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President Emeritus of Dartmouth College

An Interview Conducted by

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DICKEY: I found it very difficult myself to conceive of a student union, a student center and the various activities involved in it as having a priority claim on our funds. And I by this time was very realistic about what was involved in raising money. And along with this came an observation by a man in whom I had a great deal of confidence as a person who penetrated to the inner significance of most matters. The man I am speaking of was [Adelbert] Delbert Ames [Jr.].

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: Who had been professor of optics here, and founded the Dartmouth Eye Institute, and had done some very creative work in the field of perception and vision. We'd become very much—very comfortable with each other, talking back and forth, everything from metaphysics to art. He'd painted and been a sculptor.

DANIELL: Yes, he designed the Shawmut....

DICKEY: The Shawmut Indian.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And he was on one of these committees. And I'm not sure whether he’d been on the Larmon Committee, the planning committee.

DANIELL: I don’t think so.

DICKEY: But he was on one of our committees in any event. And he had heard this give and take about a student union. And he got a hold of me one day, he said, “John, whatever else you do, don’t try to combine a student union with a serious educational purpose.” He said, “It’s all right. There’s nothing wrong with it. People need those things. But it will take over. It will corrupt the purpose, the vision that you have for this as an educational facility. And you’ll never forgive yourself if you do it.”

Well, this was all I needed, to have somebody whom I respected as much as I respected Ames, and who had no axe to grind. He wasn’t going to use these facilities one way or the other. And that was just about all he said and just about exactly the way he said it. And I knew it just brought together all the misgivings, all the unformulated convictions I had on that particular issue.
So from that time on, I just said I was—I had responsibility for saying that we were not going to turn this into a student union. And I must say I have been ever since immensely thankful for Ames’s understanding of this.

Well, it was not just accidental that he had this understanding because his later work was very largely focused on the importance of purpose in human activity.

DANIELL: That’s a dimension of his life I hadn’t heard about.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. He related it to one of his favorite sayings, by way of explaining to the uninitiated, his work in perception; that seeing was not believing, he would say. Believing is seeing. And believing is essentially a matter of your purposes.

Well, once we got straightened out on that, things began to fall into place. Warner was playing a key role in planning the theater facility. And I, by this time, had conceived of this thing as a large complex where there would be an interrelationship of the arts; an interrelationship of the arts on exhibit and an interrelationship with the creation of the arts, something that I was increasingly interested in: the interplay of the enjoyment of the finished product with the work involved in creating that product.

At about the same time here, in the middle fifties, while we were for several years engaged in trying to get our purposes and priorities straightened out, I had occasion to be exposed—and I forget where it happened initially—to Professor [Homer A.] Thompson, the classical scholar, the classical archaeologist, of the Princeton Institute of Advanced Study. He came up here, I guess, to get a degree. I’m sure he came up to get a degree. I know he did. And I did what I did with so many other people that I was interested in, I got to talking with them about what we were doing. And I said we’re working on the planning of this complex, and there’s no precedent for it that I’ve been able to find anywhere where you bring together the enjoyment, you bring together the creative work in the studios, you bring together the teaching in these fields, and try to get them related physically so that they contribute to each other’s strength. And I happened to make the statement that I had not seen or heard of anywhere where this kind of total activity had been focused in a particular facility. And with the greatest modesty, he said, “Well, it sounds very much like the ancient Athenian agora.” I’m not sure I ever heard the word agora before. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes. You sure did after that.
DICKEY: And I said, “Well, tell me more about the agora.” And he said, “Well, here
daily work in the arts and the teaching, the post office—“ I remember he
said. [Laughter] He said, “These things are all focused physically in this
square known as the agora of ancient Athens.” And he said, “Artists—
sculptors—did their sculpting where their work could be seen while they
were working.” He said, “They didn’t think it was necessary to work in a
garret and so on.” And he said, “It was one of the most fundamental
factors in the community feeling developed in Athens at that time.”

Well, I didn’t need any more argument. But I became interested in the
agora [laughter] and had to do some reading to find out a little bit about it.
And then went over later to visit Athens. And he gave me a personal tour
of the stoa of Atlas, which he was working on then. Showed me the layout
of the reconstruction of the agora and the whole thing. But out of that
came another, if you will, verification of the validity of the concept which
we were trying to put together; and it served the purpose of putting the
idea of combining it with the student union aside. This man, Thompson,
served the purpose of giving me a sense of this having great validity,
classical validity, and real significance.

Well, we went on from there with the planning and the subcommittees,
subgroups in music. In mentioning music, I should mention one of the
unhappy personnel experiences that we had in the course of this planning
work. It involved a man who is here with us today but not any longer an
active member of the faculty. He’s retired. Jim Sykes. And it’s not a major
thing except as a major thing for him, and was a necessary thing as far as
I was concerned. Jim had come to us, I believe, from Colgate in an effort
to build up teaching in music. A very fine pianist, very enthusiastic teacher.
I think his closest friend would say a somewhat chaotic person in respect
to his enthusiasms.

DANIELL: Yes. [inaudible] with Jim Sykes.

DICKEY: But I was never really close to him. We were good friends and so forth.
And then we were trying to develop an orchestra at the same time. We
had had miserable experiences with orchestras, according to the people
who knew anything about music, in recent years. And Sykes took on the
leadership of the orchestra; and at the same time, we brought him in as
the representative on the building committee or the planning committee,
whatever it was called, of music. And he was a thoroughly committed,
helpful, enthusiastic colleague. But you didn’t have to be in a meeting very
long with Jim Sykes until you realized Jim was just off in all directions
when he was gone on something, and was not a very disciplined....
DANIELL: I think it goes with the field of music.

DICKEY: Does it? Well, in any event, it was ... But increasingly it was clear that some of the other people who were working on the thing found...well, they just didn’t have confidence that this large sector of the operation was going to be quite as well implemented or carried out as they had hoped. And then we were facing the question of who was going to take on the leadership of the music program because there was the one thing that Warner kept coming back at me on.... He said, “Look,” he said, “we were planning the greatest facilities that anyplace is going to have in terms of their relationship to each other and the concept and so forth. But we just have got to have people that can make these facilities work, or we’re going to be really in very, very deep trouble because we’ll be showing off our music, our theater and other things, to a larger and larger critical public.” Not critical in the negative sense. But a public that had a critical taste and capacity to respect these things. Well, Jim was leading the orchestra at this point—or developing the orchestra. And I began to get reports from, oh, two or three sources of people that just said, “We love the guy, but we just can’t go on. We’ve got to drop out. He’s just making a nervous wreck out of this.”

DANIELL: The man himself, too.

DICKEY: The man himself, too. But we’re changing this. We think we’re going to do this. And then we’re told we’re going to do that. And so forth. Well, I didn’t pay too much attention to them at first. But one day Warner came to me, and I said, “Now, Warner, I want you to level with me. Is Jim Sykes going to be up to doing what we’ve got to have in the way of leadership here?” In the plans we were at the point where we were planning personnel as well as facilities and programs. And he said, “Well, I wish I could say yes. But this thing is coming apart over in Webster Hall, and I don’t know where we’ll come out.”

Well, the net of it was I had to—Arthur Jensen was dean of faculty at the time; I told Arthur we just had to tell Jim that we just weren’t going to be able to turn this whole music program over to him. And Arthur spoke to Jim and came to see me and said, “Jim says it’s got to be that way.” And that I don’t understand him and so forth. So I said, “Well, I’ll just have to take it on myself.” And I had to have a session with Jim in which I said, “Jim, this just isn’t going to work out the way you’d like it to work out. We’re going to have to get another person in here that’s director of this thing, and so forth.”
Well, this was very unpleasant for both of us. There was a period of years when he and his wife didn’t speak to me and things like that. But, okay. That’s more or less over. And there’s no question at all but—I never had any question at all—that it was the sort of thing that had to be done. That was the only difficulty really that we had. [Richard W.] Dick Olmsted [‘32 TH ‘33] was marvelous in carrying the load on his side of things. And the key decision that was made on the implementation side was selection of Wallace [K.] Harrison to be the architect. I’m not sure whether I gave you this story or gave it to somebody else. Do you have it on your tapes?

DANIELL: No. The only reference I have to that is Warner does talk about it, and he addresses himself mainly to the fact that although some people in the public thought that Harrison was the architect because it was part of a Rockefeller money-Harrison architect package, he strongly denies that. But that’s mainly what he focuses on in his tapes.

DICKEY: Well, I can assure you that that is not the case. And I had occasion to hear the same things that Warner refers to.

When we were at a point where we were ready to go forward, we were going to mount the first capital gifts campaign under Charlie Zimmerman’s leadership to raise the money, and we had the concept of it worked out fundamentally, we were still far from having the relationship of the facilities to each other worked out finally.

We established a subcommittee of the planning or building committee with a number of people on it. One of the people who’d been on the committee and been a very useful person was Ann Hopkins. She took a great interest in it. She, of course, had been very active in Dartmouth drama, dramatic work, as a young woman around Hanover, and had kept up an interest in theater. She, of course, was very much interested because at this time we had taken a decision to name the project the Hopkins Center. And she came to meetings and participated and made a thoroughly good contribution.

I, of course, had in my mind that this was a somewhat delicate thing as far as Mr. Hopkins was concerned. Or at least I could imagine it might be a delicate thing because we had clearly reached the point where we knew we couldn’t go back to the Georgian thing; the Larson question had been settled. And the nature of the facility, the nature of the concept that we had was going to require a modern structure. There was no question about that. And I wasn’t uneasy, but I was concerned that what we did should not be something that was needlessly difficult for Mr. Hopkins to be happy about, particularly if his name was going to be identified with it. So that I
had this in mind when we asked Anne to serve with us on the committee. We got the key people for each one of the areas in the planning: Paul Sample from the arts studios, Jerry Lathrop from the galleries, Warner, the theater, and I forget what we did do on music at that point. Maybe Jim was still handling that at this stage.

**DANIELL:** Warner may have that on his tapes.

**DICKEY:** But I don’t recall whether Jim was in on that or not. In any event, Warner, Paul Sample, Jerry Lathrop and myself and Ann and Dick Olmsted were the key people who worked on this question of an architect. We went to visit, not as a group but as individuals, various outstanding architectural examples. Did a good bit of reading, discussing. And it came down to two or three possibilities. And quite somewhat surprisingly to me, the consensus was that Harrison was our best bet. Rockefeller had been chairman of the Hopkins Center Committee, but wasn’t involved in this at all—at least that’s my memory—certainly not importantly involved at all.

I remember one Sunday afternoon we had a meeting of the committee, and I polled each one individually. Said that I thought this was very important that everybody should have a chance to say what he or she thought about it. And as I recall, everyone who spoke said, Well, they felt that everything considered, we’d probably do as well or better with Harrison, if we could get him. I said I wasn’t sure about this. But I said, “He is a friend of mine from wartime days. And therefore I want to be very sure that I don’t get into a position of trying to sway you because of my friendship with him.” I don’t think I gave very much thought to the relationship with Rockefeller, although it was true Rockefeller—that I got to know Harrison working in Rockefeller’s Latin American office in the government. Both of us were working there. And we had become really very good friends. And I had admired many of the things he did and had a pretty good feel for his approach.

Well, at the end of the meeting, the consensus was that we should find out whether Harrison was available to us, and they would like me to approach Harrison to find out. I went down to New York and had a very good talk with him about this. Gave him the whole history of the project—he hadn’t been in on it at all—and the development of the concept. And he’s a genuinely modest man, and he said, “Well, I don’t know whether I can really do a job of that sort. I’ve never done one quite like it.” He was about to take on Lincoln Center. But this did not have the same educational dimension that we had in our project. But he said, “Look, if your group is clear that they would like me to have a go at it and you want it, I’ll do it.” It was just about that simple.
DICKEY: And I said, “Well, this then is a go because they do want you, and I want you, and so we'll go ahead.”

I'll tell you just one other specific—there are a great many specifics that could be related. But shortly thereafter, oh, I would guess maybe six weeks or two months afterwards, while Harrison and I were sitting beside each other at a meeting of the Rockefeller Foundation trustees; he was a trustee of the foundation at that point, as I was.... And I forget, some dull subject was being discussed in the meeting, and Wally wrote a note and said, “What is your idea of what this—how this center should be laid out? What are you aiming at to have it seem to be?” Or something like that. The essence of it was: What's your concept of the way the center would look, the way it would fit and work?

Well, this was a large subject to discuss when somebody else was carrying on a meeting. [Laughter] And I remember I got a piece of paper and began to sketch the various possibilities and relationships of the theater to the auditorium to the galleries and the studios. I wanted a maximum exposure to the beauty of the campus and Dartmouth Row and to the campus and Baker Library. I wanted a maximum of multiple use in it. And I wanted a functional relationship of the different main areas that would compliment each other. And so forth. I said maybe we could have a post office, student post office, down in the middle of it or something like that.

Well, I handed him this little slip, and I've often wondered whether he still has it. It was the crudest thing because my draftsmanship is crude. And he took it, and he looked at it, and he said, “I get it. I get it. Thanks. That's all I need.” [Laughter] I thought, oh, my God! I went away [inaudible]. Of course we went on from there. In our discussions later, you know, in much detail, he got that. He got the central idea, and then he began to work on it and work on it himself.

DICKEY: No, I talked with him about that. But I didn’t hand back a single word at that point. Indeed, I'm not sure that this didn’t precede my visit with Thompson. These sequences are a little mixed up in my mind.
Well, the choice of Harrison was a very, very important one because he threw himself into it. He regarded it as a challenge, a fresh kind of challenge as far as he was concerned. He’d built Rockefeller Center, he’d been the managing architect for the United Nations building and things like that. And here was a new thing. And about the same time they found themselves planning Lincoln Center. And I remember one day he said to me, he said, “If anybody ever tells you that the Hopkins Center looks like Lincoln Center,” he said, “you can tell them the opposite is true.” He said, “We got our basic approach worked out with the Hopkins Center, and we gave it to Lincoln Center rather than the other way around.”

DANIELL: I have one question: I’m not sure whether this is something that you had planned to talk about subsequent… But after the tape was off last time, and we talked about what we were going to do in this session, we talked about somewhere in the process of these developments, the way in which... You potentially saw the kind of center you’re now talking about as a very healthy addition to a campus which you saw as a vehicle for maybe reforming, making more sensitive, making more aesthetically sensitive, the student body which didn’t have a great deal of that. Were your thoughts on this—did they coalesce around the student center issue earlier? Or is this something that came subsequent to the…?

DICKEY: No, I think it was something that came mainly subsequently.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: But it was present all along, and it built up. It built up from various things, not the least of which was…there was a large measure of faculty indifference, really colossal indifference. The people who were working in the arts—Jerry Lathrop, Warner Bentley, Paul Sample, and a few of the people in music, yes. But once you moved beyond that…at least I wasn’t being confronted with much faculty antagonism, a few people. But just indifference. It had no clear relationship to the educational purpose of the College.

At about this time, I had become concerned that we should find ways to invigorate the humanities side of the faculty. The physical sciences had come along, were coming along very well. The social sciences in several areas were taking on the kind of vigor we wanted. The humanities were comfortable, and they were a little too comfortable as a group, as a whole, it seemed to me. And they also had acquired, not only here but especially elsewhere, a feeling that there was something incompatible between the humanities and the arts, that they didn’t go together as well as it seemed to me they might.
Well, I guess I’d have to say that after I talked with a number of people, people such as Mow, Henry Alan Mow, of the Guggenheim Foundation, who’d worked with scholars in all fields and particularly in the arts and the humanities, and others, I just decided that we were just simply not reaching out the way we ought to be reaching out and that we could make a contribution to the invigoration of the humanities here with first-rate attention to the performing arts and the visual arts.

But it was uphill going. And this attitude was communicated to the students. You found a smart-alecky kind of philistinism, cracking about the arts and so forth and that there was something incompatible between the concern for the arts and manliness. This was a favorite line. And of course… And then *The Dartmouth* got onto this a little bit. But I would run into this with students who were getting this from faculty. This was the sort of thing that fell on my job: I got quite a bit of feedback from faculty through students. And then, of course, the alumni issue which focused ostensibly, and primarily, I guess, on the architectural issue. They wanted a continuation of the Georgian.

**DANIELL:** That observation you made about students is fascinating in part because just about the time this is being generated, when I was a senior at the College, I can remember taking a course with Henry Terrie in which I wrote a long… It was my only effort in creative writing and the only story of any substance I ever tried to write in my life, and had as its head note, really, a quotation from Pericles, something about to cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. So that same sort of—I was on the edge of just exactly what you’re talking about, a feeling. And I have no idea whether my choice was a product of something that is feeding into this or not but I know exactly what you’re talking about.

**DICKEY:** Well, there was a substantial amount of that. The opposition that was most serious in a way was the alumni opposition.

**DANIELL:** Yes, yes.

**DICKEY:** Because it focused on this Georgian versus modern issue. And some of the older alumni regarded….

**DANIELL:** Yes. Just let me turn this over.

[End of Tape 35, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 35, Side B]
DICKEY: As I was saying, some of the older alumni, a substantial number, regarded the coming of modern architecture to the campus as a desecration and as I learned in other areas, you can quickly develop a syndrome of opposition which is opposed to Great Issues because some liberal or radical speaker spoke. Then you get into architecture, and then you get into a losing football season. And before you’re through, you’ve got the whole ball of wax all rolled up into one.

Well, there was a fair amount of that sort of thing that went on in opposition to the center. And there was one class—I think it was the Class of 1914—had a number of individuals in it, fairly prominent alumni, who tried to organize a boycott of the Alumni Fund and things like that.

DANIELL: [Inaudible] precedence for that.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Over the center issue. And behind the architectural issue there was no question at all there was a philistinism.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: The view of Dartmouth which these individuals had was not, to my mind, a very worthy view of Dartmouth...or at least it was an inadequate view of Dartmouth, let’s say that. So that it was an uphill battle all the way. There were quite a few people around who were loyal and went along. I think that this was true of quite a few on the board. I don’t know. I never had—I can’t remember that I had any overt difficulties there. But they were the recipients of a lot of this complaint. And there were times when one had to wonder whether this would eventually prevent you from raising the kind of money you were going to need.

But we got through it. And as it began to take shape, people began to see—more and more people began to see—what it was all about, began to see the vision of it. And I’d have to say something else today: A lot of people in town take a lot of pride in the center who were about as indifferent as anybody to the center. But as it began to take shape and form, there were more and more recruits to the fact that, well, maybe Dartmouth does need something like this. Maybe this is a good thing. And, oh, the problems ranged all the way from...for example at one point we were well along with the structure when Jay Gile, a wonderful close friend and on the board of trustees, said, “You know,” he said, “that architect must be crazy building these roofs with these curves in them. Snow will get in there, and you’ll just have one awful time.” Well, I talked with Dick about it, and Dick said, “I have confidence in Harrison. But,” he said, “you can make mistakes about this sort of thing. So let’s experiment with it.”
don't know whether you've ever noticed the little cement garage down behind the heating plant—  

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: --with the Hopkins Center type roof?

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: Well, that was built as a trial.

DANIELL: Oh, no kidding!

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Oh, [laughter] yes, yes.

DICKEY: To try the curves and snow and so forth. [Laughter] That was not an art aesthetic; that was a trial run. And Harrison agreed. He said, “I think this is all right.”

DANIELL: It's right in that square behind the heating plant where they store all the equipment.

DICKEY: Yes. “Let’s find out,” he said. “We’ll try it.” Well, I liked that attitude.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: He wasn't defensive about it at all. He said, “I think it’s all right.” It turned out it was better than all right.

Then once we had the center up, and we were just finishing off the Top of the Hop lounge there, I went up one day, one Saturday, I guess it was, to look at it. And somebody had put a heating duct, a prominent heating duct, right across—it broke the line of the windows looking out over the campus. And I thought, oh, my God! So I’d tried to exercise a good bit of self-discipline in not telling the architect how to do things. And I thought this is something I've just got to raise with Wally. So I went home and called him up. And he said, “Well, I haven’t seen that. But if you say that that is wrong, it’s wrong.” And he said, “Don’t apologize at all. I’m coming up to look it over.” He came up, and he said, “We can find another answer. Nothing has to be done just one way.” I always liked that. Nothing has to be done just one way. He came up, took that duct off of the windows or up in front of breaking the whole line of the windows and put them down on
the floor—the radiators had gone about that far, but after we’d looked at it, there was no problem about the radiators cutting off the view of the campus. And he took the circulation of the ducts and put them around in a curb. If you look up....

DANIELL: He made a Communist sign out of it.

DICKEY: Exactly. You’ve heard that story.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: That old colonel—what was his name?

DANIELL: I haven’t got the name of the person yet. But there were two different people...

DICKEY: Colonel Somebody. He’d been an arctic man. He was a very elderly man, I think in his nineties or something at that time. Somebody came up to tell me that this man had been saying that we were Communists because we had the hammer and sickle on the Hopkins Center. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Warner discovered it one day. He said, “I followed it when he called you up.” And there it was. Looking up at the ceiling of the Top of the Hop.

DICKEY: So that was the kind of thing that went on.

