The Ordinance of Sabbath and mariage compar'd. Hyperbole no unfrequent figure in the Gospel. Excesse cur'd by contrary excesse. Christ neither did, nor could abrogat the Law of divorce, but only reprove the abuse therof.

HItherto the Position undertaken hath bin declar'd, and prov'd by a Law of God, that Law prov'd to be moral, and unabolishable for many reasons equal, honest, charitable, just, annext therto. It follows now that those places of Scripture which have a seeming to revoke the prudence of Moses, or rather that mercifull decree of God, be forthwith explain'd and reconcil'd. For what are all these reasonings worth, will some reply, whenas the words of Christ are plainly against all divorce, except in case of fornication. To whom he whose minde were to answer no more but this, except also in case of charity, might safely appeal to the more plain words of Christ in defence of so excepting. Thou shalt doe no manner of worke saith the commandment of the Sabbath. Yes saith Christ works of charity. And shall we be more severe in paraphrasing the considerat and tender Gospel, then he was in expounding the rigid and peremptory Law? What was ever in all appearance lesse made for man, and more for God alone then the Sabbath? yet when the good of man comes into the scales, we hear that voice of infinite goodnesse and benignity that Sabbath was made for man, not man for Sabbath. What thing ever was more made for Man alone and lesse for God then mariage? And shall we load it with a cruel and senceles bondage utterly against both the good of man and the glory of God? Let who so will now listen, I want neither pall nor mitre, I stay neither for ordination nor induction, but in the firm faith of a knowing Christian, which is the best and truest endowment of the keyes, I pronounce, the man who shall bind so cruelly a good and gracious ordinance of God, hath not in that the Spirit of Christ. Yet that every text of Scripture seeming opposite may be attended with a due exposition, this other part ensues, and makes account to find no slender arguments for this assertion out of those very Scriptures, which are commonly urg'd against it.

First therfore let us remember as a thing not to be deny'd, that all places of Scripture wherin just reason of doubt arises from the letter, are to be expounded by considering upon what occasion every thing is set down: and by comparing other Texts. The occasion which induc't our Saviour to speak of divorce, was either to convince the extravagance of the Pharises in that point, or to give a sharp and vehement answer to a tempting question. And in such cases that we are not to repose all upon the literall terms of so many words, many instances will teach us: Wherin we may plainly discover how Christ meant not to be tak'n word for word, but like a wise Physician, administring one excesse against another to reduce us to a perfect mean: Where the Pharises were strict, there Christ seems remisse; where they were too remisse, he saw it needfull to seem most severe: in one place he censures an unchast look to be adultery already committed: another time he passes over actuall adultery with lesse reproof then for an unchast look; not so heavily condemning secret weaknes, as open malice: So heer he may be justly thought to have giv'n this rigid sentence against divorce, not to cut off all remedy from a good man who finds himself consuming away in a disconsolate and uninjoy'd matrimony, but to lay a bridle upon the bold abuses of those over-weening Rabbies; which he could not more effectually doe, then by a countersway of restraint curbing their wild exorbitance almost into the other extreme; as when we bow things the contrary way, to make them come to their naturall straitnesse. And that this was the only intention of Christ is most evident; if we attend but to his own words and protestation made in the same Sermon, not many verses before he treats of divorcing, that he came not to abrogate from the Law one jot or tittle, and denounces against them that shall so teach.

But S. Luke, the verse immediatly before going that of divorce inserts the same caveat, as if the latter could not be understood without the former; and as a witnesse to produce against this our wilfull mistake of abrogating, which must needs confirm us that what ever els in the political law of more special relation to the Jews might cease to us, yet that of those precepts concerning divorce, not one of them was repeal'd by the doctrine of Christ, unlesse we have vow'd not to beleeve his own cautious and immediat profession; for if these our Saviours words inveigh against all divorce, and condemn it as adultery, except it be for adultery, and be not rather understood against the abuse of those divorces permitted in the Law, then is that Law of Moses, Deut. 24.1. not onely repeal'd and wholly annull'd against the promise of Christ and his known profession, not to meddle in matters Judicial, but that which is more strange, the very substance and purpose of that Law is contradicted and convinc't both of injustice and impurity, as having authoriz'd and maintain'd legall adultery by statute. Moses also cannot scape to be guilty of unequall and unwise decrees, punishing one act of secret adultery by death, and permitting a whole life of open adultery by Law. And albeit Lawyers write that some politicall edicts, though not approv'd, are yet allow'd to the scum of the people and the necessity of the times; these excuses have but a weak pulse: for first, we read, not that the scoundrel people, but the choicest, the wisest, the holiest of that nation have frequently us'd these lawes, or such as these in the best and holiest times. Secondly, be it yeelded, that in matters not very bad or impure, a human law giver may slacken something of that which is exactly good, to the disposition of the people and the times: but if the perfect, the pure, the righteous law of God, for so are all his statutes and his judgements, be found to have allow'd smoothly without any certain reprehension, that which Christ afterward declares to be adultery, how can we free this Law from the horrible endightment of being both impure, unjust, and fallacious.

NEither wil it serve to say this was permitted for the hardnes of their hearts, in that sense as it is usually explain'd, for the Law were then but a corrupt and erroneous School-master, teaching us to dash against a vitall maxim of religion, by doing foul evill in hope of some uncertain good.

This onely Text not to be match't again throughout the whole Scripture, wherby God in his perfect Law should seem to have granted to the hard hearts of his holy people under his owne hand, a civill immunity and free charter to live and die in a long successive adultery, under a covenant of works, till the Messiah, and then that indulgent permission to be strictly deny'd by a covnant of grace; besides the incoherence of such a doctrine, cannot, must not be thus interpreted, to the raising of a paradox never known til then, onely hanging by the twin'd thred of one doubtfull Scripture, against so many other rules and leading principles of religion, of justice, and purity of life. For what could be granted more either to the fear, or to the lust of any tyrant, or politician, then this authority of Moses thus expounded; which opens him a way at will to damme up justice, and not onely to admit of any Romish or Austrian dispences, but to enact a statute of that which he dares not seeme to approve, ev'n to legitimate vice, to make sinne it selfe, the ever alien & vassal sin, a free Citizen of the Common-wealth, pretending onely these or these plausible reasons. And well he might, all the while that Moses shall be alledg'd to have done as much without shewing any reason at all. Yet this could not enter into the heart of David, Psal. 94.20. how any such autority as endevours to fashion wickednes by a law, should derive it selfe from God. And Isaiah layes woe upon them that decree unrighteous decrees, 10.1. Now which of these two is the better Lawgiver, and which deserves most a woe, he that gives out an edict singly unjust, or he that confirms to generations a fixt and unmolested impunity of that which is not onely held to be unjust, but also unclean, and both in a high degree, not only as they themselves affirm, an injurious expulsion of one wife, but also an unclean freedom by more then a patent to wed another adulterously? How can we therfore with safety thus dangerously confine the free simplicity of our Saviours meaning to that which meerly amounts from so many letters, whenas it can consist neither with his former and cautionary words, nor with other more pure and holy principles, nor finally with the scope of charity, commanding by his expresse commission in a higher strain. But all rather of necessity must be understood as only against the abuse of that wise and ingenuous liberty which Moses gave, and to terrifie a roaving conscience from sinning under that pretext.

