Does the LIBOR reflect banks’ borrowing costs?

July 21, 2010

Abstract

The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is a vital benchmark interest rate to which many trillions of dollars of financial contracts are tied. Recently observers have expressed concerns that the Libor may not accurately reflect average bank borrowing costs, its ostensible target. We argue that if banks have incentives to alter the rate, as opposed to simply reporting costs, they will bunch their quotes around particular points. We show that this bunching holds in the data. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that several banks have large portfolio exposures to the Libor and have recently profited from its rapid descent.
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is a widely used benchmark interest rate, intended to reflect the average rate at which banks can borrow unsecured funds from other banks. The rate is set each day by taking a truncated average of the reported borrowing costs of a panel of 16 large banks. Since its introduction in 1986, the Libor has steadily grown in importance and is now among the most widely used benchmark rates in financial contracting. The British Bankers Association (BBA) estimates that $10 trillion of loans and $350 trillion of swaps are indexed by the Libor. Since the upheaval in financial markets that started around August of 2007, the Libor has diverged from many of its historical relationships causing market observers to question its proper functioning. An influential article by Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008) argued that the Libor was too low in this period and suggested that banks in the panel were intentionally quoting low rates in order to burnish the markets’ perception of their riskiness.

In this paper we provide two types of evidence that banks’ Libor quotes may not reflect true borrowing costs. First, we corroborate the Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008) finding that bank Libor quotes are very weakly related to other measures of bank borrowing costs, in particular to the price of default insurance. As the Libor survey is administered in several different currencies, we are able to use a bank’s quotes in another currency panel as another measure of its borrowing costs. The idea is that if one bank submits a higher quote than another in one currency, it is because it is riskier, and should submit a higher quote in other currency panels as well. We find, on the contrary, that it is common for a bank to submit a higher quote than another in one currency and a lower one in another.

The second type of evidence comes from the intraday distribution of Libor quotes. We present a simple model of bank quote submission in which some members may or may not have incentives to alter the Libor fix. The model predicts, in the presence of these misre-
porting incentives, we should see “bunching” of quotes at particular points. This prediction is due to the form of the rate setting mechanism, which averages the middle eight quotes of the sixteen. If a given bank wishes to change the overall Libor rate (as opposed to simply reporting costs) and it knows the exact location of the pivotal fourth and twelfth quotes, its own quotes will tend to cluster around these pivotal quotes. This is where the bank moves from being included in the middle eight quotes to the top or bottom four. The marginal impact of that bank’s quote on the overall rate, and thus the marginal benefit of changing the rate, goes to zero at these pivotal points.

We find strong evidence of quote bunching behavior consistent with the model. We also show that the intraday distribution of other measures of bank borrowing costs do not exhibit this bunching pattern. Under the reputational theory of misreporting, a bank cares about how the market perceives its own quote and not the Libor fix itself. It therefore does not predict that banks will bunch around the pivotal quotes. In this sense, we present evidence in favor of our hypothesis and against the reputation hypothesis and discuss the different policy implications of our results. Moreover, using more recent data, we find evidence of misreporting is stronger in the period since markets have calmed somewhat from their recent upheaval.

After establishing our arguments for the existence of misreporting incentives, we go on to explore the magnitude of the quote skewing and the sources of the incentives. To get a sense of the magnitude of skewing we compare the behavior of Libor quotes with the behavior of actual market lending rates in the Eurodollar market. We assume that in a benchmark (pre-financial crisis) period there was a relationship, similar to a bid-ask spread, between the Eurodollar rate and the Libor and that banks were truthfully reporting their costs in this period. We then measure the degree of skewing as the divergence in this relationship after
the benchmark period. By this measure, we find that the magnitude of skewing is upwards of 40 basis points for some banks.\footnote{We also emphasize the limitations of this, at best, back of the envelope exercise. There has also been some concern that the Eurodollar Bid rate data is unreliable.}

Finally, we present suggestive evidence that the misreporting incentives are potentially driven by member bank portfolio positions. We find that several banks in the U.S. Libor panel have very large interest rate derivative portfolios, likely have significant unhedged exposures to the U.S. Libor, and have profited from their interest rate derivative portfolios during the rapid descent of the Libor during 2009. We also argue the direction of bank skewing behavior is consistent with these portfolio incentives. We then examine banks included in several currency Libor panels who have financial incentives to raise some of the Libor rates and to lower the other rates. We find, as our model predicts, that they simultaneously submit quotes near the upper and lower pivotal points in the respective currencies.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In section I we present evidence of the apparent lack of relationship between bank quotes and measures of bank costs as well as evidence of cross currency rank reversals. Section II presents our evidence of strategic behavior suggested by the simple model we lay out in the appendix. We also present our Eurodollar bid rate-based counterfactual analysis. Section III presents our evidence that several panel banks have large Libor positions and have recently profited from a low Libor. Section IV concludes.

