

Walter Burke '44
Chairman of the Board of Trustees
of Dartmouth College, Emeritus

An Interview Conducted by
Jane Carroll

DOH-22

Special Collections
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire

INTERVIEW: Walter Burke, Class of '44

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Greenwich, CT

DATE: August 9, 1996

CARROLL: Walter Burke, Class of '44, who has served many posts for Dartmouth, most prominently that of Trustee from 1976 to 1986 and chaired the Board of Trustees from 1983 to '86. If we spent all of the time telling all of his positions, we would use the tape up, but we hope to cover these during the interview.

What were your first impressions of Dartmouth when you arrived there in 1940?

BURKE: My first impression in 1940 was that I liked it very much. I went with a roommate who came from Westchester County as I did and had attended Brunswick School, an independent school here in Greenwich, and we both went up together and roomed together. We had a very nice room in Russell Sage, bedroom and I guess you would call it a sitting room/study room, which struck me as being very nice. I haven't been in Russell Sage too recently but it looked great to me in 1940.

CARROLL: How had you chosen Dartmouth?

BURKE: I think we sort of nourished each other. There were three or four in the graduating class of 1940--three or four boys who, somehow or other, and I can't take you back to the exact starting point because I don't think it was apparent having gone there. In any event, only two of us got in, but I think there was a lot of, not peer pressure, but swapping of information. You know in those days we didn't have the gigantic tests that you have to pass so that it was just one of those things that happened. It was no big program nor exercise on the part of the student or the parents or friends writing letters or... I just went.

CARROLL: When you got up there, you came as a comparative city boy...

BURKE: Suburban. I refer to myself as a suburban child.

CARROLL: And you went up to Dartmouth, which was very isolated at that time. Did you enjoy that part of it?

BURKE: That did not bother me. That did not bother me. If there was anything that bothered me each year, it was the prolonged winter. But that was a minor irritant.

CARROLL: Did you ever take up winter sports?

BURKE: No. Not really.

CARROLL: That's why you found it to be an irritant. [Laughter]

BURKE: I guess that's it. Yes.

CARROLL: After you graduated from Dartmouth...

BURKE: I didn't graduate.

CARROLL: Oh.

BURKE: I thought you might not be up on that. I went there in 1940, September, '40, and, as a historian, you well know what happened in the years 1940, '41 and '42. So I went in the Navy in I think it was the fall of '42 and was in the Navy for four years. Came out in the first quarter of '46 and then I had the choice. By that time I was married and had one child who was two years old, I guess--a year and a half, two years old. It's hard to believe she is 51 or 52. I guess that arithmetic adds up and is unavoidably correct. So I had the choice of going back to Dartmouth and I was all set to go back. I had the arrangements, and then there came the possibility of my going directly to Columbia Law School and they had a special--everything was done rather specially then, as I am sure you know, for the returning soldiers and sailors, including paying all their expenses--their tuition and books and all of that.

Columbia had a special program where you, the student, could go in--they had a few slots that they were saving. I guess this is it although the details have faded from my memory, and I took either one or two tests, series of tests, whatever they were and they said "Alright, you can come." So, being married with a child and having lost almost four years--not that it was a complete loss, but four years had gone by without advancing a career, let's put it that way--I decided to go right to law school.

CARROLL: Had you always wanted to study law?

BURKE: I think for some time. Yes, because I was going to major at Dartmouth in Political Science and those two seemed to go together.

CARROLL: What had you done in the Navy?

BURKE: In the Navy, I started in the intelligence as a yeoman third class, I think, and after about six months, went to mid-shipman's school at Columbia.... I went to mid-shipman's school there and was assigned to the amphibious forces, L.S.T., landing ship tanks, and was in the States then another nine to twelve months and then in the Pacific.

CARROLL: Where did you meet your wife then?

BURKE: I had met my wife right in our hometown of Larchmont some years before--maybe two years before going to Dartmouth.

CARROLL: I am asking because I interviewed Alex Fanelli and he met his wife--well, he was in the service and had taken up his career at Dartmouth.

BURKE: No. Actually I met my...everything I have told you is true, but there is one other detail as to how I did meet her and that was that my car, or my family's car, broke down in front of her house. [Laughter]

CARROLL: The gods had a hand. [Laughter]

BURKE: That's right and that still is a good story.

CARROLL: Did you work with President [John Sloan] Dickey ever during his administration in any way?

BURKE: No. I met him a little bit, but I can't really say that I did.

CARROLL: So your closer connection to Dartmouth really came under John Kemeny's administration.

BURKE: Definitely. Definitely. Yes. Although there was an intervening period. Let's see. I went on the Board [of Trustees] in 1976; so, for three or four years [1972-76], maybe five years, I worked a little bit, because of our Foundation, the Sherman Fairchild Foundation, with John Kemeny, Jim Hornig and, Leonard Rieser. Those were the three key people. I may have left out some, but I did work fairly closely with them for the most part while they, on behalf of the College, and we, as good listeners and

perhaps donors--potential donors--developed what has turned out to be the Sherman Fairchild Foundation for the Physical Sciences.

CARROLL: Now, as I understand it, you turned your attention full time to the Fairchild Foundation in 1972. Is that right?

BURKE: I never worked full time for the Foundation. No. I never did. I have always done a series of other things--personal investments and, well, I practiced law for almost five years after graduating from Columbia. So I did a little of that for a very brief period. But, my principle job from 1952 until we settled all of the Fairchild Estates, when the individuals died--that was mid to late 1970's--so, for that period of 1952 to '77 or '78, my primary job was working for the Fairchild family as their... First it started as sort of in-house counsel, but then, happily, it broadened and threw me into just about everything that the family did and we expanded enormously in the family investment program.

CARROLL: And the Foundation is dedicated to furthering education. Is that right? Is that one of its aspects?

BURKE: It is one of its aspects. Yes. We don't have a set-in-concrete set of guidelines and we get about five calls a day here asking for that and we really don't have it. We say "Write us a letter." But, as you can see from our list of grants over the years, starting in '72--that's when the Foundation really began to operate--it was formed fifteen years before that. In '72 is when it really began to operate for the simple reason that Sherman Fairchild, whose name is on the Foundation, died in '71 and he left the bulk of his estate to the Foundation. So, we had something to work with then.

CARROLL: Now, did you come back into closer contact with Dartmouth through the Foundation or through another road?

BURKE: I think it was a combination. My wife, Connie, and I attended (don't ask me when, but in the early seventies)--I am sure you have heard this and I hope that you will hear it many times more from others--the splendid Horizons Program that Fritz Hier then use to do, major domo among his other accomplishments. That certainly tweaked our interest again because that was a common thing and then there was the Alumni College. So you are reminding me, really, that there were other things. I just didn't suddenly appear on the door as a Trustee and I had done some interviewing of student, local student applicants in Westchester County earlier on in the 1950's.

CARROLL: Had you known John Kemeny before he became President?

BURKE: No.

CARROLL: Do you remember your first meeting with him or when you first met him?

BURKE: Whether it was the very first [meeting], I think maybe it was the most significant one...[it] was in Function Room [Hanover Inn] where they asked me to give a little speech. This was while John Kemeny was still alive. It was a ground breaking. That's what it was. It was a ground breaking for the chemistry lab, whenever that was [1971]. John Kemeny spoke and they asked me to say something, and I hashed over this session when...it must have been in the very early 70's because the project was completed, I think in '73...

CARROLL: Late '72, I think.

BURKE: Late '72. So this must have been 1970 or so. So John Kemeny had not been President all that long and Function Room in the Hanover Inn, 101, was the scene and they had a mockup, a cardboard model, of what [it would look like], the buildings that were on site at the time. Not very many. Steele and Wilder. That was it. That was it and then there was the grandiose plan. Grandiose for the Dartmouth campus, it seemed. And, of course, behind it was the concept of a center.

I don't necessarily say that was original to Dartmouth, but it certainly was very appropriate and I think it has been proven at Dartmouth and at many other places. And the architect had--a Boston architect who was named Bull Knapp or some such thing as that [Shepley, Bulfinch, Richardson and Abbot]--had, I thought, quite an intriguing...we thought quite an intriguing plan to bring about that center, architecturally. It seemed as though it would function very well. We didn't pretend to be...the Foundation doesn't pretend to be an expert in matters of architecture; but, we had seen quite a bit and had some feel for what's going to work and the concept of the glass tower as a joining feature--that worked about--well, it was partially unsuccessful. Let's put it that way. Not fatally unsuccessful. Almost humorously unsuccessful in that it was glass.

It was, what, five stories high and was held out in glowing terms by the architect, Kemeny, [Leonard] Rieser, [James "Jim"] Hornig--this would be a wonderful place for the academic traffic of all ages and types to go through to bring their coffee and sandwiches to sit in lonely meditation or talk and hash over matters, academic or just relax or whatever it was. The one thing that happened almost immediately after the building was

completed, I think, was the oil embargo, the first crunch that the Arabs treated us to. It immediately became--the price of oil by the gallon went from \$3.00 to, I don't know, ten times that or more. So, the College, rightly so, said "We can't afford to air condition it in the summer and we can't afford properly to heat it in the winter. We can keep it so that you can pass through in comfort, but it probably is not going to work as a sit-down, relaxing spot." Which it never has. It's been a site for get-togethers, cocktail parties, receptions and luncheons and all of that and is, I think, a wonderful sight, particularly on the top floor. So there are periods of the year when it's very hospitable; but, then there are these other periods, and you may very well know that or appreciate it, when it is not so hospitable and people just keep going through it.

CARROLL: What has worked there is that they have showcases in which they can put small exhibits of scientific instruments and that has worked very well.

BURKE: Yes. And they had, and I think still do, some art that has been hung there on the walls mostly, I think, by Vermont and New Hampshire, and maybe Dartmouth family artists. So that was the project that John Kemeny and Leonard Rieser were pitching, if we can call it that, when I first met John Kemeny in Function Room 101. And the price of that, the entire cost--and my numbers may be a little out here--but it wasn't much over \$4,000,000 (four million dollars). It may have been less than that to build the glass tower and the Fairchild wing behind it where the geographers and whoever else were in there. I don't know where they are now.

CARROLL: They are still there.

BURKE: Are they there? Yeah. So that is what we were talking about. There was no conversation then of sprucing up Wilder or Steele. Maybe some knew that that would have to be done but it was only one thing at a time. So the Foundation stepped in and gave them, I think, mostly all of the cost of that project.

CARROLL: When the Foundation gives its money, do you then sit on the project and do overseeing of how the money is spent? How does it work?

BURKE: No. No. We never do that. We have--in order to make the grant, we have to have full confidence in the college that is going to be the recipient, it's president and it's other administrators, the architects involved, instruction--all the way down--and we don't interfere with that. What we do get, and what we got then, from the Provost, from Hornig--his was sort of a special slot--at that point, I can't remember what his title was, if he had one--but he was very much a moving force in this project. He sent us a report,

semi-annual report, a summary report--"We had an add-on here." "We've accomplished this at so much cost." "We're on schedule." "We're behind schedule." "You have an add-on here." Whatever. That type of report and that practice and procedure hasn't changed very much all the way to 1996.

CARROLL: As I understand it, the Fairchild Center and that expansion of the sciences was part of Kemeny's plan and Leonard Rieser's plan to bring the sciences at Dartmouth up to speed. Did they present it as such to you?

BURKE: Yes. Yes. And it was a very convincing presentation. I've talked about the architecture and how that would cause a bringing together, but also to get the hard sciences gathered in one spot, hence the name "Physical Sciences." That seemed to make tremendous sense and it is so obvious now, but it wasn't quite that obvious or it was more difficult, of course, for Dartmouth because they were spread around then.

CARROLL: They had done something similar with [John Sloan] Dickey when they brought the bio-medical group together with the bio-medical library, Dana. So I suppose they had a precedent in mind.

BURKE: Yes. Yes.

CARROLL: Now, you were asked to become a Trustee in 1976. Did you have to think about this twice?

BURKE: My only hesitation was whether I could spend enough time to do a decent job and I think that is a very serious matter for anyone who is asked to be a trustee. And I am talking now just about Dartmouth because it is a relatively small school--not relatively--a small Board of Trustees who almost by definition have to serve on several committees and take on many other assignments. It's a very demanding...and I had a feel that that was so, although I really didn't know much about how the trustees operated, but I had a feeling. That was my hesitation, which I expressed to John Kemeny. Because then I was still the chair of the Fairchild Camera and Instrument, which was a demanding assignment, not a full-time assignment, but an important assignment and on the West Coast. So it took a lot of travel time going from New York to California and you've encouraged me to wander around.

I now project myself forward. This question, for an incoming trustee, are they really going to be able--is he or she--really going to be able to spend the required time? First, to get indoctrinated, to get oriented--that takes a while no matter where you've come from and no matter what your

experience is. But, then, go along and pick up whenever and wherever you are needed. I have seen, unfortunately, a couple of cases, not many but two or three on the board, where that was not so and it is a real burden on the College and a chore and a burden also to the rest of the trustees. No one does it intentionally, but I guess it can happen if something unexpected arises or just that they don't give it enough thought, or underestimate the time demands that they will have from somewhere else. But it is disappointing and it makes the life of whoever is the then chairman of the board much more difficult because he really can't count on "a" and "b" being anywhere at any time. They cancel at the last moment or they don't attend the meetings or they have to leave early, arrive late and leave early syndrome. That is spoken really more as a chair because it falls to the chair then and some of the other trustees to pull together and do the job. That was my only hesitation, but it didn't take me long to get over that and say, "Yes, I will be delighted." I remember John Kemeny speaking, I guess, from the boardroom where they had just adjourned and it was very noisy and he said, "Now, Walter, this is the most important assignment that you are ever going to take on in your life." [Laughter] I thought that was...

CARROLL: It kind of makes you want to reconsider.

BURKE: ...a grandiose statement, but I think there are many germs of truth in that.

CARROLL: You have been a trustee for many other institutions along the way.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Cal Tech and the Union Theological Seminary.

BURKE: Yes, and the Metropolitan Museum and, more recently, Columbia and Brunswick School.

CARROLL: How does it compare, the job that has to be done as a Trustee of Dartmouth with that of other institutions?

BURKE: The most...well, I was going to say there is a marked contrast, that is the way I should put it, between the Dartmouth Trustee situation and Columbia. There are many similarities, but each has its own unique qualities. Cal Tech sits somewhere in between, I guess, and I can give you the details if you want it here. And the Metropolitan Museum is, because it is a separate breed--it has a different, for the most part, a different mission than the other educational institutions I have just talked about--that is different, too. So there are obvious differences in the

demands that are made on the trustees and, of course, there are many similarities and, if you would like me to speak a little about...

CARROLL: Yes.

BURKE: The one that is most clearly in my mind is the contrast between Dartmouth and Columbia because, I guess it was eight years ago, something like that--I have forgotten exactly when that was--well, I got a phone call from Mike [Michael] Sovern, the then President of Columbia, and he said "I've been thinking about you and we've been late doing this, but we hope that you will come on as a Trustee." I said "Mike, are you aware that I am sixty-seven." I think I was sixty-seven then. "I don't know what your cutoff age is, but it doesn't sound too practical." He said, "Yes. We know all about that and we have a three-year term now and that would leave you one more year of eligibility and we know that we are going to have a one-year vacancy. We have looked at that so you know you can have four years on the board." Then he said "We try to stay very close to the trustees when they become emeritus and we think that would be a good idea and that you would like that, too." And he was right on all of those.

The differences, and not just to dwell on the trustees, but on the institutions, Dartmouth, of course, is basically undergraduate, liberal arts, with a few graduate programs and maybe slightly growing. But nothing compared to the panoramic view that you get from the President's Office at Columbia--the number of things that they try to do. Obviously, at the undergraduate level, Columbia College is, in many ways, quite similar. It is in New York City, but it is in many ways in the Ivy League, similar to Dartmouth. The host of professional schools including the medical school at the Columbia Presbyterian and its location in a different part of the city make it extremely unique and a great contrast, obviously, with Dartmouth in Hanover. The numbers of students, of course, when you add them all up at Columbia, I guess there are twenty-two, twenty-three thousand students there, and I don't think that is counting Barnard. I am sure it is not. So that is one set of basic differences, the contrast between...