That to allow sin by Law, is against the nature of Law, the end of the lawgiver and the good of the people. Impossible therfore in the Law of God. That it makes God the author of sin, more than any thing objected by the Iesuits or Arminians against Predestination.

BUT let us yet further examin upon what consideration a Law of licence could be thus giv'n to a holy people for the hardnesse of heart. I suppose all wil answer, that for some good end or other. But here the contrary shall be prov'd. First, that many ill effects, but no good end of such a sufferance can be shewn; next, that a thing unlawful can for no good end whatever be either don or allow'd by a positive law. If there were any good end aim'd at, that end was then good, either as to the Law, or to the lawgiver licencing; or as to the person licenc't. That it could not be the end of the Law, whether Moral or Judiciall, to licence a sin, I prove easily out of Rom. 5. 20. The Law enter'd, that the offence might abound, that is, that sin might be made abundantly manifest to be hainous and displeasing to God, that so his offer'd grace might be the more esteem'd. Now if the Law in stead of aggravating and terrifying sin, shall give out licence, it foils it selfe, and turns recreant from its own end: it forestalls the pure grace of Christ which is through righteousnesse, with impure indulgences which are through sin. And instead of discovering sin, for by the Law is the knowledge therof saith S. Paul, and that by certain and true light for men to walk in safely, it holds out fals and dazling fires to stumble men: or like those miserable flies to run into with delight and be burnt: for how many soules might easily think that to be lawfull, which the Law and Magistrate allow'd them? Again we read, 1 Tim. 1.5. The end of the Commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfained. But never could that be charity to allow a people what they could not use with a pure heart, but with conscience and faith both deceiv'd, or els despis'd. The more particular end of the Judicial Law is set forth to us clearly, Rom. 13. that God hath giv'n to that Law a Sword not in vain, but to be a terror to evil works, a revenge to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. If this terrible commission should but forbeare to punish wickednes, were it other to be accounted then partial and unjust? but if it begin to write indulgence to vulgar uncleannes, can it doe more to corrupt and shame the end of its own being? Lastly, if the Law allow sin, it enters into a kind of covnant with sin, and if it doe, there is not a greater sinner in the world then the Law it selfe. The Law, to use an allegory somthing different from that in Philo Judæus concerning Amaleck, though haply more significant, the Law is the Israelite, and hath this absolute charge given it, Deut. 25. To blot out the memory of sin, the Amalekite, from under heav'n, not to forget it. Again, the Law is the Israelite, and hath this expresse repeated command to make no cov'nant with sin, the Canaanite, but to expell him, lest he prove a snare. And to say truth it were too rigid and reasonlesse to proclaime such an enmity between man and man, were it not the type of a greater enmity between law and sin. I spake ev'n now, as if sin were condemn'd in a perpetual villenage never to be free by law, never to be manumitted: but sure sin can have no tenure by law at all, but is rather an eternal outlaw, and in hostility with law past all attonement: both diagonial contraries, as much allowing one another, as day and night together in one hemisphere. Or if it be possible, that sin with his darknes may come to composition, it cannot be without a foul eclipse and twylight to the law, whose brightnesse ought to surpasse the noon. Thus we see how this unclean permittance defeats the sacred and glorious end both of the Moral and Judicial Law.

As little good can the lawgiver propose to equity by such a lavish remisnes as this: if to remedy hardnes of heart, Paræus and other divines confesse, it more encreases by this liberty, then is lessn'd: and how is it probable that their hearts were more hard in this that it should be yeelded to, then in any other crime? Their hearts were set upon usury, and are to this day, no Nation more; yet that which was the endammaging only of their estates, was narrowly forbid; this which is thought the extreme injury and dishonour of their Wives and daughters, with the defilement also of themselves, is bounteously allow'd. Their hearts were as hard under their best Kings to offer in high places, though to the true God; yet that but a small thing is strictly forwarn'd; this accounted a high offence against one of the greatest moral duties, is calmely permitted and establisht. How can it be evaded but that the heavy censure of Christ should fall worse upon this lawgiver of theirs, then upon all the Scribes and Pharises? For they did but omit Judgement and Mercy to trifle in Mint and Cummin, yet all according to Law; but this their Law-giver, altogether as punctuall in such niceties, goes marching on to adulteries, through the violence of divorce by Law against Law. If it were such a cursed act of Pilat a subordinate Judge to Cæsar, over-swayd by those hard hearts with much a doe to suffer one transgression of Law but once, what is it then with lesse a doe to publish a Law of transgression for many ages? Did God for this come down and cover the Mount of Sinai with his glory, uttering in thunder those his sacred Ordinances out of the bottomlesse treasures of his wisdome and infinit purenes to patch up an ulcerous and rott'n common-wealth with strict and stern injunctions, to wash the skin and garments for every unclean touch, and such easie permission giv'n to pollute the soule with adulteries by publick authority, without disgrace, or question? No, it had bin better that man had never known Law or matrimony, then that such foul iniquity should be fast'nd upon the holy One of Israel, the Judge of all the earth, and such a peece of folly as Belzebub would not commit, to divide against himself and pervert his own ends; or if he to compasse more certain mischief, might yeild perhaps to fain some good deed, yet that God should enact a licence of certain evill for uncertain good against His own glory and purenes, is abominable to conceive. And as it is destructive to the end of Law, and blasphemous to the honour of the lawgiver licencing, so is it as pernicious to the person licenc't. If a private friend admonish not, the Scripture saith he hates his brother, and lets him perish; but if he sooth him, and allow him in his faults, the Proverbs teach us he spreads a net for his neighbours feet, and worketh ruin. If the Magistrate or Prince forget to administer due justice and restrain not sin, Eli himself could say, it made the Lords people to transgresse. But if he count'nance them against law by his own example, what havock it makes both in Religion and vertue among the people, may be guest by the anger it brought upon Hophni and Phineas, not to be appeas'd with sacrifice nor offring for ever. If the Law be silent to declare sin, the people must needs generally goe astray, for the Apostle himselfe saith, he had not known lust but by the Law: and surely such a Nation seems not to be under the illuminating guidance of Gods law, but under the horrible doom rather of such as despise the Gospel, he that is filthy let him be filthy still. But where the Law it selfe gives a warrant for sin, I know not what condition of misery to imagin miserable anough for such a people, unlesse that portion of the wicked, or rather of the damned, on whom God threatens in 11. Psalm, to rain snares: but that questionlesse cannot be by any Law, which the Apostle saith is a ministery ordain'd of God unto our good, and not so many waies and in so high a degree to our destruction, as we have now bin graduating. And this is all the good can come to the person licenc't in his hardnesse of heart.

