

GERMAN JEWS AND AMERICAN REALISM

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What it means to be a refugee cannot be described in the simple terms of finding a job and adjusting to foreign customs. It is a way of being, constantly lingering between arrival and departure.

- - Henry Pachter¹

From about 1950 until the end of the Cold War realism was the dominant paradigm in international relations in the United States and widely influential abroad. It never went unchallenged and other paradigms have made considerable inroads. Within the realist paradigm there is now considerable diversity. Realism is unusual in being one of the few developments in international relations theory that has had significant impact in the wider world. Policymakers, military officers, intelligence officials and journalists, and not just in the United States, tend to be far more accepting of the so-called verities of realism than most scholars.

Realism was propelled to the forefront of thinking about international relations by the pre- and early post-war writings of Nicholas Spykman (a Dutch immigrant), Arnold Wolfers (a Swiss who left Nazi Germany where he ran a prominent institute in Berlin), E. H. Carr (British), William T. R. Fox (American) and Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz (German-Jewish immigrants). In the United States, by the far the most influential realists were Morgenthau and Herz. *Politics Among Nations*, first published in 1948, had an extraordinary print run. The sixth and posthumous edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, appeared in 1985.² John Herz's early works on international relations theory, published in 1950 and 1951, were followed by a widely read text in 1959.³ Morgenthau and Herz were particularly influential because they developed the theoretical outlines for

a paradigm, and a full-blown theory in Morgenthau's case. Unlike Herz, who was shy and retiring and described himself as introverted, Morgenthau thrived on public exposure. His numerous lectures, newspapers, radio and television interviews, magazine articles and later, magazine articles about him, did much to publicize his books and propagate the fundamentals of his brand of realism.

It is certainly possible that the paradigm of realism would have developed in the absence of these two German-Jewish refugees. In the aftermath of World War II and America's rise to "superpower" status (a term introduced by realist William T. R. Fox in 1944), realism provided the intellectual foundations for an activist foreign policy based largely on considerations of power.⁴ It seems less likely that home-grown realism would have been embedded in a general theory of international relations that claimed validity across cultures and epochs. Kenneth Waltz published such a theory in 1979, but it was written very much in response to the earlier works of Morgenthau and Herz. Their writings are distinct in another sense; they are worldly in way more parochial American political science is not. While they aim at a synthetic and parsimonious treatment of international relations they are aware of numerous complexities, including the independent role of leaders and the importance and diversity of regime types; characteristic features of international relations that confound the kind of theories they aspire to construct. Educated in the German idealist tradition, they conceived of international relations theory as a transformative project and one closely linked to ethical imperatives. These features of their writings were largely ignored during the Cold War – even dismissed as irrelevant or embarrassing – but have been increasingly welcomed and

emphasized in the post-Cold War era by scholars attempting to reconstruct what has come to be called "classical realism."

We all recognize how the intellectual life of America was enriched by scholars and writers fleeing European tyrannies. After World War II, a few emigres returned home, but most remained. This generation of emigres – the majority were born in the last decade of the nineteenth century or the first decade of the twentieth – had a profound impact in their new countries, and often in their old countries if they were fortunate enough to have postwar democratic governments. Both vectors of influence are worth studying, especially in comparative perspective.⁵

Equally worthy of investigation and also beyond the purview of this paper, are younger emigres, social scientists and historians, who were largely or entirely educated in North America. They arrived before the War, usually with their parents. This generation also produced notable scholars, among them Harry Eckstein (who arrived sans parents), Fritz Stern, George Mosse and Arno Mayer. There is a younger generation still: those born in the middle 1930s to early 1940s who came to the United States during or after the war. They often lost one or both parents in the Holocaust. Those among them who became social scientists, often developed research agendas, like those of earlier émigrés, that were significantly influenced by their European experiences.⁶ They have been largely neglected as a group, although extensively honored as individuals. One member of this cohort, Daniel Kahneman, spent the War on the run with his family in occupied France, returned to Israel afterwards, did his graduate study at Berkeley and was awarded a Nobel Prize in 2002.

Immigration has been intensively studied and we know from the literature and our own encounters with immigrants just how wrenching and uprooting this experience can prove. Intellectuals and scholars were often in a privileged position in that they had friends, colleagues and sometimes jobs waiting for them when they arrived. Many, however, did not and depended on charity and menial, poorly paid jobs. Even those scholars who were quickly picked up by ranking American institutions acknowledge suffering culture shock as America differed from Germany in so many ways. Its university culture, approaches to social science and philosophy and the role of professors in society. Beyond everyday and professional concerns, most émigrés, like their non-professorial counterparts, suffered mounting anxieties about the fate of family members, friends and colleagues back in Europe.

Emigré scholars had highly idiosyncratic encounters with the countries in which they sought refuge. Certain generalizations are nevertheless possible and permit us to establish a framework against which to understand and evaluate individual experiences and responses. Not every émigré scholar fits neatly into the four patterns I describe but they are useful ideal types for making sense of the emigré experience. To illustrate and analyze these patterns and the kinds of intellectual and emotional choices they represent I draw existing biographical and autobiographical accounts of the personal and professional lives of a number of scholars of emigrated to the United States in the 1930s. I supplement these accounts with insights gained from first-hand encounters with political scientists with whom I studied or worked, among them Hans Morgenthau, Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Karl Deutsch, John Herz and Henry Pachter. I studied with Hans and worked as his research assistant at the University of Chicago. We later became

colleagues and friends at City College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Karl was my mentor in graduate school at Yale in the early 1960s. John and Henry were colleagues at City College and the Graduate Center

I use the term émigré in preference to refugee. Refugee is a legal category, defined in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It describes people who must flee their native land due to persecution by dint of their political views, race, nationality, religion or membership in a particular social group. An émigré is someone who chooses to leave his or her country for another one. Almost all of the émigré scholars who come within the purview of this paper would have qualified as refugees if the UN Convention had been in effect at the time. The April 1933 *Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufs Beamtentums* [Law to Restore the Professional Civil Service], dismissed more than 16 percent of the German professoriate, most of them on the ground of being "non-Aryan." By 1938, 39 percent of German professors had lost their jobs, and the figure was 47 percent for social scientists. The *List of Displaced German Scholars* prepared in the fall of 1936 by the *Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland* (founded by exiles in Zurich in 1933) and the London Academic Assistance Council identified 1,639 German scholars who had been fired.⁷

The popular understanding of the term refugee assumes that people who flee persecution arrive with little more than the clothes on their back. Unfortunately, many émigré scholars fit this description. Others, who left in the early days of Fascism, or who had sponsors or positions waiting in America, were in a better position.

