This intimates but what our Saviour taught before,
that divorce is not rashly to be made, but
reconcilement to be persuaded and endeavord, as
oft as the cause can have to doe with reconcilement,
& is not under the dominion of blameless nature;
which may have reason to depart though seldomest
and last from charitable love, yet somtimes from
friendly, and familiar, and somthing oftner from
conjugal love, which requires not only moral, but
natural causes to the making and maintayning; and
may be warrantably excus'd to retire from the
deception of what it justly seeks, and the ill requitals
which unjustly it finds. For Nature hath her Zodiac
also, keeps her great annual circuit over human
things as truly as the Sun and Planets in the
firmament; hath her anomalies, hath her obliquities
in ascensions and declinations, accesses and recesses,
as blamelesly as they in heaven. And sitting in her
planetary Orb with two rains in each hand, one
strait, the other loos, tempers the cours of minds
as well as bodies to several conjunctions and
oppositions, friendly, or unfriendly aspects,
consenting oftest with reason, but never contrary.
This in the effect no man of meanest reach but daily
sees; and though to every one it appeare not in the
cause, yet to a cleare capacity, well nurtur'd with
good reading and observation, it cannot but be plaine
and visible. Other exposition therfore then hath
bin given to former places that give light to these
two summary verses, will not be needfull: save onely
that these precepts are meant to those maried who
differ not in religion.
[But to the rest speak I, not the Lord; if any
brother hath a wife that beleeveth not, and she be
pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away.
Now follows what is to be done, if the persons
wedded be of a different faith. The common beleef is,
that a christian is heer commanded not to divorce, if
the infidel please to stay, though it be but to vexe, or
to deride, or to deduce the christian. This doctrin
will be the easie worke of a refutation. The other
opinion is, that a christian is here conditionally
permitted to hold wedloc with a misbeleever only
upon hopes limited by christian prudence, which
without much difficulty shall be defended. That this
heer spoken by Paul, not by the Lord cannot be a
command, these reasons avouch. First the law of
Moses, Exod. 34. 16. Deut. 7. 3. 6. interpreted by Ezra,
and Nehemiah two infallible authors, commands to
divorce an infidel not for the feare onely of a
ceremonious defilement, but of an irreligious
seducement, fear'd both in respect of the beleever
himselfe, and of his children in danger to bee
perverted by the misbeleeving parent. Nehem. 13.
24. 26. and Peter Martyr thought this a convincing
reason. If therfore the legal pollution vanishing
have abrogated the ceremony of this law, so that a
christian may be permitted to retaine an infidel
without uncleannes, yet the moral reason of
divorcing stands to eternity, which neither Apostle
nor Angel from heaven can countermand. All that
they reply to this, is their human warrant, that God
will preserve us in our obedience of this command
against the danger of seducement. And so
undoudtedly he will, if we understand his commands
aright; if we turne not this evangelic permission into a
legal, and yet illegal command; if we turn not hope
into bondage, the charitable and free hope of gaining
another, into the forc't and servile temptation of
losing our selves; but more of this beneath. Thus
these words of Paul by common doctrin made a
command, are made a contradiction to the moral law.
Secondly, not the law only, but the Gospel from
the law, and from it selfe requires even in the same
chapter, where divorce between them of one religion
is so narrowly forbidd, rather then our christian love
should come into danger of backsliding, to forsake all
relations how neer so ever, and the wife expresly,
with promise of a high reward, Mat. 19. And he who
hates not father or mother, wife, or children
hindering his christian cours, much more, if they
despise or assault it, cannot be a Disciple, Luke 14.
How can the Apostle then command us, to love and
continue in that matrimony, which our Saviour bids
us hate, and forsake? They can as soon teach our
faculty of respiration to contract and to dilate it selfe
at once, to breath and to fetch breath in the same
instant, as teach our minds how to doe such contrary
acts as these, towards the same object, and as they
must be done in the same moment. For either the
hatred of her religion, & her hatred to our religion
will work powerfully against the love of her society,
or the love of that will by degrees flatter out all our
zealous hatred and forsaking and soone ensnare us to
unchristianly compliances.
Thirdly, In marriage there ought not only to be a
civil love, but such a love as Christ loves his Church;
but where the religion is contrary without hope of
conversion, there can be no love, no faith, no
peaceful society, (they of the other opinion confess
it) nay there ought not to be, furder then in
expectation of gaining a soul; when that ceases, we
know God hath put enmity between the seed of
the woman, and the seed of the Serpent. Neither
should we love them that hate the Lord, as the
Prophet told Jehosaphat. 2 Chron. 19. And this
Apostle himselfe in another place warns us that we be
not unequally yokt with Infidels 2 Cor. 6. for that
there can be no fellowship, no communion, no
concord between such. Outward commerce and civil
intercours cannot perhaps be avoided; but true
friendship and familiarity there can be none. How
vainly therfore, not to say how impiously would the
most inward and dear alliance of mariage or
continuance in mariage be commanded, where true
friendship is confest impossible. For say they, wee
are forbidd heer to marry with an infidel, not bid to
divorce. But to rob the words thus of their full
sense will not be allow'd them: it is not said, enter
not into yoke, but be not unequally yokd; which
plainly forbids the thing in present act, as well as in
purpose; and his manifest conclusion is, not only that
we should not touch, but that having toucht, we
should come out from among them, and be separat;
with the promise of a blessing thereupon that God will
receave us, will be our father, and we his sons and
daughters. v. 17. 18. Why we should stay with an
Infidel after the expence of all our hopes, can be but
for a civil relation; but why we should depart from a
seducer, setting aside the misconstruction of this
place, is from a religious necessity of departing. The
wors cause therfore of staying (if it be any cause at
all, for civil government forces it not) must not
overtop the religious cause of separating, executed
with such an urgent zeal, & such a prostrate
humiliation by Ezra and Nehemiah. What God hates
to joyn, certainly he cannot love should continue
joyn'd: it being all one in matter of ill consequence, to
marry, or to continue maried with an Infidel, save
only so long as we wait willingly, and with a safe
hope. St. Paul therefore citing heer a command of the
Lord Almighty, for so he terms it, that we should
separate, cannot have bound us with that which he
calls his own whether command or counsel that we
should not separate.
Which is the fourth reason, for he himselfe takes
care least we should mistake him, [But to the rest
speak I not the Lord. ] If the Lord spake not, then
man spake it and man hath no Lordship to command
the conscience: yet modern interpreters will have it
a command maugre St. Paul himselfe, they will make
him a Prophet like Caiaphas to speak the word of
the Lord not thinking, nay denying to think; though
he disavow to have receav'd it from the Lord, his
word shall not be tak'n, though an Apostle, he shall
be born down in his own Epistle, by a race of
expositors who presume to know from whom he
spake, better than he himselfe. Paul deposes that the
Lord speaks not this, they, that the Lord speaks it:
can this be less then to brave him with a full fac't
contradiction? Certainly to such a violence as this,
for I cannot call it an expounding, what a man should
answer I know not, unless that if it be their pleasure
next to put a gag into the Apostles mouth, they are
already furnisht with a commodious audacity
toward the attempt. Beza would seem to shun the
contradictory, by telling us that the Lord spake it not
in person, as he did the former precept. But how
many other doctrines doth St. Paul deliver which
the Lord spake not in person, and yet never uses
this preamble but in things indifferent? So long as
we receave him for a messenger of God, for him to
stand sorting sentences what the Lord spake in
person, and what he, not the Lord in person, would
be but a chill trifling, and his readers might catch an
ague the while. But if we shall supply the
grammatical Ellipsis regularly, and as we must in the
sam tense, all will be then cleer, for we cannot
supply it thus, to the rest I speak; the Lord spake
not, but I speak, the Lord speaks not. If then the
Lord neither spake in person, nor speaks it now, the
Apostle testifying both, it follows duely, that this can
be no command. Forsooth the fear is, least this not
being a command, would prove an evangelic counsel,
& so make way for supererogations. As if the
Apostle could not speak his mind in things
indifferent, as he doth in fowr or five several places
of this chapter with the like preface of not
commanding, but that the doubted inconvenience of
supererogating must needs rush in. And how adds it
to the word of the Lord, (for this also they object)
when as the Apostle by his christian prudence guids
us in the liberty which God hath left us to, without
command? could not the spirit of God instruct us by
him what was free, as well as what was not? But
what need I more, when Cameron an ingenuous
writer, and in high esteem, solidly confutes the
surmise of a command heer, and among other words
hath these. That when Paul speaks as an Apostle, he
uses this forme, The Lord saith, not I, v. 10. but as a
privat man he saith, I speak, not the Lord. And
thus also all the prime fathers Austin, Jerom, and
the rest understood this place.