I am next to mention that which because it is a ground in divinity, Rom.3. will save the labour of demonstrating, unlesse her giv'n axioms be more doubted then in other Arts (although it be no lesse firm in the precepts of Philosophy) that a thing unlawfull can for no good whatsoever be done, much lesse allow'd by a positive law. And this is the matter why Interpreters upon that passage in Hosea will not consent it to be a true story, that the Prophet took a Harlot to wife, because God being a pure Spirit could not command a thing repugnant to his own nature, no not for so good an end as to exhibit more to the life a wholsom and perhaps a converting parable to many an Israelite. Yet that he commanded the allowance of adulterous and injurious divorses for hardnes of heart, a reason obscure and in a wrong sense, they can very savourily perswade themselves; so tenacious is the leven of an old conceit. But they shift it, he permitted only. Yet silence in the Law is consent, and consent is accessory; why then is not the Law being silent, or not active against a crime, accessory to its own conviction, it self judging? For though we should grant, that it approvs not, yet it wills; and the Lawyers maxim is, that the will compell'd is yet the will. And though Aristotle in his Ethicks call this a mixt action, yet he concludes it to be voluntary and inexcusable, if it be evill. How justly then might human law and Philosophy rise up against the righteousnesse of Moses, if this be true which our vulgar Divinity Fathers upon him, yea upon God himselfe; not silently and only negatively to permit, but in his law to divulge a written and generall priviledge to commit and persist in unlawfull divorces with a high hand, with security and no ill fame: for this is more then permitting or conniving, this is maintaining; this is warranting, this is protecting, yea this is doing evill, and such an evil as that reprobat lawgiver did, whose lasting infamy is ingrav'n upon him like a surname, he who made Israel to sin. This is the lowest pitch contrary to God that publick fraud and injustice can descend.

If it be affirm'd that God as being Lord may doe what he will; yet we must know that God hath not two wills, but one will, much lesse two contrary. If he once will'd adultery should be sinfull, and to be punisht by death, all his omnipotence will not allow him to will the allowance that his holiest people might as it were by his own Antinomie, or counter-statute, live unreprov'd in the same fact, as he himselfe esteem'd it, according to our common explainers. The hidden wayes of his providence we adore & search not; but the law is his reveled wil, his complete, his evident, and certain will; herein he appears to us as it were in human shape, enters into cov'nant with us, swears to keep it, binds himself like a just lawgiver to his own prescriptions, gives himself to be understood by men, judges and is judg'd, measures and is commensurat to right reason; cannot require lesse of us in one cantle of his Law then in another, his legall justice cannot be so fickle and so variable, sometimes like a devouring fire and by and by connivent in the embers, or, if I may so say, oscitant and supine. The vigor of his Law could no more remit, then the hallowed fire on his altar could be let goe out. The Lamps that burnt before him might need snuffing, but the light of his Law never. Of this also more beneath, is discussing a solution of Rivetus.

The Jesuits, and that sect among us which is nam'd of Arminius, are wont to charge us of making God the author of sinne in two degrees especially, not to speak of his permissions. 1. Because we hold that he hath decreed some to damnation, and consequently to sinne, say they: Next, because those means which are of saving knowledge to others, he makes to them an occasion of greater sinne. Yet considering the perfection wherin man was created, and might have stood, no decree necessitating his free will, but subsequent though not in time yet in order to causes which were in his owne power, they might, methinks be perswaded to absolve both God and us. Whenas the doctrine of Plato and Chrysippus with their followers the Academics and the Stoics, who knew not what a consummat and most adorned Pandora was bestow'd upon Adam to be the nurse and guide of his arbitrary happinesse and perseverance, I mean his native innocence and perfection, which might have kept him from being our true Epimetheus, and though they taught of vertue and vice to be both the gift of divine destiny, they could yet find reasons not invalid, to justifie the counsels of God and Fate from the insulsity of mortall tongues: That mans own will self corrupted is the adequat and sufficient cause of his disobedience besides fate; as Homer also wanted not to expresse both in his Iliad and Odyssei. And Manilius the Poet, although in his fourth book he tells of some created both to sinne and punishment; yet without murmuring, and with an industrious cheerfulnes acquitts the Deity. They were not ignorant in their heathen lore, that it is most God-like to punish those who of his creatures became his enemies with the greatest punishment; and they could attain also to think that the greatest, when God himselfe throws a man furthest from him; which then they held hee did, when he blinded, hard'n'd, and stirr'd up his offendors, to finish, and pile up their disperat work since they had undertak'n it. To banish for ever into a locall hell, whether in the aire or in the center, or in that uttermost and bottomlesse gulph of Chaos, deeper from holy blisse then the worlds diameter multiply'd, they thought not a punishing so proper and proportionat for God to inflict, as to punish sinne with sinne. Thus were the common sort of Gentiles wont to think, without any wry thoughts cast upon divine governance. And therefore Cicero not in his Tusculan or Campanian retirements among the learned wits of that age; but ev'n in the Senat to a mixt auditory (though he were sparing otherwise to broach his Philosophy among Statists and Lawyers) yet as to this point both in his oration against Piso, and in that which is about the answers of the Soothsayers against Clodius, he declares it publikly as no paradox to common ears, that God cannot punish man more, nor make him more miserable, then still by making him more sinnfull. Thus we see how in this controversie the justice of God stood upright ev'n among heathen disputers. But if any one be truly, and not pretendedly zealous for Gods honour, here I call him forth before men and Angels, to use his best and most advised skill, lest God more unavoidably then ever yet, and in the guiltiest manner be made the author of sin: if he shall not onely deliver over and incite his enemies by rebuks to sin as a punishment, but shall by patent under his own broad seal allow his friends whom he would sanctify and save, whom he would unite to himselfe, and not dis-joyne, whom he would correct by wholsome chastning, and not punish as hee doth the damned by lewd sinning, if he shall allow these in his Law the perfect rule of his own purest wil, and our most edify'd conscience, the perpetrating of an odious and manifold sin without the lest contesting. Tis wonder'd how there can be in God a secret, and a reveal'd will; and yet what wonder, if there be in man two answerable causes. But here there must be two revealed wills grappling in a fraternall warre with one another without any reasonable cause apprehended. This cannot be lesse then to ingraft sin into the substance of the law, which law is to provoke sin by crossing and forbidding, not by complying with it. Nay this is, which I tremble in uttering, to incarnat sin into the unpunishing, and well-pleas'd will of God. To avoid these dreadfull consequences that tread upon the heels of those allowances to sin, will be a task of farre more difficulty then to appease those minds which perhaps out of a vigilant and wary conscience except against predestination. Thus finally we may conclude, that a Law wholly giving licence cannot upon any good consideration be giv'n to a holy people, for hardnesse of heart in the vulgar sense.

