The differences between the genders, which are profoundly different from the differences between whites and blacks.

The differences in the nature of the privileges and developed pride and capability and power within the two groups: Women had quite privileged circumstances with respect to their ability to find places where they could be treated in a way that would allow them to develop to their fullest. Smith College was a place where you could do that. Howard University was not, and it isn't today. And the black colleges I visited to recruit Tuck students were not such places. And I knew that. I didn't know how to explain it in a way that was useful because you know how quickly I could be portrayed, where I'd say that, by the blacks, as being wrong. Or by the women as not understanding the situation. But there was a very important difference. Also, there were such differences as the readiness, culturally, of significant numbers of women to come in and do what students do at Dartmouth, and blossom, and change, and love it; and the ability of blacks or Native Americans to do that when every day they felt like second-class citizens.

CARROLL: And was it therefore hard to recruit blacks and Native Americans to Tuck? Or to even Dartmouth?

HENNESSEY: It was much more difficult to recruit blacks, Native Americans, Asian Americans to Tuck than to recruit women. To recruit women meant that we simply had to say, "The door's open. There should never have been discrimination. Our education is your education. Come and get it. And change us in the process. And we'll change with you." I mean we were wrong to think--I was wrong to be willing to go to Harvard Business School when it was all male. I mean, why did that happen? Well, it was America. America was slow to pick this up. But my wife, who was--and is--a very strong woman, a leader in the transformation of America on

value issues, went with me to Harvard in 1948 and was willing to have Harvard Law School say, "Forget it, young lady."

CARROLL: Truly, they would not take her because she was a woman?

HENNESSEY: Correct.

CARROLL: From this perspective today it's hard to imagine how far we've come.

HENNESSEY: Jane, that's a very important statement. It is hard to realize how far we've come. Those of us who've gone through it have just constantly been amazed by the slowness of it all, the difficulties of doing it, the human passions that were pulling things in wild directions. And yet looking back to see how much change.

CARROLL: Just in a lifetime.

HENNESSEY: Yes. Huge, huge change.

CARROLL: Really.

HENNESSEY: My mother was part of the march in New York.

CARROLL: That's fascinating. Tell me.

HENNESSEY: Well, I have feelings about it, but as a senior in college, she marched in the suffragette parade.

CARROLL: Oh, my heavens!

HENNESSEY: And had very deep and strong beliefs and feelings. But how could my mother not have been permitted to vote? She was a senior at Vassar. She went down to New York and wore the banners. But she could not understand it when my daughter--not my wife--said she was not going to accept her husband's last name. My mother in 1917…

[End of session two]

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: October 11, 1996

CARROLL: ...October 11, 1996. I'm speaking with John Hennessey in Baker Library at Dartmouth College. And I wanted to start talking about the expansion of the Tuck School, which began really in the 60's. There was a whole influx--we talked about the introduction of women--and I'm wondering then, there seems to have been an expansion that resulted in the building of new dorms and the Tuck Mall. And what brought that about?

HENNESSEY: There really are two issues. One is expansion, and the other is building buildings. And they weren't tightly linked. The new buildings were required for the modernization, bringing up to our expected level of quality, of the school. And actually, with respect to the dormitories, the reason for expanding had more to do with the mores of young people and the changing percentage of married students versus single students than anything else. Plus the decision--but even that didn't have a direct effect on dorms--that women would live in the same dorms as men would live in. But unless we expanded the total student body, that wouldn't make any difference.

The expansion of the student body was very slow. I mentioned last time that at the same time we were-- Well, what we were doing was managing a very complex transformation process. Because as we engineered and rode the wave of a diminution in the number of applications from Dartmouth, as it became clear that a better way to go to Tuck was not the 3/2 program but to wait a while, "wait until you're a little older and you'll benefit more from it," that meant that we didn't have the volume of students coming right in at the end of junior year. Which meant that the total number of the total Dartmouth complement at Tuck was clearly going to be smaller because we didn't capture them while they were right here. But then the odds that all of those who might have come to Tuck as 3/2 students coming as graduate students were, I don't know, 50%, 40%, whatever.

At the same time that was happening, we also had to guarantee ourselves that in recruiting students from outside Dartmouth, which we began to do in the '60's, and which was a very challenging affair, we had to be sure that we brought in students from those other institutions who could not only hold their own with Dartmouth students but might even be better. Because of the ethic we had in place then that we

should be a national institution. We should not be driven and dominated by the Dartmouth ethic or ethos or style of life. So in expanding, we were not doing it for its own sake. We were doing it to maintain quality and to fill the entering class. And by that I mean we for a long time had felt that the classrooms, the old classrooms we had, that two sections in the first year was probably right. And whereas some faculty said section size of 50, 55 is optimal, others, including I, felt that 60, 65 was fine for using the case method in a creative way. And with that general idea that the faculty had, right on through the '70's and into the '80's--indeed I think into the mid '80's--we stuck with that model of about 120, 125 maximum in each class.

Then the issue was, well, what about facilities? And in the area of facilities we were facing the problem that we didn't have enough dormitory space for all of the single students. And we experienced that in the late '80's. So some of our students... The question is what to do about that if you don't have enough space. And I consulted, early in my deanship, with the students, student leaders. And the idea was, “well, some of the second-year students are sort of tired of dorms anyway. So why don't we give all the second-year students the option to move out?” So they moved into boardinghouses, rooming houses. And some said, "Well, you know, we'd like to do that, but we'd still rather live in a dorm. Why can't we have a dorm?" So a compromise came along I would think maybe in the early '70's, maybe late '60's, was, “let's contract with Dartmouth,” because Dartmouth was at that time having a problem that it had overbuilt its dormitories. And I guess I was in a council with Kemeny where we were discussing this whole mix. And I said, "Well, I've got news for you. Here's a win-win situation. Let us take over a floor of Hinman down in the River Cluster, and maybe tone it up a bit because they're pretty rough. And you give that to us for as long as we need it and as long as you don't need it." So we did that.

But those were all-- We always felt, you know, that's-- It doesn't work well to count on the fact that students will be so tired of living in our dorms, which should be better than that, that they'll want to go off to some other place and live. And the number of married students was decreasing. So we had a smaller core down out in Sachem Village. Our study methods dwelled more and more and more on group work in the '60's and '70's. So another ethic was, you know, “don't we owe it to the students to be able to provide them with attractive dormitory space right here? So that they can work all the time and not have any kind of a walk out to the town where they live and all that.” So we felt under pressure to expand the dormitories.

Now, the pressure was finally expressed in a commitment--and now I'm getting my dates a little straighter--a commitment to build a new dormitory that I am sure happened either in '65 or '66. The ground was broken in '66. The dormitory was ready for occupancy, the new dorm, which we called the Tuck Mall Dormitory [Buchanan Hall], the one that perpendicularly points up to Baker. We opened it in my first year as dean. I remember that distinctly because I presided over the opening. And there it was.

At the same time, we were pushing out for more faculty space and for administrative space. And the moment we began to move into this new dormitory, whammo! We took over two or three rooms here and there and in the other two historic dormitories we had, Chase and Woodbury. And I tried to hold that back for a lot of reasons. But we had committed ourselves to a larger-sized faculty. That was part of expanding our quality. Instead of being a faculty of 18, we thought we could be a faculty of 28 or 30--still, however, relying on tuition income from the 250 or 238 students. Which then meant that I needed to add, as I did, "Well, look, we can start a Tuck Associates Program. It will bring in two, three hundred thousand dollars clear and free for our budget each year. And we'll start alumni fundraising." And before we knew it, we were up to four or five hundred thousand dollars of income from those other sources. Which meant that we could give faculty--not only could we hire more faculty, but we could say to faculty, “one of your terms each year can be spent on research because we have money to support your research, and let's do that. At the same time, of course, we expect you to raise funds outside to supplement this.” So we were on a kind of expansion in all respects, a part of which was the physical plant.

CARROLL: Did you ever have any of the faculty, the older faculty, whom you had to solicit for money, come back to you and say, "You've changed this institution. It's not a Dartmouth institution anymore. Why should I give?"

HENNESSEY: Why should faculty give?

CARROLL: No, why should the older alums?

HENNESSEY: Oh, the alumni. There were a few, but very few. The reason was--the feedback I got was—“that's wonderful. Right on. For the first time, I, a Tuck alumnus from the '20's and '30's, am able to feel that my school is competing head on head with Harvard and Wharton. And the national polls are saying we're-- I mean that's great. Because that pride and that higher status for me as an alumnus, which I enjoy so much, also will mean that your graduates are going to be able to compete with those

other graduates in the marketplace. And we all win. There's a rising tide of the reputation of Tuck School, from which we will all benefit." I don't recall more than one or two crabbed statements about "why--what about the past?"

The only criticism, Jane, that came along--and John Kemeny had to answer this, and I cooperated with him to explain it to him because he didn't fully understand it--was an accusation in the mid '70's that we were driving a stake in the heart of the 3/2 program. We were doing away with it. And the 3/2 alumni, proud of that option, proud in lots of ways of the modern program, and so on and so forth, were saying, "Well, why are you doing that? There are very bright young men and women coming along who are your prime customers. Capture them when you can." And I needed to explain, and I wrote a paper on it, "what that's all about, what's happening, why it's happening, we're not squeezing it, we really aren't squeezing it. But we're setting up a situation in which a lot of elements melding together are making the 3/2 program less attractive to the students, less sensible to the faculty."

By then, the average age of the entering class, by the mid '70's, average age upon entry to the Tuck MBA program was 25, 25-1/2. And it moved on up to 26, 26-1/2. Well, if the average is 25, and the average student is from Oberlin or Stanford or Reed College or Lawrence or MIT, then the Tuck 3/2 student, who wants to come in at age 20 or 19 or 21, is competing with students with whom he or she may not really be ready to compete. Also, we have discovered, through fairly reasonable research--it wasn't true scientific research because it would be very hard to conduct that--but it was our very strong impression as a faculty that students who were getting more out of it--not necessarily doing better in the class, but are getting more out of it--were more mature, more experienced.

So all those things came together so that we were actually advising students: "Look, if you want to come in the 3/2 program, you'll have to go against all this. You'll have to convince us that you're that different student." Every year, three or four students worked their way on in. I just last week was in correspondence with one of them from 20 years ago, who in that letter and every letter he writes to me, "you know, you tried to argue me out of coming, and you put up every barrier. But I came anyway, and look what I've done." And he's a partner in a major consulting firm. So a lot was going on.

CARROLL: When you had to decide to turn to your alums to raise money, did you turn to the development office for some advice? Most of them were also Dartmouth alums.

HENNESSEY: We didn't think it would be wise to ask the Dartmouth alumni development office to do the program. So we said, "You know, you're very used to going out to Dartmouth alumni. Some of you have raised doubts that we can do it in a way that won't injure you. You have a kind of conflict of interest, so that's fine. We will hire our own development people, and we'll do it our way. We think we can be pretty smart about doing all of that, too." They then said, "Well, wait, wait a minute. You're underestimating the professionalism and the difficulty in doing all these things, number one." And right behind that came the statement: "Well, we have to coordinate this. You understand that, John. We've got to coordinate this. We don't want to go down to New York and get in a waiting room to see the president of XYZ television studio, and in there before us is somebody from Tuck. I mean we've got to coordinate, right?"

We said, "Of course we want to coordinate. Not only that, but we respect your professionalism a very great deal, and if we hire somebody, that person will have a dotted-line relationship to you, [Addison] "Ad" Winship, George Colton, Orton ["Ort"] Hicks. We want you to be their mentor on the professional side. But on the program side, whether they're doing a good job or not for Tuck, they report to me; I'm their boss. And they will rise or fall according to my appraisal of their performance, right?" And they said okay. But what that required, of course, was a good bit of respect between me and George, me and Ad, and certainly me and Orton Hicks. Orton Hicks was the grand old man of development. I don't know if you know him or know about him.

CARROLL: His name comes up frequently. I would love to meet him because he permeates the history of Dartmouth.

HENNESSEY: I can tell you so much about him. He was a close friend. And I will also tell you you can't talk to him now. He's over the edge of being able to focus.

CARROLL: What a shame.

HENNESSEY: It's very much too bad. I have been close to him over the last ten years, and I can tell lots of tales about him and his background. He's a Tuck alumnus.

CARROLL: Oh, really! I didn't realize that.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes, 3/2 program. He's Dartmouth Class of '21, Tuck Class of '22. Brilliant career. And then returned here in the late '50's, about the time I arrived. John Dickey brought him back to be the first vice president for development. And when he came back, he was on the Tuck board of overseers. So I've known him all that time. But you'll want, at some time, to focus on Orton Hicks.

CARROLL: I'm going to put a little star here to come back to that. Because he really brings fund-raising at Dartmouth into a new era.

HENNESSEY: He did it better than anybody I know in the world. He was just world class, to use that term. Superb. And the reason was that he wasn't just a technician. He wasn't even just-- He wasn't a professional fund-raiser, he really wasn't. He was a person who loved and loves Dartmouth College more deeply and more intelligently than almost anyone else I've ever met. And who wanted to enrich the lives of [Thomas] Tim Murdough, for example, by letting Tim make an investment here which would fulfill him and help Dartmouth. And he put it that way. And it all happened. He was marvelous.

CARROLL: He must have really invented the whole concept out of whole cloth. I mean when he came, as I understand it, there was very little in place.

HENNESSEY: Yes. There wasn't anything. He did it, and he did it the right way. He did it because he cared. And because of his personality, which is a combination of empathy and sympathy and tough-mindedness. He had this way of approaching people that was most disarming. But he was dogged in his intent to get down to business, push people at the right time and in the right way. Use other people. Just a master.

CARROLL: Did he help you, then, in raising money for the Murdough Center?

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure. I could not have done close to doing that. I mean Ort came down to see me one time to say, "You know, we're talking with Tim Murdough--and he had done this with other major donors--and I'd like you to meet him. But I'm not so sure I want you to meet him because we want Tim to be interested in..." And I forget what it was. I think it had to do with the athletic plant. And I remember I had these marvelous conversations with Ort where I would kid him about, I mean, "Ort, how can you do that? You're a Tuck alumnus. We need two, three, four million bucks to get this building started between Tuck and Thayer. Let

me at least talk to him." And he'd say, "No, no, no, no. There are other things that are more important." And off we'd go.

Then there was a wonderful one day when he came down and said, "Well, I have been thinking about it, and I've talked with Tim and Grace. And they're kind of intrigued by this special opportunity. Why? Well"-- And here's how the subtleties become so important. "Well, you can look out the window, you know, and look down Tuck Drive from Baker Library, which they respect so much. And there's a-- They look into the hills of Vermont, and there's a gap between Tuck on the right and Thayer on the left. And what you want to do--what you've been trying to do all along--is bring those two schools more together: technology and management. And a building right there"-- And Tim said, 'Well, you know, that sounds right. Let's do that. That can be the Murdough Building.'" So that's how those things came about.

CARROLL: Now was he, was Tim Murdough, a Tuck alumnus?

HENNESSEY: No, no.

CARROLL: Just a Dartmouth alumnus.

HENNESSEY: He was a Dartmouth alumnus. He had been the-- I had known about him, and he knew about Tuck and about me, because, you know, not to make this too long, but one of the earlier deans of the Tuck School, Herluf Olsen, O-L-S-E-N-- Herluf was dean in the '30's and part of the '40's. Yes, that's right. I don't remember the dates, but it was that era. He stayed on the faculty. And when I arrived in '57, he and I got to know each other. And he was very much interested in hospital administration and health sciences administration. Had done some work in that area, and knew some people in that field. Through Herluf's connections, four of us on the faculty proposed to the National Institutes of Health and to the public health authority--by whatever name it was going in those days--to do research on the application of modern management science to hospitals and hospital administration, which was a very important, burgeoning field at that time. The arguments fundamentally were, why wouldn't you want a doctor to run a hospital? And the other argument was, why wouldn't you want a professional executive to run a hospital and the doctors doing what they do best? And hospital administration masters' programs were developing for the first time in the late '50's, early '60's.

Well, Tim Murdough was an executive with American Hospital Supply Corporation, one of the very large--and later much larger--hospital

supply organizations, located in Evanston, or around Chicago. So Tim and the American Hospital Supply Company knew what we were doing. We did our research, we published a book on hospital administration. I wrote a paper on it which led to my going out to Chicago to get an award for the article I wrote. And Tim Murdough knew about that. And Herluf Olsen was the one who communicated, and then others did.

Then Mr. [James] Vail, who was the--as I recall it--chairman of the board of American Hospital Supply, got involved in the development of the medical school. And there is, as you may know, a Vail Building down at the medical school. So the Vails--including the Vail son with whom I served on the board of overseers at the medical school for a while, [James] Jim Vail--the Vails made their investment there. So for Tim Murdough, it was natural to say: “The great success of American Hospital Supply is bearing fruit for Dartmouth in one area. But here's another area where the Tuck School has really been interested in management in this hospital realm.” And so that connection was another thing that made Tim think that maybe that would be a good idea.

CARROLL: Now what did the Murdough Center give you at Tuck that you hadn't had before?

HENNESSEY: Well, number one, it gave us a magnificent auditorium: very modern, very different from the cramped, dark little room we were using to gather all the students together, and we really couldn't fit them all into it. So the Cook Auditorium, as part of Murdough Center, was vital. Secondly, it gave us a magnificent, *much* needed library. We had a library that had been in the same quarters for 40 years or so, and was relatively small, to the extent that we had to have some of our important books and serials elsewhere. And as I recall, there was even a section here in Baker Library--although they didn't want to do that, and we didn't either. We were embarrassed that our students couldn't-- We tended to take over faculty offices and try to keep [the collection] all down there. But we were bursting at the seams, and we knew it. And that was a loud lament from the faculty: “We don't have the right library, we don't have enough money for the library to be-- To have everything come up to our status as one of the five or six leading business schools, we have to solve this library problem and soon.”

So that was a very major push. And we got this magnificent library, of which we were very proud from the start. And I promised the faculty that when we got it, not only would it have a lot of extra space, but I would be sure that some of the money we were raising from outside, in

combination with other revenues, would mean that we would never stint on the library budget. Which blew all our minds. “I mean, come on, this is a limited resource, and we can't say we'll never say no.” But I said, "Yes, we're going to start with the proposition that, until we feel we're doing too much, until we can say that we have too good a library."

Because we also-- At that same time, Jane, there was another dynamic involved. And that was, “should we--now that we have expanded the school, enhanced its quality, set in motion 20 different things all of which were moving the school the way we wanted--why shouldn't we give a Ph.D.?” The Dartmouth trustees voted in 1967 or '68 that Dartmouth would go into the Ph.D business, which it had never been in. “And you just have to propose, and maybe it can happen.” Well, we thought in combination with economics and sociology and psychology or maybe by ourselves.
And twice in my deanship we had a special blue-ribbon commission of faculty and others who looked at that. And each time we said no. But each time we said no, I said, "Look, we're going to have our Ph.D. program and eat it, too. I mean we're not going to have any Ph.D. candidates because we've agreed that that's not probably right. That will take our faculty away from sole concentration on our MBA students, who are the best in the world. We're going to maintain that competitive advantage. Come to Tuck, you'll work with our faculty. They're not off on doctors' theses. But, we're going to raise enough money to sponsor enough research. So that any faculty member who wants to propose a high-quality research program will get funding; and enough funding to bring in as visiting faculty members, colleagues in the field you're going to be doing research in who will be better colleagues than doctoral candidates.”

So that was our design. The library, therefore, had to be a key part of that. And that's why we were so excited in 1973 when we dedicated the Murdough Center and the [Stanley and Theodora] Feldberg Library. We raised money in quadrants, in segments. And the library, we attracted Stanley and [Theodora] Feldberg to give the library. They committed $750,000--today you'd probably ask for five million for that kind of library. And I knew them very well. In fact Stanley was the chair of the board of overseers of the Tuck School.

CARROLL: When you built this library and opened it up, was this to be also a drawing card for new faculty, to be able to recruit?

HENNESSEY: Sure. Oh, absolutely. Sure.

CARROLL: Had you had any problems recruiting earlier? In other words, how did the trajectory of recruiting go in your history at Tuck?

HENNESSEY: I wouldn't say that we ever had trouble recruiting. Because I would then have to tell you how I got recruited. I mean there was no trouble in recruiting me or the people who came in--the other people who came in--in the '50's, which was when we did not have the right size library. During the '60's there were times when we had difficulty. As we said, you know, “In this area, at this moment, we'd like to bring in a person who's more researchy than teachy.” Up to then we had said, hiring people like me and Wayne Broehl and [J.] Brian Quinn and others, “we're going to get the whole person who will be able to teach very well, and that's how they're going to live and die. But they'll also have to be scholars so that they can keep up with their field. But they may not be known for their scholarship first. Their scholarship will be an adjunct to their teaching, and partly that's because the field is emerging rather slowly--although there's a lot of promise in it.”
The twinning of management science, the behavioral sciences, and the field of business administration was only beginning to be understood for what it really could promise. And there was still a hesitation, because we made some real mistakes occasionally, to go out and bring in to Tuck someone who didn't know the field of business administration and management. We brought in a psychologist, for example, who lasted a couple of years. Excellent researcher and writer, but never really was credible to the students. The students are very demanding. They come at age 26, they've had responsible positions in excellent firms. They want to meet with faculty who are not just theoreticians, but who know the applications of theory.

But I felt, when I became dean, that if we were going to have the next generation of faculty, whom we deserved and whom we wanted to recruit, and who would act as motivating forces to accelerate the academicization of our faculty, and maybe be the next generation of changing the school even more toward competing directly with the hot-shot researchers wherever they are, the Nobel Prize winners, we have to have a better library. So we gradually came to realize this was a barrier. We were losing some of the better people because all we could say is, "We promise you we'll have this great library."

CARROLL: Now, this is also the same time, in the early '70's, when the computerization of the campus is really taking off.

HENNESSEY: Yeah.

CARROLL: Did you have, as part of your plan, a kind of built-in state-of-the-art computer center?

HENNESSEY: Exactly. I'm so glad you mentioned that. We said just the same thing about computational power. “Dartmouth is pretty good. But Dartmouth is not able, because it's so big, it can't experiment with all the latest things that are coming along. So we're going to build a computer laboratory, and we're going to market it in our development campaign.” And we did. And the family of Robert Bosworth [Robinson Bosworth, Jr. ’37 TU ‘38] gave $250,000 for the Bosworth Computational Laboratory. I'm not even sure I've got the first name straight because I always called him Boz, B-O-Z. And his son came to Tuck, and he was Robert [Robinson Bosworth, 3rd TU’67]. I think the father might have had a different first name.

CARROLL: I can check that.

HENNESSEY: But, in any case, they gave the money for that. And from the first day, when we opened the Murdough Center in June 1973, that became a focal point for new equipment being broken in by our very good students. I mean, we had students who could do anything on computers, even more than the faculty could. We hired a director for that--a very good director--for that laboratory, who of course was tied in directly to Kiewit. Yes, that was another way in which we were very modern.

CARROLL: This building spanned Thayer and Tuck. And what I'm curious about is, what projects grew out of your closer relationship with Thayer?

[End of Tape 5, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 5, Side B]

HENNESSEY: ...back up just a bit, and I'll try to make it very brief. But, Tuck and Thayer had worked together pretty well for a very long time. I told you last time that we had a Tuck-Thayer degree program that people were quite proud of. It was born after World War II. With the advent of Myron Tribus as dean of the Thayer School in probably 1962, '3, '4--I forget the year--he was irreverent about almost everything. He was a wonderful questioner, doubter. And he came in and said, "You know, I think we ought to change everything, don't you? Well, what about this Tuck-Thayer program?" And what he got the Thayer School faculty to do was to say, “you know, we should have more degrees at three levels--baccalaureate, master's, and doctoral. We should have at least two degrees at each level, six-degree program at a minimum. Every one of

them should have built in certain baseline criteria or competencies, and one of them will be management."

He went through all that with his faculty without even letting us at Tuck School know they were talking about it. We didn't know until one of their faculty came over and told us. In other words, he acted as if we didn't exist. And this was part of Karl Hill's problem. Karl was a great gentleman. How do I deal with this upstart, young, brash, modern, pyrotechnic character, who doesn't listen even when I do raise my hand and say, "Wait a minute"? So it became my job then to deal with Myron Tribus. And I rather enjoyed doing that because we had the common need for new space. And my commitment to him was, "I'll work with you, and our two overseers boards will work together here, and from time to time we'll meet together as one board of overseers, to plan the future of our schools, which will result in the need for a new expanded plant. And it will be right in between the two schools. So, look, now we have a real need to cooperate. Because we're both going to have to sign off on every square inch of that building.

"So, okay. Let's get down to brass tacks. What can we do? Well, one thing we ought to do is we ought to have faculty research space in that building, right? Yeah. Well, shall we have the faculty design it together? I'll go back and talk with the faculty about that."
The two faculties, particularly the sharpest youngest people, said, "We're competitors for outside funding, for students, for attention, for Kiewit..." Kiewit thinks that Tuck knows how to do it. But the right theoreticians in electronics, in electromagnetic systems, are over in the Thayer School. There was a wariness about getting too close. Faculty are like that, as you well know. The lines are very sharp, even between segments of the English Department, let alone between English and Romance Languages or between Art and Art History or whatever.

But in working that out, we looked at the Tuck-Thayer program itself, and we decided to change that. I could describe that to you, but I think you're more interested in what were the things that we decided we would do together. Well, we decided that we would--that some faculty--would work closely together, and their research offices would be closer together. "So the northeast wing"--to you it will seem, as you look down at the Murdough Center, to be the north wing; it's pointed toward Baker—"on the third floor, those will be Tuck hideaway research studies, and there will be 12 of them. I mean this is really big time. We're now going to give faculty two offices. If you're doing research, you can have your own research office up there with no phone, but you have your computer. And now going down the western wing pointed

south, will be the Thayer faculty. And we'll have common space with a coffee machine and a nice place to sit, and we'll see what happens. And if faculty get together, and like each other, and want to bid for offices beside each other, won't that be great? But we'll wait until they decide to do that.

“It's going to be a faculty-driven program of bringing the two schools closer together around intellectual pursuits. The deans are not going to say it, because the minute the deans say it, or the minute the board of overseers, or the minute anybody else says, ‘You've got to get together,’ the faculty would say, ‘Forget it. We're scholars first and Tuck faculty second. And we're going to be true to our discipline.’" In the teaching area-- Then we also built-- We needed badly--and I didn't mention this because it's so obvious--we needed marvelous new classrooms with the latest in audiovisual capacity, computer displays. And we built three classrooms, each for a quarter of a million dollars, which we sold to three alumni, and they're still down there and still working very well. They were the most attractive by far of the classrooms on this whole campus. I almost think today they still are. So that was very important.

And we said to the Thayer School, you know-- We had to have a planning committee because everything that we shared ran the risk of being an area of dispute. So how do the classrooms get scheduled? The Thayer faculty say, "We want to use it Tuesdays from ten to twelve, and that's it? Is it first come, first served?" And we agreed, because of the strong press of the Tuck School, the Tuck faculty, the Tuck administration, four new classrooms which the Thayer School faculty had not pressed for. We agreed “those are Tuck, and they'll be scheduled by Tuck School. And obviously Tuck has first call. But be our guest when we're not using them.” Cook Auditorium we agreed would be scheduled for Tuck and Thayer, first come, first served. And then very quickly we agreed to the Arts and Sciences faculty, “sure, you have a large class and want to use it.” And so on. So we had to work out--we had to have infrastructure people and processes and rules for decision-making about how that building would serve the best interests of both. The cooperation, the pure cooperation, occurred in the library. Where we had infinite space and infinite money, we'll just do it. And that worked very well.

CARROLL: So there were research projects between the two schools? Were there also team-taught courses between the two? Or did they keep the curricula as separate?

HENNESSEY: I preached--rarely preached--but one thing I preached was that if our faculty is going to use colleagues, experts, scholars, or teachers from outside Tuck School to enhance the quality of a particular class session or segment of a course or a course, because of a visiting term, we will first look at Thayer School. First look at Thayer School. Secondly we'll look at the rest of this campus. And then we'll look outside. Faculty said, "Come on, come on, I know who I want." And I said, "Yes, that's true. But promise me that you'll go through my process. Because if you don't do that, eventually we're going to make a real error. Number one, we're going to say we don't care who's recruited by Thayer because we're never going to use them whoever they are. And secondly, we'll overlook someone who is there and could be very helpful. And thirdly, we will avoid--at our own peril--the possibility that the jointness, the working together, someone at Thayer and someone at Tuck, because of their propinquity, may result in some discovery, some new way of teaching that really couldn't happen any other way." So I tried to take that sort of policy approach to it, and it worked-- It did not work well, Jane. You know what I'm telling you is the way I went at it. But it didn't work well. There remained a disdainful distancing of faculty across the gulf between the two schools. It seemed almost to have to do with the mentality, the intellectual style, of the people at Thayer School. Driven by the engineering, engineering science ideas about everything: how you do research, where your roots are in research back into physics and math, and how you treat students frankly. They were far less accommodating to their students. They cared less about their reputation. As far as they were concerned, students come, students go, and they didn't have to recruit students. We were in the business of attracting students from all over the world. So we dealt with our students in a customer-friendly way, even though we had a lot of rigor in what we did. But we weren't about to have an admissions office or a placement office or a librarian who would be rude to students. Thayer didn't care. I say that on tape, and I'll defend it.

And even in the library--I could tell you stories about that. I have things on file. But I ended up being the dean who sort of chaired the joint library committee because the Thayer School cared only that there were certain books there and certain journals. But when it came to policy and user-friendly environment, it turned out only I cared. And I battled Baker on some pretty fundamental issues. In my last year of deanship I got into quite a distinct argument with the librarian of Baker Library. And only grudgingly did I get the Thayer School dean to join me and write a joint letter. He preferred not to get in the line of fire because he wanted other things from the library. So politically he wasn't too sure he wanted to join me. I say that only to illustrate that although the

building was shared, the lives of the two schools were intertwined, on any particular issue it almost had to be managed because there wasn't any natural--or there was very little--natural joining together. At the dedication in June of 1973 we spoke boldly about the merging of the spirit, contact of these schools, these faculties. But that isn't what happened.

CARROLL: This is switching just a bit. I'm talking about Tuck still a little bit. But what I'm wondering is throughout--and I know you still kept in touch with Tuck throughout the late '70's and the '80's, there seems to have been in business schools a great surge; it became very popular.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: How did you deal with that? Did you make changes in the structure of Tuck or the numbers that were accepted?

HENNESSEY: No. What happened was that the business schools, particularly in the '70's-- As a matter of fact, it was during the era of my being on the board of the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business. I was on the board from '72 to '78. What we experienced was, every year a boom in applications. But that was true at the undergraduate level as well as the graduate level. It came--the high water mark, I think, was 1974 or '5 when 27 or 28 percent of the undergraduates on American campuses, on *all* American campuses put together, 27 percent were business majors. Now that's a huge, huge number. In addition, MBA programs were very much more popular because by then, businesses were beginning and consulting organizations were beginning to realize that the best and the brightest--crudely said--were coming out of the MBA programs.

The MBA programs were really doing a great job. Did they mean we were doing a great job of education? I would like to think so. But what they really meant was, the students they wanted were coming out of MBA programs. They were the students who had maybe left-- They'd gone to Booz Allen or to IBM after graduating from Dartmouth at age 22, knowing they ought to get some experience. And they came back to Tuck or Wharton at age 26, and now they had to get them back. And students knew that to be promoted--they were beginning to see the career path in GE and Westinghouse was to get your MBA, come back, and then you could really go. So the MBA was far more attractive.

But the statistic that I followed was the number of students, the number of people who took the Graduate Management Admission Test, which was by then, in the '70's, required in all the competitive schools--which

meant the 25 business schools, undergraduate level, that were really competitive and weren't admitting almost anybody who applied. And I had been part of creating the test. I was on the--starting in 1961-62, I was Tuck's delegate to a planning group at the Educational Testing Service to create and enhance the Graduate Management Admission Test. Which, like the SAT, would be designed by psychometricians specifically to have the highest possible correlation with success in the first year of the master's program. Just like the SAT is designed to correlate as highly as possible with the first year of undergraduate education. That led to my being on the policy study--the policy committee--and then I chaired the Policy Committee of the Executive Committee of the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business [AACSB] on the relationship of the GMAT.

Then when I became the president of AACSB, I was nominated by ETS--and now I've just retired--to be a trustee of the Educational Testing Service. And I served as a trustee, as chairman of the Educational Testing Service over an eight-year span. So that's another part of my career. Starting in '76, suddenly I was an ETS trustee, no longer a business school person. So I can tell you those statistics, I followed them for all those reasons, the statistic was vastly impressive as to how many of these people were taking the test. What did we do at Tuck to adapt to that? We watched our average GMAT score go up. That simple. We didn't say, “okay, so we'll take more students.”

CARROLL: What I'm wondering, too, is when you taught these students or handled them, was there a vast difference in the quality of the students you were getting in the late '70's from what you had gotten in the '60's?

HENNESSEY: Interesting question and a very good one. I remember yesterday the discussion on the radio, the oral history people saying, you know, that one of our great skills is the kind of question we ask and when we ask it. That's a perceptive question.

The important thing to say, Jane, is the quality of the Tuck student body when I arrived in 1957 was very impressive. Now, 70% of the students in my first-year required course were Dartmouth seniors on the 3/2 program. They were darned good. Their average quality was probably as high as any average quality of sheer brain power, intellectual acuity, of any class Tuck has ever had since. Now, that's a radical statement for me to make, but I'm making it as sort of a debating point: who can tell me if that is true? In terms of sophistication, the ability to use their brain power in a creative, imaginative, problem-solving way, to develop wisdom during the MBA program? No, they weren't as mature, of

course. But good students, yes. Give them two days to write a 3,000-word paper on anything? Never mind. They'll stay up for three days, three nights, and do it, and it'll be very, very good.

However, in terms of motivation, getting the most out of their brainpower, there was a span-- I found that the morale and the motivation of the Tuck student body in the first-year program when I started in '57, was not nearly as high and cohesive--that is, binding--as it was later on. Because these were students who were still in the fraternities, they were still taking ROTC and Great Issues. Some of them were wondering, “do I want this or don't I?” Later on, the coherence and cohesion around a common style, a common ethos, meant that you had the feeling that students were getting more out of it and putting more into it.

Now, another thing to say: As we began to recruit more students from outside and see a diminishing of the 3/2 students, we had more of a span of quality in the students coming from other schools at the start than we had as we fine-tuned it, for a number of reasons. One, we wanted to break the ice with schools where we had never recruited any students to Tuck. I could name schools that we were determined to break into. Now the trick there was--

CARROLL: Give me a few. Just give me--

HENNESSEY: Well, my beat was Harvard, Yale, Princeton, MIT. And we only had a few students there, if any, from those schools for the history of Tuck. So I can speak from my own agony over how to do this. Because I'd not be willing to say to Princeton students, my own alma mater, “you know, why don't you think about Tuck if you can't get into Harvard?” I didn't say that, I didn't believe that. I believed my mission was to show them that these are two utterly different models. And that I think, depending on your style of learning, your readiness to accommodate to the particular culture of these two schools, you should consider Tuck. Some of you should consider Tuck rather than Harvard,” which I knew very well from being an alumnus from Harvard. I would often, with the students I interviewed at Princeton--and of course I interviewed faculty and administrators, too--to try to get them to understand what the modern Tuck School was all about--I would often say, "Let me tell you what I think the distinctive styles and the different cultures are of Tuck on the one hand, Harvard on the other."

I am loyal to Harvard. That's my MBA program. I'm not going to knock it. And I never did, I never would. But it's very different. The first year is 750 students. When I went there it had 750. It has 800 today. It's never varied much. You're lost in a sea of students. You live all over the place. There's no cohesive-- If you're not ready for that, if you don't want that, Tuck may be a very different, more accommodating place. Also, frankly, it has something to do with your lifestyle as a newly married couple. And then I would say, “you know, if you haven't lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and if your spouse hasn't lived there, this may be your one time. So think about it. That'll be very different from living in this small town.”

But what I'm trying to say in a long-winded way, but all of this is rather-- We weren't willing to admit to Tuck students who couldn't do well in the program--from Princeton or anywhere else. But we probably took more of a chance to break the ice and get the flow started, but not too much of a chance. There's a fine distinction. And then as we got it going, and as the reputation took over, of the school, that drove it. Then we had students, knowing Tuck alumni, saying--from Princeton, Harvard, other places--"That's where I want to go."

CARROLL: I've been reading a little bit about the history of education in business schools in general. And it's my understanding in the '70's there were two basic models: There was the case study model that was a Harvard model. And then there was the Wharton, more analytical and number-crunching model, is the way it was explained. I shouldn't say explained--the way I understood it from this book. And I was wondering, (a) is that true? and (b) then what did Tuck decide to do?

HENNESSEY: Well, (a) is not true. But, Jane, it was common that those were the caricatures. People have a need to describe an institution of higher

learning in one sentence. Or in an epithet. It's the American game. Tell me what you think about Smith. Compare Smith to Yale. Compare Yale to Dartmouth. I mean you've got to have some fun. Dartmouth, it's up in the woods, right? And it's more outdoorsy. Or it's the more drinking place. I, as a person who is a professional faculty member and administrator inside institutions, and have cared a lot about analysis and policy, found it my duty to say, "Enough already with these headlines. They say nothing. They mislead atrociously. They're almost like characterizing Jane Carroll in one sentence. And that's awful! Why would you do that? They lead to stereotypes, and they lead to the wrong impressions. And it will block your real understanding."

"So come with me, dear Applicant to Tuck School, beyond the stereotype you've just told me you have." Every time I sat down with a student at Princeton, Harvard, Yale or MIT, they'd say that: Tell me again. Why would they say it? Because their advisors said it. Why did their advisors say it? Because they read it in Newsweek or somewhere. Or in these books that try to-- I knew, from having friends in all the schools, and having visited them all, and caring a very great deal about whether Tuck was developing all by itself down some crazy lone-wolf path, or whether we were using the best wisdom of all the other schools to design the way we wanted to go.

The one characterization that captured a school properly, the only one, was to say Harvard was case method. That meant different things to different people. But the difference in our business school from almost all the other schools was that they said, “Nothing matters more to us than protecting, defending, and nurturing the case method of study.” I say that deliberately. That that was driving, defining ethic. “Everything else follows: how we hire faculty, how we teach, how we think, how we do our research.” That case method approach came out of the history of the development of professional schools in Cambridge at Harvard. Harvard Business School was founded in 1908. Going back into their history, as I've often done, it's fascinating to see the extent to which the founders of the business school thought of the law school and the medical school particularly, about the need to understand that professional schools are above all places to prepare bright, well-educated arts and science graduates to be able to use their power on-site in the patient's room, on the floor of the legislature, or in the courtroom.

“We're going to think of business education in a similar way. Rather than simply going out and bringing in business people to lecture about what business is all about, let's put business under a kind of

microscope by going out to do what was done in medicine way back at the time of Hippocrates, which was to use--instead of just lecturing about how physicians (and there were some before Hippocrates), how they did their work, let's look at patients and write down what we see. Let's record notes about the difference, the phenomena that are in front of us. And then out of that begin slowly to piece together a science of how we classify and catalog and respond to these phenomena. Rather than just living life and doing what you think is right, which is what a nonscientific approach does." Legal people were saying a similar thing. "Rather just using common sense, let's look at phenomena"--and they were doing it in the law schools. Well, business... It was a wonderful thing what Harvard did. Business education grew up, then, not necessarily with business people as the faculty. See, law and medicine, then, and almost still now--well, not really now, but to some extent now--brought excellent practitioners back to be in the classroom, and just do it. There's more to say than that, but-- What Harvard did was to say: "We're going to establish a method of inquiry that will be interesting to the philosophers and the faculty in general at Harvard as they take under their consideration the question: How do people think most effectively about the application of science and social science at the point where it's going to make a difference?"

So the kind of cases they wrote were fascinating and, I think, evocative types of cases. And it became so successful as a pedagogical technique, but so difficult to use well--including the difficulty of collecting cases in a wise and useful way. It doesn't mean you just go out and have somebody say, "Here's what we do." It was a kind of sophisticated oral history not done by the practitioners; but done by sophisticated oral historians who cared about the history not just about the phenomena that people were talking about.

So by the '30's there was in place a faculty at the Harvard Business School who were respected across the campus, who were doing something very exciting, and doing it differently. Books were published by philosophers. Whitehead got interested—Thomas [Alfred] North Whitehead got interested. Lawrence Henderson got interested. George Homans in sociology got interested.

When I went through the MBA program, I became very aware of these deep intellectual roots at a high level of quality. And I became so committed to the case study method as an antidote to other styles of learning, teaching, and discourse with which I had become acquainted in my life to date, that I changed my own life, in a rather fundamental way, around this new approach to human inquiry and teaching. And I

became dedicated to the idea of being a case method teacher, and I always have been. That's what I have always done. And will. (In another couple of weeks I'm going to be teaching). But a case that brings the students into a situation that I know is valid, out of which they will develop their own skill in asking questions, and inquiring to see how we get the answers, so...