\section{Libor Quotes and Bank Borrowing Costs}

In a competitive interbank lending market, banks’ borrowing costs should be significantly related to their perceived credit risk.\footnote{When credit risk is private information, it is possible for credit to be rationed and for risky and safe borrowers to receive the same interest rates, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Here we focus on risk measures} If the Libor quotes express true, competitively deter-
mined borrowing costs, then we should expect the quotes to be related to measures of credit risks, such as the cost of default insurance. Mollenkamp and Whitehouse were the first to point out the anomalous behavior of bank Libor quotes with respect to bank risk measures, credit default swap (CDS) spreads in particular.\(^3\)

Figure 1 shows the 12 Month U.S. Libor quotes for Citigroup and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi along with their corresponding 1 Year Senior CDS spreads. The first puzzling fact is that while Citigroup has a substantially higher CDS spread than Mitsubishi, it submits a slightly lower Libor quote. The CDS spreads suggest that the market perceives Citigroup as risker than Mitsubishi, as it is more expensive to insure against the event of Citigroup’s default. The Libor quotes, however, tell the opposite story. If Citigroup and Mitsubishi were truthfully reporting their costs, then the quotes suggest that market participants view lending to Citigroup as slightly safer than Mitsubishi.

A second puzzling pattern is the level of Citigroup’s CDS spreads relative to its Libor quotes. Given that purchasing credit protection for a loan makes the loan risk free, one would expect difference between the loan rate and the CDS spread to roughly equal the risk free rate. This corresponds to the idea that a loan’s interest rate contains a credit premium, here measured by the CDS spread. If loan rates contain other premia, such as a liquidity premia to compensate for the illiquidity of loans, then the loan rate should exceed the sum of the CDS spread and the risk free rate.\(^4\) In figure 1, however, we see that Citigroup’s quote

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\(^3\)Credit default swaps are bilateral agreements where one party, the Guaranteer, will pay another, the Beneficiary, if a particular reference entity defaults. The Guaranteer will pay \((1-R)V\) where \(R\) is the recovery rate of the obligations determined in bankruptcy, so that, if the Beneficiary has \(V\) amount of obligations owed by the reference entity, the return in the event of default is \(RV + (1-R)V = V\). Purchasing an equal amount of CDS protection makes the debt risk free. In return for this protection the Beneficiary periodically pays \(rV\) to the Guaranteer, where \(r\) is the ‘CDS spread’.

\(^4\)This has been the case for corporate bonds. Mitchell and Pulvino (2010) show that corporate bond spreads have been considerably larger than CDS spreads throughout the financial crisis.
is often significantly below its CDS spread. This implies that there were interbank lenders willing to lend to Citigroup at rates which, after purchasing credit protection, would earn them a large guaranteed loss.

The Mollenkamp and Whitehouse analysis and figure 1 paint a picture somewhat at odds with the findings of Taylor and Williams (2009) who find evidence that, at the level of the Libor fix, increasing bank risk does explain much the behavior of the rate. Table I displays the results of regressions similar to those performed in Taylor and Williams, now including more recent data up to October 2009. The dependent variable in the first specification is the spread between the 3 month U.S. Libor and the 3 month rate on Overnight Index Swaps (OIS). Regressing the overall Libor fix on the Median CDS spread delivers a coefficient of 0.621 which is within the range of coefficients found by Taylor and Williams in their earlier period.

In the next four specifications the dependent variable is the spread of a bank’s submitted Libor quote over the OIS rate, and is regressed on the bank’s corresponding CDS spread. Now, at the bank level, we find a smaller effect. Controlling for bank-level heterogeneity in the spreads reduces the coefficient further and it becomes negligible once we control for serial correlation in the error terms. The estimated serial correlation is reported as $\rho$ and is very large, as might be expected when working with daily frequency data. After controlling for serial correlation, CDS spreads are unable to explain the Libor quote variation between banks as well as the Libor quote changes within a bank through time.

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5Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) are agreements where one party pays a fixed rate in return for a series of floating payments based on an index such the federal funds rate. As the most that can be lost in the event of default is the foregone payments accruing over a short period, they are considered to be considerably safer than bonds and their spread usually considered risk free.
Table I: Bank-level 3 Month LIBOR-OIS Spreads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBOR Pooled OLS</th>
<th>Random Effects</th>
<th>Random Effects</th>
<th>Fixed Effects AR(1) Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>0.474 (0.102)</td>
<td>0.373 (0.098)</td>
<td>0.039 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.038 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.173 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.112 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.333 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.505 (0.085) 0.921 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>581</th>
<th>19235</th>
<th>7839</th>
<th>7839</th>
<th>7824</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within $R^2$ 0.199 0.199 0.002
Between $R^2$ 0.001 0.001 0.005