That if divorce be no command, no more is mariage. That divorce could be no dispensation if it were sinfull. The Solution of Rivetus, that God dispenc't by some unknown way, ought not to satisfie a Christian mind.

Others think to evade the matter by not granting any Law of divorce, but onely a dispensation, which is contrary to the words of Christ, who himselfe calls it a Law, Mark. 10.5. or if we speak of a command in the strictest definition, then mariage it selfe is no more a command then divorce, but onely a free permission to him who cannot contain. But as to dispensation I affirm, the same as before of the Law, that it can never be giv'n to the allowance of sin, God cannot give it neither in respect of himselfe, nor in respect of man: not in respect of himselfe, being a most pure essence, the just avenger of sin; neither can he make that cease to be a sinne, which is in it self injust and impure, as all divorces they say were which were not for adultery. Not in respect of man; for then it must be either to his good or to his evill; Not to his good; for how can that be imagin'd any good to a sinner whom nothing but rebuke and due correction can save, to heare the determinate oracle of divine Law louder than any reproof dispensing and providing for the impunity, and convenience of sin; to make that doubtfull, or rather lawfull, which the end of the law was to make most evidently hatefull? Nor to the evill of man can a dispence be given; for if the Law were ordaind unto life, Ro. 7.10. how can the same God publish dispences against that Law, which must needs be unto death? Absurd and monstrous would that dispence be, if any Judge or Law should give it a man to cut his own throat, or to damne himselfe. dispence therefore presupposes full pardon, or els it is not a dispence, but a most baneful & bloody snare. And why should God enter covnant with a people to be holy, as the Command is holy, and just, and good, Ro. 7.12. and yet suffer an impure and treacherous dispence to mislead and betray them under the vizard of Law to a legitimate practice of uncleannesse? God is no covnant breaker, he cannot doe this.

Rivetus, a diligent and learned Writer, having well waigh'd what hath been written by those founders of dispence, and finding the small agreement among them, would fain work himselfe aloof these rocks and quicksands, and thinks it best to conclude that God certainly did dispence, but by some way to us unknown, and so to leave it. But to this I oppose, that a Christian by no meanes ought rest himself in such an ignorance; whereby so may absurdities will strait reflect both against the purity, justice, and wisdome of God, the end also both of Law and Gospel, and the comparison of them both together. God indeed in some wayes of his providence, is high and secret past finding out: but in the delivery and execution of his Law, especially in the managing of a duty so daily and so familiar as this is wherof we reason, hath plain anough reveal'd himself, and requires the observance therof not otherwise then to the law of nature and of equity imprinted in us seems correspondent. And hee hath taught us to love and to extoll his Lawes, not onely as they are his, but as they are just and good to every wise and sober understanding. Therfore Abraham, ev'n to the face of God himselfe, seem'd to doubt of divine justice, if it should swerve from that irradiation wherwith it had enlight'ned the mind of man, and bound it selfe to observe its own rule. Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? That be far from thee; shall not the Judge of the earth doe right? Therby declaring that God hath created a righteousnesse in right it selfe, against which he cannot doe. So David, Psal. 119. The testimonies which thou hast commanded are righteous and very faithfull; thy word is very pure, therfore thy servant loveth it. Not onely then for the authours sake, but for its owne purity. He is faithful, saith S. Paul, he cannot deny himselfe, that is, cannot deny his own promises, cannot but be true to his own rules. He often pleads with men the uprightnesse of his ways by their own principles. How should we imitate him els to be perfect as he is perfect. If at pleasure hee can dispence with golden Poetick ages of such pleasing licence, as in the fabl'd reign of old Saturn. And this perhaps before the Law might have some covert; but under such an undispencing covenant as Moses made with them, and not to tell us why and wherfore indulgence, cannot give quiet to the brest of any intelligent man. We must be resolv'd how the law can be pure and perspicuous, and yet throw a polluted skirt over these Eleusinian mysteries, that no man can utter what they mean: worse in this then the worst obscenities of heathen superstition; for their filthines was hid, but the mystick reason therof known to their Sages: But this Jewish imputed filthinesse was daily and open, but the reason of it is not known to our Divines. We know of no designe the Gospel can have to impose new righteousnes upon works, but to remit the old by faith without works, if we mean justifying works: we know no mystery our Saviour could have to lay new bonds upon mariage in the covnant of grace which himselfe had loosn'd to the severity of law. So that Rivetus may pardon us, if we cannot bee contented with his non-solution to remain in such a peck of incertainties and doubts so dangerous and gastly to the fundamentals of our faith.

THerfore to get some better satisfaction, we must proceed to enquire as diligently as we can, what a dispensation is, which I find to be either properly so call'd, or improperly. Improperly so call'd, is rather a particular and exceptive law absolving and disobliging from a more general command for some just and reasonable cause. As Numb. 9. they who were unclean, or in a journey, had leave to keep the passover, in the second moneth, but otherwise ever in the first. As for that in Leviticus of marying the brothers wife, it was a penall statute rather than a dispense; and commands nothing injurious or in it selfe unclean, onely preferres a speciall reason of charitie, before an institutive decencie, and perhaps is meant for life time onely, as is exprest beneath in the prohibition of taking two sisters. What other edict of Moses, carrying but the semblance of a Law in any other kind, may beare the name of a dispence, I have not readily to instance. But a dispensation most properly, is some particular accident rarely happ'ning, and therfore not specify'd in the Law, but left to the decision of charity, ev'n under the bondage of Jewish rites, much more under the liberty of the Gospel. Thus did David enter into the house of God, and did eat the Shew bread, he and his followers, which was ceremonially unlawfull. Of such dispenses as these it was that Verdune the French Divine so gravely disputed in the Councell of Trent against Friar Adrian, who held that the Pope might dispence with any thing. It is a fond perswasion, saith Verdune, that dispencing is a favour, nay it is as good distributive justice, as what is most, and the Priest sins if he give it not: for it is nothing else but a right interpretation of law. Thus farre that I can learn touching this matter wholsomly decreed. But that God who is the giver of every good and perfect gift, James I. should give out a rule and directory to sin by, should enact a dispensation as long liv'd as a law wherby to live in priviledg'd adultery for hardnes of heart, and yet this obdurat disease cannot bee conceiv'd how it was the more amended by this unclean remedy, is the most deadly and Scorpion like gift that the enemy of mankind could have given to any miserable sinner, and is rather such a dispence as that was which the serpent gave to our first parents. God gave Quails in his wrath, and Kings in his wrath, yet neither of these things evill in themselves, but that hee whose eyes cannot behold impurity, should in the book of his holy covnant, his most unpassionat law, give licence, and statute for uncontroul'd adultery, although it goe for the receiv'd opinion, I shall ever disswade my soul from such a creed, such an indulgence as the shop of Antichrist never forg'd a baser.