Fifthly, The very stating of the question declares
this to be no command; If any brother hath an
unbeleeving wife, and she be pleased to dwell with
him, let him not put her away. For the Greek word
suneudokei does not imply only her being pleas'd to
stay, but his being pleas'd to let her stay; it must be
a consent of them both. Nor can the force of this
word be render'd less, without either much
negligence or iniquity of him that otherwise
tranlates it. And thus the Greek Church also and
their Synods understood it, who best knew what
their own language meant, as appears by Matthaeus
Monachus an author set forth by Leunclavius, and
of antiquity perhaps not inferior to Balsamon who
writes upon the canons of the Apostles: this Author
in his chap. that mariage is not to be made with
heretics, thus recites the second canon of the 6.
Synod: As to the Corinthians Paul determins, If the
beleeving wife choos to live with the unbeleeving
husband, or the beleeving husband with the
unbeleeving wife. Mark saith he, how the Apostle
heer condescends, if the beleever please to dwell with
the unbeleever; so that if he please not, out of doubt
the mariage is dissolv'd. And I am perswaded it was
so in the beginning, and thus preach't. And
therupon gives an example of one, who though not
deserted, yet by the decree of Theodotus the
Patriarch divorc't an unbeleeving wife. What
therefore depends in the plain state of this question
on the consent and well liking of them both, must not
be a command. Lay next the latter end of the 11.
v, to the twelf (for wherfore else is Logic taught
us) in a discreet axiom, as it can be no other by the
phrase, The Lord saith, let not the husband put away
his wife, But I say let him not put away a
misbeleeving wife; this sounds as if by the judgment
of Paul, a man might put away any wife but the
misbeleeving; or els the parts are not discrete, or
dissentanie, for both conclude not putting away, and
consequently in such a form the proposition is
ridiculous. Of necessity therfore the former part of
this sentence must be conceav'd, as understood, and
silently granted, that although the Lord command to
divorce an infidel, yet I, not the Lord command you?
No, but give my judgment, that for som evangelic
reasons a christian may be permitted not to divorce
her. Thus while we reduce the brevity of St. Paul to
a plainer sense, by the needful supply of that which
was granted between him and the Corinthians, the
very logic of his speech extracts him confessing that
the Lords command lay in a seeming contrariety to
this his counsel: and that he meant not to thrust out
a command of the Lord by a new one of his own, as
one nail drives another, but to release us from the
rigor of it, by the right of the Gospel, so farre forth as
a charitable cause leads us on in the hope of winning
another soul without the peril of loosing our own. For
this is the glory of the Gospel to teach us that the
end of the commandment is charity, 1 Tim. 1. not the
drudging out a poore and worthlesse duty forc't from
us by the taxe, and taile of so many letters. This
doctrine therfore can bee no command, but it must
contradict the moral law, the Gospel, and the Apostle
himselfe both else where, and heere also eevn in the act
of speaking.
If then it be no command, it must remain to be a
permission, and that not absolute, for so it would be
still contrary to the law, but with such a caution as
breaks not the law, but as the manner of the Gospel
is, fulfils it through charity. The law had two
reasons, the one was ceremonial, the pollution that
all Gentiles were to the Jewes; this the vision of Peter
had abolisht, Acts 10. and clens'd all creatures to
the use of a Christian. The Corinthians understood not
this, but fear'd lest dwelling in matrimony with an
unbeleever, they were defil'd. The Apostle discusses
that scruple with an Evangelic reason, shewing them
that although God heretofore under the law, not
intending the conversion of the Gentiles, except some
special ones, held them as polluted things to the Jew,
yet now purposing to call them in, he hath purify'd
them from that legal uncleannesse wherin they stood,
to use and to be us'd in a pure manner.
For saith he, The unbeleeving husband is
sanctifi'd by the wife, and the unbeleeving wife, is
sanctifi'd by the husband, else were your children
uncleane; but now they are holy. That is, they are
sanctify'd to you, from that legal impurity which you
so feare; and are brought into a neer capacity to be
holy, if they beleeve, and to have free accesse to holy
things. In the mean time, as being Gods creatures, a
christian hath power to use them according to their
proper use; in as much as now, all things to the pure
are become pure. In this legal respect therfore ye
need not doubt to continue in marriage with an
unbeleever. Thus others also expound this place and
Cameron especially. This reason warrants us onely
what wee may doe without feare of pollution, does not
binde us that we must. But the other reason of the
law to divorce an infidel was moral, the avoiding of
enticement from the true faith. This cannot shrink;
but remains in as full force as ever, to save the
actuall christian from the snare of a misbeleever. Yet
if a Christian full of grace and spiritual gifts finding
the misbeleever not frowardly affected, feares not a
seducing, but hopes rather a gaining, who sees not that
this morall reason is not violated by not divorcing,
which the law commanded to doe, but better fulfill'd
by the excellence of the Gospel working through
charity. For neither the faithfull is seduc'd, and the
unfaithfull is either sav'd, or with all discharge of
love, and evangelic duty sought to be sav'd. But
contrary-wise if the infirme Christian shall bee
commanded here against his minde, against his hope,
and against his strength, to dwell with all the
scandals, the houshold persecutions, or alluring
temptations of an infidel, how is not the Gospel by
this made harsher then the law, and more yoaking?
Therefore the Apostle ere he deliver this other
reason why wee need not in all hast put away an
infidel, his mind misgiving him least he should seem
to be the imposer of a new command, staies not for
method, but with an abrupt speed inserts the
declaration of their liberty in this matter.
But if the unbeleeving depart, let him depart; a
brother or a sister is not under bondage in such
cases: but God hath called us to peace.
[But if the unbeleeving depart. ] This cannot be
restrain'd to locall departure only; for who knows not
that an offensive society is worse then a forsaking. If
his purpose of cohabitation be to endanger the life,
or the conscience, Beza himselfe is halfe perswaded,
that this may purchase to the faithfull person the
same freedome that a desertion may; and so Gerard
and others whom he cites. If therefore he depart in
affection, if hee depart from giving hope of his
conversion; if he disturb, or scoffe at religion, seduce,
or tempt, if he rage, doubtlesse not the weake only, but
the strong may leave him; if not for fear, yet for the
dignities sake of religion, which cannot be liable to all
base affronts, meerely for the worshiping of a civil
mariage. I take therefore departing to bee as large as
the negative of being well pleas'd: that is, if he be not
pleas'd for the present to live lovingly, quietly,
inoffensively, so as may give good hope; which
appeares well by that which followes.