Well, Warner was just a tower of strength in all respects. I remember, for example, at one point when we were getting very close to finishing off the theater, and he had his heart set on having some kind of hoists, automatic or mechanical hoists or electrical, to handle the scenery, a very advanced thing. And we were running over budget in this area of the theater, or this area of the center. And I got Warner over one day, and I said, “Warner, we’ve just got to go back to the old-fashioned block-and-tackle—“ or whatnot “—for handling the scenery.” I’ll never forget it. He said, “Well, I don’t know what we can do. We must try to save those things. But I know that you’ve got to bring this in at a figure that you can justify.” He said, “Suppose I had enough money to put into that, could we do it then?” Well, I decided we weren’t going to do that. But we found the money. But....

DANIELL: He’s—in the tape with Warner, he discusses in a lot of detail the sort of last-minute adjustments and the kind of sacrifices that in some ways had to be made in, I guess, the last wing as you’re facing the Center Theater is not as wide and cut back that wall a little. From his point of view, the one essential compromise, in retrospect, in Spaulding Auditorium not having
stage facilities or a place for an orchestra pit there. But [inaudible] necessary, but from his point of view not particularly desirable.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, there were lots of things like that.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: As I look back on it, leaving aside the educational philosophy and the relationship of the center to the community and everything else, this was a gigantic, complicated project.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Just a gigantic, complicated project. And to bring it in more or less on budget was some achievement. And people such as Dick Olmsted and Wally Harrison and Warner are entitled to tremendous credit for their willingness to work at this thing and to accept some of these difficult decisions. I was prepared to make the decisions when they had to be made. But still you had to carry your colleagues with you to a considerable degree, and they did go along. I remember when we were dedicating the center, and I think the total cost came in at something like seven and a half million.

DANIELL: Yes, that’s the figure I had, too.

DICKEY: Wally Harrison and I were standing together, and he said, “You know if we were doing this again today and didn’t have some of the people working with us that we had working with us, this could come in at 15 million very easily.” We had hit in just at the right time to put our contracts out.

DANIELL: ’58.

DICKEY: And we had this kind of cooperation from the people that we were working with, it came off. One of the things that I remember about it, the opposition was…they tried to stir the students or the students got stirred up—I don’t know who stirred them up—I guess they did themselves—over the post office, that this was a dirty trick to trap students into coming for their mail, to make them look at art. [Laughter] But so be it. Are there other questions…?

DANIELL: I had two questions about it: One, any observations about the fundraising for this?
DICKEY: No, I don’t recall. I was able to get a million dollars from the Rockefellers for it. This was terribly important. It took the heat off the rest of it. Charlie Zimmerman led a good campaign, and we finished with I think about 17 million in the total....

DANIELL: This was a part of the 17 million?

DICKEY: This was a part of the 17 million.

DANIELL: Right, that’s what I recall.

DICKEY: And I was well pleased, and I think most people were well pleased because here now was music, here was theater. We weren’t going to build a new theater, we weren’t going to build a new music hall. Here were the workshops. And we felt we’d really done very well on the financial side with what we’d gotten for the money.

Mr. Hopkins, I think, was genuinely pleased. I can remember one day sitting over in my study, he and I were talking about it. And he said, “Well, as you know, I’ve always taken great pride in Baker Library. But,” he said, “one could spend a year or two in this building and get quite a liberal arts education...” He was talking.... “Just the same as in Baker Library.” And he said, “I think that these two things are just—“ How did he put it? “—they are the foundations of what we want Dartmouth to be.” Something like that. So he was pleased. He never spoke to me about the architecture. I can imagine that this disturbed him. But he had enough understanding to know that it couldn’t be Georgian.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And was a great help in this respect. I’m sure, although I never knew it, but I’m sure that the fact that Ann was more than happy—she was really quite enthusiastic about it—played a big role in Mr. Hopkins’s reassurance that the center was right, and he would be happy to have his name on it. And this was very important to all of us. Very important to all of us.

DANIELL: The second question was, was there any question as to whether Warner Bentley would be the director of the...?

DICKEY: Never.

DANIELL: Never.
DICKEY: Never, never. The only personnel question I had at all is the one I mentioned about the leadership of music. And [Mario] de Bonaventura came to us in the orchestra at about that time. And that is a whole story in itself. He was an absolutely first-rate man in music, but a first-rate son-of-a-gun to handle.

DANIELL: Yes. [Laughs]

DICKEY: And Warner spent a large part of his life centered on keeping di Bonaventura from blowing his top. But, once again, we got a man who commanded respect from the outside and in Europe and so forth. And when he took a hold of it, I knew nothing about music, couldn't even tell one note from another. But I used to pick the minds of music critics, and they said they knew of nobody who could whip an amateur orchestra into shape as fast or as well as he could.

DANIELL: That’s what—Warner said exactly the same thing.

DICKEY: Is that so? So I learned to put up with a lot of prima donna behavior.

DANIELL: What with the medical school… [Laughter]

DICKEY: Yes, the fellow had the stuff. If the fellow had the stuff, why, that was all that was important.

DANIELL: Well, I don’t have any further questions about Hopkins Center. We’ve gone on more than an hour and 15 minutes or so.

DICKEY: Well, then probably we’d better break because I find I get more tired as I get…

[Break]

DANIELL: Okay. We finished up with the Hopkins Center last time. What I’d like to start with today is just any comments you have on the origins of the Tucker Foundation. There have been some people in the tapes who have said that one of the limiting factors in the—eventually canceled the auditorium-theater project earlier—was that some people felt that something should be done for President Tucker before such a grand thing should be done for President Hopkins. Was that part of the process of getting the Tucker Foundation to sort of honor both of the great 20th century presidents?
DICKEY: I’m sure that it’s not accurate to say that the honoring of Tucker through the establishment of the Tucker Foundation was involved in the calling off of the first so-called Hopkins Center project. I’m sure that that’s not accurate. There was a situation, a difficulty, that arose in connection with the planning of the second Hopkins Center, the one that became today’s Hopkins Center project, that arose in connection with finding a suitable memorial for Dr. Tucker, suitable in the eyes of the so-called Tucker generation of alumni.

DANIELL: Okay. Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I can get that out of the way right away since it sort of hooks into Hopkins Center.

After we had formulated the basic plans for the Hopkins Center project as we know it today, the idea was suggested that possibly the theater or the auditorium might be a suitable memorial for Dr. Tucker.

DANIELL: Really!

DICKEY: As I look back on it, I think I might well have been more sensitive to the possibility that this would seem to be—would seem to some people interested in Dr. Tucker—as subordinating Dr. Tucker’s memorial to that of President Hopkins simply because the larger, overall designation was going to be the Hopkins Center, and taking a specific part of it as a memorial to Dr. Tucker could be understood as putting him in second place. For better or for worse, and I guess it could be said to be both, that never occurred to me or to several of the others of the Tucker Foundation with whom I was consulting. But it did occur to some other members of the Tucker Foundation. At one point there was a meeting of one of the classes—I forget which class it was—here at reunion time while we were in the very early stages of going forward with the Hopkins Center. There was a class meeting, and at the class meeting the question arose as to whether they were satisfied to have it designated the William Jewett Tucker Theater. There had been no formal presentation of that, no designation had been made. But the possibility had been explored with a number of members of this class.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I think it may have been the Class of 1907 or 1906, one or the other. In any event, the word came back to me from one of the men with whom I had consulted, and he said, “We’re going to find that there’s unhappiness in this class and in this generation about this idea.” Well, I said, “For
goodness sake, as far as I'm concerned, let's not buy trouble. We've got plenty of opportunities to name these various major units. So that if there is unhappiness, let's just call it off right now." I discovered that somebody said the same thing to Mr. Hopkins subsequently. And he spoke to me about it almost in passing at just about the same time. And he said, “I need not say anything to you, I know, about my embarrassment if anybody thought the naming of something for Dr. Tucker was subordinated to anything that was going to be named for me.” And he surely was right about that because if ever a man stood in the greatest admiration of another man, this was Mr. Hopkins in relation to Dr. Tucker. So that was called off. And it did eventually, not immediately, but it did eventually lead to—I guess to be straight about it—my developing the idea that a foundation such as we called the Tucker Foundation would be a particularly appropriate thing for Dr. Tucker. And this is how the foundation eventually got to be designated the Tucker Foundation.

DANIELL: I see. Was there...you talked about consulting with people, and you used the phrase “over in the Tucker Foundation.” Now, was there a group?

DICKEY: No, no, not in the Tucker Foundation. No. In the Tucker generation in the alumni body.

DANIELL: Generation, okay. Yes. I think you just made a, you used... I didn’t think that it pre-existed the...

DICKEY: Oh, no. Oh, no.

DANIELL: Okay. Fine. That clears up... Well, I can’t honestly remember whether somebody in the tapes had it confused with the earlier project. But the outlines of the episode you’ve described here are...

DICKEY: I’m quite certain this is the correct account of that particular thing.

Well, now, to go back, Jere, the development of the Tucker Foundation was again with me, and I've got to possibly come back to the first person a little bit more than you feel comfortable with.

DANIELL: Well, after all, these are your memoirs. [Laughs]

DICKEY: But it was something that grew as far as my understanding of the need and formulation of the idea. It wasn’t something that just sprang out fully armed and ready.
When I came on the job—as a matter of fact, within weeks, certainly within a month or two of being on the job—I had a number of people come to me: several faculty, one faculty and staff, Roy [B.] Chamberlin who’d been chaplain and various other things connected with the religious side of the College but also had done very important work on the Dartmouth Bible project and things of that sort; one or two faculty members who were concerned about religious teaching in the College or religious practice in the College, and a number of alumni...I don’t know, no large number, but, oh, I would suppose must have had a half dozen or so people come to me, with the view that one of the great needs that had been lost in the College was an affirmative attitude with respect to the place of religion in liberal learning. It was just that fundamental.

I listened to Roy Chamberlin on a number of occasions, and I would have to say with, I think, understanding of the way he felt; namely that this side of education had been shunted aside. That the faculty and the administrative officers of the College had, it seemed to him, not to be interested in making it a significant part of the educational experience of undergraduates. And he felt rather deeply—alienated would be too strong a term, but sort of shunted aside as being in the mainstream of the educational purpose, as well as activity, of the campus. He had specific suggestions to make, namely that it was necessary for the president to show the flag on this question.

Well, I had to make clear to him that I was not very deeply committed, if at all, to any religious creed. That I’d been brought up in a so-called Christian family, Presbyterian family, in central Pennsylvania. Had a very great appreciation of the contribution that Sunday school had made to me. And I’m sure that being a churchgoer had meant a great deal to my mother and father. But I had not kept up church affiliations, I had to tell him. And increasingly, while I was standing literally every day more in awe of the universe than I had been as a younger man, I still was further and further removed from being able to practice a particular religious creed.

I think this disturbed him to some degree. But he said, “I’ve long since learned not to try to convert my friends.” He was very decent about this. But he said, “Will you play a more active role in the chapel” that we had at the time, which was a bare shadow of what compulsory chapel had been. It was voluntary chapel, a small group keeping it going. And some very good union services about every six weeks in which the local Protestant churches combined with the College. We’ve come back to this now, curiously.

DANIELL: Was all this held over in Rollins Chapel?
DICKEY: These services were always held in Rollins Chapel. And there was a regular some sort of treaty between the College and the churches that they would divide up the collection and so on and so forth, which the whole affair was managed primarily by Roy Chamberlin at the time. But he kept at me…not insistently, but would come back to talk about these things and try to make sure that I understood that he felt there was a critical need here.

Well, the more I let the question develop I guess I’d have to say in the back of my mind, because it certainly was not one of the top priorities that I was trying to think through, the more puzzled I became about it. And puzzled on several counts. First, I became increasingly uneasy about the notion that a college could institutionally do the work of liberating men in any fundamental, profound sense, introducing him to the work of a lifetime of self-liberation, which is the way I prefer to put the purpose of liberal learning, without being institutionally, not necessarily individually, but without being institutionally prepared to say that the purpose of the place embraced the opportunity for experience with the ethical dimensions of life…if you will, the moral dimensions of life, even if you want to say the spiritual dimensions of life.

DANIELL: Why don’t we stop for a second until I…

[End of Tape 35, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 36, Side A]

DICKEY: …all of which is to say that once again, I find myself going back to try to think through where we should stand with respect to our view of the institutional purpose of this enterprise. I can’t, as I look back trying to understand my own development, I can hardly overemphasize the importance which I now, in retrospect, see was developing in my eyes in respect to the purpose out of which our programs, our personnel efforts, things such as Hopkins Center, all of these major fronts would develop.

One of the most important elements, in my growing sense of the need for some measure of ethical and moral concern on the part of the institution as a basic aspect of the institutional purpose, was my deepening acquaintance with Dr. Tucker’s work. I began reading some of Tucker’s addresses and other writings and the further I went with it, the clearer I became this was a very major person. And I just instinctively found myself persuaded—if you can be instinctively persuaded—that as is so often the case, progress had been made that had to be made in getting rid of some forms, compulsory church, compulsory chapel. But that in carrying out
these reforms, we had given a dangerously limited, even in some measure false, lead in respect to where an institution of liberal learning should stand in these matters.

I found that the more I read faculty views from other institutions—and there were quite a few things being written at this time in the literature—and the more I talked with faculty here and elsewhere, there was either a combativeness about these elements of man’s relationship to the universe as perceived in institutions of higher education, in other words, what you might call an old-fashioned suspicion that this was a kind of... That any concern of this sort was a holdover from the dark days of authority and religious suffocation of the free spirit. Or there was a more benign attitude that, well, this is a valid aspect of human concern, but it has no place in higher education, that it was something that had to be left to the churches, it had to be left to the family; it simply had no validity as an element of purpose or concern, institutional concern, in higher education.

Well, the more I puzzled about these views, the more doubtful I became of their validity; but also the more puzzled I became, the more perplexed I became about how you carried out any concern or sense of purpose if you came to the conclusion that this was a desirable, legitimate element in the purposes of liberal learning. That perplexity led me to be very skeptical that this purpose could be based solely, perhaps even not primarily, on chapel. I’m not just talking about Dartmouth.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But I’m talking about the world of higher education. I had no doubt at all that there were many individuals in the student body, many individuals in the faculty who wanted and in a very real sense needed a church affiliation or church relationship, the experience of worship. But I also was increasingly doubtful that in the long run—and by that I guess I would have said 25 years or so that might be ahead for me—this was going to be a viable base on which to mount anything as broad as an institutional purpose.

Well, this was not what Roy Chamberlin wanted to hear. And to some extent I think I would have to accept the fact that Roy came to regard me as a benign but not very committed Christian...if that's a possible combination. [Laughter] And I had one highly respected colleague on the faculty who said, “Well, you’re a deist. You don’t reject God, but you don’t formulate a view of Him that has very much structure to it.” I said, “Well, I think that is pretty accurate.”
Well, the first thing that began to be clear to me was that this rejection of this dimension of purpose, while it had been necessary in respect to some of the forms for which that purpose had been expressed in earlier years, preacher presidents, compulsory church, compulsory chapel and so forth; well, the time had come long since previously for them to be dropped in the higher educational community of the country, that nothing had been put in their place. And that this was an opportunity, it was a responsibility which I was prepared to believe was very fundamental and had a claim on us.

So I came at it first through that formulation of a sense of the validity of this moral purpose within the overall sense of responsibilities of an institution of liberal learning. But the next perplexity, as I've just said, was how to carry this out. Well, I tried in a small way and a very imperfect way to do what I could to respond to Chamberlin and others. I went into the voluntary chapel several times and gave what I'm sure they regarded as an essentially secular sermon.

DANIELL: They were complaining that Hopkins was doing that back in the twenties.

DICKEY: That's right. And I tried to in a sense show the flag. I genuinely enjoyed going to the Union services because this was where I began to meet Bishop Dallas, Reinhold Niebuhr, eventually Tillich and other major figures.

DANIELL: Yes, they had some take in the undergraduate institution. And I remember, for instance, that with my attitude fundamentally like yours, somehow I got part of the non-classroom study group in which we quite systematically went over in some room over in College Hall, and we read Niebuhr and Tillich and... group of just interested undergraduates.

DICKEY: That’s right. I think this was after the formulation of the Tucker Foundation had begun to take a place in the life of our thinking in our efforts to formulate programs. And of course this sort of thing had been done for a long time during the twenties and probably earlier by the Dartmouth Christian Union. And when you were here George [H.] Kalbfleisch, I believe, was still here, wasn’t he?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: He was leading this activity?

DANIELL: I don’t think that was true.
DICKEY: No?

DANIELL: I think this was just a student-generated activity.

DICKEY: I see. Well, in any event....

DANIELL: He probably would have organized—he would have played a role, yes.

DICKEY: He would have played a role in encouraging it.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: So we went forward haltingly in an effort to find a formulation that would be broad enough to embrace—indeed it would perhaps work out from—a religious commitment in such directions as the individuals found satisfying for their individual needs. And this was a slow business. I talked with—really very intensively on occasion—about it with Bishop Dallas. Over at the house one Sunday, we had a long talk about it. And I found considerable encouragement from him not to try to turn this thing back to the old forms of a president leading religious services and things of that sort. He said, “If that isn’t for you, for goodness sake, don’t let people persuade you that it’s necessary.”

DANIELL: Just for the purpose of the tape, could you identify Bishop Dallas?

DICKEY: Yes, Bishop John Dallas was a major figure in Episcopal Church affairs in New Hampshire. He was the bishop of New Hampshire. I had first become acquainted with him only very slightly when he was here as a minister in the Episcopal Church during my undergraduate days. Very close friend of people just as John R. McLane, and a highly respected churchman, certainly in New Hampshire and I think to a considerable extent....

DANIELL: I have one question about him. I don’t mean to get off the track here. But I just think it would be useful because this is the first time his name has come up except in the context of Don Bartlett’s tapes in which he talks a fair amount about Bishop Dallas. The one question I have is did Bishop Dallas have a particular relationship to this community, either in a Hanover sense or a Dartmouth sense?

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Not in the Dartmouth, he had no Dartmouth ties other than having been here in the community and become, during that period as an Episcopal minister, he had become a highly respected person in the community. And he subsequently had very close personal as well as church relations with people here. Took quite a personal interest in the
Episcopal Church here. He’d come up regularly. Came up and participated in chapel.

DANIELL: I see, yes.

DICKEY: Meetings. And he knew many faculty members. He knew a number of the trustees, especially Mr. McLane and Dudley Orr, and New Hampshire, he had a very special interest. Indeed, I think it would not be inaccurate to say a special affection for this place. I believe his university affiliation was Yale originally. I’m not sure about that. But in any event, his interest in Dartmouth was special and our confidence in him.

DANIELL: That explains fundamentally why it was perfectly natural for you to be talking about some of these things with him.

DICKEY: Very natural, very natural. So I exposed all of these things almost in the same terms I’m exposing them to you, as to where I was in this thing and what his counsel would be. And he responded as I’ve indicated, albeit with very positive feelings on his part that my concern was a correct one, that it was a legitimate one, and one that he applauded, without applauding my perplexities as to what you did about it.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Said that…well, he counseled against pressing forward into something I didn’t have confidence in just to show the flag of presidential leadership, so to speak, and so on. And I took a good bit of reassurance from this. I regarded Dallas as a wise, wise man.

Then I had opportunities to talk with Niebuhr. And needless to say almost, I found this an immensely stimulating experience, and one that played a considerable part in my increasing conviction that the world of higher education, particularly at the collegiate level, was in very serious trouble because it had not worked at either the question of whether this was a valid sector of purpose, let alone how you got at this if you accepted it as a valid sector of purpose. Of course later it became a fashionable sector of purpose.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: So that I’ve always, somewhat I hope quietly, felt that this was one of the areas in which Dartmouth broke out of what I think has come to be regarded as an unduly sterile attitude towards the purposes of liberal learning in this respect.
DANIELL: Yes. I’ve often felt that the quite in some ways envied reputation as an academic institution Dartmouth is rooted to the early start on a type of social consciousness which I assume.

DICKEY: Well, a good bit of the thinking in this respect that I developed I now realize came from my exposure to Tucker. I should want to be very clear about that. That this was an immensely important factor in the evolution of my thinking. Tucker was not afraid of the subject of doubt. He was not afraid of a social conscience. He had gone through the experience of being charged with heresy in Massachusetts when he was on the Andover Theological Seminary faculty and so forth. Well, these were reassuring things to me: that a man could go through and let these things become an important part of his life and still not be driven to a wholly negative view of.

DANIELL: He also was involved in the late 19th-century counterparts of the kind of social reform movements that became popular in the sixties. I remember picking up a volume on dealing with poverty in Boston, and there was Tucker’s name as part of a group...

DICKEY: That’s right, that’s right.

DANIELL: So there was a direct...

DICKEY: He had a profound understanding of the role of what we call today social conscience.

Well, along about in the, oh, in the late forties or very early fifties, I began to have a little more confidence that—I had great confidence that the purpose was something that had to be accepted as an important part of the total institutional commitment. And I began to have a little more confidence that as long as we didn’t try to base it on the chapel solely, we could develop it in ways that were not yet foreseeable, and in most respects never would be totally foreseeable, that would serve that purpose in a variety of ways on the campus: in the classroom, in the agencies of social concern, some of which—many of which—were being sponsored by the Dartmouth Christian Union in relation to other activities that had no religious commitment.