$\rho$ 0.995 0.995

A Cross-Currency Rank Reversals

Many banks participate in multiple Libor panels and presumably there is some relationship between a bank’s costs in these different currencies. If one bank quotes a higher rate than another in the dollar Libor, we might expect it to be riskier and submit a higher rate in the yen Libor as well. It is common, however, for a bank to simultaneously quote a higher rate than another bank in one currency panel and lower rate in another currency panel. Figure 2 shows the differences in bank quotes in two currencies for four pairs of banks. We see that is is common for Bank of America to quote a lower rate than the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi in the yen-Libor while submitting a lower quote in the US-Libor. Since the same bank is participating in each currency, the credit risk is the same for loans in either currency.\textsuperscript{6} This

\textsuperscript{6}While bankruptcy laws vary across countries they do not vary across the currency denomination of the obligations.
shows that differences in banks’ Libor quotes are not primarily due to differences in credit
risk, something we would expect of their true borrowing costs.

The significance of these rank reversals is that they show that either Libor quotes
cannot be expressed as the sum of bank specific variables and currency specific variables,
or banks cannot be reporting true costs. In contrast, most of the variables that we would
expect to be important for pricing debt either do not vary across banks or do not vary across
currencies. If banks were truly reporting their costs, then there must be large and persistent
bank-currency specific risks concerning lenders. While it is possible there could be such
effects - we will consider some of them later in reference to Citigroup - it is less clear that
they are important enough to rationalize the magnitude and persistence of the reversals we
observe in figure 2.

An alternative explanation would be that in some currencies banks are submitting mis-
leading quotes. In our earlier discussion, if Citigroup was submitting a quote in the U.S.
Libor that was below their true borrowing costs, while a submitting a correct quote in the
Yen Libor, this could appear as a rank reversal if Bank of Tokyo quoted true costs in both
currencies. We return to this example later.

II Quote Bunching

Our final source of evidence comes from the intraday distribution of bank quotes. First we
find that, relative to CDS spreads, Libor quotes are closely clustered together. Prior to
August 2007, banks in the U.S. Libor panel submitted similar, often identical quotes. In

\[ c_{itm} = \alpha_i + \alpha_m + \epsilon_{itm}, \]

where \( c \) denotes borrowing costs, and \( i, m, \) and \( t \) denote bank, market and time respectively. Differencing differences in bank quotes across
markets gives: \( (c_{itm} - c_{jtm}) - (c_{itm'} - c_{jtm'}) = \epsilon_{itm} - \epsilon_{jtm} - \epsilon_{itm'} + \epsilon_{jtm'} \). If the bank-currency specific
shocks are such that the \( \epsilon \)'s are mean zero and i.i.d, we should see no rank reversals on average.
this pre-crisis period, the CDS spreads for panel banks have also been similar and low. This behavior changed with the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, with the intra-day variation of both Libor quotes and CDS spreads increasing from their historical levels. The intra-day variation of CDS spreads, however, grew considerably larger than that of Libor quotes. Figure 3 shows histograms of 12 month Libor quotes, normalized by subtracting the value of the day’s fourth highest quote for each bank quote. An identical procedure is performed for 1 year CDS spreads.\textsuperscript{8} Libor quotes are much more clustered around the day’s fourth lowest quote than CDS spreads are of the fourth lowest spread. If banks were truthfully quoting their costs, however, we might expect these distributions to be similar.

There are several possible explanations for the bunching of quotes around the fourth lowest. The one that we pursue here is that some banks have incentive to alter the rate of the overall Libor and the bunching is a result of these incentives interacting with the rate setting mechanism. In the model that we lay out formally in the appendix, a bank’s payoff, vis a vis it quote, is the sum of two terms. The first term is proportional to the Libor fix and captures the bank’s direct incentives to change the fix. The second term is the “cost” of misreporting, for example the cost of a BBA investigation, which is triggered by unusual quotes. Bank incentives interact with the truncated averaging mechanism of the Libor. Consider a Libor panel member that knows the quotes of the 15 other members on a given day.\textsuperscript{9} Figure 5 shows graphically that bank’s optimal quote problem, which requires equating the marginal benefits of changing the Libor with the marginal cost of misreporting. The marginal benefits function, which assumes the hypothetical bank’s payoff is decreasing

\textsuperscript{8}We drop the day’s fourth lowest quote and CDS spread from the data, in order to avoid spurious bunching around zero due to the fact that there is always a fourth lowest quote

\textsuperscript{9}Simple forecasting models do an excellent job in predicting the levels of Libor quotes during 2009. This is because Libor is administered with a daily frequency and Libor quotes move in a slow and predictable manner. We also note that the basic insight of the model can be extended to the case where there is uncertainty about the exact location of the pivotal quotes.
in the Libor, is a step function with a discontinuity at both pivotal quotes. The optimal quote is the intersection of the marginal cost curves and this step function, which bunches quotes representing a wide interval of true borrowing costs at (in this case) the lower pivotal point.