[A brother or a sister is not under bondage in
such cases. ] If Saint Paul provide seriously against the
bondage of a christian, it is not the only bondage to
live unmaried for a deserting infidel, but to endure
his presence intolerably, to beare indignities against
his religion in words or deedes, to be wearied with
seducements, to have idolatries and superstitions
ever before his eyes, to be tormented with impure
and prophane conversation, this must needs be
bondage to a christian; is this left all unprovided for,
without remedy, or freedom granted? undoubtedly
no, for, the Apostle leavs it furder to be consider'd
with prudence, what bondage a brother or sister is
not under, not onely in this case, but as hee speaks
himselfe plurally, in such cases.
[But God hath called us to peace. ] To peace, not to
bondage, not to brabbles and contentions with him
who is not pleas'd to live peaceably, as mariage and
christianity requires. And where strife arises from a
cause hopelesse to be allayd, what better way to
peace then by separating that which is ill joyn'd. It
is not divorce, that first breaks the peace of a family,
as som fondly comment on this place, but it is peace
already brok'n, which, when other cures fail, can
only be restor'd to the faultles person by a
necessary divorce. And Saint Paul heer warrants us to
seeke peace, rather then to remain in bondage. If God
hath call'd us to peace, why should we not follow
him, why should we miserably stay in perpetual
discord under a servitude not requir'd?
[For what knowest thou O wife, whether thou
shalt save thy husband, &c. ] St. Paul having thus
clear'd himselfe, not to goe about the mining or our
christian liberty, not to cast a snare upon us, which
to doe hee so much hated, returnes now to the second
reason of that law, to put away an infidel for feare of
seducement, which hee does not heer contradict with
a command now to venture that; but if neither the
infirmity of the Christian, nor the strength of the
unbeleever be fear'd, but hopes appearing that he
may be won, he judges it no breaking of that law,
though the beleever be permitted to forbeare divorce,
and can abide, without the peril of seducement, to
offer the charity of a salvation to wife or husband,
which is the fulfilling, not the transgressing of that
law; and well worth the undertaking with much
hazard and patience. For what knowest thou
whether thou shalt save thy wife, that is, till all
meanes convenient and possible with discretion and
probability, as human things are, have bin us'd.
For Christ himselfe sends not our hope on pilgrimage
to the worlds end; but sets it bounds, beyond which
we need not wait on a brother, much lesse on an
infidell. If after such a time we may count a
professing Christian no better than a heathen, after
less time perhaps we may cease to hope of a heathen,
that hee will turne Christian. Otherwise, to binde us
harder then the law, and tell us wee are not under
bondage, is meere mockery. If till the unbeleever
please to part, we may not stirre from the house of our
bondage, then certain this our liberty is not
grounded in the purchas of Christ, but in the
pleasure of a miscreant. What knowes the loyal
husband whether he may not save the adultresse,
he is not therfore bound to receive her. What knowes
the wife but shee may reclaim her husband who hath
deserted her? yet the reformed Churches doe not
enjoyn her to wait longer then after the contempt of
an Ecclesiastical Summons. Beza himselfe heer
befriends us with a remarkable speech, what could
be firmly constituted in human matters if under
pretence of expecting grace from above, it should be
never lawfull for us to seeke our right. And yet in
other cases not lesse reasonable to obtain a most just
and needfull remedy by divorce he turnes the
innocent party to a taske of prayers beyond the
multitude of beads and rosaries, to beg the gift of
chastity in recompence of an injurious mariage. But
the Apostle is evident anough, we are not under
bondage, trusting that he writes to those who are not
ignorant what bondage is, to let supercilious
determiners cheat them of their freedome. God hath
call'd us to peace, and so doubtlesse hath left in our
hands how to obtaine it seasonably; if it be not our
own choise to sit ever like novices wretchedly
servile.
Thus much the Apostle in this question between
Christian and Pagan, to us now of little use; yet
supposing it written for our instruction as it may be
rightly apply'd, I doubt not but that the difference
between a true beleever and a heretic, or any one
truely religious either deserted or seeking divorce
from any one groslly erroneous or profane may be
referr'd hither. For St. Paul leaves us heer the
solution not of this case only, which little concernes
us, but of such like cases, which may occurr to us. For
where the reasons directly square, who can forbid
why the verdict should not be the same? But this
the common writers allow us not. And yet from this
text which in plaine words gives liberty to none
unlesse deserted by an infidel, they collect the same
freedom though the desertion bee not for religion,
which, as I conceive, they neede not doe; but may
without straining reduce it to the cause of
fornication. For first they confesse that desertion is
seldome without a just suspition of adultery: next it
is a breach of mariage in the same kind, and in some
sort worse: for adultery though it give to another,
yet it bereaves not al; but the deserter wholly
denies all right, and makes one flesh twain, which is
counted the absolutest breach of matrimony, and
causes the other, as much as in him lies, to commit
sin, by being so left. Neverthelesse those reasons
which they bring of establishing by this place the like
liberty from any desertion, are faire and solid: and if
the thing be lawfull, and can be prov'd so, more waies
then one, so much the safer. Their arguments I shall
heer recite, and that they may not come idle, shall
use them to make good the like freedome to divorce
for other causes; and that we are no more under
bondage to any hainous default against the main
ends of matrimony, then to a desertion: First they
allege that to Tim.1. 5. 8. If any provide not for
those of his own house, hee hath deny'd the faith, and
is worse then an Infidel. But a deserter, say they,
can have no care of them who are most his owne,
therefore the deserted party is not lesse to bee righted
against such a one then against an infidel. With the
same evidence I argue, that man or wife who hates in
wedloc, is pereptually unsociable, unpeacefull, or
unduteous, either not being able, or not willing to
performe what the maine ends of mariage demand in
helpe and solace, cannot bee said to care for who shou'd
bee dearest in the house; therefore is worse then an
infidel in both regards, either in undertaking a duty
which he cannot performe, to the undeserved and
unspeakable injury of the other party so defrauded
and betrai'd, or not performing what he hath
undertaken, whenas he may or might have, to the
perjury of himselfe, more irreligious then
heathenisme. The blamelesse person therfore hath as
good a plea to sue out his delivery from this bondage,
as from the desertion of an infidel. Since most
writers cannot but grant that desertion is not only a
local absence, but an intolerable society; or if they
grant it not, the reasons of Saint Paul grant it, with as
much leave as they grant to enlarge a particular
freedom from paganisme, into a general freedom from
any desertion. Secondly, they reason from the
likenes of either fact, the same losse redounds to the
deserted by a christian, as by an infidel, the same
peril of temptation. And I in like manner affirme, that
if honest and free persons may be allow'd to know
what is most to their owne losse, the same losse and
discontent, but worse disquiet with continuall misery
and temptation resides in the company, or better
call'd the persecution of an unfit, or an unpeaceable
consort, then by his desertion. For then the
deserted may enjoy himselfe at least. And he who
deserts is more favourable to the party whom his
presence afflicts, then that importunat thing which
is and will be ever conversant before the eyes a
loyal and individual vexation. As for those who still
rudely urge it no loss to mariage, no desertion, so
long as the flesh is present and offers a benevolence
that hates, or is justly hated, I am not of that vulgar
and low perswasion, to thinke such forc'd
embracements as these worth the honour, or the
humanity of mariage, but farre beneath the soul of a
rational and freeborne Man. Thirdly they say, it is
not the infidelity of the deserter, but the desertion
of the infidel from which the Apostle gives this
freedom; and I joyne that the Apostle could as little
require our subjection to an unfit and injurious
bondage present, as to an infidel absent. To free us
from that which is an evil by being distant, and not
from that which is an inmate, and in the bosome evil,
argues an improvident and careles deliverer. And
thus all occasions, which way so ever they turn are
not unofficious to administer somthing which may
conduce to explain, or to defend the assertion of this
book touching divorce. I complain of nothing, but
that it is indeed too copious to be the matter of a
dispute, or a defence, rather to be yeelded, as in the
best ages, a thing of common reason, not of
controversie. What have I left to say? I fear to be
more elaborat in such perspicuity as this; lest I
should seem not to teach, but to upbraid the dulnes
of an age; not to commun with reason in men, but
to deplore the loss of reason from among men: this
only, and not the want of more to say, is the limit of
my discours.