INITIAL ENCOUNTERS

A few émigrés, especially those on the left, believed that Hitler would prove a short-lived phenomenon and the prelude to socialist revolution. Many comrades sought temporary refuge in France, the "natural" home of all revolutionaries. Some non-socialists shared this expectation. Ernst Cassirer, who left Germany for America before Hitler came to power, told Henry Pachter in New York: "You know. . . this Hitler is an error (*Irrtum*) of History; he does not belong in Germany history at all. And therefore he will perish."⁸ Most refugees recognized that Hitler would be in power long enough to make their life in Germany, if not in Europe, impossible. There was a push to emigrate to America, even when there was no pull. John Herz is a case in point. He reluctantly convinced himself that "the leap into the dark and uncertain" could no longer be postponed even though the New World seemed "utterly alien" to him at the time. Influenced by continental prejudices, he shared the widely held view that America, like Rome, was "a mere civilization," in contrast to the Greece of "European culture."⁹

Some refugees had easy professional transitions from Europe to America. Older scholars with international reputations – Albert Einstein, Hans Bethe, Ernst Cassirer – were readily welcomed and offered positions at top-flight institutions. Some of them had independent financial resources and had learned English by virtue of earlier stays in the U.S. Physicists were particularly well-placed in this regard. American graduate students and professors routinely visited all the major universities and laboratories in Europe. Germans and other European physicists had spent time at Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, Chicago and Berkeley, all of which were interested in building up their physics departments. Emotionally, migration to America was difficult because of the personal and cultural ruptures it created and threatening personal and political conditions under

which it was carried out. Victor Weisskopf, who later won a Nobel Prize in physics, came to the University of Rochester via Zurich and Copenhagen. He recalls his first years in America as “a period when you were asked if you were expecting children, and you said, 'No, first we expect parents.'”¹⁰

Other emigrés had a more difficult time. Several, like Bruno Bettelheim and Marie Jahoda, spent time in Nazi concentration camps or prisons before their departure for the New World.¹¹ Many of those who left wandered from country to country in search of a permanent refuge. Morgenthau’s journey started in Geneva, after which he moved to Madrid where he and his wife happily settled in. The Spanish Civil War and subsequent siege of Madrid ended their idyll and propelled the Morgenthaus into a state of limbo. They criss-crossed Western Europe going from consulate to consulate in search of a visa for the United States. Success and emigration led to a more physically secure but equally precarious economic existence. They reached New York in July 1937, just as unemployment was reaching a peak; between May 1937 and June 1938 it increased from 11 to 20 percent. Arriving late in the game, Morgenthau found most academic positions already taken by Americans or earlier arrivals from Europe. He also lacked contacts. The only academic he knew was Richard Gottheil, professor of Semitic Languages at Columbia University, whom he had met in Paris. To his dismay, Morgenthau discovered that he had since died. “My only hope was gone.”¹²

Morgenthau wrote letters to endless institutions in search of employment and traveled the Midwest by train in the hope that showing up in person would meet with more success. Nobody was interested. Fortune finally smiled upon him when someone at Brooklyn College fell ill and he was offered a temporary replacement position for a

measly \$30 a week. Morgenthau taught long hours in English, a language he was still learning, and prepared lectures on subjects of which he had no prior mastery. In the classroom he was harassed by communist students because of his anti-communism. They would stand up and shout at him while he lectured. His wife Irma worked selling hats at Macy's and the couple received some help from her cousin, Samuel Rothschild, and an occasional check from one of the several refugee institutions that supported émigré scholars. What Irma remembered most about this period was that "I was hungry most of the time." After seventeenth months of living hand-to-mouth in Manhattan Morgenthau landed a job at the University of Kansas City.

John Herz also had a rocky start in New York. "I remained in the giant city, all by myself. It seemed that the age-old, fearful dream of lonely walking the city streets had become reality. Never before had I felt so lonely and abandoned."¹³ In vain, he used the dilapidated typewriter he had brought with him to write about a hundred letters to colleagues, colleges and universities seeking jobs, accompanied by letters of recommendation. In his despair he considered hiring himself out, along with a girl he had met, as a servant and maid. Back in Europe, his brother Gerhard had befriended the Roselli brothers, Florentine anti-fascists who were later assassinated in France by Mussolini's agents. They had given Gerhard a letter of introduction to Max Ascoli, another Italian anti-fascist who had immigrated to New York and secured a professorship at the New School. Ascoli knew the Flexner brothers, well-to-do descendants of German-Jews who had settled in Louisville after the 1848 Revolution. Gerhard had been hired by a college in Louisville due to Bernard Flexner's intervention. Bernard's brother Abraham had founded the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton. Gerhard spoke to

his brother and John was hired as a research assistant. He stayed there three years and remembers them as among the most productive of his life.¹⁴

Herz's first teaching job was at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut in the spring term of 1940. His appointment was not extended, a colleague told him, because of his "non-Aryan background."¹⁵ He left Princeton to work at Howard University, where he made the acquaintance of Ralph Bunche and confronted America's race problem from the inside looking out. In 1943, with most Americans of university age serving in the military, he became redundant at Howard and moved to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He worked with Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer – three fellow "enemy aliens" -- in the Central European Section to prepare American officials for the occupation of Germany. He found the job extremely challenging and frustrating, having to negotiate between Henry Morgenthau's desire for a punitive peace that would have de-industrialized Germany and anti-communists who wanted to build it up as quickly as possible as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. His immediate colleagues were Marxists who hoped that democratic reconstruction would pave the way for socialism. He returned briefly to Germany via liberated Paris to assist in the Nuremberg War tribunal, where he had the opportunity to interrogate former Nazi Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick before he was tried and hanged. In 1952, Herz accepted a professorship in the political science department of The City College of New York (CCNY), where he stayed until his retirement in 1977.¹⁶

Emigrés faced major linguistic and psychological hurdles. The majority did not speak English, and the minority who did, spoke it far from perfectly. Einstein never felt fully comfortable expressing himself in the language. To the best of my knowledge, none

of the adult refugees ever learned to speak English accent free. Even those with a good command – and almost all would become fluent in due course – admit to missing their native tongue. Vladimir Nabokov, who wrote stunning English, testified to "the intensity of pain which he experienced at the loss of his native language."¹⁷ John Herz, Henry Pachter and Karl Deutsch, whose mastery of English was better than most native speakers, felt they had renounced part of themselves when they gave up daily use of the languages with which they had been raised. Herz chose to write his autobiography in German and set off its chapters with quotes from Goethe.¹⁸ Pachter lamented that conversation in German among fellow emigres was not the same: "We the pure ones, the bearers and preservers of German culture, became guilty of something worse: our language froze at the point of emigration, or it even became poorer for want of a dialogue with the people who create and develop speech every day. The sweet preciousness of the past. . . was no substitute for living communion."¹⁹

Emigrés who were fortunate enough to secure university positions, found it necessary to adapt to a very different academic culture. At top institutions, these differences were often welcomed. Hans Bethe arrived at Cornell in 1935 and was immediately struck by the extensive contact he was expected to have with graduate students. "It was customary in Europe to let the professor address the class and talk and write formally on the blackboard and then leave. The students would listen and try to understand. Occasionally a few came forward at the end of the lecture to ask a question or two; whereas here, whenever a student feels like it, he asks a question. I think it's much better."²⁰ Henri Peyre was impressed by the holdings of the libraries and how helpful the librarians were. The French department at Yale had highly proficient

secretaries to type faculty manuscripts and they went to better run presses with superior editing, resulting in more professional products.²¹ Erwin Panofsky was absolutely amazed that he could request and read a book at the New York Public Library without first being vouched for by two responsible citizens.²²

For social scientists there was also a negative side to American university culture. Theodor Adorno was disturbed “by a basic methodological problem – understanding the word 'method' more in its European sense of epistemology than its American sense, in which methodology virtual signifies practical techniques of research.” He had a strong negative reaction to the stimulus-response research program in psychology, which rested on the assumption that something was “objectively” knowable.²³ Franz Neumann rooted a similar objection in a broader understanding of the different intellectual traditions of European and American social science. The world view of continental scholars had been shaped by German idealism, Marxism and historicism. “All three have in common that they are comprehensive systems of thought claiming to fit every phenomenon into its system. All three express the extraordinary weight of an historical tradition. Thus the thought of German scholars was primarily theoretical and historical – rarely empirical and pragmatic. It makes for skepticism.”²⁴ Such skepticism was a two-way street. Back in Europe, “The whole theoretical-historical approach is (or rather was) accompanied by contempt for Anglo-American philosophy. I still hear the sneers of my philosophy professor about Locke, Condillac, and Dewey, while Whitehead was greeted with silence then as now.”²⁵

