Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets
Erin T. Mansur
Many studies have found
substantial market failures in electricity markets that have been restructured
to allow wholesalers to set prices. Vertical integration of firms may partially
mitigate market power, since integrated firms have a reduced interest in
setting high prices. These producers sell electricity and also are required to
buy power, which they provide to their retail customers at set rates. This
paper examines the importance of vertical integration in explaining firm
behavior during the first summer following the restructuring of the
“Vertical Integration in
Restructured Electricity Markets: Measuring Market Efficiency and Firm Conduct”
UCEI CSEM Working Paper-117, October 2003.
SSRN Yale SOM Working Paper No. ES-32 (abstract number 459593), October 2003.
This paper has been split into two papers:
“Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets” and
“Measuring Welfare in Restructured Electricity Markets”
“Pricing Behavior in the Initial Summer of the
Restructured PJM Wholesale Electricity Market”
UC Energy Institute POWER Working Paper-083, April 2001.
This paper has been incorporated into the following paper:
“Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets”