Measuring Welfare in Restructured Electricity Markets
Erin T. Mansur
Restructuring electricity markets
has enabled wholesalers to exercise market power. Using a common method of
measuring competitive behavior in these markets, several studies have found
substantial inefficiencies. This method overstates actual welfare loss by
ignoring production constraints that result in non-convex costs. I develop an
alternative method that accounts for these constraints and apply it to the
Integration in Restructured Electricity Markets: Measuring Market
Efficiency and Firm Conduct”
UCEI CSEM Working Paper-117, October 2003.
SSRN Yale SOM Working Paper No. ES-32 (abstract number 459593), October 2003.
This paper has been split into two papers:
“Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets” and
“Measuring Welfare in Restructured Electricity Markets”