[End of Tape 1, Side A-- Beginning of Tape 1, Side B]

BURKE: ...the big city of New York. It is a much different background and really affects the mission of Columbia as indeed the education of rural students, as an example, affects Dartmouth and has some priority there.

Then the boards are quite different in size. Dartmouth, counting the President and the Governor, as you know, adds up to sixteen; fourteen of whom are...well, you know how they are appointed and elected. Whereas Columbia has, I think, twenty-four or twenty-five and that doesn't sound like too much of a larger board, but they do use their trustees emeriti in a fashion that Dartmouth does not. They invite them to committee meetings, to the board meetings, keep them really very well informed as to what is going on and, particularly, following the interests that those trustees had when they were serving voting members. They do that really quite well. So that is another difference.

The fact that there are so many professional schools at Columbia, at least by my lights having had the first and longest experience at Dartmouth, to see all these professional schools, most of them outstanding, that is really the bottom line that I carry away about Columbia. I am amazed that they are able to do so many things so well. They are not all Number One, all these professional schools are not all Number One. Some of them are one, two, three, maybe in that grouping and you may know more about that than I do. But they are serving vital needs within the New York community and, indeed, around the country and, in some instances, around the world. The strength of the national support that comes from those professional schools--from the lawyers, from the doctors, from the engineers, from the architects--is very splendid and I guess I was somewhat amazed at that.

CARROLL: Did that work as well at Dartmouth? I know that you have been very closely involved in both fund-raising and the financial investments at Dartmouth. Did the professional school there also create graduates who feel loyalty to the institution?

BURKE: I can now answer that "yes". I think when I went on the board Tuck, Thayer and certainly the Medical School, when those items came up on the board agenda, there was a rolling of the eyes, looking toward heaven and eyebrows raising and all of that sort of thing. Because, more often than not, those schools were a financial burden to the college. The Medical School, indeed, was. Tuck School was not quite that burden but, nevertheless, if my memory is correct, in the early and mid-seventies, they all received what I guess was then called a subvention which, as I understand it now (and I haven't seen any figures of late) Tuck School is not only self-supporting but contributing to the whole Medical School and the whole Medical Center, and we can go into that. Speaking of Dave McLaughlin, that is probably something that he could be most proud of, in my opinion. The Engineering School, I guess I will have to beg off. I don't

know what their situation is, but I doubt that they are a burden to the extent that I am talking about in the early or mid-seventies.

CARROLL: Now, what changed that around?

BURKE: I think it must have been a combination of several factors and I would start with the quality of the deans administering those schools, bringing in top-flight faculty which in turn attracted students, good students, who, in turn, went out and were successful. That's something that I have seen as clear as the sun is coming through the dirty windows here--the number, increased number as maybe engineers would say, an order of magnitude increase in the number of successful, financially successful, Dartmouth graduates and I guess, principally--not exclusively, but principally--well, let's say a lot from Tuck. Maybe a lesser amount from Thayer and, of course, the Medical School has always had successful doctors who were very loyal.

But, in a way, when you talk about fund-raising and my early Dartmouth experience, again in the seventies and probably some of the eighties, it never struck me that Dartmouth was competitive in fund-raising with Princeton. Harvard should really be omitted from this because it is such a different animal, but Princeton and Yale...and maybe Princeton because it's maybe even more, a good bit more like Dartmouth. They had, quite obviously, richer alumni and they also had young, successful alumni filling the pipeline, called at the time, and you could see this in the annual giving program, with the bequests. It was fairly obvious that--not just any personal discovery of mine--but you could see that change in the Kemeny campaign [Campaign for Dartmouth] where I think Dartmouth is right up there with any other school that you want to point to, whether you are looking at Wall Street, Silicon Valley, the Midwest, rust belt, whatever. It is now very competitive, which it has to be if the school is going to be able to go on and do the things and have the monies available.

CARROLL: We have been talking about the ability to attract really good students and Dartmouth, in the seventies, was faced with the question of whether they should go co-ed. One of the arguments of coeducation was that it would attract better students.

BURKE: That was a very big point. Now, keep in mind the co-ed decision was made before I came on the Board, but I heard a lot about it, obviously, when it was in the works. But, also after coming on the board, it was still something that was under constant review, whether the trustees wanted to review it or not. The alumni, particularly the old goat variety, would come in with nasty comments--not all of them, but a hard core. It was something

that was constantly...and John Kemeny, I think, consistently said that the academic standings, academic potentials of the student body would improve when the girls were admitted and there has been no doubt as to the question. That's a fact.

CARROLL: It was borne out absolutely.

BURKE: Yeah.

CARROLL: When you were on the Board of Trustees was a time when Dartmouth went from a set quota of women admitted to sex-blind admissions.

BURKE: Oh, it was a continuing...that was part of what was in my mind when I said coeducation and the ratio, the proportion. I think when I went on the board, it was in the high twenties, or low thirties. It crept up a little. It was a slow climb, sort of a tooth-pulling exercise I would say.

CARROLL: Do you remember any of the debate that persuaded people to stop the quotas and turn to the sex-blind admissions?

BURKE: Yes. I would say, initially, that the board, to its credit, the bulk of the board, the majority of those fourteen alumni sitting around--certainly the President and I forget about the Governor--always were of a mind that there should be an equal balance. I don't know that people came out and said that, but the discussion in my mind clearly reflected that. Maybe I was just trying to transfer my own thinking, but I don't think so. I think for the most part there was the feeling on the Board that that day was coming, and the sooner the better.

Of course, there were arguments made such as, "We will not have enough men to field a football team," or any other rough and tumble sport that you want to talk about, but particularly football. And we don't have the facilities. These arguments were still being made after the decision to go coeducational was made. "We don't have enough facilities, dormitories, athletic facilities, sororities houses." Which was true. They didn't and, of course, the Dartmouth Plan, Kemeny's plan, there was a splendid attempt to solve that problem to give the College more tuition monies and lower the demands on what facilities we had...spreading them out over a twelve month period, all of which you know.

One of my first recollections, speaking of John Kemeny, was I guess when I came on, there was yet another review of the Dartmouth Plan underway and the discussion was about that and Affirmative Action was constantly in the grinder, as it were. So that there were discussions about the

Dartmouth Plan and I was amazed in the first, first or second, discussion, at how enormously complicated that plan was. And it seemed to be getting more so as they gave more options to the students. Complicated and complex was what stuck in my mind and I think there were some others who still had that feeling also. But I remember we had a vivid (I did at least) demonstration by Kemeny as to what a good teacher he was. He came in one time--I guess he may have had a transparency, but I think he also had a blackboard, one of these old blackboards on wheels and it sort of tilted this way or that--and he laid out a series of matrices by terms. He had it broken down in all sorts of columns going here and there, but then he had a simplified version which he was then suggesting. That was going to be the revision and, I tell you, he took us through a very, very complicated thing and, of course, explained it very well and was therefore very convincing about what should be done. I thought that was a wonderful example. I have never attended a math class of his, which would have been a waste of his time and mine, but certainly this was Kemeny at his best as a teacher.

CARROLL: What are your impressions of John Kemeny when you look back on your years of working with him?

BURKE: Well, I have said this to John Kemeny. This is a few years after he had retired--quite a few years, I guess, in the Presidential backyard and I had had some more experience dealing with other Presidents. I said to John Kemeny in a rare moment of complete forthrightness and honesty. I said, "John, I think you are the best college president I have seen." And he said not a word, not a word. He just looked at me. I couldn't quite tell if he was thinking, "Now this fellow has lost what few marbles he had." He didn't know what to say, but we didn't pursue that any more.

CARROLL: And why did you believe this?

BURKE: He was a combination scholar, teacher, administrator, fundraiser extraordinaire. Again, in my mind, he was very articulate also. His speeches, whether prepared word for word, he didn't need that, obviously. He spoke in full sentences and his sentences were full paragraphs and all of that. Example: when the Rockefeller Center [Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences] was a gleam in, I guess, Kemeny's eyes and probably some others...Leonard Rieser...and then the fellow who became the first head of the Rockefeller...

CARROLL: It was (Frank) Smallwood, wasn't it?

BURKE: Smallwood. Yes. Frank Smallwood. Yes. There was a problem of finding money to put up the handsome, I think the very handsome, building that Lo-Yi Chan, Dartmouth Class of whatever he was ['54], architect, had designed. And somebody had the idea that, because of Nelson Rockefeller's (a fairly obvious idea) career as a politician that the Rockefeller family--Nelson, of course, was dead at this time--that the Rockefeller family would be the place to go for the money and that led them to Laurance Rockefeller. And, through the Foundation, I had worked over some years reasonably closely with Laurance Rockefeller, meaning that our Foundation shared his interests and contributed to some of his favorite causes. And every now and then he would come along--I won't say that it was a mutual back-scratching society, but we worked on some outstanding institutional leads.

So I arranged for Laurance to come over from his pad--we should all have a pad like that--in Woodstock. He [promised] to come to the Hanover Inn at ten o'clock on a Thursday morning or whatever and, sure enough, at that time comes along this quite ancient, but meticulously maintained green Mercedes. I remember that. Fortunately, also, he found a parking space so then... [Laughter] ...we go over to John Kemeny's office for our date, which was at ten, I guess, and we go in and we start talking about the proposed Rockefeller Center and its place on the campus. We, at that point, had a very preliminary sketch--I am sure we didn't have any cardboard mockup, but a preliminary sketch that Lo-Yi or somebody had drawn up and where it was going to be. How it would blend with the other building--what's the other one that it is tied to...

CARROLL: The big red pillar... I can't think of the name.

BURKE: No. This is not the one with the... Silsby.

CARROLL: Silsby.

BURKE: Silsby. Yeah. Silsby. And that it could be one unit and that kind of thing was considered to be a plus with its nearness to the library and all of that. We were having a very good--just the three of us. I was there. Kemeny and Laurance Rockefeller and Laurance was a fine, wonderful person--very kind and quite sharp, intelligent. And, suddenly, John Kemeny, after about forty minutes, suddenly John Kemeny stood up and said "You will have to excuse me now, I have a class to teach." I had no warning of this and my heart fell down to my kneecaps when he said "I have arranged for the Provost, Leonard Rieser, to come in and carry on while I am away." I really thought we were just ready when he did that--we were just about

ready to press, make a final press and try to get some answer and some show, at least, of heavy interest and John Kemeny walked out.

Oh. Okay. Leonard came in and did a very good job, but he was not the President. Nobody can do the President's job like the President, really. So we carried on with Leonard and I talking to Laurance and, after a while, or I guess we went somewhere, started for lunch, and John Kemeny joined us then and that was the end of that. We didn't get any indication of high interest or no interest or anything like that. And I thought, oh--I really did think that it wasn't going to come off, principally because John Kemeny had to get up and leave at a crucial moment.

So, the following week, the phone rang--I guess three or four days after we had been in Hanover--and it was Laurance Rockefeller. Boy, what am I going to say to him? And his first comment to me, after a few pleasantries, he said "Walter, I want to start by telling you how impressed I am by your President, John Kemeny, and how he has his priorities in just the right order." [Laughter] "He left to teach and that is where he belongs. He is a great teacher." [Laughter] We got, I think it was three and a quarter million dollars.

CARROLL: Do you think that Kemeny had any idea or was this just...

BURKE: No. It was just Kemeny at work. He was at work as a teacher, as the President, as a fundraiser and he blends them together...

CARROLL: That is fascinating.

BURKE: ...and that's about it.

CARROLL: That is a great story. You served on the Committee for the Arts at Dartmouth from 1977 to '82.

BURKE: Well, I had forgotten that, I guess. [Laughter]

CARROLL: [Laughter] Believe me, I will bring it all back. I was wondering if you could describe what that job entailed.

BURKE: Well, that job entailed bringing additional pressure on anybody who was important enough to give us a helping hand to build a separate museum for Dartmouth College and for the environs. And there was a sometimes overly passionate--I guess he is still there--McGrath. Bob. Is it Bob McGrath?

CARROLL: Yes, it is.

BURKE: He would make...he made a presentation to the Board one time that I thought was way over--it was around this period--excessively passionate, you know. He needed it. He was pounding the table. Anyway. Having been interested in the arts and the various galleries in the Hop and over in Carpenter, and learning a little more as I went along about those, I was interested in it. It seemed the time had come when the College really should have its own museum, but as a teaching museum. And certainly McGrath was a very effective spokesman and his passion, on the whole, was effective, but it took many years--it really did--I don't know how many years it was in the works before we really got it moving. And, of course, the key players there were Peter Smith. Bob McGrath and Peter Smith.

CARROLL: Of the Hopkins Center.

BURKE: Of the Hop. He was the director of the Hop. And there was a committee--there were various committees formed along about that time or a little later. We had overseers, I believe, the overseers of the Hopkins Center and then, later on, we had the overseers of the Hood and we pushed them together, I think, at one point. But, that involved what I've said--trying to keep the pressure on in this forward press to get a fine museum on the campus. But also [concerned were] the relation[ship] of the art on the wall to the teaching, and all of that in its relation to the performing arts in the Hop. And we had a splendid fellow in Peter Smith, who really had the leading oar and pulled it enormously well. They were on these committees--whatever their evolving names were--people who had some monies. I don't think we had another Rockefeller there, but there was enough so that we could keep this moving forward and show the trustees, I think, that there was a determination and maybe some practicality to it. And then I do believe it was John Kemeny who scrounged around--maybe it was somebody in Blunt -- but I think maybe it was Kemeny or a combination of the two and looked back and found a former board member who had a milk company. I am having trouble...

CARROLL: Harvey Hood.

BURKE: Harvey Hood. Of course. His name is on the [building]... Harvey Hood had given some monies to the College and it was a fairly complicated--details of which I don't have nor are they too helpful for our purposes--but they were restricted for some years. After that, there were fewer restrictions or the restrictions were taken off completely. So there were two or three million dollars and Kemeny pointed at that and said "That's

enough. That's what we can use to go forward." And Hood's widow then enhanced that over the next four or five years.

And, of course, we were able to get a splendid architect, Charles Moore, who had done the smaller but nevertheless very impressive museum for Williams College. Not the Clark Museum. The one right on campus. Some of us went down to see that and it was a very interesting exercise, going around with Peter Smith--seeing some of the things that Charles Moore, who was an enormously interesting, talented, skilled, almost genius-sort of architect (who unfortunately did not take the best care of himself so he is no longer among the living)--but going around. We went to New Haven at one point. You'd think that you are going to see something at Yale. But, no. He had done a public housing, a couple of buildings, and that was a perfect demonstration of the genius. But I don't think I am reaching too far using a word like that of Charles Moore, applying his particular spin to what public housing should be, whether it was elderly people or public housing. I have forgotten, but it was a far cry from the Yale campus or really from the Dartmouth campus and what went on in there was a far cry, but he was a very fine and very skilled architect and a good listener. A very good listener. He came to the Top of the Hop more than once and would come and sit cross-legged...

[End of Tape 1, Side B—Beginning of Tape 2, Side A]

CARROLL: ...in the Top of the Hop and looking out over the Green and the campus, contemplating...

BURKE: And the problem, as he saw it, was large...it was a problem because he saw it in an expansive way. He saw the Hop. He saw the empty space. He, of course, saw the boiler facility and a little dorm--or was it an administrative, it doesn't make any difference, a small brick building that was near a garage down at that end and then, coming back up to the old library, the College's first library...

CARROLL: Wilson.

BURKE: Wilson. Charles Moore and his very able assistant--that is not quite the right word--associate. They both had been connected with--well, Chad Floyd graduated from the Yale Architecture School and Charles Moore, I think, I am sure, had been the Dean there.

CARROLL: Of course.

