Wolfgang Gick

Visiting Associate Professor of Economics
Dartmouth College
Department of Economics

Telephone: (603) 646-0641
Fax: (603) 646-2122

6106 Rockefeller Hall
Hanover, NH 03755-3514

email: wolfgang.gick "at" dartmouth.edu

My fields of interest are games, information, communication, and contracts. What mechanisms do
multi-player organizations choose to cope with the problems of information gathering and decision making? Is it possible to find internal control schemes that reduce the loss of control in large orga-nizations? Another field of study is the market for technology and what limits firms to signal their
technological ability to outside investors. My third research topic is information gathering and expertise. Why would a CEO prefer to combine the opinion of two biased experts when he could consult only the less-biased expert? I address these questions in complete contracting frameworks,
in costly signaling models, and in cheap talk models, to explain puzzles that we observe in the field
of Industrial Organization, Firm Strategy, and Behavior.

It is my experience and my philosophy that a scholar should aim at succeeding both in teaching
and in advanced research, and that he benefits from reaching these goals together. Before coming
to Dartmouth in 2001, I have held a tenure-track position and a Senior Researcher position
in renowned European institutions, as well as visiting positions at Harvard University.

I received the Dartmouth-wide "Profiles in Excellence" teaching award.

CV

Selected Publications and Working Papers:

Little Firms and Big Patents: A Model of Small-Firm Patent Signaling
Article
Presentation to the 17th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, July 2006   

Delegated Contracting, Information, and Internal Control
Article
Presentation to the 10th ISNIE Conference, Boulder, September 2006   

Two Senders Are Better Than One - A Note on One-dimensional Cheap Talk 
Article

McNollgast's Role of Administrative Procedures Revisited: Rules As Mechanisms Under Collu-
sion and Supervision CES Working Paper #02.5, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 9/2002.
Article

Schumpeter's and Kirzner's entrepreneur reconsidered: Corporate entrepreneurship, subjec-
tivism and the need for a theory of the firm, in: Nicolaj J. Foss and Peter G. Klein (eds.), Entrepreneur-
ship And The Firm: Austrian Perspectives on Economic Organization, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar,
July 2002 .

Challenges for management development in the German-speaking nations for the twenty-first century, in: Journal of Management Development, Volume 18, No. 1, 1999, pp. 18-31. I wrote this article with Gayle Avery, Otmar Donnenberg, and Martin Hilb. The JMD editor and the editorial advisory board awarded
the Highly Commended Author Prize to the authors of this article.
Abstract 
 
On Incentives in Technology Policymaking: What the EU can learn from U.S. developments, CES Working Paper #7.7, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Revised version, July 2000.
Article at Columbia International Affairs Online

Innovationspolitik: Anpassungen im Zeitalter globalisierter Forschung und Entwicklung [Innovation policy: adjustments in an era of globalized research and development] in: Koch, L.
ed. (2001), Wirtschaftspolitik im Wandel [Changing Economic Policy] , Munich and Vienna: Oldenbourg,
pp. 165-180.

Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Förderung von Forschungskooperationen: Unter welchen Bedingungen können cost-shared actions der EU Wirkung zeigen? [Chances and Limits of EU R&D subsidies: The impact of 'cost-shared actions'], in: CESifo Economic Studies ("Ifo Studien"), Volume 44, No. 1, 1998, pp.25-45. This article extends D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's seminal 1988 AER paper and to incorporate EU R&D policy
settings such as "cost-shared actions" into the model.
Abstract 

Courses taught at Dartmouth:

• Economics 1: The Price System
  This is an introductory course of microeconomics covering consumer choice, the behavior of profit-maximi-
  zing firms, competitive markets, monopolies, oligopolies and monopolistic competition. I have taught this
  course from 2001 to 2003.

   

  Economics 21: Intermediate Microeconomics

  The goal of this course is to give a concise and formal treatment of microeconomics by using a more rigorous analytical approach. Basic concepts of individual behavior in markets are explained, how markets coordinate
  the activities of economic agents, and when and why they fail. The main focus is on consumer theory and the theory of the firm, furthermore topics of strategic behavior under symmetric and asymmetric information
  are discussed. I am using the new 7^th edition of Hal Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics" because I think
  that undergraduate students should be given a complete understanding of the Slutsky substitution effect and
  the Slutsky equation to be prepared for grad school. I also focus on an easy treatment of new topics like
  platform markets, entry deterrence and exclusive dealing. I have taught this course starting Spring 2004
  and am teaching it again now in Spring 2007. The course page is www.dartmouth.edu/~econ21wg

   

  Economics 28: Public Economics 

  This course considers the theoretical tools of public economics and public finance. It offers a comprehensive treatment of public goods, externalities, political economics and public choice. The economic effects of expen-
  diture policies, such as social security, Medicare, welfare, and environmental policies are applications that are
  discussed in detail.  The course concludes with an examination of the U.S. tax system, paying attention both
  to institutional details and the economic effects of the tax system on individual behavior. I have taught this
  course in Fall 2004 and 2005, and used Jonathan Gruber's "Public Finance and Public Policy."

• Economics 35: Games and Economic Behavior

  Economics 35 is part of Dartmouth's IO sequence and offers a treatment of the basic concepts of game theory
  with an emphasis on economic applications. Topics covered are static and dynamic games with complete and
  with incomplete information, equilibrium concepts, refinements, and signaling games.
  Course Page

   

• Economics 81: Advanced Topics in Microeconomics (Contract Theory)
  Economics 81 is an advanced course on the economics of information. The course covers the theory of incentives, the principal-agent model, adverse selection, moral hazard, mechanism design, the informed principal problem
  with applications to regulation and corporate finance.
  Course Page