Who among the fathers have interpreted the
words of Christ concerning divorce, as is heer
interpreted; and what the civil law of Christian
Emperors in the primitive Church determind.
Although testimony be in Logic an argument
rightly call'd inartificial, & doth not solidly fetch
the truth by multiplicity of Authors, nor argue a
thing false by the few that hold so; yet seeing most
men from their youth so accustom, as not to scanne
reason, nor cleerly to apprehend it, but to trust for
that the names and numbers of such, as have got,
and many times undeservedly, the reputation among
them to know much, and because there is a vulgar
also of teachers, who are as blindly by whom they
fancy led, as they lead the people, it will not be amiss
for them who had rather list themselves under this
weaker sort, and follow authorities, to take notice
that this opinion which I bring, hath bin favour'd,
and by som of those affirm'd, who in their time
were able to carry what they taught, had they urg'd
it, through all Christendom; or to have left it such a
credit with all good men, as they who could not
bouldly use the opinion, would have fear'd to censure
it. But since by his appointment on whom the times
and seasons wait, every point of doctrin is not fatall
to be throughly sifted out in every age, it will be
anough for me to find, that the thoughts of wisest
heads heertofore, and hearts no less reverenc't for
devotion have tended this way, and contributed
their lot in some good measure towards this which
hath bin heer attain'd. Others of them and modern
especially, have bin as full in the assertion, though
not so full in the reason; so that either in this
regard, or in the former, I shall be manifest in a
middle fortune to meet the praise or dispraise of
beeing somthing first. But I deferr not what I undertooke to shew, that in
the Church both primitive and reformed, the words
of Christ have been understood to grant divorce for
other causes then adultery; and that the word
fornication in mariage hath a larger sense then that
commonly suppos'd.
Justin Martyr in his first Apology writtin within
50. yeares after St. John dy'd, relates a story which
Eusebius transcribes, that a certain matron of Rome,
the wife of a vitious husband, her selfe also formerly
vitious, but converted to the faith, and persuading
the same to her husband, at lest the amendment of
his wicked life, upon his not yielding to her daily
entreaties and persuasions in this behalf, procur'd
by law to be divorc't from him. This was neither for
adultery, nor desertion, but as the relation saies,
Esteeming it an ungodly thing to be the consort of
bed with him, who against the law of nature and of
right sought out voluptuous waies. Suppose he
endeavour'd som unnaturall abuse, as the Greek
admitts that meaning, it cannot yet be call'd
adultery; it therfore could be thought worthy of
divorce no otherwise then as equivalent, or wors;
and other vices will appear in other respects as much
divorsive. Next tis said her friends advis'd her to
stay a while; and what reason gave they? not
because they held unlawfull what she purpos'd, but
because they thought she might longer yet hope his
repentance. She obey'd, till the man going to
Alexandria, and from thence reported to grow still
more impenitent, not for any adultery or desertion,
wherof neither can be gather'd, but, saith the
Martyr, and speaks it like one approving, lest she
should be partaker of his unrighteous and ungodly
deeds, remaining in wedloc, the communion of bed
and board with such a person, she left him by a
lawfull divorce. This cannot but give us the judgment
of the Church in those pure and next to Apostolic
times. For how els could the woman have been
permitted, or heer not reprehended; and if a wife
might then doe this without reprooff, a husband
certainly might no less, if not more.
Tertullian in the same Age, writing his 4. book
against Marcion witnesses that Christ by his answer
to the Pharises protected the constitution of Moses
as his own, and directed the institution of the
creator, for I alter not his Carthaginian phrase; he
excus'd rather then destroi'd the constitution of
Moses; I say he forbidd conditionally, if any one
therefore put away, that he may marry another: so
that if he prohibited conditionally, then not wholly;
and what he forbadd not wholly, he permitted
otherwise, where the cause ceases for which he
prohibited: that is when a man makes it not the
cause of his putting away, meerly that he may marry
again. Christ teaches not contrary to Moses, the
justice of divorce hath Christ the asserter: he would
not have mariage separat, nor kept with ignominy,
permitting then a divorce; and guesses that this
vehemence of our Saviours sentence was chiefly
bent against Herod, as was cited before. Which leavs
it evident how Tertullian interpreted this prohibition
of our Saviour: for wheras the text is, Whosoever
putteth away and marieth another, wherfore
should Tertullian explain it, Whosoever putteth away
that he may marry another, but to signify this
opinion that our Saviour did not forbidd divorce from
an unworthy yoke, but forbidd the malice or the lust
of a needless change and chiefly those plotted
divorces then in use.
Origen in the next century testifies to have
known certain who had the government of Churches
in his time, who permitted som to marry, while yet
their former husbands liv'd, and excuses the deed, as
don not without cause, though without Scripture,
which confirms that cause not to be adultery; for
how then was it against Scripture that they maried
again. And a little beneath, for I cite his 7. homily
on Matthew, saith he, To endure faults wors then
adultery and fornication, seems a thing
unreasonable, and disputes therfore that Christ did
not speak by way of precept, but as it were
expounding. By which and the like speeches Origen
declares his mind farre from thinking that our Saviour
confin'd all the causes of divorce to actual adultery.
Lactantius of the age that succeeded speaking of
this matter in the 6. of his institutions, hath these
words. But lest any think he may circumscribe
divine precepts, let this be added, that all
misinterpreting, and occasion of fraud, or death may
be remov'd, he commits adultery who marries the
divorc't wife, and, besides the crime of adultery,
divorces a wife that he may marry another. To
divorce and marry another, and to divorce that he
may marry another, are two different things; and
imply that Lanctantius thought not this place the
forbidding of all necessary divorce, but such only as
proceeded from the wanton desire of a future chois,
not from the burden of a present affliction.
About this time the Councel of Eliberis in Spain
decreed the husband excommunicat, If he kept his
wife being an adulteress; but if he left her, he might
after ten yeares be receav'd into communion, if he
retain'd her any while in his house after the
adultery known. The councel of Neocaesarea in the
year 314. decreed, that if the wife of any Laic were
convicted of adultery, that man could not be
admitted into the ministery: if after ordination it were
committed, he was to divorce her; if not, he could not
hold his ministery. The councel of Nantes condemn'd
in 7. yeares penance the husband that would
reconcile with an adulteress. But how proves this
that other causes may divorce? It proves thus;
there can be but two causes why these councels
enjoyn'd so strictly the divorcing of an adultress,
either as an offender against God, or against the
husband; in the latter respect they could not impose
on him to divorce; for every man is the master of his
own forgivenes; who shal hinder him to pardon the
injuries don against himself? It follows therfore
that the divorce of an adultress was commanded by
these three councels, as it was a sin against God; and
by all consequence they could not but beleeve that
other sins as hainous might with equal justice be the
ground of a divorce.
Basil in his 73. rule, as Chamier numbers it, thus
determins, that divorce ought not to be, unlesse for
adultery, or the hindrance to a godly life. What doth
this but proclaime aloud more causes of divorce then
adultery, if by other sins besides this, in wife or
husband, the godlines of the better person may be
certainly hinder'd, and endanger'd.
Epiphanius no less ancient, writing against
Heretics, & therefore should himself be orthodoxal
above others, acquaints us in his second book, Tom.