BURKE: So the problem wanting solution was where to put this new museum. How many buildings should it tie into? How large should it be? Should it be a commanding presence in the front line near the street nearest the campus? And there were four or five solutions and he--Charles Moore and Chad Floyd--propounded, thought through, came, sat, explained, took comments, criticism as to what the museum should be like and where it was.

Initially, the location was the most important thing. Do you tie them all in? One solution called for taking the top of the Hood and the glass arches--the three signature items that what's his name--Wallace Harrison--had put there and extending that right along the street. So that (when I think about it now) is sort of the M.I.T. [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] solution where everything is cheek to jowl to something else. And then what about Wilson?

Chad Floyd went over and looked at that and came back breathless. I remember his coming back--I think he did that right before we had one of these sessions--came back breathless. "Do you know what sort of exciting space you have over there?" "And the basement," he said, "would be particularly attractive for administrative offices." And maybe or something else and the old galleries where they had the stuffed Indians and the feathered hats or whatever they had over there can be renovated in such a way...he was most excited, and of course, therefore made a very good pitch that Wilson should be incorporated in this complex. And he was so right. He was so right.

And Charles Moore decided fairly early on that there should not be this M.I.T. solid front. And I guess, for an architect, maybe that's a sign of his independence and wisdom. His building didn't have to be one that would be seen as visible as the Hop. It could play somewhat second fiddle to the Hop by being recessed as it is, a considerable distance. So that was, I think, a happy result as far as financing the Hood Museum and the ultimate result. And you probably would know more as to how that's fitting in from an academic point of view, but it must be better than what we had before. [Laughter]

CARROLL: I would say not only that, but it was a real sort of show piece. It becomes the center with so much and they very wisely, I think, put a large auditorium in the basement which would also become a movie theater so that the students get drawn there on one level and become accustomed to going back to that archway and going in.

BURKE: Yes. I see.

CARROLL: Very wise. What impresses me with Charles Moore though, is his details. His attention to details...

BURKE: Yes. Yes.

CARROLL: ...in his buildings.

BURKE: His stairways, stairwells, or whatever you want to call them are sensational. Indeed, Chad Floyd has done a very fine spiral stair in the Tuck School in the addition to that. You have not seen that? It has been there. I think it is Byrne. Is that called Byrne?

CARROLL: Yes. That's right. I haven't gone down there. Now, you live in a Charles Moore home. Is that right? Or did you?

BURKE: No. We still have the home and Charles Moore was involved very much when we first started to consider building a new home on the property where we had lived for quite a few years. We had a fire so we were forced to decide "Do we want to renovate" or "Do we want to have a free-standing brand new home?" So, Charles Moore worked quite hard on that for several months, along with Chad Floyd. And then Charles Moore, at that time, was lured away from wherever he had been, to Austin--the University of Texas at Austin. I guess Ladybird Johnson moved him, or somebody down there. So we didn't see very much more of him. He was in touch, but not in the way that he had been and we also decided that we didn't want the free-standing, that we were going to have a major renovation, so the design of that major renovation was something that Chad Floyd took on. He consulted Charles Moore. I know, because he showed us some film, a tape, of several of the houses Charles Moore has done--did many private homes. He did one for a blind person which was just unique and outstanding and very touching to hear the reasons and see the way the home works.

CARROLL: That is fascinating. I never thought about the special concerns that you would have to have.

BURKE: Yes. Yes. So, that was a wonderful--I would summarize that personally by saying that that was a wonderful experience--the Hop-Hood and the Charles Moore exposure.

CARROLL: Were you also part of the committee, I gather, when the Hopkins Center changed from Peter Smith's tutelage to that of Shelton Stanfill. Did you spend much time with Shelton Stanfill?

BURKE: No. No. He had some other job when I was active in that. He had some other job at the second or third tier, so I didn't see that. Really, I had so many other things to do by that time. It wasn't that I lost interest in the Hop-Hood or the arts. Of course, I couldn't do that with the Metropolitan spurring my interest all the time. But there were so many other things with respect to Dartmouth that I thought in the area where I could help, I had done what I could.

CARROLL: Now, you had worked with David McLaughlin when he was on the Board of Trustees and Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: And I was wondering...not talking about his presidency now, but just his time as a Trustee, if you could talk a bit about and characterize his...

BURKE: Yes, I could. I was thinking that was one of the things I was thinking about last night or coming down this morning, I guess. Without any qualification or hesitancy, David McLaughlin was a splendid, superior Chairman of the Board. He was just outstanding and, without too many names, maybe the predecessor made Dave McLaughlin look a little, I am sure he made him look somewhat better. But, all on his own, he was outstanding in running the meetings, in relating to each Trustee, to the committees, bringing up questions and issues that should be before the Board, relating to the President and really having a presence on the campus as a Trustee and as a Chair. He was Phi Beta Kap. He was a star of the football team, pass receiver, all of that. He had a certain feel and a recognition around the campus and, of course, had been devoted to Dartmouth on many--much service to the College before he went on the Board. So that is my unqualified recollection and solid recollection about Dave McLaughlin as a Chair.

CARROLL: Jean Kemeny said something very similar. She said that he was a splendid sort-of back up force to John Kemeny during his presidency.

BURKE: Yeah. Well, I think I might have said it...complimentary--not necessarily backup, but the combination of McLaughlin, Kemeny and Rieser was very good. Each in their own niche.

CARROLL: Now, you were the chair of the committee to go about finding a replacement for John Kemeny.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Were you surprised when he announced that he wanted to retire after eleven years?

BURKE: No. No. I don't think I was surprised. There was then this feeling on the part of the presidents, serving presidents in many institutions around the country that ten years was about the time that any one person should stay in office.

CARROLL: Do you think that is true that...

BURKE: Obviously, with what I have told you about Kemeny, you know I am going to say in Kemeny's case, I wish he had stayed on. [Laughter] And I do, but that is somewhat similar, not really on target, but somewhat similar to the ten years "up and out" for the trustees. That's a policy. There is nothing in concrete on that as far as I know. But, overall, for the trustees, I'm sure, that's a very good idea. For the presidency, when you have an outstanding, sort of by acclamation outstanding, president, I am not so sure.

CARROLL: When you gathered together as a committee to find a replacement for John Kemeny, what did you decide you were looking for in the next president of Dartmouth?

BURKE: Well, there is always a school of thought in a situation like that where you have had an outstanding academic-type, head of a math department, recognized as a computer language innovator, creator--there is always that question. "Don't we want now for the next period of years someone who has had administrative background, who is used to making things tick, managing quite a few people?" That sort of supposedly more practical president. So that was the school of thought that some of the trustees had and, I tell you right away, that whatever thought the trustees had, they were never bashful about giving it to the committee and to me as the chair--very forcefully.

CARROLL: Was Dartmouth's financial position less than advantageous at that time? Is that one of the reasons?

BURKE: Well, I read that somewhere in the clipping that you sent me which I just re-read this morning, I think, and Daniell's commented--or perhaps he was

going back further. Dartmouth's financial position was all right. In looking back on it, of course, it seems--the endowment seems now to have been awfully small then. There are many of us now who think it is still very small. It should be doubled and that is easy to say after the successful campaign. I think we have a handsome endowment, but I don't think that was an impediment in the search. We did not get that reaction from those in whom we were interested, saying that, "your endowment and your financial support is woefully inadequate". We didn't hear anything like that. Of course, you have to keep in mind that [the] competition didn't have the large endowments that they now have. I mean, those several billion dollar--we are in the category just barely now, but there were others, very few, maybe Harvard was over a billion, but that's about it, I think.

CARROLL: So you were looking for--the trustees decided to look for an administrator. Was there anything else they were looking for?

BURKE: Well, when you go into something like this, there are always a lot of things--the wish list--the laundry list. They are looking for the person, really, who can walk on water. [Laughter] And you know that he or she is not going to be forthcoming. And there is another very practical factor, which I don't think I was sufficiently aware of at this start of the search. And that is that you must have awfully good luck in those who are available during the short period of time--the window that this committee, any search committee, has to operate. It may be ninety days. It could be one hundred twenty days. Who is out there looking right then? It is just luck, I think, as to who happens to be available. Some of it, of course, depends on how efficient you are in casting the net. It has come to be more of a practice now to use a head hunter, at least as a consultant, and indeed we did use one as a consultant, but he didn't have a very active role in the search as I recall.

But the pool--you can tell I have probably given you a clue as to what I am now going to say--during the period that we were looking, and some of this is hind-sight obviously, there was not a goodly number of top-flight candidates available. I just have to say that. And whether that should have meant to us that we delayed the search--just postponed it--and there was some thought about that. It was rejected thinking that we should get a president in place and get on with the affairs of the College so that we wouldn't have a lame duck. Even John Kemeny, once he announces that he is going, is a lame duck. There is no avoiding it. So those were some of the considerations as we started to form this. The faculty input, of course, was enormously important. I thought, as we went through this, we had a very good working relationship with the faculty members.

CARROLL: Do you remember who the faculty members were?

BURKE: Oh, boy. I am assuming that you can refresh my recollection.

CARROLL: I believe Mary Kelley was one.

BURKE: Yes, she was.

CARROLL: That is the one name that has come up often.

BURKE: And Bill [William "Bill"] Cook.

CARROLL: And, Bill Cook. Of course.

BURKE: Mary Kelley. Bill Cook. They were outstanding people and they were extremely helpful members of it. The board members--I am going to have the same trouble...

CARROLL: I can look this up. I just...

BURKE: Yes. But it might spark in my memory some of the issues and the problems if we have the names.

CARROLL: I don't have them handy, but I can look them up.

BURKE: Yeah. All right.

CARROLL: Was David McLaughlin's name in the pool from the very beginning?

BURKE: Oh, very much. There was a core on the board that kept hammering the table and saying, "You have no choice. You must have Dave McLaughlin." So much so that I think they overdid it. When I say there was a "core" there, one or two. I think that's probably not the way for a trustee to operate.

CARROLL: So what was it in David McLaughlin that they saw that they thought was going to make a good president?

BURKE: They said they saw his experience in the business world as the type of skill that Dartmouth needed for the ensuing period. His ability to bring in top-flight--they thought his ability to bring in top-flight administrators. His feel for the College that he had always had, but had developed in a splendid fashion while he was the Chair, and generally his relationships in the alumni body. All of those were pluses.

CARROLL: Did he have to hesitate about thinking about accepting the Presidency when it was offered?

BURKE: No. No. I don't think he did. I think he always wanted the job. Yeah.

CARROLL: Did anyone express reservations about his lack of connection to an academic community?

BURKE: Oh, very much. Yes. The faculty members, obviously, and so did some of the rest of us. And there were reservations about his ability to articulate the mission, if we can use that high-flying word, the mission of the College and, indeed, relate to the faculty. There were questions that were raised and were debated and thought out as best the search committee as a whole could do.

CARROLL: David McLaughlin has written, actually, that he had found it to be a very hard adjustment--harder than he had anticipated--moving from the corporate world to the academic world. But, he has never elaborated on that and I wondered if you know exactly what he is talking about in specifics?

BURKE: Well, I know that, most unfortunately, his health weakened there for a period of time. It seems to me at that time--maybe I have got an anti-smoking campaign going and I really don't have--but he had been a fairly heavy smoker. Just at the time or right after he had been selected, he began not to feel so well and then had a sufficient heart valve stoppage--artery stoppage--so he had angioplasty, the balloon treatment, performed. And that came right at the very beginning of his presidency, I think and I may be off by a few months.

But also, frankly, on this tape (and it is not going to be open as I understand it, for some time) I don't think Dave was ever the same person after that. I'm practicing amateur medicine, but I saw a lot of him before that part and a lot of him after, and there were some minor, which turned out to be important, changes in Dave. Whether it was due to the heart bump or the difficulty, as he said, adjusting to the presidency. It was a different sort, a much different assignment, than what he had had before, but I find that hard really to believe. I think that anyone sitting as a trustee and being a chair would be well aware of the difference in the assignment the president has and that anybody else around the campus. For the moment that's what I have to say.

CARROLL: What do you think were the most important achievements of David McLaughlin's presidency?

BURKE: I think there were several and the ones that I am ticking off I think were of great benefit. I speak with high prejudice here because I voted for all of these and helped to finance some of the others and, in some ways, his achievements are of a type that remind me of [President] Richard Nixon, where only a rock-ribbed Republican in office could do some of the things that Nixon did.

CARROLL: Such as opening China.

BURKE: Yes. And his entrance and partial opening of Russia--I happened to be over in Russia at that time right after he had done that, so that sticks in my mind. I was there as a businessman. That sort of thing, and I guess to finish the thought, that Dave McLaughlin as the President with the non-academic teaching background could do things that an academic-type would find harder to do. Allocation of monies toward a gymnasium, for instance.

CARROLL: The Berry Gymnasium?

BURKE: Exactly. He went out and got that seven million or whatever it was. I think it was seven million from John Berry. The renovation, very significant renovation, not covering huge areas, but in each of the dorms to have private study areas where the rock music or the cans of beer, whatever, were not allowed. And in many dorms, Fayerweather, that complex for one, I think, was very well done and then the large newer dorms that were conceived during Dave McLaughlin's reign, if we can call it that.

CARROLL: The River Cluster? Is that what you are talking about or the ones on Wheelock?

BURKE: The ones on Wheelock. Yes. Yes. Which are really quite nice. Then, I think, probably the decision, and having been very close to this while we were withstanding blows and everything else, had to do with the purchase by the College of the property from the Hospital and the Clinic for, I think, twenty-five million dollars to give us those acres extending to the north and to give expansion room for who knows, maybe the next fifty years. And, at the same time, this twenty-five million didn't bring about all of this; but it created the opportunity to move the Clinic and the Hospital to the Medical Center and, I guess eventually--I don't know how that is coming out--the better part of the Medical School may go down there also.

CARROLL: Well, that brings me to the point of your role in buying this acreage in Lebanon.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: That was a huge purchase in 1980.

BURKE: It was, indeed.

CARROLL: How did it come about that those were offered because there were two thousand acres there?

BURKE: No. Oh, no. You are... All right. There are a couple of different things we are talking about here.

CARROLL: Okay.

BURKE: A couple of different things. Let's stick to the Hospital Medical Center where the old Fortress Hospital...

CARROLL: Mary Hitchcock.

BURKE: Mary Hitchcock. Right. That became available through a combination of desires, if I remember correctly, on the part of the Clinic and the Hospital to expand, to have better facilities, to have more modern facilities, not to be confined to the Fortress--as a witness what happened to the Fortress-- [Laughter] imploded. And that really made the most sense. That was at the top of their wish list, their dream list. And, of course, along with that was the feeling that the Medical School, at some time, should move also. Then the two thousand acres that you are talking about is the plot, the acreage that is on the borderline between Leb [Lebanon] and Hanover on whatever the route number is there.

CARROLL: 120.

BURKE: 120.

[End of Tape 2, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 2, Side B]

BURKE: ...was an effort by a local developer, I think based in Lebanon, somewhere around there, to buy this land, put in roads, sewers and develop it successfully, make a lot of money. It didn't happen and Paul Paganucci, the astute and much-devoted-to-the-College fellow whom you probably know, with his nose to the ground, got wind of this. And the fellow was running out of gas even before he ran out of money and talked to him and then came to the investment committee with this thought that we should buy this two thousand acres.

When you are talking about land, when you are talking about the number of acres, two thousand acres, in a location so close to the campus for the relatively small--I think the price was something like two million dollars that we had to pay for that. It was a lot of money then, but you buy a piece of property like that for a price like that, for the most part, with details unknown, with purposes, eventual use unknown. But you just have an inner gut feel that the College had to have that property and that it would be a handsome site at some point for some activity of the College even if it came, even if it was not academic. That the College had enough money and would be around, it is not subject to the mortality tables. It would be around long enough to be able to develop it in a commercial, residential, whatever way and also it's awfully good to have that number of acres in the hands of the College and not in the hands of anybody else.

So we put all that together and there was not really a large discussion and debate about that. There was good thinking. It was examined, but, as I recall, the committee--I'm not sure whether I was the chair of the Investment Committee then or not--but the committee was of a mind that "let's take it."