That the Jew had no more right to this supposed dispence, then the Christian hath, and rather not so much.

BUt if we must needs dispence, let us for a while so farre dispence with truth, as to grant that sinne may be dispenc't: yet there will be copious reason found to prove that the Jew had no more right to such a suppos'd indulgence, then the Christian, whether we look at the clear knowledge wherin he liv'd, or the strict performance of works wherto he was bound. Besides visions and prophesies they had the Law of God, which in the Psalmes and Proverbs is chiefly prais'd for surenesse and certainty both easie and perfect to the enlightning of the simple. How could it be so obscure then, or they so sottishly blind in this plain morall and houshold duty? They had the same precepts about mariage, Christ added nothing to their clearnesse, for that had argu'd them imperfect; hee opens not the Law, but removes the Pharisaick mists rais'd between the law and the peoples eyes: the onely sentence which he addes, What God hath joyn'd let no man put asunder, is as obscure as any clause fetcht out of Genesis, and hath encreast a yet undecided controversie of Clandestine mariages. If we examine over all his sayings, we shall find him not so much interpreting the Law with his words, as referring his owne words to be interpreted by the Law, and oftner obscures his mind in short, and vehement, and compact sentences, to blind and puzzle them the more who would not understand the Law. The Jewes therfore were as little to be dispenc't with for lack of morall knowledge, as we.

Next, none I think will deny, but that they were as much bound to perform the Law as any Christian. That severe and rigorous knife not sparing the tender fore-skin of any male infant, to carve upon his flesh the mark of that strict and pure covnant wherinto he enter'd, might give us to understand anough against the fancie of dispencing. S. Paul testifies, that every circumcis'd man is a debtor to the whole law, Gal. 5. or els circumcision is in vain, Rom. 2. 25. How vain then and how preposterous must it needs be to exact a circumcision of the Flesh from an infant unto an outward signe of purity, and to dispence an uncircumcision in the soul of a grown man to an inward and reall impurity? How vain again was that law to impose tedious expiations for every slight sinne of ignorance and error, and to priviledge without penance or disturbance an odious crime whether of ignorance or obstinacie? How unjust also inflicting death & extirpation for the mark of circumstantial purenes omitted, and proclaiming all honest and liberall indemnity to the act of a substantial impurenesse committed, making void the covnant that was made against it. Thus if we consider the tenor of the Law, to be circumcis'd and to perform all, not pardoning so much as the scapes of error and ignorance, and compare this with the condition of the Gospel, beleeve and be baptiz'd; I suppose it cannot bee long ere we grant that the Jew was bound as strictly to the performance of every duty as was possible, and therefore could not be dispenc't with more then the Christian, perhaps not so much.

That the Gospel is apter to dispence then the Law. Paræus answer'd.

IF then the Law wil afford no reason why the Jew should be more gently dealt with then the Christian, then surely the Gospel can afford as little why the Christian should be lesse gently dealt with than the Jew. The Gospell indeed exhorts to highest perfection but beares with weakest infirmity more then the Law. Hence those indulgencies, All cannot receive this saying, Every man hath his proper gift, with express charges not to lay on yokes which our fathers could not beare. The nature of man still is as weak and yet as hard, and that weaknesse and hardnesse as unfit and as unteachable to bee harshly us'd as ever. I but saith Paræus, there is a greater portion of Spirit powr'd upon the Gospel, which requires from us perfecter obedience. I answer, This does not prove that the law therfore might give allowance to sinne more then the Gospel; and if it were no sin, wee know it the work of the Spirit to mortifie our corrupt desires and evill concupiscence; but not to root up our naturall affections and disaffections moving to and fro ev'n in wisest men upon just and necessary reasons which were the true ground of that Mosaick dispence, and is the utmost extent of our pleading. What is more or lesse perfect we dispute not, but what is sinne or no sinne; and in that I still affirm the Law requir'd as perfect obedience as the Gospell: besides that the prime end of the Gospel is not so much to exact our obedience, as to reveal grace and the satisfaction of our disobedience. What is now exacted from us, it is the accusing Law that does it ev'n yet under the Gospell; but cannot bee more extreme to us now, then to the Jewes of old: for the Law ever was of works, and the Gospell ever was of grace.

Either then the Law by harmlesse and needfull dispences which the Gospel is now made to deny, must have anticipated and exceeded the grace of the Gospel, or els must be found to have giv'n politick and superficial graces without real pardon, saying in general doe this and live, and yet deceiving and damning under hand, with unsound and hollow permissions, which is utterly abhorring from the end of all Law, as hath bin shewd. But if those indulgences were safe and sinles out of tendernes and compassion, as indeed they were, and yet shall be abrogated by the Gospel, then the Law, whose end is by rigor to magnifie grace, shall it self give grace, and pluck a faire plume from the Gospel, instead of hastning us thither, alluring us from it. And wheras the terror of the Law was as a servant to amplifie and illustrat the mildnesse of grace; now the unmildnesse of Evangelick grace shall turn servant to declare the grace and mildnesse of the rigorous Law. The Law was harsh to extoll the grace of the Gospel, and now the Gospel by a new affected strictnes of her own, shall extenuate the grace, which her self offers. For by exacting a duty which the Law dispenc't, if we perform it, then is grace diminisht, by how much performance advances, unlesse the Apostle argue wrong: if we perform it not, and perish for not performing, then are the conditions of grace harder then those of rigor. If through Faith and Repentance we perish not, yet grace still remains the lesse, by requiring that which rigor did not require, or at least not so strictly. Thus much therfore to Paræus, that if the Gospel require perfecter obedience then the Law as a duty, it exalts the Law and debases it self, which is dishonourable to the work of our Redemption. Seeing therfore that all the causes of any allowance that the Jews might have, remain as well to the Christians, this is a certain rule, that so long as the causes remain the allowance ought. And having thus at length enquir'd the truth concerning Law and dispence, their ends, their uses, their limits, and in what manner both Jew and Christian stands liable to the one, or capable of the other, we may safely conclude, that to affirm the giving of any law, or law-like dispence to sin for hardnesse of heart, is a doctrine of that extravagance from the sage principles of piety, that who so considers throughly, cannot but admire how this hath been digested all this while.

The true sence how Moses suffer'd divorce for hardnesse of heart.

WHAT may we doe then to salve this seeming inconsistence? I must not dissemble that I am confident it can be don no other way then this.