Now that-- I was asked to come to Tuck-- I was invited by Karl Hill to come to Tuck to bring that to Tuck, the Harvard Business School modern approach. And he said, “you know, we're going to be hiring a couple of other people in your year.” My question to Karl was, "Do you want to turn Tuck into a Harvard Business School? Is that our future?" I was entertaining the idea that maybe that was a good idea.

I had been recruited from Harvard Business School by the University of Washington to help them build a Harvard clone at the University of Washington. That's why I went there. At the same time, I was recruited by the University of Western Ontario in Canada to do the same thing. Because they had decided: This was what we want, that's going to be our future. There was an interest in America at that time--in the late '50's, early '60's, or something--there may have been ten, 12 places that said, “We want to be Harvard Business School. Forget anything else; that's what we want to be.” What about the other schools? The other important places where there were arguments going on about how we do this were the University of Chicago and Wharton. They were the--

[End of Tape 5, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 6, Side A]

HENNESSEY: The three different models I thought, in addition to Tuck, were Chicago, Wharton, and Harvard. And they tended also to be three schools in which students I was talking to at Princeton, Harvard, Yale, MIT, were interested. So that they were interested in having me compare them, and they always started with their own comparison. Fact is, I knew that the University of Chicago was far more driven by an economic, theoretic approach than any of the other business schools. Chicago's MBA program in those days was almost entirely a first-class, excellent graduate program in applied economics. That's what it was. You had to be a highly respected economics theoretician, scholar, to be on the MBA faculty there.

Number two, I knew that their students had revolted in the 50’s, early 60’s--during the 60’s--over the lack of any opportunity to think through practical applications. Their faculty were disdainful. "Young

man, how could you possibly worry while you're here in this fermenting place of intellectual distinction, the greatest place in the world for brainpower? How could you worry about what you're going to do when you get on the job? Forget it! Discipline your mind according to driving yourself down these theoretical lines, and that will make you the better person." [The students] said, "We need some opportunity to do here, while we're on this campus, what we're going to have to do on the first day on the job. Which is to say, 'Yes, I think I know what you mean about this practical problem, but I'm not sure. But let me tell you about economic theory because...'" They begin--they run into problems with that. So they demanded a couple of courses in applications.

Chicago, hat in hand, went to Harvard--and one of them came to Tuck--and said, "What's this case method? I mean, come on, how can we do this?" There was one wonderful fellow who became for a short time the dean of Chicago's Business School, whom several of us got to know very well, and we invited him to come to Tuck. After he was dean, we invited him several times to come and teach at Tuck. Because he developed a business policy course using Harvard Business School cases. And that was the first crack in the armor of Chicago. But whenever they could, Chicago, from then on, including today, stepped back, saying, "Well, maybe we have to do that, but let's do the minimal amount of it." They still feel that way. Obviously there are some shadings of difference.

They did hire some faculty after that who could combine--one of the marvelous people they hired was one of my favorite students from Tuck, who wanted to get a Ph.D. at Chicago and stayed on and taught there. In fact two of my Tuck students went on to teach at the University of Chicago. One of them was because in two fields Chicago said, “we won't teach at all, because economics has nothing to do with that.” Or has very little to do with it. One is marketing. “Who cares about marketing? That's psychology of individual decision-making. That's really applied psychology of consumer thinking or something, and we don't want to have anything to do with that.” Well, their students demanded that they do it. And to teach marketing, they hired--and he's still there--a Tuck alumnus who went on and got his Ph.D. in marketing.

The other area where they had to compromise a bit was in the behavioral sciences, where they had to put together some courses that showed how do you apply the behavioral sciences in building and motivating and organization. So that was Chicago. I still think of them that way, and they are different in that respect, very importantly different. If you'd look over the history of the Nobel Prizes in Economics,

most of the Nobel Prizes have come from the Chicago Economics Department. And many of them have joint appointments in the Business School.

Wharton was very different. For one thing, Wharton thrived on a really very big undergraduate program. Had one; still has one. Very different. Harvard never had an undergraduate program; Tuck never had one; Chicago never had one. So that makes Wharton distinct and different. And a very different kind of faculty. They were also the biggest school at the undergraduate level until later when some of the state schools took over. And they were the second biggest at the master's level. They had an MBA program of 1100 students, which is almost as big as Harvard's 1500. And vastly bigger than Chicago or Tuck.

So they had to have--they had to have more faculty, diverse student body. They had older students because they're in an urban area. They were eclectic. They really didn't care almost what teaching style would be used. They were far more faculty-driven. And they put together a faculty that were good, but they had to serve a huge number of students, lots of programs. And it was more of a mixture. Quality they cared about, and that was what drove them. “Let's be good, and let's be sure that our students are ready for their first job. But if we have some teachers who are very good at doing that through lectures, that's fine. If we want to recruit some people up from Chicago to spice up our research program, let's do that.”

It turned out that one of their distinctive qualities was they built a research capacity, research program, to fuel their Ph.D. program, which they wanted to where they were competing also with Chicago and Columbia. They weren't competing much with Harvard because Harvard didn't have a Ph.D. program. Harvard had a Doctor of Business Administration Program. To illustrate their approach was so different, the DBA was to be the doctoral program that was not governed by the strictures and policies of the total faculty. If you had a Ph.D. program at Harvard or any other university, the Ph.D. program had to be approved by the general faculty. Which meant at Chicago their Ph.D. program was driven by the theoretical proclivities of the Arts & Sciences Faculty. And they never could have had an applied program.

At Harvard, there's no way Harvard Business School could have produced a Ph.D. program that then had to be approved by the Arts & Sciences faculty. So they said, “well, from the start, we'll develop our own.” In fact, when they developed their doctoral program in 1912, it was a Doctor of Commercial Science (DCS). And it was only in the 50’s

or 60's...And as a matter of fact, the [original] master's degree at Tuck was an MCS, Master of Commercial Science. And only later did "BA" compete with "CS" and then...[Tuck changed its MCS to an MBA in the 1950's. Later it gave MCS degree-holders an opportunity to convert their diplomas to MBA ones.] But Harvard retained its doctoral program. They once changed the title from Doctor of Commercial Science (it was in the 50's) to Doctor of Business Administration. But they continued their own doctoral program. And at the dissertation level, it meant writing cases, superb, path-breaking cases. And being examined only by the Business School faculty.

CARROLL: Does anyone else do that?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Ten other schools do it. Fundamentally, the schools that modeled themselves on Harvard. And were convinced, as I was, that it made a lot more sense for the excellent business school to design its own Ph.D. program than to have to design your Ph.D. program that first of all would require two foreign languages. Who cares about foreign languages as research tools in the business school? One of the foreign languages should be computer, the computer languages. And who cares about having on the dissertation committee, a philosopher and an English professor? I mean the archaic, torturous requirements laid down by Arts & Sciences faculty for their doctoral programs, which looked as if they had been invented in the year 1250--and some of them had been and had never changed. It seemed sadistic--and are at times sadistic--they're almost uncontrollable in their strange behavior from time to time, depending on who's on the committee. "We're more mature than that. Let's do our own. And it'll be akin to the doctor's degree." The law schools finally decided they should have the JD rather than the LLB. And it'll be something like the MD after internship and residency and so on.

So Tuck, when it thought about having a doctoral program, had to choose between DBA and Ph.D. What we did at...But Wharton had chosen the Ph.D. program. So as they attracted faculty who were capable of operating in a PhD program, they built with huge numbers of students and lots of money, they built research-driven institutes on quantitative financial models or whatever it might be. They got people to give money for those things. And that meant that they were very large, very diverse. And as a student, you might run into a Nobel Laureate--and there were a couple--who have come out of economics and really aren't teaching much, but they're doing their research.

Tuck was different in that we said, we--I, John Hennessey--respected the case method more than anything else I've run into in my intellectual life. A very powerful way of thinking and living. “But I don't think Tuck should be a clone of Harvard. I don't think we should be a clone of anybody. I think we should realize our best potential. And we should change our skin from time to time as we outgrow our old skin. As we bring in more academically-oriented, research-oriented people who can teach but maybe want to spend more time in research, that's going to change us. But we're going to have to promise--as we promised in research--that we'd have a critical mass of faculty and all the money we needed. And we were going to do it right. We have to guarantee ourselves that we'll have some quality control over the students' experience in our master's program. And that's going to be our only educational program. So we'll be unique. No other--no other--university in the country will have, will sponsor management education only at the master's level. We're unique. So let's let that flower.

“And out of that--to do that well, from time to time we have to maybe change our balance of case method versus theoretically-oriented versus computer modeling versus behavioral sciences. Let's just keep that blend, but in a critical way, and constantly be looking at outcomes as to what the quality of our program is.” And I think that's why the Tuck MBA program became so well known and so favored. There was one year when in one of the national polls we ranked one. When the quality control was students and alumni reporting on the quality of the educational experience, we ranked number one. Because that's what we really cared about. Our faculty had to serve that. Our faculty served the students. And that was different from saying our faculty will serve the case method or some other method or research or anything else.

CARROLL: Was there any grumbling in the faculty at the decision not to offer a Ph.D.?

HENNESSEY: Well, Jane, again a very good question. We were a small--and during my deanship maybe we--average number of faculty to 28, 30. There are a number of departments at Dartmouth that are bigger than that. We knew each other very well. We worked long and hard together on all things. And at the level of the proposal for a doctoral work--a doctoral program was proposed. I resolved in my mind to manage that process in a way that would bring us out in a win-win situation, whatever we decided. You see, to ask the question was to suggest that there were going to be winners and losers. There were going to be those who say, yes, let's have one. And there were going to be those who say, no, we shouldn't. So the idea was not should we have a doctoral program or

not. That wasn't the driving thing. “What can we do to improve Tuck School for the long run? We certainly don't want to have a doctoral program unless that improves the quality of faculty in a way that will improve the MBA program.”

So we held ourselves to those issues. And looked for a model of a Ph.D. program that would maximize the things that were important to us. And we literally never found it. But when a faculty group said, “I think we've got it. Yes, I think we have it.” We gave them months of an opportunity to try to convince us. And only in the end, almost using the case method, did we try to conclude. And by that time that group of faculty had themselves said, “okay, I think, you know, it isn't going to work. We can't quite do it.”

CARROLL: That is so clever. I really think that's a wonderful--it's all in how you phrase the question.

HENNESSEY: Absolutely.

CARROLL: I wanted to move into Kemeny's relationship with Tuck, unless there’s something else you want to--

HENNESSEY: No, I'd love to do that because...And I should mention, when I talked about the Murdough Center, I forgot to mention John Kemeny. He was much involved with that. I mean that was the first three years of his presidency, that was one of the big things going on. And he helped us to dedicate it.

CARROLL: So when did your working relationship with John Kemeny begin?

HENNESSEY: Well, last time I led you into our relationship and what we had done before he became president. But after he became president, we immediately developed a relationship because I was suddenly--in his empire, I was a dean. So that's one of the first--and as I told you, the first thing in that was he told me to give him an MBA in one week.

CARROLL: So typical. When you were working with him, was the first large project that you worked on together the Murdough Center?

HENNESSEY: Well, let's look at my outline here and see. Now, there are things in '70, and there's things in '71.

CARROLL: Oh, the first thing seems to be when you worked on the Copenhaver Commission on the organization of the faculty.

HENNESSEY: Yes, I was. In his first four weeks as being president, he decided to--in fact, I think it was his first announcement, maybe in his second week of his presidency…

CARROLL: What was he looking for in that committee?

HENNESSEY: A number of us felt--a number of us felt--that Dartmouth College was not organized in an optimal way. Why did we feel that? Because there was no faculty at Dartmouth College. There was no artifact out there, no body of people that you could say is the faculty, and that you could have a meeting, and you know how to preside over it. What we had was a faculty that was the Faculty of Arts & Sciences. And that faculty meeting was chaired not by the dean of Arts & Sciences, but by the president of Dartmouth College. And throughout the history of Dartmouth, the president of Dartmouth College had presided at the meetings of the Faculty of Arts & Sciences. The Tuck School Faculty was called "adjunct," "associated school." That language was used. Medical school, similar way. These people were somehow cousins but not children in the family. And all of us who arrived after World War II and got to know John Dickey and got to know Don Morrison, believed that that had to change. But we knew it was going to be slow. We had to earn our way into the conversation. We had to show that we were important to the life of the general faculty, that we had something precious to add.

Well, John Dickey didn't particularly want to take on the organizational challenge as to how we would do this. I mean what do you then do to create the sense of general faculty? His attitude, as he explained it to me, was: "Let's let this grow. Let's see what happens. And big issues that are coming along always seem to be undergraduate issues. I mean that's where I, John Dickey, am spending my time. That's how I am known around the country. My article in The Atlantic, 'On Conscience and Competence,' defines me, with the picture on the front of The Atlantic with my dog in my office. It's an undergraduate college that I'm the president of. That's who I think I am."

As John Kemeny came along--as we searched for John Dickey's successor, I testified to the committee that was looking, that was defining the presidency in 1967-68--and some of those people are still around, I say, because not all of them are--that committee's job was to define the presidency before the search committee found one. And I remember very well my two hours with that group, saying, "You know, the time has come when the presidency is going to be president of

Dartmouth University, not Dartmouth College. And some very important things are going to happen in medicine, business, engineering. I can tell you at Tuck School we're doing things that are going to intersect with and intertwine with the future of Dartmouth. And the president has to be our president, too. We're not adjunct, we're not associated. We're Dartmouth's professional school."

And out of that--and I remember a couple of people afterwards saying, "Wow, we hadn't heard that before. Is that right? You're called an associated school?" And after that there was a kind of resolution that, in seeking a president, we would describe this place more like a mini--like a university with a small U that would always be called "Dartmouth College." Remember, the faculty had convinced the trustees in 1967 to vote to establish Ph.D. programs. If you're going to have Ph.D. programs, you're not a college. If you're going to have Ph.D. programs and an MBA program and an MD program, which it looked might come back in play then, again, you're not a college. You're a university. I knew, from reading my Dartmouth history, and felt passionately, that Dartmouth should never change its name. That would be wrong, a real mistake. It always ought to be Dartmouth College. Because of the Dartmouth university battle in the early 19th century that was finally won before the Supreme Court by Daniel Webster's oratory. So it had to remain Dartmouth College. Well, that I understood. But we should conceive of it and understand it to be a small U university.

So in seeking the president, one of our charges to the new president was: “We expect you to have some ideas about what to do to celebrate the fact that this has become a small U university.” And Kemeny from the start was harmonic with that. He said, "You're right. That's my feeling, that's the kind of university..." And coming from the Princeton model, which he respected a very great deal--he had two degrees from Princeton--he was ready to explore it. So one of the things he and I talked about, when we were talking about what he would do as president to manage it--one of the illustrations I used in trying to help John to think about what he might have to do as manager before he became president, was to take that example. “You're going to be managing a large complex institution, which is now not set up in a way that will allow you to do that. We don't even have a general faculty. We certainly don't have any way to gather faculty of the university around common issues. I mean the budget of this place certainly ought to be a budget that everybody cares about. Honorary degrees: I mean let's--an honorary degree should be nominated. The honorads should be proposed by the whole faculty, not by the Faculty of Arts & Sciences. That's ridiculous. I mean at the commencement, we give MD's--I mean

we're going to be giving them. We give MBA's, we give a Ph.D." So John said, "You're right. We'll set up a commission." He set up the Copenhaver Commission, and he had that ready to go before he was inaugurated. And it chose people from all over the campus. John Copenhaver chaired the whole commission. He broke it down into smaller groups. And I was on all these--I worked on the commission.

CARROLL: Of the major suggestions that came out of that commission, what were some of the ones that you remember that were put in place?

HENNESSEY: Well, I got very involved in it because I'm a student of organizations. And we visited other campuses. We were very taken by Princeton, oddly enough. Princeton's modernization... [Break in recording] The reason I wanted you to turn over is that's a very important intertwining of strands. You asked what do I remember most about the model. But to describe that, I have to tell you part of what was happening. See, in looking around for other models, we were looking at universities that had been very much changed by the 60's. What do I mean? The 60's, as I described last time, were a time of great ferment on campuses. And one of the results of the ferment, among others (and there were permanent changes in universities), was an agreement that there would be more conscious democracy in decision-making. The faculty would find ways to be involved, but so would staff, so would students, so would alumni. These were new entitlements that people were feeling, particularly students. "We want to be part of the action. We want to talk about these things." And that was--we all felt it in America. The time had come when everything--the parent-child relationship, the superior-subordinate relationship, the trustees' relationship to the faculty--suddenly there was a voice coming back up, "We want part of this process."

So, Princeton had put in place a set of governing councils that had on them students and alumni and staff and faculty. What kinds of councils? The Council on Budgets and Priorities, meaning that this 17-person body consisting of all these odd folks who'd never been part of budget-making at all. Budgets had always been the president does something, and the deans react, and the treasurer says, "Forget it. Here's the way we're going to do it." Now it was a whole new organism, a whole new plant, a whole new growth, a whole new fermenting of decisions in a new fashion. Well, we were pretty much taken with the Princeton model, and they had it in writing, and we saw it. And John Copenhaver I remember commenting on it. And we looked at four or five others, and we developed some of our own.

Some of the main things that came out of it were, number one, a recommendation that there be a general faculty. It would be called the capital G General capital F Faculty. And it will meet a minimum of once per year. And it will be presided over by the president of Dartmouth College. And he will give an address on the state of the college to the General Faculty. It had never been done before. It changed everything. But then, in addition to that, there will be--and whenever anything important came up, ROTC, invasion of Parkhurst, whatever--that required a meeting of the General Faculty, one would be called. But there would be at least one per year. We didn't even have a way of doing that.

Secondly, any important issue that cuts across the place, will be a candidate for creating a council (and we were going to use that word, and did use that word) that probably will have students and faculty and staff and administrators on it. And, you know, come to think of it, there are a number of them: the library system cut right across five, six different ones; the concerns for academic freedom and responsibility; the whole question of tenure and faculty positions and that kind of thing. They're university-wide. We don't want differences. And budgets, budgets and priorities. We should have one of those. Sponsored activities. Raising funds. Whatever it is.

So we put together as a start--and it was very slow--the Copenhaver Commission worked for a year. Much, much democratic discussion. Our report probably came in in June of '71, but I can't remember for sure. The faculties got around--and then, the question was, “how are you going to decide to do this? We don't have a general faculty to say let’s do it.” So we agreed that the separate faculties would put these things in their process, and they’d all have to agree to do this before we did it. So we would not have a general faculty until all the faculties thought it was a good idea. Well, my memory is that took two years. I'm not sure. I think it took two years.

I remember presiding over the discussion down at Tuck where they were saying: “What's in it for us? I mean just another meeting to go to. If we do go to a meeting of the General Faculty, for pete's sake, we'll be outnumbered.” And I said, "Yeah, we will in the General Faculty meeting. But of course if the issue is important to us, we can deal with that. And don't forget in the councils, we're going to have equal representation." And I said, "That's pretty heady stuff." I remarked on the Honorary Degree Council, for example, which was going to be one of them. And I was Tuck's delegate once, and ended up chairing it, and there were only eight of us, I think, on it. Tuck was going to be much

more heavily represented. Each Tuck faculty will have more representation than Arts & Sciences. Of course on the other side of the campus, the Arts & Sciences faculty were saying: “We've done very well, thank you, running this place as the Arts & Sciences faculty. What do you mean we have to bring in Tuck and the medical school? That's terrible.” So they had to be sold on the very idea. And it took time.

The first council I remember, personally remember because I chaired it, was founded in 1974. That tells you how much time might have taken place. And the one I chaired in 1974 was the first Council on Budgets and Priorities. And in my last two years as dean, '74 to '76, I chaired that at John Kemeny's request, in effect. And I saw, in chairing that council, what I really think was the great wisdom of articulating this new structure and set of processes for the governance of this little university.

CARROLL: You had then been chairing that committee at a time when there were budgetary constraints.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: When there was a fiscal crisis, really.

HENNESSEY: That's right.

CARROLL: How did you begin to decide what gets priority and where the money could go?

HENNESSEY: Boy, you always see me giving long answers. First, let me describe--I have to describe it to you. In August 1972, John Kemeny had a retreat at the Minary Center, inviting all of the deans. And he said at the retreat--we were still all debating the organization of the faculty, so we weren't talking about that because that was in process--he said, "Ladies and gentlemen, we have in the budget that I've been handed, that I've helped to put together for next year, we have two lines. Let me show you on my chart. We have the line going up at 5 percent; that's revenue. We have a line going up at 6 percent; that's costs. That produces the following gap. We can't tolerate that." Our recommendation was to appoint a campus-wide task force on budgets.

[End of Tape 6, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 6, Side B]

...in my hearing oral historians yesterday, that was one of the things that should have been brought out. That fussy interviewees will constantly be thinking about...

CARROLL: Like a managed [inaudible]

HENNESSEY: John said, "We've got to do that because there's no way I'm going to solve this myself. And besides, we're beginning to feel the breadth of this change coming along. That if we're going to cut costs here, which we've never done openly before, we're going to have the students and the faculty and everybody else saying, 'Yeah, that's right.'" So he turned to me and said, "You chair it." I remember driving back from the Minary Center. I remember the trip back with my fellow deans, and with the provost and vice provost, talking on "how in the world are we going to do this?" So I chaired in '72-73, a task force on budgets. It wasn't called budgets and priorities. In which our job was to bring the two lines in synch. We interviewed [many] people, we wrote a report, and we did it. And it was successful.

So in the spring of '74, when the idea was finally agreed to that we ought to have a permanent council, we had a model to work with. And Kemeny then asked me to chair it. And one of the things I then described to the committee was "from my experience with the earlier task force," which I remembered so well (I still have copies of all those reports, of course), "one of the things we have to articulate more clearly is what is the set of criteria for doing all this?" And during that year we worked out our criteria. And I remember handing, at the end of that year, handing that set of criteria to an incredulous trustee who chaired the Budget Committee of the trustees, and who was coming very late to the idea that there was this stupid council. Because the trustees enjoyed budgets and priorities. It was one of the things they knew how to do, [from their other lives].

The chair in 1974 or '75 was Ralph Lazarus, who you know, of Federated Stores. And Ralph, whenever there was a problem at Dartmouth that he thought could use some expert help, he'd bring in one of his executives. I remember talking with these executives, budget people, and they're a pain in the neck, frankly. I remember trying to get Ralph to understand that we need to have criteria for making budget decisions. And he said, "Are you nuts or something? What do you mean, criteria? If you have business experience, you know how to cut dead wood, you know how to do..." "Ralph, you don't cut dead wood at a university. As a matter of fact, cutting budgets in a university is a very similar to cutting budgets in the Boston Symphony. You wouldn't start by saying, couldn't the five oboes do a better job if we had three? You say that, and the oboists will each go out and buy a cheap oboe, and hit you over the head. You know. So the criteria are very important."

Well, I wrote the criteria. I sent it through the committee. They changed it, they changed it. Finally I gave it to Ralph and said, "Take this to the trustees. And if they had any objections, now was the time to object. Because this is what we're going to use next year, this set of criteria." And I remember Ralph still saying, talking as if I was from Mars, "Okay, I'll take the stupid thing. But it really frankly bores me." I think that was the way he--but to me the set of criteria was absolutely vital. I do not have the set of criteria...

CARROLL: I can probably find them.

HENNESSEY: Well, I have them at home. I'll give them to you. I was going to say I later...Want to stay on the Council of Budget & Priorities for just a--?

CARROLL: Yes, I do. And I also want at some point for you to explain why the college was in a fiscal crisis. I just realized that really should have been my first question.

HENNESSEY: Okay. I can either way. How do you want to do it?

CARROLL: Let's do first finishing about the committee. I think we'll do it that way.

HENNESSEY: Okay. To put some placeholders for you, I can give you, of course, the set of criteria, which I used later when I was provost of the University of Vermont. So they're tested in both. And I'm proud of them. I think they make sense. The Council on Budgets & Priorities was always seen by the president and by the trustees with mixed feelings. If it's one thing that a president and board of trustees feels that they can do well and that will affect the future in a defining way, it's creating the budgets. Long-run budget plans and so on. And so to have this community group doing this, and coming in with off-the-wall suggestions and so on, they were a little worried about that. We had to prove that we could do it well. And I think we did in '74-76. And certainly John Kemeny felt that it was a great help to him. It wasn't that we told the board of trustees, “this is the way you will do it.” We were advisory, and we knew we had to be advisory. And I insisted to the council--which had dreams of glory that we would do the budget--that we would be advisory to the trustees who have the financial, fiduciary responsibility.

In later years there were times when presidents found that they didn't like having such a committee. Frankly, in the McLaughlin years, and the combination of Dave McLaughlin and Paul Paganucci at the top in 1984-5, there was a--maybe it was earlier; it probably was earlier. It

was earlier. It was '80-81-82. They strongly suggested that maybe that committee ought to be abolished. And it was one of those actions by Dave McLaughlin that sent a shiver through the community. Because it said, “I don't need to consult really. I mean, after all, budgets? priorities? I'm very good at that.”

I was asked by [James] Jim Hornig, a good friend of mine, a chemistry professor and one-time dean, one-time dean of the graduate programs at Dartmouth, and on my 1972-73 task force on budgets where I got to know him best--he became chairman in 1981 of a committee to examine the Council on Budgets & Priorities. Because Dave McLaughlin wondered why he had one. And I wrote this--he asked me to testify, and that's when I wrote Jim about the council. And I thought that had the criteria, but I don't see it. So that's your copy.

CARROLL: Well, thank you for this. I have to ask for the punchline in all this. Was it eliminated by McLaughlin?

HENNESSEY: For probably emotional reasons I can't tell you for sure. I want to say that I think it was abolished for a year or two, but I know it came back. I think maybe Dave and Paul really did get rid of it by saying, “we just don't need this. It's taking too much of our time.” And I think that might have made some sense; because I think what happened over time was that successors to Kemeny, not having gone through these defining conversations, came into the presidency and did not realize that these councils are dangerous instruments if they're not nurtured. If they do not operate at a high level of quality in what they do and how they do it, they will make terrible mistakes. They will recommend things that will sound to you like nutsy ideas, and they'll get--then they'll be politicized, and they'll go out and get people to support them. They'll go to The D and The Dartmouth and will say, “the council recommended that you cut out six professors of physics, and you, the president and the trustees...” You could get into a really rough spot.

So one of the ways you have to prevent that is to be part of the process of deciding who will be on the council, and what the criteria will be for the person to chair the council. It should be someone who really does understand all this. Over time that became forgotten. And Dave McLaughlin inherited a council where--I am not going to name names, nor am I going to be able to tell you precisely what years this happened--but there were years when the feedback I got from Paganucci and McLaughlin was, “look at the council we've got, and look who's chairing it. I mean it's a lobby; it's not a council. It isn't doing what

you said could be done." That's why I wrote this memo saying, if you've got the right kind of council--

CARROLL: This is what you can do.

HENNESSEY: --it can do great things.

CARROLL: Could you back up just a little bit and explain how the college got into financial trouble during the early Kemeny years?

HENNESSEY: Yes. What happened in the calendar year--the academic year--1971-72 (and maybe it happened in the summer of '72) was that some people out in the Middle East decided to restrict the production of oil. A group of folks known by the acronym of OPEC decided to restrict the production of oil. And that plus other things in the American economy had a terrific effect on some prices and some costs. And energy costs suddenly bloomed out of the budget and became horrendous. And the idea for this cold college was in the academic year '72-73, if we had to pay that much for oil, well, we'd better try to conserve it. But let's be prepared for a budget crisis.

There were other things happening. By then some other prices were beginning to be suspect, like the cost of running a library because the postage costs and the subscription costs for foreign journals were beginning to escalate. It was the early time of that. And another thing that was happening, that was sort of fascinating, was in many fields of inquiry for libraries, suddenly they realized there was an exponential growth in journals. I mean not arithmetic, but exponential. So that instead of ten journals of biochemistry, there were a thousand, and from all over the world. And the library was saying, "To be a good library, we have to have them all." So those...And computers and other things. And John said, "Look, all these things taken into account, we've got this crisis, and we're going to have to shave this amount of money--" I forget even what it was "--out of the budget." And we did.

CARROLL: It must have been--I cannot imagine being faced with that and all the different groups who would've wanted a piece of the pie after that.

HENNESSEY: Oh, boy! Never having had to do it before. Always being able to blame the treasurer. John Meck, the treasurer, was the bad guy. And everybody lamented how cruel that man was in these budgets. I lamented it myself because John did rule with an iron hand. But no more. Now it's we're the enemy.

CARROLL: That's right, and it's tough. Kemeny, I read once, lamented that he was not able to do building the way he had wished that he could on campus. Was that directly because of the financial crisis?

HENNESSEY: I don't know. I would guess so. I don't know. Because buildings have little to do with the financial--not a lot to do--with financial crises. I mean building costs may go up because fuel costs go up. Buildings were to be built on the Dartmouth campus in two ways: Either borrowing money or raising money. And John was very good at both. And I don't know what he would've meant if he said it because a lot of buildings were built during his time.

CARROLL: Well, certainly that's when the Murdough Center was built.

HENNESSEY: Sure. A lot of others.

CARROLL: The glass tower behind--

HENNESSEY: That was before John. John had his office there before he became president.

CARROLL: Ah! I thought that was--

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: Okay. It was Dickey then?

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. I remember—-as a matter of fact, I remember it awfully well. Because John Masland--I talked about him last time?

CARROLL: Mmmm hmmm.

HENNESSEY: John Masland was provost when it was built. And I told you John Masland stopped being provost about '65 or so?

CARROLL: Yes, okay.

HENNESSEY: And John Kemeny's office was in that building before he became--I visited him there--before he became president.

CARROLL: Okay. And then when was the decision to build the Hood Art Museum made?

HENNESSEY: That was made in the 1980's.

CARROLL: So that's under McLaughlin's period?

HENNESSEY: That's McLaughlin, definitely.

CARROLL: Okay. Then maybe it's time to talk about David McLaughlin and--or if you want to do coeducation. We didn't talk about that. We said we were going to put that off until next time.

HENNESSEY: True. Let's stop for a minute and see if there's anything else. [Break in recording]

CARROLL: We both have the little sheet that tells us that on October 2, 1970 in his convocation speech, Kemeny talked about complex systems. And I wonder if you wanted to speak about that.

HENNESSEY: I'd like to say just a quick word about it. One of the ways in which John intellectually appreciated what we were doing at Tuck, and wanted to contribute to it, was his very intelligent instinct for modeling reality. And to him the world was made up of complex systems. And he thought about that mathematically, scientifically, philosophically. He was a systemic thinker. And believed there was no system he couldn't think about relatively effectively. He ran into Jay Forrester, a path-breaking faculty member at MIT, who had just written a book--the title of which I should be able to bring back; it was something like The World As a System. But Jay Forrester showed that you could carry systems thinking to analyzing any social/political phenomenon, even the entire world. Certainly cities, certainly the nation. And he was one of the first to do that in a credible way. Because he, like Kemeny, was a genius. And also knew about computers. And computer modeling allowed this, obviously, to happen in a different way.

Many people thought Forrester was a little nutty because everything that he talked about in terms of systems; you couldn't talk with him without talking system language. Well, Kemeny would go a very long way down that road, and he did. And in his convocation speech, he said to the whole community, "You know, one of the things I think the modern university should respect and understand is the systemic approach to intellectual definitions of the world and how it works and how it might work better. And, by the way, if we can create models, let's think about using computers to help to drive those models. And maybe eventually we can even put pretty complicated models into the computer." And his eyes lit up.

And when he gave that speech, I was so pleased the next time I saw him to say, "John, do you know that we have two faculty members at Tuck who have worked with Forrester? Do you know, John," I said, "that we invited Jay Forrester to come to Tuck while I was associate dean, to help us with our own thoughts about curriculum development? So I mean we've got something here that we want you to understand." That led to his almost permanent interest in, “okay, show me what you're doing.” And he’s lectured at Tuck on these systems ideas.

He brought to Tuck two years later, he brought to our attention, the availability of two of Jay Forrester's students, doctoral students, who worked with Jay Forrester, and became famous overnight as systems thinkers--Dennis and Donella ["Dana"] Meadows, who had written The Limits to Growth under Jay Forrester. And Kemeny brought them here, and I remember going to John's office when the two of them were there. And John said to me and to other people whom he had gathered together, "I want to recruit these two wonderful people to come here to Dartmouth because of complex systems. But if we're going to recruit them, Thayer School, you're going to have to have a faculty position for one of them; Tuck School, you're going to have..." And we debated that. It was a wonderful time. They ended up coming to Tuck and Thayer, and Dana Meadows--Dana is still involved. Donella Meadows whom we called Dana.

And that's another chapter in my history. I got to know her very well later after my deanships. She was one of those who invited me to teach with her in the Environmental and Policy Studies Program. And we cooperated in some teaching around systems. So that was--it was important that John Kemeny was thinking in those ways and wanted to bring the excitement of that to the Dartmouth campus.

CARROLL: When he talked about systems, and he talked about the larger issues, how did he then relate that to his own style of leadership and his own decision-making process?

HENNESSEY: Well, one thing he did, Jane, that he did with a panache and with a convincing air that I never saw anybody else do, was to say, "The topic we are now talking about is connected to this topic over here in this way. And that's connected to these three. And those three come back to..." He wove a web in conversation that was brilliant. You don't ever think of things in isolation. You never let yourself be tempted to do that. You don't think of just budgets. You think of budgets and mission. You don't think about just the Thayer School and what it may do in the future. But it's Thayer tied in with undergraduate life in this way and

that. And the more he invited that, the more he got back from it. He trained the rest of us to think those ways.

And I think that was a powerful, convincing way for him to become president. After all, one of the knocks on him, one of the raps on Kemeny, was that he'd be lopsided. He'd care more about sciences and math, and he wouldn't care about athletics or whatever. He just would be--it was hard to think of him as the renaissance man because he was so brilliantly good in some of the mathematically, computer-oriented areas. We wanted to be sure he was balanced. Well, he showed his balance through the intellectual artifact of the systemic approach.

CARROLL: That's fascinating, actually. Now, there comes also the same month, the same year, he writes a letter to [Richard] Nixon. I was wondering what prompted that, and what was the result of his letter to President Nixon.

HENNESSEY: I don't have the material with me. You might have it. I have a later letter that the Ivy presidents wrote, and then John actually wrote it. But at the time of Cambodia, Kent State, Jackson State, when we were all agonizing so much, John decided that he would actually, respectfully, write a letter to the President of the United States, to try to explain what this campus ferment really was. That it was not taking a political position, so much as an agonizing, spiritual, conscience-driven concern about what was happening to America. And he did write it. He got back, finally, a letter from Nixon which was insulting to him, he felt. Probably not written by Nixon. And later, while Nixon was still president--John was puzzled by--he almost felt he had made a mistake in writing President Nixon. Let me say again as a footnote, if you want that correspondence and you can't find it, I can try to find it myself.

CARROLL: I have seen it. I was hoping to get you to talk about it by phrasing the question that way.

HENNESSEY: But later then, when he--occasionally John chaired the Ivy presidents' group because they took turns chairing it. And one year I remember he, in the Deans' Council, we were talking about writing again to Nixon. And decided that the Ivy presidents ought to do it, not just one president whom Nixon could knock off one by one. And that's a copy for you of the letter that the Ivy presidents then wrote to President Nixon.

CARROLL: What did he hope to accomplish, do you think, with this?

HENNESSEY: I think he wanted to raise to its highest level of legitimacy the intellectual nature of what was really going on here. He wanted to have

a very mature discussion with senior representatives of the American public.

CARROLL: How did he stop this campus from igniting as so many others did?

HENNESSEY: Well, first of all, I guess I'd have to say that it would've ignited. It was ready to ignite in 1970. If Cambodia, Kent State, Jackson State had not occurred in the way it occurred and had not created the reaction that was created on this campus, there would have been more and more sharp programmed pressure on Dartmouth, and sit-ins and takeovers. And that had been done at Dartmouth around ROTC, connected with Vietnam. We were recovering from that, and it would have happened again. But it didn't. We had the opportunity because of that May 1970 set of incidents to define our participation in this discussion in a different way. And actually to begin to slide down a different slide. We were sliding against--we were sort of sliding up, ratcheting up, our resistance to complaints from students and faculty about Vietnam. Almost saying until May 1970, “but don't you get it? This really is a legitimate war. The president's right, McNamara is right. They're all right.”

Now, I should take that back. Because not many people that late were saying that. But certainly through the 60’s there was that resistance to it. And I think I've told you, later, for myself, it was '68. But I think really for this community it may have been more describably 1970 when we flipped, and everybody said, “We had reached the ultimate end of trying to support and explain the policy of the president on these issues. It's destroying us. It's ripping us apart as a nation. And it's ripping the young people away from believing that there's any credibility in American politics.”

CARROLL: What I wonder when I read a letter like this, when I see Kemeny's action writing to Nixon, that so much of the student protest was aimed against an administration they felt was in opposition to their beliefs. I think of [Samuel Ichiye] Hayakawa in the 60’s.

HENNESSEY: But that was 60’s; that was earlier. Hayakawa was sort of a dictator. I knew him, and I admired him enormously in his scholarship. He had written in the area of general semantics. I had used one of his books many times. He's a very wise writer. But he was a dictator when he was at San Francisco State.

CARROLL: San Francisco State, yeah.

HENNESSEY: Yes. But Kemeny was determined not to let that happen. And there was a presidential change at the right moment. And then just three months into Kemeny's presidency comes this defining change in the reaction of the administration to students and to this protest. And then we get--the reelection of Nixon takes place in November 1972. And then you have this creeping, sudden, mushrooming of all kinds of problems around Nixon. No longer--the Nixon presidency doesn't turn into something that you have to fight. It turns into something that you almost watch destroy itself. And so things changed. And the protests--and the next great protest on the Dartmouth campus occurred not around Vietnam at all, but around the South African issue and the reaction to that, which we'll get to when we talk about McLaughlin.

CARROLL: McLaughlin, absolutely. Now, under Kemeny's administration there's the change to the year-round operation.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Did that affect you in Tuck as directly as it affected Arts & Sciences?

HENNESSEY: No, it didn't. We debated it, thought about it, and were dazzled by John Kemeny's intellectual solution. It was his personal solution to it, having used his computer to model various things. He was able to show--with having his computer run right in front of us--that we can increase the student body, which was one of the arguments over coeducation. One of the arguments over coeducation was, “okay, if you're going to add women, how many are you going to add, 600? That's going to give us a student body of 4,000, right? You’re going to have to build new dorms. How are you going to do that? Where are you going to get the money? You want money for Murdough Center and everything else.” John Kemeny, one weekend, went back to his computer. He said, "You know, I've got to accept the fact that the minimal number of women will have to be 600. And if we have 600, that'll mean that we're going to...I cannot sell, but I'd like to, the model that we will therefore have a student body of 3200 with 600 women.” The argument among the alumni--there were so many arguments. But one of the precious, narrow arguments was, “oh, wait a minute. Maybe--I see. Maybe we're going to have to have women. Maybe as many as 600. But if you mean we're going to have 600 fewer men, how are we going to win the Ivy championship at football?” And so on.

But finally one of the great compromises was “we'll add women so we won't have fewer men.” Then they asked, "Is that a promise? We'll always have 3200 men?" And that--you'll get into that with others.

Leonard will be able to tell you the answer to that. I was embarrassed because I thought there were some almost promises made to get this thing done. But later on it was obvious that it wasn't going to stick. But John's model was, “you know, I've got to accept the fact we're going to have 600 new students. We have to deal with the present plant. Ah ha! If we require one summer”--he programmed this into his computer—“what if we required that every student spent one summer? How many students will we have in the student body filling the dorms and having 4,000 students registered?” And the answer came back: “If you have students spend--every student spend one summer mandatory, you can have 3200 students here, never having more than 3200 students on campus at any one time. And you'll cover a 4,000 student body.” I remember his pointing it out in a faculty meeting, and it was dazzling. So it was a win-win situation.

CARROLL: At this time, too, there began to be a lot of off-campus programs. Were you ever involved in the development of any of those? Or was that something that Tuck did not come in contact with?

HENNESSEY: Well, it seemed to us unlikely that there would be time in the very, very tight, very busy Tuck MBA two years for a student to spend a significant amount of time overseas. Number two, management education was an American invention. And there were no good management schools anywhere else. The American invasion of Europe--there was a book written by [Jean Jacques] Servan-Schreiber in 1950-something called The American Challenge, Le Défi Américain. It challenged the European universities that maybe they'd better, if they didn't want the invasion to be permanent, they'd better have their own schools. And during the fifties and sixties, schools of business did begin to develop. In fact, I was asked by Harvard to go to help to develop one of those in Switzerland in '59-60, and I was already at Tuck. And I brought back to Tuck the idea that, you know, there are some very good management programs that are now being developed in Germany, in England, and in Switzerland, and one in France. But they're fledgling efforts. Our students, I felt, would gain nothing from going there for a time. Nevertheless, we were very much interested in the Dartmouth style that all students would have some overseas experience. And we believed that MBA students needed to understand--and increasingly needed to understand--the whole globe. So we pressed our students to have on admission, to show us that they knew the world in some way. Had been abroad. And we favored students who had. And in recruiting faculty, we said “we won't recruit any faculty that don't have an international perspective, even if they're teaching accounting.” We had decided--and this was one of those great debates at Tuck--we could have a...