And it was at this point, and as a result of my coming under the influence of Tucker’s thinking, that I suddenly said to myself, why isn’t this the role that a Tucker memorial could play? Building into the institution a
commitment that would embrace Tucker’s philosophy and my growing conviction that this purpose had great validity in liberal learning.

At just about this point, I began to expose this thinking to certain members of the board of trustees, and to talk it over with them and ultimately to expose it to the full board. The man who, interestingly enough, was immediately seized with it, said this is important, don’t mistake it—I wasn’t entirely sure yet that I had a hold of something that was of that central importance—was Beardsley Ruml.

DANIELL: Oh, really! If I’d go down through my list here, it wouldn’t be him.

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: A man who was not himself particularly religious. But who gave one, from time to time—and I’m not sure he was doing it when you were an undergraduate—but in the early years of the Great Issues Course, gave a lecture that really shook up some of the most thoughtful members of the senior class. Men still come to me and say that they’d always been influenced by the lecture on choice and duty that Ruml gave to Great Issues. It shows you how some of these things stick when you don’t have any idea that they’re going to stick.

Well, Ruml wanted to get into the act with me. He said, “Let’s work on this.” And he began with a very broad sweeping outlook to suggest formulations and things to be careful about. That we didn’t want to be in a position of rejecting religion. But we didn’t want to be either in the position of establishing it as the primary purpose, sense of purpose, of the foundation. We began to talk about a foundation—I forget what we call it at that point—as a Tucker memorial. And he kept saying we must be sure that we don’t attempt to foresee what forms it will take if it’s going to be built into the institution. Other people will have different ideas about it.

Well, of course, we didn’t foresee any of the racial activities with any clarity if at all at that point that the Tucker Foundation would sponsor. We didn’t see the work in the cities that the foundation would sponsor. And so on. And he said, “We’ve just got to keep it broad. But we must come back to it that there is a duty, there is a choice before men. And that this College has made a choice to be committed to the good rather than the evil.” He said, “Don’t say anything more than that.” He said, “Men will still understand that 50 years from now as they understood it for 2,000 years before.” [Laughter]
DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Don’t get too fancy. Oh, I can remember so vividly this creative mind still being able to formulate things simply. And if you go back to the resolution in which the Tucker Foundation was accepted by the board of trustees, you’ll find these formulations.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: These formulations left some of my more sophisticated faculty colleagues rather skeptical: What was this, a kind of lay Holy Rollers? [Laughter]

DANIELL: Well, I don’t think it would be that far. I did notice that the word conscience crept into your vocabulary….

DICKEY: Yes, yes. Well, conscience came into my vocabulary largely because I felt uncomfortable with this moral and spiritual values. I used this, and I just felt it didn’t have quite the bite, quite the relevance, quite the reality that we needed in this. And the more I began to think about it, the clearer I became that the development of a conscience that reached out and that sought to leave behind the provincialisms of an individual’s experience—at least to expand them—was compatible with the basic commitment of liberal learning. And that developing an individual conscience, which gave plenty of scope for variety of emphasis, was something that was totally compatible with the purposes of liberal learning. That’s where my emphasis on conscience began to develop.

DANIELL: A very, very fortuitous, it seems to me, choice of terminology. Because I can still remember, maybe it was a particular take in my case because of my family background, of finding that a very effective way to accomplish the purpose of the importance of judgment, right decisions, without putting it in an institutional or theological framework which diluted from the importance of that.

DICKEY: Well, this was the basic thing that I saw in….

DANIELL: [inaudible].

DICKEY: That had a relevance to the individual, but it still had a capacious quality about it that permitted the individual to find his own or her own commitment.
Well, there were others. I talked with Dud Orr who had some interest in this at the time. But by and large, again, I want to give full credit to Ruml for the encouragement, the knitting and the on that he did in the development of the idea. And this led then to our passing the resolution—I guess it was in '51, was it? Or something about that time—by the board of trustees.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, we were far from being home with that. But this was a big step. It’s hard to now say convincingly how big a step it was. But it was a very major step.

It was here that we brought in the Tucker Memorial idea. And I tried to sell it, I think it’s correct to say, to the shrinking Tucker alumni body which was at the point where many of them were disappearing. It never sold as well as I think it should have, and I’ve never entirely understood that. Several of the important Tucker alumni took hold of it and were very enthusiastic about it. Charlie [Charles E.] Griffith over in Norwich, Class of '15; Dick [Henry Richardson "Dick"] Lane, Class of '07; and others worked at it, and they did raise some money. And there were some wills that included the Tucker Foundation.

But I guess I’d have to still say that if we had been a little bit further along in our understanding and sophistication with respect to money raising, that this could have been a substantially larger memorial than it is. It should have appealed and did appeal to the Tucker generation much more than to later generations at that point. But we were still wallowing in the ineffectiveness of the first Hopkins Center campaign failure and so forth, and we really never accomplished what we should have accomplished, in my view, so far as the endowment of the Tucker Foundation was concerned.

Well, then the problem of leadership of the foundation came up. And we thought at first—and whether correctly or not, I’m uncertain—but we thought that it was important not to break, if we could avoid it, with the religious leadership that this kind of thing had had, if it had had any, up to now in the College. So we began looking for somebody to head the foundation who would have a broad outlook but still would have a nucleus of religious sophistication and commitment. We looked and looked, and we had an advisory committee that Francis Childs chaired and so forth.

I guess I’d had have to say that we saw an awful lot of people that didn’t seem quite right. Some that we might have been interested in, but couldn’t
move. And eventually Fred Berthold [Jr. ’45] out of really a sense of duty accepted the deanship to get us started. Fred had all of the commitment qualities that we were looking for. But as he would be the first to say and said to us, he was not interested intellectually or otherwise—not interested is too weak—he was not prepared to orient his career around this kind of thing indefinitely. So that we to a degree marked time while we looked further. And then we moved…[Richard P.] Dick Unsworth came up from Smith, had been a chaplain down there. We made a mistake there. He made a mistake. Although he was candid with us. He said, “My primary commitment is to preaching. This is what I do best. But I would be glad to take a….”

DICKEY: …Unitarians, Episcopal high churchmen. He seemed to be the sort of person we were looking for. Intellectually active and, as I’ve said a moment ago, a man who had had a very successful experience so far as the chapel was concerned at Smith. Well, it turned out that what he had said to us about his primary interest being that of a preacher, and that being his top talent, was more literally true, more totally true than we had realized and perhaps he realized. In any event, he found that within—I forget what it was, two or three years, it was a short time….

DANIELL: A short time.

DICKEY: This was not for him and that he wanted to go back to Smith, and they wanted him back to be chaplain. And this was all for the good. At the time I thought it was a little precipitous as far as he was concerned. But I subsequently came to believe that it was for the best in all respects. Well, we went through a much briefer review of where we were in the leadership of this thing. And of course it was a difficult thing to get hold of as far as a career opportunity was concerned for a man. A minister could see it in relationship to chapel, and Dick Unsworth….

DANIELL: They’ve fixed it now you could become headmaster of a prep school afterwards.

DICKEY: Yes. Unsworth had emphasized chapel, and he didn’t want particularly the Union services. He wanted to preach himself and bring in a few outsiders. And he did have some success in building chapel up. But once again, I was confirmed in my view that this was not the way to reach the large campus and make it aware that there was some concern here, regardless of how that concern was being expressed and how well, that there still
was an institutional commitment. Various individuals on the campus took a considerable interest in it and helped.

At this point I again decided to play a personal role of leadership in respect to taking a bold step; namely, I decided that we were at a point where we should not anymore regard religious commitment as an essential part of the leadership of the Tucker Foundation. Various things played a part in this. First, our experience with Unsworth. Secondly, the experience we’d had interviewing people from the churches. As I’ve said, there were several men from the West Coast. Went down to talk with a man involved in the—this dean of chapel. We’d gone to [James Albert] Jim Pike, Don Morrison and I, when he was dean of St. John’s in New York. Don had become persuaded that Pike could be moved, and he at that time looked to be one of the important leaders of a broad, very broad religious commitment to social needs.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: On and on, he came up, made several good lectures here at the College on our Guernsey Center Moore Foundation. But fortunately he had in mind more important opportunities for a churchman; namely, he really was looking ahead to getting a bishop’s job, which he subsequently did get out on the West Coast…and of course came a cropper personally. We saw the prelude to that here the last time he was here for a series of lectures. We realized that we were looking at a man who was coming apart so far as his control over drinking was concerned.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And this was a sad thing to see. He got on top of that for a while. Subsequently, however, his—at least in my eyes—his playing around with mysticism and talking to his departed son and things of this sort at least seemed to me to suggest that there was a mental instability there that would have been disastrous for our purposes.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I mention that only to indicate the range of our search. And out of this I just decided that the time had come not to be bound by the notion that we had to have a man who had a religious….

DANIELL: Was Roy Chamberlin still in the picture at all then?

DICKEY: No.
DANIELL: He had....

DICKEY: I'm not sure whether Roy was living at this point. But he was not involved. Francis Childs was, but not Roy.

After looking around quite a bit, and then realizing that we were moving into a period of opportunity in the racial field and so forth, and having worked quite closely with Charles [F.] Dey ['52], Doc Dey, as assistant dean of the College, I thought, well, why don't we consider making this bet and see how we come off? And it was just about as bold as reaching out for Don Morrison to be dean of faculty because here we were moving away from religion, we were moving to a young fellow, and we were moving to a staff fellow who was not very widely known in the faculty and so forth. I remember having talked with several people very privately about how they would do this, and they thought it was a very—had a very great potential and so forth.

I decided to make a move and went to see—went to have a luncheon meeting with a faculty advisory group. One fellow was a mathematician, and one was I think Fred Berthold, and one or two others. And I said, "I don't think it's fair to come and ask you to consult because I've pretty well reached a decision about where I think we ought to go in the leadership of the Tucker Foundation." And the one thing that I'll say for myself over the years in the use of consultation, I don't think I ever used it if I felt the decision had really, for practical purposes, been taken.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And I was just trying to maneuver people around. I had a deep distaste of that kind of shenanigans which is so common and goes under the banner of consultation. So I did come explicitly clean with this group, I remember, and said that I had reached the conclusion that we've got to move, we ought to move away from the religious commitment. We've looked now at a lot of possibilities, and they haven't been right or available to us for one reason or another. And I'm going to suggest that we go to a man that I don't think is probably on very many minds of anybody's mind, and that's Charles Dey.

Well, of course, I had at first the startled reception that you would expect. And there was a lot of...well, there was a good bit of hesitation: Have you really made this decision? Have you thought it through? And so on and so forth. I think Fred accepted it pretty seriously right quickly. One of the
faculty fellows, the mathematician, was doubtful. Gee, he wondered whether that was too bold. And so forth.

Well, Doc Dey’s leadership gave the foundation an outreach and a position of influence in the faculty that was just what we were looking for at that time. I worked fairly closely with him down in Jersey City putting some Tucker Foundation interns down there. And the mayor that we worked with subsequently went to prison, so we were probably [laughter] exposed to the source of some of the ills of the city and so on. But that was the culmination of, in a sense, of my relationship to the Tucker Foundation. Dey’s interest. And this was a tough, tough job because some of the blacks towards the late sixties began to become very difficult to work with, very suspicious of the interests of whites in their affairs, as you must remember.

DANIELL: Oh, yes. I was teaching black history as a white.

DICKEY: Oh, were you?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, then you made [inaudible].

DANIELL: [inaudible] responsibilities.

DICKEY: But Dey had the experience which is a very hard one to take. I had it several times, not as often as he did. And that is giving everything you think you’ve got to try to help an individual, and then have him betray you. Betray you for reasons either good or bad, but turn on you. He had this with several of them. And I just admired greatly his ability to absorb it.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. No, I have the highest respect for him in the way he handled…. Well, first the way he engineered the earlier commitment to the kinds of things, the ABC Program, the Jersey City program you’ve talked about. And yet it was just at the point, at which I came here initially or two or three years later, in which he began to take guff from the very people who would have benefited most from what he had done.

DICKEY: Exactly. Exactly.

DANIELL: And he had the sense to recognize that and to simply see that you needed a different institutional framework to continue what were the consistent purposes in his life, moving down to where he did it seems to me the timing on that was…. 
DICKEY: Oh, I had no doubt that Doc was not going to make a career of this here. Too young, had too much potential for larger administrative responsibilities than we could provide in the Tucker Foundation. But he gave us what at that point was indispensable to the development of the larger view of the Tucker Foundation.

So I look back on the Tucker Foundation as one of the potentially great threads of purpose that we developed. It’s going to, needless to say, depend upon the quality of its leadership. It’s going to depend upon the sense of purpose the particular president brings to the place. It’s going to some extent on the times, opportunities for this side of educational purpose. Many, many things that are hard to foresee. But if they can keep the structure there, if they can keep the purpose alive, I think that more often than not higher education will—especially the concept of a liberating education—will find itself coming back to this as a valid concern of, well, human development.

DANIELL: Yes. I couldn't agree more.

I don’t have any more questions about the Tucker Foundation. My main interest was in how you saw this in relationship to the College purpose. And that’s automatically how you cast your discussion of it. Now, let’s see. Why don’t I turn the machine off here just for a second.

[Pause]

The March 9th interview ended here.

The interviews with President Emeritus Dickey resumed on March 22nd.

It’ll be short on this side because I have half a tape. As I said, what I’d like to do today is to spend time talking about your relationship to the alumni body as a whole. When we talked about this after I turned the tape off last time, you made a few general observations about the importance that you felt [inaudible]. I guess now the question is really about how you found the most effective way of maintaining or trying to fulfill that purpose as you saw it.

DICKEY: Perhaps the most appropriate way to start is that this was another area in the Dartmouth picture where I turned immediately and frequently to Mr. Hopkins for his views and his experience in respect to the relationship of the alumni to the College. He had had a long personal experience going back to even his undergraduate days when he came to know a number of
prominent alumni through his undergraduate activities. And then much more importantly as assistant to Dr. Tucker during Dr. Tucker's presidency. He came very close to the relationship of the official College and the alumni and had the very great benefit of Dr. Tucker's experience in dealing with the alumni. So that he came to the presidency with an unusual understanding of the importance of the alumni to Dartmouth and an understanding of the need to devote a great deal of attention to the alumni and their understanding of the College. I saw something of this as a young alumnus myself when I was class agent working on the Alumni Fund. I had the privilege each year of….

DANIELL: This was when you were in Boston, right?

DICKEY: Yes… of meeting with Mr. Hopkins at Alumni Fund dinners and usually a second time I would hear him at the big Boston Alumni dinner. And all of these contributed to my great respect for his wisdom in this area. So that when I came to the job, it was the most natural thing in the world for me to turn to him for advice. And he was very much interested in this side of the College. Indeed, remained in close touch with it because of his friendships with prominent alumni.

Well, he emphasized to me constantly the importance that he attached to the president devoting himself to alumni affairs; not simply because of the importance to the College of the Alumni Fund financially. But because in a more fundamental sense Dartmouth attracted such intense alumni interest and loyalty that if it was misdirected, if it got under the influence of shall we say a do-nothing, know-nothing I mean kind of leadership, it could cause the College very great trouble. Well, my first introduction to alumni affairs was out on the circuit introducing myself, so to speak, to the alumni at the annual dinners in the principal cities: Chicago, New York, Boston, I forget…maybe a half dozen more of the principal centers, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Denver, I believe, places—and Cleveland. These were some of the stronghold positions of the alumni body and had been for quite a few years.

DANIELL: Was this in the spring after you became president?

DICKEY: Yes. I went out on the alumni circuit actually that winter.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: Sid Hayward was in charge of alumni affairs at that point as secretary of the College. And he was very anxious that I should have an opportunity to meet some of the key alumni leaders as soon as possible. And I felt the
importance of it. So that I was out at these dinners that winter, as I remember, and right into the spring.

I also that year moved into the job of meeting with Alumni Fund agents at several key—well, a number of key cities—to brief them on the affairs of the College, particularly on the transition from the wartime V-12 campus back to the new—renewed—undergraduate campus. With the veterans flooding in and a mix of veterans and newcomers to the College, it was a situation that intrigued alumni. They wanted to know how was this working out, how were we handling that? And so forth.

Well, very soon, certainly within the next year or so, the validity of Mr. Hopkins’s feeling came home to me as I saw at first hand how essential it was to keep coming back to the purpose of the institution, to the basic principles involved in the welfare of an institution of higher education. It came up in admissions, as I believe I’ve mentioned to you earlier. At every alumni gathering, frequently at breakfast in the mornings before an evening dinner or at the next morning after an evening dinner, there would be maybe a half dozen, sometimes as many as ten or 12 alumni, usually with one or two who had real grievances and who would want to talk with me in a smaller group about disappointments over admissions, over the issue of McCarthyism pro or con; all of the things which were important to the campus were important to many, many alumni. So that one had no need to create opportunities to be in touch with them. They created the opportunity.

Well, I decided that I was going to take this mission seriously. And as I’ve looked back over the notes I used over the years in my alumni talks, there’s a strong thread of purpose being enunciated in regard to one aspect of the College or another. And it was an educational mission; it was not a public relations undertaking in any shallow sense. It was an effort to create understanding and support for the essentials of what I thought—or at least what I thought—were the essentials of Dartmouth’s strength.

I look back on that mission—and it was a mission—as one of the very important strengths which I carried on or tried to carry on from President Hopkins’s era. Because if there’s one single thing I suppose that his administration is remembered for it was his relationship with the alumni.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Well, needless to say, when we turn to mounting the capital gifts campaign in the middle fifties after the abortive first big theater/auditorium project, there was just an essential need that had to be met in the way of
educating the alumni, for example, on the whole concept of a Hopkins Center. As I've said earlier when we were talking about the center, there was a broad streak of philistinism.

DANIELL: [Adjusting microphone.] Okay.

DICKEY: There was a broad streak of philistinism in the alumni body that was, to put it mildly, suspicious of any emphasis on performing arts or the arts. And this could only be met through carrying the word, meeting with the opponents of the project, meeting with the people who were doubtful, meeting with the people who were well intentioned but still didn’t really see its relationship to the educational purpose of the institution. Well, there are many specifics that could be mentioned. But I would, until we get to those, I think I would sum it up by saying that all of the other major things that we were able to initiate and carry out, including not by any means the least of these initiatives, was in building up a faculty of teacher-scholars. Here again....

DANIELL: I was just going to ask specifically about that.

DICKEY: It was one of the major themes of my talks to the alumni constantly, that we were seeking to keep Dartmouth strong by going into the academic marketplace, competing for a few loss leaders, so to speak in business terms, but mainly seeking to recruit the topnotch prospects in competition with the strongest institutions.

Well, there’s no need to go into the difficulties which I encountered sometimes on that front. But it was a necessary type of alumni education that paid off great dividends. They became proud of the Dartmouth faculty. And when they would hear about somebody at Dartmouth doing something that had attracted attention somewhere else, they were very quick to seize on it and cite it to their friends.

We had special causes that required explanation and considerable attention on the part of the president. For example, the development of a recruitment program for first-rate students.

DANIELL: Why don’t I just take this off and put the other one on before you get into that because that material is...

[End of Tape 36, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 37, Side A]

DANIELL: We were talking about the development of a recruiting program.
DICKEY: Yes, well, rather early on in my administration, I don’t remember just when but I would guess sometime within the first five years on the job, it became clear that if we were going to compete for the kind of faculty that we wanted to attract to Dartmouth; we not only had to raise the money to be able to do that, we had to be very careful about our priorities as to how we spent the money that we had and the money that we raised. But also we had to work in a systematic, continuing way to attract to the College more of the topnotch students coming out of the high schools and private schools than we would get if we didn’t undertake such a program. I believe it was Princeton that led the way in developing an organized recruitment program. Princeton had always been an attractive, strong college. So that if they needed to do it, it seemed to me we had all the more reason to get going on this side of things. The Alumni Council took a very active interest in this. It was one of the really critical fronts that the Alumni....

DANIELL: Yes, the Alumni Council [inaudible]. I think, comes more interest basically, except for the big symbolic issues, in that than anything else...

DICKEY: I wouldn’t be at all surprised if that’s so. I haven’t attempted to analyze the whole spectrum of Alumni Council interests and activities over the years. But along with the Alumni Fund, which had to a considerable extent an organization of its own and which was backed up by a growing development staff here at the College, the Alumni Council had in it, oh, three or four, not many more, individuals when we started who quickly saw the importance of this. And they saw it as an opportunity for alumni service to the College which would make the alumni influential in ways that they ought to be and wanted to be. [Donald C.] Don McKinlay [’37] from Denver was one of them. He was probably the first most effective alumnus in organizing the recruitment work. John [B.] Faegre [Jr. ’33] in Twin Cities.

DANIELL: How do you spell that last name?

DICKEY: F-A-E-G-R-E, Faegre. He was another very active, hardworking, effective alumnus on enrollment work. And there were others whose names I could recall, but I don’t have them at the tip of my tongue at the moment.

Well, this work required a rather sophisticated understanding of Dartmouth, what Dartmouth had to offer, what Dartmouth’s claim to the interests of high school boys was, and particularly what was our claim to the interests of schoolteachers, principals, and college advisors in the secondary schools, public and private. Well, as with so many other things of this sort, it required presidential activity and leadership, going into meetings with schoolteachers, with school principals, certainly with school
students. And also often with parents. Indeed, on occasion, going to a parent-teachers’ meeting of sorts and standing questioning. As our staff developed, as our admissions office developed, they took on in the later years much of this activity. But during the early years when Don McKinlay was chasing around and John Faegre was lining up lads, this required direct participation.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Bob Strong was the admissions officer when you arrived.