CARROLL: So it was not in anyone's mind the idea of, at that time, building a hospital there.

BURKE: No. I am quite sure of that.

CARROLL: Okay.

BURKE: When that came, it may have come sooner than those of us who had a hand in buying it thought it ever would. I think that's the case. But it was not, when we bought that, on the table.

CARROLL: Have you seen the Hospital...

BURKE: Oh, yes. I have been out there a few times.

CARROLL: It is a very splendid addition.

BURKE: It is, indeed, and I think the commercial piece of property that the College now owns across the street is just beginning to blossom.

CARROLL: That's the Centerra Park.

BURKE: It takes a long while for those things to come about. Yes.

CARROLL: When the Hospital approached, and I suppose it must have been D.M.S. as well (the Medical School), approached the trustees about the move, did they bring it as a formal proposal or was this discussed years before hand?

BURKE: There was a great deal of discussion about it. A great deal of discussion and Paul Paganucci, Dave McLaughlin himself, had several meetings with the officers of the Clinic, at the Hospital and, of course, with the Dean... What was the Dean's name? [Carleton] Chapman?

CARROLL: It was Chapman at that time, I believe, because [Dean] Strickler was not there at that time.

BURKE: I'm not sure. The Dean of the Medical School was very eager for it. I think he saw it all as one package. He saw his Medical School moving at the same time. It didn't work out that way; but, nevertheless, the arguments that he put forward were quite convincing, at least to the trustees. There was tremendous opposition, though, to this. I mean we had forums, open discussions, tremendous tension, to begin with, about spending twenty-five million and moving the cherished Hospital and the Clinic, isolating...and I guess right along about that time, they began to question whether the biological science that is housed in some of the Medical School buildings, and is still there, whether that was a good idea to move that out...that much of that. Mostly, my recollection was that it was the faculty, certain key faculty members, who were, I would say, strongly opposed to this. The factor which I thought was also of significance had to do with the quality of life; more specifically, Hanover traffic, and how that would be improved by getting those three entities off into another spot. Unfortunately, a lot of the traffic still has to come right through the [Hanover] Inn corner. I know that, but I think there has been some improvement and they don't have the throb of the parked cars and everything else.

CARROLL: Or the wail of sirens.

BURKE: Yes. That's true, too.

CARROLL: When you talk about the enmity among the faculty and I was going to bring up the October, 1985 faculty meeting where you and Dave McLaughlin put this idea in front of the faculty.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Do you remember that?

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: I've read the minutes. They were very vociferous.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Why do you think they felt so, I don't know, I will say "threatened" when I read the minutes about this proposal?

BURKE: I think a lot of it (this is a very general answer), but my observation of some of the faculty members, not always the same faculty members depending on which issue was being raised, are very upset when there is significant--what they deemed to be, in which in this case was true--significant changes suggested. There was just something about that that goes against the intellect and the type of mindset that some of the faculty members had established within themselves--tenured members. "We should devote our time to this, our monies?" "What we could do with twenty-five million dollars for all sorts of good things," and there was no arguing with it. There were certainly labs and everything else could have been, and have been since then, improved. But there was that very strong feeling of resistance to change in itself and then, when it has a twenty-five million dollar price tag on it, that's something else.

Another factor, I think, had to be some of the opposition that the faculty--the growing opposition to Dave McLaughlin within the faculty. It was almost, if he wanted this, then they really put it under the magnifying glass. My recollection of that meeting, I said I endorsed it, that it had a good feel. I thought it was in the best interest of the College. I think that is what I said. Paul Paganucci made a much more detailed statement. He had been familiar and served, as I said, on a couple of the boards and had a good working knowledge of the Hospital, the Clinic and the Medical School. And he made, what I thought, was a very powerful statement in support of it.

CARROLL: We have the notes from your speech and Mr. Paganucci's speech and David McLaughlin's speech for that. Did you, among yourselves, talk together before you went before the faculty? Did you know there was going to be this kind of opposition?

BURKE: Yes. I think we did. Because it wasn't just at this forum. It was banging on the President's door in letters and notes and all. It wasn't a surprise when we got to the forum.

CARROLL: Okay.

BURKE: That's my recollection, anyway.

CARROLL: This leads to a secondary question. What do you think it is that led David McLaughlin to lose the trust of the faculty?

BURKE: First, I have to say that there were some faculty members--quite a few--who were very devoted and loyal to Dave McLaughlin and they were very key members. Then there is another category, a handful, it struck me--I put them in a category of being interested in hearing themselves talk, hearing their own voices and being part of an active discussion and being an organizer and talking to the students about these issues and generally getting their picture and name in the Daily "D" or in the Valley News or whatever it was. Of course, there are always the same names on petitions that would come in, so that was another category. I can't say it was huge, but they made so much noise, it had the feeling of being a large group. That was the impression.

And then, I guess, the greater part of it, the rest of the faculty, maybe (and I have never gone into this in any great detailed way) shared a disappointment in Dave's ability to, I guess, represent the College and appreciate what the faculty was attempting to do--to state the mission repeatedly, which is what, let's face it, Kemeny had obviously been able to do. What, in more recent times, the combination of Jim Wright and [James] Jim Freedman do. Although this word "vision", there are many others including [President] George Bush who refer to it as "the vision thing," that can be very fluffy. But I think that is a big factor with the faculty. On the search committee, they would always ask the question of the candidate, "Now tell us, what is your vision for Dartmouth. If you sat in the presidential chair, what would be your vision for Dartmouth?" It's a good question and, for them, a very important question and I don't think they heard a continuing, refreshing answer to that. There may be other things there. Have you talked to Dave McLaughlin yet?

CARROLL: No. I am hoping that will happen later on this month. He is up around Lake Sunapee now.

BURKE: Yeah. Yeah.

CARROLL: I was wondering--to sort of bring back and bring closure to the hospital...

BURKE: Also, you asked me about what were the things that Dave McLaughlin did. He did another thing. He kept pressure on the Investment Committee as the President. Kept a constant pressure in a friendly, but nevertheless firm way. You know, "Get going." "Get busy." "You've got to take a few more risks." "This endowment must be enhanced, must be increased. You are going to have to take some chances." Well, in fact, we are doing that. I think, with his encouragement, we did more of it and it worked out pretty well. But that was a very vital nudge because the investment officer, and maybe some of the trustees, think, "Oh, for a college, we are stewards" and, you know, the old Presbyterian Church type of thing, stewardship, and we can't get too high-flying, or too much of a high-wire act here. He was supportive in the role of taking on some more risks with the hope, which has materialized, of greater reward. I cite you one category and that was and is venture capital in the portfolio.

CARROLL: That is exactly what I wanted to bring up. Now, this came about--this idea of using venture capital--as I understand it, when you were a member and then chair of the Trustees' Investment Committee?

BURKE: I think it was sort of a one-two punch of Pag and myself.

CARROLL: Did you talk about this before deciding, or did it seem self-evident that one should move into venture capital?

BURKE: It seemed self-evident, that's maybe a little too strong--but it seemed like a good idea to me that some of the assets should be put in it because, going back to 1965 when one of the more successful--still very successful--venture capital partnerships had been formed. I had a role in that and I still do. So I saw that and I saw what they were able to do and they really pretty much wrote the rules. This one and the group, plus another, which we were involved in which, through Pag, we were involved in very early on.

CARROLL: Which group was that?

BURKE: Advent [Group]. Advent. And they, today, have grown enormously and have been very successful. So that, I think the feeling on my part and

Pag's had been that there should be a role that venture capital can play in the portfolio and you may remember, and Pag is a better one to tell you this, but he served as--was it Assistant Dean or Associate Dean--or some such thing?

CARROLL: Associate.

BURKE: As sort of, I guess, financial administrative manager.

CARROLL: And then Vice President.

BURKE: ...for the Tuck School? Yeah. And while he was doing that, he brought up a couple of venture capital people who had--one of them was one that had been one of the founders of the first venture capital group, Greylock [Group], that I had mentioned to you. He came up, this fellow and his partner, came up and talked to a class or conducted a seminar or some such thing. So, Pag and I were both ready to go and, indeed, I think it started some of this before Dave--I'm sure we had--before Dave had said, you know, "Let's get going. I'm behind it. You can take more risks." Meaning, go in for more of this type of thing.

CARROLL: How much of a risk was it to move into this direction?

BURKE: It was a higher risk than you would think now because the College has expanded its holdings in venture capital and they have been very successful. So that it doesn't seem all that high risk now, but it was a new boy in town, pretty much. The one firm I started with, Greylock, they were started in '65 so that, even ten years later, their operation was quite small. The venture capital community was no where near the size that it is now and there were not the number of entrepreneurs out there looking for finance. The technology, the pace of improved technology, constantly changing, we hope, improving, was no where near what it is now. Of course, that is the basic that feeds the venture capital. So it was more a tooth-pulling type of thing, long and tedious searches for the little company with the right management and a good idea. Now, there are many more, as I said, entrepreneurs out there looking for money. There is still plenty of high risk, but I think the techniques within the venture capital partnerships have improved. Their techniques of identifying and then striking the right deal, not paying too much and being able to track the investments that they make, they become more expert in that.

The venture capital people have a broader education. It is not just an M.B.A. Quite often, those now who are serving, working at Greylock and Advent, have other degrees in engineering and computer science--what

have you. So, it is not quite as high risk. It was plenty. I guess that was your question. It was of a higher degree of risk and volatility. There is still plenty of volatility, meaning by that, when you get your money in and the stocks come out of these little companies, you'd better keep your seatbelt on and be ready for the rollercoaster ride because it is still there, as exhibited in the month of July.

CARROLL: Were other colleges and universities putting part of their endowment into venture capital at this time?

BURKE: Yes. To a small extent. I wish I could remember the date, but going back before the period we are talking about here, with my exposure to Greylock and a couple of others, I had suggested to our Foundation, which at that point, whatever it was, didn't have anywhere near the endowment it has now--maybe half, or less--that the Foundation invest in venture capital and put that to our New York attorneys. And "Oh my goodness." It was worse than the rector of the Episcopal Church spending money like that. You couldn't do it. Of course, granted, the Foundation directors and trustees are held to a higher standard than the Dartmouth educational institutions. There's special language that is narrower that applies to it, so this firm said, "Oh, no. No, I don't like it at all." Then, one day, not too long after they threw up their hands with a stop sign, Harvard went into its first venture capital and then the law firm--it is a very good law firm--they served us right there. Probably their advice was very good with respect to the Foundation. Harvard should have been the one to break the ice here, not a little foundation. But, in any event, they came back promptly and said, "Okay, now you can do it. Harvard's going to do it." That's the magic of Harvard, of course. And then the gates were opened.

CARROLL: When you were the Chair and on the Trustees' Investment Committee, that committee managed to triple Dartmouth's endowment, which I think is an amazing feat. Was that all through venture capital or were there other things?

BURKE: No. I don't think, though venture capital did very well, but you may be counting gifts in there. I don't know.

CARROLL: No. Just--it says, "endowment to the College became six hundred and twelve million dollars" at that time.

BURKE: Well, there are several things that make an endowment grow, of course, and some of it can be gifts, bequests, so that number may have it in there. The endowment did grow. I don't know the exact amount, but six hundred...I remember thinking that was a wonderful number when we got

to six hundred. That was splendid. It was along about that time that I--or higher, I guess, a bit higher. Maybe when we got to three-quarters of a billion that Dave McLaughlin said, "We've got to get to a billion."

CARROLL: When you were going and taking this money and investing it in venture capital groups, did you seek out certain kinds? Were you investing in electronics, investing in computers? Investing in any kind of specific industry?

BURKE: To some extent, but more so, we sought the groups that had--and this is very important and is something that Paul Paganucci insisted on and he was really, I say, the main force behind the investment effort. That was his job. That was his 100% job. But he was very insistent that any group that we went into have a track record. And, for a while, we maintained that at ten years. Well, they were very hard to find, ten-year track records. So we backed off that somewhat, but we did not back (and this was very important) start-up venture capital groups. Maybe we would have made a lot more money if we had and Dartmouth has a little piece of it's endowment now that they do just that with. Somebody comes along and, of course, we check them out--what they have done prior to that and the idea and all that--but put a small amount of money, put a small chip on these fellows without track records. But, with a billion dollars, you can do things that you couldn't do with two or three hundred million, so we insisted on the track record, checked very thoroughly on the people involved because that is so important--the general partners who would chose the investments and with whom Pag and his staff would have to work to track the investments. And we insisted that the general partners of the venture capital partnerships appear before the investment committee so that we could get a first-hand feel for what these fellows were trying to do, what they sounded like.

After awhile, we began to get our own feel for venture capital and our own feel for the particular niches that we thought were good. And these people quite often would come along, say in the early seventies or seventy-five, and say "We are going to concentrate on medical equipment, in communications, software programs" and that sort of thing. There arose within the venture capital community--and that is still happening--specialists and they were the ones that we sought out. We made some mistakes. There is no question about it; but, of course, the trick is not to throw good money after bad. We put, in those days, a million and a half, two million dollars and sometimes something less. I think we, at some point--and this was after Pag left-- there were too many recommendations coming to us to go into various partnerships and we went into too many, trying to put chips on too many numbers and that was not a good idea.

Looking back, it might have been better, but this is hindsight again, to concentrate on those in which we had confidence, the partnerships in which we had confidence to put more money with them and no money on these others where we didn't have the first-hand information. However, it worked out.

CARROLL: When the decision was made to invest in a certain company or to put money into a certain group, how did it work? Did you make a recommendation to the Treasurer, to Paganucci, and did he have the final say? Or how did that...

BURKE: Oh, no. The committee always had the final say. The committee always had the final say. Sometimes the trustees, the chair and others would throw ideas in to the staff because, in making their trustee rounds in their careers, they would come upon something that looked attractive and then the staff would run it down and do the homework. Or Pag, with his many connections, he had very good connections and relationships with his peers in the Ivy League and Stanford--key places like that. So, no matter where the leads came from, they were always thought out, worked upon, and the judgment and the recommendations were either discarded, or some recommendation brought to the committee, and thoroughly discussed at the committee. And, before we went in, quite often, the general partners of that particular proposed partnership appeared before us. Now there are so many that the committee doesn't work that way.

CARROLL: Did the committee have a researcher who researched these groups for you?

BURKE: Yeah. It was Pag and he usually--at that time he had one assistant at Tuck...

CARROLL: That is a lot of work to do.

BURKE: Yes. The volume wasn't what it is now, of course. But Dartmouth has always been skinny in the investment field.

CARROLL: When you were part of this committee, did you come up against the request to divest from South African holdings? Was that during this period?

BURKE: Yes. Yes. We had a special committee--the trustees had a special committee that handled that.

CARROLL: Now, as I understand it, in 1978, Dartmouth had signed the Sullivan Principles, agreeing to divest itself from companies who had significant holdings in South Africa.

BURKE: You say that's the date. I'm sure that's about it. Yeah.

CARROLL: But then, in 1984, there was an Assistant College Counsel, Thomas Castari. Do you remember?

BURKE: Yes. Yes. That name, I remember.

CARROLL: He came out and said that the College's holdings were actually not complying with the Sullivan Principles. What I am wondering--this caused, of course, the great campus flare-up that ended up with the shanty being built in the center of the green and the student protest that came about. Were you surprised by the students grasping on to this issue?

BURKE: I guess not really because they had done that at Cornell and had the same uprising...

[End of Tape 2, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 3, Side A]

CARROLL: ...the shanty protests at Dartmouth were a bit of a copycat from the Cornell protests?

BURKE: Yes. I always thought that.

CARROLL: Did that protesting on the part of the students influence your committee at all in the divestiture or speed up the process?

BURKE: Well, you are talking now about a period--because the complete divestiture came about after I went off the board. And then, I think the then chair of the investment committee, resigned as a result of that. Bob Henderson.

CARROLL: I see.