There may be other explanations for why Libor quotes might be more closely clustered together than other measures of bank borrowing costs. The first is that, in this period, banks faced large reputational risks - bank runs on Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, and others were allegedly fueled by rumors of difficulty of raising funds from other banks. As suggested by Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008), an otherwise healthy bank submitting a high quote in the Libor panel might appear to have such problems and, by the same token a bank that actually has these problems might have incentive to submit low quotes to convince the market otherwise.

It is important to note different banks may have different net exposures to the Libor. Some banks may profit from a higher overall Libor rate, others may profit from a lower overall rate, and others still might be perfectly hedged. With this in mind, we examine the clustering behavior of individual banks, four of which are shown in figure 6. Here we see that Citigroup and Bank of America tend to submit quotes that are identical to the fourth lowest quote of the fifteen other banks, while this is not the case for WestLB. This is consistent with Bank of America and Citigroup having incentives, potentially stemming from their possession of Libor-indexed contracts, to lower the overall Libor rate, while WestLB does not have such incentives.
A Constructing the Correct Libor: Eurodollar Bid Rate

Eurodollars are dollar denominated deposits held in banks outside of the United States, and have historically been an important source of funding for large American banks. They are functionally similar to interbank loans as they have a term maturity and, as they are held offshore, are not covered by FDIC insurance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Eurodollar Bid Rate, a market rate for eurodollars, has had a historically tight relationship with the Libor. Prior to August 2007, indeed for nearly the whole history of the Libor prior to then, the banks submitted quotes between 6 to 12 basis points above the Eurodollar Bid Rate. Banks were treating the Libor, the London Interbank Offered Rate, as their perception of the ask rate corresponding to the listed bid rate for eurodollars. The Eurodollar Bid Rate-Libor spread of 6-12 basis points was then simply something like a bid-ask spread. Since 2007, for the first time the Libor descended below the Eurodollar Bid Rate and at times quite dramatically. Figure 7 shows the Eurodollar-Libor spread which is slightly positive prior to August 2007 and then drops dramatically once the Libor drops below the Eurodollar rate.

In table II we perform a structural break test to show the collapse of this historic relationship. We can see that, both in levels and in differences, the previous days Eurodollar Bid Rate was more important for determining the following days Libor than the previous Libor rate. This suggests that, prior to the crisis, banks simply observed the preceding days bid rate and added a fixed spread. Alternatively, banks may reported the prevailing offered rate for eurodollars, supplied by money market brokers, which maintained a fix spread over the bid rate. After the crisis, however, the Eurodollar Bid Rate has much less predictive power on the following days Libor. The lagged Libor rate instead becomes much more important as it drops below the Eurodollar rate. The chow test statistic tests the null of no structural
break in August of 2007, and rejects the null conclusively.\textsuperscript{10}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Table II: Structural Break Test} \\
& U.S. Libor & \\
& Levels & Differences \\
\hline
Eurodollar Bid Rate & 0.608 & 0.696 \\
& (0.033) & (0.031) \\
U.S. Libor & 0.392 & -0.123 \\
& (0.033) & (0.032) \\
Eurodollar Bid Rate & -0.605 & -0.589 \\
* 1(After August 2007) & (0.034) & (0.034) \\
U.S. Libor & 0.600 & 0.586 \\
* 1(After August 2007) & (0.034) & (0.034) \\
\hline
N & 1911 & 1392 \\
R\textsuperscript{2} & 1.000 & 0.423 \\
Chow Test Statistic & 175.07 & 148.5 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Dependent variable is the current days Libor. All right hand side variables are lagged.

In a related study, Abrantes-Metz et. al. (2008) investigate the possibility of collusion among Libor panel banks in the post August 2007 period. A commonly used screen for collusion tests for whether cross sectional prices-or quotes in this case-have lower variance during the suspected collusion period relative to a benchmark period. They find that the variance is substantially \textit{lower} in the benchmark pre-August 2007 period. Our results suggest the answer for this is that in the benchmark period, banks are coordinating on the previous days Eurodollar rate.

\textsuperscript{10}The statistic follows an \textit{F}(4, 2999) distribution.
In another related study, Kuo, Skeie and Vickery (2010) compare the quotes submitted by Libor panel banks with the rates they receive on interbank loans that are settled over Fedwire, a large electronic payment settlement system operated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. They find that, prior to the crisis, the Libor was 2-3 basis points above the average interbank loan rate. This is consistent with the Libor as being treated as an offered rate. They also find that the dispersion of loan rates is small, suggesting that there was little credit tiering in this pre-crisis period. Most importantly for this paper, they find that, after the Lehman failure, the average 3 month dollar interbank loan rate was 12-20 basis points above the Libor. This post-Lehman period is also when we find the strongest bunching of quotes around the discontinuities of the Libor mechanism.