DICKEY: When I came. But Bob, of course, died before I had been on the job a year.

DANIELL: And Al Dickerson.

DICKEY: And Al Dickerson. And Al and I would go out together frequently to the schools. First time I went as a matter of fact to Twin Cities, Al and I went together. So we put this right up at the top of the list of, if you will, alumni activities that I had to be a direct participant in.

DANIELL: Yes. You can see why that would be. It’s clearly in the area of admissions that you were most suspect with the alumni body as a whole, after more friction there from disappointments.

DICKEY: This was true on that side, that is on the side of disappointment on the part of alumni. I suppose that every alumni meeting that I attended for the first five years, perhaps, I had to devote a considerable amount of my time explaining the admissions system: what had been changed in the form of the competition, what had not been changed in respect to the competitive nature of the process. And it was often a very rough go. But on the other side of the recruitment spectrum, there was the need to go into the schools and to speak directly to what we thought we had here at Dartmouth as a program and an institution that was worthy of their best students.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And in many places, I encountered a real suspicion that maybe we weren’t quite as good as we thought. And then there was another very common reaction…which the alumni would give me the advance word about what I was going to find in these particular schools often; usually it would be an individual who was suspicious for one reason or another. But one of the areas that had caused Dartmouth trouble was the notion that some of the school counselors held, or at least professed to hold, that there wasn’t much point to applying to Dartmouth unless you were a Dartmouth son.
DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And that preference for admission into Dartmouth was such that if you were a Dartmouth son, you could walk in; and if you were somebody else, you would have a very difficult time getting in.

Well, this was an area that required some delicacy in handling because on the one hand we didn’t want…it would have been wrong to have given the alumni the impression that we didn’t take into account the Dartmouth family connections of an applicant, which we did; but it also would have been just devastating to have the schools turning away their good people because they’d say, well, they really don’t want you up there unless you’re the son of a Dartmouth man or whatnot. And some of them used this argument not in a wholly sincere way. They would cite this argument to their better boys that they wanted to send somewhere else as something that we couldn’t, they thought, object to, but which would still permit them to counsel a lad, well, why don’t you go somewhere else?

So this was a very, very difficult, delicate, but very fundamental aspect of the work of the president involving, as I said a moment ago, a very close, constant working relationship with key alumni. It permitted one to—it required one indeed—to identify the staunch alumni leaders as distinguished from some of the so-called professional alumni. And one had to be quite careful in the handling of this. And of course they still do have to be very careful about it in the admissions office. You go out and you steam up a boy and his counselor and his parents about coming to Dartmouth, and then he doesn’t make it in the competition. And you’ve bought yourself almost always an awful lot of explaining to alumni and explaining by them to the parents and to the boy and to the teacher. So that you had to be careful, very careful that you didn’t arouse a lot of unrealistic expectations of admission to Dartmouth.

In the area of athletic recruitment, this is…well, it’s just an essential form of judgment and sensitivity if you’re not going to both waste your time and create more ill will than you do good. I never—I’ll say this—I never had the slightest difficulty about athletic recruiting as long as it was done from the vantage point of the purpose of education, and so long as it was carried out with utter integrity in respect to admissions and in respect to the subsequent standards to which the athlete would be held academically, and, needless to say, in respect to financial aid. And this was where a man such as Al Dickerson was an indispensable colleague. And it was also a front on which I spent a good bit of time being as clear as I possibly could with coaches and others and alumni. A certain type of alumnus was
not particularly interested in recruiting top students; he wanted to simply recruit athletes. And there was a very real need to be pretty clear with such a man: Yes, we welcomed the athlete who could make it and stay in and be a good performer. But that was essential. We had our share of individuals that we just had to part company with who couldn’t get the message.

DANIELL: Yes. Just a question about timing on this. Clearly this would be, as you already said, in the first few years of your presidency.

DICKEY: This is where it got launched, very early in my administration.

DANIELL: Yes. Do you have any observations about when you as president sensed that the…well, you’re talking really about reeducating the alumni body to a different set of aspirations and expectations in the area of admissions. Did that take five years, ten years, you never accomplished that? How much continuing effort did this effort at making clear what the institutional policies were?

DICKEY: Oh, I’ve never thought about it in those terms. But it was constantly, the activity, the recruitment activity was constantly related to some aspect of the College that had to be explained and, if you will, sold to the alumni: raising money, capital gifts, recruitment, standing off the McCarthy pressures, later campus unrest. So that all of these areas of alumni interest or concern required, at least I felt they required, a returning, if you will, to the principles and purposes which ought to govern an institution of higher education. So I don’t think that I could say that there was any point at which I could, so to speak, change the message. I could relate it to different….

DANIELL: I had a narrow question about the whole question of admissions because you said [inaudible].

DICKEY: Oh, oh, well, that became a more organized staff activity, I would say, along about the middle fifties…along about the middle fifties. And I would still be going out to key schools that I perhaps hadn’t been to, major schools. I might be going down to Exeter to meet with a faculty group or something of that sort. But this increasingly became a staff function of the admissions office.

DANIELL: That was my impression, in general, probably from other evidence in the tapes, that certainly after you’d been on the job for a decade, the image of the institution outside….
DICKEY: Well, we began to feel...we began to feel that we weren't walking uphill.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. This is the sense I'm getting.

DICKEY: This is the way I would put it. At first not everybody that you met but an awful lot of people were competing with Dartmouth, and this was never entirely eliminated, but enjoyed throwing off on you. Sometimes half in fun, sometimes seriously. But after our recruitment began to take hold and when some of our major projects began to come through...Great Issues received very flattering attention from outstanding universities from coast to coast, some of the other things of that sort...

DANIELL: The Chicago Tribune.

DICKEY: ...three course, three term program in the middle fifties, things of that sort, we were able to systematize, if you will, institutionalize the recruitment activity. I never eliminated it from my activities. But it was not as central with me as it was during the first five years when we were getting it launched.

DANIELL: Okay. Well, that's about why I say I thought it would be useful for the tapes to get a sense of once you, as you say, stopped—felt you were going uphill, then that became more a routinized form rather than a major effort. I should imagine another ingredient in it was simply that as the Dartmouth alumni in communities became accustomed to the fact that their sons weren't going to get in necessarily, that then a different attitude...the fact that you don't have so many people whom you disappointed. They say, Boy, if he gets in, that'll be great. But I can't set my hat on it.

DICKEY: This was very fundamental. This was very fundamental. And that took us about, oh, really five years to get over the crisis, if you will, in misunderstanding what was going on at Dartmouth in respect to admissions. The popular grievance in the alumni body was that a new gung-ho, intellectually oriented president had come in and was changing the admissions policies. And it was therefore a change of policy which was at issue rather than the thing which they wouldn't have wanted changed for the world if they understood it; namely, that Dartmouth was becoming a very sought-after opportunity.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: This is what they wanted. But when it resulted in a negative decision with respect to a son or the friend of a son or whatnot, a fine lad, then it was hard to take. But I would say that at the end of five years certainly, we had
begun to get the question of the alumni preference understood as a preference which operated when other things were equal. In other words, theoretically, the last man in the class would be the son of an alumnus. But it didn’t mean that you could go down a hundred or two hundred men further down the list and bring in the son of an alumnus who would be like the last car on a train, I used to use the figure of speech, that was left half a mile back on the track.

DANIELL: Another area you’ve mentioned is the way in which selling sort of the need for the advantages of a really different attitude towards faculty recruiting than had been true before World War II. Now did Don Morrison go on some of these…?

DICKEY: Don went out to a degree. But this was not something that he greatly enjoyed or that he was really as well situated for doing as a Dartmouth person such as myself was.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: There was a little bit of a feeling on his part, a little bit of a feeling on some alumni, well, maybe he wouldn't understand Dartmouth as well as somebody who had been a Dartmouth man. But all of the administrative staff shared in the work of alumni club visiting. And some were better at it than others. We had some very fine staff people who just were utterly unsuited for it. They would try, but they would come back and say, “I just can't do it. It's traumatic. I don't do it well.” And so forth.

DANIELL: It must have been a real immense burden on you. In terms of the range of things you have to do, this must have taken huge chunks of time.

DICKEY: Well, it did. It took time. But more than almost the time, it required—involved a great drain on your emotional energies, your intellectual energies. You were to some extent constantly out on a potentially adversary relationship. And this was draining. And then often I would be out by myself and be going ‘til one o’clock or later at night with talk and drinking. And then up the next morning for breakfast at seven o’clock because the alumni had to get to their office by eight-thirty or nine. And I found myself coming back off of some of these trips pretty well beaten down just as a matter of energy and anything resembling spiritual buoyancy. But you couldn’t do it without realizing its importance.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: That was the other side of it. And I formed some very staunch friendships on the alumni circuit. This was immensely important. And then usually friendships that mattered to Dartmouth. Frequently the quiet ones. So it was a form of mission to the alumni that was one of the essential aspects of my leadership as I saw it at that time. And it had a great continuity, at least as far as my sense of its importance was concerned, with President Hopkins’s feeling about the College and the alumni.

DANIELL: I have a few sort of factual or less important questions on this; they may turn out to be important really. Sid Hayward who obviously was a key person in engineering a lot of the mechanics of your getting together with them. Was there a difficulty—or how did you go about, when Sid died, shaping really a replacement for the role that he played?

DICKEY: Well, this is a very important aspect of this side of my work. Sid was very effective, very helpful, particularly during the early years. And Sid was, as I believe I said earlier, was I think the first person on the staff who identified for me the need to develop a systematic development program and not just leaning on the Alumni Fund for support. He had an understanding of the alumni. He had a way about him that was accepted. Sid came to be a very vulnerable personality on the alumni circuit, though, because he had, as they’re fond of saying today, a drinking problem. And that’s something that’s almost incompatible with alumni and traveling and alumni meetings. I prefer not to go into that in any detail. But it would be wrong not to say, as he would certainly I’m sure want it said, that this was a real handicap later over the years, and one that required as much understanding as I could muster, as much help as I could muster. But also, but even what I want to say…but even at the best, it limited Sid’s ability to carry the full brunt of leadership that he was capable of carrying; and during the times when he wasn’t under the gun of this problem, he did carry. It came in…. Well, he’d get it under control, and then something would happen it would come back.

Quite early on, it was clear to me that we had to get somebody to take charge of—almost as an alter ego to the president, try to—the alumni side of things, by which I mean not just the secretary’s own affairs which Sid handled from here in Hanover very well; but the alumni magazine, the public relations activities and the news service, the development office, and all of the things that are today pretty well clustered in Crosby Hall.

We set out to find a person to head up the development work. I’m not just sure how. Well, he was the first one. But [J.] Ross Gamble was here and brought into that. Again for reasons that aren’t other than personal this did not work out satisfactorily.
DANIELL: He was a lawyer from Chicago [inaudible]...

DICKEY: That’s right. That’s right. And we had to change, and we did. I spent a great deal of time looking over the alumni body to see whom we might turn to for something of this sort. I wanted just as high-grade a person as I could get. I wanted somebody who had devotion to the College. I wanted somebody who really understood and was sympathetic to the basic intellectual work of this kind of an enterprise. And we… I think the first man, there may have been others, that we looked at—I know there were several, two or three, that we thought about—but the first man that we persuaded to have a go at it, as I recall, was [A.] Justin Stanley ['33] from Chicago. A very topnotch person and a man who had a sincere, deep interest in the educational purpose of the College. And his wife was an ideal person to help on this. He came on at some point, I don’t remember just what point it was, in the fifties. I would guess it was about the mid-fifties.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: To be vice president of the College. And the understanding was that he would have a broad jurisdiction and not just money raising. He was with us for two years. And as far as I was concerned, it was a satisfactory relationship, but it was quite clear that Justin’s interests were not going to be fully exploited in that job. He had an interest in the intellectual educational side of the College which it was difficult for him to have an opportunity to develop simply because he was not on the faculty or hadn’t had teaching experience or scholarly experience. And while he had the interest, he, I think, found increasingly that he wasn’t becoming involved in as much of the substantive side of the College as he wanted. Money raising was something he did. But again, money raising was not something that he took great satisfaction in and so on. So that that one at the end of two years was terminated by him with the, I'm sure, absolutely sincere explanation that he had come to as I quite understood to try it out but that he was pretty sure....

[End of Tape 37, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 37, Side B]

DICKEY: ...going out and visiting with alumni and commanding their respect as a person of substance and so forth. But it just wasn't enough of a job in the direction of Justin's interests to have the kind of satisfaction that any person wants. Well, after that we were a little clearer about what we wanted.
DANIELL: This is interesting to me because I’ve just done a lot of tapes with Ort Hicks, just finished indexing them.

DICKEY: Yes, yes. Well, this is where Ort comes into the picture. And I think it’s very important to emphasize that we had the benefit of several efforts that weren’t right for what we were looking for. We weren’t too sure just what we were looking for. I talked with various colleagues about it. Some of our—most of our operating areas in Alumni Fund and otherwise were well covered. But for this kind of top-drawer, if you will, cultivation of alumni we needed someone who was a little bit more salesman I guess would be the way to put it and a little less of an intellectual, would probably be the way I would characterize it, the fact that it wasn’t right for Justin.

Well, I went over two or three possibilities. One of them was Guy [P.] Wallick [TU ‘23] out on the West Coast who’d worked on a committee set up by the Alumni Council to study Alumni Council operations and what the Alumni Council ought to be doing from time to time that it would have such a review. And Guy, who was I think number two in the telephone company on the West Coast was very good at that. He could analyze what was needed and had a good head on him and a deep devotion to this College. He was much interested. The thing I was very worried about and never wholly satisfied, and I guess he was worried and even less satisfied than I was, was that his wife was…well, she was a wonderful person as his wife. She was just incurably reactionary in her political orientation and was prepared to believe that the, well, this is a figure of speech, there was a Communist under every bed especially in the colleges, and terribly, obviously worried about that. And she was realistic enough when we talked to them once about whether they would want to consider this seriously, and they came on, she was realistic enough to say, “I don’t know whether I’d be happy in an academic institution where you have all these….”

DANIELL: Ort emphasized the tremendous importance in the multiple roles he began to play of a husband-wife relationship which enhanced the role rather than….

DICKEY: Well, this bothered me. I couldn’t see her doing this. She was not a person who clearly was going to relate to a social responsibility easily. And more importantly, there was this negative aspect which I had a deep concern about. And I talked with Guy a bit about this. Well, Guy decided it wasn’t for him for various reasons. He had—I don’t know whether it was an arthritic condition, but it was something that he had to give some thought to as to what the future held for him. Kent, as they called her, was clearly
not sold on it. And we called it off. And I would say very fortunately, very fortunately. Guy had many of the qualities we were looking for, might have been himself very effective; we don’t know about that. But I still would be prepared to bet that if you hadn’t had these other factors, he could have done it and done it well.

Well, there were one or two others, one of whom I got so far as to writing a letter to and then held it for a day or two and decided not to send it. And increasingly found myself wondering whether Ort Hicks, whom I’d gotten to know on the alumni circuit and through his interest in the Alumni Council, might not be the man that we were looking for. Well, I talked with a number of people about that and got very, very strong endorsements of the idea. I don’t think I got any negatives at all. I think there was one….

DANIELL: Except he wasn’t a good public speaker, supposedly….

DICKEY: Ort is somebody who makes a lot out of sometimes very little. [Laughter]

DANIELL: That’s right. I’m well aware of that [laughter].

DICKEY: And he used that line until it was threadbare.

DANIELL: That’s right. He told me he had the same speech he always gave to the alumni club, and that was the way he introduced it, the same one, you know, 50 times a year, whatever it was. [Laughter]

DICKEY: I would have to say I don’t know how much truth there was in it, although I suspect a minimum of factual accuracy. In any event, I decided to have a go at Ort about taking on the job. And I’ve always been immensely thankful that we turned to him and that he came. Because, well, if you know Ort even reasonably well, you know he’s a rather unique combination: On the one hand he got on very well with the most conservative, indeed reactionary alumni. At the same time he was a freedom fighter, so to speak, against McCarthy. Got into the frontline trenches a couple of times over the McCarthy business before he came here.

And he was just built to raise money in cases where a considerable amount of cultivation, not to mention flattery, was part of the effort. And he knew how to use me. [Laughter] And he had no compunction about using me. He was always making snowballs for me to throw. But only after he had prepared the way and all but made the sale. He had a good head on him. But he did not project an image, if you will, of a person who was primarily interested in the intellectual side of the College. But he was smart
enough, just the same as Blackman was as a football coach, to know what he was selling was an enterprise of higher education.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And that it had to be sold on the basis of being a quality product. There was no other basis on which you could sell the place. So that Ort came to us, and we gave him overall responsibility pretty much the same as Justin had had as vice president. From the point of view of alumni relations, the point of view of the cultivation of difficult but substantial prospects for giving to Dartmouth, I doubt very much that we could have found a better man. I don’t believe we could have found a better man, and I knew the….

We might have asked but as far as you could sift them out, I don’t think we could have found a better man. And he just did some wonderful things. When it came to administrative supervision, this was not his forte and, of course, not his primary interest. So that I think you’d have to say that the offices had to be manned by people who could and wanted to more or less be left on their own.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And Ort had enough sense to do this.

DANIELL: That’s essentially what Ort said--

DICKEY: He did?

DANIELL: --about himself.

DICKEY: Well, this was the case. And the alumni magazine, [Charles E.] Charlie Widmayer ['30], the Alumni Fund, several….

DANIELL: And the way I organized that interview with him as we got into it was I, after we got to this point, is take, okay, the functions of this office, and then went down through kind of systematically. And his immediate and initial statement at each one was that—whether it was George Colton or whether it was Charlie Widmayer or whether it was [J. Michael] Mike McGean ['49], what form it took—that these were things which were in such completely capable hands that he could focus his energies on the major cultivations.

DICKEY: Well, I think that’s an accurate description of the situation. And it was one that was really necessary because the other side of this was not Ort’s interest or his forte. And I’d say something else: I’m proud of many things about the College. But we had a staff of operating people that you could
put up against almost anybody that I was running up against in the academic world, and they would hold their own and more than hold their own. So that it’s worked out pretty well.

Now there were situations in which I had to understand Ort and occasionally he had to understand me, where....

DICKEY:  I’d forgotten that, but this was one of them. And there were a couple of situations in the admissions side of things where I felt a great sense of responsibility for not having somebody tampering with admissions. And Ort was... Well, he understood that. But as with one of his close friends in his generation of the alumni—no point in bringing the name into it—this person wanted to get a grandson in. And the lad didn’t have the credentials to walk in, and Ort was never one to take no if he wanted to accomplish something, which was part of his strength. [Laughter]

DICKEY:  So he carried on a correspondence with this fellow and kept sending the admissions office this and that and so forth. And one day the file—or a file—came to me. I don’t know whether it was an admissions office or something, and I happened to look at it. And here was a copy of a letter which Ort obviously hadn’t intended to get into the files—to the effect that...writing to this grandfather, saying of course I’m not telling the admissions office everything that I know. [Laughter] But I think maybe we can work it.

DICKEY:  [Laughter] Well, I never told him that I’d seen that. But when the file went back to Eddie Chamberlain, I put on the note something to the effect that all I need to say is that both of us understand Ort Hicks, and that I look to you as the only person who’s going to decide matters of this sort and not Ort. He never knew that, but that was that.

So there were situations of that sort that required, I think I would say, this required understanding of where I had to draw the line. And where a fellow such as Eddie would just draw the line without making a federal case out of it.

DICKEY:  [Laughter] Yes, yes. [Laughter]

DICKEY:  [Laughter] Yes, it sounds like....

DICKEY:  [Laughter] Well, I never told him that I’d seen that. But when the file went back to Eddie Chamberlain, I put on the note something to the effect that all I need to say is that both of us understand Ort Hicks, and that I look to you as the only person who’s going to decide matters of this sort and not Ort. He never knew that, but that was that.

So there were situations of that sort that required, I think I would say, this required understanding of where I had to draw the line. And where a fellow such as Eddie would just draw the line without making a federal case out of it.

DICKEY:  I think Ort understood that, too.
DICKEY: I’m sure he did. But our relationship was, as far as I was concerned, really deeply satisfying. He and Lois did more entertaining of alumni coming back to Hanover than anybody else. I think Chris and I were often concerned that maybe Ort asked more of her than he should in this respect, putting on parties almost every weekend. We would be asked to come to many of them, and we did as many as we thought we could without utterly exhausting ourselves. But it was a service that I don’t— I’ll say again—I don’t think anybody else in my acquaintance could have rendered as he and Lois did. And I could cite specific instances. For example, [Nathaniel] Nat Leverone ’06. I’m sure he mentioned him, must have told you about his cultivation.

DANIELL: One of the things that we do have on this is that I got a hold of and added to the collection about an hour and a half of tapes that were done at really a luncheon set for this purpose. [Robert B.] Bob Graham ’40 was there, [Robert J.] Bill Finney [Jr. ’63] was there, Ort was there, in which—it was rooted in a talk he’d given at the Tuck School about the joy of fundraising basically, the fundraising managerial activity. And there are a lot of concrete details about Leverone, Remsen, and two or three of the others that…. So that there is a good deal on that.