These differences were less pronounced in economics where there was a strong affinity between the Viennese school and American approaches; both emphasized

quantitative approaches and models. Leading Austrian economists – among them, Friedrich Hayek, Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar Morgenstern and Gerhard Tintner -- had previously visited the U.S., had close contacts in the country and had learned some English. Some used these visits to scout out more permanent employment.²⁶ Quantitatively inclined sociologists and philosophers of the so-called Vienna Circle (e.g., Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, Otto Neurath) received a hearty welcome because their ideas were also compatible with those of many of their American colleagues.²⁷ The same was true of the roughly forty German and other European psychoanalysts; they arrived at a time when young Turks in the American profession were trying to move it in their direction. Many of the émigrés were central figures in a closely knit international community.²⁸

There was also a question of status. Franz Neumann noted the different function of universities in the two countries. “The German universities considered themselves to be training grounds for an élite – although that élite was constituted solely by a socio-economic criterion and not by intellectual achievements; the American universities were organs of a democratic educational principle – that is the participation of the largest possible number of its citizens in the benefits of education, the elite training being a mere fraction of the total educational effort.” The German professor was part of “a privileged caste with fairly high pay and extraordinarily high social prestige. The American college and university teacher enjoyed virtually none of these privileges.” The German professor is a researcher, his American counterpart a teacher. The German professor often considered his students a nuisance.²⁹

The situation was more difficult for faculty who did not find professorships at the most prestigious institutions. Hans Morgenthau's situation was again typical in this regard. Mrs. Morgenthau remembered that "Kansas City was heaven after the New York curse. We were very well received there. The mid-western friendliness and neighborliness cured me from many of my ills, my bitterness, my fears."³⁰ Her husband nevertheless labored under terrible conditions. He was given a tiny, odorific office that had once been a bathroom; thirty years later he told me that he still remembered the smell. The library owned only one volume on international law, making it necessary for him to travel every summer he could afford it to New York to conduct his research in the Columbia University library. He had to teach American as well as international law. He felt himself trapped "in a kind of slave labor camp."³¹ In 1943, he was rescued by the University of Chicago, which offered him a temporary appointment at a six month salary that was more than twice of his annual salary in Kansas City. His appointment was extended and ultimately made permanent.

The other impediment to Jewish émigré scholars was anti-Semitism, compounded by growing anti-immigrant sentiment. Franz Neumann thought the U.S. of the 1930s more anti-Semitic than Germany, although there were no laws discriminating against Jews.³² Harvard-based Viennese economist Joseph Schumpeter, who was not Jewish, did his best to hire Jewish emigre scholars, first at Harvard and then at other institutions. He met so much resistance that he gave up.³³ The Rockefeller Foundation sought to help, but some of their staff were anti-Semitic, including the head of their Paris office.³⁴

Fortunately, there were philo-Semitic individuals and institutions. The Carnegie Corporation, the Quakers, the Joint Distribution Committee, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine all sponsored Jewish immigrants and made efforts to find them jobs.

The Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, founded by Abraham Flexner, took in a number of Jewish émigré scholars, among them Albert Einstein and Erwin Panofsky, but also younger and lesser known figures like John Herz. Most impressive were the efforts of Alvin Johnson, who organized the University in Exile in 1933 as a division of the New School for Social Research. It was intended as a haven for scholars who had to flee fascism. Initially funded by Hiram Halle and the Rockefeller Foundation, it hired fourteen émigrés, including Hannah Arendt, Arnold Brecht, Eric Fromm, Hans Jonas, Karl Lowenstein, Hans Speier, Leo Strauss and Max Wertheimer. The New School also established the *École Libre des Hautes Études*, which received a charter from Charles de Gaulle's Free French government in exile. The *École* attracted such distinguished refugee scholars as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jacques Maritain and Roman Jakobson. Unlike most of the Germans, the French considered exile temporary and returned home after the War.³⁵

Personal and professional difficulties were reinforcing and led many émigrés to think of themselves as living a liminal existence; they were no longer part of their original culture – many felt it had ceased to exist -- and they neither understood nor fully sympathized with their new one. Henry Pachter observed that "more often exile destroys talent, or it means loss of the environment that nourished the talent morally, socially and physically."³⁶ This was the plight of some refugees, especially writers who felt cut off from their audiences and culture. Kurt Tucholsky, Walter Hasenclever, Stefan Zweig,

Klaus Mann, Ernst Weiss and Ernst Toller committed suicide. Among social scientists, the older ones often felt the most out of their element and like Kurt Riezler, lamented that they were too advanced in age to take advantage of the opportunities America offered.³⁷

A substantial proportion faced the additional burden of trying to support themselves and their families and of bringing over siblings, parents or grandparents still in Europe. Economists aside, almost everyone agreed that the New Deal made it easier, and even created a sense of euphoria for liberal and socialist immigrants. Many hoped that the New Deal could achieve what Weimar had not.³⁸ Pachter observed that emigration and a new life was made psychologically easier by the alienation of German-Jewish intellectuals who had also thought of themselves as outsiders in the Weimar Republic.³⁹ Herz shared this sentiment. He readily acknowledged that his world had collapsed and that he had redefined himself as an outsider before leaving Germany for Geneva, his way station en route to New York.⁴⁰ Paul Tillich stressed the benefits of cultural alienation. The creative spirit, he insisted, should be "the permanent émigré in the world."⁴¹ Louis Wirth voiced similar sentiments. He thought the concept of intellectual immigrants redundant because intellectuals are nomads and should never feel at home, even in the countries of their birth.⁴² Hans Speier, the youngest émigré social scientist at the New School, also gave exile a positive spin. Cultural alienation provided its own transportable identity. "The intellectual may change his location. . . but does not become a stranger." He welcomed his exile as a kind of second youth.⁴³ Years later, Adolph Lowe described himself and his colleagues as *Emigrationsgewinner*. That was decidedly not how it appeared to any of them at the time.⁴⁴

The majority of German émigrés aspired to become Americans. Some had begun to prepare before leaving home. Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann began intensive study of English in 1932 in expectation of emigration. Adolf Löwe, a Kiel economist kept a suitcase packed once Hitler came to power.⁴⁵ Even those intent on citizenship and assimilation were loath to shed their language, culture and German or European intellectual commitments as they were central to their identity. John Herz felt himself so strongly rooted not only in Germany, but in the Rhineland – his local home or *Heimat*, that he could not visualize a life elsewhere.⁴⁶ For most emigrés identity would remain a central issue for decades, if not for the remainder of their lives. As we will see, they approached the problem of identity in a variety of creative ways, in a manner that was generally consistent with the kinds of intellectual choices they made.

PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

Following the War, American universities expanded to accommodate the education boom made possible by the GI bill. By 1950, 49 of 64 émigré political scientists had found more or less permanent positions. German-Jewish refugees made important contributions in four of the five sub-fields of political science: international relations, comparative politics, political theory and methodology. One of them, Karl Deutsch (originally from Prague) would become president of APSA in 1969, and later of IPSA and the society for General Systems Research.⁴⁷ By the 1960s, members of the discipline were increasingly conscious of the collective contribution of emigre scholars, and the first book about them, edited by Franz Neumann appeared in 1953.⁴⁸

Looking backwards, many trajectories appear consistent, if not preordained. A focus on professional success can obscure the different paths that led to it as well and even more, those that did not. The response to émigrés scholars to America – and its response to them -- was neither uniform nor linear. Claus-Dieter Krohn offers a three-fold typology: adjustment without much difficulty, refusal to make any concessions to the New World and withdrawal into non-political concerns.⁴⁹ I find these categories enigmatic as the last two are by no means inconsistent with successful adjustment. Leo Strauss and Theodor Adorno fit in his second category because of their immutable world views, yet both were very successful professionally.