BURKE: So we are talking about a long period of time. In general, I would say that the two subjects that were discussed almost ad nauseum, with little

practical result for the enormous amount of time put into it by this special committee, by the trustees. The two subjects were Affirmative Action and, more specifically, the divestiture. It became, I would say--and I thought this as we were going through that time--a distraction, a serious distraction, really a disservice to the College because other things were shoved to the side in an attempt to maintain a certain peace and order and a "let's get through this" period. And, here again, we had a hard core of students--one fellow, the one who has written these books and was making a career for himself and is still doing it. I don't think I realized what he was doing and maybe he didn't, either. I've forgotten what his name is. He is a Pakistani or...

CARROLL: Dinesh D'Souza.

BURKE: Yes. Yes. He was making speeches from the steps of Parkhurst to a relatively small number of students and that sort of thing. That type of person, I think. There again, one who loved to throw the match on the flames, I think. And then, also, the radically conservative paper, which I haven't seen--I guess that's a blessing--for some time.

CARROLL: The Dartmouth Review.

BURKE: The Dartmouth Review was constantly, at that time, throwing lighted cans of gasoline on the fire with really unacceptable, terrible statements about minorities--and you were not at Dartmouth then maybe, but you've...

CARROLL: We were.

BURKE: You were.

CARROLL: We had just gotten there.

BURKE: And, indeed, they made a habit of that. There was a pattern in the statements that they made later on after I was off the board when Jim [James] Freedman came in of a heavy anti-Semitic tone. They were doing the same thing with the Blacks for the most part. So that was highly inflammatory. And there were other incidents around the Ivy League that maybe set some example or had some influence on some minds--minds of those who want to demonstrate. I remember one at Yale. A graduate who had a torch and he personally burned a shanty. Do you remember that at Yale?

CARROLL: I had forgotten that until you mentioned it.

BURKE: Yeah. He was an older fellow, not a Dartmouth Review type student, but an older dentist, or somebody. And he was there on a reunion in the same period of time and had a torch that was in front of the President's shanty and he ignited it. I don't know what ever happened to that. But, in any event, that's all part of the picture here. The discussions with respect to divestiture were had, I think within the trustees, in a fairly calm, friendly way. There was a determination that divestiture really should not be allowed to seriously adversely affect the College; but in fact, that was never--as I remember the portfolio in those days, it was a small percentage of the portfolio that was involved. It did--there were some numbers that showed that the averages, the S & P 500 average, did better with all of the stocks in it than it did if you pulled out those doing business in South Africa. And I guess our portfolio might have suffered a little bit from that. But there was a gradual, I think, diminution of the holdings where the companies were doing significant business in that.

CARROLL: I think it ended up being five percent of the portfolio. Less than five percent that had any connection and some of it very tangential with South African companies.

BURKE: And then, I think the final straw was put in the cocktail by Mike [Michael] Sovern, whose name I gave you before...

CARROLL: [President of] Columbia.

BURKE: At Columbia when he one day made a call to I think all the Ivy League Presidents and said, in effect, and you can check this, that in effect, "I am sick and tired or trying to run Columbia University with all this shouting and screaming, name-throwing and occupation of offices and all of that sort of thing. Columbia is going to, under my leadership, sell all of the stock where there is any, any question about it. We are going to do that. Stock and bonds. Out of it. Out of it. And we will get on with our business."

And, very shortly after that, a lot of schools--again, the time lag here you will have to check me on--and that was after I got off the board, but there must have been increasing pressure, I would think, for Dartmouth to make a similar move. And Bob [Robert] Henderson was a very astute, caring, a very astute investment manager and a very caring person. Well, I saw the letter that he wrote, as you probably have seen also, thinking that this was just the wrong course for a college to take. It should be aware of the problem and all, but that the difference in the--and, by that time, there were more numbers to statistically demonstrate the penalty that you pay. He thought that was not in the best interests of the College.

CARROLL: He eventually did divest, almost completely.

BURKE: Well, the College did. I don't know that Bob Henderson had a--I guess maybe they did and then he resigned. I don't know what it was. Yeah.

CARROLL: There seems to have been some controversy about David McLaughlin's handling of the shanty protest. The questions that seem to be debated are "did he leave the shanty up too long", "did they become too much of a drawing card"...

BURKE: Yeah.

CARROLL: Have you thought about that at all?

BURKE: Oh, yes. And I was in touch with him, as you would expect as the chair then, and Dave McLaughlin during this period was in constant negotiations with whoever the leaders of the shanty brigade were. And this is something that you are going to have to get from him, but my recollection is that it was a tough, a hard negotiation, that he was doing it himself, and that he had a date set for their removal. It was agreed upon that the College would take them down and there wouldn't be anything...and the night before, I think that's it, the Review group came in and leveled it. Now I have to also say that it did drag on to the point where maybe a week before the leveling of the shanty took place, I called Dave and said, "Dave, I don't know how your negotiations are coming, but I think you have got to put it into higher gear and do it--step up the pace--and do it much faster. You've got to get those off there. That should be the prime goal." He almost made it, but didn't.

CARROLL: And Ed [Edward] Shanahan was doing a lot of negotiation as well.

BURKE: Yes. I guess that's true. Yes.

CARROLL: He seemed to have found that to be hard going.

BURKE: Yeah. Yeah. I guess that's true.

CARROLL: I think this would be a good time to make a closure for this meeting, if that is all right. Do you have anything that you want to add about divestiture or investments at that time?

BURKE: I don't know. I may, as I think about what we have talked about today, I may have some ideas.

CARROLL: Okay.

BURKE: If we are going to meet again. I had one follow-on item with respect to John Kemeny.

CARROLL: Oh. Right.

BURKE: And I have forgotten what subject...

CARROLL: Smoking.

BURKE: Oh. Smoking. Absolutely. You've probably heard this, but--you reminded me of it when you talk about Jean still puffing away. For quite a few years, I sat next to John Kemeny. We would sit at a long table. He would sit in the center and the chair would sit opposite, so as you achieve some seniority, you got up closer to both of those dignitaries. So, for a couple of years, I was right next to John Kemeny and our meetings started at nine o'clock, I guess. I used to know all of the names of the girls, the women, who worked up there, but one of them, prior to every trustee session, would come in with an enormous round ashtray. [Laughter] I mean this size--and would place it right next to John Kemeny. And then, on her second trip, she would come back with either three or four packs of cigarettes with these little white cigarette holders--a couple of those. And that was it. During the course of the meetings, from nine to twelve or one, depending on how long we had to go, the ashtray filled up with cigarettes. The packs went down and one was lighted from the other, with the holder. He would take that out and put the other one in.

CARROLL: You must have had a lot of second-hand smoke on that one.

BURKE: Yes. I didn't realize how dangerous--what danger I was in.

END OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW: Walter Burke, Class of '44

INTERVIEWED BY: Jane Carroll

PLACE: Greenwich, Connecticut

DATE: August 27, 1996

JANE CARROLL: Today is August 27, 1996 and I am speaking with Walter Burke for the second time in his office in Greenwich, Connecticut.

We have decided that we are going to start the second interview discussing the issue of divestiture, which dominated so much of the 1980's. Now you were on the committee, the Trustees' Investment Committee, as well as being the head of the Board of Trustees. When do you remember first being confronted with the issue of divestiture?

WALTER BURKE: May I back up?

CARROLL: Sure. Absolutely.

BURKE: A moment because in your introduction that I heard the first time, it was divestiture; the second matter was divestiture and the shanties.

CARROLL: Yes.

BURKE: Divestiture certainly is a very broad subject and the shanties being probably the most dramatic demonstration of the feelings of some and it was an important issue for the country and for the college, but I would not want anyone to believe that the issue dominated the College to the point where it was paralyzed to do anything else. I don't think that was at all true. The trustees, the officers and, indeed, the faculty spent an enormous amount of time and, looking back on it probably much too much time, in taking a longer term view and the best interests of the College. Certainly, I feel that way about the trustees' sessions where this...I would say to get back to answering your question, that it seems to me...let's see, I went on the board in '76. Your chronological recap here does not go that far back, but it does seem to me that, from the very beginning of my service, there were rumblings, if we can call them that, that had to do with South Africa. And, of course there became, in incremental fashion, increasing rumblings as the years went by.

CARROLL: What kind of holdings did the College have in companies that were invested in South Africa?

BURKE: Well, the College has a pretty standard portfolio at that time. I am sure that might be available to you. It would be something good to look at. It was nowhere near as diverse as it is today. It had holdings that were then fairly easily separated between stocks and bonds. Most of the stocks...not all of them, most of the stocks were in large, well-known companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. There were many fewer investment managers working for the College. Actually, in 1976 when I went on the board, the College only had one, believe it or not. One investment manager, Colonial Management in Boston and John Meck, who was Paul Paganucci's predecessor, had worked with them. At that particular junction, as I look back on it now, was a time when there was considerable and important change going on in the field of investments, institutional investments, and the advisors who would work for them. Very shortly, Dartmouth dismissed Colonial and brought in some other, more than one, investment advisors for both the stocks and the bonds.

Of course, we must keep in mind in '76, the portfolio or the endowment was considerably smaller than it is. If it is a billion dollars now and it was maybe a couple of hundred then. I am just making a wild guess. But they were basic. Everybody would know most of the names of the stocks in the companies. You would know what their products were. So that there was not the holdings such as we have, as the investment portfolio now has, of many so-called smaller, much smaller, companies that, for the most part, no one has ever heard of. So that is a long-winded answer to saying that they were the then standard, large capitalized capitalization companies and the same thing for the bond part of the portfolio. My recollection is that they were bonds issued by the large corporate entities or the governmental entities, the U.S. Treasury's, like that.

CARROLL: How difficult was it to discover in these holdings which companies had connection with South Africa?

BURKE: It became less and less. It was difficult to begin with, as I recall, but it became less and less because there were services, I.R.R. [?], or some such. I didn't see that in your rehash, but this was a group that came out of, I think, one of the Ivy schools. And they offered their services for profit to examine the companies and what the extent of that particular...any company's presence in South Africa

and the institutional responsibility or some such name as that. So it became less and less difficult.

CARROLL: When the trustees were first confronted or continued to confront this idea of divestiture, was there debate among them as to whether this was a good idea for the College?

BURKE: Debate may be too strong a word to begin with. There was discussion and we must remember that the Trustees of Dartmouth College have several responsibilities, which they are held to fulfill in the best and most prudent manner. One of them is the management of the endowment, of the portfolio, under whatever the applicable laws. That the investments must be made in a prudent fashion, taking into consideration all of the factors that are involved including, of course, the many cases that have spoken to what the trustees are allowed to do and what they should not do. And some of the state legislatures define acceptable investments for colleges and universities and others are not acceptable and, if those are not adhered to, the trustees, themselves, might be, could be and, in some instances, it seems to me, have been liable for wandering from that path.

And that became more and more of an issue and I think it was really the issue that disturbed Trustee [Robert "Bob"] Henderson, Bob Henderson. I was not on the board when he resigned, but he resigned from the Investment Committee, I believe that's what he did. And you are going to be talking with him, or have, but I think his principle thrust was that the trustees were no longer--if there was complete divestment, the trustees were no longer adhering to the investment standards--the traditional investment standards--and the standards that were in the best long-term interest of the College. Meaning that the College endowment would suffer. It would no longer get the income that it should be getting and, even more certainly, would not get the appreciation in its investments. And there were numbers to back that up. The investment benchmarks that were used...the S & P [Standard and Poors] 500, Dow Jones, and other indices, but mostly, I'd say the S & P 500. That came to be calculated in two ways. It was the standard calculation that had come out for years and then there was the South Africa-free version. Are you familiar with that?

CARROLL: I know Standard and Poors. I did not realize that they had done that.

- BURKE: The S & P 500 and the results, the performance results, were broken out so that quite often you saw what the performance of the standard index would be and then they gave you the South Africa-- if you eliminated those companies doing business in South Africa-- and that indicated almost invariably, as I recall, that the return was less if you took those companies out.
- CARROLL: Mr. Henderson made a statement at one point about the trustees' responsibility for the financial security of the college and I assume that's what he was talking about at that point. When were the Sullivan Principles introduced and read and understood among the trustees?
- BURKE: I would just be guessing. You don't have that...you don't have available to you the Trustees' minutes?
- CARROLL: No.
- BURKE: No. So if I came on in '76, I would say that it was maybe early '80's, something like that.
- CARROLL: At that point, was there a unanimity or was there a feeling among the trustees that these were principles one should adhere to or attempt to adhere to as much as one could?
- BURKE: I think there probably was, particularly amongst the five that these principles made sense, were fair all the way around. Yes.
- CARROLL: So that one needed then to start divesting and what I am curious is, how does one go about divesting and how do the stocks as opposed to bonds come into play, etc.?
- BURKE: Well, one goes about divesting by just telling the investment advisor; say, Dartmouth had an investment advisor that had fifty stocks in the account and the Dartmouth College Investment Office would know that three or four of those were still doing business in South Africa and didn't meet the Sullivan Principles or for some other reason should be divested. They just told the investment advisor to sell those and not to buy any more. That's really what it came down to. Not to buy any more that did not observe the Sullivan Principles. They would just sell the stock, is the answer to your question and the same thing for the bonds as well.
- CARROLL: And the bonds, as well.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Then you had this pot of money that needed to be invested in something that was acceptable.

BURKE: Yes. Yes. And I don't think that it was a difficult thing to do--to find another place to put the money. The question always is "What's the return going to be?" Are you going to get a lesser return in your second choice as to where you put the money? And that's always a very difficult call. For the most part, there were two categories in which I think a lot of people on the investment committee, at least while I was on there, thought that the College would suffer. One, that the large CAP companies, names known to everybody had an international, global presence. Coca-Cola sells everywhere and many other companies like that...IBM. Invariably, those companies in those years were expanding, were very profitable, had been very good investments and, in most cases, they also were active in South Africa. Many of them were active in a very compassionate, helpful, caring way in South Africa; but they were there. But that was one group that, to completely divest, would have shut Dartmouth out on that group. And as a sub-set of that group were the oil companies who, just by definition, operate on an international, global basis. And, to remove that category from a portfolio was a serious step to take because traditionally the oils had been very good stocks for colleges, in general, to have in their portfolio. They had down periods; but, taking the longer view, they were a place where every institution should have some of its money. So those are two examples.

CARROLL: In coming to a decision whether this was the right thing to do--to divest--what role did the pressure that was being put on the trustees by the students and the faculty play in that decision?

BURKE: It obviously played some role for the simple reason, well, for many reasons. One, they were sincere statements from caring people and constituents of the College and they should be listened to, and listened to carefully. On the other hand, that stream of thought and, at some time noise, was not nor should it ever have been allowed to take over and really single-handedly push and move the trustee decision process. And that never did happen. That would, I think, be an abdication of the trustees' responsibility and I don't believe that was done while I was on the board. But then, again, the last

couple of years, when I was off and the committee decided to completely divest, you will have to get that story from them.

CARROLL: How aware were you of the shanties and the problems that were surrounding the campus at that point?

BURKE: Well, I was very aware, very aware of them. Just as your chronological summary of some of the events...you must have gotten that out of the Daily D and some of the other...yes. Some of this is sort of oriented to the sensational events of the time...at least for the moment...sensational events. But it would be impossible not to be aware of those.

But I think the trustees were also aware that this was a combination faculty-student movement that was going on all around the country. We had to do our best for Dartmouth to see that it didn't create utter havoc and disaster. And I think we did that, although, with the unannounced and uncontrollable intervention of what I guess we could call the Dartmouth Review group. It was very difficult because the College and its administration were always on the defensive against a group like that. As our country is now, this is not a great analogy, but against terrorists; it is very, very difficult to anticipate what a group like that is going to do next and also difficult to reason and negotiate with them.

CARROLL: A lot of criticism was leveled at David McLaughlin for allowing the shanties to stand too long.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Do you remember that period?