DICKEY: Well, he’s entitled to great credit for accomplishing something that I couldn’t have done in some of these cases. Leverone was about as difficult a person…. His early efforts were directed to criticizing me.

DANIELL: Getting rid of you. [Laughter]

DICKEY: Then he turned around and embarrassed me by praising me every time he made a speech. I’m not sure which was worse. And then there were others where the original cultivation was simply sincere friendship on his part with the man or with the man’s friend. That would have been the case with Peter Kiewit ’22. Then he would bring me in, and he would take a backseat or wouldn’t be present, and just leave it to me to make the case for Dartmouth. We had, in this respect, a very effective partnership.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, I don’t know how much more detail you want on that. And he was backed up by George Colton who was a very different— had very different strengths, and who was much more given to the managerial, administrative side of the development office.

DANIELL: Well, that really corroborates….
DICKEY:  But I don't want to do Ort an injustice in respect to the intellectual side of the College. He took great pride in that, and he knew it was the product that ultimately we had to make the sale on.

DANIELL:  That comes through very clearly in his tapes, too.

DICKEY:  And he’s entitled to credit on that side of things. I think where he would agree we occasionally had to diverge in our approach to things was when he would get into a mood: "Well, I'm doing it for Dartmouth! I don't care what they think! If they think I'm overdoing the flattery or doing this or doing that, I'm doing it for Dartmouth. That's all that matters." Well, I couldn't quite go that far. [Laughter] And I would occasionally have to have a different judgment about how Dartmouth's welfare would be best served.

DANIELL:  I'll say it for the tapes, too, that of all the sets of interviews that I've done, and I must have done altogether somewhere between 30 and 40 (I haven't counted up the people I've interviewed), I found being exposed to Ort Hicks for a sustained period of time the most fascinating, I think, of all the interviews. Because as you started off by saying and that I would, I can't imagine a person like Ort Hicks—I mean I couldn't imagine a person like Ort Hicks unless I had seen him in the multiple roles that I know he played. And my general assessment from potential writers of something about all this is he's been an extraordinarily important and key individual.

DICKEY:  Oh, very, very key...a very key individual.

DANIELL:  And much sharper. I've known him mainly on the tennis court, the public manner he has, and he just impressed me as a much more observant and perceptive individual in private than you'd automatically think if you just witness his manner in public.

DICKEY:  Well, we had a lot of fun together and I think did some good. [Laughter]

DANIELL:  Well, do you have anything else that comes to mind?

DICKEY:  At least we avoided some of the worst difficulties that we might otherwise have fallen into occasionally by his grace and my judgment, I guess, is the way we'd put it. [Laughs]

DANIELL:  This seems to me fine as far as the whole topic of alumni relations goes. We've gotten in all the jottings I've made. Why don't we break?

DICKEY:  Okay.
DANIELL: …the end of the tape. So it'll only be about ten minutes until I change it.

I really don’t know how the best way to go about talking about fundamentally basic decisions that had to be made on facilities. You know the key decisions an awful lot better than the kinds of records I’ve read or the kinds of interviews I’ve had would suggest.

DICKEY: I suppose you can start by saying that when I came to the job, there was no critical plant problem that I had to devote myself to immediately. The plant had been kept up well. There were some situations that required attention. But there was nothing critical about the plant situation. The Hopkins Center project for a large auditorium and a theater as part of it was the only major new plant project that was on the agenda; I’ve already dealt with that. And the development of the Hopkins Center as we have it today was by all odds the largest single plant development of my years on the job. It was directed at the needs of a number of different departments, a number of different programs: music conspicuously, drama, the fine arts, teaching as well as the gallery facilities; the replacement of the facilities for the student workshop and the enlargement of those facilities; the provision of a place for large alumni gatherings such as we provided in Alumni Hall. All of these and quite a few others were plant needs which were identified as legitimate, educational priorities within the—from well within my first ten years on the job. So that the planning in that respect grew out of our attention to the redefinition, the reformulation of the Hopkins Center project.

DANIELL: I hadn't quite thought of it that way before. But the more you delayed it, the more you absorbed other possibilities.

DICKEY: Oh, this was a very basic aspect of the matter because, well, it was not just because of the educational concept which was involved in bringing these different activities into physical proximity. That was very basic. But it was the fact that we spent enough time living with the needs to be reasonably clear that this was not just something that was nice to have, but it was just simply something that we had to have. And this resulted in, I think, some very first-rate planning, planning that has by and large stood up extraordinarily well in use. Indeed, today the only complaints of any consequence that I’m aware of about the center is that they’re beginning to outgrow it, which is a pleasant complaint in my eyes.

Now, there were other areas that, as they acquired strength, needed facilities. Mathematics would be a good example of that. And as John
Kemeny built a department that was young and vigorous and wanted to move on into graduate work, it very quickly had a claim upon more adequate facilities. And this led to the building of the new mathematics facility. And that in turn sparked the way toward the development of the Kiewit Computer Center, which was itself an expression of the strength and developing interest in that field in the department of mathematics.

So that the plant responses here, I can almost proudly say were made after the educational objective, the educational program, the educational strength required it. We did the same to a considerable extent in providing facilities for psychology.

Then, of course, at about the same time came the re-founding of the medical school. And this required the kind of planning that really started from scratch because, as I've said earlier talking about the medical school, the old medical school plant was simply used up and couldn't be expanded or rehabilitated any further to do what needed to be done in the re-founding of the medical school. So it really was, in effect, started from scratch there. And this was a very fortunate thing.

One of the lessons that I learned on the job over the years was that quite frequently when you start from scratch, you have an opportunity to take a so-called quantum leap out ahead of somebody else who's been ahead of you for a long time simply because you've had nothing up to that time that....

DANIELL: The frequency with which you use the phrase, “one of the lessons I learned.”

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: When you're talking [inaudible] all of these things.

DICKEY: Well, I never thought, never had occasion to think about it before. And I will even pick that phrase up again and say that I don't think I shall ever again use the phrase “bricks and mortar” contemptuously. This was another cliché that was kicked around in the academic world. People thought they were saying something when they said, “Well, I wouldn't want to give you money for bricks and mortar.” Or “bricks and mortar are not important.”

DANIELL: Yes, yes.
DICKEY: What I learned was that bricks and mortar can be essential or they can be a waste, depending upon how closely they’re related to your basic purposes and your basic programs. If you really have got the purpose, the aim, the objective thought out, if you’ve got the personnel or you’re out to seek the personnel to man that purpose and that objective, you have got to think creatively, you’ve got to think out ahead with regard to providing the facilities for first-rate people, for first-rate ideas. You don’t solve anything by just downgrading bricks and mortar without regard to whether it is necessary or not for the accomplishment of some central, fundamental purpose. Well…

[End of Tape 37, Side B]  
[Beginning of Tape 38, Side A]

DICKEY: ...played a very important part, probably a decisive part, in permitting us to solve another perplexity. For a number of years there was quite a drive on here and on other campuses to build science libraries. This was something that was done on a good many campuses. We were at a point where Baker Library was being pressed very hard for space, and the different science departments were building up departmental libraries which at best were not well managed or built systematically and adequately, other than as working libraries which faculty might need on a regular basis. But they just weren't adequate to giving, in most instances, faculty the kind of library resources they would need for research or other large-scale scholarly activity. And this quickly developed into a division on the part of those who didn’t want to give up their departmental libraries and those who wanted a centralized--more centralized--library system, more centralized management.

DANIELL: It seemed to be that Hopkins had a good deal of this done when Baker Library was built.

DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes. Well, this is something that I discovered when I went around and sought advice from people on other campuses. It was a bit like the experience I had in trying to acquire some background with respect to biochemistry. I discovered that everybody had the same controversy on their hands, and that there were different approaches to its solution. Well, to some extent this one was solved by the re-founding of the medical school, the clear need to move the medical library out of Baker where it was occupying space that really wasn’t suited to its maximum--or at least optimum--utilization. In short, it was agreed that we would turn to a separate library for medicine, and everybody seemed to be pretty well agreed that it was not going to be a good idea to attempt to put medicine, the medical library, into a science facility--or a science library.
At about the same time, it also became clear that the Department of Biological Sciences was acquiring a vigor and ambitions that needed attention. And there was just enough sentiment in the science faculty that was divided so sharply that you just weren't going to persuade one group or the other give up their position. The result was we said, well, let's stop trying to formulate some concept here of an overall monolithic science library. Let's begin to break this down into smaller functional units. The first was medicine, which was a clear division. Then the biologic science people said, well, we make common cause with medicine. We really have a potential for use of certain materials, especially the basic science materials, in medicine. Correspondingly, the basic science people who were still here--and the dominant factor in the new medical school, so to speak--wanted to be in touch with the biologic sciences. So this permitted some what I think fairly could be characterized as creative thought and planning. We decided, well, we'll have a go at bringing those two together, and we will locate the facility where it can serve, through proximity, both the new medical school and a new building for the biologic sciences.

Now, this was something that hadn't occurred to us earlier. But the more we played with the idea and consulted with these two centers of program here at Dartmouth--the medical school and the biologic science people--it attracted them and made a lot of sense. So these were two areas where I got on my bicycle and went out to see whether we could raise some money for them. Neither of them came in under the blanket of capital gifts campaign, the first capital gifts campaign or the other. And the Gilmans, the Gilman Family, which had two boys go to Dartmouth, the family which had the mill up north, had been very nice to me at the time of the first capital gifts campaign. They had made a sizeable gift but not a major gift. But the father had said to me, "We want to keep in touch with you, and one of these days when we're in a position to do--"

DANIELL: Is this International Paper?

DICKEY: No, no. This is a small family-owned paper company, specialized papers. Gilman Paper Company.

DANIELL: Gilman Paper Company has put in a wood-burning plant now.

DICKEY: But they had said to me, "We're not ready yet to make a major gift, but when we are, why, we'd like to do business with you." So I kept in touch with them off and on. And on one of my calls to see them in connection with our plans for developing the new biologic facility and developing the
medical center up there, Biomedical Center as we then called it, I went to see them. And with his little preliminary warm up, as you can imagine, the father always called in his two sons, and they always paid great respect to him by remaining silent until he asked them the question. He simply turned to me, and he said, "Well, Mr. Dickey, as I've told you before, we've always wanted to do something for Dartmouth, and we've liked the way our relationship with you has developed. I thought maybe you would like to know that we've put a check for a million dollars in the bank." Well, this was my first million-dollar gift and I was taken aback.

Well, this solved the notion of building a biologic sciences facility. And also helped my pursuit of Mr. [Charles] Dana, Charles Dana, to provide money for the biomedical library. He was a much more difficult sell. He was quite a remarkable gentleman, well up in his years at the time that I pursued him. And he always wanted to bargain. He was a businessman to the last. We could get along on four hundred thousand dollars as well as six hundred thousand or, you know, this kind of-- Whereas I would try to reverse it by saying, well, you could give us six hundred thousand as well as you could give us four hundred. "Oh, but that's not the point!" he would say. But we got our Dana Medical Library, which has served--Biomedical Library--

DANIELL: That's right. As you were talking, immediately came to mind, not knowing anything about this beforehand, the whole concept of biomedical, I remember once somebody asking me, "What a strange name for a library." I wish I'd known what I know now.

DICKEY: Well, this is the way the concept came about. Again, as far as I know, it has proven to be a very workable relationship. The library is physically of course connected with biologic sciences and with the medical school. Indeed, only two years ago or so, I think they expanded it by putting a third floor on it. I believe it is a facility that has been well used and has justified the original plans for it. Well, at the same time, it was pretty well agreed, out of this continuing dialogue among the scientists, that mathematics, again, had a certain specialness about its literature, and that really it wouldn't be well served in an overall science library. But that it would be better served by providing for a reasonably extensive departmental library facility in the new math building. And most of the science people, when they examined closely what they wanted, said, "There are only a few books that we really, out of the math library, that we'll use on our own. Otherwise we'll go to our colleagues in math, and talk with them about it, and get them to tell us what we ought to have or what we need for a particular problem." And this then resulted later, after I retired, in a-- Well, before I retired, we'd planned an extension of chemistry and physics. But
the College found it didn't have the money to build the kind of combined new facilities for chemistry and physics that we had originally envisaged, which had a joint library, and which is there today with the extension that they finally developed.

So that was the way one sector of the plan developed. Another sector that was quite a difficult one to get formulated in any way that was reasonably satisfactory to all interests, was the need of Tuck School and the engineering school for expanded facilities. Tuck School was in increasingly acute need of office space for faculty and classroom space, as well as library space. Thayer School was increasingly in need of the same type of additional space. And the two schools had really almost a historic difficulty in getting together on anything like a combined program or combined facilities.

DANIELL: Yes. Jack Dodd, I believe--

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: --was one of the key individuals in that process.

DICKEY: Yes. Various people had a go at it with relatively little success. There had been a Tuck-Thayer program which conceptually, I think, had real validity. But in practice neither school was prepared to make the commitment to it that would make the Tuck-Thayer program a real competitor.

DANIELL: My brother was a graduate of that Tuck-Thayer program, and he thinks it's the best thing.

DICKEY: Well, many people did on the outside. But the people who ran it didn't think it was the best thing. If they did, they kept it a secret. And it was not an unusual kind of problem in the academic world where a department or a professional school wants its own strength, wanted its own strength. It was willing to cooperate, but it didn't want to subordinate its strength to some hybrid creature. Well, I won't go into the detail of this. It was one of the most frustrating, one of the most maddening, problems because, I guess perhaps too readily, I had come to a conclusion that neither of these schools had a prospect of getting to the point in size and strength that was going to make them as good as they wanted to be unless they did find a way to complement each other more imaginatively, more centrally. This was the critical issue that led to the dean leaving here, Karl Hill. Karl had other problems, physical, health, and these worked upon his mental outlook at times. But basically, Karl just simply couldn't accept the notion that I had, that these two schools could--
DANIELL: Jack said exactly the same thing.

DICKEY: --work more closely together. I had had a friendly relationship with Karl; I continue to have a friendly relationship with him. But he at one point, when I told the overseers of the two schools one evening at a joint meeting, as far as I was concerned I was just determined that we were going to have to have a more fully-realized collaborative relationship between these two schools. Karl realized that we were on a divergent course, and said that he thought he would have to leave. Well, I was sorry that Karl felt that way, but I also had no doubt at all in my mind, rightly or wrongly, that at some point--and the sooner the better--these schools had to be brought into a more creative collaboration. Each of them was engaged in planning a separate library, a separate this and a separate that, and we just didn't have the money. And they weren't raising the money, also, to put it right on the line, which was in many ways an opportunity as far as I was concerned. Because if somebody had come up with a million bucks and said we'll build a Tuck School library, and we don't want to get messed up with Thayer School, I guess the law of gravity that you're familiar with in administration would have said, well, let's go where the money is. And we'd have shaped our planning to fit the money.

But when the money wasn't there, we had, so to speak, an open opportunity to plan and to urge on them the kind of collaboration I was speaking about. Well, this is what ultimately resulted in the library, the joint library, of Tuck and Thayer, a professional staff that we couldn't afford in both of those two schools just across the aisle from each other, as well as, other facilities that have--classrooms, offices, conference rooms--that have added very directly to the needs, or the facility needs--have fulfilled the facility needs--of both schools.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. And even more than that in some ways. It's one of the most popular places for undergraduates to study at times.

DICKEY: Yes. And also it has brought the rest of the campus into a little closer relationship with the two schools, both faculty and students. So that once again, I look back on it as a situation where conviction grew. It wasn't suddenly revealed. And where the planning took a long time and ultimately, I think, brought forth a facility that is playing a role--and that's as strong as I'd want to put it. It's playing a role and increasingly, I understand, a substantial role in bringing these two schools into a more fruitful cooperative relationship. What the future holds there, I'm not prepared to prophesy. But I don't think it's going to be in the direction of attempting to build strength on an individual basis. I think increasingly
whatever form it takes, it is going to be based upon a collaboration of some sort.

DANIELL: Yes. Well, probably one in which Thayer plays the junior partner role—not only because of size, but appeal.

DICKEY: Well, that was another major area that was a long time in coming. Now, of course that came with the money, in that instance, we developed in the second capital gifts campaign. Here again, since we're talking about my activities, the Murdough Center, as it's called, was finally something that I decided to sell to Tom Murdough and his wife, Grace--two very fine people with a deep interest in Dartmouth. Well, this involved some competing uses as to what this large gift should be put to. Ort, whom we were talking about earlier, he thought maybe this ought to go into athletic facilities, but he wasn't dogmatic about it. But he thought maybe he could sell Tom and Grace more readily on that. I felt, myself, that the primary need, the priority educationally, was in another direction, provided it was something that really would appeal to these people for purposes of a major gift. And in due course they accepted that view.

DANIELL: That's the one that he described, "putting a model of it in the trunk of a car" at one point when he was visiting them. I don't know. I think that's one of the details that Ort used.

DICKEY: Well, this is another situation where Ort carried the laboring oar and cultivation. A couple of times he and I had to talk out what we really needed, and what would serve the long-range, fundamental interests of the College best. But I could talk with him about that. I didn't have any difficulties about that. And in due course he saw that the Murdoughs were really probably more interested in something of this sort than in an athletic facility--or at least as much interested. And that is how that came about.

DANIELL: There's a couple of questions on this. One is a very basic question which has to do with other facilities; namely, the time relationship between the process of making sure you know what you want to do with the building, in other words, the designing of it, the mock-ups, and the soliciting for the money of it. In short, it sounds in both these cases you were very certain that you knew pretty much precisely what you wanted to do to the point in which you could design, basically, the campaign to raise money, the effort to raise money, around an educational idea with a plant designed to the point where-- Is that an accurate generalization?

DICKEY: I think it is with this addition: That time and discussion, even argument, postponement, all these factors, played an important part in permitting us
to understand better what we really wanted. If I had to prescribe any single ingredient of wisdom in respect to the development of a plant, particularly in an institution of this sort, it would be to take a little more time. Take a little more time. The number of times when people, after really arguing something out, and reaching the point where there is almost ill will growing out of frustration, the number of times when that process brought about a more profound understanding of what was possible and what was really needed, well, the number of times was quite considerable.

DANIELL: [inaudible]

DICKEY: I'll cite the same thing in the area that interested you, namely, the athletic facilities.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: I do want to make sure that when we talk about this plant planning, we realize that this was another aspect of the Trustees' Planning Committee work that started back in '54 or thereabouts. Where the fundamental planning--we had a plant planning committee--was brought into the committee's time, time and time again. For example, you take the most recent large-scale project, the Thompson Arena. This was in the Trustees' Planning Committee for years, several years, more than several years, I guess, in which we went up and down on the question of did we want to try for an auditorium combined with an athletic facility or not? And there were very strong views expressed on both sides of this, really very strong views. But gradually this, with further study and further discussion, came around to the conclusion that it was desirable, everything considered, to aim at a combined facility. And that once the money was available and could be freed for it, we would have a facility of this sort.

DANIELL: Of course up until that point this was a big question in terms of Hopkins Center. I know [Warner] Bentley said he pushed for a much larger facility than Spaulding Auditorium which is 1500 seats rather than 800 or 900, whatever it is in there. Once that was resolved, there was the smaller units in Hopkins Center, then that clears the path, in a sense, in terms of the need for combining that into what is now Thompson Arena.

DICKEY: Well, the athletic facilities were clearly something that had to be given attention when we started our plant planning in the first capital gifts campaign. This is an area where it's no secret to anyone alumni interest is always very strong. It's also an area where the undergraduate college has need of keeping its student body well taken care of in regard to their interests and activities. And the membership of the College in the Ivy
group was another factor that increasingly created comparative standards that you had to keep your eye on and which played a part. Well, Dartmouth had had this wonderful gymnasium that in its day had led to that crack that no one, I guess, liked very much: Dartmouth had the largest gymnasium in the East and the smallest library. This sort of thing, you know.

But the point gradually began to be reached in the postwar period where the gymnasium was dated and no longer was meeting, really, the fundamental needs of the institution in a good many areas of physical education and athletic activity. One of them was swimming. Here again, partly as a result of having a very fine coach who had done a good job with modest facilities--certainly modest as compared with other institutions--we were building up a constituency that wanted swimming facilities that might bring some of the larger meets to Dartmouth, and also attract swimmers that would keep our teams at least in the running with some of the other teams and other considerations of that character.

Well, you smiled when I mentioned at one of our earlier sessions some of Karl Michael's suggestions for consideration. One of which related to the possibility for gutting Webster Hall and turning it into a first-rate swimming pool, with high ceilings for diving, room for spectators, and putting in a full-sized pool. That project never got very far. Certainly it was not one that ever seemed to me to--it was not a project that warranted being taken very seriously. I just couldn't imagine that it was right strategically to think of putting a physical education facility, an athletic facility, up in the central campus between Baker Library and Dartmouth Row and whatnot. But Karl had urged it quite seriously. He referred to it the other day with some amusement.