Franz Neumann proposes four categories on the basis of the choices scholars made concerning the European intellectual milieu in which they studied, and perhaps began their professional lives, and the American one in which they subsequently found themselves. They could abandon their previous intellectual orientations and accept the new one without qualification; retain their old orientation and convince themselves that their mission was to revamp the American system; withdraw from engagement with the new; or attempt to integrate their old ideas and experiences with the new environment. He considers the last the most difficult but most rewarding strategy.⁵⁰ I reformulate and extend his typology. The four patterns I describe were viable choices all of which had the potential to lead to productive research programs and international recognition. I exclude from my analysis mathematicians, scientists, most economists and psychiatrists because European and American research in their respective fields, or clinical practice in the case of psychiatrists, was sufficiently compatible that they did not confront the kinds of difficult intellectual choices Neumann and I describe.

These four patterns are independent of the choice for assimilation versus waiting out the war in the expectation of returning home and degree of willingness to adopt the outward trappings of American culture. Hannah Arendt, who is best described as a synthetic thinker, refused for years to accept that her exile was permanent. At considerable expense, she and her husband lived in furnished hotel rooms as part of their unrealistic commitment to temporary exile.⁵¹ When Henry Pachter bought a used car Hannah Arendt and her husband considered it a sign of assimilation and betrayal.⁵² Czech born Max Wertheimer, one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, signaled his non-assimilation in his appearance. He went around New York in a Loden coat with a rucksack.⁵³ He died in September 1943, while a professor at the New School, so we do not know how his later career would have developed.

The first pattern of my typology is characterized by rejection of the old and the new. Scholars who chose this path tended to spurn the old as tyranny and the new as the harbinger of tyranny. They led liminal lives outside the mainstream. Herman Broch continued to write as if he were in Germany and rated as "zero" American influences on his work.⁵⁴ Thomas Mann lived as a friend among alien strangers.⁵⁵ Wilhelm Reich arrived in America in 1939 and although he lectured for a while at the New School, established few contacts with Americans or even other refugees. He limited his acquaintances largely to his disciples.⁵⁶ Leo Strauss is the paradigmatic example in political science. Back in Germany, he had rejected the fact-value distinction on which modern social science rests and liberalism more generally. He maintained his beliefs at the New School and at the University of Chicago, where he taught from 1949 to 1969, and at both institutions sought disciples to propagate his views.

Max Horkheimer followed the same trajectory, but as a man of the left. He was a Marxist critic of Weimar Germany and became a Marxist critic of liberal America. His *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, coauthored with Theodor Adorno, and first published in German in the New York in 1944, became a core text of critical theory. It expressed deep pessimism about the possibility of human emancipation and freedom, a position Horkheimer would maintain for the rest of his life.⁵⁷ He admitted that his 1933 expulsion from Germany was profoundly disruptive, as was his relative isolation on the upper west side of Manhattan. He chose a life of “quiet scholarly work,” having decided that it was better to “live as a philosopher, that is, in the world of imagination and abstract ideas [because] concrete reality is too unpleasant.”⁵⁸ Although he became an American citizen in 1940, Horkheimer returned to Germany in 1949 to help reopen the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University.

The second pattern involves old outright rejection and enthusiastic adoption of the new. This has been a common mode of coping for younger immigrants to America and many younger emigrés also adopted this strategy. The art historian Erwin Panofsky, who arrived in 1931 to teach at New York University, did not flee Hitler but emigrated as a matter of choice. Once here he gave up his left Kantian perspective to adopt a more positivist approach. Political scientist Henry Pachter underwent an even more profound intellectual and political reorientation. In Germany he was an active member of a Communist Party cell and committed to socialist revolution. In America he gave up his Marxism to become an American liberal, from which perspective he wrote books about Germany, socialism and the first book-length study of the Cuban missile crisis.⁵⁹ For

Panofsky, the strategy was rewarding and his work on iconology greatly enhanced his international reputation.

The third pattern involves a rejection of the old and adoption of the new before leaving Europe. Emigration was made necessary by Hitler, but may have been welcomed by some of these scholars even in the absence of the Nazi threat because of the professional opportunities it offered. Paul Lazarsfeld and Karl Deutsch exemplify this orientation. Lazarsfeld earned his Ph.D. in mathematics in Vienna in 1925, became an associate of the Vienna circle and gradually moved into sociology, in part through his involvement with the socialists. In 1932, with his first wife, sociologist Marie Jahoda and Hans Zeissel, he coauthored a pioneering study of the social impact of unemployment on a small community.⁶⁰ The so-called Marienthal study used survey data and statistical analysis to show that sustained unemployment made workers more apathetic than revolutionary. It attracted the attention of the Rockefeller Foundation, which offered Lazarsfeld a two-year traveling fellowship to the United States. In 1933, he applied for American citizenship, convinced that there was no future for him in Europe.⁶¹

Lazarsfeld became director of a Rockefeller Foundation funded project on radio communications. His research, which made use of extensive public opinion surveys, pioneered the field of mass communications. It studied why messages are introduced into the media and why people attend to them. In the mid-1980s the directors of CBS, ABC, and NBC were his former students. Lazarsfeld went on to found university institutes of applied research at the University of Newark, Princeton University, and the one he would work at for many years, the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia

University. In 1949, he was elected president of the American Association for Public Opinion Research and in 1961, president of the American Sociological Association.⁶²

Karl Deutsch was born in 1912 in Prague. He began graduate work in optics at the Deutsche Universität but became increasingly active in leading anti-Nazi student groups. When the University was taken over by a coalition of Nazi professors and students he left for England to continue his studies. On returning home he was granted admission to the Czech national Charles University, a signal honor for someone classified as a German-ethnic Czech. He received his doctorate in law in 1938. Shortly thereafter, Deutsch and his wife left for a brief visit to the United States. Following Munich and the German occupation of the Sudetenland, the Deutsch's decided to remain in the U.S.⁶³ He worked for the government during the War and was a member of the secretariat at the San Francisco conference that created the United Nations. After the War he resumed his doctoral studies at Harvard, but in political science. In 1951, he was appointed professor of history and political science at MIT.⁶⁴ In 1953, his dissertation was published and immediately propelled him into the front rank of quantitatively oriented political scientists.⁶⁵ *Nationalism and Social Communication* stressed the role of common symbols and experiences in creating a people and the relative onset of mobilization versus assimilation in determining the ability of a state to assimilate another people. It also required responsiveness on the part of political elites to the needs of communities they were seeking to assimilate.

Deutsch's research agenda was the product of his first-hand experience with the tragic consequences of nationalism in large multi-ethnic societies. His second major project, a coauthored work on supra-national communities, envisaged them as one

solution to the dangers of nationalism. Drawing on historical case studies prepared by his coauthors, Deutsch emphasized the possibility and benefits of “security communities,” regions of the world whose peoples retain their governments but consider war among their states unthinkable. He stressed the density and effectiveness of two-way channels of communications between elites and mass and among non-elites as the key to their development.⁶⁶ A third prominent book, *The Nerves of Government*, offered a fuller presentation of the cybernetic approach to communication and politics that formed the foundation of Deutsch’s two earlier studies.⁶⁷ Deutsch differs from Lazarsfeld in that his research agenda only developed in exile. However, some of the methods he used – surveys, quantitative data and statistical analysis -- were in part an application or elaboration of the methods he had learned when studying optics in Prague.