BURKE: Yes. I remember that because I talked with David McLaughlin frequently during that time and he outlined to me the various steps that he was taking to talk to the student groups, to the student/faculty groups, to, as I remember, if we could separate them out, the Dartmouth Review groups--with the idea of bringing about reasonable discussions and particularly a peaceful removal of the shanties. He worked very, very hard...as the President should. One of the questions I had to decide was how strong a role should the Chairman of the Board play in that. Should he take off the gloves and pitch in with the President, or separately from the President attempt to do something? My conclusion there was that I should not dive in as a trustee, as the chair of the trustees, but I

should stay in constant touch with Dave McLaughlin and, was it [Edward "Ed"] Shanahan?

CARROLL: Edward Shanahan.

BURKE: Yes. To make sure that they were doing what, at least I, as one trustee, thought they should be doing. Every effort to remove the thorn that the shanties had become, and it did...I obviously thought that they were doing the best job that they could in reaching out and offering solutions and negotiating; but, the process took too long. I mean, the final judgment, here again, was passed by the people who came in and tore down. In their minds, it took too long. So we're all sort of saddled with that judgment that it took too long. And, to some extent, it did, but that's the way that it turned out.

CARROLL: At the end, when divestiture was completed...I know that you were not on the board at that point...but, I know that you kept in contact, and I am wondering, do you think that the holdings suffered at all because of that decision?

BURKE: You must remember that, for good reasons or not, I was retained on the Investment Committee and have been on it...I'm sort of the Cal Ripken of the Investment Committee... Yes. There were times when the evidence meant that performance indicated that making the portfolio for the most part South Africa free or, then later on, completely free, did hurt the performance. But I cannot give you the statistics, but I think someone like Bob Henderson probably could. I don't say that the difference was fatal, but every half of a percent of performance on the negative side over the long term compounded can be very significant.

CARROLL: I want to get away from the facts and ask something that for me is just from a point of curiosity...

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: When you are dealing with something like investing in South Africa, what goes through your mind as you are trying to weigh on one side the financial security of an institution and, on another, the moral stance that one wishes to take in the world?

BURKE: Well, I think both those...what you do, I think, is try to strike a balance between the two. The loudest forces were devoting most of their energies to the cause of South Africa, assuming in deed

that there was an answer and that this course of action would help augment that answer. That remains open even today. But I think you do attempt to strike a balance and the Sullivan Principles and the adherence to those probably is a prime example of that balance.

CARROLL: When you had been given the mandate not to invest in South Africa any more, did that change all the kinds of things that you invested in or what you looked at?

BURKE: Yes, of course it did because the investment advisors had to avoid the stocks that our investment office said they could not buy.

CARROLL: Did you then...I guess what I am asking is so many of the multi-national companies seem to have been forbidden at that point.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Did you look into smaller companies? Did the investments change or shift away from blue chip stocks?

BURKE: It did, but I am not sure as a result of this. It did because that was the thing to do. I had been in venture capital since 1965. Paul Paganucci became aware of it when he was at Tuck School and had one of the founding partners of the Greylock Group venture capital partnership that was founded in '65. He had come to Tuck with one fellow that I remember. So that was a trend and had a much more lasting and beneficial effect on the College and its portfolio than any other thing that we have been talking about here this morning.

CARROLL: To shift just a tad from this. In reading David McLaughlin's reports to the trustees, he seems to feel that one of the reasons for the unrest on campus during this period was what he called the diversity on campus, the change where it pits 'old Dartmouth' against 'new Dartmouth', as he phrased it. New Dartmouth being the presence of women, the presence of...a strong presence of minorities and that these people he sees as having a more radical agenda than the old Dartmouth people. Do you think that's a fair assessment?

BURKE: I'm not quite clear. Who is the radical here?

CARROLL: I'm reading from the McLaughlin notes. "The radical is the new Dartmouth element." And he says how difficult it was to incorporate into Dartmouth women, Blacks, Native Americans, etc.

BURKE: Well, I don't know that I would use the word "radical" for either one of those groups. There were fringe elements in both groups that felt extremely strong about the issues, but I think that was a very small minority. For the most part, the young women who came to Dartmouth, starting in '72 I guess and began to graduate in '76, which is when I came on, did have a splendid experience. I think there is great testimony to that effect. And, as John Kemeny predicted, their very presence and arrival improved the academic record and statistics for each of the entering classes from that period on. So that was a very intelligent, really stable, group.

And there may have been some...and there were many reasons why there should be things called to the attention...things to be done whether it was athletic, equal athletic facilities, courses or what have you...that were not done as promptly as they should have been done. That's all very true, but I never felt there was any radical feeling by them. The Afro-American group, certainly, for the most part, was a good solid group. Also as were the Native Americas, at least with my experience. I never had the feeling that they were going around with torches, ready to set fire to everything. There again, I think, what I am talking to is the fact that the College went along...

[End of Tape 4, Side A – Beginning of Tape 4, Side B]

BURKE: ...in a solid manner and, to some extent, some of these activities although important at the time and the voice is quite strident, were on the fringe of the life of the College. Let's see, you had mentioned the arrival of women, the Afro-American. What was the other?

CARROLL: The Native American.

BURKE: The Native American. Well, I've already commented on that. I don't see them as rebellious. On the other side, you had some, I guess for the most part, not all ancient, alumns. Some of them were still in their late forties and going from there on, but for the most part, they were in the older classes who felt very, very strongly

about the ratio of men to women, for one thing. Every year there was a discussion that the trustees and the admissions office would engage in and I think, my impression looking back on that is that, over the years, that was handled pretty well. Quite well. Maybe most of the salutes should go to those in the admissions office and the way that they handled the applicant pool in a natural, but incremental fashion, increasing the female numbers. As we went along, some of the alumni shuddering and shaking and quivering each time, there were more women admitted because that meant that...this was their translation...that there were fewer football players. Whether that was actually true, I think that has been worked out. It has been worked out across the Ivy League...a splendid Ivy League-wide athletic program, the best in the country, the best in the world...has evolved from all of that.

I never saw, really, that so much as...enough to characterize the alumni as radical. Indeed, I think there was always a feeling, and this may make some of the trustees including myself, sound like a philosopher without credentials that time indeed would heal a good deal of that. And the number of stories that have come down about older alumni having a change of heart and a change of position once they had a granddaughter in the Dartmouth ranks. You have heard of those. It didn't take any great insight to realize that that would happen and those people who were writing letters and saying, "I'm cutting off. I won't give any more money to this and to the College. I'm going to start a fund and everybody will send their money to me and I will see the College spends it properly." And the big effort there, of course, was at Princeton where they actually had people with some significant career reputations formed, what is it? The Concerned Alumni of Princeton? Are you familiar with that?

CARROLL: No. I have not...

BURKE: That came along about this time. They made quite a large effort to detour funds coming into Princeton University to their particular center of activity. "Send it to us, C.A.P. and we will spend it. We know how to spend it better than the present college authorities." That never got off the ground at Dartmouth. One of the reasons it never got off the ground is that the people who wrote those letters saying that they were cutting off their giving weren't giving very much anyway.

CARROLL: Do you know...I've always wondered. As you read these letters, did the gifts to Dartmouth dip at all after coeducation?

BURKE: Well, you mean post '72.

CARROLL: Post '72.

BURKE: I am inclined to think they did not, but I would have to bow to the actual numbers. I think they might have leveled off but... And there probably were one or two significant givers who were turned off for awhile and I can think of a couple right now. But they came back to make enormous...really, by my standards and yours and the College's...gifts to the College. So, if there was any decline or leveling...there never should be a leveling, obviously...it was temporary.

CARROLL: In '79, the trustees, along with admissions, made a decision for sex-blind admissions. Do you remember any of the debates surrounding that decision?

BURKE: Well, I remember it. Sex-blind was one of those steps that was taken on a gradual basis. It had the effect of increasing the number of women admitted, and I think that was done after the full discussion really adopting the same train of thought as to need-blind, the same type of thing that leads you to that. Need-blind happens to be much more expensive than sex-blind. That was not a heated matter. I think that came along and was recognized as really a sensible thing to do.

CARROLL: Now, you worked on the Committee of Educational Affairs. Do you remember that?

BURKE: Yes. Yes, I do.

CARROLL: What was the mandate for that committee?

BURKE: I was never the chair of that committee, nor should I have been particularly. It was, as I remember it now, to see that Dartmouth College not only retains its educational standards, but is constantly making an effort to improve it. To improve the caliber and quality of the students as they come in, to make sure that there is a minimum of dead wood. This maybe too practical and functional a response, but nevertheless, there is no dead wood in the faculty. You can never guarantee that 100%, but you can help keep the number down.

Also, I think to evaluate Dartmouth against its competition to help define the role that Dartmouth has in undergraduate education; what its competition, is doing there; what, if anything, and there is always something that Dartmouth can learn from the competition. And then, to a lesser extent, to--and this is something that came up in somewhat increasing fashion--to review the graduate degree program at the College. It has always been very small. Should it be that small or should the present programs be expanded? Should there be more programs? And, of course, that goes on, as you well know, in the faculty now. I think that was generally the...and, of course, that involved reviewing an awful lot of things and there was great overlap between this education committee and many others. Just the dormitories, the study areas in the dormitories, which were improved enormously under Dave McLaughlin...to have a quiet, comfortable place with some peace, quiet and even a touch of dignity without the distractions.

CARROLL: This was the time of so many interdepartmental areas of concentration. I am thinking of Women's Studies and African-American Studies and Native American Studies, which all sort of corresponded to the new diversity on campus.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Was that discussed at all as whether it was, first of all, worth the money and was getting the right kind of leadership?

BURKE: Yes. It was discussed, but I think here that discussion at the trustee level took off from a very important point and that was the conviction...well, the hard work, the homework and the conviction on these subjects that John Kemeny developed.

CARROLL: And that was?

BURKE: Native American and he was in one of the commencement speeches or one of his speeches, he pointed out how ridiculous it was that the charter mentioned Native Americans and I don't think there was any in the undergraduate body at that time. That they should make an effort and the splendid Native American program results from that. So I think you have to keep in mind that something that John Kemeny put on the table from the word "go" with his strong endorsement would [engender] discussion. But I don't recall that there was really heated opposition to any of the programs that you mention. The faculty obviously worked very

closely; the Dean, the Provost and the President and the faculty committees, as I recall, worked very closely with some of the students who felt very strongly about the Afro-American Studies program, the Women Studies. Mary Kelley is one.

CARROLL: Brenda Silver, probably.

BURKE: Yes. I guess so although that name doesn't ring a bell. I, for one, would be very interested to know what there is in the curriculum at Dartmouth now that was begun...I am sure there were several things begun and some probably discarded, others enhanced and now form a genuine asset for the College curricula. There was discussion, but on each of these, because they came out of a different background and had different sponsorship, the discussion was somewhat of a different nature.

CARROLL: Each one of those took a difference in the road to try to establish themselves and I think probably, when I look at this, the most successful was the Native American...

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: ...because they had the good fortune to hire Michael Dorris.

BURKE: Michael Dorris.

CARROLL: When you met him, were you at all involved in the setting up of the department and in his hiring?

BURKE: I remember seeing and hearing him from the very beginning and right off I think he struck most of us, all of us, as a genuine find, a gem to bring into this program and it certainly worked out that way. On the other hand, the Afro-Am, [William "Bill] Cook was playing a significant role. I think maybe most of it informal, but it doesn't make any difference whether formal or informal and he is a great fellow and has made enormous contributions to the College and he was a splendid presence and factor here. But I think one of the things...there were disappointments. There is no question about that, that things were not working out. One, just the absolute numbers were disappointing of those who came and the additional efforts, such as setting money aside each year to bring the best of the Black applicants to the College to see the campus and I think that was a successful program. Successful would be defined as

getting one or two more Blacks who would not otherwise have come to the College. So that was a plus and a good effort.

One of the disappointments and it is certainly nation-wide and it is still in the press, was the fact that there never...the College never seemed to be able, nor did the Afro-Ams, have much taste for it, I gather, to move out from their own particular houses or dormitories. I remember the trustees made a visit to the one across from the chemistry lab, whatever house that was [Cutter Hall]--I have forgotten the name of it. It was 100% Black. We had a very nice meeting there, but we came away with the obvious conclusion that it was just too bad that there wasn't a greater mixing of the groups. But it was difficult and still is.

CARROLL: And still is.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: With the arrival of these different and diverse groups on campus, it is almost inevitable that there is going to need to be different course offerings. Was that understood when the decision was made to open up the enrollment?

BURKE: I am not sure that I was on-hand for that because those discussions must have started before the co-ed decision was made, so they must have started when John Kemeny came into office. I am sure that they were discussed and that the Dartmouth Plan was, as you well know, for year-around operation was conceived to make use, basically to make greater use, of the College facilities on a year-around basis and not have to build more dormitories and classrooms. And, as it turned out, we had to do both, but that's all right. That was a good happening. The extent to which the curriculum would be changed, and over the years has been changed, I don't know how much of that had been anticipated.

I've recently seen at Columbia where I am an emeritus trustee. And probably you have read in the papers that they, Columbia, the black students have recently, meaning this spring, mounted a demonstration and some fasting on the campus in tents. I hesitate to use the word "shanties". But all of that, with the strong demand and request for more ethical studies. Ethical Studies, I believe, they wanted to have a separate department. Certainly many more courses, but a separate department, a separate head and all of that. I guess the message we get is that it is still going on. The

faculty at Columbia was much involved in this and the faculty took, in my opinion, a strong and sensible point of view that, "Yes, as time goes by, there should be more, but the time is not right for a separate department and the courses still must meet the test of passing the faculty committees and all the other tests." And that was pretty much the way that it was settled, if you can use "settled" as a word. I put some of that under the category that it was springtime and those things happen.

CARROLL: That's right. In 1984, the trustees once again considered the presence of R.O.T.C. on campus.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: They had had, as I understand it, some sort of informal relationship with Norwich University.

BURKE: Norwich. Yes. A few boys, a handful of boys, went over. I don't know how many. Six? Ten? Something like that and they would do the R.O.T.C. training. This was a matter that Dave McLaughlin felt very strongly about and I felt was very convincing. He made his way through Dartmouth College and became a Phi Beta Kappa, football star and all of that, as he says, with the sponsorship of the Army, the military forces, that R.O.T.C. program. And the thought was that it should be available to the students now. There was no pressure to be applied in the recruiting, they set certain standards and many, many things that the recruiters could not do and all that. Dave McLaughlin and several other alumni, and I think trustees who had benefited--and some who had not benefited such as myself (I didn't need that assistance going through), thought that it should be one of the items offered.

And thought also that it would be good to have Dartmouth students in our military which provides a vital function, not only for this country, but in increasingly global fashion as it has turned out over the years, that Dartmouth should have a presence there. So it was done. I guess I am a little vague now as to the reaction, but these years later, I don't think it was really a volcanic eruption when this went in.

CARROLL: No, it wasn't. Although, what is interesting is that David McLaughlin put it before the faculty, I believe, that this was the proposal. The

faculty, in a meeting, voted it down and then he put it on campus, anyway.

BURKE: I see. I had forgotten that.

CARROLL: Which...I don't want this to be my interview...but, as I read that, it also was one of those distancing elements that began the division between...

BURKE: Yes. That probably was and I remember talking to him, now that you refresh my recollection about the faculty vote, I remember talking to an educator, much respected woman, former president of a college and very active on the grant-making side. And her comment to me was that Dave McLaughlin had better be careful here because every president only has a few cards to play with the faculty and he may be playing one or two in this instance.

CARROLL: It was shortly after that that the faculty, I think it was in conjunction both with the R.O.T.C. and the shanties, that the faculty wished to put before themselves a vote of 'no confidence' for David McLaughlin. Do you remember that incident?

BURKE: Well, I remember that that was suggested. Yes, I do. It was at some point there where a couple of the trustees, myself included, attended a faculty meeting. Yes. They did not vote 'no confidence'. There was a lot of speech making and, at times, during that meeting, I thought the faculty was, I must say, trying to micro-manage the College and certainly the trustees. "Do you do this?" "Do you review?" "What about the salaries and the level of quality of the people?" And all of that. It indicated that, well, on the part of the speakers, it indicated little confidence in Dave McLaughlin. But the question, the obvious question, was whether that really was the faculty's province to dig into--into the College in those areas and in that detail.