[End of session three]

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: October 18, 1996

CARROLL: Today's October 18, 1996. And I'm speaking again with John Hennessey. When we were speaking last time--we were talking about your interaction and the work that you did for John Kemeny. One of the major innovations that he started when he became president was to develop and to implement the year-round plan.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: Could you explain that a little bit and about the debate that surrounded the plan?

HENNESSEY: Right. As I mentioned last time--and now I'll back up a bit just to warm up the subject--the idea of year-around operation derived from a problem at Dartmouth., If we were going to expand the student body to accommodate women--and that was the only politically feasible way to do it--we'd have to build new dormitories, presumably. And yet that really interfered with our long-range planning and capital fund-raising and although most of them would be bonded, it still-- We didn't really want to do that. Where would they be? And we were uncertain in a number of ways.

So John Kemeny designed, as I recall it, quite personally, a computer program that was almost a linear programming model. “If you hold this constant and that constant, what can you do to make it all happen? And if you agree that we're going to have 4,000 students, but you're not going to build dormitories, then if we required students to be away from here for X amount of time, at what point would we get to a homeostasis, to an equilibrium?” And the answer came down--and I'm sure the program was more crude than I now think, but to me it was quite magical--the answer came back: “If every student has to spend one

summer here, and therefore obviously compensate by not being here for that term in whatever year it would have been that the student came here for the summer, then we'll never have more than 3200 students on campus at any one time. And that does it."

So then we began to turn a necessity into virtue: "Well, wouldn't it be a good idea for students to be gone for six months? Rather than having their summers, what about combining being here for a summer and then being gone for other parts of time? Maybe the following summer you could couple that with a spring term or a fall term. And maybe you could get a real job. Who knows what might happen?" So those who know about student activities turned their minds to the model, and began indeed to find ways to attract students to the idea of mixing up their times on campus in some way around the requirement that they be here for a term. My memory is that at first no one seemed to care which term it was, which summer term students came back to Dartmouth. But others can tell you more accurately than I. It seems to me, fairly soon it became clear that it would be wiser to have more students doing it at the end of sophomore year, and fewer students doing it-- In other words, not distributing the students evenly across the three or four summers when they might [otherwise choose to] do it.

The other issue then was for the faculty and the administration to think about the quality of academic life. "How could it be even enhanced if we asked students to come here for a summer term?" The reason we put it that way was-- our first reaction was "that won't work. Students come back here for a summer, we can't possibly offer the rich array of possible electives and courses that would be available in a normal term. First of all, how are we going to get faculty to agree to teach in the summer? Faculty are accustomed to the pattern of being away. Some of them are contractually going to be away." It was an implied promise. So all that had to be worked out, with bugs; but it got worked out over time. There was a certain attraction to some faculty members. They began to realize not only they'd be here for that summer, but maybe to translate that into a term off during the year instead of the summer, which for some faculty, given their discipline and their activities when they were away from here, was more attractive. However, that didn't distribute itself evenly across the curriculum.

There was the problem of sequencing courses. "What about a student who needs to take Chemistry 106A and then Chemistry 106B in sequence? Are you always going to be able to provide that in the summer when the student comes?" A lot of practical problems, and a lot of hard work went into trying to solve that. And there were times when

people said, “is this not a high cost Dartmouth is paying for the unwillingness of the trustees to decide that we'll admit women and not increase the student body?” So there were some who were pushing that point. But the decision was made. “It's going to be 4,000, and it's going to be 800 women.” And it took some years before the guarantee of 3200 men was dissolved; and we agreed, slowly but surely, to get to a kind of parity based on quality and no differentiation in quality between the two cohorts, the male and the female cohorts.

One other issue was the feeling expressed by those who know Dartmouth's alumni body very well, and how Dartmouth prepares students to buy into the idea of being a strong, contributing alumnus or alumna. The idea there was, “look, if you break students up that way so that when you're back, you come for a summer, and then you're here for funny schedules for the rest of the time, and you're back on campus when some of your fellow classmates are off--it may be in winter term 1981, but only half the Class of '82 is back because you've chosen terms off. And you won't have the class spirit. And you can't do much with class spirit during the summer, after all, because things are...” So all those things had to be ironed out, too.

Looking back, it seems to me it was the right solution, given what we had to accept at the time. But it did introduce a sense of breaking patterns, changing traditions. Welcoming women in a way that was costly. It wasn't necessarily really easy to do it because women were causing these problems by coming here and increasing the student body size. That was one mood that I sensed among people on the campus. But John Kemeny was president, and the mood was a very positive, optimistic, problem-solving mood. And one of the questions we all asked as administrators was: “What will John think up next?” Because he was so full of ideas and challenges.

CARROLL: Do you know statistically if that proved to be true, that the class spirit or the sense of class giving--has that diminished in the classes from the 70’s and 80’s?

HENNESSEY: Well, Jane, I'm not sure. But I certainly do remember reading memos, analytical memos, from the experts saying that “in fact that's happening. And we're going to have to counter that with dramatic new ways of inculcating class spirit.” It was hard to be sure because starting with the 60’s, the idea of class spirit, class officers really running things, and all that, became diluted. Students were less interested in formal structure. They didn't turn out for elections. They didn't care so much who were the class officers. And class spirit was no longer a desideratum as it

had been. It became something the administration and the older faculty and the alumni seemed to want the students to feel. But the students didn't feel it so much themselves. They were preoccupied with other things.

CARROLL: As far as I can tell from the debates that surrounded this, the sciences seem to have been very much for the shorter terms. Whereas the humanities, if I'm reading the minutes correctly, seemed rather resistant. Is that right?

HENNESSEY: Well, I think there are two issues intertwined in your question. There was a substantial debate at Dartmouth over whether we should continue with a quarter system or go to a semester system. And the science faculty preferred the term system, and the humanities preferred the longer incubation period of the semester. That debate occurred in the first year I was here, 1957-58, and was settled; we're going to have a term system. Which lent itself, of course, to the idea of the summer term. And I don't recall any serious debate after that, although there probably was one from time to time, over semester versus term. It's logical for a faculty to revisit that every ten years, quite organically almost. It happens. But when the summer term was proposed and it seemed to be a shorter term, the debate was, “how can we accommodate to that?” And it was the humanities faculty mainly that felt that the summer didn't lend itself to the deeper commitment to humanities education that they had become accustomed to, that faculty had been accustomed to accommodating to, in the term system for the fall and the winter and the spring.

But as we examined it, it really wasn't so. The summer term wasn't shorter. It had the same number of class periods. The schedule was a bit different. I think it may even have been compressed into eight weeks instead of nine, but there were more class meetings. And there was some way to show that a course that happened to be placed into the summer, unless driven by some preferences of the faculty, would be the equivalent of that same course offered any other time.

CARROLL: Did Tuck follow as well this new pattern?

HENNESSEY: Tuck did not for what were obvious indisputable reasons. So we really didn't even debate it. First of all, the term system was okay with us. It was working well. And in all of our curriculum reform, we found it better to work with terms. And if we didn't want to respect the terms, we didn't. For example, when I was associate dean and we were revising the curriculum, the first thing they said was: If we want courses to run ten

weeks, 14 weeks, 16 weeks, we'll do it. So we weren't as locked in the way the larger undergraduate body had to be locked into a registrar-driven kind of schedule. But also, it was very important for our students to get out of here for the summer. And we were committed to that. We helped them get very good jobs. And getting away from here and working in a responsible professional environment, where they could test what they had learned in the first year. Begin to think through how they wanted to specialize in the second year, what they wanted to get out of it, have a job that might very well lead to the job post-Tuck, was simply the way of life at Tuck and still is.

CARROLL: Is this the time, too, when all of the foreign study programs began to spring up in the undergraduate body? Is this a result of the year-round program?

HENNESSEY: Perceptive question. Certainly the term away overseas became more attractive to students and faculty to administer when students had more free terms because of coming here for the summer. That aided that whole system. But my memory is that Dartmouth was in that mode considerably prior to--maybe not a long time prior--but before John Kemeny became president. I would guess in the latter decade of John Dickey's presidency that began to be accomplished. But it was accelerated by the year-round operation.

CARROLL: Well, certainly Dickey had a very international outlook. It wouldn't surprise me that that--

HENNESSEY: That's right.

CARROLL: This is sort of shifting a bit. But then in the spring of '71, Kemeny asked you to serve on a three-person feasibility task force because I gather they had received the Minary Center bequest.

HENNESSEY: Yes. John called me up to his office one Wednesday afternoon, and I found I was meeting with him and John Meck, who was vice president and treasurer--a very important administrative person. And, as I recall, Frank Smallwood, a friend of mine in the Government Department, who occupied a number of administrative positions. And I think at that time Frank Smallwood was vice president for student affairs. That was a job that was created by Kemeny, and Smallwood was the first occupant of it, I believe. It seems to me that's what happened. But following all of my instincts, I have to warn myself that my choice of Frank as the third person may be wrong. It may not have been Frank. It could have been [Richard] Dick Olmsted who was business manager. But in any case,

John explained that William Paley, chairman and chief executive officer of CBS, wanted to give to Dartmouth his summer estate on Squam Lake. And he had been convinced of doing that because his closest business advisor, personally, and to some extent within the CBS empire, was a man named John Minary, a Dartmouth graduate of I think the 20's [Class of 1929], but I may be wrong on that. It could have been the early thirties.

By then John Kemeny had been told something about the estate, although he had not seen it. And it sounded very attractive. At first blush, the real question was "why wouldn't you accept a gift?" But quickly we said, "what are the strings attached here?" John Meck asked that first off. And one of the strings was that Mr. Paley, whom we really didn't know at all, wanted a tax deduction. That's why he was making the gift. His family had outgrown the use of it, and Minary urged him to get rid of it. But the idea they had was, let's give it to charity so you can take a deduction. But the only way he could take a deduction would be if the property were held by the recipient for I think five, perhaps ten years, at a minimum. And was used for educational purposes, charitable purposes.

Well, if we were going to hold it rather than receive it and dispose of it on the market, then the next question was, "what will it cost us to hold it?" And we didn't know. We would have to keep the pipes from freezing, and pay the taxes, and so on. So we went over to take a look at it. And we fell in love with it. It's a magnificent property. Have you been over there?

CARROLL: No. My husband has, though. I've seen the pictures that he took; it's quite beautiful.

HENNESSEY: It really is. It was easy to see why the Paley Family when their kids were growing up loved it. It's a huge--I forget the number of acres. But it's secluded, and it's beautiful pine forest. It has tennis courts. It had this huge mansion with 11 bedrooms and ten baths, or six or eight or whatever. And a huge living room with a magnificent fireplace. A great sun porch. A boathouse with cruisers and canoes, and a dock and everything. Right on Squam Lake--on Golden Pond. So we came back and discussed it. And decided that it would cost about 25 or 30 thousand dollars a year to keep it going. Particularly if we had custodians there. And we felt we'd have to have, for a number of reasons.

So the quick proposal, then, was that we use it as a Dartmouth College off-campus retreat facility. And price it in a way that would cover our costs. And we got John Kemeny to go over there with Jean [Kemeny]. In fact, as I think I mentioned to you before, my first memory of having John there was in the summer of '72 when we had a retreat in August there of the administrative hierarchy, and decided to have a task force on budgets. That was August '72. So at least by then John had gone over. But John and Jean loved it. It was a terribly comfortable place. And for a retreat, we could all stay in the mansion overnight.

Soon, my Council on Budgets & Priorities in '74-76 discovered that it was running a deficit. And we were looking for deficits. The Hanover Inn was running a serious deficit, too. And of course we responded: “You can't do that. I mean with the cuts we're making across the board in educational activities and administrative activities and cutting out sports, we can't run a deficit on a luxurious estate on Squam Lake.” So we resolved to market it, and began to do just that. And to this very day it's marketed to not only nonprofits, but even profit-making institutions that want to have a retreat there. And we charge a pretty stiff price. So that's a shorter story than I could give you, but that's what happened there.

CARROLL: Why did they decide to call it the Minary Center and not the Paley Center?

HENNESSEY: Well, Mr. Paley was quite pleased to have John take credit for it. And to have Dartmouth call it the Minary Center, not the Paley Center. Paley didn't care. He had no particular connection with Dartmouth, and of course Minary had. He wouldn't have given it to Dartmouth if it hadn't been for Minary. I think in one generous, perhaps untypically generous motion, Mr. Paley just thought that he ought to do that. And that would be good for everybody. Maybe even good for himself. That he didn't particularly want a Paley Estate with his name on it not knowing what was going to happen to it, what terrible reputation it might acquire. The evil things that Dartmouth might do there from time to time. So it became the Minary Estate.

Then one of our ideas, of course, and John Kemeny was very bold about this, was to meet with John Minary, and see if John Minary might not want to endow it. And Orton ["Ort"] Hicks became very important in that. Indeed Orton, after he became vice president emeritus--this is a tale that I'll tell you in some detail if you want later on; it's part of the legend of Orton Hicks--Orton received a large grant from a Dartmouth family for his own use in any way he wanted to use it. And he hit on the

idea of establishing each summer a retreat that he would run at the Minary Center for a week or two, where he would invite all kinds of people who might be major donors. And would invite people like me and my wife and others to come and be there--Leonard Rieser and Rosemary. And he did that for about ten straight years. And every time he invited Mr. Minary, trying to urge him to understand how important these things were. I remember visiting with Mr. Minary down in New York to talk about such things. And went over to talk to Mr. Paley.

CARROLL: Did he ever endow it?

HENNESSEY: No, he didn't. To the best of my knowledge, he never did. But I've lost track of whether somebody else might have endowed it. I also may be wrong, Jane. He may by now have endowed it. He surprised us in the late 70's by--this is too private to say.

CARROLL: Okay. What I'm curious about is did you have to make any kind of adjustments to the estate to make it suitable for meetings?

HENNESSEY: Very few. Almost none. We got a long table for the dining room. But then I think there were two long tables. And then in another room for overflow there were some round tables. We had to set up a kind of restaurant or dining room facility. The meals were famous for being just wonderful. And they still are.

CARROLL: They still are, yes.

HENNESSEY: It's now run by the Hanover Inn office. They schedule it. We had scheduled it in another office. We had to put in the computer, some audiovisual capacity and blackboards. But that's about all.

CARROLL: So it was a minimal, really, investment?

HENNESSEY: Almost none, yes.

CARROLL: Then comes-- In the same spring. This was a very busy year, I must say.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: A debate over the proposal to merge Tuck and Thayer boards of overseers.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: What brought about the idea that they should be merged?

HENNESSEY: Number one, in order to plan the future of the two schools, particularly around the deanship of Myron Tribus and my deanship (my deanship began in 1968), around the bringing of the two schools together for expansion and renewal and refreshment of their physical plants, Tribus and I hit on the idea of having some meetings of the two boards jointly. By 1971 the chairman of the board of overseers of the Thayer School was David Lilly [‘39], chairman and chief executive officer of Toro Company in Minneapolis. And the chairman of the board of Tuck was one David McLaughlin, who had moved from Champion Fibers or Papers to being president and chief operating officer of Toro, Inc., in about that same year. So the two of them were chairing these two boards. Quite a remarkable phenomenon that the two men in the same company ended up chairing these two boards.

Well, they then began talking about that idea. Kemeny wrote me in probably September of '71--but I can go back and figure it out--a letter saying, "John, I've heard this talk." It probably was after an overseers' meeting where he had heard the two of them kicking this around. I never took it seriously, frankly, although I thought meeting jointly was a good idea. So Kemeny wrote me saying, "You know, it isn't a bad idea. Wouldn't that be a way of enhancing the probability that the two schools and the two faculties would interleaf in an appropriate fashion?" And I thought it over for a couple of hours, and then wrote him a long letter of the seven or eight reasons why it was a lousy idea. And described my exchange with our faculty. It was one of those times where the idea was so, it seemed to me, so obviously not a good idea, that I wanted to nip it in the bud. And I guess I was a little concerned that the president of Dartmouth, whom I was getting to know well, but who was a very forceful man, who liked to argue and liked to win his arguments, that he was going to give me some trouble on this.

He never did, by the way. He was a gracious man in debates over Dartmouth affairs. If I wanted to get into an argument with him which would be everlasting, it would be on a non-Dartmouth issue. But on Dartmouth matters, he yielded. He seemed to say that deans probably are right, rather than starting out with the idea that they're probably wrong--which some other folks in the administration might have felt.

So my reasons were fairly straightforward. Number one, it's very difficult to get people with a very strong capacity to serve, to serve on either one of the two boards. But at least when there are two different boards,

they know what they're signing up for. It's clear. It's one of the oldest and best business schools in the country. There's some prestige to signing up to be on that board. And it's all about business education. It's preparation for business. Thayer School similarly. The kinds of people they got to serve on that board were tied into technology and quantification and science. And it was easy to do it.

Secondly, there clearly would be a need to shrink the board if we brought them together. Because the two boards had already become too big. They were already 16 or 17. To have them be 32 or 34 did not make sense. And then to require that over a period of time we shrink it down to a working board of 16 or 17, for all kinds of reasons, seemed to me to be a negative thing. “You're going to be getting rid of people. Why do that?” Also, to shrink the board to a smaller size means that in terms of the development purpose of having boards--and that's probably the third in the hierarchy of reasons for having a board of overseers--clearly, as you shrink the board, you have fewer people who are potential donors. And so on. And John said, "Yeah, you're right. I hadn't thought much about it." But it was natural for Dave McLaughlin and Dave Lilly to think that way.

Interestingly, about that time we invented the Executive-in-Residence Program at Tuck. One of my concerns was to bring--because of our lack of cheek-to-jowl familiarity with business men and women in the major city--we couldn't ask William Paley to drop into our class and go by limousine right back to Black Rock down on 53rd Street. Why not get people to come for three days, four days, five days. The first two, as I recall it, the first two men we got to come and spend a week, were David Lilly and David McLaughlin.

CARROLL: That's interesting.

HENNESSEY: And they loved it. They had a great time here as executives-in-residence.

CARROLL: Now when they came on that program, they would then do sort of mini-seminars for the students? Was that the thought?

HENNESSEY: We said the students would run it. “If it's okay with you, the students are going to run this.” And the students then had a committee. And they worked very hard on which classes. And they talked with faculty. “Do you want this person?” They researched the thing. And they did everything. They lived in the dorm. They went to meals, they went to

discussion sessions, they went to evening parties, they went to classes, and they complained that it was very hard work!

CARROLL: I bet. Is that something that's still going on?

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: That's wonderful.

HENNESSEY: Yes. We finally got an endowment for a special room for the executive-in-residence.

CARROLL: Much better.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Then you also-- Is that part of this desire to spread Tuck out to an international scale that prompted the invitation of 20 CEO's from European corporations to come here to campus?

HENNESSEY: No, that happened in a different way, Jane. It was quite independent of anything we were doing. The Time-Life Corporation--maybe it was Time, Inc. I'm not sure Henry Luce was still the boss, but I think he was. In any case, his son, Henry Luce, Jr., had the great idea of inviting each year luminaries from the world to come to the United States for a gold-plated tour of the United States. Starting with the President of the United States, the Speaker, the head of the Senate, the Cabinet officers. David Rockefeller and anybody who was thought to be in the top tier of running...

[End of Tape 7, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 7, Side B]

The year that I put on this, was it '71? I don't recall if it was the first year Time did that. I think it probably wasn't. But in '71 they had the idea of taking these executives to a campus. And one of our administrators at Tuck was a former executive of Time, Inc., and knew Henry Luce. And somehow they got talking about Dartmouth. And Henry Luce, Jr., who thought it would be marvelous during the foliage season to jet into some little town in New Hampshire... It all got poetically described as the right moment for all these great executives. And they were the top CEO's. The chairmen and CEO's of all the important, of the top dozen or 15, with their entourages. They were people who didn't travel without lawyers and secretaries and...

It was an amazing influx. They came in by jet. The reason I put it down was that John Kemeny and I were to be the hosts. And we each gave a speech to these people: John about higher education, I about executive education and what it was all about. They spent a day on the Dartmouth campus. And while here, they had some of their other sessions. For example, Daniel Boorstin, who is now librarian, was Librarian of Congress, and his successor, [James] Jim Billington, whom I believe is now Librarian of Congress, both were here and both gave talks down at the Dartmouth Outing Club. I remember Boorstin especially. And some members of the President's Council on Economic Advisors were here. Some of the members of Congress, senators and representatives, were here. So they came to Dartmouth not necessarily to see Dartmouth. But to have their sessions in Baker Library or Hanover Inn or down at the Outing Club and sort of soak in this ambience.

And the Dartmouth parts of it were two: One was for Kemeny and me to speak. And I think the other was for-- No, I'm wrong. It was another occasion when we opened up the homes of administrators and faculty to guests. That's when we had a high-level Soviet delegation come through, which was another couple of years later. So I put that down as something that John and I pulled together. And I had reason not too long ago to pull out those documents and look through the--I have the printed program, and I have something about what John said and what I said.

CARROLL: What was the purpose of bringing these CEO's to the United States? Is this for trade? Or is this better relations?

HENNESSEY: It was communicated to them as a high-level familiarization tour that would have multiple benefits. They would be visible. They would be able to talk with their prime ministers and presidents about first-hand conversations they had had on trade, international relations, technology, patents, intellectual property, whatever it might be. And they asked superb questions. They clearly were movers and shakers in their countries. They were people who were listened to by their governments, by their cabinet people. So to do this in this sort of red carpet way, with everything opened up for them, I think to them was a very attractive possibility. And the fact that Time was willing to do it I think gave them no pause at all. Today it might. It didn't matter.

CARROLL: Were they at all curious about what a business education was? Because my knowledge of the European system is that their business schools are not a European invention; they're an American invention.

HENNESSEY: They are an American invention. Starting in the mid-50's, European countries began to talk openly about the managerial gap. That America obviously was exporting business and management expertise. IBM was moving into France and England and Germany. And they, of course, were only ten years out of the destruction from the First and Second World Wars. And were still relying in their governmental, civic, social instincts on a cultural past which said, among other things: "The preparation for business in Germany," for example, "is to come up through the law, through economics, through the political science, through a first-class university degree. Probably get a Ph.D., and then you might get into executive management. But you'll be in an elite group." France did the same thing. The H.E.C. [Hautes Études Commerciales] and the Ecole Polytechnique idea was to, as you know so well, was to pick out the elite at younger ages, and then train them to become the administrators in the business and government. It didn't matter what because they were so bright they'd be able to do anything.

In England it really was even more class structure and less meritocratic. It was important, of course, to have an Oxbridge degree, and then to have connections, and to be-- It was okay to come along in some other pattern. But you wouldn't be on the board of directors. It might be possible to relax a bit and have the red-brick universities train people who might become operating folks or engineers who might come in and rise to a third or fourth level. But the idea of educating at the university level for management was appalling. However, in England there was a commission, a royal commission, established which Lord Robbins chaired, in the 50's or 60's. I forget now when all these things occurred.

But out of that commission, trying to understand why it was that British industries were falling behind and not attracting the best and the brightest to come with them at all (or if they did, they were unprepared), and why it was that even young MBA's from American schools were able to be recruited and suddenly had some ideas that were beneficial that no one else had thought of, they decided to establish two graduate schools of business in England. And they did. One in Manchester and one in London. And they were both to be established as post-university programs, aiming to give an MBA.

While all this was fermenting, in France an institution was founded in 1955 or 1956 called--and I don't remember now the French words--but the acronym is INSEAD, which was established at Versailles. I knew about this because I was recruited. Harvard Business School was often asked to cooperate in setting up these management schools. And Harvard established its first of such schools in collaboration with the

University of Lausanne in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1956 or 1957, financed entirely by the great Nestle Company, one of the great Swiss companies. And Harvard was unwilling to do it unless Nestle opened it up to people from all the European countries who wanted a one-year, strong, Harvard Business School MBA compressed education.

Those things were starting in those times. And by now, of course, it's radically changed. I can tell you, of course, a great deal more about that. But I went over to be part of the Harvard Lausanne program in 1959, and traveled to see these other schools to see what was going on in the various countries. And so when I talked in 1971 to these visitors from Europe, I was able to trace what had happened, and to tell them my pleasure in, when I was in Lausanne at IMEDE of having 34-year-old students from Germany or from France. And tried to get them to understand at the very top that I thought it was a very good idea for them to be oriented toward the MBA programs. That these were programs that could do a very good job of preparing people to learn to operate at the highest level.

CARROLL: Now, you also worked for John Kemeny when you went to be his representative, or Dartmouth's representative, on the board of directors of what was called the Controlled Environment Corporation?

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: And what is that?

HENNESSEY: It was a corporation established probably about 1965 or 1966 to receive a gift of property, as I recall, given or sold at a very low price by the International Paper Company, a New Hampshire-based or at least operating company, that no longer needed or wanted a patch of many acres in Grantham, New Hampshire. Actually, it was in four or five different towns: Springfield, Grantham, Enfield. I forget all of them.

CARROLL: New London, I think, is one of them....

HENNESSEY: I think New London, too. Right. And I cannot any longer remember the history. But four institutions collaborated to say: “We will accept that gift, and we will develop this tract of land for second homes in a modern way that we'll be proud of.” Much of which really was tied up with environmental issues. “This will be environmentally the best of all the communities of this sort. Just wait and see.” The owners then of it: I think 25 percent was Dartmouth; I think 25 percent was the Manchester Bank, now under a different name.

CARROLL: Citizens Bank I think it is.

HENNESSEY: I think it's Citizens. It was Bank East. But at that time it was Manchester Bank, I think. And an insurance company in Concord, the name of which I can almost say but not quite [United Life and Accident Insurance Company of New Hampshire]. And the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests, one of the best of the country's environmental organizations, 501C3. So there were two businesses and two 501C3's, as I recall it. There may have been somebody else involved in that. In any case, each of these institutions then put people on the board of directors. Dartmouth was very much concerned about it for a whole host of reasons, including the fact that Dartmouth alumni were buying the properties and were raising all kinds of questions. It was a business venture that Dartmouth hadn't seen the like of, where we were really-- I forget what the monetary investment was. I should remember this. But I think Dartmouth was to some extent monetarily at risk. I mentioned that it was a gift. I don't think it was a gift. I think it was sold to us at a low price. And I think we all had to contribute to the price of buying it. But I can't hold myself to that. It's been too long ago. The logical person to go on that board was John Meck, Dartmouth's treasurer. But for a variety of reasons John Kemeny asked me to do it, and report regularly to him and John Meck what was going on. So I did. I went to very frequent meetings of that board.

CARROLL: And were they there to give--to build-- guidelines for the development? Or was this to oversee and approve of somebody else's plans for the development?

HENNESSEY: It was really the latter. We were a real board of directors. Nothing much happened of any importance that we hadn't approved. We hired a developer; a very good but hard to manage director, a very creative guy who was a very temperamental fellow.

CARROLL: Was it hard to get people who are from two different worlds--from business and banking, who want to see a profit very clearly, to agree with the kinds of concepts that the environmentalists wished to have in place?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Well, it was-- That part of it was not too difficult. The policy issues were solved fairly quickly because we went into it with the concept that everybody agreed to that this was going to be a model project. And the bank, for example, and the insurance company were going to get public credit for their citizenship in doing it in this way. And getting the Society

for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests, which was known as the grandparent of all environmental issues, meant that we were going to have to listen to them. And we did.

CARROLL: Did Dartmouth see a profit on this?

HENNESSEY: I don't know. I forget.

CARROLL: Interesting to note. Right in that--the following spring, in March of '72, there was the protest over Marine recruiting on campus.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Was that something that came about spontaneously, or did it build over time?

HENNESSEY: Well, I think after our debates over ROTC in the late 60's, our Cambodia-Kent State drama in 1970, extending into '71, the reelection of Nixon, the atmosphere of hippies and disrespect for anybody over 30, and drugs and the drug problem on campus, and all kinds of things, it became stylish almost whenever there was any question of the presence of the federal government on this campus, there would be protests. There would be picketing, there would be letters to the editor. And one of the issues over Vietnam, which of course was still heated up--I can't remember when we departed. Do you remember the year when we actually helicoptered out?

CARROLL: 'Seventy-four. I remember that because I was going to Germany, and it was having to explain when I was over there to everyone what had happened at the end.

HENNESSEY: So the denouement was in '74.

CARROLL: I think it was spring of '74.

HENNESSEY: The very year that Mr. Nixon was--

CARROLL: Kicked out.

HENNESSEY: --kicked out. I'd forgotten that. Well, so there was still the Vietnam--strong Vietnam--issue. And every time something came up, there would be a protest of some sort, and that was understandable. On the Marine recruiting, what happened was that one of the groups of faculty and students, looking for a way to continue to express their angst over

Vietnam, in the context of all the other things going on here, wrote a letter to John Kemeny saying, “One of the recruitments that will be happening this fall for our Dartmouth senior class will be from the Marine Corps. Now of all the services, somehow we feel that's the least attractive to us now. It represents the more macho side of the services, and we don't think they should be allowed to recruit on this campus. Do you agree?” And John, without a heck of a lot of consultation, wrote back saying: “I don't agree. That's not-- I mean you certainly can't say that I do not share with you much alarm and anxiety and concern over what's going on in Vietnam. Of course I do, and we've expressed that in multiple ways. But this is not one of them. Because if students on this campus wish to have the opportunity to talk to the Marine recruiters--and there may not be very many, there may be none--they should have that opportunity. Why would we deny them the opportunity? Are you telling me that there is something illegitimate about allowing seniors to discuss going into the armed forces with one of the branches of the armed forces?”

And Kemeny made that surprisingly clear and stiff, and that was it. I mean he dealt with it. I wanted to put that on my list, Jane, for one thing to show that in my judgment, anyway, on many issues Kemeny was able to rise to a level of convincing policy position on things and be persuasive and be trusted. Now those folks who were protesting then about Marine recruiting, would certainly in their memory not tell you that they were pleased at all with what Kemeny did. Or that they even trusted him. But they accepted his logic, and were a bit proud that Dartmouth could use that sort of freedom of access, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and general freedom to have a choice argument. And I have that letter somewhere if you'd like to see it, that John wrote.

CARROLL: Now. Is this also about the same time that the ROTC begins to be questioned on campus?

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Were the faculty behind the idea of eliminating ROTC?

HENNESSEY: Yes, indeed. And very much so always against allowing ROTC to continue. I played a fairly major role in the debate in 1968. And then found myself so preoccupied with ROTC and Tuck students, who progressively were not Dartmouth students but had come from somewhere else, and their service was tied up with some other--I didn't continue to pay a lot of attention to the debate over ROTC on the Dartmouth campus until it erupted a couple of times, including, of

course, in Dave McLaughlin's time. But my memory is that the decision was to phase out ROTC gradually, and that that decision was made in '68-69. And indeed we did phase it out gradually. And that every year there were protests over why we were doing it so gradually. But we wanted to give all the students who were in it an opportunity to get out of it. And so the arguments, starting by 1972, '73, '74, were more bringing it back. “Now the Vietnam War is over, why don't we bring it back?” That's my memory. But you can tell me that I was wrong, and I would--

CARROLL: No, no you're absolutely right. And what fascinates me is that the argument to bring it back started so swiftly.

HENNESSEY: Well, after Nixon and after Vietnam was behind us, I think those who all along felt it was a proper thing to have it here became more respectable. I mean after all, ROTC at Dartmouth was seen by many people as a pretty honorable ROTC. I mean it was not dominated by the military types. Dartmouth had demanded all kinds of compromises so that students had very little close-order drill, marching, worrying about weapons, things like that. Many courses that they were able to take in military history and sociology and psychology were accepted as part of the ROTC program. It offered students who came from a military family background, or who for otherwise respected and wanted to think about the military option, offered them a marvelous source of financial aid. And that was a strong argument. “Why are we denying to those students who are going to go into ROTC, who want that route, why are we denying them an education at Dartmouth?” ROTC hadn't disappeared from all the Ivy campuses. It was still available--it was by 1974 or '75--available on some other campuses. I think it was, for example--and I may be wrong about this--but I think Harvard agreed to get rid of ROTC, but signed a contract with MIT that it would happen there. And I think that's still happening, as a matter of fact.

CARROLL: Well, then, we talked a little bit about the IVY presidents' statement on Vietnam last time.

HENNESSEY: Mmmm hmmm.

CARROLL: What I wanted to get to was really what happened in August '72, where you were asked by Kemeny to chair the Task Force on Budget Priorities. At a time of very strong fiscal restraint that needed to be put into place. I was wondering, how did you go about tackling the problem, and who did you gather onto your task force?

HENNESSEY: Well, first of all we made the task force a university-wide enterprise. I don't remember all the reasons we did that. But it was obvious to me and to my colleagues that we needed the opinions and the involvement of everyone on this campus if we were going to understand this crisis for what it really was, and manage it in a way that would be credible and acceptable. It was not something Kemeny could decide behind closed doors. Or that the trustees in their earlier fashion, through their budget committees, could simply prescribe. So we asked that there be three students, one of whom I still remember--no, two of whom I remember very well, very well indeed; and one of them is now a writer for the Wall Street Journal, Victor Zonana ['75], and has become famous. We asked two alumni. One of them was [E. Ronan] Ron Campion ['55] who was by then the chief executive officer of James Campion & Company downtown, a Dartmouth alumnus. And the other was, as I recall, a former headmaster of a prep school in Vermont, who was living in Vermont. I'll think of his name in a minute. Should know that. Lovely man.

CARROLL: It wasn't Choukas, was it?

HENNESSEY: No, it wasn't. It wasn't. Mike at that time was I think still headmaster of--

CARROLL: Green Mountain Academy.

HENNESSEY: --Green Mountain Academy, yes. No, this was an older man. I'll think of it. I know his name. Can almost say it. [Laurence Leavitt, '25] We asked for faculty from all three divisions: humanities, social sciences, and sciences. We asked for administrators. We thought the provost ought to be on it and some of the vice presidents ought to be on it. We wanted representatives from all three professional schools. We didn't want any trustees on it. That wasn't practical. I believe that was right. So we had, I believe, 17 people on it. I remember--I can almost name them all. We became a pretty tight-knit group. And we first-- We decided to walk two routes at one time, two pathways at once. One was to go through a seminar in Dartmouth financing and budgeting, where the budget and financial people would simply tutor us on how budgets are put together. What the key financial factors are, how our budgets compared with other institutions, why our budgets were out of balance, and so on.

The other path we followed was to begin to interview people who made recommendations and budgetary decisions from the faculty and the individual schools, to understand their worlds, what they were like. And by January--we had multiple interviews with these people--by January we had asked them to come back and tell us where they would cut if

they had to cut. If we simply said across the board cut of .6 percent or whatever it was, where would you cut? And soon we realized the naivete of that. The inside joke was it's the Washington Monument Phenomenon. By which we meant that if you asked in this--it wasn't so funny later on--if you ask in Washington what you're going to cut in the budget, well, the first thing that would be offered was, “well, we're going to sell the Washington Monument. Or we're going to privatize it. Or we're going to close it.” Which, of course, does happen when the government shuts down. It's not so funny. So sure... But we had talked with budget heads enough so that we knew and they knew that if they played that game, it would be pretty obvious to us. Nevertheless, it was hard to get the Kiewit Center or the library system or Tuck School to offer up easy cuts because there weren't any. Or if there were some, they wanted to wait and make those easy cuts when they really had to make them.

So what we then did was to interview these cost center people in depth, after we understood the budgets very well. And really put them on the hot seat, which we explained to them in all colleaugeship had to be done. We really had to get to the bottom of it because we had to make recommendations. And we wanted to be convinced, in a utilitarian fashion, that we'd be doing something that was for the greatest good of the greatest number. And I think that worked pretty well. It meant, however, that we had to push people, and we had to-- I'm tempted to give you some examples, but I won't now. I will if you ever want me to.

CARROLL: Please do. I think it might help to illustrate your points, if you feel comfortable with it.

HENNESSEY: Well, yes. I'll say it in a way that I think will be acceptable. It's still a sore point for me, for more than one reason. The library system is my example. Dartmouth has been very fortunate in its library and its librarians and its library staff. To become a university with a small U, it was very important for Dartmouth's library to expand. It had not been-- The library had been such a close adjunct of the life of the faculty and of the students, it was almost not thought of as an administrative cost center. The attitude I took at Tuck was “we don't care what the library budget is. We'll do whatever we have to do to have a first-class collection, and that's the way it's going to be.”

Well, that attitude came up hard against this demand that we look all over the campus, including the president's office, for ways to do a better job but save money. And the challenge we presented to the library was: “Couldn't you do an even better job, if you really think it through, for a

lower cost? Isn't that possible through different management, different arrangements? Isn't it possible that you're using some archaic procedures that are faculty-friendly and student-friendly, but might not make a huge difference if you changed them?" We even said, "one of the things you've done"--I believe I'm right about this in the timing—"one of the things you've done is you've looked to see which books in the collection haven't been used by anybody for five years or ten years?"

[End of Tape #7, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 8, Side A]

HENNESSEY: Engaged in some very sensible practices of saying to the faculty, "if you haven't used a book in ten years, we're going to put it out somewhere else. And we'll get it for you within 24 hours." Some faculty grumbled about that, saying, "well, the fact that we haven't checked it out, doesn't mean that we don't go there and look at it and perhaps pat it on the binding or whatever out of friendliness." But in talking with not just the dean of the libraries, Edward Lathem, but other people in the system, we became convinced that indeed there were some ways to rearrange the workings of the library system, and save money and not reduce quality. That was very hard because Mr. Lathem disagreed, and I think conscientiously felt that this was an invasion by the Goths, or the Visigoths.

CARROLL: I see, a little rampant pillaging going on, eh?

HENNESSEY: And a sort of disrespect for him. And that led to some pretty serious disagreements.

CARROLL: You ended up with a list of nine points that needed to be considered every time someone wanted to decide about cuts.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Which I read over with awe. Because I think that they're very well-considered points. And I'm curious-- What I'm going to ask is a chicken-and-egg question: Were these points drawn up at the beginning of this examination, or were they end result of this time?

HENNESSEY: We didn't know enough to draw them up at the beginning, number one. Number two, the only person who had had any practice in that on the commission was me. And as chair of the task force, I instinctively realized that the moment I said, "Here's the way we're going to do it," or even proposed here might be the way, it would be misconstrued as the business system. I mean "sure, we understand how businesses cut

budgets by firing people and, you know, whatever they have to do to compete. But that's not the world we're living in here. So don't give us that kind of technocratic solution." And I was sympathetic to that. I really did believe it. I had not been in business. I have never been in business even though I was pointed to, as the business school dean, as the epitome of the corporate type. But my whole life has been spent in educational institutions except for time in the army. All my experience in business has been as a consultant or as a board member. So I was very sympathetic to the idea that we had to treat the university as a delicate, delicate structure. We derived, then, this list that you spoke of, as we went. It was part of our contribution to the future. We did that towards the end of our work.

CARROLL: And were these then to be kept on file to be guidelines for the future?

HENNESSEY: They were. But, you know, almost from the start that was just too darned logical. No one wanted to be bound by any criteria. They were willing--they were very polite in accepting that. The task force-- The list that you have is I think dated '76.

CARROLL: Right.

HENNESSEY: That was after two years of my chairing the Council on Budgets & Priorities, from '74 to '76. Actually, during the '72-73 year, although we weren't on criteria and had some of these in place, we were so unsuccessful in capturing the attention of the community--and, frankly, of the trustees--for a set of criteria, that we couldn't get it down on paper. People just didn't want to see that. They wanted to know how we made up our own mind. So it was a germ that got planted. It was only after we went through more of all of this in a more difficult period, '74 to '76, that I finally said--Because the trustees-- I kept testing the trustees: "Do you have criteria?" "Well, of course we do, but we don't reduce them to writing." "Well, couldn't you?" "Well, maybe some day." And it was an art form. And they wanted their freedom to come from deciding almost on an ad hoc basis what criteria to use. It was almost a way of defending themselves against the faculty accusation that "these trustees are all corporate types (almost all of them). And so they're going to use these Draconian measures, aren't they." Well, they didn't want to put in writing any of the measures they used. So they did it behind closed doors.

Well, we tried to introduce this as a way of legitimizing. But the trustees did not adopt these techniques. And I don't know, because I left the scene, I don't know whether after 1976--I don't even know for sure that

the Council on Budgets & Priorities continued to feel this was a good idea, to have these criteria. But I know they were very valuable to us in the time that I was on board.

CARROLL: Why was '74 to '76 an even more drastic time financially for the college?

HENNESSEY: We had to make more cuts, cuts that were deeper. Because the forces that had created the budget crisis in '72-73 became even more dramatically evident in '74 to '76. I should have chronicled that. But let me mention just a few of them that occur to me: '72-73 was OPEC. OPEC introduced a time, a continuous time, of higher inflation, of larger deficits, higher interest rates. I think the interest rate by 1975 or '76, I think the prime rate was up to 19 percent or so. And we were paying a lot of money for our indebtedness. The stock market wasn't that great in terms of what it was producing. And so our revenue was going down. Our costs were screaming up because of inflation in the American economy. We suddenly discovered that even things like postage were going up through the ceiling. And certainly salaries, which were tied to cost of living. All salaries were heating it up. And in the American economy, we'd gone through a depression of sorts--it wasn't called that--in I forget '73, '74, '75, whenever it was. Bad times. And it was partly what contributed to Mr. Ford's lack of success in being elected in '76.