1, not that his private persuasion was, but that the
whole Church in his time generally thought other
causes of divorce lawful besides adultery, as
comprehended under that name; If, saith he, a
divorce happ'n for any cause either fornication, or
adultery, or any hainous fault, the word of God
blames not either the man or wife marrying again,
nor cutts them off from the congregation, or from life,
but beares with the infirmity; not that he may keep
both wives, but that leaving the former he may be
lawfully joyn'd to the latter, the holy word, and the
holy Church of God commiserates this man,
especially, if he be otherwise of good conversation,
and live according to Gods law. This place is cleerer
then exposition, and needs no comment.
Ambrose on the 16. of Luke, teaches that all
wedloc is not Gods joyning and to the 19. of Pro.
That a wife is prepard of the Lord, as the old latin
translates it, he answers that the septuagint
renders it, a wife is fitted by the Lord, and temper'd
to a kind of harmony; and where that harmony is
there God joyns; where it is not, there dissention
reigns, which is not from God, for God is love. This
he brings to prove the marrying of Christian with
Gentile to be no mariage, and consequently divorc't
without sin: but he who sees not this argument now
plainly it serves to divorce any untunable, or
unattonable matrimony, sees little. On the 1 to the
Cor, 7, he grants a woman may leave her husband
not for only fornication, but for Apostacy, and
inverting nature, though not marry again; but the
man may: heer are causes of divorce assign'd other
then adultery. And going on he affirms, that the
cause of God is greater then the cause of matrimony;
that the reverence of wedloc is not due to him who
hates the author therof; that no matrimony is firm
without devotion to God; that dishonour don to God
acquitts the other being deserted from the bond of
matrimony; that the faith of marriage is not to be
kept with such. If these contorted sentences be
ought worth, it is not the desertion that breaks what
is broken, but the impiety; and who then may not for
that cause better divorce, then tarry to be deserted?
or these grave sayings of St. Ambrose are but
knacks.
Jerom on the 19. of Matthew explains, that for
the cause of fornication, or the suspicion therof a
man may freely divorce. What can breed that
suspicion, but sundry faults leading that way? by
Jeroms consent therfore divorce is free not only for
actual adultery, but for any cause that may encline a
wise man to the just suspicion therof.
Austin also must be remeber'd among those who
hold that this instance of fornication gives equal
inference to other faults equally hateful, for which to
divorce: & therfore in his books to Pollentius he
disputes that infidelity, as being a greater sin then
adultery, ought so much the rather cause a divorce.
And on the Sermon in the Mount, under the name of
fornication will have idolatry, or any harmfull
superstition contain'd, which are not thought to
disturb matrimony so directly as som other
obstinacies and dissaffections, more against the daily
duties of that cov'nant, & in the eastern tongues
not unfrequently call'd fornication, as hath bin
shew'n. Hence is understood, saith he, that not only
for bodily fornication, but for that which draws the
mind from Gods law, and fouly corrupts it, a man
may without fault put away his wife, and a wife her
husband, because the Lord excepts the cause of
fornication, which fornication we are constrain'd to
interpret in a general sense. And in the first book of
his retractations chap. 16. he retracts not this his
opinion, but commends it to serious consideration;
and explains that he counted not there all sin to be
fornication, but the more detestable sort of sins. The
cause of fornication therefore is not in this discours
newly interpreted to signify other faults infringing
the duties of wedloc, besides adultery.
Lastly the councel of Agatha in the year 506.
can. 25. decreed, that if lay men who divorc't
without some great fault, or giving no probable cause,
therfore divorc't, that they might marry som
unlawful person, or some other mans, if before the
provinciall Bishops were made acquainted, or
judgement past, they presum'd this, excommunication
was the penalty. Whence it followes, that if the cause
of divorce were som great offence, or that they gave
probable causes for what they did, and did not
therefore divorce that they might presume with som
unlawfull person, or what was another mans, the
censure of Church in those daies did not touch them.
Thus having alledg'd anough to shew after what
manner the primitive Church for above 500. yeares
understood our Saviours words touching divorce, I
shall now with a labour less disperst, and sooner
dispatcht, bring under view what the civil law of
those times constituted about this matter: I say the
civil law, which is the honour of every true Civilian
to stand for, rather then to count that for law, which
the pontificiall Canon had enthrall'd them to, and
in stead of interpreting a generous and elegant law,
made them the drudges of a blockish Rubric.
Theodosius and Valentinian, pious Emperors both,
ordain'd that as by consent lawfull mariages were
made, so by consent, but not without the bill of
divorce, they might be dissolv'd; and to dissolve was
the more difficult, onely in favour of the children. We
see the wisdome and piety of that age one of the
purest and learnedest since Christ, conceav'd no
hindrance in the words of our Saviour, but that a
divorce mutually consented, might bee suffer'd by the
law, especially if there were no children, or if there
were, carefull provision was made. And further saith
that law (supposing there wanted the consent of
either,) wee designe the causes of divorce by this most
wholesom law; for as we forbid the dissolving of
mariage without just cause, so we desire that a
husband or a wife distrest by som advers
necessity, should be freed, though by an unhappy,
yet a necessary releefe. What dramm of wisdome or
religion (for Charity is truest Religion) could there
be in that knowing age, which is not virtually summ'd
up in this most just law? As for those other
Christian Emperours, from Constantine the first of
them, finding the Roman law in this point so
answerable to the Mosaic, it might bee the likeliest
cause why they alter'd nothing to restraint' but if
ought, rather to liberty, for the helpe and
consideration of the weaker sexe, according as the
Gospel seems to make the wife more equal to her
husband in these conjugal respects then the law of
Moses doth. Therefore if a man were absent from his
wife foure yeares, and in that space not heard of,
though gon to warre in the service of the Empire, she
might divorce, and marry another by the edict of
Constantine to Dalmatius, Co. l. 5. tit. 17. And this
was an age of the Church both antient, and cry'd up
still for the most flourishing in knowledge and pious
government since the Apostles. But to returne to this
law of Theodosius, with this observation by the way,
that still as the Church corrupted, as the Clergie
grew more ignorant, and yet more usurping on the
Magistrate, who also now declin'd, so still divorce
grew more restrain'd; though certainly if better
times permitted the thing that worse times
restrain'd, it would not weakly argue that the
permission was better, and the restraint worse. This
law therefore of Theodosius wiser in this then the
most of his successors, though not wiser then God
and Moses, reduc't the causes of divorce to a certain
number which by the judiciall law of God, and all
recorded humanitie, were left before to the brest of
each husband, provided that the dismisse was not
without reasonable conditions to the wife. But this
was a restraint not yet come to extreames. For
besides adultery and that not only actual, but
suspected by many signes there set down, any fault
equally punishable with adultery, or equally
infamous might bee the cause of a divorce. Which
informes us how the wisest of those ages understood
that place in the Gospel, whereby, not the pilfering of
a benevolence was consider'd as the main and only
breach of wedloc, as is now thought, but the breach
of love and peace, a more holy union then that of the
flesh; and the dignity of an honest person was
regarded, not to bee held in bondage with one whose
ignominy was infectious. To this purpose was
constituted Cod. l. 5. tit. 17. and Authent. collat. 4. tit.
1. Novell. 22. where Justinian added three causes
more. In the 117. Novell. most of the same causes are
allow'd, but the liberty of divorcing by consent is
repeal'd: but by whom? by Justinian, not a wiser, not
a more religious emperor then either of the former,
but noted by judicious writers for his fickle head in
making and unmaking lawes; and how Procopius a
good historian, and a counselor of state then living
deciphers him in his other actions, I willingly omitt.
