Vox Populi
The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the United States withdraw its
combat forces from Iraq reflects a growing national consensus that our military
cannot quell the violence there and may even be making matters worse. Although
many are hailing this recommendation as a bold new course, it is not bold
enough. America will best serve its interests in the Persian Gulf by
withdrawing its ground-based military forces not only from Iraq, but from the
entire region.
Critics of the report continue to debate the wisdom and details of a drawdown
in Iraq, but there has been no debate about America's broader strategy in the
gulf. Policymakers and analysts from across the political spectrum assume that
the United States must maintain a robust military presence there.
Daryl G. Press
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Benjamin Valentino (Photos by Joseph Mehling '69)
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The bipartisan authors of the report, for example, advocate maintaining
"a considerable military presence in the region" including
"powerful air, ground and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain and
Qatar" even after the last American combat troops leave Iraq.
Others—including Donald Rumsfeld and Hillary Clinton—go further and consider
strengthening our forces around the Gulf by shifting some troops from Iraq to
neighboring countries.
Maintaining a large military presence in the region has been the cornerstone
of American policy since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and remains so today. With
the Iraq war, we now have tens of thousands of troops elsewhere in the
neighborhood.
But this strategy is flawed. In fact, many of the same considerations that
led the Iraq Study Group to call for withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq
suggest that the United States should withdraw its troops from neighboring
states as well—leaving only naval forces offshore in international waters. As
in Iraq, a large U.S. military footprint on the ground undermines American
interests more than it protects them.
Just as our troops on Iraqi streets have provided a rallying point for the
insurgency, the United States military presence throughout the region has been
a key element in Al Qaeda's recruitment campaign and propaganda. If America
withdrew from Iraq but left behind substantial forces in neighboring states, Al
Qaeda would refocus its attacks on American troops in those countries—remember
the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia?
Worse, the continued presence of our military personnel across the region
will continue to incite extremists to attack American cities. Osama bin Ladin
repeatedly stated that the presence of American forces on the holy ground of
the Arabian Peninsula was a primary reason for 9/11.
Our presence also destabilizes our important regional allies. Not only do
American bases make these countries a target for terrorists, but many of their
citizens bristle at the sight of U.S. bases on their soil. Indeed, the most
serious near-term threat to our energy interests is the overthrow of friendly
governments by domestic Islamic extremists, a danger that is increased by the
presence of our troops.
The good news is that the United States does not need to station military
forces on the ground in Persian Gulf countries to protect its allies or to
secure its vital oil interests. For nearly 30 years, Pentagon planners have
focused on two principal threats in the Gulf: the conquest of major oil
reserves (by the Soviet Union or a regional power like Iraq or Iran) and
interference with shipping through Persian Gulf waters, particularly through
the Strait of Hormuz. Forces stationed "over the horizon"—afloat in
the Indian Ocean and at bases outside the Middle East—can address both
threats.
By maintaining a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean, along with some
naval forces in the international waters of the Persian Gulf itself, the United
States would be able to thwart an invasion of any Gulf oil producer. Long-range
American aircraft stationed at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean,
could contribute as well. Should more substantial threats arise, those air and
naval forces would buy time for ground forces and land-based aircraft to return
to bases in the region.
This is the same strategy that the United States used to defend the Persian
Gulf during the later years of the Cold War. It would be even more effective
now. Today's adversaries have considerably less offensive military power than
15 years ago: the Soviet Union is gone; two wars with the United States have
destroyed Iraq's offensive capacity; and Iran's poorly trained and ill-equipped
ground forces have grown even more obsolete.
While the threats have withered, new technology has vastly increased
American military capabilities. Today, aircraft carrier strike groups can carry
hundreds of precision land-attack cruise missiles in addition to their
complement of aircraft (which also drop precision weapons). And long-range Air
Force bombers are now far more lethal against ground targets, particularly
targets advancing across highways and open desert.
Yes, there are limits to our military might. America's vast firepower is ill
suited for policing the streets of Baghdad, or forcing Sunnis, Shiites and
Kurds to get along in Iraq. But our modern weapons could easily halt an Iraqi
or Iranian invasion in its tracks.
Protecting the flow of oil through narrow shipping lanes in the Gulf is a
more difficult mission. But responding to Iranian mines or cruise-missile
attacks on oil tankers would not require ground forces or land-based aircraft
to be stationed in the Persian Gulf during peacetime. In fact, in a war in the
Strait of Hormuz, American operations would be carried out largely by
submarines, surface ships and naval aircraft-all of which could be stationed in
the Indian Ocean during peacetime.
There are, of course, other threats to American interests in the region.
Terrorists could damage key oil fields and ports, or friendly governments in
the Gulf could be toppled by anti-American extremists. These concerns, however,
do not justify peacetime forward deployment. United States allies play the
primary role defending their own oil fields and safeguarding their internal
security, and their forces are better suited for the job. If anything, the
presence of "infidel" soldiers nearby increases the likelihood of
terrorist attacks and political upheaval.
This does not mean the United States can withdraw all its military power
from the region tomorrow. As the Iraq Study Group persuasively argued, forces
will be needed in Iraq during a transition to train Iraqi troops, to guard
against threats to topple the government in Baghdad, and to strike at any newly
discovered Al Qaeda threats. But these missions can be conducted from a small
number of temporary Iraqi bases in remote parts of the country, where the
American soldiers would be less visible and less vulnerable.
The Iraq war is now a painful failure for the United States. One silver
lining brightens that gray backdrop. The Iraq debacle creates an opportunity to
reassess long-standing policies that would otherwise be too difficult to change
and prompts us to rethink the premises of United States military policy toward
the Persian Gulf region. The best way to increase our security and the
stability of that troubled region is, paradoxically, to drastically reduce our
military presence there.
By DARYL G.
PRESS, associate professor of government, BENJAMIN
VALENTINO, assistant professor of government, and EUGENE GHOLZ, assistant
professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin
This essay originally appeared in The New York Times on Dec. 12,
2006.
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