CARROLL: Now, when you were on the Council for Budgets & Priorities, did you ask people to bring you ideas for cuts? Or did you go into areas and suggest some of those?

HENNESSEY: We always asked people to suggest cuts. We asked them to suggest not cuts so much as ways of rearranging what they were doing to maximize, to protect, as best they could, their purposes, and maximize their contribution. We tried to say that we really thought that if for the first time in many areas we reviewed how things were done, we might find that we could spend more wisely. “We might,” and this is a very crude example, “we might discontinue two staff positions for a total saving of $40,000, and find one $10,000 computer program that might do what those two people were doing. Or we might out-source it”--that awful verb—“out-source it. We might decide not to do this, but have some firm out there do it for us for a much lower price.” We realized that often this would interfere with people's employment because 80 percent, 82 percent of the budget was personnel. But there was turnover every year. Not filling positions became our major way of dealing. Not many people were actually fired, although there were

people who left because of discomfort or because their jobs, more was demanded of them.

See, what I think is fair to say about the past of Dartmouth, and of all institutions like Dartmouth, was that they administered themselves in a comfortable fashion. That is, they added people as they felt comfortable adding people. The only person around here who said don't do that was John Meck. John Meck was Mr. No. But you could talk with John Dickey and explain how, you know, you could really get along much better if you had one more faculty or one more administrator. And John Dickey would be sympathetic if you made a good case, and you wouldn't tell him if you didn't. John Meck would say, no, on anything. And he became known as sort of the unreasonable No Man, the Abominable No Man. But there was no particular incentive for a dean or a chairman of a department to--or for a business office at Dartmouth--to reduce its budget. To the contrary, not-for-profit institutions and governmental institutions rather live on the idea that if you're doing a good job, you'll probably have to add more people. And the way you measure whether you did a good job or not was how many people you had, how big your budget is. So there's an instinct to expand your budget. It always grows; it never goes back.

So it took a serious outside challenge to make us responsible. We clearly probably should have been responsible before that. But why be responsible? A good example is in the sports area. "Why would anybody think that Dartmouth couldn't afford to have any intercollegiate sport that other colleges had?" Well, one of the cuts we made--I think it was in that first year, but I'm not sure--was in the wrestling team which was losing $20,000 a year or whatever it was. And which had a very small contingency, constituency. Of course it became the example of the crude and rude way that Dartmouth would go at these things. "How could you possibly move in on these vulnerable wrestlers who were just trying to exercise their muscles and take money away from them? And if you're going to do that," they said, "well then, clearly we're going to raise money privately to have these things happen. Because Dartmouth should be able to do anything it wants to do." That was the mentality of the time.

CARROLL: Did the Development Office look with favor upon the idea of rogue recruiters out there looking for money?

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: Were they taking action, then, to try to curb the wrestling group from going out and finding a patron?

HENNESSEY: They were trying to curb it, and they were unsuccessful. Dartmouth was doing it for crew, for rowing. That had the blessing of a few people in the administration, who really argued against Development. They were doing it for sailing. And they're still doing it to this day for sailing. And they're doing it for a couple of other sports. The Development Office was a very interesting one. They thought, of course, that in this striving for higher revenues and lower expenses that they would be asked simply to raise more money. We asked them to raise it for less money. We asked them to make cuts in their offices, too. Or at least to justify for the first time "why you need 14 people doing this or six people working with alumni affairs. I mean how do you know you couldn't do it with five?"

So it became a different conversation. Which finally, because of the way all of America became more cost-conscious, finally made sense. It wasn't so much that all America convinced Dartmouth to be more cost-conscious. It was that these mid-70's pressures put a couple of colleges out of business. I mean they became bankrupt, and they became famous cases. And we looked around the Ivies, and they were all going through exactly the experience we were going through. So then, as usual, the question was, "how can we do it better than they can do it? They're going to trim where they shouldn't trim; we're going to only trim where we can do a better job."

CARROLL: I remember at that time Yale was in a very severe financial crisis, which lasted many years.

HENNESSEY: Many years. Right on into three or four years ago, they were still in deep trouble. Because they tended to do things like deferring maintenance. Yale did that, and suddenly had a billion dollars' worth of new buildings and no money to pay for them.

CARROLL: When did it become the policy that when you raised money for a building, you must also raise an endowment for that building?

HENNESSEY: Well, it would have been in the 70's, maybe early 80's. It wasn't the policy in my time as dean.

CARROLL: Did the Murdough Center have an endowment to support it?

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: No, it did not. We didn't even have the brazen attitude to say to the Murdoughs, for example, you know, “we'll be glad to take your $3 million. But you're going to have to give us four or we're going to have to raise a lot more money for operating the building.” We thought that was probably not going to work. How are you going to raise money from people who are going to get credit--some people are going to get credit with their name on it for the building. Then you're going to go to some other people who will be very glad to pay for the maintenance with their name on the brooms and mops? No way! So it seemed ridiculous. But it may even have been only under McLaughlin that we were able to legitimize that and point out how to do it in a highly acceptable and highly stylized way. And it was a very smart thing that Dartmouth did.

CARROLL: Now, in September of '75, you have the opening convocation honoring Tuck.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: What brought that about?

HENNESSEY: Well, we realized that we had an anniversary coming along. Tuck was founded in the year 1900. It was the first graduate school of business in the world. Seventy-five is a nice number for a celebration. So we ought to do it. So we planned, starting in about '72 or '73, that we would do it. And our sesquicentennial was going to be in the academic year '75-76. So we, of course, had a committee that worked very hard on all the things we might do. Very much the way the medical school had a committee last year. And very much the way Tuck is now starting to prepare for its 100th, which is four years off. And we used the planning that Dartmouth did for its bicentennial, among other things. And the medical school had a re-founding anniversary. Thayer School had a centennial. I forget which came first. But one of our ideas was--John Kemeny was very willing to do this--let's start the academic year with an accent on the major event of the '75-76 school year, which we think is the 75th anniversary of the Tuck School. So John said, "We'll do that. We'll devote it to Tuck School. And I will speak, I, John Kemeny, will speak about Tuck and what it means to the school. And you, John, the dean, will give the major address." And I remember it very well.

CARROLL: And then what followed? How did they celebrate the sesquicentennial?

HENNESSEY: Is that the right word?

CARROLL: I was thinking sesquicentennial might be 150.

HENNESSEY: It is, it is.

CARROLL: And so I'm not-- But I don't know that there's a name for the 75th. The 50th would be the golden.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: So what is 75?

HENNESSEY: It's something.

CARROLL: Platinum?

HENNESSEY: I don't think so. We knew at the time because we had publications, but I have forgotten. Isn't that awful? Silver, golden... It wasn't golden, it wasn't silver. It was diamond.

CARROLL: Diamond!

HENNESSEY: Diamond.

CARROLL: Because Queen Victoria had--

HENNESSEY: Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee.

CARROLL: That's right. Exactly.

HENNESSEY: Exactly. It was our diamond. I don't think we pushed that too hard. Diamond didn't sound very university-like. We did all sorts of things. We had seminars. We had conferences with alumni in the various cities. We had a big Diamond Jubilee celebration on the campus. We chose to do that in June or May of '76 and invited everybody back. We had a scholarly conference, and we invited people from all over the world to come and be on panels. We published a book. The works. So we had a lot of stickers and medals. We did all the things you do.

CARROLL: Did you have also with this a big fund-raising effort?

HENNESSEY: Well, we certainly did, but we didn't make it a feature of the diamond celebration. We didn't say, “let's take advantage of this.” But we did, in

talking-- By then we had encouraged a lot of people to be primary prospects for giving to Tuck. We were really expanding our focus a good bit. In fact I remember so well in the 1975-76 year myself playing a primary role in raising a million and a half dollars for a chair. And I remember urging the donor--I guess it was '74-75—but urging the donor to be part of that Spirit of '76. Nineteen seventy-six was the nation's bicentennial, too, so everything got sort of wrapped up. We did ask people to-- We wanted the '75-76 year to be a banner year for alumni giving and for the Tuck Associates Program and for major giving. But we were wary of making too big a promise that we would raise X million dollars or that we would outdo the Murdough gifts because we weren't sure we would.

CARROLL: Did you do any kind of reflection upon what the future of business education was?

HENNESSEY: We did. That was part of what we did. I gave speeches. It was my year, curiously, or coincidentally, it was my year to be president of the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business. So I was going around the country preaching about the management schools, what they had been, what they could be. So, yes, I did that. Faculty did that. And we had these panels here for our celebration that looked ahead. And that was part of the spirit. We also commissioned a history. Twice we commissioned a history: Once in 1964 or '65. A woman named Carla Sykes, who was a faculty spouse (her husband was in the Sociology Department), she wrote for the Dartmouth Alumni Magazine a lengthy history of Tuck. I remember her doing that, but I don't remember the year. And then one of our faculty members, for the bicentennial, wrote an historical sketch. And we did a good bit of looking into our history and collecting memorabilia for the first time. And many of the times when I talked as dean, I talked about the history of the school.

CARROLL: When you look back on this--this is that not quite in the realm of this project--but I'm wondering, how accurate were you in '75 about the future and the direction of business education?

HENNESSEY: We were quite accurate in our predictions of the shape and the form and the areas for investment. We were less accurate in our predictions of the timing of when things would happen. We had the tendency that I think I always felt in making predictions: We thought some things that were already in process would happen really quite fast. For example, the internationalization of the student body, the curriculum, and the faculty at Tuck. We thought that we were at a point where it would begin

to change exponentially. We thought that the bringing of minority students and minority faculty would begin to change exponentially. The working of women into the warp and woof of the place and their being welcomed into every possible position in professional and business life would take off exponentially. President Carter was elected with a certain optimism about the international scene and what might happen. And there was a good bit of optimistic speculation. I think our most naive, perhaps, prediction was that overnight we would all become computerized. Partly we were listening to the romantic comments of John Kemeny. But we thought that was right around the corner.

CARROLL: It took a little longer.

HENNESSEY: It took a little longer.

CARROLL: There was a time when, in the spring of that year, '76, you were part of the group that had to examine retirement age, and whether 65 was the correct age.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes.

CARROLL: What brought about that idea?

HENNESSEY: What brought about it was a fascinating example of administration, and I wrote a case about it one time. I'll tell you the way I remember it. I read a little piece in some newspaper--I don't remember which one--saying that a committee of Congress was holding hearings on a bill to raise the retirement age in American employment from 65 to 70. And I said, “isn't that interesting? They do all sorts of weird things in Washington. They're going to hold hearings, and maybe in the next ten years it'll take it seriously. I can't imagine they will, though, because of all the incredible ramifications of doing that. And anyway, why do it?” The next day I read another article saying committee hearings have concluded, and a bill is going to be sent to the Senate to remove the 65 required age. I was on my way to a meeting in John Kemeny's office of the deans. So it had to be while I was still dean. But I'm quite sure it was in 1976.

At that meeting I said, "Well, I don't know what's going on these days. But here's something that's happening in Washington. Now obviously higher education must be aware of this because if you remove the 65 retirement age for colleges and universities, if that happened at Dartmouth next year, we'd be in the soup. All the people who are going to retire won't retire. And all the young people we were going to hire

won't get hired. And we'll break our budget, and we'll... This is nuts, isn't it?" And John Kemeny said, "Well, you've got to be kidding because I hadn't heard anything about that. Don't take it seriously. It's not really happening."

So I then said to--somebody was there representing the legal division and whose job it was to keep in touch with Washington--"Have you heard anything about this? Has anybody testified from higher education?" "No. Nobody's testified." "How could that be?" "Well, it's not going to happen." “Well, should we make some phone calls?" We made some phone calls, and we discovered suddenly that all of higher education overnight became aware that the committee of Congress, and now the committee of the Senate, which was going to report this out within three days of hearings, was responding to blue collar workers, unions, small business--it wasn't small business.

It was a group of people who consisted of unions on the one hand, groups that began to feel that America was discriminating on the basis of age in employment and that that was not appropriate, professionals who had testified to Congress that the 65 age was an arbitrary derivation from a very early time. And then I realized that in my undergraduate days I had taken a course in the Social Security System at Princeton, taught by a faculty member who had written the original Social Security laws. Who had said--I had forgotten it--you know where we got the age 65? We got it from Bismarck in 1848. Bismarck, who was one of the first people to put these things in place, suggested 65. And we've just never, ever questioned it.

So suddenly I found myself saying, “Wow! This whole thing is really a dramatic change in American society.” Most of the people I knew who were 65 weren't really--didn't seem old. I mean so--and I by then was 50-something-or-other. And I suddenly realized, “you know, I don't feel older ever.” Anyway, I then asked John Kemeny if we should not spend a lot of time and be concerned. And we rapidly found out that this was all going to be locked up within, I think, within a week, maybe. Kemeny was chairman or president of the Ivy Group, and our advice as deans was that John get on the phone, after checking out with Washington to be sure that we knew what we were doing.... Because we had, presumably, outposts in Washington which were supposed to be looking at legislative initiatives for the Ivies. We had Ivy people down there who would give us early warnings who had never said a word about this. Let's get a conference call of the Ivy presidents--the way I remember it--and see if we can't get in touch with some of our friends in the Senate, someplace where we have a connection. And maybe begin

to testify about how we are one sector that needs more time to work on this. “Exempt us from this.” But it might be a very tough call to do that; other people were asking for exemptions, too. I don't remember all of them who were.

Well, the bill itself was going to exempt business corporations with more than a thousand employees. I forget what the number was. But many of the business corporations were retiring people at age 62 or 60. IBM's retirement age was 60. They weren't going to interfere with that, at least not in this cut, believing that that was an important way to generate more jobs and so on. Well, the long and the short of it was that Derek Bok--and here I am going to take some liberties; I don't know that this is exactly what happened. But I do know that the senator who was willing to listen to us was a certain Patrick Moynihan who had recently left the faculty at Harvard to go into the Senate. And it may have been Bok, it may have been somebody else. But Moynihan said that he would provide a way for the Ivy presidents to express their concerns.

Then, of course, the Chronicle of Higher Education took it up in a front-page article, and we all began to talk and testify, and there were letters to the editor. And faculties became very interested and involved, half of them advocating that “we take the 65 off because I'm 65 and I don't want to retire this year and go to a lower income when I could continue to teach. And by the way, I'm the most popular teacher at Dartmouth. Why in the world shouldn't I teach one, two, three more years?” And the younger faculty saying, “our getting tenure depends upon the opening up of tenured spots. You brought me here because you told me in 1977 X was retiring. You tell me now that X might not retire? “

We did succeed in getting an exemption for five or six years while we tried to work out our feelings about all of this. Which meant, really, that we were invited to reconsider the whole tenure system, and it became then a national debate. I remember that the law was signed into being by Jimmy Carter. So it was after January of 1977 that the law itself passed. So we did slow it down, or it got slowed down. There are probably a lot of other reasons for that. And Congress grinds things slowly. It went into conference, and it took a lot of time. A lot of people by then were testifying to the economic characteristics of all of this. And it looked as if we'd better look at each economic sector and fine tune who should be exempt and who shouldn't. And should dentists who were in private practice be covered by this? Should physicians in a medical center be covered? Dozens of categories came under the microscope, and it took some time then. But it was amazing to me that something that important could get plunked down in a committee of the

Congress. They could get testimony after testimony. They could report out a bill. And no one would even know it.

CARROLL: During that whole debate, when they were trying to bring--Dartmouth and other Ivies--are trying to struggle with what's going to happen to them, was there ever any debate about whether tenure should be abolished?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Sure.

CARROLL: Then why was it retained?

HENNESSEY: Well, it's a big, big argument that I would like to describe to you, Jane. And I've been part of it all my academic life. And I've argued it on both sides and been part of public debates on it. Of course it was instituted originally for the protection—

[End of Tape 8, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 8, Side B]

But let me just describe this briefly as I can what I think is involved. The first issue is that when you grant tenure, that individual should be totally immune from any political interference by anyone with what that person will do. That person presumably then seeks the truth unencumbered. Says outrageous things, it doesn't matter. Pursues crazy paths, it doesn't matter. You can't touch that person. Trustees can't interfere. Nobody can interfere. You don't give tenure immediately because you're not sure that you want that person around forever. So you certainly don't want to give tenure until you're certain that that's the individual who has passed all your tests and is now ready for this permanent bonded contract that works both ways. It became...

Tenure was tested during the 30's and 40's. There were classic cases where the protection of tenure proved to be a noble part of the academic scene. There were people accused of being Communists or Nazis, whom the state legislators went after and governors went after, and who were protected. And finally universities were seen, I think, as better places because they cared so much for this pursuit of truth unencumbered. At the same time universities began to realize that the system worked pretty well for them, too. Because it was such a serious decision to be made, to grant tenure, that really tough appraisal systems, that really meant something, were put in place for those institutions who could put them in place because they were competitive. So it drove the quality of the performance appraisal system for junior faculty. And universities, then, that were of the first rank were proud of

the fact, became proud of the fact, in the 50's, 60's, that it was almost impossible to get tenure at my university if you started there. Harvard was one who said that. "We will never promote from within. It's just a privilege to be with us. But we are so committed to making the tenure decision as something we can be proud of for life, for the life of this faculty person, by which we mean until they reach 65."

And another thing that happened was that some institutions that were not competitive for faculty, began to trade on tenure as a way to compete. And so they said: "Come with us and we'll give you tenure in four years." "Ah, come with us, and we'll give you tenure in two years." "We're a struggling community college, and we're not sure how we're going to get faculty. But if you come with us, we'll give you tenure from the first day." That changed the whole mood of the system. Those of us who thought the system was working well began to be worried about the institution of tenure. If it's happening that way, it doesn't make much sense.

Now, we worked through the AAUP [American Association of University Professors], which had been interested since the 30's, in tenure and in the characteristics of tenure, in the way in which it would be administered as a system. So that it was trying to protect it and defend it, but also nurture it. So it was trying to work against this giving of tenure without much thought itself. It was diminishing the coinage. But, alas, what really happened was not so much tenure was diminished in a place like Dartmouth or Harvard or Smith. But there was tenure and then there was tenure. Tenure given by these junior colleges and quickly-created four-year places that were giving it in two years or so no longer--it was looked down upon as being... Not down upon. It was in a different world. And those institutions were going to have to live with that. I mean they, then, would not be able to replace their faculty because their faculty would be there forever.

Well, their argument was: "Don't worry. Our best faculty are going to leave us because we're just growing and burgeoning, and we're going to be out-- To the extent that we are able to give tenure to good faculty, they're going to be hired away by others. And we're always growing. So why worry?" Those places came on very bad days when they stopped growing, and they found they had given tenure to people who weren't being lured away by other places, and they then became stuck. Some departments in some places got stuck. I went to the University of Vermont as provost in 1987 and found some departments characterized by their having given tenure when they shouldn't have given it. And they were stuck with that group of people for a very, very long time.

Now, what else? Well, another issue, obviously, is--and I was very sensitive to this as the dean of Tuck—“what do you do in the abstract and to assure your clienteles about quality of senior faculty? If you give tenure at age 30 or 35, and that person has 30 years or more on the faculty, and can do anything the person wants to do, and you no longer have any promotion carrot or stick (or the system doesn't provide it), then what if a faculty member runs into a dead end, and gives up, and does no more scholarly work, and begins to teach badly? What do you do?” It was one of the first questions I asked when I became a dean.

I went and talked with other deans who ought to know. And I discovered that in the best places deans would say to me, "Don't worry about that. There are plenty of ways in which you can deal with quality assurance in the senior ranks." How? “Number one, faculty salary administration. Number two, enlightened counseling, guidance, developing supportive relationships, and allowing faculty the opportunity to fail and renew themselves. A faculty member who had pursued a dead end in scholarship, was a 55-year-old tenured professor of art history or accounting, who with a year's sabbatical and an opportunity to recommit to something else, without having to produce scholarly output in five years, you might have an opportunity to replant--have that person restart, almost, her or his career. So you should work on it as a human challenge. And realize that your job as a dean is to nurture faculty talent so that faculty can become what they should and can become--whatever their age. And if you do that, you'll find the life of the senior faculty supportive of one another.

“You also, however, must--must--if you want to maintain your sanity, promise your students that you will not allow to go into the classroom a faculty member who would be injurious to their best interests, whatever that means: teaching something that was out of date, teaching in a sexist way, teaching in a poor way.” And that was very, very difficult. At Tuck one of the things we did over time--and Dartmouth did it, too, and I watched it with great interest--was to develop a performance appraisal. A teaching measurement and appraisal system of a very sophisticated kind, using psychometricians from all over the country and making it user-friendly and doing all the right things. So that was part of counseling with senior faculty also. All the while thinking that it was still very important to protect freedom of speech.

I became convinced over time, though, that the evils of the system, which were still to say to faculty, particularly in places not like Dartmouth which was fairly privileged, “you can have it for life”-- By then

high schools were beginning to do it, too. I felt that that was a sort of mindless way of saying: “We don't know how to nurture growth in senior people.” Particularly if there's a junior department head, a 40-year-old department head or dean, and a 60-year-old faculty member or high school teacher, very difficult to know. I mean you sort of give up from the start. Well, you can't do that. My attitude became you've got to deal with that directly.

But, as I thought about the ideal day when we will have given up tenure because (a) we no longer need it to protect speech, that we will reach that time when we're strong enough as an institution to defend against--and we're making progress all the time anyway on that. And anyway, giving up that because there are so few needs to protect faculty who have many ways of protecting themselves from legislators who want to fire them or whatever. On the other side we would gain so much by getting rid of tenure, that we ought to give it up.

Then I began to realize, though, that if tenure is going to be dissolved, and it's going to become obsolete, probably the first place for it to happen should not be Dartmouth. Because if Dartmouth wisely, in a sober, diplomatically attractive way said to the world, “we're so good, we're so proud, we run our whole system so well, that we don't need tenure either to protect faculty or to inspire faculty or to protect the quality of teaching or anything else, we're going to give it up”, the institutions that would suffer in New Hampshire would be Nathaniel Hawthorne, would be New England College, would be the University of New Hampshire. Because then the legislature, which always seemed to be trying to interfere, would say: “You give it up, too. And then we'll be able to line item budget some of these crackpots that you have on that faculty that we really want to get rid of.”

So my feeling was it would be counterproductive for Dartmouth--and I felt that in Vermont, too. For the University of Vermont to do it, when the state college system was exposed, it's not the right time. And anyway, I wasn't convinced that we had matured the system of faculty appraisal and faculty inspiration in a way that would allow us to deal with senior faculty universally in this new and modern way. So long answer, but that's a big issue.

CARROLL: It's fascinating. I like that. Now, in September of '76, you began your association with Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. But I want to kind of sideline that because that's going to be a big section.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: And fraternities, I want to sort of skip over that. And I want to do the--you had assigned your Policy Studies 45 course in the spring of '79 to advise on the Three-Mile Island Commission that John Kemeny was heading.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: What role did they play in that? How did that work?

HENNESSEY: It was a very small matter, but it was very important to me, and seemed to me to be typical of Kemeny. I put it on the list because of it's reflection on John. John Kemeny suddenly became chairman of this important commission. He came back to the campus, and he said in his meeting with us deans: "Now, look, I'm going to be absent for a while. I want you to run--I want you to be able to handle that. And, you know, I've got a terribly intriguing challenge here. I don't quite know how to approach it. How do you do this sort of thing? It's a complex systems challenge, which I know something about now. But I'd really like, particularly you deans from engineering and business, to chip in." By then I was not a dean, so I'm wrong on that. Somehow he asked me individually. And one of the things I said to John was, "I'm now teaching an undergraduate course, and the course is focused on policy making and policy implementation in governmental and private organizations. This would be a pretty good case."

And he said, "Right. I'd love to get your advice. So I will invite your students to put themselves to create a consulting corporation. And I'll give them all the information I can give them. And I simply want their best advice on how to organize my commission, not how to do the job. But how to organize this huge commission with all kinds of funny people on it. How am I going to organize these people in a short time to do what we have to do?" And so my students got that opportunity because he was so generous. And because he loved working with students.

CARROLL: Did he use their ideas?

HENNESSEY: Yes, he did. He did. They were very pleased.

CARROLL: I bet. How did Jimmy Carter come to find Kemeny as the person to head Three-Mile Island, do you know?

HENNESSEY: No, I don't. But that's around someplace.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: None of us was surprised.

CARROLL: But Jean Kemeny said that he was waiting for the call after Three-Mile Island. He thought he would be on the panel. What he hadn't expected is that he would lead the study.

HENNESSEY: Well, of all the people who were known to have had something to do with the development of the atomic bomb in Los Alamos, he was one of those who was somewhat prominent. But not as prominent as many other people. I think the fact is that most folks who were visible, and who should be on such a commission--physicists, scientists, political science experts, nuclear regulatory people--were all either governmental and therefore not outside and able to make an objective judgment, or they'd had no administrative experience. One of the things John was was an extraordinary scientist and a mathematician and computer person who was an administrator, and had proved that he was a first-class administrator.

CARROLL: During the time he was away, was he a presence at all during those months here on campus? Or was he simply removed?

HENNESSEY: He was a presence. He couldn't extract himself from those things that were really presidential.

CARROLL: Yes, I was just curious. And then you say in '79 and '80 you had weekly sessions of what you called "hard bargaining" groups of trustees about the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. What were you bargaining about?

HENNESSEY: The future of the center.

CARROLL: Oh...

HENNESSEY: It would have what power, in what way. We'd been battling it since 1973. I had positioned the argument in '76 when I was asked to be a consultant to the center; Kemeny asked me to be. And that is one big saga of its own. It ended up in 1979-80. After we did all the hard bargaining, one of the more surprising things in my relationship with Kemeny happened. And I'll put it on tape in context later if you want. But he invited me one day, when we had solved this problem, and he felt that we'd solved it--and I had chaired the so-called Joint Council of the Medical Center during the time we solved it. He invited me up to his

office, and he said, "Sit down there," and put on the fire. And he reached down beside his chair and brought out a brown bag. And out of the brown bag he pulled a bottle of Hennessy cognac. Hennessy cognac! And he uncorked it, and he poured drinks for the two of us. I don't think anybody knows that.

CARROLL: Oh, what a sort of wonderful sort of sense of humor and style.

HENNESSEY: Yes, and style. I thought that was really classy.

CARROLL: Yes. I'll tell you what. I'm going to suggest that we stop here because the next two topics we have to really discuss are the fraternities and the medical center, and those are both big.

HENNESSEY: They're huge, yeah. That's fine.

[End of session four]

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: October 25, 1996

CARROLL: ...25, 1996. And I'm speaking again with John Hennessey. We left off last time talking a bit about your relationship with John Kemeny. One of the things that we haven't touched upon yet is the problem and the recurring problem of the fraternities at Dartmouth. I'm curious on two levels: You were here earlier at Dartmouth. Were the fraternities always a problem?

HENNESSEY: That's the first question you've asked that had a bit of a bias in it, Jane.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: You've been so careful. Problem, I don't know.

CARROLL: It is, it isn't. Let's put it this way. Did the nature of the fraternities change from the way they were in 1960 to what they were like in '79?

HENNESSEY: I think they certainly did. But it's a complicated story, in my judgment, because of the transformation of Dartmouth College into a two-gender place. What do you do with a fraternity--what does a fraternity do with itself--as it participates in the celebration of the change to coeducation? I think all the fraternities were prepared because they had discussed the matter, they had been part of the process. The dean of the college's office had worked wonderfully well through that four- or five-year period when the debate was hot. And then in the middle of the debate it became clear what was going to happen, what had to happen, even though there were folks who were still hoping it would be put off. But I don't think anyone believed that it was not inevitable that Dartmouth would become coeducational.

Another thing to say, as one analyzes all of that, is that fraternities are not stable systems. They are unstable as Dartmouth itself is, in the sense that every 12 months one quarter of the student body leaves, and a whole batch of brand new young people come in, with all the changes that implies. Over a period of four years, then, you have a total changing of the guard. At the same time the college lives and dies with history and ritual and continued culture. So that, as a silly illustration, that I've always marvelled at, the fact that on College Evening in the fall, when a bonfire is to be built in a certain way, somehow it gets built just the way it was built the year before. It just goes on and on and on. The same with the ice sculpture for the Carnival. It's not just the technique of the sculpturing. It's the built-in instinct that no matter what, it's got to be done. It's got to be. That the pride of the class is tied up in performing in a way that will carry an echo from the many shouted traditions of the past.

So, yes. They changed. At the same time, each fraternity, in my experience--and I visited a number of them while I was teaching my undergraduate course, I was invited to come and talk and shmooze and have dinner and all that--I thought they were really very different, one from another. They’re almost like the difference among people, the fraternities had their personality. And they were rather proud of that, too. They were able to continue that personality. Some fraternities prided themselves on being able to attract sports-oriented people. Others had a sort of sub-specialty of that: not just sports-oriented people, but it's hockey stars. Or another one might specialize in football second-stringers, or something. And I guess the specialization took place naturally because of the competition the fraternities experienced as they went out into their marketplace to bring in pledges, to bring in new students. They couldn't just say “we're like all the others.” They of course said, “we're different.”

Well, similarly with regard to coeducation: Some of the fraternities made it almost a stylistic declaration that they were going to be statesman-like and leaders in the transformation process. That it was an unusual opportunity. I think fraternities have one other aspect to them that I now think of as a remark on their differences, differences among one another, and that is they have alumni ties. And they also have ties locally, sometimes in the faculty, sometimes in the administration. The dean of the college [Ralph N. Manuel ’58 TU ‘59] in the early 70’s, in the mid-70’s, had gone to Dartmouth, had been a fraternity member, had been a football hero. Came to Tuck. So I knew him at Tuck, longer, as a student. And he had to rise above that as dean of the college. And deal with coeducation. I think he did that very well. But he was part of the system that he was responding to and acting as a policy guide and overseer to. And the fraternities knew that. So they tended to use the advice and help of the faculty, administration, people in the community, who were willing to visit and interact with them. Many trustees were--and I guess still are--alumni of the fraternity system. So those connections tended to be part of the, if I may use an art term, part of the tapestry.

When things went wrong, as they were bound to, in the quality of life at Dartmouth in the 70’s, a target for accusations about the causes was the fraternity system. And as the fraternities became a target, and as some of them were more vulnerable than others and became the classic cases of the jocks, the non-compliant male chauvinist pig contingent, then other feelings came out, too, that all of us had to handle in a mature way. And it wasn't easy. Let me illustrate. I think the experience, as you well know, the experience of a student on a selective college campus--on any college campus, almost any except the large commuting colleges and junior colleges and community colleges in the great cities where students don't really become a part of the institution because they go home at four o'clock and come in at nine--one of the things that's happening is that young people are carrying out their instincts for behaving creatively, experimentally, stupidly, wonderfully, and independently while they're here on the campus.

One of the classic experimentations--one of the experimentations that I think must have gone on back in Bologna in the year 1000 when they started to go to university--was to eat of the forbidden fruit. Almost in that same sense of the forbidden fruit. And one of the things for many students that was forbidden at home, and in those days forbidden in their high schools and certainly in the grade schools, was alcohol.

Experimentation with alcohol was more evident on the Dartmouth campus than on some others only because we were such a cohesive, coherent culture. But it was always a problem for faculty to decide how to think about that. Not so much what to do about it, but just how do you even think about that? “A number of students are getting drunk a couple of times a week, and they come into my class. Now what's my responsibility?”

And faculty members--I'm just repeating myself--always have reacted very differently from one another in the crucible of that dilemma as to what you do. Obviously, partly, because of their own past experience they tend to either find some opportunity to be pietistic about it, which they always wanted to be but somehow nobody ever listened to them in their earlier time. Or apologetic. Or philosophical, saying, “you know, this is a good thing. Isn't it much better that students experiment in this crazy way now and here than to have them do it later in a way that will injure a lot more people? Let them experiment and find their limits, and go out of here a whole person, having decided, no, I don't need to be drunk every couple of nights.”

Of course part of that discussion then was, “well, you see, one of the things that used to happen on the Dartmouth campus was that students would celebrate with alcohol more on weekends, when they imported women, than they did during the week. And now that women are going to be here, how is that all going to work out? Does that mean that in order to fashion your relationships with women, which you had learned to do with the lubrication of alcohol on weekends, and now women will be here seven days a week, what happens to the weekends and what happens to the lubrication? And should we have a party every night or every other night? What's cool? What's uncool?” All that was complicated business, too.

CARROLL: Was there ever any debate or questioning among the administration or faculty about the fact of what the legal drinking age is?

HENNESSEY: Yes, sure.

CARROLL: Because for most of this time it's 18, in fact.

HENNESSEY: Well, yes. I guess it's fair to say that until the mid-70’s, I don't remember--

CARROLL: I guess it was in the 70’s it's 18.

HENNESSEY: I think it became 18 maybe in the 70's. But there always was, I think, there always was an age. And I don't recall that that ever was addressed seriously by Dartmouth College. I mean Dartmouth's attitude was "Prohibition didn't work. We treat our students as adults," increasingly so during the 60's and 70's. "Alcohol was one of the things they experiment with, but the law doesn't say they can't drink in their own dorm room. The law says they can't buy it without certain permits. And, well, we're not going to police that because we don't sell alcohol. So, it's up to their local places to decide whether to serve or not to serve." Dartmouth knew that there were famous people in Hanover making a living by delivering beer to the campus. And from time to time there would be a sort of crackdown on that. But it was a losing battle, Jane. Much like Prohibition. This was something that was going to happen. And the more barriers you put up to it, the more fun it was. The more experimentation gave this heady feeling that "now I am an adult. Now I really am. I'm old enough to vote, I'm old enough to serve in the armed forces. And by gosh I'm old enough to experiment with alcohol."

So it was a very hard thing for Dartmouth to move in with any kind of Draconian laws or efforts. Now when the federal government finally got involved, as it did four or five years ago and cracked down itself; and said "if you don't police this system of drugs and alcohol, you will lose some of your federal privileges, federal funding. And we might inspect at any moment." Dartmouth took that very seriously and moved in with a whole new set of procedures and requirements. But earlier, no. I don't think there was ever anyone who thought that was the way to do it. Because you'd lose. And if you try something and lose it, then you're diminished as an adult model, as an adult force on the college campus.

CARROLL: Was there ever any effort by those fraternities, more moderate fraternities, perhaps, to try to control the behavior of their more outrageous brethren.

HENNESSEY: Always so, yes. Because every once in a while there would be some terrible incident--often during hazing of pledges. Although I think Dartmouth has had a somewhat healthier experience with that than a lot of places like the University of Vermont, for example, while you and I were there. But students would end up in Dick's House having consumed too much, or they'd fall off a roof, or they'd injure themselves in some other way. And then there would be an outcry. The whole community would realize that some limit had been passed. And responsible officers of fraternities--and in my judgment the majority of the officers, student officers, were quite responsible--found a way to talk about that and gather people around the idea that, "you know, this is a

civilized thing for us to do, but it can grow to be--it can be barbaric, too. Anything we do we can do too much of. And that's not the Dartmouth way."

And when it became clear that there were outside images that were injuring Dartmouth, the "Animal House" image or whatever it might be, a great many students stepped right up to that, saying, "you know, that's an exaggerated caricature, a Daumier etching, and it's not the real we-- It isn't. And it's going to hurt us in recruiting. It's not only going to hurt us in recruiting male students, because we're going to tend to get the students who want to come here to play, which we don't want because that isn't really what Dartmouth is all about." In the 60's and 70's students knew that. We were getting the valedictorians and-- So that wasn't right. "But if we're going to become coeducational, we don't want women who will come here because of their attraction to this outmoded and ridiculous cartoon. We don't want that." So sure. Everyone realized that was something we all had to work on.

Nevertheless, Jane, just to finish a sort of long paragraph there, there were faculty members, particularly, as you would expect, the faculty members arrayed themselves across a continuum. Those who joined in the debauchery, really, even promoted it--"alcohol, drugs, you name it, I'll be part of it;" to those on the other edge who on a principle basis all their lives had fought any kind of intoxication. And who were conscientiously appalled at the thought that one of these bright, promising, flowering young minds would be stunned by alcohol the day before the discussion of [inaudible]. That to some faculty members was outrageous, and they began to move on that.

And there was, as I mentioned to you, there was a time, there was a year, when all faculty either joined in saying, "you know, we're going to have to stop all this; and it's the fraternities we're going to deal with; and if we abolish them, everything will be better." And it happened with such a fury and around so many stimuli, that the moderates and those on the more barbaric end, who were drunk themselves part of the time or abusing the substances, were just quiet and let it happen. And there was a faculty vote to abolish fraternities. The trustees couldn't do that. They knew they couldn't do it, and they didn't do it. It would have been unwise to do it. It was a cri de coeur of the faculty. It was just saying, "I've had it! It's too much. I don't want to have to deal with this anymore."

CARROLL: Did the fraternities themselves decide to go coed? I know not all of them did, but some did.

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes. Sure.

CARROLL: And that came from not their national offices but from themselves?

HENNESSEY: From themselves. From their participation in the conversation on this campus about values and about the culture. Their willing decision to become coeducational. There were some who said, “Never!” There were some who were pushed by their nationals and disaffiliated around this issue. So it was a complicated business. And similarly when women arrived, there was the question of shall there be sororities or not? Great debate over that. And then a mixed history of some fraternities joining with sororities and mergers and acquisitions. And some sororities still, I think, remaining all female. And others starting out that way and then welcoming men. And some other living arrangements. Or junior-senior affiliation groups, not actually having the fraternity system--that is, not having a house where people could live, and not like a sorority or fraternity, but-- I often went off to have dinner in one house or the other named for--carrying a different sort of name--where people were gathering around their intellectual interests or their social philosophy or whatever it would be. I thought it was a healthy mixture of things.

CARROLL: What is the actual relationship of Dartmouth to the fraternities? Are they part of Dartmouth and administrated by Dartmouth? Or are they independent?

HENNESSEY: Someone else can give you the careful legal definition. My belief is that they're independent. Certainly they own their own property. They operate themselves. They have boards of governors, and they have student officers. But Dartmouth has said to them: “Even though you are, in that sense, autonomous. We will not look the other way. You are institutions, which are so much a part of our culture, our value system, and participating in the consequences of what we do here, that we are going to oversee you. How are we going to do that? We're going to do it by setting down some criteria, setting down some rules. One of the first rules will be that you will have rules. If you go about setting your rules in a way that will satisfy our rather abstract criteria, you'll never even know we exist as a college. But if we find that you aren't doing that, we're going to move in.”

I think that's a very American way. That's what happens with--that's the way the trustees deal with the faculty. It's “you're the experts, you're the pros at this. But tell us what your system is going to be. What is your

system of promotion and tenure? And we'll sign off on that. And if you don't abide by your own rules, we might move in." That's what accreditation is all about. That's what licensing is all about, too. Graduate business schools have their own accreditation body, and there's a federal agency that said, "Fine. Do it all yourself. But here's some guidelines."

CARROLL: One speaks so often or hears the fraternities spoken of as being primarily revolving around drinking. And I'm wondering, were drugs an equal problem? Did people talk about that?

HENNESSEY: There was a time when drugs suddenly became far more important than alcohol--far more so. I would guess that might have started about 1966 or '67. It was a new phenomenon in American life suddenly: LSD, marijuana, Timothy O'Leary, and all that. It became a real challenge. Because students and faculty, the whole culture, was unprepared for that. They knew how to deal with alcohol, and they knew how to deal with tobacco. "But LSD and marijuana, what are they? In the first place, what are they?" We had crash courses for the faculty and administration and student body on what they are. We created brochures explaining scientifically what these things are, what the rules are, what the national laws are, what might happen, and what our rules will be on campus about selling or using drugs.

I remember it so well because in my early years as dean, Dartmouth brought to this campus six or seven black gang leaders from Chicago, who were very bright young men. Had no opportunity to go to college or anything else. Somehow, through an alumni connection, we got the great idea that if we transported them--trans-potted them--from one cultural ground to another, Dartmouth might be able to do something for them, and they might be able to do something for Dartmouth. Like the Native American students I got to know, some of them came down and lived at Tuck because they didn't want to live--they, too, thought they were more mature than the Dartmouth undergraduates. They wanted to live with older people.

And I'll never forget the time when two or three of them came into my office and said, "Dean, we hear that drugs are coming on this campus. We just want you to know that you can count on us. We'll let you know the minute they hit this place. We'll let you know who's bringing them in. We're experts, we're pros on the drug culture. And we'll let you know how to deal with it." It was so amazing to me. They were so almost professional about it in an area where I knew nothing at all. So they were enormously helpful to me.

CARROLL: And protective, which is--

HENNESSEY: Very protective. Saying, "You don't want that stuff here."

CARROLL: Amazing. This is a bit of a sidebar, but I believe that was called the Bridge Program.

HENNESSEY: It was.

CARROLL: How long did that actually run, and why was it dropped?

HENNESSEY: Can't tell you. I don't know. I only know my own insight into it from a distance. And my impression was that the students who came found Dartmouth too much of a jump. It was too big a leap. They weren't ready, they really weren't. And I'm sure one of the lessons was: “Students have to go through a decompression that involves chambers of decompression. You can't come from 100 feet beneath the sea and bingo you're at sea level. You've got to go through...” And that's when the prep schools stepped up to it.