CARROLL: When did the trustees become aware that David McLaughlin had lost the confidence of his faculty?

BURKE: Well, let's see. I left the board in...

CARROLL: In '86.

BURKE: In '86. I would say that it was late in...and this doesn't happen as you know on any one day or a weekend or anything like that. It's a

gathering feeling, which is the way the world works anyway. Things grow upon you. I think that started probably six or nine months before I got off the board. And it just wasn't the faculty. That was probably the most visible and loudest demonstration, but the trustees also had other avenues of observation and other tasks that were done or were not done. I guess there were certain benchmarks and I think all of that came together so that in late '85 or early '86, there were discussions that we had better watch this very closely--that we cannot have much more deterioration. Deterioration is too strong a word. But more of these signs that are susceptible to being read as being really unsatisfactory.

CARROLL: Somebody in his administration called it the 'unraveling'. I think it is a good term because it means that it starts as a little pull and it just comes apart. Just like that.

BURKE: But that question, of course...Sandy [Norman E., Jr.] McCulloch, whom you have on your list (if you haven't already talked to him), he will tell you that he and I had discussions on that subject.

CARROLL: Did you talk with David McLaughlin?

BURKE: When I was the chair, I had some discussions with Dave on some points. The shanties being one that we have already talked about. I never had any discussion with Dave McLaughlin suggesting that I thought he should step down, if that's your question. No. I did not. I thought, at the time, that, if it had to be done, it had to be done in a measured way and not in a precipitous fashion. I think Sandy McCulloch and I talked about that and there was an obvious time for that to happen. I think Sandy chose it and did what he had to do.

CARROLL: I've always wondered when I read about the unraveling, was David McLaughlin aware of just how bad it had become? Was he upset about this? He seems so calm in his pronouncements throughout the whole presidency.

BURKE: Yes. I really don't know whether he was or not. I doubt that he was, to the full extent because we did have some board discussions when he was excused. They covered all the waterfront, all the possibilities, and he certainly was not aware of that.

CARROLL: The other point that seems to have riled the faculty was the decision to move the hospital. Do you remember that meeting?

BURKE: Yes. Yes.

CARROLL: What are your recollections of the meeting with the faculty? Where you and David McLaughlin presented the ideas about the hospital to them?

BURKE: Yes. Now that involved the moving of the Clinic and the Hospital and, eventually, the moving of the Medical School. I think, as part of the same package, the purchase by the College of the 20, 22 acres, whatever it is...in other words, the old hospital property. That [proposal] involved all of that.

CARROLL: That's right.

BURKE: I think I mentioned, maybe in passing, we didn't zero in on it at that time, that that, to me, was an obvious good, right, must move to make. I thought that at the time. So did Paul Paganucci. So did Dave. In the best, long-term interest, that or something like that, had to be done and it seemed like the pieces fell together there. The fact that Pag...I'm just going to get a glass of water here. Would you like anything at this...

[End of Tape 4, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 5, Side A]

CARROLL: The purchase of the Hospital was such a good decision for the University.

BURKE: It was a good decision because, at this particular time, a lot of the factors involved with respect to the Medical School, the Clinic, the Hospital, the availability of a decent-sized, a good-sized piece of property, which Paul Paganucci had arranged to purchase and which the Investment Committee spent, I think, about two million dollars to buy a couple of thousand acres. The reasons why it was good are many, it seems to me. For one, the relationships between the College, the Medical School, the Hospital and the Clinic had been improving over the years. There had been something... I was never directly involved with the Medical School...

but over the first several years I was on the board, those relationships were less than ideal. I don't think there is any question about that and part of the irritant there was the fact that the Medical School was always operating at a deficit and there had to be a subvention provided by the College. There was, as we heard it from the Dean of the Medical School, outstanding Dean...[Dean Carleton Chapman, Dartmouth Medical School]...Chapman, I think his name was...and an obvious and convincing set of arguments that the Medical School really needed much improved facilities and would need more land and everything, I think, that goes with it. So that the Dean of the Medical School was a vigorous proponent of this entire complex project that was undertaken.

There was, as I recall, upon the part of the medical officers, the doctors involved in the Hospital and the Clinic, a strong conviction that they were working with and the Town of Hanover and the region had a quick, a fast-becoming-outdated fortress. Inadequate hospital facilities, and the word 'fortress' was used quite often inferring, which was indeed the truth, that it was very difficult, impossible, to renovate that building. And that was proved by all sorts of engineering studies and, as we all know, was imploded not too long after.

Also, from the Town of Hanover's point of view and the College's point of view, the traffic on Main Street, Wheelock, coming across the Ledyard Bridge--however you want to slice the traffic problem--a lot of it was attributed at that time to the fact that the Hospital and the Clinic employed...it was either three or four thousand [people]. And they were by far larger than the College with people and the parking and the buses and all of that sort of thing. Then, also, there were the limitations on the expansion of the College and the expansion of the Hospital complex there...limitations placed... [Interruption] I was talking about the advantages to the Town of Hanover by way of reducing the traffic. And also, I think, advantages that the town fathers, the governing bodies including the zoning people, saw in that, brought about by the restrictions that had been placed on the expansion of the College. And I am not going to be able to recall any of these, but there were instances when the College went to the town to expand here or there, put a new building, larger building and it became increasingly clear that the town fathers were not really receptive to that sort of thing.

So the expansion of the College was a particular factor. What this did on that point, as we all have seen and, frankly, was easy to anticipate, was to allow the measured, measured maybe could be defined in terms of forty, fifty years--the measured northward expansion of the campus. And there have been several, two or three, plans put forth...it's a little early in the process yet, but that's the sort of thing. The objections, as I think about it, which were voiced in a very reasonable fashion...I would say in my mind, there was none of the, at sometimes, high rage that was present in some of the student demonstrations on divestiture. And the students, some of them, were involved in this and some in a fairly impolite way, I remember. But I am sure that was just a handful of the students.

CARROLL: What were their objections?

BURKE: I am trying now and am having a difficult time. The objections, I think they were fanned, for the most part, the students were fanned by the faculty feeling about this. There was a feeling with respect to the faculty...I am now talking about the Faculty of Arts and Sciences...not the Medical School. I think the Hospital complex including the Medical School spoke pretty much with one voice on this, but there was objection within the faculty in the Arts and Sciences, the undergraduate faculty. One that I can think of was that you were going to be divorcing. If you move, particularly if you move the Medical School, you are going to move it from the Biology, the Biological Sciences that are situated near the Medical School. And, even then, chemistry was becoming more and more important. This was a dream in somebody's eye to expand and improve the chemistry facilities and that still is in the works. And that it's going to be very impractical to have the Medical School two miles out on Route 120. That was one of the objections as I recall. The Medical School, of course, has not yet been moved, although it is closer. I'm not up to the minute on that, but I gather it is becoming closer and closer.

CARROLL: The library, I believe that was one of the problems, as well.

BURKE: The Library?

CARROLL: Dana Bio-Medical Library. Where was it going to be and would students have access to it?

BURKE: I see. I don't recall that. I guess it's obvious from what I am developing here that the opposition points didn't register all that much with me. Oh. I do know another one though and this is a standard objection and always has to be considered in detail. And that is that you are spending a lot of money, Dartmouth College, you are spending twenty-five million dollars to buy this twenty-two acres and look what you could do academically with the present campus, and even athletic facilities with a sum like that. That is true. It happens that most of the things, a lot of the things that were pointed to that we should be doing had been done anyway. So it was a little, to me, the voices of opposition could be lumped under the heading of "Oh, ye of little faith."

CARROLL: This is also October of 1985 and getting back to your friend's point of there are only so many cards to play, I think there was less than total faith on the part of the faculty toward anything David McLaughlin might have put in front of them at that time.

BURKE: Well, I don't know. Each faculty member would have to judge that. I think there was enormous confidence in the faculty in Paul Paganucci and when he stood up and made a detailed presentation saying, in effect, he was terminating...not due to this...he was taking a job elsewhere. He was leaving after this, but one thing that he wanted to see passed was this, for all these reasons.

CARROLL: If you read the minutes in October of 1985, you see the tenor of things seemed to change after his statement. That's not surprising. You gave a statement, as well.

BURKE: Yes, but mine was more of a summary-type thing. Dave and Pag really handled that. But I remember that we had any number of sessions--one on one, two on two with faculty members, with the dean or the dean joining a couple of administrators, talking with faculty about this--in an attempt to explain the advantages. The more I think about it, it seems to me that we did hear an awful lot about the cost of this. Twenty-five million dollars which, I imagine eight years ago was probably a larger sum than most people deem it to be now. There it was.

CARROLL: The other thing that comes up in the faculty meeting minutes is that they had a window of opportunity that was less than, I guess, two months to decide whether they were going to give this a vote of confidence and, as I understand it and maybe I haven't gotten it quite right, is the reason for such a short an amount of time is that

on December 31st, there was going to be...tax exempt bonds would be made unavailable for this kind of project.

BURKE: They were going to change the rules?

CARROLL: Yes. Does that ring a bell?

BURKE: Very vague. There again, Pag would know. I think there was something which, in retrospect, turns out to be a blessing to have a deadline that everybody can see is right up there. If you want to do it, this is by far the most favorable way to do it. Borrowing rates. That's really what they are talking about. Borrowing rates are the best that you are going to get and you'd better step up.

CARROLL: It seemed to have worked.

BURKE: Yeah.

CARROLL: It certainly put their minds to it. Now, this is switching gears just a bit because, in 1985, the same year, you were made the Chair of the Board of Trustees.

BURKE: No. I was made the Chair before then, I think.

CARROLL: You were the Chair. I am sorry. That's right because you would have had the five years. Is that right?

BURKE: Three years.

CARROLL: Three years. So, it was '83. In April of that year, of '85, the trustees issued their reports on fraternities and sororities. What had prompted that report to be written? Do you remember?

BURKE: Well, that's one, you know, long series of reports, discussions, debates. At Dartmouth College, it has been going on at several levels. The role of the fraternities...I know in your time in Hanover, you have heard a lot of that. There came on the board during the ten years that I was on it, and I guess maybe particularly the last five, an increasing dissatisfaction on the board with the fraternities, the role that they were playing and the way that they handled themselves. Other colleges had made efforts, not always awfully successful, to eliminate fraternities. That was discussed, but that never really got off the ground. It never seemed at Dartmouth a viable alternative. If you ask me to make a prediction, I would think,

at one time, that is the solution. Some time, that is the solution, but the timing was not right. The leadership was not there. You can say by the trustees or by the College. The trustees have never stepped up to that extent. Short of that then is this growing determination to improve what we've got and that report, which I had no great detailed memory about, I am sure, came out of that background.

CARROLL: Why do you think the fraternities play such an important role at Dartmouth?

BURKE: One of the reasons why someone like John Kemeny, who certainly had the stature. He's...maybe of the people that go through my mind over this period, he is the one who could have done it. He always put considerable weight on the fact that the fraternities supplied something like four hundred beds and, keeping his administrator hat on maybe too tightly, he didn't see how we were going to face up to filling in those four hundred beds with either off-campus housing, expensive new dormitories. Since, of course, there have been quite a few new dormitories added, so I don't know how valid that argument is now. But it was the fact that four hundred beds was a large percentage of the bed population and that carried a lot of weight in John Kemeny's mind. Not that he didn't want to, on the other hand, improve and enhance and regulate more. But it is a continuing problem, I guess, and there are still quite a few young male graduates, I don't know the exact numbers, but I do happen to have one in my wife's family. He is the Class of '92, who is gung-ho for his fraternity and, when he goes back to Hanover as he has done frequently, he visits the fraternity. He goes to the fraternity. That's his return address.

CARROLL: So, it's a social institution.

BURKE: I guess so. Social, macho...I don't know. Maybe I am putting the fraternities in a poor light and I guess there has been some improvement, but that report, plus others, plus the efforts by the dean of students and residential housing and whatever else, whatever other officers. There is always an on-going effort. If you are asking my opinion, the College could do a much better job. We should have done a much better job. Then, we can still, as I am just examining Webster Avenue. It's not good for an institution with the quality of Dartmouth for the people and the visitors that we have. It is just not a good atmosphere for the students, themselves,

not to have to pick up and maintain a certain degree of orderliness. It's just not good.

CARROLL: Kemeny began a process of buying up some of the actual houses, since the College owns them, thinking that would help control this.

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: But that seems to have been stopped at some point. Was that because the fraternities were unwilling to sell or was that a decision made for some other reason.

BURKE: Perhaps a little of both. I really don't know. I know there were negotiations with several of the fraternal orders and some of them came to fruition and I guess there was the feeling that if the College owned the property, then they could improve the living standards and all, but that doesn't quite seem to have happened.

CARROLL: Not as much.

BURKE: No.

CARROLL: There were also alternatives put forth in this report from '85. The desire to have a master in some of the houses...

BURKE: Yes.

CARROLL: Did any of that come to pass?

BURKE: I noticed... I don't think that it did then. No. I don't think that it did, but I notice happily now that not only in the houses, but in the dorms, there are masters and there are families moving in. For one thing, in the dorms now they have been built, as I understand it, with some suites of rooms that are appropriate for a family, which, of course, was never the case in the much older dorms. But, here again, I am reminded of Williams College and I remember one of the trustees, Bill Morton, and I waiting upon the Mellon Foundation and Jack Sawyer was then the head. Sawyer was a former President of Williams and, under his regime at Williams, he abolished fraternities. Well, it wasn't quite a wave of the hand. I guess it is, over the years now, it has taken but there were some real difficulties with that where some of the older alumni went out and bought homes off the campus. Yes. And said, "Here you are, boys. Here is your fraternity." And some of their older alumni who

were disenchanted by the move. But he felt very strongly about it and took all kinds of flack, and just charged ahead. And [he] gave Bill Morton and I a lecture to the effect that you ought to do it. There is no reason to wait. It is not going to get any easier. Just step up and be counted and do it. Get rid of them.

CARROLL: What is it about the fraternities that is so objectionable?

BURKE: I think probably more than anything else...well, it is two. It is that sometime quite objectionable behavior whether it is due to drinking or drugs or whatever...mostly alcohol, I guess. And, number two, I think at least in my mind...well, there are more now when I start to talk...number two is the appearance of the fraternities. The fact that there is not a tidiness by a long shot. And number three, and this maybe should be number one, that I think most people know a lot more about it and Jim Wright, I guess, could talk on this. I had too many discussions with him about it. But there is an anti-intellectual flavor that permeates the fraternities and I think some real strides have been made to introduce lectures, visiting speakers and whatever else along those lines into the fraternities. But I think those are the three and they are also somewhat selective and that, in this day and age, is not good.

There again, in the perfect college, a blank sheet of paper, that would be unacceptable if you have to pick. If anyone wants to get in can't get in, that's very bad. It would be a more democratic campus if they all were in dormitories. I guess that's true, but the dormitories fitted with all sorts of rooms for social occasions and everything else. Of course, the whole social problem...social activities, I am sure in many ways, it has done well but the number of buildings, including most recently the Collis and the expansion and renovation of Collis. And some of the rooms in the dormitories and all of that, to manufacture an appropriate social setting for a changing group of students over the years is very, very difficult.

CARROLL: In 1986, this is the next year, the trustees saw a report that said that faculty salaries had to improve, that they were some of the lowest in the Ivies and they were having trouble recruiting top notch...

BURKE: Particularly in some of the grades, some of the notches... Yes.

CARROLL: And, fairly soon after that, you established the Walter and Constance Burke Research Initiative Program for junior faculty.

Was that a result of that report or was that something that you had been thinking about?

BURKE: Well, we had been thinking about that subject for a long time. This Fairchild Foundation made, some years prior to what you are talking about, a grant to the College, an expendable grant that was to be used...I can give you the date on this or Laura can give you the date. [Interruption] Did I say the Sherman Fairchild Foundation had made a grant...

CARROLL: Earlier.