Well, here again, we didn't see our way clear to doing what we finally did at the very outset. And if we had, we would've probably done the wrong thing. But we talked and thought and looked at other places, and set up a committee that worked on these things. And gradually reached the conclusion that what we ought to do was to build a field house. And if we built a field house, we could clean out that east end of the gym and give it a very serious look as a possible area for a first-rate swimming pool. And do other things that would permit us to improve the basketball court and other aspects of the total program. Well, this gradually took hold, and we talked simply about a field house. And then we went through a long period--I don't know what it was, months, six months, or maybe it was a year--of trying to formulate what kind of a field house we wanted. And where we wanted it. And the question of site loomed not just in that project, but in all these other projects as something that was more than
just finding an open space. It involved thinking ahead with respect to your programs. Thinking ahead, for example, the Dana [Bio]medical Library, and the relationship of biologic sciences and the medical school.

[End of Tape 38, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 38, Side B]

DICKEY: And this was one of the more fascinating aspects of the thing for me, that it did involve what I call strategic planning, not just tactical building decisions.

Well, this led us into a number of proposals for building a field house, including the final one--or the next to final one--which was a gigantic quonset hut. And I'll never forget the day that Dick Olmsted, who was carrying the laboring oar on these matters, and who was just an indispensable person in the plant planning--A man of real patience, a man of great responsibility, but a fellow who did not seek to impose his enthusiasms, which so many people tend to do when they get around to a plant planning activity. They become partisans very quickly of this or that or putting it here or putting it there. Dick had the capacity to stand back and to serve whatever decision was ultimately reached, and to make a contribution to reaching that decision.

DANIELL: Warner [Bentley] said exactly the same thing about his role in terms of that.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, it's due him to say this, it's due him to say this. He was another one of these colleagues who played a really tremendous, important, positive role in all the things that we tried to do during those years. Well, we brought him this project, which was aimed at coming within a budget that we thought we could swing. And everybody just knew it was not right. It was clear that Dick felt that it wasn't right. That it was going to bring to Dartmouth something that would keep the rain out, and maybe the snow out for a period. But it had no aesthetic contribution to make whatsoever--indeed quite the opposite--as far as the development of the campus was concerned, the development of the College. Well, we discussed it. What could be done? Well, we might get a better-looking quonset hut that would still be a quonset hut, and so forth. And it was clear to me--or it became clear to me as we discussed it--that we really didn't have the answer. I was convinced that we ought to have the facility of some sort, but that we didn't have the answer.

So Dick had been abroad shortly before this meeting, and he had become acquainted with [Pier Luigi] Nervi's work in Italy, the work he was doing in
cement structures. And he said to us—he mentioned this—he wondered whether it might be worthwhile investigating something of that sort. This seemed to most of my colleagues on the board pretty far out, going to Italy to solve this problem. And I found that I was intrigued by it. And I had great confidence in Dick that he wasn't just looking for a trip to Italy or a wild goose chase, which sometimes people—well, sometimes people get swept downstream with such ideas. So I had a talk with him about it, and decided that as far as I was concerned, this would be a very worthwhile exploration. So I talked with Harvey [Hood] and several others individually, and we said, well, go ahead. Go on over and take a look at this thing, this fellow's work, and see whether it has some prospect of being a realistic answer for us.

Well, that's how it all came about. Dick went over, got to know the Nervis personally, investigated their work and various things, and came back very greatly impressed with it as a possible—indeed as a very promising—thing. It had all sorts of complications in it, quite aside from the money involved, which was a little bit more than we had figured on. It was an unprecedented structure as far as the United States was concerned and other things.

Well, not going into that too far, Dick put together a team—John Minnich, engineer, and [Phil] Jackson, the contractor. And we worked it out so that we could get an Italian architect licensed over here, which wasn't the simplest thing to do. Brought these together, and finally came up with a project that everybody was enthusiastic about. Just the aesthetic quality of it, and the creative quality of the structure helped us sell. And in rather short order, its reputation as a genuine contribution to structures in this country became such that selling it turned out to be no problem at all. We probably could have sold that structure two or three times.

DANIELL: Selling it by getting someone to finance it.

DICKEY: Getting someone to give the money and put their name on it. And I don't suppose we could have gotten anybody to put his name on it with the quonset hut, [laughter] let alone give us any money for it. So that here again I learned something that I would hold onto very strongly: Don't settle too quickly for something that doesn't have a quality of significance, hopefully a distinction, about it. And this was a lesson I had to learn the hard way because I was brought up in a make-do situation at home frequently. And I would say that this is something of very fundamental importance in planning and developing a place such as Dartmouth. Well, out of that, of course, came the repeat over at the Thompson Field House, carrying out our earlier plans for a combined athletic facility and
auditorium. I related this one in as much detail as I have because I think it bears upon the question you put: What was involved? And I think the factor of time, of discussion, of dialogue, debate, and of opening up your horizons, that these were fully as important as any specific technical factor.

DANIELL: Well, you've answered it just the way I was hoping. Hoping in the sense that my initial question was triggered by a couple of things Ort [Hicks] said to me, particularly talking about the cultivation of Matt Leverone and, namely, that the building plans, plans for the building, the idea of a field house was already completed. It was a question then of selling an idea, fundamentally, to an individual. And without going into that in detail, it happened to work out well. Because I think probably the external conception is that the institution waits for the money and then decides to build. I mean that's more commonly held outside. What you've said seems to me puts it in a way that makes ultimate sense. And also helps to explain why the end result's not a mishmash, but rather a... Then, at that point, you went back, and you did build the pool facilities and the...[inaudible]

DICKEY: At that point we did. We knew we were in a position to move out what was in the east wing. Karl made a very substantial contribution in his ideas of what was needed, what was possible. The area available was ideal for what we wanted with very few modifications, such as not bricking up the east wall and leaving that window there. And a few little things like that which unfolded as we went along. But out of that we got a magnificent pool. We got the use of the older Spaulding pool for women's swimming today. And it has worked out just splendidly. I think they still have a problem in trying to, if you will, get both beef and milk from the same cow in respect to the Thompson Arena, changing of the facilities for hockey and basketball.

DANIELL: Actually, that's much less of a problem than they thought it was going to be.

DICKEY: It's what?

DANIELL: It's much less of a problem than they thought it was going to be.

DICKEY: Yes, I think it is. But okay. As with some things we had to compromise on in Hopkins Center, you just can't have everything. I will say that the athletic facilities of the College were well taken care of. We waited until we were able to do it right. And well, it was one of the situations where this question of site planning became very important in its relationship to what Dartmouth is, and what are its fundamental virtues. One of the
fundamental virtues that outsiders, as well as Dartmouth people, have rated quite highly has been the fact that it's a relatively compact campus. That you don't have to take a bus, you don't have to take a subway, to get out to practice fields. The football fellows can run across the street and so forth. When we were faced with the question of where we would locate the Leverone Field House, there was a considerable demand--or at least a considerable argument made--that it should be located right where the baseball diamond is. And we almost located it there. But the argument finally prevailed, well, if you did that, you're pushing baseball clear out of sight. It has been satisfactory where it is. People like it there. Putting the field house down would save that space, keep it open, not get everything too tightly related. And the tunnel, the above ground tunnel, which we built would be perfectly satisfactory for athletes running back and forth in their warmup suits or whatnot, and so it's turned out. So that we finally took a decision on it. I, actually, I guess, was the one that took that decision. That, okay, the balance of the strategic argument seemed to me to favor putting it where we did, and I've never regretted that.

DANIELL: That bridges--connects--another just athletic facilities question, the west end of the football stadium. Was that a long-standing pressure from the athletic department to do something?

DICKEY: You mean the east stands?

DANIELL: East stands, yes. Right.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, it was something that they had wanted for some time. We had the old wooden stands there which were going to have to be replaced. We talked with Red Rolfe about this. [Robert] Blackman was, again, one of the people that played a role in that. And again it was the story of a high-powered fellow wanting to have his teams play before larger crowds. And our success in football had built up audiences that needed larger stands. It was not a priority item. I forget what its magnitude was in dollars. But we played around for a while. Ort [Hicks] was an advocate of putting handball courts under these stands, and we looked at that, had a feeling that that was an expense that we could do without at that point. With the handball problem, handball courts, for soccer--for squash--and handball I think has never been fully met. But we didn't go in for the squash courts under those stands. That was the only decision that I remember of any great consequence. Another plant planning question which was a major one early in my years on the job was where we committed to keeping the heating plant where it is.

DANIELL: The last one I had on my list.
DICKEY: Yes. And this had risen back in President Hopkins' years, not critically. But it came to a head with us really. At least more or less to a head when we found that to do the building that we were committed to doing, the new facilities--medical school, the Wigwam dormitories down by the river, and the kind of expansion on the circumference of the campus, of the College--we had to make a major commitment in the development of a steam distribution system. I think it was before you came to the College that we tore up the whole central campus. It looked like a Civil War battle for about a year.

DANIELL: Must have been. I don't remember any of it.

DICKEY: Well, this was an ungodly mess.

DANIELL: [Laughter] Just as the new president was coming in.

DICKEY: Well, I can remember Mr. Hopkins saying to me, smiling, he said, "This shows that you've got nerve, young man. I didn't have the nerve to do that, that is to make such a mess of the central campus." And I would tell you I didn't do it lightheartedly. But again, I did it very largely out of confidence in Dick. He just said, "We can't get by here long without doing this." And today practically all of the things that have been done have been beneficiaries of that very substantial move and very substantial expense in putting a whole new distribution system in under the central campus. Well, we talked a great deal--not a great deal, but sometimes quite seriously--about the possibility that we ought to take the heating system away from where it was, and perhaps put it down in that parking lot by the river. We had some preliminary engineering--I don't think you'd call them studies, but some preliminary opinions--about such possibilities. And each time that they came up with the figures that were involved, and I looked at the educational priorities which we were wrestling with, I just didn't think it was something that I wanted to get into, or needed to get into. Gradually we took the position that, at least for our time, we would not attempt to move that heating plant.

DANIELL: A good decision.

DICKEY: So there it is. Some day I suppose it may go. I don't know. Maybe that's something that will come with nuclear power.

DANIELL: Well, I wouldn't bet on that. Well, this involves all the questions I had except one you've really answered in the process of this discussion. And the final question is one you touched on especially with the field house,
but it has to do with architects, basically. Clearly this is a major matter in
dealing with the Hopkins Planning Center, the Hopkins Center, with [Jens
Frederick] Larson's presence initially in the project. You've already
answered in terms of the field house. Did the choice of architects or
architecture itself play as important a role than in any of the other major
facilities?

DICKEY: No. Not as critical as the choice of architect--as I indicated earlier--was a
major factor in the development of the Hopkins Center. It was the decisive
factor, of course, in the development of the Nervi buildings. But elsewhere
the important thing was that the notion of having a single architect was put
aside when we decided not to go with Larson on the Hopkins Center. This
was very fundamental. Mr. Hopkins and Halsey Edgerton, who had the
primary responsibilities for plant as treasurer during Mr. Hopkins's
administration, had been well satisfied, and I think justifiably so, in their
relations with Larson. And they had also pretty well settled on a kind of
architecture for dormitories, as well as the Baker Library complex, that
Larson did exceedingly well, the neo-Georgian.

As I've indicated when we were talking about the Hopkins Center, this was
not put aside lightly. Nobody had any illusions that this was going to be
done without controversy, and it wasn't. But we were at the point, a really
critical point, so far as even the educational development of the place,
where I became convinced we had to break out of this pattern. I, as I've
said, admired and pay great tribute to having Baker Library as we have it.
And some of the other things that he did, that Larson did. But I became
increasingly, let's say, educated by some of my friends in the outside
world, and by some of my own thoughts and observations. That if an
educational institution committed itself only to repeating what had been the
architecture of the past--I thought there's a real place for some of that, a
real place for it; but if it found itself just committed to repeating that, and
building only in one architect's style, I would have to say, without ever
making a speech about it, I became convinced this was an unhealthy
influence on the educational climate of the place.

I found myself looking around at Rollins Chapel and the old library, Wilson
Hall. And then realizing that these were not of a piece. And also began
realizing through the observations of other people that these were
counterpoints that created interest, maybe disagreement. But made a
contribution to the vitality, to the growth, to the evolution of the aesthetics.

DANIELL: Far beyond President Hopkins's comment: namely, "We have nothing to
do with murals." That may cause controversy but...
DICKEY: Yes. So that I was… Quite aside from the fact that we had to do this in order to accomplish the educational programs we had envisaged for the center, the Hopkins Center, there was a larger conviction growing—that's about as strong as I'd want to put it—a larger conviction growing, at least with me, that we would not be well served to commit ourselves simply to one architect and his style, his approach. And Dick shared this view. And when we talked it out in the trustees, we found that others came to this view. As a result of which we said we won't appoint anybody else to be the College architect. Again this was the case with Larson. What we would like to have is somebody that we can call in for consultation, making clear to him that he might or might not get projects for himself, for his own firm. And this is what subsequently was done with Nelson Aldrich.

DANIELL: Oh, I see.

DICKEY: He was brought on as consulting architect of the College, and for a considerable period he didn't have a project of his own. But we would consult him about other architects' ideas, about our planning needs. He served the Trustees' Planning Committee with his formulations of the strategic planning, the site planning, of the campus. I think it worked very well. He was recommended to us by a number of people, including Wallace Harrison as a young--

DANIELL: I was going to say, was there a connection there?

DICKEY: Well, he wasn't in the firm with him; he was in Boston and had been originally an apprentice in Wallace Harrison's firm.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: But he then at that point had a firm of his own in Boston, and did do a number of things here for us. Ralph Hunter's brother, Ted Hunter, did the math building and the one in front of it. I think that many of the people--some on the board and otherwise--felt these were less successful than other buildings that we had.

DANIELL: They were also some of the first ones, the first major plant construction after you were president? Would that have been Gerry Hall or…?

DICKEY: Well, they were built with money that came in in the first capital gifts campaign.

DANIELL: Yes. So it would have been before Hopkins Center, would have been before-- Well, that's not important.
DICKEY: In the middle fifties or thereabouts. But again, I think they found their place. I don't think they make any pretense to being distinguished additions to the campus comparable to some of the other places. But they found their place and their acceptance. And then the medical school, we went to a well-known large Boston firm to work with us on that. And one of the fellows that has been closest to the College, architecturally, has been the builder of the--I just gave you his name.

DANIELL: Jackson?

DICKEY: Jackson, [Philip R.] Phil Jackson ['43 TH '43]. He's a Dartmouth graduate. And here again, I give credit to Dick Olmsted for seeing the possibility that Jackson, who was hungry for business at that time and hungry for recognition and hungry for a prestige job--which was something that you had to take into account. Because a Dartmouth account, whether it was an investment or a building or architecture, was something that somebody liked to say we're connected with Dartmouth. But Jackson was a young fellow getting started, and he took on the Nervi job in a way that permitted him to subordinate his own interests and own view to some extent to Nervi. Thereafter he took on, of course, the more complicated, larger job with the Thompson Arena. Then two or three other things for us here at the College, and did them very satisfactorily and as reasonably as they could, I'm sure, have been done by anybody. So that we were well pleased with that. Here again, though, we mainly put our normal buildings out to bid. In the case of the field house it was a different thing. It was an unprecedented thing where we felt we had to get somebody that we could just work with right straight through.

DANIELL: Well, that's all the questions I have about plant issues. We've gone on just a little bit more than an hour. Do you have any other observations you want to make on this? No?

DICKEY: No, I think that... It also might be mentioned that this was an area which required quite close attention on the leadership of the College to its relations with the town. This raised tax questions, it raised important questions of locations of buildings. For example, the question of closing College Street from the campus down to Lebanon Street was a big decision the town fathers had to take, and we had to say that, well, as Wallace Harrison said, "We can build this complex without closing that street. It certainly is going to be not as satisfactory a project as it would be closing that street." And we were able to work this out with them, and it was done amicably and with a positive outlook. The original terms of the arrangement were that we would agree to the reopening of the street if it
really didn't work. That would have required us to tear down some other buildings along there. But the relationship with the town authorities all through this period was an amicable one, and one where occasionally we had to have an adversary relationship. The development of the medical school involved our relations with the hospital because it was clear that whatever happened with respect to the development of the four-year school, that the relationship with the hospital was going to be much closer. This raised questions of the comparative tax burdens of hospital and College in the town, which--

DANIELL: Yes. As you say this, it occurs to me that probably--

DICKEY: John Meck had to wrestle with and wrestled with very well.

DANIELL: It occurs to me that it would probably be wise to take that as the subject, relationships to the town or other local institutions, and have at least more time to--

DICKEY: Yes, yes. I only mentioned it as something that was an integral part of the plant development, and one which, as I look back on it, I think was handled in a responsible way by both town and college. John Meck—

[End of Tape 38, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 39, Side A]

DANIELL: ...interviews with President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey resumed in January 1978. The following interview took place in President Dickey's office on the afternoon of January 19th.

[Pause]

DICKEY: ...a good place to start, and any effort to recall the town-gown relationship during my years on the job would be to say that it was one of those things--of which there were many--that was in good shape when I came on the job. There were many other situations which required special attention as a result of the hiatus of the war period, the fact that the faculty had begun to age, and all of those things, and the problems of starting up. But my recollection of the period is that the--of the first years, '45 to '48 or thereabouts, the first two or three years--were that the relationship had been good. And I do not recall any acute problems that were, so to speak, on the desk when I sat down there.
DANIELL: Yes. Because I've talked to a lot of people in town who were part of the College before--

DICKEY: See, it does check.

DANIELL: It checks out. That's exactly what they would say, too.

DICKEY: Well, this would be my recollection. My first memory--unless you can refresh my memory and jog it--of any problems was in the relationship of the campus police and the town police. I have not reviewed the dates on this, but fairly early on we began to develop a campus police. Previously the College had relied--prior to the coming of the war--on night watchmen, individuals, all of whom were--

DANIELL: I think in an earlier interview you talked about the transition from this informal to a more formal stage between night watchmen and--

DICKEY: And most of them became characters. I remember as an undergraduate some of the characters who were supposed to look out for the welfare of the students, as well as to keep them somewhat under control. But following the war, you had a different situation on the campus. You had most importantly, I guess, men coming back from the war: older, who had experienced women and liquor and were ready to dispose of discipline on their own terms. It was a different campus than the campus that was made up entirely of boys who'd come from school and spent two or three years, maybe, in college. There were probably other factors in it, but this was a real factor. Things as specific as setting up a beer parlor and regulating it and doing it in terms that were acceptable to the state presented no great issues, but required somebody that would pay some attention to the way it was operated.

I don't know whether [Theodore] Gaudreau was the first of the campus police, but I think he was the first that I had anything to do with. He was a great big rough-hewn, good-natured fellow, who had, I guess, a minimum of subtlety and who was not probably as astute a person as you might get into a job of this sort. But as with almost all campus police--indeed all policemen, including guards, from my experience--these people, if they're successful, learn to get along with the people they're in charge of. And they are not as tough or as much given to the use of force as the average citizen might imagine. But Gaudreau in this respect was an easy-going person, probably to a fault. And I don't know whether he had an assistant or not. He must have had an assistant, but I forget now who it was. But his appointment and his designation as in charge of the campus police--and I'm not sure what we called it; I believe it was "captain" of the campus
police or something--stirred up feelings of jealousy, to put it baldly, on the part of the town chief of police, Andy Ferguson, who'd been around before and was, whatever else you might say, he was not an easy person. He wore his prerogatives on his sleeve. And Andy was never happy with the fact that the College established an independent security operation.

DANIELL: I didn't know that part of it.

DICKEY: He didn't say as much. But I don't think there was any doubt about it. And I also think that he consciously, and probably to a degree subconsciously, he expected the campus police to be responsible to him, which is an understandable sentiment. And to a degree they had to be when something reached the point where you're likely to be taken into criminal court. Well, the town police not only had a right, they had a duty to get into the act. So this was not a situation that was without potential difficulties regardless of the individuals that were involved. Just the situation was one that could get into trouble. Well, without reviewing individual occurrences which I don't recall too vividly, it built up into a grievance as far as Andy was concerned, Andy Ferguson of the town police. And I had a number of talks with him about it. He was not on very good terms with the deans, who regarded him as a troublemaker, and not without cause.

DANIELL: He had lots of problems, as came out on some of the other tapes, with everyone.

DICKEY: The deans also realized that they had to ultimately keep on amicable terms with him. I forget what the occasion was. But one night I recall we were at dinner, and I was called to the telephone by I'm not sure now whether it was Ferguson, the chief, or by what's his name? The town selectman who was in charge of--

DANIELL: Gordon Gliddon?

DICKEY: Gordon Gliddon, who was in charge of the police force within the Board of Selectmen. One or the other. They were both there. Which one put through the call to me, I'm a little hazy about right now. In due course I talked to both of them. But I rather think that Andy put the call through because this fits the situation a little bit better.

In any event, the purpose of the call was to complain to me about the fact that the campus police had not notified the town police--this was one of the areas of difficulty--had not notified the town police about something that the campus police knew about. I think it must have been a theft that
the campus police had run down. Andy was just in a huff about this, and he was going to do this, and he was going to do that, and so forth.

Well, I was also at the point where I was getting a little fed up with this kind of trouble. So I took the offensive and said that by God we were not happy with the way the relationship was developing, and the difficulty certainly was not solely on one side. And if there was any complaining to be done, I would like to be heard also. So I said, "Let me talk with Gordon." He had said that Gordon was there. Or Gordon had put the call in; I don't know which it was.