### III Sources of Misreporting Incentives

Having established evidence of misreporting, we now turn our attention to the sources of misreporting incentives. We argue that banks’ portfolio exposure to the Libor generates potentially strong incentives for banks to alter the overall Libor fix. To examine the extent of these exposures we focus on the three American bank holding companies in the U.S. Libor panel. These banks are required to provide information about their interest rate derivatives and net interest revenue in the quarterly Reports on Conditions and Income (Call Reports) to the FDIC. The level of detail is still not fine enough to completely describe each bank’s portfolio exposure to the Libor, so we emphasize the suggestive nature of the results presented in this section.

The call reports show that these three banks hold a large number of interest rate swaps, a popular type of interest rate derivative.\(^{11}\) Table III shows the notional value of these swaps.

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\(^{11}\)An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties, where one pays a fixed interest (the Payer)
positions. While these swaps could potentially reference any interest rate index, the 3 month Libor is the standard rate for dollar swaps. Indeed, the Libor was introduced in order to provide a common, standardized index to be used as the floating rate in swaps and other interest rate derivatives.

It is important to note that as these three large American banks serve as market makers in swaps and other derivatives, it is likely that many of their contracts net out. The outstanding notional value of their net positions is likely much smaller than that of their gross positions shown in table III. Even then, as the payments are linear in the notional values, a small unhedged exposure to the Libor can generate large financial incentives to alter the overall Libor fix. If J.P.Morgan, for example, had a swap position with just a 1% net exposure to the Libor in the fourth quarter of 2008, then the notional value of its net position would be $540 billion. If it succeeded in modifying the Libor by 25 basis points over 2009 it would make $540 \times 0.0025 = 1.35$ billion from doing so. If it had a 10 percent net exposure it would recieve $13.5$ billion. Note that we are focusing solely on swaps, a contract which has a payout that is linear in the Libor. These banks also participate heavily in other more complex derivatives, such as ‘swaptions’ - options to purchase swaps, whose payoffs may be substantially nonlinear in the Libor.

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rate in return for a floating or variable rate from the other party (the Receiver). If $f$ is the fixed rate and $L_t$ is the floating rate at a payment period $t$ for such a contract, then the Payer receives $(L_t - f)V$ and the Receiver receives $(f - L_t)V$ in that period, where $V$ is the notional value of the contract. While similar to a principal, the notional value is never exchanged and exists solely for computing payments.
Table III: Notional value of Interest Rate Swaps (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Citigroup</th>
<th>Bank of America</th>
<th>JPMorgan Chase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007.1</td>
<td>15,712,307</td>
<td>19,305,479</td>
<td>43,357,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007.2</td>
<td>16,133,587</td>
<td>19,873,919</td>
<td>49,287,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007.3</td>
<td>18,371,402</td>
<td>22,339,658</td>
<td>59,919,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007.4</td>
<td>16,955,132</td>
<td>22,472,948</td>
<td>52,097,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008.1</td>
<td>19,585,284</td>
<td>25,261,266</td>
<td>55,188,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008.2</td>
<td>18,732,046</td>
<td>26,162,587</td>
<td>59,821,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008.3</td>
<td>17,360,100</td>
<td>26,230,767</td>
<td>54,907,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008.4</td>
<td>15,859,923</td>
<td>26,577,385</td>
<td>54,524,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009.1</td>
<td>14,177,696</td>
<td>49,717,209a</td>
<td>49,282,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009.2</td>
<td>15,613,216</td>
<td>49,577,518</td>
<td>48,914,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009.3</td>
<td>15,230,030</td>
<td>48,676,584</td>
<td>48,893,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bank Holding Company FR Y-9C Reports.

a. Bank of America completes merger with Merrill Lynch.

Many interest rate derivatives held by banks are held for the purpose of hedging other items on the balance sheet, so notional portfolio sizes can be misleading. Perhaps a better picture of aggregate exposure is given by aggregate revenue that banks earn from their derivative portfolios. Table IV shows the net interest revenue banks have made over the last 2 years, including the contribution of trading revenue on interest rate derivatives. Notably each of the three banks experience large net revenue increases in the first quarter of 2009, when the Libor fell dramatically.
Table IV: Net Interest Revenues ($m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Citigroup</th>
<th>Bank of America</th>
<th>JPMorgan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007.1</td>
<td>12,129</td>
<td>9,182</td>
<td>6,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007.2</td>
<td>13,032</td>
<td>8,683</td>
<td>7,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007.3</td>
<td>13,774</td>
<td>7,026</td>
<td>8,961</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007.4</td>
<td>14,046</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>6,561</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008.1</td>
<td>12,366</td>
<td>10,394</td>
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<td>2008.2</td>
<td>13,664</td>
<td>11,725</td>
<td>8,760</td>
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<td>2008.3</td>
<td>11,527</td>
<td>11,832</td>
<td>6,084</td>
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<td>2008.4</td>
<td>7,728</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2009.3</td>
<td>13,741</td>
<td>11,042</td>
<td>14,189</td>
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</table>