Moses Deut. 24.1. establisht a grave and prudent Law, full of moral equity, full of due consideration towards nature, that cannot be resisted; a Law consenting with the Laws of wisest men and civilest Nations. That when a man hath maried a wife, if it come to passe he cannot love her by reason of some displeasing natural quality or unfitnes in her, let him write her a bill of divorce. The intent of which Law undoubtedly was this, that if any good and peaceable man should discover some helples disagreement or dislike either of mind or body, wherby he could not cheerfully perform the duty of a husband without the perpetual dissembling of offence and disturbance to his spirit, rather then to live uncomfortably and unhappily both to himself and to his wife, rather then to continue undertaking a duty which he could not possibly discharge, he might dismisse her whom he could not tolerably and so not conscionably retain. And this law the Spirit of God by the mouth of Salomon, Pro. 30.21,23. testifies to be a good and a necessary Law; by granting it that a hated woman (for so the hebrew word signifies, rather then odious though it come all to one) that a hated woman when she is maried, is a thing that the earth cannot beare. What follows then but that the charitable Law must remedy what nature cannot undergoe. Now that many licentious and hard hearted men took hold of this Law to cloak their bad purposes, is nothing strange to beleeve. And these were they, not for whom Moses made the Law, God forbid, but whose hardnes of heart taking ill advantage by this Law he held it better to suffer as by accident, where it could not be detected, rather then good men should loose their just and lawfull priviledge of remedy: Christ therfore having to answer these tempting Pharises, according as his custom was, not meaning to inform their proud ignorance what Moses did in the true intent of the Law, which they had ill cited, suppressing the true cause for which Moses gave it, and extending it to every slight matter, tells them their own, what Moses was forc't to suffer by their abuse of his Law. Which is yet more plain if we mark that our Saviour in the fifth of Matth. cites not the Law of Moses but the Pharisaical tradition falsly grounded upon that law. And in those other places, Chap. 19. and Mark. 10. the Pharises cite the Law, but conceale the wise and human reason there exprest; which our Saviour corrects not in them, whose pride deserv'd not his instruction, only returns them what is proper to them; Moses for the hardnesse of your heart suffer'd you, that is, such as you to put away your wives; and to you he wrote this precept for that cause, which (to you) must be read with an impression, and understood limitedly of such as cover'd ill purposes under that Law: for it was seasonable that they should hear their own unbounded licence rebukt, but not seasonable for them to hear a good mans requisit liberty explain'd. But us he hath taught better, if we have eares to hear. He himselfe acknowledg'd it to be a Law, Mark 10. and being a law of God, it must have an undoubted end of charity, which may be us'd with a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfained, as was heard: it cannot allow sin, but is purposely to resist sin, as by the same chapter to Timothy appeares. There we learn also that the Law is good, if a man use it lawfully. Out of doubt then there must be a certain good in this Law which Moses willingly allow'd; and there might be an unlawfull use made therof by hypocrits; and that was it which Moses unwillingly suffer'd; foreseeing it in general, but not able to discern it in particulars. Christ therfore mentions not here what Moses and the Law intended: for good men might know that by many other rules: and the scornfull Pharises were not fit to be told, untill they could imploy that knowledge they had, lesse abusively. Only he acquaints them with what Moses by them was put to suffer.

The words of the Institution how to be understood; and of our Saviours answer to his Disciples.

ANd to entertain a little their overweening arrogance as best befitted, and to amaze them yet furder, because they thought it no hard matter to fulfill the Law, he draws them up to that unseparable institution which God ordain'd in the beginning before the fall, when man and woman were both perfect, and could have no cause to separate: just as in the same Chap. he stands not to contend with the arrogant young man who boasted his observance of the whole Law, whether he had indeed kept it or not, but skrues him up higher, to a task of that perfection, which no man is bound to imitate. And in like manner that pattern of the first institution he set before the opinionative Pharises to dazle them and not to bind us. For this is a solid rule, that every command giv'n with a reason, binds our obedience no otherwise then that reason holds. Of this sort was that command in Eden; Therfore shall a man cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh: which we see is no absolute command, but with an inference, Therfore: the reason then must be first consider'd, that our obedience be not mis-obedience. The first is, for it is not single, because the wife is to the husband flesh of his flesh, as in the verse going before. But this reason cannot be sufficient of it self: for why then should he for his wife leave his father and mother, with whom he is farre more flesh of flesh and bone of bone, as being made of their substance. And besides it can be but a sorry and ignoble society of life, whose unseparable injunction depends meerly upon flesh and bones. Therfore we must look higher, since Christ himself recalls us to the beginning, and we shall finde that the primitive reason of never divorcing, was that sacred and not vain promise of God to remedy mans loneliness by making him a meet help for him, though not now in perfection, as at first, yet still in proportion as things now are. And this is repeated vers. 20 when all other creatures were fitly associated and brought to Adam, as if the divine power had bin in some care and deep thought, because there was not yet found an help meet for man. And can we so slightly depresse the all-wise purpose of a deliberating God, as if his consultation had produc't no other good for man but to joyn him with an accidentall companion of propagation, which his sudden word had already made for every beast? nay a farre lesse good to man it will be found, if she must at all aventures be fasten'd upon him individually. And therefore even plain sense and equity, and, which is above them both, the all-interpreting voice of Charity her self cries loud that this primitive reason, this consulted promise of God to make a meet help, is the onely cause that gives authority to this command of not divorcing, to be a command. And it might be further added, that if the true definition of a wife were askt in good earnest, this clause of being a meet help would shew it self so necessary, and so essential in that demonstrative argument, that it might be logically concluded: therfore she who naturally and perpetually is no meet help, can be no wife; which cleerly takes away the difficulty of dismissing of such a one. If this be not thought anough, I answer yet furder, that mariage, unlesse it mean a fit and tolerable mariage, is not inseparable neither by nature nor institution. Not by nature for then those Mosaick divorces had bin against nature, if separable and inseparable be contraries, as who doubts they be: and what is against nature is against Law, if soundest Philosophy abuse us not: by this reckning Moses should bee most unmosaick that is, most illegal, not to say most unnaturall. Nor is it inseparable by the first institution: for then no second institution in the same Law for so many causes could dissolve it: it being most unworthy a human (as Plato's judgement is in the fourth book of his Lawes) much more a divine Law-giver to write two several decrees upon the same thing. But what could Plato have deem'd if the one of these were good, the other evill to be done? Lastly, suppose it bee inseparable by institution, yet in competition with higher things, as religion and charity in mainest matters, and when the chiefe end is frustrat for which it was ordain'd, as hath been shown, if still it must remain inseparable, it holds a strange and lawlesse propriety from all other works of God under heaven. From these many considerations we may safely gather, that so much of the first institution as our Saviour mentions, for he mentions not all, was but to quell and put to non-plus the tempting Pharises; and to lay open their ignorance and shallow understanding of the Scriptures. For, saith he, have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning, made them male and female, and said, for this cause shall a man cleave to his wife? which these blind usurpers of Moses chair could not gainsay: as if this single respect of male and female were sufficient against a thousand inconveniences and mischiefes, to clogge a rationall creature to his endlesse sorrow unrelinquishably, under the guilefull superscription of his intended solace and comfort. What if they had thus answer'd, Master, if thou mean to make wedlock as inseparable as it was from the begining, let it be made also a fit society, as God meant it, which we shall soon understand it ought to be, if thou recite the whole reason of the law. Doubtlesse our Saviour had applauded their just answer. For then they had expounded this command of Paradise, even as Moses himselfe expounds it by his lawes of divorce, that is, with due and wise regard had to the premises and reasons of the first command, according to which, without unclean and temporizing permissions he instructs us in this imperfect state what we may lawfully doe about divorce.