BURKE: Earlier. We were in the process of coming up with the date, we hope. It was expendable money, expendable over a period of three or four years. During that period, the money was to improve the salaries, to add another... If the trustees increased the faculty salaries--and this, I think, was particularly in the associate and maybe the assistant rank, but mainly in the associate category--if the trustees of the College were going to grant an increase of six percent, then this expendable fund would be used to tack on another set percentage, one or two percent. And that was done and it did succeed for a brief period of time. But this is a very competitive field and we have some well-heeled and deep pocket competitors. (Okay, thank you.)

The grant consisted of two annual payments of one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00) each and the first payment was made at the end of '82 and the second at the end of '83. And this was the grant for the purpose of funding increases in faculty salaries according to a proposal that the College had submitted to the Foundation. The reason I go back to that was that this was--this did achieve the goal, as I said, but on a short-term basis because the competition, just the general momentum of the economy soon leveled the playing field again and Dartmouth was lucky to stay level, it seems to me. I am not sure what the numbers are right now, but it is always an up-hill battle.

The other program that you mentioned, the so-called new hires, new faculty, recently minted Ph.D.s coming in...

[End of Tape 5, Side A -- Beginning of Tape 5, Side B]

BURKE: ...the program was, I guess, a reasonably bold and certainly a highly focused effort to enable the College to attract its first choice, the young faculty that they had their eye on. For the most part, I think, a significantly large percentage of young people have been attracted. Less so in the hard sciences, but that brings in a lot of other considerations where Dartmouth really does not compete with the research universities.

CARROLL: When you were setting up this research initiative for junior faculty, there are so many components to it. Really, it is a pot of money to allow you to write your first book. It would seem to us, looking at it. Did you have that in mind?

BURKE: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. This was done with the great assistance of...well, I know it was Jim Wright, but I think maybe even before then there were discussions with Dwight Lahr. I believe so. And all of that culminated in the program as it has been refined now. But the monies...of course, we get reports...all the time. Certainly the ability to write a book and the expenditures in connection with that are one. Equipment having to do with research, just not surfing or administrative-type things, but the equipment having to do with research is another. Travel in connection with any of the research, or travel just to keep up to date in his or her respective field. And to hire assistants.

CARROLL: It's certainly done all that. Do you get reports periodically of the results or the output of people who have benefited from the program?

BURKE: We do get reports outlining the names and the background of those entering the faculty. We are now getting more detailed reports where someone leaves. We had tightened up the dispensing of the monies to make sure that we just don't have people, which I guess has happened once, coming in, spending the money and departing. We don't want to run a very expensive training program. We get reports on that. As to what they have done at the College, we hear some about that. It is still maybe a little early to talk much about how they...whether they have become a chair of a department or outstanding scholar in a particular field. We get anecdotal evidence as to that.

Probably the most convincing and touching, really, report that we get is more than a report. It is a personal visit that my wife and I make each year up there and almost every one of the new arrivals appears and gives testimony. It's like standing up at a Quaker meeting and telling why they came or, if they have been there two or three years, it's not just brand new arrivals...if they have been there two or three years, what they have done with the money and the difference that it has made.

CARROLL: Do you know if there is any other similar program at any other institution?

BURKE: Well, it's not structured quite that way, but the larger colleges and universities have monies, much greater monies, that they make available for off times, down loading the teaching load and all of that. They have ways of accomplishing the same thing in a broader fashion than Dartmouth is doing. But, for a basically undergraduate school for the Faculty of the Arts and Sciences and for Dartmouth, this seemed like a good idea. Certainly more has to be done and, in the campaign, there is monies, as you know, for additional fellowships and that type of thing, and some of these fellows would get that.

CARROLL: When you were a trustee in 1986, there was a very divisive trustee election. The challenge was issued to the trustee who was going to be put up and, shortly thereafter, there was a change in the rules as to who and how the trustees were elected and who can be a trustee. Is this coming back?

BURKE: Yeah. When you mention a divisive election, we had one of those earlier than this, which involved John Steel. That was, I think, one of the worst happenings for the College. It was not a complete disaster, but it was an enormous distraction and unfortunate. Apparently it has happened at other schools which I have heard about where there is not only one person such as Steel, but a handful, two or three, who seem to form themselves as a hard core. But Steel came in in a contested election and I've forgotten now when he came in, but it was pretty early on. Maybe in the early '80's. Or maybe...

CARROLL: I think it was '78.

BURKE: It may have been then and I think he was again elected after that. I really don't mean to pick on one person named John Steel because

he was what he was and he can express his opinions. But I do think...I know that in Dartmouth's experience that his presence or the presence of someone like him, and I am now trying to look forward, can be most unfortunate. I guess, in that...well, the type that I am describing here, and some of this is John Steel and some may not be John Steel...but, for the most part, I think in today's vocabulary would be characterized as radically conservative and with very close ties to similar thinking people on the faculty. And similar-minded students who could make their presence felt in several ways including starting a school newspaper, who were so enamored with their personal convictions that the breaches of confidentiality from the board room...information is passed which only could have come from a closed session, executive session, of the board meeting--not once, but other times. Who really...I am still talking about this type...who really I don't think ever acquire a reasonably decent comprehension and overview of the affairs of the College because they have these enormous blinders on that cause them only to think and discuss about matters that they think are enormously important...the agenda, really, for the most part, of the radically conservative.

And efforts to bring someone like that into the body and the spirit of the trustees, which is always enormously good, high-spirited, splendid way, not only the trustees but the spouses, but that was damaged by the presence of this, in this one instance of a type like this. So, when you mention the revision of the electoral process, I think that was done under the leadership of Sandy [Norman E. "Sandy" Jr.] McCulloch and he is the best one to go to for that. It struck me as I heard about it from a distance as something that had to be done, but then I was looking at it out of this background of watching this one trustee.

CARROLL: How are trustees chosen?

BURKE: Well, there are two different groups. One group is self-perpetuating and the other group...six and six, you know...and the other group is elected by the alumni and it was with respect to the six elected by the alumni that they changed the rules. I think they have made them a more democratic... Before then, a pitifully small group of alumni could put up a candidate and, frankly, cause a lot of trouble. And the caliber of the person that you get, the ability to contribute to the committee work is minimal. So I know that I am examining a particularly horrible case and painting a sad and black scenario, but that, indeed, was what it was.

CARROLL: In 1988 to '89, you were an overseer of the Hopkins Center and the Hood, how did that come about?

BURKE: Oh, that came about, I guess, through my interest in the arts, growing interest, having gone on the Metropolitan Museum Board, and my conviction...I think we talked a little about this in our last session...my conviction spurred mightily by [Robert "Bob"] McGrath, Professor Bob McGrath...that Dartmouth College was overdue to have it's own decent museum, not just a few galleries. And I thought that really the time had come not only for the College, but for the region. So it eventually did come and our foundation contributed a bit to that, but the main benefactor, enormously helpful, was the Hood family.

CARROLL: Did your interest in the arts come out of your undergraduate education or was this something that you...

BURKE: No. I never took a course. My interest in the arts came as a businessman when I traveled around the country and, more often, abroad and would have a few hours or a half a day or something, some time like that, and wonder "What am I going to do? What's available here?" I began going to museums and then I began realizing that I didn't know much about what I was looking at. So I went to Columbia, as I could in their general studies program, and took maybe eight or ten, maybe seven or eight, courses from the splendid art history faculty. Then, I have been bumping around the Metropolitan and then our Foundation has made grants to top-flight museums and some a bit more marginal in the early years.

CARROLL: Is there any kind of art that attracted you at first?

BURKE: No. I don't think so. I was reasonably open. There are some that I'm not very keen on now, but I was mostly open and interested in the role of the museum--what they were doing by way of preserving their recorded history and culture. I don't know that I thought all those grandiose thoughts at that time.

CARROLL: It is interesting that you came on to both the Museum Board at the Met and then were instrumental in the development of the Hood at a time when the role of museums was changing very much in society, from being sort of great repositories of culture to being more interactive with communities.

- BURKE: I think that is true. And the audience was enlarging all the time. I would bet that fifteen years ago, whenever it was that I went on, sixteen years ago, the Metropolitan Board that if they had two million people, two and a half million people, a year go through, that was it. Now it's five million.
- CARROLL: Are you aware of all the programs that are at the Hood as well, that have been developed over the years?
- BURKE: Not all of them. I am sure I haven't because I haven't been all that active since those dates. No. I am not.
- CARROLL: They are a real factor in the community.
- BURKE: Yes. Well, that much I do know or assume. Yes. That's true. Of course, the role of museums...I was taken by a notice that came to me that one of the donors, a Wall Street type named Bernie Canter, Fitzgerald Canter, Canter Fitzgerald is a Wall Street firm that makes a market in various bonds, very successful over the past recent number of years... Not too far back, he and his wife have been very generous to the Metropolitan and also the Brooklyn Museum and, when you talk about the changing role of the museum, Bernie Canter died and his memorial service...I think it is going to be held in a week or so at the Metropolitan Museum. There are those who I think half in jest joke about the current role of the museum as being sometimes a substitute for the cathedral or the temple. So here we are having a memorial service at the Metropolitan. [Laughter]
- CARROLL: I can think of an institution where a man who gave his collection was buried in the museum, so I guess...there you go.
- BURKE: There you go.
- CARROLL: Now the last thing I really want to talk about was the 1987 resignation of David McLaughlin. Were you surprised when he made that decision to resign?
- BURKE: No.
- CARROLL: Why not?
- BURKE: No. I was not because...you asked me how aware Dave was of the many things happening and I say "not awfully aware", but he was sufficiently aware that I was not surprised. Also, the role of the

trustees in that...at best...in that period had best be discussed, I think, in terms of accuracy and everything else with Sandy McCulloch, who was the chair, but it is safe to say that the trustees had a hand in that.

CARROLL: You were at that point, as I understand it, part of the President's Advisory Council. Is that right?

BURKE: No. That came, I think, at a later...the President's Advisory Council came under James Freedman.

CARROLL: Okay. Okay.

BURKE: That wasn't for awhile. And that really would not have gotten...that was not the role of that President's Advisory Committee.

CARROLL: When that came about, did anyone approach you and ask you what you thought would be necessary for the next President of Dartmouth?

BURKE: Oh, yes. Yes. I was...Sandy McCulloch talked to me and I think one of the...not the whole search committee, but one or two of the members. And, if you are going to ask me what I said...[laughter]

CARROLL: Yes, indeed.

BURKE: I don't know. There was...I guess really the dominant feeling at that time was that the next President should be an academic type. Beyond that, the search committee had to again, as I mentioned in our last session, hope that when they cast their net--in that brief ninety or one hundred day period--that there were a lot of good candidates out there so that they could have a decent choice. And I don't know who was in the net or anything about that.

CARROLL: Before I turn this off, is there anything else that I have somehow forgotten or skipped over that you would like to speak to in more depth about that Kemeny-McLaughlin period?

BURKE: Well, I think it is important to keep in mind that over this period, and indeed, I guess, starting with John Sloan Dickey but certainly with John Kemeny within my purview, that the College had an increasing momentum behind it, in the best sense of the word "momentum". They were doing several things not only right, but better than they had before in terms of the quality of the faculty, the students who

wanted to come, the physical facilities, the success of the Dartmouth graduates. No matter how you want to define success in financial terms, monetary terms or even to a lesser extent in scholarly, academic terms, I think there was an outstanding, tremendous momentum generated that continued through all of this period. Not the doing of any one person or committee, and not deterred by the sensational, dramatic incidents involving shanties or R.O.T.C., or ratio of women to men and all of those things that had more than their share of heat as part of the discussion. They were part of the times, but they did not infringe [upon] the splendid momentum that was gathering and, as far as I see, still nicely gathering under Jim Freedman.

CARROLL: When you look at Kemeny and you look at McLaughlin, how would characterize their strengths, their respective strengths? What did each bring?

BURKE: Well, let's start with John Kemeny. Some of this I may have said before. I know I told you and I told John Kemeny that I thought he was the best college president that I, in my limited observations had experienced. Kemeny was extraordinarily bright, extraordinarily bright, extremely articulate, a good teacher of anybody--one-on-one, I am sure in the math class, teaching fourteen trustees--a good teacher. He had a grasp of the society in which he lived and in which way it was going, having arrived in New York I guess at age twelve and gone through the best of the city's schools and then Princeton and all with record academic results and in minimum time.

He was in the forefront, at least in my mind, at that time. One of those who did, indeed, have a vision. I am not great for the "vision" thing, as [President] George Bush has denounced it, really. But John Kemeny had a goal, I think, for an undergraduate college such as Dartmouth. He had a goal, which related to the faculty, that related to the sports activities, the content of the student body. He saw all of those things. He was able to articulate that.

He was a very good fundraiser, although most people at first blush would not have thought that he would be that. He was indeed a good fundraiser and turned out, I think, being enormously well liked by, certainly by the faculty, but by the alumni. There were only a few of the very elderly that I have heard...who may be radically conservative or so ancient that their thinking cannot be held against them type.

Kemeny was not the world's greatest administrator. He had Leonard Rieser for the most part as his sidekick, collaborator who did an awful lot of right things it seems to me as the Dean and the Provost, mainly in acquiring and strengthening the faculty and attracting better top-flight people during his years. When it came to the administration side, Kemeny by virtue of his personality, could get things done. When it came to an organizational chart or having to make a decision, he was not the greatest in those fields.

Dave McLaughlin...are we still on target here?

CARROLL: Yes.

BURKE: Dave McLaughlin, both as Chairman of the Board of Trustees and as President, was indeed a good administrator. I say that even though some of his picks, some of his choices for second, third and fourth tier appointments--a few of them didn't turn out well at all. But he was a good administrator in terms of matters of the budget, financial controls. He, of course, had Pag under him in that area. He was also a good fundraiser among the alumni. When it came to raising money for things, probably that John Kemeny--his heart wouldn't be in it nor would he be so effective--but certainly athletic facilities or large projects such as a new gym or locker room, additional or brand new, acceptable, good locker room facilities for the women students, the renovations of the dorms. I suppose Kemeny could have done that, but it didn't seem so timely then. If you like the R.O.T.C. and that blending with the government in that limited fashion, that could be called something that he did and really insisted on more than he did.

But, Dave McLaughlin was a tireless worker. So was John Kemeny, I suppose. His ability to interact with the Investment Committee was one that neither John Kemeny had nor, I guess...I am just guessing, Jim Freedman has... Well, I know because I've been on the committee. He stays on Webster Avenue and lets the committee do its thing.

Dave McLaughlin had one very vital insistence. He insisted and spelled it out to the committee, the Investment Committee...you can ask whoever it is...Pag or Bruce Dresner...whatever it was. At one point, there were so many things that the College needed to do and this, I guess you could say is always the case, but at this point was very obviously the case--so many things that the College needed to

do and should be done for a top-flight undergraduate facility and, of course, we didn't have the money to do it. He came in and said, "You have got to realize this and you must take more chances. You must increase the risk with the hope..." We had already started down this path. I must tell you that. We weren't just sitting there with our head on the pillow. We had started down the path, but he came in and he was an additional injection along these lines. You increase the risk and the hope is, and we have to take that hope and hope that it is fulfilled, that the rewards will be greater and that we will indeed have greater appreciation in the endowment and be able to do more of these things. And that, coming from the President...

[End of Tape 5, Side B -- Beginning of Tape 6, Side A]

- BURKE: ...his pronouncement to the Investment Committee is significant. There is no doubt about that. But it fell upon receptive ears because there were several of us, Morton, Burke, Paganucci, sitting around that table who, deep down within their own bosoms were thinking this way also and were ready to go. But to have the President of the College who is always held, no matter who he is, on a pedestal somewhere and should be. Have him come in and shove in this direction was very helpful and was of long-term benefit to the school. It would have happened, but at a much slower pace.
- CARROLL: So he had vision.
- BURKE: Yes.
- CARROLL: In financial matters, at least.
- BURKE: Yes.
- CARROLL: Thank you very much.
- BURKE: Thank you. Thank you. It has been...

END OF INTERVIEW