Source: Bank Holding Company FR Y-9C Reports. The shown values are the sum of reported Net Interest Revenue and Trading Revenue on Interest Rate Derivatives.

The bunching on the lower discontinuity shown earlier in figure 6 suggests that some banks like Citigroup may have incentives to alter the rate while others may not. Table V shows Citigroup’s reported counterfactual gains from movements in interest rates for several different currencies. In the first quarter of 2009 Citigroup reported it would make $936 million in net interest revenue if interest rates would fall by 25 basis points a quarter over the next year and $1,935 million if they were to fall 1 percent instantaneously. In terms of exposure to yen interest rates however, Citigroup reports it would make $122 million if yen interest rates were to rise gradually and $195 million if they rose by 1 percent instantaneously. Citigroup’s exposure to the euro switches signs and is generally low. Figure 8 shows Citigroup’s quotes relative to the upper and lower discontinuities in all three currencies. Citigroup’s dollar
quotes are bunched on the lower discontinuity of the dollar Libor while its yen quotes are
bunched on the upper discontinuity in the yen Libor, consistent with the direction the model
and table V would suggest. Further, Citigroup’s euro quotes appear to bunch less on the
discontinuities, which is consistent with its apparently smaller incentives to alter euro rates.

There are several reasons that Citigroup might submit relatively higher quotes in the
yen than in the dollar. First, the banks in the yen panel may be considered relatively safer
than the banks in the dollar panel. Second, Citigroup generates large amounts of dollar
core deposits from its branch network in the United States. If counterparties disagree on
the credit risk of Citigroup but all of them set limits on the amount they will lend, as is
standard practice in the fed funds and eurodollar markets (Stigum and Crescenzi 2007), then
Citigroup’s core deposits allow it to finance its dollar activities with relatively less eurodollar
borrowing. This means it can borrow all of its remaining dollars from counterparties who
view its credit risk relatively favorably. When borrowing in yen, however, Citigroup may
also have to borrow from counterparties who view its credit risk less favorably and demand
a higher risk premium, pushing up Citigroup’s yen borrowing costs.

Another reason stems from the importance of relationships in interbank markets - most
banks only transact with a small and largely fixed group of counterparties. The strength and
number of such relationships is a potentially important determinant of how much a bank can
borrow in the interbank market (Stigum and Crescenzi 2007). If Citigroup has a stronger
relationship with its dollar counterparties than its yen counterparties, this might translate
into a relatively lower dollar borrowing cost. See Freixas (2005) for a survey on the theory
of relationship banking and its implications for loan rates. We emphasize that it is not the
relatively higher yen quotes in figure 8 that we consider anomalous, but the proximity of
Citigroup’s dollar and yen quotes to the discontinuities of the Libor mechanism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1% Instantaneous Increase</th>
<th>1% Instantaneous Decrease</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Dollar</td>
<td>Euro</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009.3</td>
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<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009.2</td>
<td>-1,767</td>
<td>-29</td>
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<td>2008.4</td>
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<td>-56</td>
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<td>2008.3</td>
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<td>-52</td>
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<td>2008.2</td>
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<td>-71</td>
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</table>

Instantaneous means a ‘parallel instantaneous 100bp change in rates.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1% Gradual Increase</th>
<th>1% Gradual Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>U.S. Dollar</td>
<td>Euro</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Gradual means ‘a more gradual 100bp (25bp per quarter) parallel change in rates.’

NM - Not Meaningful; a 100bp reduction would result in negative rates.
Source: Citigroup’s 10-K and 10-Q reports.

IV Conclusion

In this paper we have presented new evidence corroborating concerns that Libor panel banks may be understating their true borrowing costs. Previous analysis of the problem have suggested the cause of this misreporting is the desire of panel banks to appear strong, especially during the recent banking crisis. In contrast, our theory of misreporting incentives points
to a more fundamental source, namely that bank portfolio exposure to the Libor give them incentives to push the rate in a direction favorable to these positions. Our theory, then, suggests that the rate may perform badly even in times of market calm, whereas the reputation theory suggests that we may only have to worry during periods of severe market stress.