CARROLL: I see.

HENNESSEY: I think that's really what happened. The prep schools moved in and said: “We'll catch these students at a somewhat younger age, and we'll acculturate them, and find out those who can adapt and those who can't. And then colleges, we’ll help you with that.”

CARROLL: Okay. I was always curious about that. Now, you have a letter that you wrote to Robert Kilmarx in '78, where clearly he was addressing some concerns when he wrote to you about student life. And you wrote back a very thoughtful and considered letter about the different solutions, the possible solutions, to the excessive partying.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: What had brought about his concern?

HENNESSEY: Bob was a trustee. Had been since 1970, I think. Maybe '72. He chaired the trustees' Committee on Student Life, and he took it very, very seriously, as he always does. I knew him because we served on the board of the medical center together, and were dealing with medical center problems together in a problem-solving mode. So we would talk about things, and we liked each other, and spent a lot of time socially

with each other. His wife is--and was then--a person who aided and abetted the quality of his investment in student life at Dartmouth.

First of all, Bob Kilmarx himself was an alumnus, from the class, I think, of '50, maybe '51 [‘50]. But he married the daughter of a dean of the college of an earlier era, and she was able to almost personify-- He became interested when he married her, after all. Her name was Mary Neidlinger. When he married the daughter of the dean of the college[Lloyd Kellock Neidlinger ‘23], he married into a family that professionally cared a very great deal about the quality of student experiences on this campus. Her sister also married--her sister Susan married a Dartmouth person, and she became a very--both of those daughters became very prominent in their own right and are today in their own right. And I'll tell you about that sometime as a sidebar. But they're both really very interesting folks. But that was one of Bob Kilmarx's ties.

So Bob showed me he was deeply interested. And when I told him about some of the insights I was gaining as a Tuck faculty member who was suddenly in this new professorial chair and was teaching some undergraduates in my own way, he asked me to write it up, which I did. And then as you know, he decided to take that to the retreat that the trustees held that summer.

CARROLL: Now, you had a daughter at that time going through Dartmouth. And did she talk to you about what social life was like on campus? I guess I would've kept it to herself. [Laughter]

HENNESSEY: You would have?

CARROLL: From my father? Yes, I probably would have.

HENNESSEY: Some of it, but not all of it.

CARROLL: Not all of it.

HENNESSEY: I mean your father would ask you questions.

CARROLL: Mmmm hmmm.

HENNESSEY: I know what you're talking about because I went through that as an undergraduate, too. But Martha and I are very close. She was Dartmouth Class of '76, as I mentioned last time. She started as a freshman at Vassar, which is a family connection. Six people in the

family have gone to Vassar. So she had to go. She found coeducation there intolerable, just awful. Badly done. And transferred to Dartmouth. So she came here not as a freshman, but as a sophomore. She loved the experience. She had a marvelous experience. She was here in the early days of coeducation. She's a rugged, mature person. And she never described to me difficulties that she saw. She was very loyal to Dartmouth. She participated in student affairs heavily. She got together the first women's singing group, "The Distractions," and chaired that for a time. Met her husband that way because he was chairing the male singing group. She was in plays. She was on the judiciary board--I forget what the name of it was--but the board that sits in judgment on students who get into trouble. And had that experience. She experienced bias among faculty who were anti-women.

CARROLL: I was curious about that because you include that in the letter to Robert Kilmarx.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: What kind of bias?

HENNESSEY: Well, I think I alluded some tapes ago to some illustrations. And as you want me to be more clinical, I certainly can be. But let me illustrate: A faculty member who said in class, "I didn't vote for coeducation, but I will tolerate it." And then called on men and didn't call on women. That simple. Men who refused to change anything in their course to accommodate to the presence of women, including the telling, occasionally, of sexist types of jokes before the term "sexist" was even invented. Faculty members who were sexually abusive--and who are today sexually on the prowl in certain ways. And therefore really not ready for coeducation: almost dangerous animals in that zoo. But Martha was very careful in portraying the Dartmouth experience to me. And I think it'd be fair to say she was an enormous, loyal advocate of Dartmouth College.

Nevertheless, after she graduated and was married and was teaching school; and I began to have my own experience with undergraduates; and I was then dealing with her not as a student at Dartmouth where I really did want to keep myself-- I was a dean, among other things. I didn't want Martha to have to be bothered by that, so that she would be perceived as anything other than her own person while she was here. But I remember talking with her and her husband before I wrote that letter to Bob Kilmarx.

[End of Tape 9, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 9, Side B]

...an alumna. I think then her attitude and mine both were, “you know, things are going very well at Dartmouth. We're very proud of it. And maybe it could be the visible well-known campus that addressed some of these problems in a leading-edge way.”

I always said, and deeply believe, that Dartmouth was not--did not--deserve its reputation as being somewhat more drunkenly and more sexist than other Ivies or quasi-Ivy schools. I never believed that. I've often battled it and fought it and I’ve tried to marshall evidence for it. I really think that's just not true. But that “Animal House” image is very hard to defuse.

CARROLL: And how did it get that image, I wonder? I’ve always thought that’s unusual?

HENNESSEY: I think it did for a number of reasons, Jane. Let me try to speculate. You often ask that kind of very good question where I become reflective. But it's never simple. I think, first of all, colleges need to develop a reputation. And the reputation needs to be a vulgar one, I mean vulgar in the sense that it will be understood by the crowd. It can't be a 16-page brochure. It can't be a 14-paragraph policy statement. It can't even be a one-paragraph mission statement. That isn't what people want to hear. They've heard those polysyllabic terms before. What they want is, “come on, now tell me, how is Dartmouth different from Harvard? How is it different from Princeton, from Smith?” You name it. “From UVM.” And there's got to be a quick and easy answer.

Well, one thing that people are always comfortable saying is: “Well, first of all, wait a minute. The similarities are far more important than the differences. The students who come here are not different from the students who went anyplace else from your Newton High School or wherever.” They really aren't. But allright, so they could go to Smith or Princeton or Dartmouth, and they came to Dartmouth. Why did they? Well, one reason might be that Dartmouth is a special place. What does that mean? It's in a rural setting. It is a distinctive culture. It's anthropologically a definable culture, and it develops almost deliberately. It develops kind of a mystique of being a little more relaxed in this natural setting. Not fighting smog, traffic, noise, crime. Which may mean that we can be more--in one sense more civilized. But unfortunately what comes with that also is more visibility to one another. Therefore, what you do becomes more visible and more the business of the other people in the culture. "What are you going to do tonight?" may

be asked on this campus; may not be asked at NYU. And may not be asked much at Princeton, because people tended--I'm reflecting now on my own undergraduate days--but it was 55 minutes away that you could be in New York or Philadelphia. But that certainly in those days and now, that's just not-- We're beyond the magnetic field here of the megalopolis, and most of the other Ivies, except for Cornell, really aren't.

So, anyway, that's one reason I think why then the drinking that took place on this campus, as part of this coherent culture where you're looking at everything that happens, became something that students talked about. How can I put that? Students who were here would say to students who asked what their life experience was here, “well, we are closer to the outdoors; but we're also able to do other things that are not lumberjacky-like, are not rural-like, are not outdoorsy-like. But in a way they are. It's the hard living, hard drinking. It's that we're not prissy. We're not afraid to drink. We're not afraid to experiment with things.”

I'm searching for something else that I've never really been able to articulate. It came out, I think, almost in the attitude toward the football games when this culture went out on the field to battle another culture. “How are we going to battle Harvard?” Because Harvard has the image of being just freakishly egghead-ish, and not able to relax, not able to be cool, not able to live a full life. “But what do you mean by a full life beyond the intellectual life?” Well, one thing you do mean is “stop and have a drink. I mean you don't have to study that way all night. You can stop and have a drink.” Now, unfortunately, the drinking of alcohol from earlier days has become the way to interact socially around a number of messages that you're trying to convey.

Now what then happened, I think, that may have--the difference in the 60’s and 70’s was that some surveys, printed surveys, of particularly the more selective colleges, books that were available to parents and applicants, some of them tended to feed back this fraternities and alcohol kind of image. And didn't choose to notice that the same thing was true of Harvard and others. Next, almost-- Another thing that happened was that Dartmouth students tended to be more disrespectful and unruly at football games. And that fed into this idea, “well now, maybe they're drunk.” And often they really weren't. And then finally Chris Miller, who had gone to Tuck, who I certainly knew who he was, created the film “Animal House”, and decided, simply, to make a parody of the whole darned thing. But it was one of those parodies that took on a tinge of reality to it. And suddenly that was “so that's Dartmouth.” And that was very hard to shake, that then was out there in the public eye as

another handy-dandy way to characterize Dartmouth because the more complicated ways are more difficult and who cares about the more complicated ways? That's my feeling.

CARROLL: In this letter to Robert Kilmarx, you really have some very good suggestions on ways to perhaps shake the strangle-hold of the fraternity system and thus perhaps counterbalance some of the alcohol-related activities. And you talk about a student center and the establishment of a student center.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Had there been no student center at that point?

HENNESSEY: There really wasn't. I even have trouble thinking back to what there was that was available. Prior to 1970--prior to 1963--there was really... Was there nothing? Well, there was College Hall. College Hall had rooms for clubs and activities. So did Robinson Hall: student newspaper, student radio station. But there was no gathering place. There really wasn't a gathering place. 'Sixty-three was the inauguration of the Hopkins Center, and that provided a very large, accommodating kind of space. But it really wasn't a student center. It was a center for the performing and creative arts. And the great idea of the trustees--or at least the trustees claimed it. To be able to get students to go in there who weren't interested in the arts--and they were fearful that 90% of the students wouldn't ever go there--was to put the mailboxes right in the center of the whole thing. And that made a difference. But in those early days, Hopkins Center was certainly not a major gathering place for students. Until Collis came along, there really wasn't. There was an attempt to turn College Hall into a student center. But compared with other colleges and universities, it was really sad. It just wasn't there.

CARROLL: When was Collis then erected--or renovated--to become a campus center?

HENNESSEY: I think 1986 maybe. And then--

CARROLL: That's late.

HENNESSEY: And then expanded more recently. Yes, it didn't come along for a while.

CARROLL: So when students went to gather, the only alternative really was, then, fraternity houses or clubs of some kind.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes. Or dorms. Some of the dorms provided pretty good social space and social activities.

CARROLL: The other thing you suggest is, that there should be a renewed vigor given to student government--

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Did that ever come about?

HENNESSEY: It began to, and it's waxed and waned. And I frankly don't know what it's like today. But I thought the college was almost an accomplice to the euthanasia of student government. Student government became nothing here. And I couldn't understand that. Why would that be true? Particularly in an age of new democracy on the campus. An age when the administrators and the faculty, but particularly the administrators, were seeking the response from the students that they were willing to sponsor themselves. “We're no longer paternalistic. But if we're not going to be paternalistic, we've got to be democratic. And we can't be democratic if there isn't a representative student body out there in some way.” But that has been a really rough problem now for 15 years. It was, frankly, at UVM. I found it a very, very difficult problem. Even when you get a student government, you have people who are ambitious and good. Young Bill Clintons who are there, and they want to do it. Are they going to have any following? Is there really going to be a system that will care that they're doing anything?

CARROLL: And the last thing you say is that the admissions process should consider more carefully the nature of the students that they admit and an interest, I think really is what you’re implying, of the students they admit.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes.

CARROLL: Was that implemented, do you know?

HENNESSEY: I did know--and I've forgotten a bit. I knew because one time in 1979 or '80, I forget which, in somebody else's course I was invited to teach a series of four sessions on the admissions process to selective colleges, because I was at the time the chairman of the board of trustees of the Educational Testing Service. So I was a resource. Like, bring ETS to the campus and we can really tear it apart--the tests and everything that goes with them. But during that time, I took the students through the life of ETS, through standardized testing, through the critique of

standardized testing in the media. And then right up to Dartmouth's use of tests and Dartmouth's admissions process. And the director of admissions, at my request, put together six or seven--with the names blocked out--six or seven samples from the previous, from the class that had just graduated, but admissions folders for them. Everything they saw when they admitted them. And we went through all that.

And it was clear to me then that it was a very complex and subtle and professional process. And a major characteristic of it was that the college did not want to admit to Dartmouth anyone who would fail here in one way or another. And one way to fail would be to have developed habits of substance abuse or partying. “Even though you're getting 800 scores, you're partying and your grades are terrible; but you have an 800, so you demand admission to Dartmouth. You would fail here in the modern Dartmouth.” So, yes, I'm very pleased and proud, personally, of the thoroughness, of the professionalism of the admissions process on this campus for all the years I've known it. It's just been--it's a gem; it's superb. I by then knew from friends who were teaching in prep schools that some of the prep schools were having a terrible time with substance abuse. I mean a really rocky time. There was then--this was in 1976, '77, '78--an Alcoholics Anonymous chapter at two of the prep schools. Alcoholics Anonymous!

CARROLL: Was Dartmouth ever protected at all being removed from big cities? Did it take longer for drugs to come up here?

HENNESSEY: Yes, I really think so. I think the invasion of this campus by drugs, as different from alcohol--which is really a very different phenomenon, I think, in so many ways. I think drugs came and went. And there was sort of a cool aspect to the marijuana business. But hard drugs really never made, in my judgment, never made much of an impact here. And finally in all sorts of ways Dartmouth became, in my naive judgment, cleansed of the hard drug culture. And part of that was because we were really in a non-urban setting, I think.

CARROLL: Smaller market.

HENNESSEY: Yes. That's part of it.

CARROLL: Moving from drugs, from one kind of drugs to another, I want to talk about the medical school a little bit.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: In 1977 John Kemeny announced in a speech that you were going to plan a model for a unified medical center that would include Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, the Dartmouth Medical School, and the Norris Cotton Cancer Center. What became of that?

HENNESSEY: Are you ready for a long answer?

CARROLL: Yes, I am.

HENNESSEY: I mean, Jane, this is really a... If you don't yawn, I'll think perhaps you're not human. I'll try to be brief. I joined the board of trustees of Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital in October 1963. By 1968, '69, '70, it was obvious that the hospital had to make a fateful decision: Was it going to become a first-class tertiary care referral institution--meaning “we do all the medical specializations and sub-specialties?” Grow out of its base as a community hospital working mainly with local physicians without much academic coloration to what was happening. “Or are we going to become a major medical center in this part of New England, deserving the process of having referrals come here from Concord and from Montpelier and from north and south? I mean we're big enough so that we certainly cannot count on having all of our patients come from the immediate area. And because there are some excellent people on our staff and we do have a medical school connection of sorts, we're big enough and expensive enough so probably we have no choice. We're going to have to be one of these developing medical center hospitals” that we were beginning in 1970 to see spotted around the nation, always tied to a medical school.

We looked at Dartmouth Medical School and wondered, because it was a two-year program. Dartmouth Medical School gave MD degrees until 1914. The Flexner Report--an interesting study of its own--caused Dartmouth to say: “You're right, Dr. Flexner. We don't have a large enough clinical base to continue to give an MD here. And instead of going out of existence as a medical school, we're going to retreat to what we do well. And that is, teaching students in the first two years, anatomy and physiology and biochemistry and microbiology. That we do well. Those are the basic sciences, and we're going to give a master's degree at the end of that two-year period. And we're then going to link our students up with great medical schools elsewhere, who by then will have found some of their students washing out, no longer interested.” And it turned out that there was a very nice twinning relationship with Harvard Medical School, which for years meant that students would spend two years here and two years at Harvard Medical

School, and get their MD degree from Harvard. Of course many of them went elsewhere.

Dartmouth used, by the way, in that two-year medical school program what in 1900 was called the Dartmouth Plan, which was you can come at the end of your junior year. Which was true at Tuck and Thayer and at the medical school. It was nationally famous as a sort of experiment. So students who went to the Dartmouth Medical School until 1970, went into a two-year program after 1914. And almost all of them went at the end of junior year. It was a great deal. You shortened your time. It cost less. You were ready anyway; you were focused. The admissions standards were very high and high morale; very good.

[In the middle 1950's, Dartmouth Medical School was put on "confidential probation" by a national accreditation committee and was on the brink of closure. S. Marsh Tenney, a 1944 graduate of the School was recruited to "save" the two-year program, and he did so with distinction. As Associate Dean for Planning and Research and Professor of Physiology and, then, in 1957, Director of Medical Sciences (a post senior to the Dean), he rebuilt the School from six full-time faculty and three small, aged buildings to a modern institution of acknowledged promise in the basic sciences. By the time he was named Dean in 1960, he had already succeeded brilliantly in attracting strong faculty and students and building research strength. While DMS was still a two-year basic science school, it re-earned the respect of all constituencies, including the science division of the College's arts and sciences faculty, as well as major donors. Yet, the 1960's brought other challenges and once again caused a reconsideration of the School's future by the Dartmouth trustees.]

About that same time, the Dartmouth trustees were not only debating coeducation, but they were hotly debating the future of the Dartmouth Medical School. There were trustees who wanted to close it. It was expensive. It was only a two-year program, and there weren't many two-year programs left in the country. There had been 20, there were 15, there were 12. It looked as if we were a vanishing breed. And that something bad might happen. We might suddenly find that we were dis-accredited or that nobody wanted to come because it didn't look like a very sensible way to go to medical school. It might also be true--in fact was becoming a bit true--that Harvard had fewer places. And what we would do if there weren't places in the clinical years of major medical schools into which our students could go?

The budget crunch was not yet quite visible. But it was obvious on the American medical care scene that costs, medical costs, were beginning to go exponentially way beyond a growth rate that anybody else, anyone, had ever foreseen. It began in 1964 with the Medicaid--Medicare--law. And all the predictions about what that would cost were wrong. And then technology began to boom. Everything became possible, and we'll do everything for anybody: kidney dialysis, kidney transplants, you name it.

After--and I'll try to shorten this part of it. The Dartmouth trustees debated fiercely among themselves and finally decided “we will create the MD program again. That's what we will do.” That was a board of trustees at it’s best. Only the board of trustees could say that. It did a thorough study. It knew what it was doing. And even though there were people saying, "Don't do that!" There were trustees who eventually resigned over it. They did it. But when they gathered around that Saturday morning when they wrote their vote, they said several things, but one of them they said: “We're convinced that there's room for a three-year MD program, and let's do that. That'll be our special thing. Not a four-year program. They also said, we cannot run the risk of putting an MD program together if we cannot guarantee a first-class clinical education. How do you do that? You have a hospital and a medical staff that are the best in the land. And the only way that we can have any influence over that, in that the hospital's a totally, totally separate corporation, the group practice is a totally separate New Hampshire corporation....

“And although we have given some of the clinicians on the Hitchcock clinic staff faculty privileges because they teach physical diagnosis as part of the two-year program, nevertheless we've never put any quality constraints on those appointments. And even for the senior people on the faculty--they're lecturers or they're assistant professors--there's no real faculty position involved there.” I'm saying that too strongly because some of the faculty members from those days who were clinicians really prized their faculty appointment and well they should, they did a very good job of it.

But in short, the trustees were asking for a medical center. And in working with the hospital trustees, not with the clinic but with the hospital trustees, a body on which I sat, there was agreement to put together a one-year study group that would decide how to create something called the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. In June of 1973 the board of the hospital and the board of the college voted it into existence. And what it was to be was a voluntary partnership, not a

separate corporation, not a legal entity, but a voluntary cooperative partnership; which would be overseen by something called the Joint Council. On which there would be two trustees from the college, two from the hospital, after some debate two from the clinic, and the dean, and the head of the medical staff, the medical director, and the chief executive officer of the hospital.

At one of their first meetings, John Kemeny asked the question: “How can we do this?” And I can tell you, if you want that much detail, what they thought this Joint Council would do, and what the separate bodies had committed themselves to in working as a unit--I think I ought to pause for a minute and tell you a few of those. One of the obvious things was that there was going to have to be a new department of medicine, of surgery. There were no such departments. There were no clinical departments: medicine, surgery, psychiatry, pathology, and maternal/child health. Those were the five [new] clinical departments, and they-- In establishing them, we all had to do it together. The [medical dean would lead the process of finding new clinical chairs]. They were going to be the equals of these titans who were chairs of basic science departments. So it was going to change the medical school. So the dean cared a very great deal about that.

The hospital was suddenly going to be dealing with a medical staff, its medical staff, that was going to have new departments and new chairs of those departments. “Well, how are you going to chair a department that you want to be world class from the start?” Well, one of the implications was “we probably don't have anybody here who can do that. We're probably going to have to recruit a new chairman of medicine. The first chairman of medicine is probably going to be somebody from the outside. The first chairman of surgery is going to be somebody from the outside.” The physicians, the very good physicians who were here, they were very proud of what they were doing. And were in the Hitchcock Clinic, the group practice that had been founded in 1927, were not entirely enthusiastic. They were guarded in their enthusiasm for the creation of this new department and the bringing in of a new person from outside. For obvious reasons, including, “who are going to be the faculty people?” And how were they going to be paid and promoted? All that.

John Kemeny had the thought that, “you know, this probably is going to require some sort of a coordinating executive, maybe a president of the medical center.” And we all agreed in the fall of 1973 to establish the office of the president, a paid full-time president, of the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. And John Kemeny had the

brilliant idea, in my judgment, of who that should be. Because he came to a Tuck overseers meeting that fall where one of the overseers spoke convincingly about management in the health-care world. He was a Tuck alumnus, a Dartmouth alumnus, who had gone on from here to get a law degree, who had been a White House Fellow. Had run Medicare and Medicaid in the Nixon Administration. And was executive vice president of one of the large urban hospitals. And John said, "Why not Howard Newman?" And we all said, "Why not?" We asked him, and he took it. So Howard Newman came here in 1973 to be the president of the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. I knew him well because I had known him when I was a faculty member and then as a dean at Tuck. We had done things together. Howard had a very tough time, as you might not be surprised.

In August 1976 John Kemeny called me and asked me if he could talk with me. And I knew I was in for trouble because he wanted to come to see me; he didn't want me to come to see him. It wasn't August '76 because I was in Europe. Because I stopped being dean on June 10, 1976, and I took my first sabbatical leave and went off to Europe with my spouse. So it must have been June. It was. It was May or June of '76, John came down to see me and said, "Something I'd really like you to do. The medical center isn't working. It's got problems that I don't even understand. They're fights every day. It's almost dysfunctional. People are at loggerheads. Newman isn't able to solve the issues, and he doesn't know what to do next. Would you take on a consulting relationship with the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center? I mean you've got this time ahead of you; it's a sabbatical." I said, "John, I'm aching for this sabbatical. I've got huge plans, and I don't want them interrupted in any way." "I want you to do this. You're the only one who can do it. You got us into this. You agreed that Newman ought to come. But the thing's going to fall apart. We're going to lose our medical center. Will you do a diagnostic study of the medical center in its present situation?"

I agreed to do that. And when I came back from my summer, I began a four-month period on my own--without pay because I refused to be paid (I thought that was wrong) and without giving up my hospital trusteeship. I interviewed everybody. I interviewed 45 people. I became an oral historian. And I became very skilled at taking some notes. And then I didn't tape-record because I thought that would be a barrier. But I dictated my notes right after, and I had a huge notebook of interview notes. I met with groups, I met with people. And then I took two weeks off in late December or early January, and I wrote a report, a diagnostic report and made recommendations. And that report was delivered to

the Dartmouth trustees, to the Mary Hitchcock trustees, to the governing board of the clinic, to the Joint Council of the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. And it started a series of events. My diagnosis was, you're right; it's falling apart.

[End of Tape 9, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 10, Side A]

HENNESSEY: But the members of the clinic, who testified to me conscientiously described the demonic traits, characteristics, of those who were in the medical school and those who were promoting the hospital point of view. And when I talked to the hospital people, they saw terrible flaws in the clinic and the medical school. And the medical school, they pointed fingers at both the hospital and the clinic. In pretty serious ways. It was not quite a Middle Eastern type of deeply built-in bias, prejudice, and animosity, but it came close. Because there really were some cultural, almost religious, gaps, philosophical gaps, that were very hard to bridge.

Some of the other people I talked to were almost neurotic because their jobs were to hold everything together: the clinical chairmen, for example. By 1976 the clinical chairmen were all present. They'd been recruited. They were fine people. They were beginning to make their way. But they had no status in the power and structure of the clinic. The clinic said, “very interesting that you’re here. You’re medical school, as far as we were concerned. We don't control you. You don't control us.” Because they didn't want interference with what they'd been doing all of their lives, which was to produce the highest quality of medical practice, clinical practice, you could have. Dartmouth Medical School had no money. In fact one of its crises that everybody talks about in 1976 was that it may become bankrupt. It was not run well. At least it was criticized by the other institutions for not having its hands on its financial affairs. Dartmouth was criticized because it wasn't overseeing the administration of the medical school appropriately, wasn't providing the financial and business expertise that should be provided. It was tending to treat the medical school as a “tub on it’s own bottom”, the way it treated Tuck School. But the medical school didn't have the kinds of expertise that Tuck had. So it was sick, [in business terms].

And to do anything, the clinical chairmen, to do anything new, they needed some money, some little pot of mad money or experimental or entrepreneur money. The only way they could get it was to go to the clinic. And so the clinic controlled them completely. And they were enormously frustrated in multiple ways. I stated that I thought the

situation had reached a point where it could either go backward and dissolve, or it could move forward and become a true academic medical center. But to become a true center, there had to be more coherence in decision-making and more sharing of power. And that probably would mean some financial sharing. It might mean, indeed, that we would begin to allow the president of the center to have more clout and the board to have more clout in making decisions where there was no way the entities could agree, where there was a no-win situation--or a win-lose situation. There was no way the clinic was going to vote for a combined center budget that would take money from them and give it to the medical school. And so it went. But we all felt that if we got to a level of real commitment and trust and the fact that we had no place to go but to unify, and to share, and create a governing body that would be respected because it would make wise trade-offs. It's almost like the present situation in baseball, where there is no commissioner, and there is no board. You can't make tough decisions.

So my recommendation was an easy one to make. I said, "Let's have a unified medical center." And I explained it and marketed it. There were complications in that because in April--in May--of 1977, after I had delivered my report to everyone, and then had commented as a witness to all of them with regard to the next steps I thought ought to be taken, the next studies that needed to be done, who needed to them, what more research we needed to do, suddenly something happened that made life very much more complicated for me. The chairman of the board of the hospital became ill, and I became chairman of the board of the hospital. And we had all agreed that the chairman of the Joint Council of the medical center would be the person who was the chair of the board of the hospital. So I became chairman of the board of the Joint Council, as well as chairman of the board of the hospital. And here I am, chair of the Joint Council, showing my utter fairness and statesmanship in looking at my recommendations!

CARROLL: What does one do in that situation? Do you sit back and let others discuss your plan? Or is the natural impulse to support and defend what you've created?

HENNESSEY: I didn't want to defend it, and I didn't want to support it. But I did want a process to take place that would assure the most responsible consideration of all of those recommendations and any alternatives. My attitude was, “Be my guest. I gave my opinions. I mean you don't need to hear from me anymore. I'm going to retreat from that. I'm going to be one of the judges of all this. And if I hear a good idea for a different way to do it--and the world is changing very fast; my ideas may be obsolete

two months from now... But we're going to have to be constructive, and we're going to have to come up with ways of cooperating. Of not just fighting and shooting one another down, but of cooperating." John Kemeny was pleased with that approach and began to say then in the fall of '77, I think you said it was, began to talk about this openly.

Later--we kept having reports and commissions where we look at this and that, and a little bit later we created a sort of final attempt to bring about some cohesive solution for some of these harder problems. And our method of doing it, borrowing from collective bargaining, was to create a group of hard bargainers who were sort of put in a room and told, "Don't come out until you solve this." Almost like a labor negotiation. You go into it saying, "We can't agree." But if you know you can't come out until you agree, maybe you can agree. And during that year John Kemeny and Ralph Hunter ['31 MS '32], who was a trustee, for the college; and myself and Allen Britton ['42] for the hospital, two trustees, chairman and vice chairman; and [Richard] Dick Cardozo ['42 TU '43] and Fred Appleton and, then one other physician, who were both on the board of governors of the clinic, for the clinic, agreed that every Thursday--my memory of it is pretty clear as to what we did. I think we said we'll meet every Thursday night at seven-thirty until we solve it. Every Thursday night at seven-thirty. And the place we chose to meet was John Kemeny's house in his study.

We battled, we got lawyers. We battled, we battled, we battled. We threatened. We stomped. We walked out. Got mad. Finally in March--maybe '79, maybe '78; I can go back and get the year for you--we signed an agreement. We all signed off on putting it all together. And that was the moment when John Kemeny invited me to his office to drink some Hennessy cognac. He gave me more credit than I deserved for pulling that off.

CARROLL: If they had not been able to reconcile their differences and come to a mutually agreed-upon solution, was there a danger that the medical school would be eliminated?

HENNESSEY: Yes, there certainly was. And there were still trustees even at that time, in the late 70's, who were saying, "It doesn't matter whether you produce this medical center or not. We cannot afford it. Dartmouth College, its first mission is the high-quality experience for undergraduates--educational, learning experience. That's its first priority. It always has been, and it always will be. And if anything interferes with that and injures it in any way, it's got to go. And the medical school looks to me," said some of the trustees, "like a dark hole

into which we could sink our treasure forever. And you say we can't have a medical school unless it's first rate. Well, we can't afford a first-rate medical school."

The feds are beginning to cut back a bit in the late 70's. Nixon put cost controls on hospitals, and they were beginning to say, "If we have cost controls, we can't give money to medical schools." I mean there were all sorts of things happening. And it was a good debate. But Dartmouth said, "You know, in the end, we think we can do it, and we're going to do it." So they reaffirmed their interest in having a first-class medical school. They decided to do some very serious fund-raising for a medical school, earmarked. Those were very interesting days.

CARROLL: I'm curious as to what you perceive as being the argument that tipped the scales in the favor of keeping the medical school and keeping the medical center.

HENNESSEY: No one wanted to dissolve the medical center. The question was, who was going to have power at the top? The best and the brightest people in the clinic, who were superior, superior people in every way, envisioned for this place a system very much like the Mayo Clinic, where the physicians were in charge of everything, including the medical schools. And they were determined to produce that kind of model. They were not willing to be beholden to the medical school or to the college. They were forced to agree by March of '78--I think it was '78--that there was no alternative. And that in order to maintain their own faculty positions, which meant a very great deal to them, facing John Kemeny right across the rampart in his study, over time they came to say, "Well, you know, maybe it'll work." But, Jane, two months after the agreement was signed and toasted, it fell apart.

CARROLL: Really!

HENNESSEY: It dissolved. And that's a whole new chapter, a whole new chapter. And I can tell you all about that, I can tell you what's going on today.

CARROLL: Yes. I think this would be good. I think we want to follow it through. This is sort of like the Middle East peace talks when you think you have peace, and then you try to implement it.

HENNESSEY: Yes. And for very fundamental reasons the board of governors of the clinic, which was then its governing board, although we insisted, we really insisted, that they create a lay board of trustees, so they would be able to establish their public-interest postures through that method of

governance which, we said, “the college has, the hospital has. Why don't you have?” Otherwise it's almost like dealing with a university run by the faculty. It's not quite there; you have too many conflicts of interest. And they did create a board of trustees finally. But the governing board of the clinic, honorable people looking very hard at this compact that we'd come up with, finally said, “No, you know, that isn't right. The Mayo model is a better model. Medical centers around the nation don't work terribly well, the faculty-- if the medical school calls the tune. We're going to have mediocre research and patient care. And it's going to cost much too much. And we don't want that, and we're not going to do it.” So they backed out.

Howard Newman resigned. My responsibility was to find a new president because I was chairman of the governing board. We found a new president and installed him in about 1980. John Kemeny left. Dave McLaughlin came on board. Got involved in the drama. Was very different from John Kemeny. Part of the examination of the difference between the Kemeny presidency and the McLaughlin presidency can be seen through the prism of the medical center and what happened. I'll give you just a couple of highlights, and then we can come back and fill in as you want to fill.

It was clear that it was going to take longer to patch this thing together. We were going to have to do more work, and we did more work. We brought in law firms, we brought in consulting firms. We believed that one thing we needed to do was to create bilateral legal relationships between the clinic and the college, the clinic and the hospital, the hospital and the college. That these compacts, these agreements, would provide a kind of base, a different sort of base, from that hard-bargaining model. And that through that process we could strengthen our commitment to a center. By 1982-83, we had done a good bit of that.

And we saw some advantage to showing progress by incorporating, legally incorporating, the medical center and creating a board of trustees instead of a Joint Council. And one of my strong beliefs was, and is, that in doing that and creating a public-interest body that will be the board of trustees of the center, that that would be our highest reach for a wise body that will be able to pull off a policy solution to the creation of this new entity. And I even proposed, and we all agreed, that there be at least three totally new outside trustees, who wouldn't be trustees of the college, the clinic, or the hospital, who had no connection. And that one of them would be the new chairman. And we

agreed to that. And we brought in three amazing people, really stellar. One of them became a Nobel Laureate in Medicine.

CARROLL: Who were they?

HENNESSEY: That was [Thomas] Tom Chalmers and his Nobel connection was that he was one of those who went to Oslo when the Peace Prize was given to the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He was one of the delegation of two or three who went and deserved the noun "Nobelist." He at that time was president and dean of the Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York. A superb person. All three of them were excellent.[3] In 1986-87, I went to the University of Vermont and went off the medical center board. And the college stated that it thought that one of the things the medical center had to be able to do, along with its slow piecing-together of a new partnership which Dave McLaughlin was playing a lot of a role in, was to have a larger board of the medical center and to have it dominated by outsiders. Not just three outsiders, but have ten of the 19 be outsiders. “And let's get on people who really have clout and know how to raise money.” We were building an endowment for the medical center. That was after I left.

CARROLL: Were the people who had to accept this new leadership able to do so? [?] three outsiders coming in?

HENNESSEY: Well, first of all, they weren't leaders. They were strangers; they were new people. Bring new people into any type culture, and they have no power at all at first. They had to earn their power. And they didn't earn it very well. They became side-lined, neglected, vilified. Because they all said, “You've got to have a unified medical center, and why didn't you have it yesterday?” [Laughter] I didn’t realize that would happen. They were seen as, “I mean, how could you--? We've been working on this for 13 years, and here you come in and tell us what we ought to do?” So they all sort of backed off and said, “Well, you know, let's get some consultants from the outside. Let's bring in the three wisest deans in the world. Let's do...” always, always had some new ideas for process. And slowly but surely the clinical chairmen were carving out their turfs, and they were getting status in the clinic. And almost every year there was a tiny accretion of some sense to this medical center. And it was working. We were doing some awful good things. But it was very hard work. And it chewed up people badly.

[3] One of the other new “public trustees was Robert N. Anthony, Ross Walker Professor of Accounting at the Harvard Business School and a nationally-acclaimed expert in non-profit financial control systems. The third was Robert A. Derzon ’53 TU ’54, a senior partner in one of the country’s premier health system consulting firms and a former head of the federal Health Care Financing Administration.

I came back from UVM in 1990. And during that academic year, I tried to stay away from everything. I wanted to be alone and on a sabbatical. But I kept hearing from friends on the board that they wanted to talk with me because it was really falling apart. They were about to have their last meeting where they would simply dissolve. Because by then--I want to be clinically accurate here--by then all of the institutions had been asked to get their boards to state what their vision of the unified medical center really was. And what they thought would not be accepted by anybody else. And what plan they would have to yield or change or meld or to cooperate or do something. I mean it was really a forcing by the boards. The way we forced it through hard bargaining. With the full clout of this big 19-person board with lots of famous people on it.

And in the summer of 1990--I guess it was '91--ideas came forward. And it was just obvious that it wasn't going to work. It just wasn't going to work. So a meeting was held in October of 1991 where two things happened. I'm so tempted to tell you much more than I'm telling you, but we can go back to it. One, there was going to be a final challenge by the Dartmouth College trustees and some of the outside trustees to the Hitchcock Clinic. Nuclear warfare was going to be declared if the clinic did not cooperate. Another thing that happened was that a new trustee was elected--I. I was convinced that I had to come back on the board. And instead of dissolving and saying, “Okay, forget it, this is our last meeting, we're going to go to war.” One of the trustees said at that meeting in October, "Let's put together a task force of three or four people who will go back to ground zero and tell us how to build a medical center, given our differences. There's got to be a way. And by the way, we have Hennessey now back on the board. He's sort of responsible for all this. And let's put him in that group. In fact, better yet, let's have him be the facilitator of that group." So I became the facilitator of that group. In 1992 I became chairman of the board of the medical center, receiving the recommendation of the group I had facilitated as to how to do this. And we began to build it again. From 1992 to 1995, I chaired the board.

CARROLL: Through all this did the medical school suffer because of these vicissitudes?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Sure.

CARROLL: And what I'm curious about is in the midst of all this, the hospital moves.

HENNESSEY: I was going to cycle back. I kept thinking of things, well, let's see, do I dare cycle back now? Yes, that was a huge drama. That absorbed everybody almost full time during the 1980's when our major battle should have been building the medical center. What happened was all of our energies and attention were transferred to another battleground. That was that in the early 80's, the hospital board declared that it could no longer even be accredited if it could not expand. It didn't have beds in the restaurant exactly. But it had beds in hallways. The hospital had been--which was founded and first built in 1890--had been built by accretion: It had a little thing here, a little thing there. No one even knew where all the wires and pipes were. I would get lost in the little warrens. It was clear that something had to be done.

So everybody agreed, "Okay, we're going to modernize and expand the facility." The clinic wanted its own building because it rented space inside the hospital. And with all these battles--and its feeling of individuality, and autonomy, and importance--they at least ought to have a building the way the college and the hospital has. And we had our experts, and we put together plans. And we agreed on one plan, and we'd go to the town and bargain with the town over all of the licenses and permits we had to have. And it wasn't quite right. And we'd come back to the drawing board, and went back to the town. In fighting this out in the public with the town, in the public gaze--in the Valley News almost every day--it became clear that some of our old animosities were being acted out. And people were ganging up. One month it would be the clinic and the [college] gathering together in a cabal to get the town to agree to something that the hospital couldn't agree to. The next month it would be the hospital and clinic gathering together to do it the way the college wouldn't want.

Dave McLaughlin presided over the college during that whole period. And it was his style of "hands-on, up front, roll up your sleeves, get mad if you have to, show people you knew how it can be done because you've been through business wars." It became a very large part of his life. And I do want to tell you more about that. But we finally agreed that we had no solution. And we were all very embarrassed by that. We had no solution in Hanover. The reason we were embarrassed was that we had already said out loud and with conviction that there was no other solution. We could not go elsewhere. Because obviously, theoretically, what we could do is just say, "Okay, town, you don't want more traffic. You don't want more problems—" We had traffic experts from Washington and Minnesota and everywhere else predicting that there wouldn't be any traffic problems. But never mind. It was clear the town

was just not going to have it, for a lot of reasons. And that is a chapter of its own.

We then swallowed hard and said: “What would it take to move the whole darned thing?” And during the 1985-1986 year, as I remember it, that was battled out. And we finally came up with a plan, a financial plan, a feasibility plan, for moving the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center from its present turf to a totally new turf. Something that had never been done before in America. There was no free-standing, brand-new medical center anywhere. It just couldn't be done. And we agreed we would do it. And then in 1990, we did it. I mean by 1990 we finished it and dedicated it. So that was going on at the same time.

CARROLL: Now, I'm curious as to why Hanover, do you think, did not want the hospital in Hanover anymore? I mean you seem to feel they really forced the move.

HENNESSEY: They did. Hanover-- Every question you've asked that drives you back to trying to think about a simple answer, makes me come up with a complicated one. Because Hanover reacted, yes. But who was Hanover? Hanover is a board of selectmen, it's a planning board, it's a zoning adjustment board. It's letters to the editor, it's--

CARROLL: It's public opinion.

HENNESSEY: I guess it's public opinion, but what is public opinion? How can that have any force? I mean why should public opinion have an equal standing with expert opinion? That’s been a problem for this democracy since Hamilton and Jefferson were debating it. So I don't really know all the things that happened. But I know I tried to play my own role. I know I stood up in public meetings and tried to explain why it was really much better to keep it right here. Moved, however, to the land north of the medical school. I mean that would be where we'd go. And if not there, then it would be where the new parking lot is. It would be a new high-rise building in between the medical school and the hospital, with a bridge over to an expanded mental health center. I really felt that was the way to do it. I couldn't imagine, I wasn't clever enough to imagine, what it would be like if we went totally out somewhere else. But--and I don't think many people in the town, in a statesman-like way, said: “Let me tell you my vision. My vision is this lovely wooded setting out in Lebanon.” No one knew. People were just saying-- People were putting up a very hard fight that they wanted to preserve Hanover as this bucolic, special town that maybe it never quite was. But it was fighting modernization, it was fighting drugs, it was fighting crime, it was fighting

the big city, it was fighting an expanded airport, it was fighting the interstates that had come, it was fighting tourism. It really didn't want another big institution plumped right down beside Dartmouth.