Well, Gordon was a friend, a personal friend, a close friend. A very mild individual, very fair and thoughtful and not looking for trouble and obviously had been dragged into this by Andy. And this was the sort of thing that Andy did. He would keep the selectmen stirred up about something like this. So when Gordon came on the telephone, I said I didn't know that he was involved in this. But that we just had to get this situation straightened out. We couldn't go on with one police force fighting the other. And that I would undertake to make sure that our people understood this. But in turn I had to ask him to be damned clear that he told Andy Ferguson. "Because," I said, "I'm not in a position to give Andy Ferguson orders. But somebody's got to bring Andy Ferguson to heel." Well, Gordon didn't object to this, but it was the last thing he wanted to do was to pick on Andy. But he was fair about it, and things quieted down.

Ultimately the problem was liquidated by Andy leaving town under circumstances that were not reassuring as far as Andy was concerned. And in turn the campus police--we got rid of Gaudreau under circumstances that again were not a great credit to the College. There was the issue of confiscation of things that hadn't been turned in and things like that.

DANIELL: Yes. Similar to what Andy got in trouble with.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, both of them, I think, got in trouble. So that was one of the problems that in due course was resolved. From that point on, really, the relationships of the town and the College in respect to the operation of the police force during my years were one of the best aspects of...

DANIELL: Yes. I've a couple of questions about that specifically. I was well aware of that. Because even though I was an undergraduate, I was involved in some of these things, which I would have brought to bear in a much broader perspective now that I've gotten older. But even then, it seemed to me that almost there was a cooperative effort in which certain
understandings, let's say, existed between--this was the post-Andy Ferguson time period--between the campus police and the town, in terms of kinds of potential behavior on the part of students that legally the town police might have been responsible for, but which they left up to the campus police. Now, this is something which I talked to Pudge [Lloyd K.] Neidlinger about and talked to Joe [Joseph Lee] McDonald about. So there's a lot of this on a tape. What I'm really interested in is not so much that, but whether or not you as the president of the College ever got involved in that personally.

DICKEY: No. I can only remember offhand one specific incident, in which I was consulted by Dean McDonald, an incident of this sort. I may well have been consulted by the deans in the past. And of course at the time of the Cirrotta death, I was very close to that situation. I did not deal directly, as I recall, with any of the police, but dealt with our deans. But my impression--or certainly my memory--is that the relationship was really a very satisfactory one. There must have been difficulties from time to time of a minor sort that required ironing out. But they were ironed out either by the two police forces themselves or by the intervention of a dean. And I have no memory of the kind of jurisdictional difficulties that frequently happen in a town where you've got private security forces and public police. Quite the contrary.

As you suggested, it's my impression that frequently the town police would say, well, if you will handle it, you handle it. If it isn't something that you can handle, we'll have to. I know that there were conversations of that sort taking place constantly. And this is par for the course in a college town, just par for the course. If the two police forces are fighting each other, it's intolerable. It gets taken out on the students.

But there was one incident--and I have mentioned it to you earlier in another connection--there was one incident where there was a pretty--Well, it was an unhappy situation in which it was found that a--it was first believed that--a college student was fooling around with young schoolgirls. By that I mean girls in junior high or grammar school, elementary school; not high school. There was a lot of difficulty in finding out who it was.

DANIELL: Yes. This was when Joe McDonald was dean, I believe.

DICKEY: This was when Joe was dean.

DANIELL: Because Joe had something about this--
DICKEY: And it ultimately came down to the fact—which we didn't know was a fact at the time, but which was determined to be a fact subsequently—that one of our fairly prominent athletes was involved in this. It was not anything that involved forcible rape or anything of that sort. But it was a sexual kind of seduction that was very upsetting to parents and townspeople that knew about it. And the police were under pressure to find the individual and do something about it. Very understandably.

Well, we went through a period of this individual finally being brought in by the town police, in cooperation with the campus police, to the dean. And then he denied it. Said that it was mistaken identity. And his friends and his coach were clear—were certain—that he was not involved, that it was a case of mistaken identity. And everybody was worried about that because you don't take a charge of mistaken identity lightly in those circumstances. Joe McDonald handled the case just as responsibly and carefully as a man could do. And the town people were cooperative on this.

I forget how they finally broke it. But in any event, the individual admitted it. And that was a big step forward because you knew then that you were dealing with the right individual. And then the question was, how to deal with it? This was one of the cases I do remember where the town police said, "Well, if this individual leaves the College, we're disposed not to take him into criminal court." And Dean McDonald and the coach and all of us—I wasn't consulted about this particular decision, but was told about it—all of us were well satisfied to have it liquidated. And it certainly did, so far as I know, work out satisfactorily. The young man transferred and went into psychiatric therapy; and so far as I know, made it satisfactorily.

DANIELL: Now, another area in which in a lot of communities there's potential tension—still within the rubric of things that, as you say, in general while you were president were rather calm basically—another potential area, it seems to me, would have been taxation. The relationship between the College—

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: --in a community where the College is such a large portion of the physical plant--

DICKEY: This is, as you correctly suggest, an area that is inescapably an area of some potential disagreement, usually some active disagreement, sometimes very acute disagreement. I do not remember, at the moment, all of the intricacies of the matter. But the fact is that Dartmouth was and is—I guess still is, but certainly at that time—was in a somewhat unusual
situation in that under New Hampshire law, our dormitories which were used for educational purposes, were taxed, subject to taxation. And most other college/university dormitory systems, at that time at least, were not subject to taxation. This was a matter of some concern to us as the tax bill kept getting higher and higher and higher as it is to every citizen. The College had up to that time negotiated a tax arrangement, in which the College authorities and the town authorities would agree on a lump sum that the College would pay taxes on. Without attempting to appraise every property, we would agree as to which properties were educational and which were not educational. In some instances there would be disagreement about that, but by and large there were no great difficulties in dividing properties between those which were non-educational and which we paid taxes on without any talk at all about it, and those which were educational and to some extent, therefore, at least partially exempt from the property tax. Partially, not wholly.

Well, I was consulted on this fairly closely by the treasurer, who had charge of this. First it was Halsey Edgerton, and then after he retired, it was John Meck. Most of the discussions over the 25 years that I was on the job were between John Meck and the town authorities. John kept me pretty closely informed, and we had--oh, I don't know--but we must have talked this issue out pretty thoroughly, at least, I would think, four, maybe five times with the town authorities. We never reached the point where there was any threat of going to court about it. We talked about this as to whether we would be better off to do what Exeter had done and take it into court. But it was worked out on a negotiated, amicable basis.

One of the problems was the relationship of the fraternities to the College and their tax bills. There was the problem of fair allocation of the costs of sewage systems and things of that sort. And there was a somewhat mixed pattern of college and town. The College had played a major role in the establishment of the Hanover Water Works, which was one of the big steps--

**DANIELL:** Yes, [inaudible] majority...

**DICKEY:** Right. One of the big steps forward in this community. It was a matter that Dr. Tucker was involved in personally. Things of that sort which required constant attention. And in the main, these were handled by John Meck as treasurer. We would take them before the Board of Trustees after we'd shaken out the positions of town and college and got them approved by the board.
DANIELL: One question there: I don't mean to interrupt the flow here except to ask, well, John Meck, whose style as a negotiator, I expect, at times might have been quite tough, what made it possible for him to pull this off? Was there a large percentage of the people who were town officials had close ties with the College so there was a basis of cooperation? I'm trying to get at really the mechanics.

DICKEY: No. As a matter of fact, you've brought up, with your question, a point on which I did have views. Very early on I was clear that I didn't want to see the College overloading if it was possible--and it probably wasn't possible--Hanover town agencies and boards with College personnel.

DANIELL: Okay.

DICKEY: I just had an instinct that this was a good way to get into trouble, get the town soured on the College. At the same time, there was usually one person on the Board of Selectmen who was a College faculty member or associated with one of the associated schools or whatnot. But I think I can say about as unqualifiedly as you dare say anything that we never attempted to use that individual to push the Dartmouth College interests. If that was done, it was done without my knowledge. I don't believe that I was ever aware of our attempting to use whoever it was. And indeed this would have been resented by most of the individuals.

DANIELL: Oh, yes, yes, yes. I was going to say: How about the other way around? You've got a community of, say, 200 faculty people, and they make up a fairly high percentage of those who will potentially want to serve as selectmen or whatever.

DICKEY: Well, there was an ambivalence on the part of many faculty people about this, and I talked with some individual faculty members about it. Sometimes you'd see a letter to the editor from a faculty man. On the one hand, I would suppose that the majority of faculty who expressed themselves to me on this--and it wasn't a large number; I mean over the years, maybe a dozen--took the view that the College should pay more of the tax burden of the town. And that this was a way of keeping the taxes of the faculty members down. On the other hand, there were some in the town who felt that if the College moved into this too strongly, it was inevitably going to reduce what was available for salaries. And it was going to invite the town, because the College couldn't pick up the whole tab, to be a little looser in respect to its budgeting and so forth than these individual faculty members, mainly very conservative individuals, wanted.
DANIELL: How about the larger question—or smaller, depending how you look at it—is to faculty participation in elective offices in the town: Was there any kind of assumption or pressure or just prevailing attitude that you say, you know, there may have been one selectman. And my question is whether or not the College in any way, or you as an individual in any way, tried to create an atmosphere that continued to limit the College's participation.

DICKEY: Well, there was some disagreement on whether we should encourage College officers and faculty to run for office. I've just stated that I was on the side of being doubtful about the wisdom of this. John Meck was on the other side.

DANIELL: Doesn't like to carry the whole load himself. [Laughter]

DICKEY: John thought that I was a little, shall we say, unduly restrained about this. And that it would have been perfectly proper and wise to have encouraged more active participation in town affairs on the part of some of the faculty in whom he had confidence.

DANIELL: Not all the faculty--

DICKEY: Not all the faculty.

DANIELL: --did he have confidence in.

DICKEY: We never had any disagreements—that is, disagreeable disagreements—about this. But I definitely, as an individual, was not disposed to have too many of our people get into this act.

DANIELL: Yes. I think that was-- I've asked this question to a number of the older faculty, and actually the one that was most articulate about that as a whole was Herb Hill who, of course, did get involved in it through his sort of statewide political activity. But I think he, if I remember correctly, I think he made the general statement that somehow the atmosphere of the community was such, the Dartmouth community, was such that no one--or very few--everyone kind of felt that this was not encouraged. It wasn't discouraged, as you felt strongly--

DICKEY: Well, I certainly, never to my knowledge, encouraged it. I remember only one instance in the area of state office, which Bob Monahan went down to the legislature. As I recall, John Meck was quite…

[End of Tape 39, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 39, Side B]
...in a position of being opposed to Monahan going to the legislature, although I've often wished since that I had. Because I think it really was not, as things worked out, in his best interest nor in the College's best interest. Not because of conflict of interest, but he just simply got drawn into a political climate, a preoccupation with politics, that lessened his usefulness as a College officer beyond what at least I foresaw. And I won't go into that. But it became a personnel problem where we had at least if not encouraged--and I think we had encouraged it, had certainly acquiesced in his doing this. I think that's the only instance that I remember about this. There were several other situations where I had opinions that did not result in College policies. But Herb Hill-- You're mentioning Herb Hill reminds me of this, and I saw it in one or two other faculty members. Dayton McKean, did you ever know him?

DANIELL:  K-E-O-N?

DICKEY:  I think M-c-K-E-A-N, I believe. But I'm not sure about that. He was in the government department, a very strong faculty member. And he became chairman of the Democratic State Committee. I believe it was after Herb was chairman. Herb, of course, ran for governor twice.

DANIELL:  I can't remember all the details.

DICKEY:  Well, several times at least. And I believe Herb at one point was chairman of the Democratic State Committee.

DANIELL:  Probably.

DICKEY:  I'm not sure. But McKean was, and he was quite active. This, of course, involved issues that were somewhat delicate with respect to the College telling an individual he could or couldn't do something on his time as he saw fit. And we didn't. But I talked with the dean of faculty several times about it because in my judgment it's a very vulnerable position for a faculty member to put himself into. We had students who came to us about this, who said that this showed through in the man's teaching. Not enough to make an issue of it. But I was frankly concerned about the degree to which Herb Hill permitted himself to be drawn into this thing. It was--

DANIELL:  Just putting in the time he permitted himself to be drawn into? He was very aggressive about it.

DICKEY:  Well, however you want to put it. But I think he paid a price for it in respect to his position in the faculty, as a scholar. And whether he would have
done more or not, nobody knows. But I think, particularly in the kind of intimate politics that you have in New Hampshire and the town of Hanover, there's a point beyond which a faculty member's participation in partisan politics is a problem. That's about as strongly as I would want to put it. And I've seen that with contemporary colleagues, as you have. So that this was on my mind, but it never became a sufficiently acute issue. But I had to move in on it, for which I'm thankful. But it wasn't far away from it on a number of occasions. And it was not just one party; it was both ways.

DANIELL: The two you've named already, one a staunch Republican, one a staunch Democrat.

DICKEY: Oh well, you take [James P.] Jim Richardson [1899].

DANIELL: Yes, I was going to ask that next. Right.

DICKEY: He was very active in the legislature. The other side of this is that you do like to have your people setting the example of being good citizens. That is an immediate and relatively easy response to where you stand on something like this. It's when it begins to go on and get repeated, and the individual gets identified in the students' minds and his colleagues' minds as having accepted partisan obligations. That's when an administrative officer has to decide just where he stands. Because I'll say this again: There are quite a few positions, but this is one of them where don't expect the faculty to please itself. This is just not something you ought to expect a faculty member to do. Well, the only town-gown situation that I remember taking a public position on was with respect to the location of the new sewage disposal plant.

DANIELL: I hadn't known that before until we talked last time.

DICKEY: This was a major town development, putting in a sewage disposal plant, an expensive thing, an unprecedented step. We'd not had a disposal plant previously. It had been studied very thoroughly by professional people for the town, and they had come up with a recommendation that the town should definitely put such a plant into effect. This was going to be an item of expense that was going to be borne by everybody, but very substantially, of course, by the College. And the question arose as to where it was going to be located. There were two possible sites for it: One was up at the mouth of Girl Brook area, just north of Cathedral Pines on the river. And the other was to the south of town at the mouth of Mink Brook. Well, there was a lot of healthy give-and-take discussion about the matter. And some of the discussion got a little heated.
DANIELL: Nobody wanted it where they lived.

DICKEY: People wanted it away from where they were. And in part this was an uninformed desire, although one that was very natural: that you couldn't imagine a sewage disposal plant close to your property was a desirable thing. The engineers were very emphatic in their reassurances that properly operated, the modern sewage disposal plant, such as we were talking about, would not produce problems of odor. Well, it came down to the issue being put on the town ballot--or agenda for the town meeting. I'm not sure whether it was a special town meeting or a regular town meeting or not. But the proponents of putting it to the north of town up the river, the leadership of that was Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Morrison, a member of the art department, and Charlotte Morrison had been a long-time leader of the--or director--

DANIELL: I've interviewed her. He did not want to be interviewed; he's not in good health. I did a nice interview with her.

DICKEY: Did you?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: In charge of Alumni Affairs. And they both were very good friends of ours. Well, after a little thought--and it didn't require a long analysis--it was just perfectly clear to me that if the town, and the College as a member of the town, was going to spend the kind of money which we were talking about, hundreds of thousands of dollars, to put this plant in here, that it would have been a foolhardy mistake to have put it right up above the town and the water facilities for boating and swimming down by the bridge. Because whatever the sewage disposal plant did with respect to the sewage, the water wasn't going to be as satisfactory for boating and swimming within a few hundred yards down the river from the plant as it would have been down below. So I decided that I just had to put the College on record responsibly and officially in this respect. I went to the town meeting and asked for an opportunity to speak from the floor, and did speak from the floor. And made this a matter-of-fact statement as I could make it. And my memory is that the vote, fortunately, was not close, and I don't think I carried it. [Laughter] But the vote was that the plant should be located downstream from the town, and it was. And I have not heard of any complaints about the way the plant's been operated since. So that was the one occasion when I moved into what was a fairly large controversial issue.
DANIELL: There's one of--I forget who the source was, and it probably was Lane Dwinnell's tape--in which he discusses the College's concern over the location of the interchange.

DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes! That's quite true, and one that I just had forgotten about. This was related to the building of the interstate over in Vermont and whether there should be an interchange put in on the Norwich side of the river--right across the river on the Norwich side of the river--for access to Hanover from the interstate. This was a long, drawn-out affair that went on for I don't know how long, but--

DANIELL: Several years.

DICKEY: Several years I would guess. And it was one that I never became as personally emotionally involved about it, or as convinced even, as I was about the sewage plant or something. But it was one that I had decided to take a position on. Most of the faculty that I knew in Norwich were very opposed to having an interchange put in there because they felt it was going to result in a--well, an occupation of a sector of Norwich that would be devoted solely to high-speed traffic. And their concern was very importantly focused on that aspect of the interchange and its relationship to Norwich and so forth. I became--when I finally decided to take a position on it--became much more concerned about the fact that Hanover had no adequate plan for handling the amount of traffic it would have then. And that this was inevitably going to feed traffic up to Inn Corner, and that we were going to just aggravate an already bad situation with trucks that wouldn't go down around to the junction, but would come up through, people going back and forth to work. And then when we--Another factor that got into it was we asked for an opinion, for example, of John [H.] Minnich ['28], who had been the engineer in charge of the bridge that took the place of the old covered bridge, the bridge that's there now. And the opinion which we got back was that this bridge was never intended to carry the kind of traffic that it was carrying--was going to have to carry--if the interchange were put in. So that we next tried to find out what the prospect was that the state would put an interchange north of the bridge, up the river, up where the old rope ferry used to cross the river. You see, very few people realize where the term "rope ferry" boat came in.

DANIELL: That's where the ice broke down on one of them.

DICKEY: Well, the road went from what's now called Rope Ferry Road, out over the golf course, and down Girl Brook to the river, and that's where the ferry was. There was no ferry down here and no bridge. And in the early days there was a rope ferry that went across the river. Well, we looked into this
somewhat casually, the possibilities for a bridge being up north of the golf course, and bringing in an access from the interstate that would disperse rather than compact--

DANIELL: The cars going north automatically would end up going through Hanover and avoid Hanover completely.

DICKEY: We never investigated that thoroughly. It became clear that the state said: Oh, we haven't any money for any more bridges. We're not going to put any more bridges in and that the state highway department was in complete agreement with the Vermont Highway Department that the thing to do was to put it where the interchange crossed the river. We had a hearing on it up here, in which I spoke publicly--and I'd forgotten all about this--to the people that were hearing it, the highway department people. But I regarded it as a rather shortsighted thing to do because, I said, "I don't think you'll take it out of there once you get it in. And I think the day will come when we'll regret that we've done this." Also, I was very mindful of the fact that there were some people who thought that they were going to use this as a lever to force us to open Tuck Drive, not only in the wintertime, which it had been closed in the wintertime for some years, but to make it a major access to the hospital.

DANIELL: Wasn't this closed in anticipation of the interchange problem?

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: I remember it being open. I remember driving up and down there a lot when I was a teen, you know.

DICKEY: No. The original closing of Tuck Drive was a winter problem.

DANIELL: I see.

DICKEY: We got into real problems with people getting stuck out there in the middle of the night and slithering on--

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: Oh, we had it. So we began to close it during the wintertime. And then it was kept closed in the summer and so forth. But the one thing that I was determined we weren't going to play ball on was a proposition that they were going to use a broadened Tuck Drive to take the traffic up to the hospital, cut right up through the beautiful spots in the campus. And that was one that I was just adamant about. And I said, "If that's going to be
the proposition that anybody's going to push, you can count upon us to be pretty unhappy about it and do what we can to block it." But that didn't eventuate.

The town selectmen, however, came into this on the side of not having the interchange over there. They, I think, were considerably influenced by the fact that they had no answer--and they don't have one yet--for how to dispose of the kind of traffic that was going to come up into the center of this town. There were a number of merchants who took the view, well, the more, the better. We want every dollar that we can lure into town. But the selectmen finally joined--or we joined the selectmen, I guess, is really the better way to put it, in opposing the interchange there; and took the view that until they could put a bridge north of town, it would be better to retain the old passage and not connect it to the interstate. See, this would have kept Norwich connected with Hanover, but wouldn't have provided an interchange. But the two highway departments wanted the interchange. I went down to Washington with Governor--the Vermont governor, a Democrat.

DANIELL: Hoff?

DICKEY: Yes. And we went down and talked with the highway people in Washington about it. They were interested, but--

DANIELL: But not very.

DICKEY: Not willing to take on the two highways departments.

DANIELL: I've got a lot of half memories about this. Did this make an editorial in the New York Times or in Jimmy Reston's column? Does that strike any bells? If it doesn't, then maybe I'm way off.

DICKEY: No. It may well have.

DANIELL: Somewhere I have a faint memory of this becoming kind of a big bureaucracy versus small town New England issue in the national press.

DICKEY: Well, it was that. This was particularly true of the Norwich constituency…

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: …who had visions of Norwich being turned into a tourist center and there were some very strong faculty people in Norwich who had strong feelings about this. Sylvia Stockmayer was one of the frontrunners on this. But—
DANIELL: How did the hospital fit into this? Was there an effort to coordinate the hospital and the town's questioning of this? Or did you have much--?