The nature of the Libor mechanism, which averages the middle eight quotes out of sixteen, helps us formulate a novel strategy for testing the theory. When the location of the “pivotal” quotes are highly predictable, as they appear to be in our sample, banks with incentive to manipulate the Libor fix bunch around these quotes because the marginal change in the fix drops discontinuously there. Borrowing costs, on the other hand, presumably have no relationship with these pivotal points and so neither should quotes from banks with no incentives to manipulate the fix.

Understanding the sources of misreporting incentives has important policy implications. Concerns about the Libor’s accuracy has led a large money market broker ICAP to recently launch the New York Funding Rate (NYFR) which is intended to replace the Libor as the standard reference rate in interest rate derivatives. The primary innovation of the NYFR is that submitted quotes are anonymous. This reflects the view that the primary motive for banks to submit downward or misleading quotes is to signal their strength or soundness. If, in addition, a major incentive for banks to misreport their true borrowing costs is to influence the index referenced by financial contracts, as we suggest, anonymity may actually make it easier for banks to misreport.

As in the reputation enhancement story of misreporting, the primary problem our theory points to is that in the Libor, and similar indexes derived from surveys, participants face little in the way of costs for submitting false or misleading quotes. Creating a system that properly incentivizes truthful reporting would require major changes and possible unintended
consequences would have to be carefully weighed. On the other hand, our theory suggests a simple approach based on diminishing the incentives for misreporting by adding more banks to the panel. Just as adding firms to a market (usually) makes a market more competitive by reducing the impact any one firm has on price, adding banks to the panel would lower the marginal impact any one bank would have on the rate.

**References**


Appendix

We now introduce a simple model of how member banks submit their quotes. Let $i = 1, \ldots, 16$ be the banks in the Libor panel for a given currency and tenor. Let $t = 1, \ldots, T$ denote the days where the Libor was administered. We let $q_{it} \in [0, \bar{q}]$ denote the quote of bank $i$ at date $t$. The Libor fix, $L_t = L(q_{it}, q_{-it})$, is then the average of the middle 8 quotes.

The true borrowing costs of each bank is denoted $c_{it} \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and the profile of costs $c_t$ is distributed according to the joint distribution $F_t$. We write the net “profit” accruing to bank $i$ in period $t$ as:

$$\Pi_{it}(q_{it}, q_{-it}, c_{it}) = v_{it}L(q_{it}, q_{-it}) + \pi_{it}(q_{it}, q_{-it}, c_{it})$$

(1)

where $v_{it}$ is the bank’s portfolio exposure to the Libor and $\pi_{it}$ captures the reputational motives of the bank. We allow the reputational concerns reflected in $\pi_{it}$ to depend on the quotes of other panel banks and its true borrowing cost, $c_{it}$. This is consistent with our favored interpretation that bank portfolio positions give them an incentive to manipulate the Libor, but they face reputational or other costs for being too far away from other banks and, potentially, for setting quotes too far from their actual costs of borrowing. Note that they are subscripted by bank and time, so we allow for incentives to vary due to, for example, changing bank portfolios.

We choose to model a bank’s payoffs as linear in the Libor as the majority of contracts have linear payouts. Adjustable rate mortgages, futures, forwards, swaps and corporate loans all have linear payouts in their underlying reference index, often the Libor. A portfolio composed entirely of these contracts would itself have a payout linear in the Libor, and although these banks likely do possess a small amount of nonlinear contracts, we consider linearity to be a good approximation. We also assume that $\pi_{it}$ is continuously differentiable,
strictly concave in $q_{it}$ and $\frac{\partial^2 \pi_{it}}{\partial c_{it} \partial q_{it}} > 0$. These latter assumptions reflect our view that banks suffer reputational penalties for submitting increasingly ‘extreme’ quotes and for quotes that are far away from their true costs. We also assume that $F_t$ is absolutely continuous and has full support on $\mathbb{R}_+^{16}$.

Let $\ell(q_{-it})$ denote the fourth lowest quote of $q_{-it}$ and $r(q_{-it})$ is the fourth highest. From $i$’s perspective, these are the points where the marginal response of the Libor changes discontinuously. We now state a proposition that forms the basis of our prediction we should see bunching around the pivotal quotes $\ell(q_{-it})$ and $r(q_{-it})$.

**Proposition 1** Let $q_{-it}$ be such that $\ell(q_{-it}) < r(q_{-it})$. Then if $v_{it} < 0$ ($> 0$) there is an interval of costs where $i$’s best response is to quote $q_{it} = \ell(q_{-it})$ ($= r(q_{-it})$). Moreover, the width of this interval is increasing in $|v_{it}|$.