The fourth pattern is best described as synthesis and involves combining features of the old and the new. Social science refugees were in some ways ideally situated to pursue this strategy. They arrived in an optimistic, confident society whose focus was empirical and present-oriented. They came imbued, in the words of Edward Shils, with “the awareness of the possibilities of decay of the social order, of the possibilities of disruption of what once seemed stable.” They brought familiarity and respect for Freud, Marx and Weber.⁶⁸ Among the scholars who embraced this strategy are Erich Fromm, Hannah Arendt, Hans Morgenthau and John Herz. The careers of Morgenthau and Herz illustrate two different routes to synthesis. Morgenthau rejected his earlier intellectual milieu, a process that began while he was still in Germany and accelerated in Geneva and the United States. In the course of his life in the United States, he moved away from extreme rejection of the Enlightenment, characteristic of his first decade of exile, to a

more nuanced and increasingly optimistic view of the role reason could play in the world. His writings on international relations and American politics reflect this trajectory. Herz, by contrast, underwent a more gradual and steady evolution that began in Germany and accelerated in exile.

MORGENTHAU AND HERZ AS SYNTHETIC THINKERS

Morgenthau scholars disagree about the relative importance and continuity of his German and American experiences.⁶⁹ Christoph Frei argues for the primacy of Morgenthau's European experiences and the continuity of his writings. He interprets his American books on international politics as extensions of his European investigations into international law.⁷⁰ Jan Willem Honig and William Scheuerman emphasize the debt that Morgenthau, and American realism more generally, owe to German totalitarian ideologies. Scheuerman is nevertheless clear about the ways in which Morgenthau parted company from Schmitt, whom he considered a truly evil man.⁷¹ Martti Koskenniemi also stresses Morgenthau's intellectual debt to Carl Schmitt, and finds striking similarities in their objections to international law and the "decadence" of twentieth century liberalism.⁷² Andreas Söllner sees a sharp break between the German and American Morgenthau; the Weimar liberal became a postwar conservative.⁷³ Niels Amstrup adopts a middle position; he finds the genesis of some of Morgenthau's postwar concepts in his prewar writings.⁷⁴

Elsewhere I argue that none of these claims adequately capture the evolution of Morgenthau's thinking about ethics, politics and international affairs.⁷⁵ Koskenniemi and

Amstrup are the closest to the mark, as is Scheuerman in his recent book. Morgenthau's prewar writings already disparaged the naiveté of those who believed that war could effectively be outlawed. He was adamant that states will always disagree about the proper organizing principles of the international environment, and that disputes with "high political content" cannot be resolved by judicial means. He also developed the three-fold characterization of states out to change the status quo, maintain it or just display their power.⁷⁶ In a more fundamental sense all of Morgenthau's written work, reveals a continuous commitment to social justice and world order, but some discontinuities in the means by which these ends might be achieved.⁷⁷

Morgenthau's short legal career gave practical and academic expression to his liberal commitments. In Frankfurt, he had several professional possibilities but chose to clerk for Hugo Sinzheimer, a prominent Social Democrat who had helped to draft the Weimar constitution and expose the "stab-in-the-back" legend.⁷⁸ Morgenthau was not so much attracted to labor law as he was to Sinzheimer who was "passionately and eloquently devoted to the legally defined interests of the underdog -- the worker exploited and abused and the innocent helplessly caught in the spider web of criminal law."⁷⁹ The labor court was an eye opener for Morgenthau. He regularly stood in for his mentor, and was occasionally asked to serve as a temporary member of the court. He was appalled to discover the anti-Semitism of some of the judges and how hostile they were to the Republic. He soon learned that for most of them, "What was decisive was not the merits of the legal interpretation, but the distribution of political power."⁸⁰ This micro encounter with politics, and the Weimar experience more generally, stripped away his liberal illusions and convinced him that power and self-aggrandizement lay at the heart of

politics. It was probably not coincidental that during this period he immersed himself in the writings of Freud and Nietzsche and read and annotated the complete works of the latter. Morgenthau was personally depressed at the time, and noted in his diary that he found solace in Nietzsche and his concept of *Blick des Sehers* – the free, analytic spirit who has the courage to look deeply into the soul. It seems evident that Morgenthau hoped to model himself on such a Promethean hero.⁸¹

Through Sinzheimer, Morgenthau met prominent Weimar intellectuals, including Martin Buber, Otto Kahn-Freund, Franz Neumann and Paul Tillich. He also came to know the leading luminaries of the Frankfurt School but was put off by what he considered their preoccupation with fine points of Marxist theory at a time when the Republic was under acute threat from the extremist forces on the right and the left.⁸² Morgenthau's own scholarly publications in this period, which others have analyzed in detail, address the role of international law and its relationship to politics.⁸³ His 1929 dissertation, *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen* [The International Administration of Justice: Its Character and Limits] was a response to the arguments of Carl Schmitt, a noted conservative intellectual and international lawyer.⁸⁴ Morgenthau sought to answer the question of why so few international conflicts were resolved by legal means. He distinguished between disputes [*Streitigkeiten*] that lend themselves to legal language and resolution, and tensions [*Spannungen*] that cannot be redressed by legal means because the goals of at least one of the parties demanded a change in legal rights or transformation of the legal order.⁸⁵ He found that even in *Streitigkeiten*, states often refused to bring their disputes before third party mediators or courts on the grounds of honor and vital interest.

Morgenthau's second book, published in Paris in 1933, continued his attack on the positivist distinction between the political and the legal. He argued that law stood in sharp contrast to the will to power [*volonté de puissance*], and could not maintain order when imperialist powers were on the rise and status quo powers on the decline.⁸⁶ His third and final prewar book, *La réalité des normes*, was published in Geneva in 1934. It addressed the problem of sanctions, and its argument was deeply influenced by, but also critical of Hans Kelsen's abstract approach to international law. He submitted it as his *Habilitationschrift* at the University of Geneva, but it was rejected by the first examination board. A second board, chaired by Hans Kelsen, whose formalist conceptions Morgenthau attacked in his book, accepted the manuscript primarily because the ever magnanimous Kelsen made such a strong statement on Morgenthau's behalf.⁸⁷ Morgenthau's last major work on international law was an article, written after he had taken up residence in Kansas City. It was highly critical, not of international law *per se*, but of unreasonable expectations so many scholars and liberal politicians had of its ability to regulate international conflicts. Morgenthau lamented that they paid "almost no attention to the psychological and sociological laws governing the actions of men in the international sphere."⁸⁸

Andreas Söllner considers Morgenthau a Weimar liberal and American conservative. This is a fundamental misreading of Morgenthau's intellectual and political orientation in the United States. His rejection of rationalism made him appear conservative, even reactionary. This stance and his general political pessimism were most pronounced in his early post-war works, notably *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*.⁸⁹ Morgenthau's views underwent considerable evolution, and by the 1970s he

had become much more optimistic about the prospects of avoiding nuclear war, restoring America's purpose and even transforming the international system. His optimism was based on his renewed belief in the power of experience and reason to serve as engines for progress.