Dave McLaughlin was pretty skeptical of the plans for another reason. He began to realize--I think one of the things Dave did so well was to look historically at Dartmouth College as a small town, with its buildings and its institutions and its traffic flows. Like any other president, he was interested in what buildings would be built while he was president. What monuments there would be to the wisdom of his trustees to provide a new plan for the flourishing of Dartmouth in an unknown future. Dave in 1985 began to say to me--and then more vocally to some others—"You know, the only place Dartmouth isn't bound, and tightly circumscribed, is to the north. And that may give a reason not to build this medical complex right there."

Our response was, "But, Dave, that is Dartmouth. I mean you can't get in this mentality of saying you've got Dartmouth here and the medical center here. Dartmouth is the medical center. Dartmouth College is going to be known, among other things, in the golden age of biology as one of those very lucky small colleges that is really a university, and has the sciences it needs and the medical school it needs to participate in the revolution of the future. And so if you want to expand, you expand on the perimeter of the college which is just north of the medical school. You've got a golf course, you've got woods. Come on! I mean there are going to be plenty of ways. We can shuttle students out there if you're going to want to build a law school or whatever you're going to build. Be imaginative!" But as it became clear that maybe we were going to have to move the medical school, Dave said even more, "One of my legacies is going to be creating the opening to the north." Which we now, of course, are celebrating.

[End of Tape 10, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 10, Side B]

...literally, up at the University of Vermont during all of that. I can only tell you that my impression is that the land that was selected for the site of the medical center, after a lot of different alternatives were looked at, had been purchased by the college in a very favorable transaction a little while before that. And that plot was expanded in ways that I'm not really clear on, made large enough to facilitate this kind of development. But it was Dartmouth that played the major role in finding the plot of land.

CARROLL: The medical school never moved, however. Was it supposed to move?

HENNESSEY: A major battle-- There were three or four major battles that Dave McLaughlin was involved in over the move of the medical center. They were defining, in his final years as president, and they contributed toward the winding down of his presidency. Number one, all of us had looked really closely at the values that were involved, the cost-benefit analysis involved, in moving the medical center to a Lebanon site--or to any outside site. Came to feel very strongly that the future of the medical center depended upon its coherence. And therefore the entire medical center had to move or none. We asked outside experts to comment, and they all agreed: “One way to cripple the medical center at a crucial moment will be to cut off the felicitous relationship between the clinical faculty and the basic science faculty. The real research on cancer is taking place between the basic scientists and the clinical scientists--the hematologists and the oncologists and the cancer therapists. So don't do that.”

Others said, “Because the 21st century will be the century of biology and genetics, you must be careful what you do to the connection between the basic sciences--microbiology, biochemistry--and the science department and science division at Dartmouth for this new strong Ph.D. program. Don't hurt that.” So people had to take sides. There wasn't any way you could do both. But in taking sides, some just took principled sides: “You're going to have to keep the basic sciences here;” the others saying, “You’re going to have to take them out there.” There was no argument, there couldn't be any argument, about the clinical sciences. The clinical departments had to move. Many of the clinical faculty--if not all--were actually taking care of patients. And if your patients are going to go out there, you're going to go out there, right? The clinical chairs. There's no doubt about that. Even those who were doing research. But we finally, as a joint council, as a board of trustees, we agreed that our support of the move would be contingent upon the move of the medical school. The board of the hospital voted that its participation in this plan to move the hospital and the medical center was contingent upon a vote by the trustees of Dartmouth College to move the entire medical school. And the board of trustees of Dartmouth College did so vote.

CARROLL: But it never came about.

HENNESSEY: It never came about in total. Some of the basic science departments did move out to the Borwell Building. The Norris Cotton Cancer Center was transplanted, too.

CARROLL: Did they run out of money?

HENNESSEY: Yes and no. The vote by the trustees of Dartmouth College--and I've had reason to go back and study it and underline it--said “as soon as possible.” And it said that of course the funds would have to be raised, and that would have to be a high priority. But, “as soon as possible.” And that language was finally signed off to by the other components: by the clinic and the hospital. It took some months to get the final wording. And I brought with me, and I have in my file, records of all those years, detailed records, including the letters between Dave McLaughlin and [James] Jim Varnum, the president of the hospital.

This was all finally, really clear. And written in blood by June of '87, by which time Dave McLaughlin was leaving. [James] Jim Freedman was the new president. I, of course, don't know what the trustees of Dartmouth College discussed with Jim Freedman. I do know that by the time I began to interact with President Freedman in 1991, because he was on the board of the medical center when I reentered the picture, I knew that he held the view that the medical center should not entirely move. And he buttressed that in part by the argument that in his judgment the bond between the basic sciences and the science departments and faculty at Dartmouth was more important than the bond between the basic science faculty and the clinical faculty. And when pressed he said to me very articulately, and then said, really quite publicly, “Dartmouth’s mission, its primary mission, is undergraduate education. And therefore the well being of the science faculty, with respect to the quality of research and teaching of undergraduates, has to take precedence over other values.”

I conscientiously disagreed. But another thing happened. And that is that the dean of the medical school [Robert Wayne McCollum], who had fought tooth and nail with Dave McLaughlin and the provost, retired. And a new dean was recruited. I think 1989, maybe 1990. Maybe 1988, I forget. I can tell you in a minute. It was either '89 or '90. The new dean [Andrew Grover Wallace], a wonderful, strong new person, was recruited by the president and provost in a way that led the new dean to believe--and he so stated it to me and to others--that the medical school would not move, and he agreed with that. He was forced by circumstances, and by the rest of the medical center community, to moderate that view, and to agree that it did not matter much what he personally thought. The faculty and trustees of a number of institutions had pledged themselves in a way that made it necessary not to close the door on the move of the medical center--the medical school.

Everyone could understand by then the enormous challenge in raising the funds to do it. But it was unacceptable to the majority of the trustees of the medical center that the president of Dartmouth College and the dean would seem to be saying that the move of the medical school had a low enough priority so that the money might never be raised and that that would be okay. So the dean then in 1993-94 appointed, as he should--a study committee of faculty to restudy the issue--the faculty of the medical school. They held hearings, and they came up with the new recommendation which was, “move it, but find the money first. We don't think you'll find the money within five years. So five years from now appoint another committee and see where it goes from there.”

CARROLL: Was one of the sticking points the Dana Biomedical Library? The reason I ask that is that some of the minutes of the meetings that I've read, people stood up and questioned where that would go.

HENNESSEY: That's right.

CARROLL: Because it was needed by so many--those two departments--who would then be split.

HENNESSEY: That was, in my judgment, an easy-to-discuss element of a far larger and more complicated debate. It’s almost like the fraternities when you're really talking about the quality of student life. It's an easy thing to talk about. I was convinced from the start that reasonable people would find a way to solve that problem. And indeed we have solved it because we had to. I mean there are two libraries. There is a marvelous little library out at the medical center which I myself have used. And because of electronic, dazzling new ways of doing things, you don't miss quite as much as you might otherwise in not having the full library right there.

Jane, another thing I've got to tell you--because I think I know more about it than anybody else, or at least than most people, and it's so germane to what happened to Dave McLaughlin--is another aspect of this. And that was when the faculty discovered that Dave had agreed to this deal with the hospital, some of them became very, very agitated. Because as it was explained, part of the cobbling together of a compact to move the medical center included the payment to the hospital for its old buildings and its land of $25 million. That was part of the deal. It wouldn't have happened without that. I can explain why, but it wouldn't have happened without that. Let me just go on to a dramatic thing that occurred. When that suddenly became evident to the faculty community, there was a faculty meeting, a general faculty meeting. And

I have some notes with me that can tell you what those meetings were like.

CARROLL: I've read those minutes.

HENNESSEY: Have you?

CARROLL: They're quite obstreperous.

HENNESSEY: They were obstreperous. They were very difficult. Very difficult. One of the things Dave McLaughlin had to do at one point was to agree that the hospital building would be torn down, which was another foul ball. I mean everybody, including the hospital, were amazed at that. No one imagined that. Part of it was a really relatively new plant, and there were all kinds of uses that could be made of it. But the faculty said, “Ah hah! I'm suspicious of this.” There was a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Arts & Sciences faculty with President McLaughlin, where it would not be an exaggeration to say, the Executive Committee said to Mr. McLaughlin:

“We do not trust you and your administration with respect to your plans for these great new edifices. Some of us believe you may move overnight the Physics Department, or the English Department to Ward 6B. But more important than that, given this whole new plant, and given what we know of you and your administration, we hold it as a finite possibility that you will feel it necessary to fill up that plant by expanding the faculty, and then have to expand the student body. You will do what businesses do--you're a businessman—you'll grow. And we're not willing to have you do that just because you bought this building for reasons that we don't understand. Why did you do that? We do not understand that.”

And so the Executive Committee exacted from President McLaughlin--I thought he was very skillful and wise in deciding it quickly--that he would retreat from the ambiguous position he was in, and state that, yes, they would buy the building because they were committed to do it. But that they would destroy it. And that he would promise then that that land would be part of Dartmouth's future master plan. And of course it did become that, and that is beneficent.

CARROLL: One of the comments made at that faculty meeting was that--there were actually two I want to talk about. But one was that the $25 million that was then going to have to be given from the college to the hospital would, in a sense, they felt, bankrupt the future of the Arts & Sciences.

HENNESSEY: Sure.

CARROLL: And what I never have really seen--it seems at that point there's so many voices that come into being--the answer is never made clear, at least in the minutes, as to what actually was the retort that was given to people with that concern.

HENNESSEY: You've talked with Paul Paganucci. Are you going to do that again?

CARROLL: Yes, I am.

HENNESSEY: Paul Paganucci gave the answer at that meeting. He was by then the vice president and treasurer and a financial wizard, a financial expert. So I think you should ask him. If I tried to characterize it, it would be inaccurate.

CARROLL: The second thing that they made a point about was that the meeting, the general faculty meeting, was October, it was the beginning of October. And that they had to make a decision, as a faculty, to vote for or against this very quickly because the bonds, the ability to buy a certain kind of bond, was going to close down on them by the end of November.

HENNESSEY: Correct.

CARROLL: And the feeling of the faculty was they had not been given adequate time to study this problem.

HENNESSEY: Correct.

CARROLL: Why was that? Why were they given so little time?

HENNESSEY: Number one, events were moving swiftly. No one was totally on top of them. I don't remember when we discovered that the kind of bonding we wanted to do had a time-certain moment to it, after which it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to do what would be best for all the institutions. But there wasn't a lot of time between our discovery that there was that problem, and the deadline itself. Secondly, there were no faculty meetings during the summer. There never are. The faculty is gone. The faculty is totally uninterested. You could say the most outrageous things and nobody would listen. And they don't get back until the third week of September. So here you are suddenly. The first

general faculty meeting you could have, because you've got to give notice, is going to be early October.

Number two, the skill with which the president and his senior staff tapped the pulse of the Arts & Sciences faculty, engaged in playing a role in the formation of opinions, was not high. I'm not sure you can point to many universities or colleges where it's very high because it's an extremely difficult art form. But for a variety of reasons, including bad luck on this campus, a number of faculty had developed a suspicion that what the administration would do would not be quite in their best interests. Nor could the word be thoroughly trusted; nor could the actions be thoroughly trusted in the sense of being predictable. And there were a lot of faculty members who were, for a whole lot of reasons, by then raising real questions in their mind about the president and the people immediately around him and what was going to happen at Dartmouth. There was a lack of morale. There were faculty groups who were meeting regularly to commiserate with one another, and to sort of plan what responsibility as a faculty they might have to express their corporate lack of total support and confidence in this team at the top. So this medical center issue came along at a really rather bad time.

CARROLL: Is there anything else to--? That really sort of covers the questions I had about the medical center. Is there anything else you wish to add to that?

HENNESSEY: I'm putting myself in your shoes. You're not interested in the medical center per se, but you're interested in the presidencies of Kemeny and McLaughlin.

CARROLL: Well, I think the medical center, its primary interest for me is, first of all, the--I see this as part of the expansion that happened in the 80's to so much of Dartmouth, and the difficulties of expanding. There are growing pains, and it really is a growing pain in that we [inaudible]. And the second thing is that in trying to negotiate the problems inherent to it, how it became part of the Dave McLaughlin story at the end of his term.

HENNESSEY: That's right. And in that sense it's reflective of Dave and his presidency. And obviously I can say more about that in a month-by-month working with him on these issues. But I think I've probably communicated the major story. I did a year ago write up some parts of this as a case study, which I then taught in a master's program in the medical school. And I have brought a copy with me if you'd like to have it.

CARROLL: Yes, I would very much like that. Then what I'm going to suggest is that we call a close for today and then next time talk strictly about the McLaughlin presidency.

HENNESSEY: Sure.

[End of session five]

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: November 1, 1996

CARROLL: ...I'm speaking again with John Hennessey. John, last time we were talking about the medical school, and I had thought we really had completed that discussion. But I found a few more questions that I would like to ask you to sort of wrap that up. The first was that when the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center was formed, there was a large fund-raising effort that was mounted. And I wondered if you could describe that and your role in it.

HENNESSEY: Well, it was a standard major campaign, with outside counsel-- a nationally famous firm that helped us. We did a feasibility study, and then we did the campaign itself. And there have been campaigns almost successively ever since the early 70's. I can't now remember the years of the major campaign. But I think those years were 1980 to 1990, approximately. I was involved until 1986 when I dropped out and then left to go up to Vermont. And I was much impressed with the quality of the whole process: the organization of names throughout the nation, and particularly in New Hampshire and Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine. By then the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center had established a full-time position of vice president for development. And a fellow named William Fissinger was that vice president until about 1987 or '88. And since then there has been a succession of very strong people who have acted in that role. So it's been a major activity, always coordinated, as you would expect, with Dartmouth College.

CARROLL: Who did they go to for money? Alums? Or was it major fund-raising organizations?

HENNESSEY: Well, it's really both. I mean it was a full campaign. So we-- Yes, alumni of the medical school, alumni of the college who might have a particular interest in the medical center. The whole hospital community of grateful patients, people who had given. The major foundations and corporations in New England. And some foundations, national foundations, that might be interested. So it was really a sophisticated, wide-ranging campaign with all the little categories that you would expect there would be.

CARROLL: Was there a goal in mind?

HENNESSEY: There was, but I can't now remember what the goal was.

CARROLL: And then at the end of this campaign--oh, you weren't around for the end, is that right?

HENNESSEY: No, I wasn't.

CARROLL: Okay, then that sort of eliminates that question. What did they want to use the funds for specifically?

HENNESSEY: Well, the hospital, on its side, began, as I described last time, in the early 70's to realize that it needed significant continual modernization and expansion. And just keeping up with the dazzling array of technological developments was a struggle by itself. But at the same time, in that same climate, there was stormy weather in that the federal support was dropping off. Beyond that, in the 70's--I think '73, '74, '75--President Nixon put on cost controls of a pretty stiff kind. It really meant we could not—I mean price controls, but they ended up being cost and price controls for hospital charges. And ever after that, there was a kind of moving in on the rate of increase of health-care costs in one way or another. In every year or bundle of years there was a different national strategy for going at that. But the climate within which we were working all said: "If you want to prosper, you've got to look out for yourself. And you're going to have to raise your own funds in every way you can in order to celebrate the investment the private sector should be willing to make in an area where, for better of worse, there's an enormous amount of almost free subsidy from the federal government in a variety of ways." And that's why, because of all those factors, that's why the fund-raising has been pretty continual ever since.

CARROLL: There was at that point, then, the decision to take the Hitchcock Clinic and make that a separate entity, its own entity. What prompted that action?

HENNESSEY: The Hitchcock Clinic was founded in 1927; and established itself in the law, in the face of the law, as a group practice with incorporation in New Hampshire as a "business corporation." It never distributed profits, so it wasn't really a business entity in that sense. There were stockholders. All of the doctors, all the physicians, who were members of the Hitchcock Clinic, owned shares in it as an entity. By the time we began debating in the 1976, '77, '78 era how to strengthen the bonds that would hold the center together and sponsor, and perhaps even encourage and push, more collaboration, more cooperation around those issues where there was not ready agreement because one of the institutions would lose while the other one or two might gain, it became evident that the decision-making in the clinic was rather different in character. Before the public gaze, and in the eyes of the other two entities. Different from the system of governance of the hospital and college, where there was a clear interlink with the public responsibility and public trust through a non-remunerated, non-compensated, carefully-selected board of trustees, both for the hospital and for the college

So as the hospital and the college--the college, of course, including medical school--began to work very hard on this complicated problem of how we were going to achieve a level of trust and collaboration that would produce a tighter centralized organization that would allow us to make decisions that we would have to make in the face of all these contingencies, we challenged the clinic by saying: “Look, we think the highest quality of decision-making about these public issues, these very salient issues that we've never had to face before, will be enhanced if you can put together a first-class board of trustees, to whom you will be accountable as a group practice. Now it's true that right now you are already accountable to two other boards.” Because the members of the Hitchcock Clinic, by fixed agreement, could not be members of the clinic unless they had been accepted as faculty members in the Dartmouth Medical School, and concurrently have been approved as staff members of the hospital. So those individuals had three appointments which were triggered by the medical school appointment.

So if the physicians in the Hitchcock Clinic wished to explain--and indeed they did wish to explain--their responsibility in the "public interest," they could simply say, and they did say, “look, we're responsible to the hospital trustees for everything we do in the hospital.

And to the college trustees for everything we do in the medical school. I mean, what's left?" Well, what was left was the operation and decision-making of their entity, the Hitchcock Clinic, and their practice as outpatient physicians, which was really governed by and administered by the Hitchcock Clinic.

It fell to me to meet with the assembled Hitchcock Clinic physicians one day in 1977 or 1978. And I shall not forget it because it fell to me to describe this request, which I knew to be, by then, almost a bargaining demand on the part of the hospital and college. I did that and found the group divided rather sharply into three parts: those who said, "Yes, you're right, and we've been waiting for that." Those who said, "Never! The implication is heinous to us." And those who didn't care, who might have understood, but didn't really care. It just didn't seem important to them. And I do recall some of the people in all three categories.

Finally, the leaders of the clinic, principally surgeon Richard Cardozo, who was president of Hitchcock Clinic, and the executive vice president and administrator, who was John Collins, agreed that the clinic would change from a business corporation to a 501C3, to a nonprofit organization, and would establish its own board of trustees. I don't remember in what year that happened, but it did happen. And it triggered some very severe legal problems and practical problems of what would happen to the ownership of the parts of the former corporation when it became a not-for-profit corporation. It took a couple of years and several lawsuits to work that out. Some of the former members of the clinic actually brought suit against the new clinic for having made this change and for having dissipated the value of their assets by doing it.

So it was all very complicated and required much involvement of legal people for all aspects of what was happening there. And then we had legal advice in 1979, '80, and '81 about how the three corporations would produce, as I described last time, the bilateral agreements that would end up with a stronger incorporated center per se.

CARROLL: Was there ever any conflict between the demands of the board of trustees for the clinic, the demands which they would place upon those physicians, and then the demands the same physicians would receive from the board of trustees of the hospital?

HENNESSEY: Well, the way you've asked that question, Jane, I find myself wanting to give a complicated answer. Maybe what I should do is suggest that we modify the question a little bit.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: You're really getting at what is the nature of a board of trustees? Particularly was there any difference in the nature of the hospital board of trustees and the clinic board of trustees?

CARROLL: And the demand is maybe not the right word, but the expectations that those boards of trustees held for the physicians.

HENNESSEY: Well, they were very different because the board of trustees--to try to put it simply--the board of trustees at the hospital, at that time, expected two major things of their medical staff, among many others. But the two major things were the continuation of highly responsible and high-quality carrying out of their responsibility as medical staff members through their organized medical staff, with respect to the appropriateness and quality of medical care. That was always a major expectation and responsibility that Mary Hitchcock trustees saw in its relationship with its physicians. Secondly, the hospital trustees expected of the medical staff the carrying out of their citizenship as the concept of a medical center was being discussed, with the hospital's interest as one of the three or four intertwined interests that had to be respected.

So the board of the clinic was really very different. First of all, it was put together for the first time in 1970-whatever it was--'78? And it was designed, as a board, as of course it had to be, in a way that would produce a maximal enthusiastic support from the physician members of the Hitchcock Clinic. Which meant a board that would be responsive to their expectations of what a board would be, rather than the other way around. And it's always really been that way. It's not a board that in my knowledge has ever dealt with quality and appropriateness of medical care. It's always been assumed that all that was really fused together in the medical staff's responsibility to the hospital trustees on that rather unitary concern.

And with respect to the political issue of how the clinic would fit into and protect its own best interests as it emerged through the 70's and 80's in a climate of expectation that there would be a unified medical center. Again, the trustees of the clinic found themselves consulting with and responding to the advice and interests of the clinicians of the Hitchcock Clinic Incorporated, incorporated as a not-for-profit. There were, by agreement, several-- There was representation of outside bodies on the clinic board of trustees. There was one--there might have been two--hospital trustees, for example, who sat on it. I believe the president of

Dartmouth sat on it. The president of the medical center sat with the clinic board, if not on it. And by then we had agreed--in fact in 1974 we agreed--that the medical director would be someone who would unify medical issues across all of the institutions in the center. And we finally agreed--and I don't remember what year--that there would be a post called medical director of Hitchcock Clinic, which would be occupied by the same person who was medical director of the hospital and a senior vice president for clinical affairs of the center. But now I'm out in further elaboration of this enormous network of issues.

CARROLL: The first person who was brought on to be the head of the Dartmouth Medical Center, as I understand it, was Howard Newman?

HENNESSEY: He became the first president.

CARROLL: And what was his role as president? What was his mandate?

HENNESSEY: His mandate was to be responsive entirely and especially to the Joint Council in the Joint Council's responsibility to grow, to incubate, to create, the best possible medical center. So he was to work on center issues, be the executive who would carry out the wishes of the Joint Council.

CARROLL: He fills this post for six years and then steps down. I know from reading your case study that it seems as though he was rather frustrated by the slow response or slow changes. I wonder what exactly was part of his dissatisfaction?

HENNESSEY: He came believing that this academic medical center would fairly quickly be a cohesive set of purposes, of people, of programs. And that his expertise in creating the organization, the organizational relationships, the organizational agreements, would produce visible progress each year. He found the going very slow, for reasons that I described last time. We had our long history of doing things our way, and the bringing of people together in the medical center often meant that people were being asked to give up their best judgment about how they should act out their roles. It was also true, as I found in my 1976 consulting study, which I think you've seen copies of, there were serious distrusts among the three major entities. A lack of trust, a lack of faith even, in the continued existence and health of one another. And Howard Newman really had to deal with that.

It was okay when he was presiding over discussions where everybody was going to win something, or where he was going to be able to carry

out a duty that people really didn't want to do themselves. But when it came to his saying, “you know, we agreed two years ago that we would do these things which are going to require--which will require--some sacrifices from A and B if not C,” no one wanted to hear that. And he became the bearer often of unwelcome or bad news about the speed of progress or about the nature of progress. He battled over the recruitment of key people. He pushed hard to get people to rise to their highest level of trust and dignity, to take the risk of bringing in a super person to be the chair of medicine or surgery or whatever it might be. And he used up his credibility, bit by bit, through one fight after the other.

He was successful in hiring a very good administrative assistant [Kevin Sexton], whose title I don't remember; it was changed from time to time. But an analyst, a very good health-care analyst, who produced statistical reports, and did other kinds of research, and compared our medical center with other medical centers around the country. And all of that information, of course, came back to say to one or the other of us: “You know, you really ought to be doing it differently.” And some of that statistical information would say, “2 entities you're right, and 3rd entity you're wrong.” It was very hard. He had to be an engineer of consent. He had to be a superior political magician. And Howard had a lot of strength, but he wasn't at his best in being a political magician. Although he was really, really, I think, quite superb.

After he and I put out the bulletins in 1977, not only announcing the result of my research and the response of all the boards to my research, but what next steps ought to be taken, we got task force A and B and all these people together. And we produced papers, and everybody thought, through the hard bargaining, we had reached a solution. When it then fell apart in 1978, '79, and John Kemeny was about to retire from his presidency. And the drink of cognac I mentioned to you became history, and it was clear that the clinic in particular in its own best interest was not going to go along with the agreements that we had all put together, Howard Newman felt that things had badly slipped backward. And it looked like the next phase of slow and agonizing progress would not interest him as much as everything else that had happened. And about then he was asked by Patricia Harris, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, if he would go back down to HEW--it hadn't yet become HHS, as I remember. And he was glad to do that and make the switch. And I thought it was a good idea for him to do it.

CARROLL: The last question I had is really one that's about decision-making. There was at this time, when you headed the task force, the decision was made to change the nature of the medical school, and the medical center, from being a regional hospital to being a large research hospital.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: As soon as you make that decision, it becomes clear that the scale of the Hitchcock was such that it could not be all things to all people. So they had to clearly decide they would specialize in this.

HENNESSEY: Sure.

CARROLL: Who made the decisions as to where that--the specialties were going to lie?

HENNESSEY: Those were decisions that were uniquely ripe for the consideration at the highest level—at the Joint Council or at the board of trustees of the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. Indeed that board, the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center Board of Trustees, when it finally became a board in 1983, established committees, one of which dealt with strategic planning. And when I came back in to chair that board in 1992, I recall so well that the trail of all that strategic planning in 1992, '93, '94, that same issue was before us. “What are we going to decide to do, and what are we going to decide not to do in order to continue to be one of the country's leading medical centers?”

There are only 126 academic medical centers in the nation to start with. That's a fairly small number for a population of 260 million people. So every one of them has to make those decisions. And very few medical centers--I think no medical center ever could claim that it did everything. There probably were ten or 12--and maybe there still are--that demonstrably did some of the more esoteric sub-specialty things that we chose not to do here. We chose not to do, for example, renal transplantation until two years ago. Well, renal transplantation started in some academic medical centers in the early 70’s or maybe late 60’s. So we kept making those decisions. Obviously the strongest voices in making those decisions came from the medical faculty-staff-clinicians.

CARROLL: Did they take into consideration what was accessible, what specialties were accessible, in something like Fletcher Allen or up in Montreal or down in Boston when making their decisions?

HENNESSEY: It would be misleading to say "no." But it would be misleading to say "yes."

CARROLL: [Laughter] Ah, the best kind of answer.

HENNESSEY: Yes. The reason it would be misleading to say "no," is that we should never, I think, be so isolated in our decision-making here in Hanover, that we would leave out of our consciousness the things being done 90 miles to the north or 125 miles to the south--northwest and southeast. On the other hand, for our medical center, for our medical faculty, for our medical school to grow and prosper appropriately, it was more important to look at where our strengths lay, and where medicine and medical science and biological sciences were going. So that, for example, if we had attracted unusual hematologists and oncologists here, and a new discovery occurred in blood chemistry or microbiology that suggested that we might engage here in a special new program even though it existed elsewhere, because it had both research and practical patient-related consequences. We would certainly have done it, whether it was being done elsewhere or not.

On the other hand, for example, if we found that there were times when we wished we had a burn center, a trauma burn center. And debated all the pros and cons, and discovered that as far the physicians were concerned, there was no one whose research, teaching, and practice demanded that we do that. Even though in a humane sense, of course, we'd like to do everything. And if we found that transporting people who needed to be in a burn center to Boston for the most part happened at a felicitous, beneficial, encouraging way, we would not likely create one here. And we still haven't.

Nor did we, for example, early on--I mean by that early in the 80's particularly--enthusiastically say, "you know, we should have a helicopter. Because when there are fires or accidents, we should be able to go out and bring those people here, rather than the helicopters from Boston picking them up or whatever may be." Those debates were always complicated, sophisticated debates, sometimes coming down to financial matters as well as matters having to do with medical care and the nature of our specializations here. But I guess what I'm saying, Jane, is that those decisions, the decisions at the margin as to what we should add, were always made in a relatively scientific, intellectually respectable way. That took into account the consequences not just of doing a new thing, but the consequences to those who were already here and to our expectations to be able to attract high-quality faculty

members who would supplement and strengthen what we're already doing.

A much harder decision for all medical centers is, "What are we doing that we ought no longer to do?" True for a university, too, as you and I both know so well. At times of great financial stress on any institution--federal government, world government, towns, businesses, colleges, universities, art museums--at a time of great stress and stringency, the question always is, "Well, in order to do what we do best, better, we probably ought to stop doing what we do least best? And although we're not accustomed to saying that anything we do we don't do well. The fact is if you array everything we do at Dartmouth, or in the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, along a continuum--force yourself to do it-- there are some things over here on the left side, on the least, well, least important, side. Which if we didn't do them, probably we'd get accustomed to doing without. And that those funds probably could be used do to even better what we do on the right end of the spectrum."

Well that's always been extraordinarily difficult. In fact, even-- there was one year when we specifically said, "you know, in order to show that we can make these decisions, we're at least going to spell out the five areas which we're going to nurture most. If we have a choice of spending our flexible resources, we're probably going to pour them into these things that we do best: in cancer or immunology or certain aspects of surgery. These things we'll nurture more than we'll nurture others." Even doing that caused a reaction from the medical faculty say, "By dint of your having pointed out these five areas that seem..."

[End of Tape 11, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 11, Side B]

…in any organization. When the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center did agree that there were five areas that indisputably were head and shoulders above the average with regard to their quality. And therefore probably ought to deserve more fund-raising energy and everything else. The faculty rose up almost as a person and said, "That's not fair. I mean I don't know what criteria you have used to say that these activities are somehow more luminous and more applaudable than other things we do, but we don't agree with those criteria. And if you're going to do that, you're going to have to involve the rest of us in some sort of consensus around these things." And we sort of pulled back and said, "Well, we will not, then, be able to declare in such a manner." But the very act of not even being able to identify clearly what the institution does best means it's going to be even more

difficult to say, “Here are some things we do least well.” That's true for Dartmouth College, it's true for the medical center.

CARROLL: Well, that really brings to an end the questions that I had about the medical center--unless you think of something else that really should be put down into the oral history.

HENNESSEY: I think I'll just end with one segue kind of comment, Jane, and that is the segue into speaking about the Dartmouth presidency. The first time I heard this joke, in one form or another, was in the 1975, '76, '77 era, when I was doing my research and also was on a national commission looking at academic medical centers. The joke was that there were two university presidents who-- I guess I'll try-- I now know there are variances. I'll tell the simplest one. A university president went before St. Peter on Judgment Day to decide what the fate of the person would be, and St. Peter said, "Well, where would you like to go?" And he said, "Well, I'd really like to ask a question first about heaven. Does heaven have a medical center?" And St. Peter said, "Well, yes, heaven does have a very good academic medical center." And the university president said, "Well, you know, in that case, I mean all other things considered, I still would love to go to heaven. But I guess I'll just have to go to the other place." He said, "Well, I should tell you, hell has four academic medical centers." [Laughter] That kind of joke was always being told because university presidents had a very tough time understanding and dealing with academic medical centers across the nation, for all kinds of reasons. So that's a segue into president.

CARROLL: I very much like that. I'm going to actually use that one. What I wanted to talk about then is to talk about David McLaughlin. We talked about Kemeny quite a bit.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: And it seems to me that to talk about David McLaughlin we should not perhaps start at his presidency because you knew him far earlier.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: And perhaps talk about him first as a trustee for the Tuck School.

HENNESSEY: Okay. I'd be glad to do that. He was an overseer of the Tuck School.

CARROLL: Overseer, yes.

HENNESSEY: When I talked with President John Dickey about my becoming dean of the Tuck School, we both agreed that the board of overseers had been under-utilized in recent years. And it had not... If I was going to use it in the way I wanted to, as a close advisory body to me and to the president, I thought it probably would be advantageous if I could nominate some new people. Particularly as some of the older people went off. The board of overseers in the period before 1968 consisted of people who stayed on a very long time. There really was not planned time on; you'd go on and sort of stay. And many of them were, in my eyes, in those days, somewhat senior to me. Mr. Dickey made several suggestions. And one of those he made with the largest enthusiasm--I can still remember his strong words--had to do with David McLaughlin, saying that David McLaughlin-- If I wanted to bring some younger people on the board, I couldn't do better than Dave McLaughlin. Who by then was 15 years out of Dartmouth. He was about 37, and 14 years out of Tuck School. And while he was at Dartmouth, he had a very distinguished career. And had come to know John Dickey well because he was a student leader in multiple respects. And John kept in touch with him and liked him. And planned that he would be brought back into significant positions of responsibility. I think he said Dave would be possibly a future trustee. But he probably didn't say that. That wouldn't have been the way John Dickey would have talked to me at that moment in that context. But I certainly think he had that in mind.

In any case, I invited Dave to come on the board, and he was delighted to come on. It was his first activity of that kind back in the Dartmouth community. He joined the board as I became dean. He became an overseer in I think it was July of 1968. The chairman of the Tuck board, [James] Jim MacFarland [’33 TU ‘34], was chairman and CEO of General Mills, and he was a Dartmouth and Tuck alumnus. He welcomed Dave back. I don't know whether he had any role in it at all, but Dave came back and came onto the board of overseers as the president of a division of the Champion Company, large paper company; and he working in the Champion Packaging Division I think in Ohio. But reasonably soon after David McLaughlin became an overseer, he moved to Minneapolis, as I mentioned to you last time. And became president and chief operating officer of Toro Manufacturing Corporation, of which the chairman of the board and principal owner was David Lilly, chairman of the board of overseers of the Thayer School here at Dartmouth.

When Jim MacFarland, who was chairman of the board of overseers through that incredibly interesting period of May 1970-June 1970, which you and I discussed some weeks ago, where the students of Tuck and

of Dartmouth conscientiously protested what was going on in America--Jim MacFarland stepped out of the chair of the board of overseers of the Tuck School in June 1970, and David McLaughlin became the chair of the Tuck board. So I worked very closely with him for a year. And I could describe that to you in several respects, but for the moment I'll pass over that. I got to know him, of course, very well, as the head of my board of overseers.

I believe John Kemeny called me in June 1971. But I'm blurred on this; it might have been John Dickey. But I distinctly remember that I was asked if I would be willing, and indeed I would be honored, to call David McLaughlin and tell him that he had been nominated as a trustee of Dartmouth. The courtesy given to me was that if, inasmuch as he was the chairman of my board of overseers, of the Tuck board of overseers, I would be giving up a chairman-- I had recruited him to come back into the first board-level appointment--that I might enjoy talking with David, and David might enjoy having me call. In retrospect, I think if I had been Dave McLaughlin, I would have preferred that call to come from the chairman of the board of trustees of Dartmouth. And because I think of that now, I wonder if my memory could be inexact. And yet I do distinctly remember making that call, and I remember getting Dave at home, and how pleased he was at the idea that he would become a trustee of Dartmouth. And he did become a trustee. And then handed over the chairmanship of the board of overseers to someone else.

CARROLL: Let's just back up just a little bit.

HENNESSEY: Excuse me, I wanted to say one thing to correct the impression there that I gave, Jane. I may have made a mistake. I don't think I did. When Dave became a trustee, I don't think he went off the board of overseers. I think he filled out another year or two of terms because we had always agreed that one trustee--that there would be one Dartmouth trustee on the board of overseers of the Tuck School. So I think Dave agreed to stay on the board of overseers as one of his responsibilities as a trustee of Dartmouth. But he did give up the chairmanship.

CARROLL: I wanted to just talk a little bit about his role on the board of overseers and then as chair of that body. When he was fulfilling those roles, did you see him as someone who clearly was going on to bigger and better things?

HENNESSEY: No, I did not. Well, yes, I did, and, no, I didn't. I was not surprised at all that Dave became a trustee. If I was surprised--I said not at all--if I was surprised by anything about it, it was that it happened quite so soon. I

thought he would be more tested and seasoned in the role of board of overseers and other activities for Dartmouth before becoming a trustee. But I was very enthusiastic about it. I guess I would have said, if you had quizzed me then, that I would expect Dave over time might rise to become a senior and much respected trustee. And might become chairman of the board of trustees. But knowing the way the board worked, knowing the older, seasoned people on the board, I think I would not have given good odds that Dave would have become chairman of the board. But it would have been, of course, I realize it would have been under John Kemeny. And I knew John Kemeny would be a very different president from John Dickey.

I did not imagine, it never crossed my mind in any way, then or until 1979 or '80, that David would be a candidate for the presidency of Dartmouth. It simply to me was not in my brain. I won't say it was inconceivable. It just never occurred to me to try to conceive of it. He didn't have the characteristics that would have led me to think of that as one of the things he might go on and do. I expected he would continue his rise in Corporate America, and might become president or CEO of almost any major corporation.

CARROLL: How would you describe his leadership style when he was the chair of the overseers?

HENNESSEY: He was very much at home with his fellow overseers, all of whom but one was a CEO, or very senior person, in a major company or corporation. No, all but two. There were two academics whom I recruited. Otherwise he was very much at home. He understood the style, the thinking style, the lifestyle of the overseers better than I did. He was a real resource to me in working with the overseers, in creating committees of the board, in utilizing the power of the board for Tuck's best interest. He was a teacher for me in that respect. On a complementary side of his job as chair, I think found him a willing student of mine with regard to academic matters, academic affairs, the academic nature of the Tuck School among other business schools in the nation.

So I think we worked very well together. He was ready, willing, and able to accept recommendations that I made, particularly on the academic side. He was happy about our innovations. He was not easy with students, as easy as I expected him to be. He was not as relaxed among the Tuck students, particularly those coming from other institutions. He didn't transmute himself from a former Dartmouth-Tuck student in the 1949 to '54 era, to that 1971 to '76 era, perhaps partly

because those students really were very different. They had come out of a totally different climate. And by then we were dealing with free speech and anti-authority, and drugs, and Vietnam protests and everything else. And Dave by then, although I'm not sure he was a--I don't know how young or old his children were--but he was more of the next generation, of the older generation rather than the younger. And I didn't feel as he tried--

I remember going with him, for example, to the first banquet of the Tuck Scholars Program, which we inaugurated. Which picked the top students from the end of the first year and said, “You're now Tuck Scholars, and we want to have a banquet, and talk with you, and tell you about the history of the place, and ask you to discuss certain matters.” And we did that. And I remember his surprising me by his being very nervous about doing that. I had asked him to make a few remarks. And he confessed to me that he was almost speechless on that occasion. And was exhibiting signs of physical real anxiety over the interaction. And I tell you that for two reasons: One to illustrate that he was not at home with Tuck students in an easy, familiar way. That he was not—he didn’t find himself moving into their world, the academic world, with great ease. He was far more at home among his own peers. But I say it also because I want to accent that he was so pleased and willing to play any role I wanted him to play. And when I asked him to make remarks, even though he was nervous and anxious about it, he did it with great willingness. And performed very well even though at the end of it he was a limp rag. It says something about him as a person, I think.

CARROLL: I'm curious that he's on the board of overseers for two years, which means that at that point he's 17 years out as an undergraduate from Dartmouth; so he's very young. And yet he is chosen among his peers to be the chairman of the board of overseers.

HENNESSEY: Well, he was chosen to be chair-- Well, he wasn't chosen by his peers, not quite. No, that isn’t quite the way it worked. The way the chairmanship worked, I made a recommendation to the president, and we talked it over, and then we sold it to the board of overseers--there was very little selling to do; it was an easy process. And the board of overseers, who met three times a year-- very busy people doing all sorts of other things. It was pretty obvious that many of them would not entertain the idea of being chair of the board of overseers. I think they also realized that the nature of that job was pretty demanding, and that that would be the overseer who would work most closely with me and with the president. And I think among all the overseers at that time,

including many who were really reasonably aged and had served very well under John Dickey, and who didn't know John Kemeny. After all, that was a new change, too. They were prepared for all sorts of crazy and wild things we might do, including asking Dave to be chairman.

CARROLL: Was he there for the fund-raising for the Murdough Center?

HENNESSEY: Well, he knew Tim Murdough, and I don't quite remember how he did. But fund-raising for the Murdough Center occurred in the '70 to '73 era. Indeed in June of '73 the Murdough Center was dedicated. And I think the Murdoughs agreed to give the money in '72. And David joined the rest of us on the team to talk with the Murdoughs. In fact, he was a very fine fund-raiser always. And I think he might have started doing that while John Dickey was still president; I'm not sure.

CARROLL: Okay, I wondered. Because it seemed to me he would be a natural to talk to another businessman like Tim Murdough.

HENNESSEY: That's true. But I do think that in every respect the person who should get major credit for the Murdough gift is Orton Hicks. And I mentioned to you in our first interview that we might one day go back to him. I consider him one of my closer friends over this whole period of three decades. He's an incredibly fine human being, who did happen to feel that the Murdough investment would be entirely appropriate and would enrich their lives as well as enrich Dartmouth's future. And so he really made that happen.

CARROLL: So David McLaughlin then moves onto the board of trustees of Dartmouth College. And that would have been what, 73?

HENNESSEY: He became a trustee in '71.

CARROLL: In '71! So that was a very quick move.

HENNESSEY: He had been on the board of overseers three years, that's right.

CARROLL: And at that point did you continue to work with him when he was in his role as trustee?

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure. Because first of all, he stayed on the board of overseers a bit. We got him to come as an Executive-in-Residence. So many times in many ways I interacted with him. Oh, yes.

CARROLL: And were you surprised, though, when he became very quickly then chairman of the board of trustees?