But if it be thought that the Disciples offended at the rigour of Christs answer, could yet obtain no mitigation of the former sentence pronounc't to the Pharises, it may be fully answer'd, that our Saviour continues the same reply to his Disciples, as men leaven'd with the same customary licence, which the Pharises maintain'd, and displeas'd at the removing of a traditionall abuse wherto they had so long not unwillingly bin us'd: it was no time then to contend with their slow and prejudicial belief, in a thing wherin an ordinary measure of light in Scripture, with some attention might afterwards informe them well anough. And yet ere Christ had finisht this argument, they might have pickt out of his own concluding words, an answer more to their minds, and in effect the same with that which hath been all this while entreating audience. All men, said he, cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given, he that is able to receive it let him receive it. What saying is this which is left to a mans choice to receive or not receive? What but the married life. was our Saviour then so mild and favourable to the weaknesse of a single man, and is he turn'd on the sudden so rigorous and inexorable to the distresses and extremities of an ill wedded man? Did hee so graciously give leave to change the better single life for the worse maried life? Did he open so to us this hazardous and accidentall doore of mariage to shut upon us like the gate of death without retracting or returning, without permitting to change the worst, most insupportable, most unchristian mischance of mariage for all the mischiefes and sorrowes that can ensue, being an ordinance which was especially giv'n as a cordial and exhilarating cup of solace the better to beare our other crosses and afflictions? questionlesse this were a hardheartednesse of undivorcing, worse then that in the Jewes which they say extorted the allowance from Moses, and is utterly dissonant from all the doctrine of our Saviour. After these considerations therfore to take a law out of Paradise giv'n in time of originall perfection, and to take it barely without those just and equall inferences and reasons which mainly establish it, nor so much as admitting those needfull and safe allowances wherwith Moses himselfe interprets it to the faln condition of man, argues nothing in us but rashnesse and contempt of those meanes that God left us in his pure and chast Law without which it will not be possible for us to perform the strict imposition of this command: or if we strive beyond our strength, we shall strive to obay it otherwise then God commands it. And lamented experience daily teaches the bitter and vain fruits of this our presumption, forcing men in a thing wherin we are not able to judge either of their strength, or of their sufferance. Whom neither one vice nor other by natural addiction, but onely mariage ruins, which doubtlesse is not the fault of that ordinance, for God gave it as a blessing, nor alwayes of mans mis-choosing; it being an error above wisdom to prevent, as examples of wisest men so mistaken manifest: it is the fault therfore of a perverse opinion that will have it continu'd in despite of nature and reason, when indeed it was never truly joyn'd. All those expositers upon the first of Matthew confesse the Law of Moses to be the Law of the Lord wherin no addition or diminution hath place; yet coming to the point of divorce, as if they fear'd not to be call'd least in the kingdom of heav'n, any slight evasion will content them to reconcile those contradictions which they make between Christ and Moses, between Christ and Christ.

The vain shift of those who make the law of divorce to bee onely the premises of a succeeding law.

SOme will have it no Law, but the granted premises of another Law following, contrary to the words of Christ, Mark 10.5. and all other translations of gravest authority, who render it in form of a Law; agreeable to Malach. 2.16. as it is most anciently and modernly expounded. Besides the bill of divorce, and the particular occasion therein mention'd, declares it to bee orderly and legall. And what avails this to make the matter more righteous, if such an adulterous condition shal be mention'd to build a law upon without either punishment, or so much as forbidding; they pretend it is implicitly reprov'd in these words, Deut. 24.4. after she is defil'd; but who sees not that this defilement is onely in respect of returning to her former husband after an intermixt mariage; els why was not the defiling condition first forbidd'n, which would have sav'd the labour of this after law; nor is it seemly or piously attributed to the justice of God and his known hatred of sinne, that such a hainous fault as this through all the Law, should be onely wip't with an implicit and oblique touch (which yet is falsly suppos'd) and that his peculiar people should be let wallow in adulterous mariages almost two thousand yeares, for want of a direct Law to prohibit them; 'tis rather to be confidently assum'd that this was granted to apparent necessities, as being of unquestionable right and reason in the Law of nature, in that it stil passes without inhibition, ev'n when greatest cause is giv'n to us to expect it should be directly forbidd'n.

The other shift of saying divorce was permitted by Law, but not approv'd. More of the Institution.

BUt it was not approv'd. So much the worse that it was allow'd; as if sin had over-masterd the law of God, to conform her steddy and strait rule to sins crookednesse, which is impossible. Besides, what needed a positive grant of that which was not approv'd? it restrain'd no liberty to him that could but use a little fraud, it had bin better silenc't, unlesse it were approv'd in some case or other. but still it was not approv'd. Miserable excusers! He who doth evil that good may come thereby, approves not what he doth, and yet the grand rule forbids him, and counts his damnation just if hee doe it. The Sorceresse Medea did not approve her owne evill doings, yet lookt not to be excus'd for that; and it is the constant opinion of Plato in Protagoras, and other of his dialogues agreeing with that proverbiall sentence among the Greeks, that no man is wicked willingly; which also the Peripateticks doe rather distinguish then deny. What great thank then if any man reputed wise and constant, will neither doe nor permit others under his charge to doe that which hee approves not, especially in matter of sinne. But for a Judge, but for a Magistrate the Shepheard of his people to surrender up his approbation against law & his own judgment, to the obstinacie of his heard, what more un-Iudge-like, more un-Magistrate-like, and in warre more un-commander-like? Twice in a short time it was the undoing of the Roman State, first when Pompey, next when Marcus Brutus had not magnanimity anough but to make so poore a resignation of what they approv'd, to what the boisterous Tribunes and Souldiers bawl'd for. Twice it was the saving of two the greatest Common-wealths in the world, of Athens by Themistocles at the Sea fight of Salamis; of Rome by Fabius Maximus in the Punick warre, for that these two matchlesse Generalls had the fortitude at home against the rashnes and the clamours of their own Captains and confederates to withstand the doing or permitting of what they could not approve in their duty of their great command. Thus farre of civill prudence. But when we speak of sinne, let us look againe upon the old reverend Eli; who in his heavie punishment found no difference between the doing and permitting of what he did not approve. If hardnesse of heart in the people may be any excuse, why then is Pilat branded through all memory? Hee approv'd not what he did, he openly protested, he washt his hands and laboured not a little, ere he would yeeld to the hard hearts of a whole people, both Princes and plebeians, importuning & tumulting ev'n to the fear of a revolt. Yet is there any will undertake his cause? If therfore Pilat for suffering but one act of cruelty against law, though with much unwillingnesse testify'd, at the violent demand of a whole Nation, shall stand so black upon record to all posterity? Alas for Moses! what shall we say for him, while we are taught to beleeve he suffer'd not one act onely both of cruelty and uncleannesse in one divorce, but made it a plain and lasting law against law, whereby ten thousand acts accounted both cruell and unclean, might be daily committed, and this without the least suit or petition of the people that wee can read of.