Nor was the Church then in better case, but had the
corruption of a 100. declining yeares swept on it,
when the statute of consent was call'd in; which as I
said, gives us every way more reason to suspect this
restraint, more then that liberty: which therfore in
the reign of Justin the succeeding Emperor was
recall'd, Novel. 140. & establisht with a preface
more wise & christianly then for those times,
declaring the necessity to restore that Theodosian
law, if no other meanes of reconcilement could be
found. And by whom this law was abrogated, or how
long after, I doe not finde; but that those other causes
remain'd in force as long as the Greek empire
subsisted, and were assented to by that Church, is to
bee read in the Canons and edicts compar'd by Photius
the Patriarch, with the avertiments of Balsamon, and
Matthaeus Monachus thereon.
But long before those dayes Leo the Son of
Basilius Macedo reigning about the yeare 886. and for
his excellent wisdome surnam'd the Philosopher,
constituted that in the case of madnesse the husband
might divorce after three yeares, the wife after 5.
Constitut. Leon. 111. 112. this declares how hee
expounded our Saviour, and deriv'd his reasons from
the institution, which in his preface with great
eloquence are set downe; wherof a passage or two may
give some proofe, though better not divided from the
rest. There is not, saith he, a thing more necessary
to preserve mankind, then the helpe giv'n him from
his own rib; both God and nature so teaching us:
which being so, it was requisite that the providence
of law, or if any other care be to the good of man,
should teach and ordaine those things which are to
the helpe and comfort of maried persons, and
confirme the end of mariage purpos'd in the
beginning, not those things which afflict and bring
perpetuall misery to them. Then answers the
objection that they are one flesh; if Matrimony had
held so as God ordain'd it, he were wicked that would
dissolve it. But if we respect this in matrimony, that
it be contracted to the good of both, how shall he,
who for some great evil feard, perswades not to
marry though contracted, nor perswade to unmarry,
if after marriage a calamity befall? Should we bid
beware least any fall into an evil, and leave him
helplesse who by humane error is fall'n therein? This
were as if we should use remedies to prevent a
disease, but let the sick die without remedy. The rest
will be worth reading in the author.
And thus we have the judgement first of primitive
fathers; next of the imperial law not disallow'd by
the universal Church in ages of her best authority;
and lastly of the whole Greeke Church and civil state,
incorporating their Canons and edicts together, that
divorce was lawfull for other causes equivalent to
adultery, contain'd under the word fornication. So
that the exposition of our saviours sentences heer
alleg'd hath all these ancient and great asserters, is
therefore neither new nor licentious, as some now would
perswade the commonalty; although it be neerer
truth that nothing is more new then those teachers
themselves, & nothing more licentious then some
known to be, whose hypocrisie yet shames not to take
offence at this doctrine for licence; when as indeed
they feare it would remove licence, and leave them
but few companions.
That the Popes Canon law incroaching upon civil
Magistracy abolisht all divorce eevn for adultery.
What the reformed Divines have recover'd; and
that the famousest of them have taught according
to the assertion of this booke.
But in these western parts of the empire it will
appeare almost unquestionable that the cited law of
Theodosius and Valentinian stood in force untill the
blindest and corruptest times of Popedom displac't it.
For that the volumes of Justinian never came into
Italy, or beyond Illiricum, is the opinion of good
Antiquaries. And that only manuscript thereof found
in Apulia by Lotharius the Saxon, and giv'n to the
states of Pisa for their aid at sea against the
Normans of Sicily, was receav'd as a rarity not to bee
matcht. And although the Gothes, and after them the
Lombards and Franks who over-run the most of
Europ except this Island, (unlesse wee make our
Saxons and Normans a limm of them) brought in their
owne customes, yet that they follow'd the Roman laws
in their contracts and mariages, Agathias the
historian is alleg'd. And other testimonies relate
that Alaricus & Theodoric their Kings writ their
statutes out of this Theodosian Code which hath the
recited law of Divorce. Neverthelesse while the
Monarchs of Christendome were yet barbarous, and
but halfe Christian, the Popes tooke this advantage of
their weake superstition, to raise a corpulent law out
of the canons and decretals of audacious preists; and
presum'd also to set this in the front; That the
constitutions of princes are not above the
constitutions of clergy, but beneath them. Using
this very instance of divorce as the first prop of
their tyranny; by a false consequence drawn from a
passage of Ambrose upon Luke where hee saith, though
Mans law grant it, yet Gods law prohibits it. Whence
Gregory the Pope writing to Theoctista, inferrs that
Ecclesiasticall Courts cannot be dissolv'd by the
Magistrate. A faire conclusion from a double error.
First in saying that the divine law prohibited
divorce, for what will hee make of Moses; next
supposing that it did, how will it follow, that
what ever Christ forbids in his Evangelic precepts,
should be hal'd into a judicial constraint against the
patterne of a divine law: Certainely the Gospel came
not to enact such compulsions. In the meane while wee
may note heere that the restraint of divorce was one
of the first faire seeming pleas which the Pope had, to
step into secular authority, and with his
Antichristian rigor to abolish the permissive law of
Christian princes conforming to a sacred lawgiver.
Which if we consider, this papal and unjust
restriction of divorce need not be so deere to us, since
the plausible restraining of that, was in a manner the
first loosning of Antichrist; and as it were the
substance of his eldest horn. Nor doe we less
remarkably ow the first meanes of his fall heer in
England to the contemning of that restraint by
Henry 8. whose divorce he oppos'd. Yet was
not that rigour executed anciently in spiritual
Courts untill Alexander the third, who trod upon the
neck of Frederic Barbarossa the Emperor, and
summond our Henry 2. into Normandy about the
death of Becket. He it was, that the worthy author
may be known, who first actually repeal'd the
imperial law of divorce, and decreed this tyranous
decree, that matrimony for no cause should be
disolv'd, though for many causes it might separate; as
may be seen decret. Gregor. l. 4. tit. 19. and in other
places of the Canonicall Tomes. The main good of
which invention, wherein it consists, who can tell? but
that it hath one vertue incomparable, to fill all
christendom with whordomes, and adulteries
beyond the art of Balaams or of divells. Yet neither
can these, though so perverse, but acknowledge that
the words of Christ under the name of fornication
allow putting away for other causes then adultery
both from bed and bord, but not from the bond;
their only reason is, because mariage they beleeve
to bee a Sacrament. But our Divines who would seem
long since to have renounc't that reason, have so
forgot themselves, as yet to hold the absurdity,
which but for that reason, unlesse there be some
mystery of Satan in it, perhaps the Papist would not
hold. Tis true, we grant divorce for actual &
prov'd adultery, and not for lesse then many tedious
and unreparable yeares of desertion, wherein a man
shall loose all his hope of posterity, which great and
holy men have bewail'd, ere he can be righted; and
then perhaps on the confines of his old age, when all
is not worth the while. But grant this were
seasonably don; what are these two cases to many
other, which afflict the state of marriage as bad, and
yet find no redresse? What hath the soule of man
deserv'd, if it be in the way of salvation, that it
should be mortgag'd thus, and may not redeem it
selfe according to conscience out of the hands of such
ignorant and slothful teachers as these, who are
neither able nor mindful to give due tendance to that
pretious cure which they rashly undertake; nor
have in them the noble goodnesse to consider these
distresses and accidents of mans life; but are bent
rather to fill their mouthes with Tithe and oblation.
Yet if they can learne to follow, as well as they can
seeke to be follow'd, I shall direct them to a faire
number of renowned men, worthy to be their
leaders, who will commend to them a doctrin in this
point wiser then their own; and if they bee not-impatient, it will be the same doctrin which this
treatis hath defended.