HENNESSEY: Yes, I was surprised. He became chairman of the board of trustees in 1977. And I guess I shouldn't say I was surprised by then. He had been a trustee for six years. The term of trustees by then had been established. I think it was by then that it was made clear that the term was going to be a ten-year term. And so to choose the chairman to succeed [William] Bill Andres or whoever it was who was chairman, or [Charles] Charlie Zimmerman--maybe it was Lloyd Brace ['25]... I forget who it was just before 1977 [William Andres]. But to succeed that chairman, it would have been important to pick somebody who had at least three or four years to go. And Dave would have been one of the few who had that much time. There wouldn't have been more than three or four people to choose among, and Dave would've been-- Sure, he would've been an obvious choice because he was a very fine presider over that kind of--a meeting of that kind of people.

CARROLL: I'm always curious-- the one thing that everybody always mentions about David McLaughlin, is that for him the day started very early. He had a lot of energy. He needed very little sleep. And while he was chair of the board of trustees, of course, he was chair under Kemeny who was just as renowned for being a night person and a very late starter. How did they ever reconcile that?

HENNESSEY: I don't think they ever really did, Jane. But as I mentioned to you in one of our interviews, John Kemeny determined that he would not start working early in the morning. But as I said, there was that famous day when the trustees were here and ready to go, and he wasn't present. And they just almost ordered him at least to start the trustee meeting early, and he did. And I think they came to an easy working with one another. I mean, after all, David McLaughlin's office of chairman of the board when John Kemeny was president meant that they worked with one another as chairman-president for 90 percent of the time at a distance, rather than person to person. There were four trustee meetings a year. So they worked around those four meetings, and John Kemeny could adapt his timing to Dave's needs then.

Otherwise, when they needed to work together, if they were going to travel together, or they needed to talk on the telephone together, Dave McLaughlin was polite enough to give in to John Kemeny. I think the hardest thing might have been for Dave to get phone calls from John Kemeny late at night. Because there was a one-hour time difference to start with. But that didn't help a lot. The time difference was in Kemeny's favor because at midnight here, it was still only 11 p.m. out in

Minneapolis. I don't think that was a big issue. Both people were very big men, and a little thing like that they'd be able to work with stylistically.

CARROLL: I've heard they worked very well together.

HENNESSEY: I think they did, for reasons of distinct compatibility on some levels. I think they were incompatible on other levels, where I think it mattered less because they were able to delegate to one another's strength.

CARROLL: Would you like to give an example of that? Can you think of something that would illustrate that? I think it's an interesting point.

HENNESSEY: Well, I think with respect to understanding and working closely with the faculty and with faculty politics and with faculty decision-making, John Kemeny was superb at that. It was part of his lifeblood. He understood it fully. He was a master at it even though he alienated some parts of the faculty from time to time. Nevertheless, in that culture he was a first among equals. Dave McLaughlin had no feeling for that culture. His knowledge of faculty went back to earlier days when he was a student. He had all of the combination of awe and good humor about faculty that alumni over time develop, looking backward. But he had no real sensitivity or appreciation of the nuances of faculty life. And I think that would have been fair to say about all parts of Dartmouth.

So they divided over that. I don't think Dave, as chairman of the board, had any need to disagree with or come in conflict with John Kemeny's preeminence in faculty affairs. Obviously there were times when faculty matters were a focus for or a stimulus for disagreement at the trustee level over plans for this program or that program. But by then the conversation was at a level where it was obvious and legitimate that the president and trustees should debate things. But it rarely required that the faculty itself get involved.

I think also, with regard to coeducation, student life, the quality of student life, all those things you and I talked about that were being debated during the 70's-- I think John Kemeny, who had a daughter who was here, who was passionately pro-coeducation, who had no background of any kind in Dartmouth's earlier history before he came here as a faculty member or fraternities or anything of that sort... I think there were times when David McLaughlin's image was more that of a stewardship for the heritage of Dartmouth. A feeling that coeducation ought to be carefully watched and it ought to evolve in a slower, more mature way than Kemeny might want it to evolve, in a variety of ways.

And who was skeptical of the criticisms of certain aspects of student life and of the fraternities. I think there, Dave's intellectual style, his cultural affiliations would have been different enough so there would have been a gap between them. Also, however, on those scores, as distinctly different from the faculty culture, I think they might have worked out together, working against each other, grinding against each other some better results than either one of them could have produced individually.

CARROLL: When John Kemeny announced his resignation, and obviously the search was on for his successor. Were you surprised when McLaughlin's name came under consideration?

HENNESSEY: I wasn't surprised. I don't think any of us on campus were surprised to see that as one of the names published in the local newspaper as the name of one out of 15 or so. I think we all nodded and said, “You know, he's been... We can see why the trustees themselves might propose Dave's name. And it's a very good model, among other models, for the post-Kemeny years to think about.” I said to myself, “Indeed, now that I think about it, isn't it interesting to imagine that Dave might become president? There are reasons to promote that, and some of them are good and some of them aren't good.” I mean some of them were ones that I valued a lot, some were ones that I knew other people would value. But I don't think surprise was a term that many people used when his name appeared. As a matter of fact, I remember a colleague saying, “I'm not surprised,” who was against it. Just saying, “I'm not surprised. After all, he's chairman of the board. And he's been a successful chairman of the board; he's been a good chairman. Most of the trustees are business people, and here's their candidate, right here. I mean he's Mr. Dartmouth. Why not?”

CARROLL: What were the pros of his candidacy?

HENNESSEY: Number one, that he understood the college very well at the highest level. He'd worked as closely as anybody with a highly successful president of the college. He was a mature professional student of management, of formal organizations, of the process of being a chief executive officer. He had been a successful CEO. And so he would bring those attributes to the challenge of being the chief officer of a complicated modern organization. He was hard working, ethical, almost a workaholic. He had a deep affection for Dartmouth. He was molded and conditioned by his Dartmouth experience so that it was a part of the real person. He had significant support among some constituencies--not only the trustees, and that would be important that he start off with their confidence, but among the alumni. And perhaps could be among

the alumni a healer because he would represent a modern young president who, however, wasn't obviously a feminist or a pro-postmodern student body. He might just be the right antidote to the flaming liberalism of John Kemeny with all the things he did so fast and furiously. So I think there were all of those, pretty logical, strong reasons for thinking of him as a possible candidate.

CARROLL: Did anyone worry that the model of Dartmouth that he carried in his head...

[End of Tape 11, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 12, Side A]

HENNESSEY: On campus, after Dave's name became generally known, and all of us who were watching, in one way or another, the search process and who were a part of it-- I was a candidate for the presidency, as were some of my colleagues. And it was a topic of very serious conversation and debate. I had heard people say that Dave McLaughlin did not understand, at the proper level of depth, the modern student body and its diversity, and the diversity and real nature of the modern faculty. I didn't agree with that. I knew Dave so well that I--and I admired him so much with regard to his adaptability and his conscientious and modern way of going at things--that I expected him to be able to relate well to a continuation of the Kemeny investment in diversity. And I knew Dave to be someone who, if given the responsibility of the presidency of Dartmouth, would do everything in his power to rise to the highest level of promise in the presidency. And that if he found that he was having difficulty, personally and presidentially, accepting the rate of change with regard to diversity, he would consult with those of us who knew him well, would seek our advice, and would adapt, as all presidents have to, in an appropriate way. I thought, on that score, he might be a fine president.

CARROLL: It's often said that he brought a business perspective to the academic administration. And I wonder what people mean by that? As a business teacher, perhaps you can explain that some.

HENNESSEY: I'd like to try to explain it. Number one, David McLaughlin was a business executive. And his description in any kind of Who's Who would begin with that. As chairman of Dartmouth's board of trustees, he was preeminently a CEO of a Fortune 500 American company. That's what identified him. That was the clothing he wore. And so if anybody wanted to describe him--anybody wanted to describe who's David McLaughlin--it would be natural to start by saying, “He is a businessperson.” “Okay. But wait a minute. He's president of

Dartmouth." "Well, yes. He is a businessperson who became president of Dartmouth." That was what could be said about Ernest Martin Hopkins back in 1917. It wasn't what could've been said about John Dickey. He was not a businessperson. He was, however, a lawyer, and a State Department person. And Kemeny was a faculty member and so on.

But Dave McLaughlin, shorthand description, a businessperson who became president. Well, when people say he brought business practices to the presidency, well, of course he did; whatever that means, of course he did. As a description, what it meant was that his skills, his highly polished skills of decision-making, of carrying out his responsibilities as an executive, were formed and shaped primarily in the crucible of his heading a major business. Were those skills and practices and experiences adaptable to another setting? I thought, as a scholar of business and business people and business decision-making, that they of course were, in very important respects. And indeed, it seemed to me that to become an excellent university or college president, it would be very wise to have spent 30 years in business, and 30 years as a faculty member, and 30 years as a fund-raiser, and 30 years as a general in the Army, and 30 years as a ministerial philosopher.

So Dave had one cluster of experiences that I thought were very important. And I gave talks about those leadership characteristics that are well nurtured in a modern progressive business setting. Probably more successfully than they can be nurtured anywhere else because of the democratic nature, for the most part, of business enterprises, despite some of the criticisms of them as being different from that. The development of consensus among bright people about how you're going to move forward in the public interest to produce something that the public really wants. In a situation of trust where your shareholders will be on top of you all the time, asking you how you're doing with their investments and why. I thought, of all those experiences can burnish some of the best instincts in men and women about how to be responsible at the head of a complicated organization. How to delegate, how to use staffs, how to face the fact of scarce resources, how to marshall human energy and gather people around things that need to be done.

Yes, he was a businessperson. But when people meant that as a criticism, what did they mean? They meant that he might give undue weight in seeking advice to people who would be experts in the realm of finance or business affairs. And might give less weight, in a decision

that required a confluence of interests and values, to voices and values coming out of the academic enterprise itself. Whenever the faculty found that Dave seemed to be behaving in a way that did not tilt in their direction, they found it easy to say, well, after all, he's a businessman who became president. You and I talked before about the necessity in human affairs to describe people with cartoons or caricatures. Well, that isn't exactly a cartoon; it's just a half-truth. I mean it fits the man. But to use it as a criticism is to say that his instincts and skills coming out of that background should be criticized. When in fact the faculty should have celebrated them in part, and criticized-- Of course they should criticize when they thought things were not tilted in their direction. But they had to recognize that the president of the place--whoever the president is--will at times have to make decisions, if they're going to be of the highest quality, that will not favor the faculty. They might favor somebody else, given the nature of that decision.

Now, when Dave showed an instinct to--I almost want to go back and stop the tape and back up because I'm not saying it quite right. There were times in Dartmouth affairs when Dave was under stress. But it did seem to me that he felt a great deal more comfortable and trusting in seeking advice among those whose greatest powers were their identification with his business skills. I should say more about that, and I'd have to illustrate it through cases especially. But maybe more importantly, I should say that there were times when Dave needed to make decisions that seemed to him did not really involve the faculty very much. But had to do with the making of business and economic and financial decisions surrounding the funding of Dartmouth's affairs, or raising new funds, the creation of buildings, the things in the realm of sports, matters having to do with the budget. Where he would have expected the faculty not to want to be much involved, and perhaps the students also. Where he felt very much at home because they were decisions and matters that he had been so forcefully involved in as a trustee, and that had their roots and perhaps many of their values in the very business decisions that he was so good at making.

Once he made decisions in that realm and was comfortable with the results, and found himself being criticized by the faculty either for the style of the decision or the results of the decision, he was in a sort of no-win situation. Where the faculty was saying "you shouldn't have done that because you left us out; you didn't know that we had interests in that. And the reason you left us out, Mr. President, is that you don't realize that everything around here really has to do with the faculty and the students. That there aren't things that you can go out and do on your own, even though they're financial and business affairs. And we

don't like what you did. And therefore we're challenging it--I mean we're saying we are the faculty, and therefore you're going to have to change that, or you're going to have to sell us." And they got into very strong debates. To some extent that was true of the medical center. But the minute I say that, you can see that all the things I've said have to be subtly changed and the coloration is slightly different as you look at each case where that phenomenon would be illustrated.

I'm almost saying to you that at times I think the faculty misused their disagreements with him to express a deeper distrust. I think the distrust was not so much that he couldn't make fine decisions in the financial and business realm. It was that the very fact that he did it without consulting and without respecting what they saw, what the faculty saw, to be interconnections, reminded them that on faculty matters, where he had to make decisions, they often found him tone deaf. They often found that he did not really appreciate either the style and process with which faculty expected decisions to be made or the decisions he himself made finally on the matters that came out of the life of the faculty. Often those were ground out with the provost before the faculty itself got involved.

But over time--and now I'm leaping ahead here--but over time it seemed to me very clear that the residue of trust that a president needs to build up in the body politic called the faculty, the level of reserves that a president needs to have was never really reached by Dave. So that when he needed to call on a reservoir of trust from the faculty in matters that affected them but that he uniquely had to call the shots on, there wasn't anything there to draw on. There was a significant cluster, a cohort of faculty members, who disagreed from the first announcement of his presidency that he ever could succeed. And said so.

CARROLL: This sort of gets to one of the questions that I have been trying to puzzle out in reading over the minutes when the announcement was made, etc. There was a very clear body of people who were hostile, as you say, from the very first. What do you think evoked that hostility in them?

HENNESSEY: Well, the first body of faculty members to express that hostility, feel it and then express it, was the small group of faculty who served, if not on the search committee, at least as the faculty advisors to the search committee. I think they were corporately on it. I'm quite sure they were. I remember being interviewed as a prospect for the job at the Minary Center. I can remember who was in the room, and the most significant questioners and personages who were there were faculty members.

They played a pretty strong role. As I think about the other people who were on that search committee, the trustees particularly, one or two of them in particular, I think it would be fair to say that the faculty members carried a lot of weight in that group. Now it was said by that group of four faculty members--I don't remember when they went public with it--but it was said at least on the day of the announcement that Dave would become the president (I think perhaps before that), that no one of them favored him.

CARROLL: Oh, truly?

HENNESSEY: They said that.

CARROLL: So that the trustees went in contradiction to the advice of the faculty?

HENNESSEY: Absolutely. At the meeting in Alumni Hall in the Hopkins Center, when Dave was brought into the room before the general faculty and introduced as the--it was before the announcement had been made. In other words, a meeting to be called to introduce the person. I don't think we even knew the name, but maybe we did. I guess we did. Yes, we did because some of the faculty members on the search committee had leaked it that morning. He was brought in by the temporary-- When Dave became the [candidate], he resigned-- Or he stepped out temporarily of the chairmanship of the board. Went on leave as the chairman of the board and went on leave as a trustee. And the board then was chaired, I think by Ralph Lazarus. And Ralph Lazarus then brought Dave into the room and introduced him. And after Dave gave his talk and Ralph gave his, I think Ralph might have said then, "Are there any questions?" And the first or second person who stood up, a faculty friend of mine who was on the search committee, who said, "Mr. McLaughlin, what makes you think you can succeed as the president of Dartmouth College when all the faculty members of the search committee voted against you?" That's when it became--

CARROLL: That’s the first person.

HENNESSEY: It was the first person. He's not only a friend of mine, I've co-taught with him, I know him very, very well. And that's--he is a brash, outspoken individual.

CARROLL: You might as well say his name. It's in the minutes anyway.

HENNESSEY: Bernie Gert.

CARROLL: Bernie Gert, yes. And yet there's no real good response that McLaughlin gives.

HENNESSEY: He couldn't. I think we all sucked in our breath. That was inappropriate. That was a gauche thing to happen. A long, first-rate search. The trustees are our governing body. They made the decision, and they're not going to change it. And now our job is to be sure that this is a bright chapter in the history of Dartmouth. And to start it off that way, publicly in that fashion, was bizarre. That's all I can say. Just bizarre!

CARROLL: I was reading these minutes and trying to figure out what the mentality was that would prompt that kind of a comment. And I was wondering, was there a sense of betrayal or hurt, do you think, among those on the search committee?

HENNESSEY: Yes. Bernie, whom I knew reasonably well, had written a book on the moral rules and the moral ideals. He's a Kantian moralist, ethicist, by training, and he teaches ethics. And I think he felt it was really unethical for the Dartmouth board of trustees to betray the implied promise that they would respect the opinion of that faculty group. And so I think he spoke out in that context. Which still made it wrong, almost unethical, to do it. But I can understand, knowing him so well, just exactly how his mind worked. I think he was angry and felt betrayed. Whether the other faculty members would've said the same thing if he hadn't, I don't know. But I doubt it.

CARROLL: I'm wondering then-- One of the first things that happens when McLaughlin comes on to campus as president is that there is a series of some bad publicity moments for Dartmouth. And I'm trying to remember-- Do you remember exactly what some of the events were? They're all rather minor, but they add up.

HENNESSEY: I don't remember.

CARROLL: But the result of it, or the upshot is what I think is the most important, and that is that David McLaughlin asks--or seems to force the hand of--Dennis Dinan to step down as editor of the Dartmouth Alumni Magazine.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: What prompted him to do that, do you think?

HENNESSEY: Jane, I have absolutely no idea. I knew Dennis well. I have in my file correspondence with him when that happened, expressing my sympathy with him. And having him try to tell me why it happened. He ended up really saying he didn't know why it happened. I was proud--I think most people here--were proud of the independence of the Dartmouth Alumni Magazine. I think we felt then and feel now that it's a strong university and a strong college that can allow its alumni magazine to be independent. Dennis was, I thought, a first-class person and a very good editor. That came to me out of the blue. I had no idea it was going to happen. I thought it was a real mistake. But I respected Dave enough and knew well enough, that I did not understand the un-publishable side of that, so that I thought it was sad and too bad. But I didn't run around saying it was a wrong thing for him to do. I just regretted it and wished it hadn't happened.

But quickly I saw that it was one of those things that, to other people, seemed to add up on the side of the ledger that said, “Dave McLaughlin will fire people out of the blue, where he has the power to fire them.” There were people saying, “That's what happens in business,” which I think is a bad half-truth. I don't think it happens in business more than anyplace else. It may be more visible under certain circumstances in business. But he did. He then became seen as somebody, who in a variety of matters, acted fairly--it looked like he was acting peremptorily. He got rid, or fired, the vice president and the person who was responsible for business affairs, [Rodney] Rod Morgan [‘44], with whom I had worked long and hard. And he went about sort of reshaping the administration in lots of different ways. Well, that was his prerogative. And I think he felt, again, coming out of business, or out of politics, that that's what you do. The new person comes in and really has to be surrounded by folks that are best for the future. And why would you want in place--or keep in place--anyone who wasn't the best person for that job? Well, one reason might be political. But that could be factored into the idea of the best person for the job: someone who carried enough political weight so that you really ought to keep them for this reason or that reason.

Of course to the faculty that was very shocking. Because I think some faculty had really come into feeling, without examining it, that people must have tenure in the administration as well as in the faculty side. I mean things ought to move much more slowly. And there were faculty members also who felt that there should never be any visible firing. Somehow universities should be gentler places. And there might be a time when somebody would be pushed into resigning. But you wouldn't fire them. So I think those were small matters. I think probably Dave,

nine times out of ten, did the right thing. But he didn't anticipate that they had the kinds of costs to them which then were, again, part of the residue of doubts and distrust that led to the much larger flaps over ROTC, divestment, medical center later in his presidency.

CARROLL: One of the things that has struck me reading the criticism of faculty to the firing of Dinan is that, coming in as an outsider with 20/20 hindsight, reading this, that David McLaughlin never stood up and said: “This is why I did it.” And gave reasons to them. I wonder, why you think he never did? Because that might, it seems to my mind, looking back on it, have been able to stem the flow of some of the criticism.

HENNESSEY: I'm not sure it could have, Jane. That's a tricky matter. In any enterprise it's uncommon, really quite uncommon, any enterprise at all, for someone who is the instrument for pushing someone out of the system, firing them, divorcing them, whatever, to give a full accounting, pro and con, as to why it was done. Very uncommon to do it. And once you do it in one case, it'll be expected that you'll do it in the next case.

CARROLL: That’s true.

HENNESSEY: Really. So, I think he was caught. If Dennis had resigned in a different way, or if somehow Dave had waited for Dennis to build up more visible support for his being succeeded by somebody else, it might have been okay. But having gotten angry and fired him, which is I guess what he did, just told him "you're through," Dave had to live with the awful fact that he could never then explain it.

CARROLL: Well, the next big moment, or the big controversy, I guess is really when he decides he’s going to bring back ROTC on campus.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Over the wishes, the expressed wishes, of the faculty.

HENNESSEY: Well, that's right. But with almost full support from the student body and alumni.

CARROLL: Alumni and trustees.

HENNESSEY: And trustees.

CARROLL: I had someone explain to me once, and you probably-- maybe it was even you.

HENNESSEY: Maybe.

CARROLL: That a president has only so much goodwill that he can call upon from his faculty, and that you expend it in different ways that you think are important.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Why do you think that David McLaughlin thought ROTC was important enough to expend some of that goodwill?

HENNESSEY: A number of things. First of all, I think he personally and professionally, after examining it, felt that there were good reasons for bringing ROTC, NROTC, back onto the campus. I think some of those who were most enthusiastic about his presidency were people who continued to carry a pretty strong grievance that Dartmouth had dealt with ROTC the way it had. I think there were many who supported the presidency of David McLaughlin, who felt to heal the wounds in the community, the post-Kemeny wounds, the disequilibria created by the Kemeny “excesses”, that Dave should do what he could do to heal the wound over ROTC. Not necessarily to bring it back in its old form, but to make some form of ROTC an option for the future leaders of the military. I think they might have felt that that was Dave's duty. As he was patching together other--as he was knitting together--other torn strands and [total?] tapestry of what they wanted Dartmouth to be, I think they really expected that he would do that. And some of the trustees might well have moved very forcefully in that direction with Dave, in terms of advice.

As he got to know students--and Dave did do the job of going around the campus and getting to know students in his way--I think he was impressed with the number of students who felt that that wasn't a bad idea. I think it was a way of expressing, also, bringing the community back together after Vietnam, after all, in the Reagan years. Mr. Reagan became president of the nation almost the same time Dave became president. His inauguration was a little before the inauguration of Dave McLaughlin. So you have to take that into account also. The healing that Mr. Reagan, presumably, was going to be able to produce after the presidencies of Nixon and Carter.

What else? Well, also, I think Dave, who did listen to faculty, who had some faculty advisors, found persuasive testimony from some faculty members that that would be a wise thing for him to do. That even though he would encounter some faculty opposition, that if he managed

the debate well, it would establish his presidency as a conservative but caring presidency that would produce more healing, that would push back the influence of the more radical faculty. And that therefore it would be wise. It would also save some money because it would produce more financial aid for some students in it. And there was the argument from the civil libertarians that students should have that right, they should have that option. I mean, “Why would you cut out that option?”

From some faculty who had studied ROTC, there were some who have written books on this campus about the history of ROTC, there was the argument that for the success of the American national experiment with its military and civilian control of its military, it would be beneficial to have more officers rising to higher levels who had had a liberal education at the highest level. Therefore, the Ivy League colleges and universities had a real responsibility to join with the hundreds of other universities and colleges to allow that small option to exist. And therefore to produce leaders who would have that as part of their gift to the nation.

I think all those things persuaded Dave that he could manage that with the faculty. And that the opposition in the faculty would come, I think he felt (indeed I recall talking with him about that) might well come from the faculty members who needed to be--how shall I put it?--who had come to have perhaps inappropriately large clout and power in faculty affairs. I mean Dave noticed that the faculty meetings weren't terribly well attended. The percentage of radical faculty who came to the meetings, depending on the agenda, was pretty high compared with those who were not radicals. I think Dave found that in some faculty meetings there were people present who didn't want him to be president and who were bringing people together as a sort of anti-McLaughlin interest group. Or “Let's be the McLaughlin watchers, and we'll come to the faculty meetings and give him a hard time.”

After all, he presided over the faculty meetings of the Arts & Sciences because that was part of the way Dartmouth was and is set up. But he was presiding as a non-faculty member over a faculty meeting, where often it was a very tortured experience. I mean that's the one place he shouldn't have been. Why would he meet... And I indeed--I won't go into that. But I just strongly felt that was an inappropriate thing for this university to have the president preside over the Faculty of Arts & Sciences. It was a losing proposition for him. But nevertheless, he felt he was willing to take that debate into that faculty, and thought that-- In the end, I think he was advised by other faculty that he could win it.

That the faculty would appreciate all the very good reasons for doing it. What he didn't appreciate, and I don't think I did or anybody else did, was how it would become a surrogate issue, a shadow issue, for other matters. And that when the faculty began to move on it, there was sort of an invitation: “Let's gang up on this to show the president he can't push us around on anything, even on something where he thinks he's got…”

[End of Tape 12, Side A – Beginning of Tape 12, Side B]

...began, as I can recall it, in July 1983, and it just went on and on. It didn't happen suddenly. The 100 percent student government vote for ROTC, my notes say, took place in February '85. So it germinated for a time. The faculty voted "no" on March 4, 1985, two years after it really first came up and was kicked around. So Dave took his time on it. And the faculty vote was 113 to 39. Well, 113 in an Arts & Sciences faculty of 360 people, and a general faculty of 500 and some, that's not a large vote. And Dave McLaughlin then said "yes" on March 12th after that faculty vote on March 4th. And he did it eight days after the faculty voted. Too bad he had to do it quite so quickly. And he did it after final exams and the faculty were all off and gone. So they were mad as hell that he did it that way. And then 52 faculty members signed the Crisis Letter and so on. My notes are no better than yours on that. And April 2, 1985, 30 students accused David of hypocrisy. And on it went.

CARROLL: That is the part that I think must have hurt the most.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: When the students came to him. Because as I read his notes, he thought he was doing them a favor.

HENNESSEY: Oh, yes.

CARROLL: To give them this option.

HENNESSEY: Yes. Absolutely.

CARROLL: And I'm wondering... There's no notes he made after that meeting with the students, when they actually went to him. But I cannot imagine how depressing that must have felt.

HENNESSEY: Very. Fundamentally depressing.

CARROLL: At this point, this is '85 now, and he has been in office for four years. He has had fairly good trust and support among the trustees. But about '85 the trustees seem to be a little less supportive in some of this-- they seem to back off a bit. And I have not been able to figure out why. What happened?

HENNESSEY: Well, I don't know. And you'll be the student of this, Jane. I don't know just exactly when the chemical balance in the board of trustees became one which could be described as importantly questioning the president. I don't know when that happened. I think they were surprised--the trustees must have been very worried--when that ad hoc committee on governance of the faculty rendered its report in late '85, raising very serious sort of formal questions about Dave's style and the quality of his decision-making. There were trustees who were in close touch with, who knew faculty members well--not many, but some--who were being warned that there were clouds on the horizon.

It was possible by then to characterize the presidency as in play, as in danger, because of the number of things Dave did that made him look angry, imperious, tough, alienated from the faculty, prone to brooding and making bad decisions. He lost his wit and warmth, of which he had some prior to then. He didn't survive the sturm und drang of the presidency the way Kemeny did. Kemeny was under terrible embattled pressures for a very long time. But he always bounced right back up. He had such strength of personality, and such wit and warmth about him as a human being that he was able to roll with it. Dave was almost too good a president in the sense of being completely invested as a human being in the nature of what was going on, and unable to pull back from it. His whole being was caught up in it, and I think he was sorely, sorely disappointed. Properly so, I think. In that sense he was dealt some of Fate's bitter blows.

CARROLL: It's right about this time when one begins to sense in the minutes of the trustees there's a less of a total support behind him when the divestment issue came into play.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes. Well, that's right. That was a terribly difficult time for him.

CARROLL: This is also '85.

HENNESSEY: Well, the shanties, they were the problem. The shanties went up in fall of '85.

CARROLL: Right.

HENNESSEY: I mean, the shanties did it. The divestment debate by itself, that could be managed. It was managed on lots of campuses. It might have led to something else. It might have led to occupying the administration building the way it did when I was at the University of Vermont. It might have. But it didn't. It acted itself out by the creation of these shanties. And the shanties were in place for a long time. Well, Dave presided over the decision-making with respect to those shanties. And I guess you have all the paperwork, so you know how tortured it was. No one knew what was the right thing to do. Dave bent over backwards, it seemed to me, to allow them to stay. I mean they stayed until February. Then went up in what, October?

CARROLL: They went up in October, and they actually got destroyed in January on Martin Luther King-- No, February, I guess, on Martin Luther King's birthday.

HENNESSEY: Are you sure?

CARROLL: It was the weekend before Martin Luther King's Birthday.

HENNESSEY: Isn't his birthday--?

CARROLL: Well, see, I thought it was January. That's why I think-- Maybe the first attack on them came right before his birthday. Because one of the points that they make in the student newspaper is the fact that it was a date chosen for that very reason.

HENNESSEY: You're right. There were several attacks. There was an attack on the Martin Luther King Birthday, which I think is January 15th or 16th. Something happened then. But the shanties were really destroyed by that final attack in February.

CARROLL: February, that's right. I want to go back just a little bit on the divestiture. The principle, it seems to me, was that Dartmouth had agreed to the Sullivan Principles years before. And then the hue and cry came when someone did some investigation and found out that they had not yet divested themselves totally. It's not that they hadn't divested. Simply that they had divested totally by this time. As a businessman, I would love to know, why do you think they had not divested totally in the intervening I think it's four years since they had agreed to the Sullivan Principles?

HENNESSEY: I'd have to do more homework, Jane. I don't remember it that way, so I'm trying to imagine, am I wrong? I mean the Sullivan Principles simply said that if you subscribe to these principles--and I can almost articulate them--then it will be legitimate for shareholders to continue to hold common shares in those companies that have so subscribed to those principles. And I mean individuals or groups or universities or foundations or churches or anybody else, and they were all in the act. I was much involved because I was president of a corporate foundation at that time, and had put in place the same set of reviews and what will be our value statement with regard to companies that operate in South Africa. And the development of the Sullivan Principles and their revision by Leon Sullivan in the 80's seemed to me on ethical grounds to be a very appropriate way to proceed in this matter. I was not aware (and would have to go back to find out) that Dartmouth, having established the principles, failed, that Dartmouth actively purchased common stock in companies that were in South Africa and failed to subscribe to the Sullivan Principles.

CARROLL: My understanding--and, again, I am not a business mind--my understanding is that they had not purchased new stock since agreeing to the Sullivan Principles. But were only asking for time so that, according to them, the financial security of Dartmouth should not be imperiled by divesting themselves of stock from companies which had holdings in South Africa. And that they were asking for more time to do that is my understanding. And it's not that they had not begun divesting. They had. But it was a slow process. And I think it was the slowness of the process that caused the people to protest.

HENNESSEY: Are you sure?

CARROLL: When you look at me like that, I'm not so sure, but I thought I was..

HENNESSEY: I'm sure you're right. There were people, though, there were very strong people on this campus with whom I talked, and with whom I debated, who believed that it was only ethical to divest of all common stock of all corporations that operated in South Africa. Whether they had-- That the Sullivan Principles were a synthetic shield. That we should not have agreed-- That the trustees made a mistake in agreeing to use the Sullivan Principles in their investment decision-making. The strongest proponents of the shanties and the strongest proponents of what Dartmouth should do wanted divestment, period. Forget this other business. And I believe--and until proved wrong I would continue to believe--that the major force, the major agony felt by those who were strong enough to be willing to build shanties and go out and sleep in

them and everything else, came from those who conscientiously believed that that was the proper statement to make.

CARROLL: I think you're right.

HENNESSEY: And there might have been those who said, “Well, you know, I wouldn't have joined you in this. But I'm frankly disappointed that Dartmouth has not divested of all the stocks under the Sullivan Principles.” Now that would have been a small segment of the community. That's my strong belief.

CARROLL: I think you're right in that. And I do not think that the shanty builders were a very large segment of the community.

HENNESSEY: Oh, no.

CARROLL: But they were so vocal, and so visible.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes.

CARROLL: Now when the shanties go up, David McLaughlin is out of town. And Ed Shanahan, who was working in his place, says to them, as I understand it: "You have 48 hours to take these down." Do you remember what happened next?

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: David McLaughlin comes back to town, and he says--he countermands Dean Shanahan's order and allows them to stay up longer. And actually in many respects, when I look back on it, seems to precipitate almost, this lingering problem.

HENNESSEY: Yes, indeed he did. I now recall that. And I think there was again a sort of sudden shock that he would countermand the decision of the dean of the college at a time when it probably would have been better for his presidency, or for any presidency, to remain more above it. More aligned with the dean of the college to do what the dean of the college felt was right.

CARROLL: So I have to ask you because you know this man, and I'm trying-- I feel like when I read Kemeny's memos, I get a sense of Kemeny. When I read McLaughlin's memos, I have no sense of the man.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: Here's a man who is so decisive that over the wishes of his faculty, he can institute ROTC. But when it comes to the shanties, he is so indecisive that the issue lingers. And why? Why was that?

HENNESSEY: You will be asking many, many people for their views on that. And each of us will have a somewhat different account, I'm sure. My explanation comes partly from watching that experience, and partly from watching it in agony, in other institutions. And having lived it for a short time at the University of Vermont myself, both in the provost's position and the interim-president position. So I think for a university, for the American university in the 1961 to 1996 era, there have been very few phenomena, very few experiences, that have been more befuddling and confusing and discouraging and difficult than student takeovers. One's instinct, when it's students who are involved, is to want to use the experience for educational purposes. That is, to see the students as students, to see the students as learners, to see the students as vulnerable and not to want to be punitive, for a variety of reasons. One, the accusation by the most angry students over the last 30 years has often included the charge that “Universities are big corporate places who don't appreciate students or anybody else. And they’re lifeless and bloodless, and they make decisions as if they were made in corporate boardrooms, and they drop bombs as if we were in Vietnam. And they really can't be trusted, and they don't have a heart or a soul.” And all that rhetoric can be used for your purpose if you are a radical. And students have used such arguments very successfully.

But nevertheless, when you're up close and personal to the experience of students expressing themselves in agonized ways. Who you may come to feel really are committed, really are some of the most sensitive, caring students on the whole campus. And they express themselves in a particular way. You then begin to ask yourself the costs and benefits of allowing them to continue. But when they're in your office as president, or when they are impeding the progress of the university, clearly then the universities have found it wise to develop policies that say “You can't do that. This will be a learning experience for you, and for all of us, that we cannot allow people to protest in ways that are not part of the corporate system. If they wish to stop the activities and interfere with the activities which have brought us together in the first place, our educational, our administrative activities. So you can't take over the president's office. If you have a grievance, you can do a lot of other things.”

Well, I think Dave felt, “Well, wait a minute. In an earlier era they did take over Parkhurst Hall. We certainly don't want that to happen again. But in this case they're out on The Green? What is The Green? Is it part of the educational turf? Well, it is and it isn't. No education goes on there; there are no buildings there. No one has to cross The Green to get where he or she wants to go. They're not impeding student traffic. Maybe it's okay. Maybe we can use this as an educational experience, and the students will be out there, and they'll be anxious to sponsor discussions, and we'll be able to get the other students to mingle with them. And they're only a minority. So over time the students who want to take back The Green will find ways to take back The Green. I mean let's let it act itself out here. And it isn't like these other universities where the agony is that the longer you let it go, the more you look like a wimp.” This is what destroyed my successor as a president of the University of Vermont. It really destroyed him. Twenty-eight days with his own office taken over, and he didn't know what to do about it.

So I think Dave really felt that incrementally day by day he did not see any reason to stop it. Indeed it had become a focus for the energy of these groups, which seem to be displaying itself in an educational way. I mean the reason they built the shanties was to protest, but also to educate the rest of us by putting up exhibits, by holding sessions. A little bit like Lafayette Park across from the White House. A little bit like that. Which for zillions of years we have set aside for the noisiest and most obstreperous kinds of protests. “But it's in control. It's okay.” I think Dave saw it in those ways. And for a time, I think, most people felt that that was okay. That was probably wise. There was a stormy, raging debate on campus, of course, as to what probably ought to be done. But I think most people, at least at first, believed that Dave probably did the right thing, and that Ed might have moved too quickly. The accident was that Dave hadn't been here. If Dave had been here, Ed would have consulted with him. And they both would have done it. That was just an accident. So, yes. I think it was-- I think what had shocked people here was the publicity that that got. And then it got a life of its own. And then it began to reflect on the nature of Dartmouth. And then it got caught up in the fact that the president who allowed this to happen was under assault, under attack for lots of other things. So it became convenient for all sorts of observers and participants in the Dartmouth adventure to begin to side with those who wanted to criticize Dave McLaughlin for allowing this to go on. Which seems so ironic. Because it was really--he was doing something that most of his critics really would have preferred to see a president do: turn this into a nonviolent, educational kind of experience. And the irony then was that the right wing students then came along and blew it up.

CARROLL: We don't have much tape left. I think I'm going to suggest we stop here.

HENNESSEY: Sure.

[End of session six]

INTERVIEW: John W. Hennessey, Jr.

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Baker Library
Hanover, New Hampshire

DATE: November 21 , 1996

CARROLL: I couldn't remember if we had or not.

HENNESSEY: Yes, we really did.

CARROLL: Let's just start in with the--

HENNESSEY: If you want to start with that as a reprise, I mean I could say more, depending on how much you now know about it.

CARROLL: I read the articles, and nothing really surprised me too much that I read in the articles about Dennis Dinan. Except the fact that there was an outpouring on the part of editors from other alumni magazines. Did that have any effect at all?

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: No?

HENNESSEY: No.

CARROLL: Had Dinan ever been a cause célèbre at any other time?

HENNESSEY: Not at all. No, he was much respected.

CARROLL: Do we know what happened to him afterwards?

HENNESSEY: I did, and now I've forgotten. Not sure. My vague impression is that he certainly landed on his feet, so to speak. But I don't remember.

CARROLL: Well, there comes a time during Mr. McLaughlin's tenure here when he fires the football coach, [Joseph] Joe Yukica, which caused an equal stir among the Dartmouth family.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: I was wondering if you could explain what had led up to that and what the reaction was.

HENNESSEY: Trouble is I don't really know. That wasn't something I followed. I only know that it fitted in. It was part of the whole tapestry all right. It came at an awkward time. The reaction of the community was, “Well, there he goes again.” It was awkwardly done, and “Why would he do that?” And the reaction was-- I could comment on it. If you want to start the tape, we'll--

CARROLL: We're on.

HENNESSEY: Oh, we're on. Okay, okay. Well, the only thing I can really recall in the discussions with colleagues who gathered together occasionally to ask, “Well, what's going on? How can we help? What can we do as a senior faculty?” And the reaction to that was, “Well, you know, we have felt that the faculty at times has been rather unfair in its demands that Mr. McLaughlin be something he can't be, which is an academic, a person with academic sensitivities. And that probably what we have to get used to is that he's really expert in the way he makes decisions outside the academic ground, and that's benefiting Dartmouth in multiple ways.” This came along. And then those who were more negatively inclined from the start--and we talked last time about the fact that there were such people who really didn't give him much of a break. They simply could say, “Well, here's an area where, I mean, he's an ex-football player. This is not academic, and look at the way he does it. He's simply insensitive. Not only that, but he doesn't appear to have the skills required in a complex organization.” Now, I don't know anything about the case, so I don't know whether that's fair or unfair. I'm just reporting that was what was talked about.

CARROLL: Very early on, then, McLaughlin made it one of his goals to raise the faculty salaries, which had been rather low at that time. Do you know how he went about this?

HENNESSEY: No, I don't because it had nothing to do with Tuck School. So I really don't know.

CARROLL: The Tuck School salaries are not part of that package?

HENNESSEY: Oh, no. Not at all. They're in our own market, so to speak, for salaries and for faculty.

CARROLL: Do you have any idea why this raise in faculty salaries did not evoke a sense of gratitude among faculty?

HENNESSEY: Oh, sure. I can certainly comment on that. By the way, Jane, you didn't introduce the tape the way you always do.

CARROLL: I know. I noticed that. I'll have to put it in right at the beginning. Because we had some lead-in where we were just chatting, and I'll put it over it.

HENNESSEY: First of all, absolutely number one, I have never been on a university campus where the faculty has been unabashedly grateful for a raise in salary, in the salary system. Nor have I as a faculty member ever felt pangs or floods of gratitude. It just doesn't occur to one to think of it that way. Among other things, what one tends humanly to focus on is one's own salary, compared with other people's salaries. It's not so much the absolute as "why could it possibly be that my salary in the same degree of service and age and everything else is a little less than somebody else's," if you know what they are. I ran into that in spades at the University of Vermont when I was provost and interim president. It became my job not only to worry about that whole system, but to preside over the grievance system and to see how people grieved, and why they grieved, and what their real message was. So that's number one.

Number two, it was seen as something that the faculty was owed. "I mean if we have a president who is a financial expert, and deeply committed, as he says, to the life and welfare of the faculty, then why wouldn't he do that? I mean that's part of his job, isn't it?" And part of that mentality is, "Well, why didn't he just do it sooner? And why didn't he do it more?" Because even having done it, you had no difficulty in those days comparing Dartmouth's salaries--indeed compensation, salary plus fringe benefits--with another bundle of institutions and showing that we still weren't where we ought to be. So the answer to that is, "Well, for heaven's sake, we're going in the right direction, aren't we?" So I think Dave must have been surprised that there wasn't gratitude as there might be in some other kind of organization.