And can we conceive without vile thoughts, that the majesty and holines of God could endure so many ages to gratifie a stubborn people in the practice of a foul polluting sin, and could he expect they should abstain, he not signifying his mind in a plain command, at such time especially when he was framing their laws and them to all possible perfection? But they were to look back to the first institution, nay rather why was not that individual institution brought out of Paradise, as was that of the Sabbath, and repeated in the body of the Law, that men might have understood it to be a command? for that any sentence that bears the resemblance of a precept, set there so out of place in another world at such a distance from the whole Law, and not once mention'd there, should be an obliging command to us, is very disputable, and perhaps it might be deny'd to be a command without further dispute: however, it commands not absolutely, as hath bin clear'd, but only with reference to that precedent promise of God, which is the very ground of his institution; if that appeare not in some tolerable sort, how can we affirm such a matrimony to be the same which God instituted! In such an accident it will best behove our sobernes to follow rather what moral Sinai prescribes equal to our strength, then fondly to think within our strength of all that lost Paradise relates.

The third shift of them who esteem it a meer judicial Law. Prov'd again to be a Law of moral equity.

ANother while it shall suffice them, that it was not a moral but a judicial Law, & so was abrogated. Nay rather not abrogated, because judicial: which Law the ministery of Christ came not to deal with. And who put it in mans power to exempt, where Christ speaks in general of not abrogating the least jot or tittle, and in special not that of divorce, because it follows among those Laws; which he promis'd expresly not to abrogate, but to vindicate from abusive traditions: which is most evidently to be seen in the 16. of Luke, where this caution of not abrogating is inserted immediatly, and not otherwise then purposely, when no other point of the Law is toucht, but that of divorce. And if we mark the 31. vers of Mat. the 5. he there cites not the Law of Moses, but the licencious Glosse which traduc't the Law; that therfore which he cited, that he abrogated, and not only abrogated, but disallow'd and flatly condemn'd, which could not be the Law of Moses; for that had bin foulely to the rebuke of his great servant. To abrogate a Law made with Gods allowance, had bin to tell us only that such a Law was now to cease: but to refute it with an ignominious note of civilizing adultery, casts the reproof, which was meant only to the Pharises ev'n upon him who made the Law. But yet if that be judicial which belongs to a civil Court, this Law is lesse judicial then nine of the ten Commandements; for antiquaries affirm that divorces proceeded among the Jews without knowledge of the Magistrate, only with hands and seales under the testimony of some Rabbies to be then present. Perkins in a Treatise of Conscience grants, that what in the judicial Law is of common equity, binds also the Christian. And how to judge of this, prescribes 2. wayes. If wise Nations have enacted the like decree. Or if it maintain the good of family, Church, or Common-wealth. This therfore is a pure moral economical Law, too hastily imputed of tolerating sin; being rather so clear in nature and reason, that it was left to a mans own arbitrement to be determin'd between God and his own conscience; not only among the Jews, but in every wise nation; the restraint wherof, who is not too thick sighted, may see how hurtfull and distractive it is to the house, the Church, and Common-wealth. And that power which Christ never took from the master of family, but rectify'd only to a right and wary use at home; that power the undiscerning Canonist hath improperly usurpt into his Court-leet, and bescribbl'd with a thousand trifling impertinencies, which yet have fill'd the life of man with serious trouble and calamity. Yet grant it were of old a judicial Law, it need not be the lesse moral for that, being conversant, as it is, about vertue or vice. And our Saviour disputes not heer the judicature, for that was not his office, but the morality of divorce, whether it be adultery or no; if therfore he touch the law of Moses at all, he touches the moral part therof; which is absurd to imagine that the cov'nant of grace should reform the exact and perfect law of works, eternal and immutable; or if he touch not the Law at all, then is not the allowance therof disallow'd to us.

The ridiculous opinion, that divorce was permitted from the custom in Ægypt. That Moses gave not this Law unwillingly. Perkins confesses this Law was not abrogated.

OThers are so ridiculous as to allege that this licence of divorcing was giv'n them because they were so accustom'd in Egypt. As if an ill custom were to be kept to all posterity; for the dispensation is both universal and of time unlimited, and so indeed no dispensation at all; for the over-dated dispensation of a thing unlawfull, serves for nothing but to encrease hardnes of heart, and makes men but wax more incorrigible, which were a great reproach to be said of any Law or allowance that God should give us. In these opinions it would be more Religion to advise well, lest we make our selves juster then God, by censuring rashly that for sin which his unspotted Law without rebuke allows, and his people without being conscious of displeasing him have us'd. And if we can think so of Moses, as that the Jewish obstinacy could compell him to write such impure permissions against the rule of God and his own judgement, doubtles it was his part to have protested publickly what straits he was driv'n to, and to have declar'd his conscience when he gave any Law against his mind; for the Law is the touch-stone of sin and of conscience, and must not be intermixt with corrupt indulgences; for then it looses the greatest praise it has, of being certain, and infallible, not leading into error, as all the Jews were led by this connivance of Moses if it were a connivence. But still they fly back to the primitive institution, and would have us re-enter Paradise against the sword that guards it. Whom I again thus reply to, that the place in Genesis contains the description of a fit and perfect mariage, with an interdict of ever divorcing such a union; but where nature is discover'd to have never joyn'd indeed, but vehemently seeks to part, it cannot be there conceiv'd that God forbids it; nay he commands it both in the Law and in the Prophet Malachy, which is to be our rule. And Perkins upon this chap. of Matth. deals plainly, that our Saviour heer confutes not Moses Law, but the false glosses that deprav'd the Law; which being true, Perkins must needs grant, that somthing then is left to that law which Christ found no fault with; and what can that be but the conscionable use of such liberty as the plain words import? So that by his owne inference, Christ did not absolutely intend to restrain all divorces to the onely cause of adultery. This therefore is the true scope of our Saviours will, that he who looks upon the law concerning divorce, should look also back upon the first institution, that he may endeavour what is perfectest: and he that looks upon the institution should not refuse as sinfull and unlawfull those allowances which God affords him in his following Law, lest he make himselfe purer then his maker; and presuming above strength, slip into temptations irrecoverably. For this is wonderfull, that in all those decrees concerning mariage, God should never once mention the prime institution to disswade them from divorcing; and that he should forbid smaller sinnes as opposite to the hardnesse of their hearts, and let this adulterous matter of divorce pass ever unreprov'd.

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