Morgenthau wrote *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* in the immediate aftermath of the worst irruption of barbarism spawned by Western civilization. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia rode roughshod over laws, norms and conventions intended to restrain hateful and self-destructive passions. His marginal life in Germany, academic humiliation in Geneva, loss of position and possessions in Madrid, anxious wanderings in Europe in search of a visa to a safe haven, struggles to survive economically in New York and Kansas City and loss of family, including grandparents, in the Holocaust, darkened his mood and sapped his faith in human reason. But Morgenthau was too intellectually curious, reflective and open-minded to allow his *Weltanschauung* to ossify. His intellectual growth did not stop with his early postwar books, but continued throughout his career. In the late 1970s he became convinced that the Cold War had been resolved de facto by mutual acceptance of the postwar political and territorial status quo in Europe. He also regarded with interest and approval Western European efforts to build a more peaceful continent on the twin foundations of parliamentary democracy and supranational institutions. Both transformations, he explicitly recognized, were based on learning and reason.⁹⁰

Morgenthau's rekindled optimism was also the result of his experiences in his adopted homeland. Quotidian life in America, especially in the Middle West, helped to restore his faith in human beings and their ability to create and sustain a productive,

egalitarian, tolerant and largely peaceful society. *The Purpose of American Politics*, published in 1960, is a biting critique of Cold War American leadership, but its opening chapters are a paean of praise to America's experiment with democracy.⁹¹ The conclusion is a reaffirmation of Morgenthau's faith in the political system. His idealism had reasserted itself, but in a more sophisticated form that might be described as a synthesis of his European and American experiences. He was painfully aware that the practice of American politics and foreign policy did not live up to its ideals. He considered McCarthyism a prominent but temporary failure of the American system, and racism as a more enduring and fundamental contradiction of the country's purpose. In 1964 he wrote that "the unequal condition of the American Negro" as "an endemic denial of the purpose for which the United States was created. . . ."⁹² Vietnam was another big failure and prompted lectures, articles and a book in which he diagnosed the causes of intervention, some of them structural. He nevertheless came to regard the domestic crisis provoked by the war as a catalyst for positive social and political change, especially in the area of civil rights.⁹³ An early and ardent supporter of the civil rights movement and early and outspoken critic of Vietnam and member of a score of liberal-activist organizations cannot be described as a conservative.⁹⁴

Morgenthau's mature theoretical work also represents a creative and thoughtful synthesis of Europe and America. His European experience taught him that status quo powers needed the military capability to deter or defeat adversaries intent on expanding their territory or imposing their social systems through conquest. From his reading of European history and experience of American politics he learned that the wide dispersion of power and authority and the operation of a balance of power among these actors was

the most efficacious mechanism for maintaining liberty and advancing the public welfare. He recognized that balances did not automatically form when their material conditions were present, but depended on the understanding and political skill of actors. It was the responsibility of international relations specialists to make actors aware of their interests in general and how they applied in specific instances.

Politics Among Nations can be read as an attempt to apply the *Federalist Papers* and the American Constitution to international relations. Both documents represent self-conscious attempts to harness “private vice” to build “public virtue” through separation of powers, checks and balances and representative institutions. Morgenthau made the analogy explicit in his lectures where he attributed the success of democratic societies to their checks and balances and talked at length about the need to apply the same principles, although not in institutional form, to international relations.⁹⁵ These principles appealed to Morgenthau because in his view they were based on a realistic understanding of the nearly universal human drives for power and self-aggrandizement and the corrupting consequences of all authority.

America taught Morgenthau a more important lesson than constitutional engineering: it was possible to create a society that minimizes violent conflict by providing security and equal opportunity to its citizens. Here too, he tried to extrapolate from the American experience to the international environment. A secure international order, like its domestic counterpart, would depend on “social pressure which is able to contain the selfish tendencies in human nature within socially tolerable bounds; conditions of life creating a social equilibrium which tends to minimize the psychological causes of social conflict, such as insecurity, fear, and aggressiveness; and, finally, a moral

climate which allows man to expect at least an approximation to justice here and now and thus offers a substitute for strife as a means to achieve justice.”⁹⁶ Morgenthau welcomed progress toward these goals in Western societies and looked forward to the day when these conditions might become realized on a regional and even global scale.

John Herz never went through these kind of intellectual swings. He began his career as a liberal lawyer with a somewhat idealist orientation, hopeful that international law could help to reduce international conflict. When Hitler came to power he emigrated first to Geneva and then to the United States. He quickly came to understand the frailty of liberal ideas in a political environment characterized by mass political movements based on emotional appeals and populated by powerful states with far-reaching revisionist agendas. He moved in the direction of realism as a governing principle in international affairs. His postwar writings advocate a theory of international relations and approach to the practice of foreign policy that tries to strike a middle ground between *Realpolitik* and idealism. His liberal variant of realism recognizes the pervasive importance of power in international affairs but also attempts to limit its exercise through international law and institutions. As he put it so aptly in the preface to one of his major works: “The human cause will be lost if the liberal ideal is forgotten, even as surely as it is lost if left to the utopian Political Idealist.”⁹⁷

John Herz, by contrast, was very much taken by Hans Kelsen's abstract, philosophical approach to law that would be embodied in his *Pure Theory of Law*.⁹⁸ He chose to study with Kelsen in Cologne and earned his doctorate in 1931. His post-educational employment in Germany was brief as Hitler's appointment as chancellor led to his firing from the civil service and search for employment in Holland and England.

His mentor Kelsen had taken a position in Geneva at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and following his advice, Herz enrolled there as a graduate student. His interests shifted from normative law to politics and from domestic politics to foreign policy and international relations. An important step in this transition was his engagement with and critique of National Socialist international law. Written in Geneva and published in Zurich under a pseudonym, *Die Völkerrechtlehre des Nationalsozialismus* read the evolution of Nazi approaches to international law as indicative of Hitler's foreign policy goals. More generally, it demonstrated the fragility of international law and institutions and just how much they rested on the underlying power of states who supported the status quo.⁹⁹

Herz's thinking about international relations in Geneva was very much influenced by Guglielmo Ferrero, an Italian historian, journalist, novelist and fellow exile, who encouraged him to think about the motives of actors in international affairs. This line of thinking ultimately led him to his concept of the security dilemma. More importantly, it inspired him to pursue the dual goal of theoretical understanding of international politics and practical efforts to call attention of the world to the danger of National Socialism. He no longer accepted the Weberian distinction between fact and value and the purely scientific role Weber thought this required of scholars. "Pure" research had become sterile in the current environment and it was imperative for scholars to warn of the peril of impending war and mobilize support against the Nazi regime. Intellectually, Herz was moving in the same direction as Hans Morgenthau. A profound difference nevertheless remained in their respective understandings of international relations. Morgenthau found the *ur*-cause of international conflict in the human desire to seek power over others, the

so-called *animus dominiandi*. Herz found the explanation in the international environment and the fear and insecurity it instilled in actors.¹⁰⁰

In Princeton, Herz became familiar with American ways of life and modes of thought and studied American history, politics and literature. He found the Federalists and Walter Lippmann especially informative. He developed the ideas he had encountered in Geneva into a broader theoretical understanding of the history and structure of the international system. The major influence on him at Princeton was the historian Edward Earle, the one social scientist at the Institute. He took European refugees under his wing and invited young ones to attend his seminar, which addressed World War II and its origins. Herz also met and profited from conversations with Felix Gilbert and Albert Weinberg and various seminar guests, including Charles Beard and Alfred Vagts. He gave his first lecture in English, at a Jewish country club, in the course of a hot and mosquito-ridden summer he spent at Dartmouth.¹⁰¹

Herz came to the realization that for the last three centuries the European state system had been characterized by "a constant fluctuation of the balance of power and attempts to destroy it by powers seeking hegemony (i.e., Spain, France and Germany). They were all checked by grand coalitions put in place by Britain, except Germany's bid, which required, for the first time, the intervention of a non-European power, the United States. The balance of power was "something relatively rational," in contrast to mass movements that surfaced from time to time (following the French and Russian revolutions) that were grounded in "more emotional" concerns, and sought universal, utopian ends. The balance of power served as an essential check on these designs. Drawing on insights from Ferrero and the writings of Hobbes and Carl Schmitt, he

developed his understanding of the "security dilemma," grounded in "mutual fear and suspicion" and other key theoretical insights that would later form the core, introductory chapter of *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. Herz insists that his understanding of history was the key to his understanding of international relations "He who controls the past, that is, the image of the past in the minds of those present, to a large extent controls the future."¹⁰²