But you know, in another fundamental sense, faculty are peculiar on salary. Not only in that they care about interpersonal comparisons, they are very worried about the nature of the decision-making process: “What are you taking into your balance as you decide what my salary will be, and who are you to do that?” Because it's usually peer review that they're accustomed to, and they don't like administrators doing that.

But in addition, it is quite fair to say that faculty members array themselves on the spectrum from those who are very proud that they don't care about salary; that's not why they're doing this. “So don't even bother me. And quit bothering me to the extent of trying to make it so important that I have to thank you and say what a great job you did. I mean that just isn't part of my life. I'm more worried about my students, my course, the spirit of this place. And by the way, Mr. President, I've got some questions for you in that sphere.” And then all the way over to other people on the other end of the spectrum who seem to care mightily about salary. And you wonder, really, why they do. It becomes sort of an estimate of self-worth for those who are worried about their self-worth. And they want every piece of positive feedback they can get. But if you're in that mood psychologically, then you're not likely to settle for a modest or even a generous increase because you need more to make yourself feel better. It's a peculiar psychological bog in a way to invest oneself in. And I can very much appreciate why Dave's effort were not applauded. I don't think they would've been even if he had been able to show we had higher salaries than some of those bench marks that we think are very important to us.

CARROLL: I'm curious that you said Tuck salaries are determined separately. How does that work?

HENNESSEY: Oh, the way it works is pretty simple, Jane. You go out into the marketplace. And I know we academics often don't like even to use the term "marketplace." But that's what it is. You want to hire faculty, so you go to the doctoral programs and you compete with other schools. And we began to find in the mid-60’s that the beginning salaries for Ph.D.'s in the fields related to business administration, even if they happened to be liberal arts fields, were going up faster than the salaries in English and art, alas. And although we didn't like that for all kinds of reasons, we felt that in order to play the game, we had to compete. None of us in the selective business schools, the selective graduate business schools, felt that we had to lead the market.

Because we saw with the booming popularity of MBA programs, which really became huge-- And I mean 25 percent of the undergraduates for a time were majoring in business. And the number of graduate students, I don't even know the percentage, but there was an exponential growth. What happened was that the newer schools, and particularly those that were well funded by someone whose name was attached to the Jane Doe or John Doe Business School, said, "Money's no object. Get me the best faculty you can." And this competition, this growth, all meant that the starting salaries rose markedly. And so our job, my job as dean in the graduate business school, was to try to maintain some decent gap or interval between the salaries of the 25-year veteran full professors and the brand-new people coming in off the street, and it became very difficult to do that. But we had to do it. You can't-- I mean obviously there was a compression. But we just couldn't allow that to continue to push down to almost no difference. And that simply wasn't true in any other area of Dartmouth. Just not true.

CARROLL: Had you done your own fund-raising for these raises?

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure.

CARROLL: Okay.

HENNESSEY: Well, we did it in two ways. And I described to you some weeks ago how I went to the trustees and bargained that we would be able to raise funds from Dartmouth alumni and then from Tuck and Dartmouth alumni. And that was one way to raise funds to create revenues in our budget. We also put together a Tuck Associates Program to get annual investments, sort of club dues from businesses and professional associations. And then finally, we broke with Dartmouth on tuition. We had our own tuition. Not the same as the Dartmouth tuition.

CARROLL: The other thing--sort of going back to McLaughlin. He had apparently, I have read, attempted to formulate rules about sabbaticals and tried to regulate those in some way. Were you involved in that at all?

HENNESSEY: Marginally. Again, I knew it was taking place because I wanted to be sure that I understood what kind of a demand might be made in a university sense on Tuck School with regard to sabbaticals, and whether we could continue to be relatively independent in that respect or not. My memory of it is very dim. But I'll tell you what I do remember. I do remember that Tuck, I determined, and in fact was true, I was not then dean, Tuck was able to maintain its independence in this regard.

Number two, I vaguely recall that nothing changed; so that there was no change. There wasn't anything we had to adapt to from the Tuck end.

I also recall vividly my own attempts as dean to moderate and regularize not only sabbatical leaves, but leaves of all sorts and the consulting opportunities of all sorts. Because faculties, as you know, believe that they have a day a week which they can devote to consulting and/or research. But consulting was the issue because that might take your energies and your attention away from activities that would generate more high quality teaching and research in your fundamental job. In a professional school that's more tricky because if you're asked to consult with General Motors on the future of its board of directors, for example, that might very well feed back into your teaching. It might generate some research opportunities. It might attract other faculty to come if you have real expertise. But it might also get out of hand. You might be paid so much that you'd be tempted to generate more than a day a week. And the question really was then, “Who's going to monitor it? How do you monitor it?” And that's very tough to know.

CARROLL: There was an expressed fear, I suppose is the best way to put it, on the part of the faculty during McLaughlin's years that he wished them to move in the direction of graduate schools, of increased numbers of graduate schools. And they worried that he was losing focus on the undergraduate institution. Are those kinds of concerns that you were just expressing part of what they were concerned about, the idea that moving you away from your main focus?

HENNESSEY: Yes, I certainly think so. I don't really believe-- First of all, I'm not-- This is not part-- something I was much a part of. I would have been if I had been dean, but I was off doing my own thing at Tuck, and was not, frankly, reading The Dartmouth. But the bigger things I caught up with. In that realm I think what Dave did--and once I even talked with him about that--was to ask questions. “Aren't we poised in a”--his most difficult question was—“where is Dartmouth going? Aren't we poised on a rather unstable model here? We've got three prominent and good professional schools. One of them, Tuck School, doesn't have any doctoral degree. Maybe they should have. One of them, Thayer School, has a total of six degrees, including two doctoral degrees. How did that happen? The medical school has the MD, but it also has Ph.D. connections in pharmacology, and where is that going? And where should it go as we get into this next century of the golden age of biology? How did that match up with our Ph.D. program in the sciences?”

And then he asked the question, “Well, if we only have eight departments that have Ph.D. programs and they all started when the 1968 green light was turned on by the trustees, why do we stop there? Why wouldn't it be advantageous for us to have doctoral work in art history? Why not?” And he challenged the faculty to answer that. Well, coming from him, these people suspected his motives. People worried about his style. People wondered about just how much he'd play "hard ball" on these things. It made people nervous. They then imputed to him, some grand design: That he wanted in his presidency to have 16 Ph.D. programs and a law school. And I don't think he really felt that way at all. I think he was simply testing at the margin.

CARROLL: The studies that were done at that time, about the feasibility of graduate schools, seemed to point out a real split in the faculty on this. Were you aware of that?

HENNESSEY: I was not aware of those studies and the consequent split. But I knew there was a split without any studies because of my talking with colleagues all across the campus over a long period of time. There was a time when, for example--I remember this most vividly--John Kemeny asked me and I think two other people to be an internal review committee for the Department of Economics with regard to its problems as a department. Why wasn't it able to attract faculty in a better way, younger and older faculty? Why did it seem to be sort of eating its own lunch, and there wasn't a healthy vibrancy there. And why was that? And one of the accusations was, “Well, they aren't good--they don't have a doctoral program. I mean why not? All [competing] economics programs have doctoral programs.

I recall debating that with economics faculty, with other faculties. And they were able to convince us that establishing a doctoral program per se was not a magical solution to anything. Because again competition came into it. There are faculty members, there are young faculty members, who are so turned off by the doctoral climate, which you and I know all about. Who don't feel an urge to get even by being on a doctoral faculty and then having your own acolytes, whom you put through torture. But who really want to be somewhere where they can be more purely interested in the life of the mind and of the spirit and helping young minds to flower, away from all the doctrinaire stuff that is involved in Ph.D. programs. They can be really nasty. “And there are faculty who would like to come here. And if we try to compete with Harvard, Yale, Princeton with regard to [Ph.D. in the] economics department, it'll take us years to be able to do that, and we probably

never will. And right now, however, we have the premier faculty for undergraduate teaching, and we do pretty good research. So why not leave us alone?" And that yin and yang argument for many departments was very important. And I think it probably came out the way it should come out. On the other hand, if you put together a study of the kind you mentioned, I can well picture how analysts might say for particular departments what they really need is a graduate school.

CARROLL: There was a lot of fund-raising under McLaughlin. He was able to double the endowment.

HENNESSEY: Right.

CARROLL: What I'm curious about, was this the time in which he was working? Or was he himself a very skilled fund-raiser?

HENNESSEY: I believe it's a combination of both, Jane. I've been with Dave on fund-raising adventures, approaching very generous potential givers. And I know how he went at it, and I know he was skilled at it. Not only in nurturing major donors, but in closing the "sale," which is often a difficult thing for a college president to do, for a variety of reasons. I think Dave was good at it. I think it was a good time economically and in other ways. There were a lot of people who had accumulated, and were continuing to accumulate, wealth in a way that allowed them to be generous. And that was not only because of what was happening in the economy and over a 20-year period; but also because Dartmouth's success in admissions. In attracting in the Dickey years and in the Kemeny years, constantly building up a higher and higher quality of attractiveness to this place meant that we were generating more and more alumni with high promise. Who were admitted with high promise and who indeed showed high promise, and were in positions where they had become pretty wealthy.

But another thing that was going on was that during the end of the Dickey era, 1967, '68, '69, when the Bicentennial was celebrated, and there was a major fund campaign then; some of the older trustees from the Classes of 1914, 1918 (now I'm thinking of particular people now), were very successful in generating major gifts from people of their generation, who were born at the start of the century or shortly after. And that campaign went well. But toward the end of the campaign it was pretty clear that some of those who were holding back were holding back because of their uncertainty about what was going to happen next at Dartmouth. After all, it was 1964 that the Civil Rights Act came along. It wasn't clear whether Dartmouth was going to be a leader

in affirmative action with regard to minorities, including Indians, American Indians, or not. There was, of course, a broiling concern and debate over coeducation. And I think it's fair to say that a number of people when John Kemeny became president--many people said, “I want to invest in that.” But there were still people holding back, who were wondering, “What is Dartmouth going to become as a diverse community and as one that admitted women?”

I think when Dave came on the scene, as you and I have discussed, he symbolized the link with the past. “Forget Kemeny if you want to, those of you who were nervous about his presidency or felt that he was going off in the wrong direction. Come home. Come home and show your generosity.” And I know of individual cases where that's exactly what happened. So he had that going for him, too.

CARROLL: His image among the faculty seems one that was based so much upon his undergraduate days: the football hero, the Phi Beta Kappa.

HENNESSEY: His image with the faculty, did you say?

CARROLL: No, with alumni.

HENNESSEY: Yes, that's right.

CARROLL: And that must have worked in his favor, to some extent.

HENNESSEY: Sure, sure. I mean people were--some were glad even to be able to touch his cloak, you know. I've now touched the famous David McLaughlin.

CARROLL: He spoke to me. And when I was asking him when he took the job, who did he look to as his role models for it. And he spoke to me of Dickey as his great influence. Could you explain to me what he saw or what he tried to take, do you think, from Dickey?

HENNESSEY: Sure. I can try. Because I've thought a lot about that. What flashes into my mind suddenly, strangely, is the model of Bill Clinton with that picture of him in the Rose Garden with John Kennedy, and how they--There was that role model which will never ever disappear from him. Well, for Dave McLaughlin, who came out of a particular circumstance in life. And came here, and found his life changed and shaped by his high success here and his great personal--the almost epiphany for him of being right where he needed to be at the right time in his life. And having all these things glow in his brain that he was at the right place at

the right time, and had become a different person, and was very successful.

All of that was under the guidance and under the presidency of John Dickey, who was able to combine conscience and competence, but also sports and the life of the mind in a manly way. Brought his dog over to the office. He was a tall impressive man with a low voice, and a sense of humor. Well-spoken but by no means slick, by no means articulate even. He was careful, but wise. A perfect model, I think, for a well-rounded Dartmouth young person in the early 50's. A sort of thinking man's Dwight Eisenhower. And also a personification himself of Dartmouth because he had been a greatly successful Dartmouth man. He had come here and done very, very well. He'd come from a very small town in Pennsylvania. He had blossomed here in wonderful ways. And then shortly after graduation here he is off in the State Department, and he's tapped to be president at age 38 or 37.

And so here's Dave McLaughlin seeing this model. And it was a full-blown thing for Dave, as I described. It had to do with everything that Dave cared about. So sure, I can see why. Also he knew that John Dickey had great respect for him. John Dickey plucked him out of the alumni body to be one of the youngest-ever overseers. And that was John Dickey who did that. And the way they talked with each other, the manners, at times the laconic male-bonding type of body language. It was a fine relationship. So I certainly understand fully all of that. I thought that was indeed a strong part of what Dave was going to bring that was positive into the job.

CARROLL: He has himself talked about the fact that some of the problems he encountered when he became president were the results of the increasing diversity of both the student body and the faculty.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: Do you think there were alumni expectations that David McLaughlin would roll back the clock on diversity?

HENNESSEY: Some. Sure.

CARROLL: You described it actually. I thought in a very interesting-- You were quoted in the New York Times as describing the problem he was confronted with as the debate of meritocracy versus equity. I wondered if you could talk about that? I like that description.

HENNESSEY: It was true in a number of ways. America was founded, among other things, on the idea that merit mattered. And it did not matter who your parents were. And so one major line of argument is that you ought to admit to Dartmouth and promote at Dartmouth, in the student body and on the faculty, totally on the basis of merit. And you ought to be, in that sense, color blind. Another, to complicate--I mean it's not just meritocracy and equity or egalitarianism. But even within the concept of merit, there was and still is a body of opinion that says you must define merit in a more sophisticated way. And you have to be sure how you measure it.

So let us not defend Dartmouth's systems of admitting students and hiring faculty on the basis of the way we always have said we're meritocratic. Namely, that you use the system devised by white males, and you ask “What's your SAT score, and which school did you go to,” and that kind of thing, and then you say, “Well, you merit Dartmouth.” Rather the wider, more sophisticated definition included saying that “You don't merit Dartmouth just because you've walked a particular classical path. You don't merit it just because you went to Andover.” And everybody would say, “Oh, sure, that's right.” You also don't merit it, I think, you probably don't merit it only on the basis of particular measuring devices that we've never questioned because they may be biased. They may not detect merit in a totally unbiased way.

Another question came: “Well, in using these measuring devices to discover merit in people, what is our test of validity?” And then we discovered, well, you know, when colleges got together to decide how to use standardized tests to admit to their institutions, psychometricians finally convinced them that there were no devices that could satisfy their rather confused definition of success in the university other than grade-point average. And that, really, there are so many intervening experiences that might cause the grade-point average to be what it will be by the end of four years. Psychometricians only promised that they could do their best to elevate the probability statistic to around [.44 or .45?] if you correlated the standardized tests with first-year performance in an apples-to-apples comparison.

That then got us very much interested in re-defining the way to measure merit and all that. That got caught up a bit. Then, that dragged those who were trying to be purists, whether they liked it or not, into the issue of whether there's a difference between the white community and, specifically speaking, the black community with regard to the definition of merit and the measure of merit. And what Dartmouth did for those who insisted still on meritocracy--

[End of Tape 13, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 13, Side B]

“We are really going to try to pull ourselves away from these tight statistical measurements of first-year grades versus standardized tests. And let's look at--as best we can; we really ought to be able to do this--at a wider definition of success at Dartmouth and even success afterwards. Because do we really mean that we only care about the students' success during the four years? Or don't we really mean that we owe society some accounting for what happens here in terms of the rest of life of the individual?” Well, that got us involved then in some very philosophical concepts. But on the one hand it was very helpful to those who believed that a new definition of merit might accommodate a different and more diverse Dartmouth. Because as you look at the contributions people might make over their lifetime, it seemed very clear that if America had-- There was more opportunity in America for physicians and lawyers, just to mention two professions, to have more excellent people from the black community that the whole society would have made faster progress toward its goal of a society that didn't discriminate. And did not harm young people.

Well, in order to have more black physicians and more black lawyers, you've got to have more blacks in the undergraduate student body. And so let's look at that. And then the other merit issue was: “If we go back now and look at the--because we recognize that success at Dartmouth is going to have some relationship to ability to get into medical school and all that. We don't want to bring in blacks who will be trapped in the definition by Dartmouth of merit and of success, and then find they can't cash that at the bank. They can't go anywhere with that because the Dartmouth C average for a black is translated by the outside world into that he really didn't succeed at all. Or perhaps even Dartmouth will get into the trap of having grade escalation around the black community so that blacks themselves will go crazy with the implication that their grades aren't worth what white grades—“ So all that had to be taken into account.

But one of the things that Dartmouth began to do in the admissions process, still thinking about meritocracy, was to say: “You know maybe there's something like ability to overcome challenges successfully, or overcome diversity”--no, no, excuse me—“overcome adversity. Which if proved by someone by age 18 might contribute to their ability to profit from the Dartmouth experience more than a white student, straight A's, high SAT scores who'd never gone through any challenge. And so let's fool around with that a bit, too.” All the time, you had people out on the

right edge of meritocracy saying, “No, you shouldn't do that at all. Don't look at anything but grades and test scores because that's really the only thing that has any merit and any scientific validity.”

Then you began to wonder, are some of them really guilty of a certain amount of racism or something, or fearfulness? Or where are they coming from? But that generated a rough debate, it was present here on the campus, it was present in the alumni body. In terms of egalitarianism, and inequality of opportunity, I had the fascinating experience (and one of the reasons I said that at that time)-- When I was chairing the board of the Educational Testing Service, whose business it is to supply the academic community with the best possible measurement instruments for predicting success in university-- during my chairmanship of the board, we were attacked by Ralph Nader who just took us apart in public in the most excoriating way, to mix the metaphor. I mean after he took us apart, he wouldn't have to excoriate us. But he sort of did them both at the same time.

But his whole-- When I visited with his people, and complained about the illegitimate--about the lying they were doing about what ETS really does. They really were twisting it terribly badly. They said, "Well, you know, our goal here--you don't seem to understand it--but our goal is egalitarianism." "Well, what do you mean by that?" "We mean there shouldn't be a Dartmouth or a Smith or a Harvard because they're only benefiting the rich. I mean our concept of an egalitarian society, equal opportunity, is that you start from scratch, zero-based admission. Not only do you say we're going to open up widely, but you say our job, Dartmouth's job-- With all that talent and all that money, it's not to add 1 percent of opportunity to a very talented young woman. It's to bring in somebody who badly needs 98 percent improvement, but has the brains and can start. So you really ought to define your university, your college, on the basis of value added.” And there's still that debate in the land. “How can you hold your head up if you don't use that as your criterion for benefiting society. Value added."

So that on the egalitarian side, on the equality side, was of almost a different world of disputation from this other nuanced argument over merit. So all that was going on. And I didn't know a campus--and I had traveled the country partly for ETS and partly for my own purposes--looking for a campus which had really raised these issues up to an art form almost. Where there was really a good philosophical debate. There was no campus where that was happening. Because as soon as you got one mile into the forest, it became too hot. People got angry. People started pushing their own agenda. People starting shouting

"Racist! Blockhead! Right-wing nut!" All that. And I thought there was some of that on this campus. There had to be. We're part of the world. And I thought Dave was presiding over Dartmouth during that set of debates. Very tough time. Very.

CARROLL: It's interesting to me though, that the number of letters generated in the Alumni Magazine about issues of blacks, Native Americans, are far fewer than the number of letters generated for coeducation. And I do not know if that is a reflection of how intensely these issues were felt. Or if it is less acceptable to rail against the admission of blacks and Native Americans, whereas it was okay to rail against coeducation. I'm not sure that's something you can answer, but it's something I've been thinking about.

HENNESSEY: Oh, sure. Sure, I can. I'm just thinking of the multiple answers one can give. It's a very stimulating question, as so many of your questions are, Jane, as you probe into these things. And obviously I don't know. But my suspicion is, number one, that the admission of women had the portent, the threat, of changing the institution overnight in an absolutely fundamental way--absolutely fundamental! And it challenged the assumptions, the life assumptions, the identifying assumptions of the male community. And it challenged them rather totally and in their own families. There isn't a Dartmouth alumnus--few--who didn't have... There are none who never had a mother. So very fundamental, very close to home. And I think there were many legitimate--socially, psychologically legitimate--reasons for arguing against coeducation. Even to say, "My gosh, why is this happening to Dartmouth and not happening to Smith? I mean if it's okay to have an all-women's school, why in the world wouldn't it be okay to have an all-men's school. You can't really tell me that there's a value there that doesn't equate us." And there was the shock and the surprise with the speed with which it seemed to be happening.

And I also think that the Dartmouth students and Dartmouth alumni in a terribly fundamental way had in their mind this awful mixed metaphor of women on pedestals and women as erotic, romantic objects. Which they had tried to work through in their adolescence, and never successfully worked through. And they never will until they're age 95. And this struck them there, there was a real nerve. Many of them had lived their lives never having to think about blacks. Never having to think--maybe they had to study the Civil War or something. But there were an awful lot of them, particularly those in New England, for whom it was no issue. "I mean of course I'm fair-minded, but I've never seen a black. I mean so what?" And so the admission of blacks in very small

numbers after the Civil Rights Act and part of the national thing, “and maybe we should have a few blacks, I mean why not? And haven't we always had a few blacks? And it won't matter because there'll never be very many because they're not going to be prepared well enough.” That was less of a fundamental issue.

But also it was true that it wasn't as acceptable. Because it sounded as if, when you began to carp about blacks at Dartmouth, as if you were maybe not a very good person. You're discriminating. Maybe you're slightly racist. But none of those inhibitions occurred with regard to these fundamental issues around women until much later. I mean finally, ten, 12 years later, people began to realize what might really be involved and might be akin to-- I mean when finally the term "male chauvinist pig" came along and stunned everybody; there was a recognition, you know, that “By George! Even for the most liberal of us, there may be some built-in things here that we never really examined.” So I do think it was different.

CARROLL: The voice that seems to stand out during this period in upholding those right-wing values is really the Dartmouth Review.

HENNESSEY: Yes.

CARROLL: How important do you think they were in the dialogue of that period?

HENNESSEY: How important was the Dartmouth Review?

CARROLL: Mmmm hmmm.

HENNESSEY: I think it was very important. I'd like to say it wasn't, but it was. It was very important.

CARROLL: And how do you think they were able to set that agenda about what was going to be discussed so successfully?

HENNESSEY: I think the first thing they might have done is to profit from the example of a failed attempt to do the same thing at Princeton. As a Princeton alumnus I got, free of charge, the regular publication of a journal called Prospect, which was exactly like the Review. And it was bankrolled by a very wealthy, very right-wing alumnus, who just said, "Money's no object. Just do it." And who had all kinds of conspiratorial theories himself about why the world was leaning in these liberal ways. And he really wanted to bring down the trustees and the president, and he attacked them personally, and everything else. But at Princeton

everybody knew, I certainly knew, from the ego display of this one wealthy man that it was his instrument; it didn't have an awful lot of credibility. And it didn't get much national publicity.

Well, Dartmouth did it more cleverly, in a way, because it got together a board of sponsors, including some very prominent Americans, from the start. Prominent Americans, prominent alumni, prominent New Hampshire people, all of whom felt, for a whole bundle of reasons (and I'd love to talk about that more because I got involved in it on a national scale) that something really bad was happening in American universities, really bad. I mean you couldn't find a conservative faculty member, they said, at Dartmouth; you couldn't find a conservative faculty member at Princeton. They were all liberals before liberal achieved quite the momentum of a pejorative nature that it has achieved today. But they're all--maybe worse, "pinkos."

I mean remember we're still in this Cold War business, and you've got these “pinkos” that were discovered by Joe McCarthy and all that business. “Who really don’t even understand the evils of communism--and may even teach Marxism in their classes; or at least, maybe even in Tuck School,” which was true, would say, “let's have a debate about the Marxist point of view and the capitalistic point of view and the socialistic point of view.” There were alumni who went crazy that that was happening: “It's abetting an enemy to do that kind of thing.”

So there were all kinds of people who gathered to say “it's a very good idea to have some counter force because it's really out of control.” And you could see it in under Kemeny. Kemeny was a Democrat; everybody knew it. His wife was a prominent New Hampshire Democrat. They were liberal. “They were pushing all this too fast, and society needs a counter.” That's why Reagan was finally elected. It was that same momentum. The same reasons honored the Establishment as some kind of decent, right-wing-- Or better to say, not right-wing, better to say conservative organ of opinion at Dartmouth. And it picked up some very good, very bright students. And it was done really very well. And it attacked the college in ways the college had never been attacked. And frankly, I hesitate to say this, but I think some of the attacks, some of the criticism, were as good for Dartmouth as the relentless media examination of phenomena like the Clinton presidency, have had some benefit for a democratic society and for the presidency of the United States. But it was awfully hard.

CARROLL: Kind of a cleansing by searing.

HENNESSEY: Yes, yes. But campuses weren't used to that and handled it very badly. And worse than that, it then got out of hand. It broke down. In the last couple of years of Dave's presidency, the presence on campus of the Dartmouth Review became an agent for his demise almost.

CARROLL: Well, it became the point, as I understand it as I was reading these, they would attack a specific faculty member or a specific course, perhaps, offering. And the expectation on the part of the faculty, as I understand it, was that David McLaughlin would respond and defend the institution. But he declined to do that. His strategy seems to have been completely different from what the faculty wanted.

HENNESSEY: Yes, that's certainly true. He was put in a really difficult pinch there. Because his own political philosophy and leanings were more conservative. He was different from the usual faculty member in so many ways, but that was clearly one. At the same time he was a very fair-minded guy, and he wanted all the voices to be heard. And he constantly said that, I think, as well as any president ever said such things. And yet they fell on deaf ears because he seemed to be defending the wrong thing in the wrong way, at least to some folks. And the issues themselves were just searing hot issues: the divestment one, the ROTC one. They were confusing and consuming issues. So there wasn't even any clear way for Dave to understand what he could do that would please the faculty and respond effectively to the whole Dartmouth community. Almost impossible.

CARROLL: You said you had some ideas about why people got attracted to the Review. And I thought maybe I'd like to sort of back you up a bit and talk about that.

HENNESSEY: Well, I'll say something briefly. Although, when I say that you'll know that I'm not going to be very brief. Then we can see how far you want to go in it. I gave some public talks that got me into trouble on this very matter. There was a group of conservatives who banded together, to attack as strongly as they knew how to attack it, the liberal leanings of American universities. And what they did, among other things, was to condemn the foundation world for giving--whom they painted with similar colors--to giving money to universities to do these strange and liberal things. All the way from helping to admit minority students and women to transmuting the curriculum and the life of the faculty and students into what seemed to be more and more a left-leaning, dope-smoking, licentious nests. Leading to things like post-modernism and all that. Whatever.

There were people who just felt that, really, “America is going down the chute here.” Family values is one of the kinder ways to describe things they were interested in. And one of the people who-- There were some very wealthy people who created their own foundations. And some of them gave public speeches suggesting ways to punish campuses. How alumni and others with a conservative leaning could begin to punish these campuses. And there were lists of things like give your money to our foundation not to Dartmouth. Or give it to this university but not to Dartmouth. And some of them actually spoke about Dartmouth. One of the most prominent people in that movement was a former secretary of the Treasury under Richard Nixon who did speak out. Who helped the Review and who spoke out against Dave McLaughlin.

CARROLL: Who’s that?

HENNESSEY: I've almost repressed his name. He's a very prominent guy. I have repressed his name for the moment. It'll come back quickly. He's somebody you know. Simon, William Simon.

CARROLL: Oh, sure.

HENNESSEY: A caustic man. Very bright, very wealthy man. Who was the guiding spirit of the Olin Foundation, a foundation that was in business to attempt to correct some of these strong imbalances. And they established Olin Professorships on some campuses. I found myself very worried about this way of attacking universities. It seemed to me almost by stealth. In some cases it seemed to me a badly distorted picture of the average faculty member. I mean what they were really saying is “the average faculty member in America's democratic, capitalistic society should be teaching young people the benefits of belonging to that, the world's best experiment in social relations and polity. That's the way it ought to be.”

They strongly suspected that the younger faculty, who had come up in an era of affluence, who were very good critics, really didn't themselves even appreciate how the capitalistic system works. “They didn't have any idea how it works. So they were throwing mud at it just in a banal way. And that's ridiculous. And why should young people for four years, particularly in the best, most-selective universities, why should they be exposed to this tripe? Where is the balance when we need it? They’re going to be turning out leaders who will be leading in the wrong way and who will not have their feet on the ground--or whatever you want.”

Well, I thought their stereotype of the average faculty member was just horrendous. And I thought their way of going at the universities, by trying to convince the American public that universities are bad, that faculty are pinkos, was a horrible disservice to the American university system. I didn't think it was a service even to the most pinkish left-wing university--whichever one you want to pick out. But to damn the whole crowd--all the American professorate that way, all teachers of art history are this way, was simply wrong. I had the data. I knew. Through the Carnegie Commission studies I knew that the average faculty member really wasn't very different from the average person in business, actually, in terms of background, values, whatever.

So I thought it was an intellectually irresponsible venture, and I spoke out against it. And that made me all the more sad that some of these same things were happening here, in both directions. I thought the conservatives were shouting at the liberals, and I thought the liberals were shouting back. I thought divestment was the absolutely perfect issue to show that. For me it was a curse on both your houses. “I mean neither of you is talking sense here. You're both using hot language. You're damning one another. You're stereotyping one another. And that is not the way to solve a problem. That's not intellectually responsible.”

CARROLL: One of the last two things I wanted to sort of talk to you about is if you could try to describe David McLaughlin's administrative style, which has come under so much criticism. How would you assess it, describe it?

HENNESSEY: Well, I'll describe it just personally, how I saw it. An intelligent man. Very hard-working style, very involved. Not just hard working. Reading everything, thinking about everything. But a tendency to feel a need, for a variety of reasons--some good, some not so good--to know the details. The way Jimmy Carter was said to want to know the details as president of the United States. And the more you do that, the more difficulty you have delegating, even though Dave was a good delegator. But it's difficult to delegate when you really think you know more about the job than the person you're delegating it to. That's hard. But it also gets involved in trust. And I think Dave did not have, as a style, an ability to trust very much in the free exercise of authority on the part of those to whom he delegated authority. And it wasn't just that. When something came along where he thought it was not going in quite the right way, he was too impatient. He wanted to correct it himself, and he would knife in and try to correct it. He would make a phone call past somebody, past a dean, to somebody else and say I want you to fix this. And that style was very hard to live with for the dean, for the intermediary or whoever it might be.

He also had a suspicion-- Part of his style was a suspicion that the academic process was [not] very efficient. Or in the end, perhaps, very effective. And he showed that in his style. He felt that his problem-solving style, coming principally out of the business world, had more validity to it than the faculty mulling over, endless debates, not coming to a conclusion style. And of course he was right on a lot of things. But it did not allow him to--that style did not allow him to become highly respected by those who felt a different style was a better way to do it. And at times of stress, his basic belief in the almost autocratic style, which everybody has to use sometimes--you can't always be democratic because the cost of being democratic is too high: it's too much of a crisis, something has to be solved quickly, too much at risk, etc. When he had to move in, he was almost scary to watch because he was so intense, he was so personally buttoned up and inaccessible. And if not angry, at least very energetic.

That it was very hard to get him to relax, and it was very hard to talk with him. And there were times when he would use other people for that same purpose. He would use some of his lieutenants to go and break the ice someplace or push somebody around--almost that. “I mean go in there and get really angry and show that we're not going to take this anymore. And then back out. And then maybe I can go into the next meeting, and they'll be more reasonable.” And you got the feeling that he was doing that as a conscious piece of style.

So if you added that, that stylistically he was not able to defend himself terribly well in a public altercation, or even in a private meeting, where he was pushed to the wall, “explain this or tell us why you're style is that.” John Kemeny was superb at that. I mean he really could dance his way around anybody orally. Dave couldn't do that. He became inarticulate, and fumbled for words. He was not comfortable, almost, in the world of language. I remarked before to you a little about that. He learned well. He knew his limitations, and he asked other people for help in writing some things. But when he had to do it on his own (you can see what I'm putting together as a package) it then looked that his administrative style, his temperament, his thinking style, his linguistic style were all slightly more appropriate in a business or military environment than they might be, in what we conceived to be, the particular culture of the Dartmouth campus. That's how I saw it.

CARROLL: Tell me if I have received a correct impression, John. As you were talking, I got the impression of a man who was in love with results being

confronted by a faculty who's in love with process. Is that a fair assessment?

HENNESSEY: Well, I think if you had to capture it in a cartoon or in a couple of words, that wouldn't be a bad exaggeration. It is an exaggeration, but it's not bad. Because some of the fundamental conflicts had to do with that. That Dave was saying, but where are we going to come out? And the faculty was saying, but how are we going to do it? Yes.

CARROLL: That really is the end of the questions that I wanted to ask. Do you have anything you'd like to add?

HENNESSEY: Let me just pause for a minute. You might even want to turn the machine off, and I'll just... [Break in recording]

CARROLL: For our last sort of question, let me ask you to do a comparison then of John Kemeny, his style in administration, with that of David McLaughlin.

HENNESSEY: Right. First of all, John Kemeny was an inexperienced administrator who thought that an amateur could learn it very quickly and do it as well as anybody. Dave McLaughlin was a schooled, experienced, and very successful administrator who understood formal organizations and complex institutions very well before he became the president of Dartmouth. So they came at it really totally differently. Dave had already had some experiences that taught him what he shouldn't do. And John Kemeny just said, “I'll learn on the job.” So, boy, that was very different! The result was that John Kemeny made some beautiful mistakes from the very start, but was able to correct quickly, and say “It's something I've never done before; I can learn from that and I’ll go on.” Whereas Dave McLaughlin came into a situation where he knew that the board expected from the start that as an experienced administrator, he could certainly manage Dartmouth. And the faculty thought that's one thing he could do, too, particularly in the non-academic side. So the two men were dealing with really very different sets of expectations and ways of measuring their success personally and the way other people would measure their success.

By temperament, John Kemeny was a far more volatile professor, for whom the life of the mind was everything. Whose identity was tied up in the fact that he was one of the most intelligent people…

[End of Tape 13, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 14, Side A]

HENNESSEY: ...was able to listen intellectually and pick things up very quickly and then form judgments. He certainly was not a process person. But he was bright enough about the life of the professorate to know the homage he had to pay to process. But he was also bright enough to know how to use the system to his own advantage. So he would take corners, and he would twist things. And he would preside over faculty meetings-- You know, he presided over a faculty meeting, I remember early in his presidency, and ran into some difficulty with Roberts' Rules of Order, which the faculty had said they were always going to use. The next time he came into a faculty meeting, it was very clear that he had read and memorized Roberts' Rules of Order, and he knew how to improve on them. And he did just that. I mean he wowed the faculty with process. But also wowed them with his vision of where he wanted to go and where he wanted--

The problem, though, with that personality was that for people who became hurt by what he was doing or by him personally, or people who had any reason to criticize him, or to try to get him to change, it was very difficult. Because you were competing against somebody who had more of the skills and the simple incandescent brilliance than you had. How were you going to compete with that? He'd already thought about anything you'd bring up, and he was already a mile ahead of you. So unless he was walking down a path he hadn't been walking down before, where you could help him find the way, he was merciless in his getting out ahead of you and saying “This is the final solution.” Of course that meant he was very good with very bright people arguing over very difficult, ambiguous issues, some of which were terribly important in his presidency. He was just terribly good at that. And for strong people--and he tended to gather strong people around him; he didn't care how strong they were--the flint stone back and forth was fascinating, I think, to John and led to some very good results. I think the sparky arguments that occasionally Leonard Rieser and John Kemeny had were very high level and very beneficial.

I think John Kemeny was perceived as vain, proud, no sense of humor, egocentric, ruthless. And I don't think any of those things was entirely fair. But I think I see why, from time to time, people came up with those caricatures of him. I think, for example, on vanity, I think the odd fact is that John was a very shy man really. I think he was very uncomfortable--I know he was very uncomfortable--whenever he had to make small talk. He was lousy at it, even with people he knew very well. I felt sort of sorry for him and wanted him to relax occasionally when I was with him, and tried some small talk. And, you know, he'd go along for a couple of minutes, and then it was clear he was just terribly uncomfortable. He

just didn't want to do that. He wanted to talk about gut issues that were terribly important. He wasn't one of the boys, and he wasn't one of the girls. He was unique. He was his own brand of human being.

He also was inordinately--to some people anyway--defined by his marriage. His relationship with his wife was so close. And when she came to faculty meetings and then he got criticized on that, and he very quickly told his critics to go to hell, which he did, that was partly coming right out of his psyche. “I am Jean/John Kemeny. That's who I am, and that's who we both are. We're absolutely fused together. It's an androgynous kind of look at humankind. And therefore of course men and women are equal in all ways and all that's just-- I mean why would you even want to talk about that?” He was uncomfortable having to meet common people at their own level of partial understanding and emotional reactions. At times he even seemed to imply that he had no emotional reactions himself. That he was all brain and no heart. Now, we knew it wasn't true. But there were times when that seemed to be the ice-cold exterior that he showed. He could show that sometimes in some circumstances terribly, terribly well.

But Dave McLaughlin was totally different. He was one of the boys. He was a football player. He loved small talk. He loved male small talk, which is a whole library of its own, as you know. He had all the instincts of the macho but gentle man. Also, Judy McLaughlin didn't attempt to do the sorts of things that Jean Kemeny said were her right to do. She didn't intrude, she didn't-- She's a very bright and very charming woman, but she did not become part of Dave's official life. And there was a definition of roles and role separation that was more traditional. And that was part of Dave and part of his personality.

Dave was certainly bright. But he was not as incandescently bright as Kemeny. Now you know on some issues in some ways I would rather have Dave McLaughlin's intelligence working on the matter than John Kemeny's. But nevertheless, I'd have to admit that overall, in terms of just sheer brainpower--by which I mean the synapse time, the time between the stimulus and the response--you couldn't match Kemeny. He was just a genius. I don't know if he was technically a genius, but we thought of him that way. And thought of Dave as far more plodding. That was not because he wasn't a very bright man, he was. He was Phi Beta Kappa, too. And had he taken a different turn in life, he could've become, I think, a very much respected academic. But he didn't take that turn. He took the turn into the world of hard knocks and business.

But in terms of expressing his intelligence as part of his personality, Dave simply wasn't articulate. And that, in terms of delivered personality, delivered to you, so that you define the personality rather than some psychologist defining it, you had to perceive John Kemeny, a very bright, very articulate man who could talk his way around and through and above anything. And you had to say about Dave McLaughlin, he seemed somewhat plodding and unsure and maybe, truly, lacking in a sense of self-worth or something here. “I mean does he have enough self-esteem?” Well, he did have. And he really did. He was a well put-together man--and I think he still is--a well integrated personality, more so than John Kemeny. John Kemeny was imbalanced; he really was. And after he put down the presidency, you could see that more than before. But Dave McLaughlin was really quite well balanced. But he didn't come through in a way that gave you, as a first cut, the feeling that he was unusually bright.

And also, as part of his personality, along with Kemeny, there was this impatience. But it was truly more of an impatience to get on with problem-solving; whereas for Kemeny, sometimes, it was simply an impatience to get to the best possible definition of the problem, which takes the greatest amount of intelligence. Kemeny would come up with the most unusual things. You'd get halfway through a problem-solving seminar with him in his office, and he'd say, "I've got it!" It turned out not to be the answer to the problem. But his comment would be, "We're dealing with the wrong problem." Because his mind was racing like a computer. “Does that fit it or doesn’t it? No, it's the wrong problem!” Not with Dave. Dave would define the problem, and he would plod along, and he'd get to its solution. So it was a different kind of mind, working of mind.

I thought in the end, interestingly, I came through believing, in my own relationship anyway, that John Kemeny was able to have more of a sense of humor--isn't that strange?--than Dave did. I felt Dave--the longer he was president, the more he invested himself so much in the job of being the president of Dartmouth College, that he couldn't laugh at anything, because nothing about his job was laughable, was funny. I mean he was in hot water from day one. John Kemeny was always far bigger than the president of Dartmouth. I mean he was sailing around the world worrying about the invention of the new this or new that in the computer world. He was a philosopher, and he was talking to the American Association for the Advancement of Science about the combination of philosophy and computers. “So being president, that's fine. But I'm a citizen of the world. I do other things, too.” That wasn't true for Dave. So I think that-- You know as we talk about it, Jane, this

helps me to understand. So I think that's maybe the most important reason why they seemed to be so very different. Just that last thing I said.

CARROLL: Having listened to you speak, I have one last question for you. And that's when you became a president of a university, did you take either man or aspects of them as models for problems you face?

HENNESSEY: Oh, I'm very sure I did, without even knowing it. Because I was a student of both of them. I watched them. I taught courses in organizations and how they worked, and in leadership, and in ethics. And my mind was always dealing with such phenomena. And, yes, certainly I learned from both of them. I don't think I consciously adopted any stylistic element of either one of them. But, you know, when I say that, I'm sure I'm right about the conscious part of it. But I'll bet I'm not right about the unconscious part of it, because I did learn something from both of them.

CARROLL: John, thank you for all of this.

HENNESSEY: You're welcome, Jane.

[End of Interview]