**Proof:** Suppose that $v_{it} < 0$. Whenever costs are such that

$$- \frac{v_{it}}{8} > \frac{\partial \pi_{it}(q_{it}, q_{-it}, c_{it})}{\partial q_{it}} \bigg|_{q_{it} = \ell(q_{-it})}$$

(2)

$$0 < \frac{\partial \pi_{it}(q_{it}, q_{-it}, c_{it})}{\partial q_{it}} \bigg|_{q_{it} = \ell(q_{-it})}$$

(3)

then $\ell(q_{-it})$ is a local optimum. If, further

$$0 > \frac{\partial \pi_{it}(q_{it}, q_{-it}, c_{it})}{\partial q_{it}} \bigg|_{q_{it} = r(q_{-it})}$$

(4)

then $\ell(q_{-it})$ is a global optimum. This follows from the concavity of $\pi_{it}$ in $q_{it}$ which ensures $\partial \pi_{it}/\partial q_{it}$ is decreasing in $q_{it}$. The other discontinuity, $r$, is not a local equilibrium. Our assumption on the cross derivatives ensures that $\partial \pi_{it}/\partial q_{it}$ is strictly increasing in $c_{it}$ and is thereby invertible in $c_{it}$. Inverting (2) - (4) conditional on $q_{it}$ and $q_{-it}$ defines an open
interval of costs which is weakly increasing in $-v_{it}$. A symmetric argument follows for the case when $v_{it} > 0$. □

This proposition, combined with the absolute continuity and full support of $F_t$, will deliver a point mass at $r(q_{-it})$ or $\ell(q_{-it})$ in the distribution of $q_{it}$ conditional on $q_{-it}$. This logic extends to a perfect information game as well.

**Proposition 2** Let $v_{it} < 0$ for some bank $i$ and let $c_t = (c_1, ..., c_{16})$ be a given profile of borrowing costs. If there is a Nash equilibrium $q_{it}^*$ where $q_{it}^* = \ell(q_{-it}^*) < r(q_{-it}^*)$ then there is an interval $(c_l, c_u)$ of costs for $i$ such that for any $\tilde{c}_{it} \in (c_l, c_u)$, $q_{it}^*$ remains a Nash equilibrium for the new cost profile $\tilde{c}_t = (c_1, ..., \tilde{c}_{it}, ..., c_{16})$.

**Proof:** If $q_{it}^* = \ell(q_{-it})$ is optimal, it is necessarily a local equilibrium, so (2) and (3) must hold for $q_{it}^*$. The only possible other optimal solution is $\tilde{q}_{it} > r(q_{it})$ that satisfies the first order condition $\partial\pi_{it}/\partial q_{it} = 0$. As $q_{it}^*$ is optimal, it must be $\Pi(q_{it}^*, q_{-it}, c_{it}) \geq \Pi(\tilde{q}_{it}, q_{-it}, c_{it})$ or equivalently,

$$-v_{it}[r(q_{-it}) - \ell(q_{-it})] \geq \int_{\ell(q_{-it})}^{q_{it}} \frac{\partial\pi_{it}}{\partial q_{it}} \, dq_{it}$$

(5)

As $\partial\pi_{it}/\partial q_{it}$ is increasing in $c_{it}$ for each $q_{it}$, the right hand side of (5) is increasing in $c_{it}$. So for any $\tilde{c}_{it} < c_{it}$, (5) is satisfied, and if $\tilde{c}_{it}$ satisfies (2) and (3) as well then it remains optimal for $i$ to quote $q_{it}^*$ for costs in this interval. As $i$ quotes the same, and no other cost has changed, it remains a best response for every other bank to quote $q_{-it}$ and $q_{it}^*$ remains an equilibrium for the new cost profile containing $\tilde{c}_{it}$.
Figure 1: One Year LIBOR Quotes and CDS Spreads
Figure 2: Cross Currency Rank Reversals
12-Month U.S. Libor quotes and 1-Year Senior CDS spreads.
Figure 4: Responses in the Libor to a Bank’s Quote

The circles represent the quotes of the 16 banks. The four highest and four lowest quotes are dropped and the average of the remaining eight quotes determines the Libor rate. Shown is the counterfactual Libor rate if one of the middle eight banks were to change their quote.

Figure 5: Discontinuities in the Marginal Response of the Libor

Shown is the marginal benefit and cost curves for banks whose portfolios are such that they profit from a lower overall rate of the Libor.
Figure 6: Clustering of Libor Quotes around Discontinuities in the 3 Month U.S. Libor
Figure 7: 3 Month U.S. Libor Spread - Eurodollar Bid Rate
Figure 8: Citigroup’s LIBOR Quotes Across Currencies in 2009

Shown are the 3 month dollar and euro quotes and 6 month yen quotes. These are the standard rates referenced by dollar and yen interest rate derivatives, as discussed in Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008). Citigroup’s quotes are clustered on the lower discontinuity in the U.S. dollar Libor while clustered on the upper discontinuity in the Yen Libor.