His search for a general historical and philosophical understanding of the events of the 1930s made his encounter with American political science all the sharper and more unsatisfying. Like Franz Neumann, he was taken aback by the optimistic, ahistorical, empirical and culturally unsophisticated approach of so many American scholars.¹⁰³ A decade later, he was dismayed by the institutional success of the behavioral revolution. His 1959 *International Politics in the Atomic Age* can be read as the culmination of his search for systemic explanation of international relations and unabated opposition to the narrow empiricism of the American study of international relations.¹⁰⁴

Despite his rejection of American social science, Herz's international relations texts and his writings in comparative politics represent a synthesis of European and American approaches. He described *Political Realism and Political Idealism* as "the product of two worlds, of his former 'fatherland' and his new 'child land'."¹⁰⁵ "Child land" was a reference to his son Stephen, born in the United States in 1945. His writings can nevertheless be considered European in their efforts to root his understanding of international relations in a general framework that highlights what is unique about the contemporary era and what it shares in common with the past. They are American in their empiricism and pragmatism. They represent a reaction against European history,

which, Herz lamented, "is rich in pure theory and poor in the ability to apply this to the world of events and actions."¹⁰⁶

Herz might be credited with having done his best to merge his European and American background in his commitment to making the study of international relations a transformative project. This commitment grew out of his early recognition of the twin dangers of nuclear and environmental degradation, and before that, the threat that runaway population growth posed for the future of the human race. For traditional realists Herz is most famous for his invention and elaboration of the concept of the "security dilemma."¹⁰⁷ For contemporary international relations scholars Herz is most inspiring for his proposal in 1976 that "survival research" be actively developed as a research program or even sub-discipline. Such research must "rise above the specific concerns, interests, even expertise, of any particular discipline, such as political science." It "must mobilize experts in the various fields so as to make them recognize the *super-disciplinary* concerns of global survival to which priority must be given over and above (and possibly in contrast to) the more parochial concerns of this or that national, economic, religious or similar grouping."¹⁰⁸

IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

There was a close relationship between the life experiences of social scientist refugees and their research agendas.¹⁰⁹ Henry Pachter reasoned that "While one could not beat the Nazis one could still analyze them – hoping in one act to keep the question of the century before the public eye and to justify one's existence."¹¹⁰ John Herz's *Die Völkerrechtlehre des Nationalsozialismus* [National Socialism's Approach to

International Law] is an early effort toward this end as were Franz Neumann's *Behemoth* and Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*.¹¹¹ Even those who did not write directly about Nazi Germany grappled with its underlying causes as did Theodor Adorno and his collaborators in *The Authoritarian Personality* and Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.¹¹² Karl Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication* addresses nationality conflicts, a related topic, while his *Political Community at the North Atlantic Area* examines ways of controlling and transcending traditional national rivalries.

The relationship between life experiences and research programs also operated at a deeper level. Almost all the emigrés I have discussed had Jewish backgrounds. Morgenthau, Herz and Deutsch – the three most prominent students of international relations -- grew up in middle class assimilated households. The Herz family celebrated Christmas, not Chanukah. Morgenthau was the grandson of a rabbi, but the son of a highly assimilated doctor and German nationalist. Morgenthau and Herz self-identified as Jews, an identification that grew stronger in proportion to the anti-Semitism they experienced. For Morgenthau, this hostility and humiliation began in his school years. Herz grew up in a more liberal and urban setting and does not remember experiencing serious anti-Semitism until the 1930s.¹¹³ In America, Morgenthau became a strong supporter of Zionism and Israel, while Herz never wrote about Jewish or Zionist questions in Germany or in exile. Prior to emigration, both recognized that the traditional accommodation assimilated German Jews had made – to define themselves as *deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens* (Germans of the Jewish faith) -- was no longer viable or desirable. Deutsch grew up in Czechoslovakia, the most tolerant state in central Europe, and was less strongly self-identified as a Jew. It is evident that Jewish origins

were a serious political, economic and civil handicap – and a life-threatening one once Hitler came to power – but for many Jews who survived their ethnic identification provided a source of inner strength that helped them to negotiate the challenges of exile. It certainly did so for Herz and Morgenthau.

Morgenthau was reluctant to talk about his German past, but late in life wrote a short essay acknowledging just how uncomfortable his childhood had been by virtue of his father's authoritarianism and his Bavarian city's anti-Semitism. In 1922 began a *Gymnasium* essay by observing that his “relationship to the social environment is determined by three facts: I am a German, I am a Jew, and I have matured in the period following the war.” His essay expresses concern that it might not be possible to reconcile his religious-cultural and national identities. By the time he left Germany, less than a year before Hitler came to power, the worst fear expressed in his essay had materialized; he was *ausgeschlossen* and *ausgetossen* [excluded and expelled].¹¹⁴ The experience of being driven from his homeland by prejudice deepened his commitment to social justice.

The cultural and intellectual milieu of the Weimar Republic constituted the second strand of Morgenthau's development. Here, German and Jew came together. The French revolution had made it possible for Jews to become full citizens and participants in the national culture while retaining their traditional religious affiliation. Elsewhere in Europe, Jews struggled to achieve similar rights and supported political movements and parties that promised to make this possible. For Morgenthau, it was natural for Jews to adopt “the optimistic outlook that the emancipation of German Jewry through the application of liberal principles was tantamount to the permanent solution of the Jewish problem in Germany.” When rabid nationalism threatened the fruits of emancipation,

many Jews clung desperately to liberalism as a psychological defense.¹¹⁵

The German Morgenthau was squarely in the liberal Jewish tradition. Looking back on his university experience he remembered that it was “impossible to visualize the ignorance, confusion, meanness and general moral and intellectual degradation that dominated German public life and upon which the authority of great scholars bestowed a semblance of moral and intellectual legitimacy.” Max Weber was an exception, and “was everything most of his colleagues pretended to be but were not.” Morgenthau also admired Professor Karl Rothenbücher and attended his lectures on Weber’s political and social philosophy. Rothenbücher lacked Weber’s ability for creative synthesis, but “approached political problems with the same detachment, objectivity, and penetrating intelligence in which Weber excelled.” Morgenthau was moved by his extraordinary courage. Following the unsuccessful Nazi putsch of November 1923, Rothenbücher wrote a pamphlet excoriating Bavarian prime minister Gustav von Kahr for his initial support of the Nazis. He became a marked man, and died prematurely in 1932.¹¹⁶

For John Herz, being a Jew was instrumental in shaping his world view but also his view of himself as an outsider, who "perceives certain things differently, and perhaps more clearly, than the 'insider.'" It also inspired contradictory feelings of bliss and terror, depending on the circumstances. He looked back with nostalgia upon the milieu of assimilated German Jews in which he grew up. He uses the German word *Geborgenheit* [safety] to headline the chapter of his autobiography describing his youth. Safety is intended in the extended sense of physical comfort and security, but also certainty about who one is and where one belongs. He grew up in Düsseldorf, in a large, cultured, liberal, assimilated Jewish family, who created an environment that was close to bliss in

his memory. It stood in sharp contrast to the events of the 1930s and made coming to terms with them much more difficult. Among other things it meant recognition that his earlier sense of security and identity as a German-Jew had been an unsustainable illusion.¹¹⁷

Morgenthau had few post-war contacts with Germany. Herz actively sought out young Germans who came to study in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He was struck by how "un-Nazi" they were and by their thirst for American-style democracy and liberalism. Through the RAND Corporation, he became involved in a project that required elite interviews in Germany during the summer of 1953. He was impressed by the progress made by the Bonn Republic, where a noticeable spirit of tolerance had emerged. "As a result of the trip, I could now, somehow, resolve my identity problem through the compromise formula of being an 'American of German-Jewish background.'" He made numerous subsequent visits and served as visiting professor at the University of Marburg and the Free University of Berlin.¹¹⁸