Wicklif that Englishman honor'd of God to be
the first preacher of a general reformation to all
Europe, was not in this thing better taught of God,
then to teach among his chiefest recoveries of truth,
that divorce is lawfull to the christian for many other
causes equall to adultery. This book indeed through
the poverty of our Libraries I am forc't to cite from
Arnisaeus of Halberstad on the right of mariage, who
cites it from Corasius of Toulouse c. 4. Cent. Sct. and
he from Wicklef. l. 4. Dial. c. 21. So much the sorrier,
for that I never lookt into author cited by his
adversary upon this occasion, but found him more
conducible to the question, then his quotation
render'd him.
Next, Luther, how great a servant of God, in his
book of conjugal life quoted by Gerard out of the
Dutch, allowes divorce for the obstinate denial of
conjugal duty; and that a man may send away a proud Vasthi, and marry an Esther in her stead. It
seemes, if this example shall not be impertinent, that
Luther meant not onely the refusall of benevolence,
but a stubborn denial of any main conjugal duty; or
if he did not, it will be evinc't from what he allowes.
For out of question, with men that are not barbarous,
love and peace, and fitnesse, will be yeelded as
essential to mariage, as corporal benevolence.
Though I give my body to be burnt, saith Saint Paul,
and have not charity, it profits me nothing. So
though the body prostitute itselfe to whom the mind
affords no other love or peace, but constant malice
and vexation, can this bodily benevolence deserv to
be call'd a mariage between Christians and rationall
creatures.
Melanchton, the third great luminary of
reformation in his book concerning marriage, grants
divorce for cruell usage, and danger of life, urging
the authority of that Theodosian law, which he
esteemes written with the grave deliberation of godly
men; and that they who reject this law, and thinke it
disagreeing from the Gospel, understand not the
difference of law and Gospel; that the Magistrat
ought not only to defend life, but to succour the weake
conscience, lest broke with greif and indignation it
reliquish praier, and turn to som unlawful thing
What if this heavy plight of despaire arise from other
discontents in wedloc which may goe to the soule of a
good man more then the danger of his life, or cruel
using, which a Man cannot bee liable to, suppose it be
ingratefull usage, suppose it be perpetuall spight and
disobedience, suppose a hatred, shall not the
Magistrat free him from this disquiet which
interrupts his prayers, and disturbs the cours of
his service to God and his Country all as much, and
brings him such a misery, as that he more desires to
leave his life then feares to loose it? Shall not this
equally concerne the office of civil protection, and
much more the charity of a true Church to remedy?
Erasmus who for learning was the wonder of his
age, both in his notes on Matthew, and on the first to
the Corinthians in a large and eloquent discourse,
and in his answer to Phimostomus a Papist,
maintaines (and no protestant then living
contradicted him) that the words of Christ
comprehend many other causes of divorce under the
name of fornication.
Bucer, whom our famous Dr. Rainolds was wont
to preferr before Calvin, in his comment on Matthew,
and in his second booke of the Kingdome of Christ,
treats of divorce at large to the same effect, as is
written in the doctrine and discipline of divorce
lately publisht, and the translation is exant: whom
lest I should be thought to have wrested to mine own
purpose, take something more out of his 49.
Chap. which I then for brevity omitted. It will be
the duty of pious princes, and all who govern Church,
or commonwealth, if any, whether husband or wife,
shall affirme their want of such who either will, or can
tolerably performe the necessary duties of maried
life, to grant that they may seeke them such, and
marry them; if they make it appeare that such they
have not. This book he wrote heer in England, where
he liv'd the greatest admir'd man; and this hee
dedicated to Edward the sixth.
Fagius rankt among the famous divines of
Germany, whom Frederic, at that time the Palatine
sent for to be the reformer of his Dominion, and
whom afterwards England sought to, and obtain'd of
him to come and teach her, differs not in this opinion
from Bucer, as his notes on the Chaldey paraphrast
well testify.
The whole Church of Strasburgh in her most
flourishing time,when Zellius, Hedio, Capito, and
other great Divines taught there, and those two
renouned magistrates Farrerus and Sturmius
govern'd that common wealth and Academy to the
admiration of all Germany, hath thus in the 21.
Article. We teach that if according to the word of
God, yea or against it, divorces happen, to doe
according to Gods word, Deut. 24. 1. Mat. 19. 1
Cor. 7. and the observation of the primitive
Church, and the Christian constitution of pious
Caesars.
Peter Martyr seems in word our easy adversary,
but is in deed for us: toward which though it be
somthing when he saith of this opinion, that it is not
wicked, and can hardly be refuted, this which followes
is much more; I speak not heer, saith he, of natural
impediments which may so happ'n, that the
matrimony can no longer hold: but adding, that he
often wonder'd, how the antient and most christian
Emperors establisht those lawes of divorce, and
neither Ambrose, who had such influence upon the
lawes of Theodosius, nor any of those holy fathers
found fault, nor any of the Churches, why the
Magistrats of this day should be so loth to constitute
the same. Perhaps they feare an inundation of
divorces, which is not likely, whenas we reade not
either among the Ebrews, Greeks, or Romans, that
they were much frequent where they were most
permitted. If they judge christian men, worse then
Jewes or Pagans, they both injure that name, and by
this reason will bee constrain'd to grant divorces the
rather; because it was permitted as a remedy of evil,
for who would remove the medicin, while the
disease is yet so rife? This being read both in his
common places, & on the first to the Corinthians,
with what we shall relate more of him yet ere the
end, sets him absolutely on this side. Not to insist
that in both these, & other places of his
commentaries hee grants divorce not onely for
desertion, but for the seducement and scandalous
demeanour of a heretical consort.
Musculus a divine of no obscure fame
distinguishes betweene the religious and the civil
determination of divorce; and leaving the civil wholly
to the lawyers, pronounces a conscionable divorce
for impotence not only natural, but accidental, if it
be durable. His equity it seems, can enlarge the
words of Christ to one cause more then adultery;
why may not the reason of another man as wise,
enlarge them to another cause.
Gualter of Zuric, a well-known judicious
commentator in his Homilies on Matthew, allows
divorce for Leprosie, or any other cause which
renders unfit for wedloc, and calls this rather a
nullity of mariage then a divorce, and who, that is
not himselfe a meer body, can restrain all the
unfitnes of mariage only to a corporeal defect.
Hemingius an Author highly esteem'd, and his
works printed at Geneva, writing of divorce,
confesses that lerned men vary in this question,
some granting three causes therof, some five, others
many more; he himselfe gives us sixe, adultery,
desertion, inability, error, evill usage, and impiety,
using argument that Christ under one special
containes the whole kind, & under the name &
example of fornication he includes other causes
equipollent. This discours he wrote at the request
of many who had the judging of these causes in
Denmark and Norway, who by all likelyhood follow'd
his advice.
Hunnius a Doctor of Wittenberg, well known in
Divinity & other arts, on the 19. of Matt.
affirmes that the exception of fornication exprest
by our Saviour excludes not other causes equalling
adultery, or destructive to the substantials of
matrimony; but was oppos'd to the custom of the
Jewes who made divorce for every light cause.
Felix Bidenbachius an eminent Divine in the
Dutchy of Wirtemberg affirmes that the obstinat
refusal of conjugal due is a lawful cause of divorce,
and gives an instance that the consistory of that
state so judg'd.
Gerard cites Harbardus, an author not unknown,
and Arnisaeus cites Wigandus, both yeelding divorce
in case of cruel usage; and another author who
testifies to have seen in a dukedom of Germany
mariages disjoynd for some implacable enmities
arising.