Increasingly comfortable as an American, he felt freer to take a more critical stance toward his adopted country. He was an outspoken opponent of McCarthyism, which, in his view, challenged America's liberal-humanitarian values. He explained it away as one of the periodic "falls from grace," to which the country was susceptible. He believed that he also became more objective in his evaluation of Germany as he was now able to give equal weight to its positive and negative characteristics. He could see "developments in both 'our' countries of the context of global trends." As a "wanderer" between his two worlds, Herz made many trips across the Atlantic. In his autobiography he cites Thomas Wolfe's observation that "you cannot go home again," but it is also true,

he discovered with the wisdom of age that "one can never separate oneself altogether from one's origins even if one wanted to." He still felt the pull of the Lower Rhine landscapes, where he grew up, and the Black Forest, at the foot of which he began his studies.¹¹⁹

In March of 2005, Herz confessed that "I now actually feel less like a traveler between two worlds than a traveler between all worlds. That is, I see myself less as a European or American and more as a resident of this planet, a planet that is becoming too small. I feel cosmopolitan more than limited to a particular cultural field or part of the earth."¹²⁰

For Morgenthau and Herz, and for some other social scientist emigrés, research agendas and identities were co-constitutive. They chose research problems that were substantively important but also critical to developing new and more complex identities for themselves. Their research fed back on the process of identity formation. Karl Deutsch did this as well but sought to transcend his multiple and at times cross-cutting identities as Jew, German, Czech and American by creating a supranational identity associated with the North Atlantic community. This project, for him, was as deeply personal as it was political. The life and writings of these three outstanding students of international relations drives home just how much our theoretical understandings of the social world are not only products of the cultures that spawn them but of the personal experiences of the scholars who formulate them.

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- ²⁸ Edith Kurzweil, "Psychoanalytic Science: From Oedipus to Culture," in Ibid, pp. 139-55; Coser, *Refugee Scholars*, pp. 42-54.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Irma Thompson, private journal., cited in Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, p. 66.
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- ³² Anthony Heilbut, *Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee Artists and Intellectuals in America, From the 1930s to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 50.
- ³³ Joseph Schumpeter to W. C. Mitchell, 22 April 1933, Schumpeter Papers, Harvard University, quoted in Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 23.
- ³⁴ Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 24.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-203.
- ³⁶ Pachter, "On Being an Exile."
- ³⁷ Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 176.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 180
- ³⁹ Henry Pachter, *Weimar Etudes* (New York: 1982), p. 116.
- ⁴⁰ Herz, *Vom Überleben*, pp. 85-88.
- ⁴¹ Paul Tillich, "Mind and Migration," quoted in Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 179.
- ⁴² Cited in *Ibid*, p. 179
- ⁴³ Hans Speier, "The Social Conditions of the Intellectual in Exile," *Social Research* 4 (1937), reprinted in Hans Speier, *Social Order and the Risks of War* (New York: Stewart, 1952), pp. 86-94.
- ⁴⁴ Louis Wirth, cited in Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 179.
- ⁴⁵ Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 15.
- ⁴⁶ Herz, *Vom Überleben*, p. 75.
- ⁴⁷ Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America*, pp. 208-13; Alfons Söllner, "From Public Law to Political Science? The Emigration of German Scholars after 1933 and the Influence on

the Transformation of a Discipline,” in Ash and Söllner, *Forced Migration and Scientific Change*, pp. 246-72.

⁴⁸ Franz Neumann et al, *The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953); Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, *The Intellectual Migration*. See also, Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America*. Later works, specifically on political scientists, are cited elsewhere in these notes.

⁴⁹ Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 181-82.

⁵⁰ Franz Neumann, “The Social Sciences,” Fleming and Bailyn, *The Intellectual Migration*, pp. 4-26, suggest something similar.

⁵¹ Coser, *Refugee Scholars*, p. 11.

⁵² Pachter, "On Being an Exile."

⁵³ Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 182.

⁵⁴ Hermann Broch quoted in Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America*, p. 237.

⁵⁵ Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America*, p. 241.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵⁷ Theodor W. Adorno with Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. trans. Edmund Jephcott. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), for the standard English edition.

⁵⁸ Max Horkheimer to Friedrich Pollack, 27 May 1934; Horkheimer to Adolph Löwe, 28 January 1935. Horkheimer Papers. Cited in Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, p. 193.

⁵⁹ Henry Pachter, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: Crisis and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

⁶⁰ Marie Jahoda, Hans Zeissel and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal: ein Soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen langdauernder Arbeitslosigkeit* (Leipzig: S. Hirtzel, 1933).

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⁶⁵ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953).

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⁶⁷ Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

⁶⁸ Edward Shils, *The Calling of Sociology and Other Essays on the Pursuit of Learning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 110.

⁶⁹ For recent treatments, see the relevant essays in Michael C. Williams, *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2007), and the William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).

70. Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, chs. 5-8.

71. Jan Willem Honig, "Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau's German Years," in Benjamin Frankel, ed., *Roots of Realism* (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 283-313; William E. Scheuerman, "Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond," in Williams, *Realism Reconsidered*, pp. 62-92, and *Hans Morgenthau*, pp. 32-39.

72. Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 459-65.

73. Andreas Söllner, "Hans J. Morgenthau: ein deutscher Konservativer in Amerika?," in Rainer Erb and Michael Schmidt, eds., *Antisemitismus und jüdische Geschichte: Studien zu Ehren von Herbert A. Strauss* (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Autorenverlag, 1987), pp. 243-66.

74. Niels Amstrup, "The 'Early' Morgenthau: A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism," *Cooperation and Conflict* 13 (1978), pp. 163-75; personal communication with the author.

⁷⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 216-56; Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, pp. 145-77; Chris Brown, "'The Twilight of International Morality'? Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt on the end of the *Jus Publicum Europaeum*," in Williams, *Realism Reconsidered*, pp. 18-41; Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau*, 45-48.

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79. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-12..
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82. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Fragments of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932," in Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers, eds., *A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau* (Washington, D.C.: New Republic Book Company, 1977), pp. 1-20.
83. Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, chs. 5-7; Honig, "Totalitarianism and Realism"; Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, pp. 440-65.
84. Hans. J. Morgenthau, *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen* (Leipzig: Noske, 1929). Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966).
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96. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*. 183.

⁹⁷ Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. v. The best secondary treatment of Herz is Jan Puglierin, *John H. Herz: An Intellectual Autobiography*, PhD dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, February 2009. On Herz's blend of realism and idealism, see also Casper Sylvest, "John H. Herz and the Resurrection of Classical Realism," *International Relations* 22, no. 4 (December 2008), pp. 441-56.

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⁹⁹ Eduard Bristler [John Herz], *Die Völkerrechtlehre des Nationalsozialismus* (Zurich: Europa-Verlag, 1938); Puglierin, *John H. Herz*, pp. 27-63; Peter M. R. Stirk, "John H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich," *International Relations* 22, no. 4 (December 2008), pp. 427-40.

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¹⁰¹ Herz, *Vom Überleben*, pp. 109-115, 120-21, 124-25.

¹⁰² Herz, *Vom Überleben*, pp. 121-22. The author's conversations with John Herz, 1965-1978; Christian Hacke and Jana Puglierin, "Balancing Utopia and Reality," *International Relations*, 21, no. 3 (September 2007), pp. 367-382; Puglierin, *John H. Herz*, pp. 148-94.

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114. Ibid., p. 2. Quotation from the German original, "Was ich von meiner Zukunft erhoffe, und worauf sich diese Hoffnung gründet," September 1922.

115. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism," originally given as The Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture in 1961. *Decline of Democratic Politics*, pp. 247-56, quote on p. 249.

116. Morgenthau, "Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography," pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 25-34.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 142, 150-56.

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¹²⁰ Jana Puglierin interview with John Herz, 21 March 2005, Scarsdale, New York.

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