Beza one of the strictest against divorce, denies it
not for danger of life from a Heretic, or importunat
solicitation to doe ought against religion: and counts it
all one whether the heretic desert, or would stay
upon intolerable conditions. But this decision well
examin'd will be found of no solidity. For Beza would
be askt why, if God so strictly exact our stay in any
kind of wedlock, wee had not better stay and hazard a
murdering for Religion at the hand of a wife, or
husband, as he and others enjoyn us to stay and
venture it for all other causes but that? and why a
mans life is not as well and warrantably sav'd by
divorcing from an orthodox murderer, as a heretical?
Againe, if desertion be confest by him to consist not
only in the forsaking, but in the unsufferable
conditions of staying, a man may as well deduce the
lawfulnesse of divorcing from any deserter, by finding
it lawful to divorce from a deserting infidel. For this
is plaine, if Saint Pauls permission to divorce an infidel
deserter, inferre it lawfull for any malicious desertion,
then doth Beza's definition of a deserter transferr
it selfe with like facility from the cause of religion to
the cause of malice, and proves it as good to divorce
from him who intolerably stayes as from him who
purposely departs; and leaves it as lawfull to depart
from him who urgently requires a wicked thing,
though professing the same religion, as from him
who urges a heathenish or superstitious compliance
in a different faith. For if there be such necessity of
our abiding, wee ought rather to abide the utmost for
religion then for any other cause; seeing both the
cause of our stay is pretended our religion to
mariage, and the cause of our suffering is suppos'd
our constant mariage to religion. Beza therfore by
his owne definition of a deserter justifies a divorce
from any wicked or intolerable conditions rather in
the same religion then in a different.
Aretius a famous Divine of Bern approves many
causes of divorce in his Problemes, and adds that the
lawes and consistories of Swizzerland approve them
also. As first, adultery, and that not actual only, but
intentional, alleging Matthew the fifth, Whosoever looketh
to lust, hath committed adultery already in his
heart. Wherby saith he, our Saviour shewes that the
breach of matrimony may be not only by outward
act, but by the heart and desire; when that hath
once possest, it renders the conversation
intolerable, and commonly the fact followes. Other
causes to the number of 9. or 10. consenting in
most with the imperial lawes, may bee read in the
author himselfe, who averrs them to be grave and
weighty. All these are men of name in Divinity' and
to these if need were, might be added more. Nor
have the Civilians bin all so blinded by the Canon, as
not to avouch the justice of those old permissions
touching divorce.
Alciat of Milan, a Man of extraordinary wisdome
and learning, in the sixt book of his Parerga,
defends those imperial lawes, not repugnant to the
Gospel, as the Church then interpreted. For saith
hee, the antients understood him separat by man,
whom passions and corrupt affections divorc't, not, if
the provincial Bishops first heard the matter, and
judg'd, as the councel of Agatha declares; and on
some part of the Code hee names Isidorus Hispalensis,
the first computer of Canons, to be in the same minde.
And in the former place gives his opinion that
divorce might be more lawfully permitted then
usury.
Corasius recorded by Helvicus among the famous
Lawyers hath been already cited of the same
judgement.
Wesembechius a much nam'd Civilian in his
comment on this law defends it, and affirms that
our Saviour excluded not other faults equall to
adultery; and that the word fornication signifies
larger among the Hebrewes then with us,
comprehending every fault which alienates from him
to whom obedience is due, and that the primitive
Church interpreted so.
Grotius yet living, and of prime note among
learned men retires plainly from the Canon to the
antient civility, yea to the Mosaic law, as being most
just and undecevable. On the fifth of Matt. he saith,
that Christ made no civil lawes, but taught us how to
use law: that the law sent not a husband to the
Judge about this matter of divorce, but left him to his
owne conscience; that Christ therfore cannot be
thought to send him; that adultery may be judg'd by
a vehement suspicion; that the exception of adultery
seems an example of other like offences; proves it
from the manner of speech, the maxims of law, the
reason of charity, and common equity.
These authorities without long search I had to
produce, all excellent men, som of them such as
many ages had brought forth none greater: almost
the meanest of them might deserve to obtain credit
in a singularity; what might not then all of them
joyn'd in an opinion so consonant to reason? For
although som speak of this cause, others of that,
why divorce may be, yet all agreeing in the
necessary enlargement of that textual straitnes,
leave the matter to equity, not to literal bondage,
and so the opinion closes. Nor could I have wanted
more testimonies, had the cause needed a more
sollicitous enquiry. But herein the satisfaction of
others hath bin studied, not the gaining of more
assurance to mine own perswasion: although
authorities contributing reason withall, bee a good
confirmation and a welcom. But God, I solemnly
attest him, withheld from my knowledge the
consenting judgement of these men so late, untill they
could not bee my instructers, but only my unexpected
witnesses to partial men, that in this work I had not
given the worst experiment of an industry joyn'd
with integrity and the free utterance though of an
unpopular truth. Which yet to the people of England
may, if God so please, prove a memorable informing;
certainly a benefit which was intended them long
since by men of highest repute for wisedome & piety
Bucer & Erasmus. Only this one autority more,
whether in place or out of place, I am not to omitt;
which if any can think a small one, I must bee patient
it is no smaller then the whole assembl'd autority
of England both Church and State; and in those times
which are on record for the purest and sincerest
that ever shon yet on the reformation of this
Iland, the time of Edward the 6th. That worthy
Prince having utterly abolisht the Canon Law out of
his Dominions, as his Father did before him,
appointed by full vote of Parlament, a Committy of
two and thirty chosen men, Divines and Lawyers, of
whom Cranmer the Archbishop, Peter Martyr, and
Walter Haddon, (not without the assistance of Sir John
Cheeke the Kings Tutor, a man at that time counted
the learnedest of Englishmen, & for piety not
inferior) were the chief, to frame anew som
Ecclesiastical Laws, that might be instead of what was
abrogated. The work with great diligence was
finisht, and with as great approbation of that
reforming age was receav'd; and had bin doubtlesse, as
the learned Preface therof testifies, establisht by Act
of Parlament, had not the good Kings death so soon
ensuing, arrested the furder growth of Religion
also, from that season to this. Those laws, thus
founded on the memorable wisedome and piety of that
religious Parlament and Synod, allow divorce and
second mariage not only for adultery or desertion,
but for any captial enmity or plot laid against the
others life, and likewise for evil and fierce usage:
nay the 12. Chap. of that title by plaine
consequence declares, that lesser contentions, if they
be perpetual, may obtaine divorce: which is all one
really with the position by me held in the former
treatise publisht on this argument, herein only
differing that there the cause of perpetual strife was
put for example in the unchangeable discord of som
natures; but in these lawes intended us by the best of
our ancestors, the effect of continual strife is
determin'd no unjust plea of divorce, whether the
cause be naturall or wilfull. Wherby the warinesse and
deliberation from which that discourse proceeded,
will appeare, & that God hath aided us to make no
bad conclusion of this point; seeing the opinion which
of late hath undergon ill censures among the
vulgar, hath now prov'd to have don no violence to
Scripture, unlesse all these famous Authors alledg'd
have done the like; nor hath affirm'd ought more
then what indeed the most nominated Fathers of the
Church both ancient and modern are unexpectedly found
affirming, the lawes of Gods peculiar people, & of
primitive Christendom found to have practis'd,
reformed Churches and states to have imitated, and
especially the most pious Church-times of this
Kingdom to have fram'd and publisht, and, but for
sad hindrances in the sudden change of religion, had
enacted by Parlament. Hence forth let them who
condemn the assertion of this book for new and
licentious, be sorry; lest, while they think to be of
the graver sort, and take on them to be teachers,
they expose themselves rather to be pledg'd up and
down by men who intimatly know them, to the
discovery and contempt of their ignorance and
presumption.