DICKEY: Well, my memory on this is not reliable. I don't recall talking with the hospital on it. Somebody talked to the hospital on it, and my memory--which could be wrong--was the hospital said they wouldn't take a position. That's my memory: That they would play it cool. And this was not something that I-- Well, as a good lawyer, I played it out to the hilt. But it wasn't something that I was going to die over. Albeit I must say, that when you're down on Inn corner in the morning or at night--

DANIELL: I make a point of not being there.

DICKEY: I want to tell you, it's a sad picture. You can sit there at that traffic light without getting through on even two changes of the light. And also, getting up and down that hill with the traffic on it is not child's play. There have been some pretty unpleasant happenings. But okay. I don't say that our opposition was right, and I'm not clear that it was wrong.

DANIELL: The other major issue--or potential area of issue, just as we listed before and thinking again, this is an abstract thing for any town that's got one institution which is so large in it as the College is, is just the space relations. When the College expands and building here and here--

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: This is both, I assume, a land issue--if it was an issue--of the College buying up property, as well as the kinds of buildings that the College chose to put up.

DICKEY: Well, we certainly did buy up a number of properties. And the man who should get credit for it--and I'm not one who would be on the side of the critical--but this was in many instances John Meck's foresight that got the College property which we were awful glad afterwards that we'd gotten a hold of. And we did pick up some-- The Garipay tract up the river, the garage down here back of Hopkins Center.

DANIELL: Rogers.

DICKEY: Rogers. And out toward Oak Hill-- Well, both, Oak Hill and Velvet Rocks, and opened them up to faculty houses, the property used for faculty housing, I think, very responsibly. And I think these were moves which
were made with, so far as I can recall, complete collaboration on the part of the town.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And consultation with the planning authorities. There was one period when there was some disagreement about the so-called "greenbelt" around town, whether the College would put certain holdings forever in trust for a greenbelt, and we were reluctant to commit ourselves too firmly on that. That was not a major fracas.

DANIELL: No. That was just...

DICKEY: But the College did seek to acquire properties, not aggressively, but properties which we had some notion fitted into our planning. We conducted a pretty thorough planning operation of our own, which Nelson Aldrich's firm did for us. Some day you might be interested in getting out the plans which were made of the potential expansion of the College in the community. So this was not a seat-of-the-pants kind of planning.

DANIELL: Was this part of the…?

DICKEY: The Fifteen-Year Planning Committee. And it was very, very thoroughly done in my opinion. Since then there have been developments which of course weren't foreseen. But by and large it was a planning operation that was very, very useful.

One thing I should mention that was relevant to our relationship with the hospital was that, we were increasingly concerned that we might find ourselves here in Hanover as one of two major charitable enterprises bearing the primary tax load. Because an awful lot of the people who were going to the Hitchcock Hospital were not indigent people. These were people who were, in many instances, better able to pay their share of the overhead costs of running Hanover than many of our students, or the parents of our students. And you just had a historic pattern that hospitals didn't get taxed. And yet here was Dartmouth in a position where, well, between 25 and 30 percent of the town's expenses were coming out of the College and the fraternities.

So that we had an increasing concern about this, and were never very clear about how to handle it. On the one hand we didn't want to be in the position of siccing the town on the hospital. And at the same time it seemed to us that the day was going to come when with the big medical
center, the charitable position of the hospital had to be evaluated in relation to the charitable position of Dartmouth College.

Well, when the hospital developed federal money, and then the clinic built its own—or took over its own—quarters in there, there was a review of the position of the clinic with respect to taxes, and they do pay taxes there for their office space. And I don't know what, if any, steps have been taken with respect to the basic position of the hospital. But what you're talking about here is a historical pattern that you don't uproot overnight.

DANIELL: How about physical structures themselves? Any town concern about the size of Hopkins Center, or the various field houses? Or was that--?

DICKEY: Well, I don't recall any issues over size of structures. And we were, during that period, pretty well on our own committed to not going up into skyscraper construction.

I might say, parenthetically, that before I left the job, I wasn't at all sure that this wasn't something we were going to have to come to, particularly for student housing. Or otherwise we were going to just cover the whole Hanover region with one- and two-story—or three-story at most—dormitories, this sort of thing. But I didn't have to take a position on that before I retired.

The Hopkins Center presented an issue which created some disagreement and mild controversy. But our selectmen, from my point of view and from the College's point of view, were exceedingly positive in their approach to it: namely, the closing of College Street in order to accommodate what Wallace Harrison, the architect, felt was a necessary size for the structure of the center, particularly the Spaulding Auditorium and the theater. We could have built the center without College Street, but it would have been a bobtailed and, in Harrison's opinion, a very poor solution for the programs that were contemplated for the center.

We went to the town authorities and laid the case out for closing College Street. There were a number of people—inevitably a number of people—in town who were opposed to this. Part of it was the fact that there were many people in town who wondered what the hell an arts center was anyway, who were not—well, not sympathetic to it—and therefore were disposed to be opposed to closing the town street. We closed it on the basis that at the time permitted the town to require us to take down Wilson Hall and the other dormitory if it was found that this was an acute cause of traffic difficulties and so forth, which I think it has not proved to be. But that was the only town issue that I recall that we had with respect to the
construction of the center. The College was treated, I always felt, with great concern by the town. Perhaps I'd be permitted to say that the town's, I'm sure, never regretted that we built the center.

[End of Tape 39, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 40, Side A]

DICKEY: You had mentioned the--

DANIELL: The field houses.

DICKEY: The field house and things of that sort.

DANIELL: That was all on College property.

DICKEY: Yes. I do not recall any town issue on that. We had needed to have the practicality of a Nervi design pretty well tested and thought through. And there were those who said it will fall with the first snow.

DANIELL: Been reading the papers lately, have you?

DICKEY: Yes, yes.

DANIELL: That's the big center--

DICKEY: I certainly have. A very well-known Hanover figure told me that Hopkins Center would be down with the first snow, and I just hadn't lived around this area long enough to realize it. Thank God he was wrong at least up to now.

DANIELL: Now we can either-- I'm going to turn this off for—

[Pause]

As I just said, I'm quite happy with what I've learned about Dartmouth's relationship to the town. You've already in a couple of your responses to this, really in three areas, have reached over into the next category I want to talk about: College-state relations, in the sense of talking about participation of College employees in state politics; you talked about it in terms of the highway department. Now, there are another two areas I'm interested in. I know there was some participation of concern on your part about the College during the McCarthy Era with potential state legislation. And I also understand there was some negotiation having to do with the top of Mount Washington.
DICKEY: Yes. Both of those were matters that involved me personally. Perhaps I should say a word by way of introduction to the relationship of the College with the state. Of course this relationship has a long history which you would be able to fill a few books on. And it's history which is not irrelevant to the basic attitude of the College toward the state: The bitterness has passed.

Most people are not able to tell you what the Dartmouth College case was all about and that sort of thing. But there is a vestigial remnant of feeling that Dartmouth is too big for its britches, too wealthy, that it doesn't fit into the New Hampshire scene, and that it doesn't take enough New Hampshire boys, and it takes its students from the wealthy families in the nation, etc., etc. The sort of thing that anybody who knows anything about relationships with private colleges to government is familiar with.

This, during my years, insofar as it had a focus, tended to focus on the relationship of the College to the University of New Hampshire. This did not become an overt difficulty. But it was one that I more or less discovered for myself and decided that it was up to us to be as mindful of the feeling toward Dartmouth as we could possibly be, particularly if it was in circumstances which might involve comparing the two institutions in any invidious way. So that it's rather important to say that over all the years of my presidency, I was very sensitive to the need for Dartmouth not to put itself in an antagonistic position toward the university, either actually or in the eyes of New Hampshire people or people in the legislature.

Now, this has a direct relevance to the so-called Feldman Bill, the so-called "Communist speaker" bill, which was introduced into the state legislature during the McCarthy period. I forget which year it was. The relevance of it is that the bill was not directed at the private institutions; it was directed at the state institutions, and particularly at the University of New Hampshire. It was not something that would take any skin, at least directly, off of the College. Yet I felt very strongly about it as an issue, that it was an unwise thing for the state to do, to try to legislate which speakers could be brought onto the campus of the University of New Hampshire. I had no doubt that that kind of an atmosphere spreads to the private campus in indirect ways or, ultimately, in other ways. So that I was--well, I was genuinely concerned about the effort to pass this kind of legislation. I had kept in touch with the presidents down there at the University of New Hampshire, whom I had known--had a good relationship with them. Went down there and made a couple of talks, was granted an honorary degree by the university--which in due course was reciprocated to the University of New Hampshire president. I mention these as background aspects of
the larger question of keeping the relationship between these two institutions in a healthy state. So that when this bill-- When it became clear that this bill was going to be pushed and could conceivably pass the legislature, I had occasion to talk with the president--I forget which one it was now; I knew two or three of them, but their names are escaping me--as to whether there was anything that we could do that wouldn't be likely to cause more trouble than good. Because it was a possibility in my mind that if Dartmouth got messing around with this bill, this would be a good reason for passing it, if Dartmouth didn't like it. Well, he said that he appreciated our willingness to help, and he wanted to talk with a few of his colleagues and faculty members and trustees.

Well, it was in a matter of days, I think it was, he called back and said, "We really feel that we would like to have Dartmouth with us on this, right out in the open. And that for every person who will be put off by it, we think we'll get more who will understand that this is a matter of pretty fundamental concern to higher education." So I said, "Well, I'll come," and I did. I went down before the legislature. At the big public hearing that they had, I said that I wanted to appear as an individual in opposition to this legislation, and tried to spell out why I felt it was an unwise thing. I had several members of the committee who cross-examined me. And as to whether the appearance did good or was inconsequential or did harm, I really don't know. But the Feldman legislation failed.

Of course this was another factor that had to be taken into account, which to some extent should certainly be mentioned at this point, was that we as Dartmouth has, ever since he got the newspaper, been a target of the [William] Loeb Manchester Union. And this has complicated relations with the state, with the people of the state. It's complicated relations with the legislature. And Loeb, of course, picked up my appearance before the Feldman Bill Committee, and tried to make something out of it.

This is a factor that is of no small consequence in understanding a policy of restraint on the part of the College in respect to state affairs. That almost everything you can imagine the Manchester Union could twist into a view of Dartmouth as a hotbed of radicals and other undesirable types in their eyes, would be twisted. It was a--insofar as one can call it a cross; it wasn't really that much of a burden--but it was an unpleasant distraction to deal with, and we dealt with it mainly by simply the silent treatment. I never took public issue with Loeb, but the Feldman Bill kind of appearance was a perfect target for the Manchester Union's attack on Dartmouth and on me. Oh, countless things were the subject of front-page editorials or slanted news stories.
DANIELL: How about the--? Closely associated with that, when Louis Wyman was attorney general, I believe, of New Hampshire, and was looking around for those who ideologically might be suspect, he did come up here, I know. He talked with at least Alex Laing. And I assume, perhaps, some others, but I'm not sure of that.

DICKEY: Well, this is one where I was directly involved, and one that I should not want any possibility of being publicly discussed while Wyman's name is before the Governor's Council as a nominee for a high judicial office. Of course the story of the McCarthy period, so-called, is a very complicated one that you have to be careful you don't distort by talking about one aspect of it without talking about others. But I got into it through the fact that one of the cases that Wyman decided he would investigate was [William] Remington, a Dartmouth graduate back in the thirties.

DANIELL: Now as you start this, we may not have to go over it again because, in fact, we did talk about it in--

DICKEY: We did talk about the Remington Case?

DANIELL: About the Remington Case, the records in the dean's office, and your role in this when we talked about the McCarthy period.

DICKEY: So we've done this.

DANIELL: We have done this.

DICKEY: And we won't do it twice.

DANIELL: We don't do it again. Because now, the minute I asked the question and you started answering it, and you plugged in Remington, I remembered.

DICKEY: Well, that's the only one that I remember specifically. There were, of course, the [Vilhjalmur] Stefansson difficulties. Dudley Orr was involved in helping Stefansson a bit on that.

DANIELL: Right. And you mentioned that one, too. Right.

DICKEY: Other things. And I guess I've probably already covered the positions that I took with the faculty.

DANIELL: Yes. Exactly. The [inaudible].

DICKEY: Yes. Things like that, yes. That's right.
DANIELL: My apologies for asking the question now.

DICKEY: Oh, no. Well, the Washington story can be told quite briefly. It's a somewhat interesting and slightly amusing one. The College acquired the top of Mount Washington and the Cog Railway under the will of Colonel [Henry N.] Teague [1900], a well-known, somewhat of a character, Dartmouth alumnus, who'd been running the Cog Railway to the top of the mountain, which he controlled, in the main, for a good many years. The story of Colonel Teague would make a good story for someone, but we can't devote ourselves to that at this time. But that's how the College came to own the top of Mount Washington and the railway. When he died, he left it to the College, partly as a result of the fact that he had borrowed money from the College during his lifetime for the operation of the place.

Well, there was no doubt in our minds that we didn't want to go into the railway business [laughter] any longer than we had to. And also there was little room for doubt that the top of Mount Washington was no great credit so far as its operation and buildings and other things to the State of New Hampshire, let alone to the College as the owner of it. It was a pretty cheesy, low-grade tourist operation on top of a magnificent mountain. And we very quickly were clear that whenever we could find a buyer or whatnot, we should sell the railroad off or do something to dispose of it. And also we were increasingly clear that we didn't want to get into the development of the top of Mount Washington. It was something that we might have done if we'd had a lot of money we didn't know what to do with. But it didn't seem to us this was our function. And really it was a function that ought to be taken over by the state. There were a lot of complications in it that I won't go into. Colonel Teague, when he was hard up for money, had sold the television broadcasting rights at the top of the mountain to the Yankee Network.

DANIELL: Oh, yes. That's how that came about.

DICKEY: And I think it goes for another 50 years or something. It's quite a long period from now. Those were the days when they thought of the top of a mountain as being a very valuable broadcasting site. Well, the satellites have pretty well eliminated--at least have modified--the strategic value of the top of a mountain and so forth. Well, we began conversations with one or two of the governors--or I guess they began conversations with us. I don't recall whether we took the initiative or not. But John [W.] King was--Is it John King? I think it is.

DANIELL: Yes. I think John King was the one.
DICKEY: Yes. John King was governor at the time. And before John King, one or two of the former governors had spoken to us about the possibility that some day the College ought to sell the top of the mountain to the state. This became a fairly widely known and, well, a realistic possibility one of these days. John King was a rather regular person in attending the meeting of the Dartmouth Board of Trustees, the governor, of course, being an ex officio member of the board. He and I began conversations about the top of the mountain. And John King was a pretty trader, and I wasn't disposed to just give up on the mountain because Colonel Teague thought he had done something for the College. He'd given us this property to further the purposes of Dartmouth, and John King was not very anxious to pay the College a handsome price for it. Well, we negotiated it out, and a number of our friends in the legislature persuaded us to compromise and persuaded the state to compromise on what we respectively thought was a fair price for it.

One day when we were just about closing the deal, John King—

[Pause]

We were in a meeting of the trustees, and Governor King said—I forget how it came up—but in any event we got to talking about Mount Washington. And he said, "You know," he said, "this is a very unusual transaction that we're working out. I've heard of states supporting institutions of higher education, but," he said, "my friend here, John Dickey, tells me that it's absolutely unprecedented for an institution of higher education to support the state. [Laughter] And he thinks that's what you're doing."

Well, we had some fun over it. But it was again something that I take some satisfaction from that it was consummated amicably and to the satisfaction of both parties. Subsequently we made it possible for Colonel Teague's so-called son—actually he was called "Teague," but he was not a member of Colonel Teague's family—and his widow to take over the railroad to get us out from operating it. And that was the story of our getting the top of Mount Washington and getting rid of it.

DANIELL: Somewhere I have in the back of my mind that as part of the negotiations—I don't know who this came from, again, nor am I sure whether it's accurate or not—as part of the negotiations, the state claimed or uncovered that they owned a little piece of property over here in the center of the campus. Does this strike any bell at all? And this was part of the trade-off.
DICKEY: No. I'm almost certain I would remember something like that.

DANIELL: Well, I'm pretty sure it's from Bob Monahan, whose perceptions of what was going on may not be accurate.

DICKEY: Let me tell you with certainty that that never came to my attention.

DANIELL: Okay. Fine.

DICKEY: And never was mentioned by the governor to me. John Meck carried on most of the discussions involving the technical problems of transferring the property. I think if there'd been anything of that sort, the governor would have mentioned it.

DANIELL: Okay. Because it'll probably be a couple of years before I get to John Meck, whose stories get...

DICKEY: Yes. Well, John handled the transaction. I had to make clear to the governor--and it wasn't a laughing matter, as they say--that we just couldn't be in the position of making a gift of the top of the mountain to the state when we'd received it as the gift of an alumnus who very understandably felt this was all he had to give to his college, and he was going to give it to his college. And he could have given it to anybody.

[Tape begins to have some problems]

So that we had to be somewhat tough-minded about it. And I'm sure there were people down in Concord who thought we were being a little too tough-minded about it.

DANIELL: Is there anything more you want to say about state relations?

DICKEY: No. I think that once again I take a considerable satisfaction from the fact that by and large our relations were thoroughly amicable. There were individuals, of course, who would be critical of the College, that sort of thing. The other governors were--And most of the governors took a very active interest in their membership on the board of trustees. Hugh Gregg, the Yale man, was a regular attendant at the board meetings. Of course Sherman Adams came to the meetings regularly. The one man that didn't come to the meetings regularly, and who had a difficult relationship with the College although we kept it amicable, was Powell.

DANIELL: Wesley Powell, yes. He didn't want to do lots of things.
DICKEY: He didn't want to be too close to the College. I took his honorary master's degree down to him at the state house and presented it to him there. Normally it's presented up here. John King was a fairly regular attendant at the board meetings. Certainly [Walter Rutherford] Petersen was.

DANIELL: I've had interviews with both Sherm Adams and Lane Dwinnell who are two of the--

DICKEY: And Lane Dwinnell, of course, attended the board meetings regularly.

DANIELL: I intend sometime in the future to go for the others. I've found very useful kinds of interviews. Okay, why don't we break for the day then?

[Tape corrects itself at this point]

DANIELL: The interview with President Emeritus Dickey continued on the afternoon of February 1st.

DICKEY: What do we do now?

DANIELL: Well, actually, what we decided to talk about today was your relationships as president of the College to things outside the institution itself. And the first set of relationships I wanted to talk about was relationships with other educational institutions, and in particular, any comments to begin with that you want to make about the continuing development of--within the Ivy group itself.

DICKEY: When I came on the job, the Ivy group was still not a fully formed group. They had a membership that hadn't changed, that called itself the Ivy group. But we were just on the threshold of having to work out an agreement that put some structure into the group. Actually, as it developed, it grew out of athletic rivalry. Mr. Hopkins had been interested in it while he was still on the job. The idea of an Ivy group had been kicking around mainly in the area of football for, oh, I guess 15 years at least. With many practical aspects to it: scheduling, trying to reach an agreement with respect to the principles on which admission would be extended to scholar athletes, the principles that should govern financial aid. And at just that time, in the immediate postwar period, '45 to '47, there was a considerable interest nationally in trying to get football under control in the immediate postwar period.

So that I found myself drawn into that much more quickly and more deeply than would normally have been the case. I attended a number of national
conferences at which this subject was discussed. I can remember the Notre Dame administrative officers being there and, as it seemed to me, talking very boldly about the reforms that they were prepared to lead on. And that kind of idealistic aspiration disappeared within the next few years, and very largely under the onslaught of competition and the needs of these large football institutions to have a big return at the gate. I was relatively innocent in respect to how powerful that influence was at institutions in the Big Ten and Notre Dame and elsewhere. We, in turn, had been living here at Dartmouth, I discovered very quickly when I looked into it, primarily upon football returns. And it was financing a large part of the sports program in other fields. Well, that began to melt away very rapidly, and we were faced with the fact that we had to put money into these other sports rather than expecting football to carry the load all by itself. The Ivy group accepted a tentative--or a draft--organizational agreement. I forget when the first full Ivy schedule was to come in the early fifties. Because they had to wait until their schedule commitments--

DANIELL: Was there any disagreement or any elaborate discussion about membership in this group? I've always wondered how Pennsylvania sort of was taking part in this.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, I think it was largely historical, and Pennsylvania was one of the oldest of the early private institutions, and that was about it. No, the membership was pretty well settled by informal discussions before I came to the job in '45.

DANIELL: Oh, that early.

DICKEY: I cannot recall any discussion of membership. There were a number of institutions that wanted to come in, or at least through informal channels had expressed an interest in being included, but nothing official that I recall.

DANIELL: Can you remember any?

DICKEY: Well, Colgate was one.

DANIELL: Colgate, I see. Interested, yes.

DICKEY: Was interested in that possibility. At least I think we heard it through some trustee of Colgate, just on his own inquiring whether the Ivy group might not be expanded to include Colgate at that point. And there were various enthusiasms with respect to the membership. The Harvard-Yale-Princeton
relationship had been regarded as a particularly special one on the part of those institutions, and they were somewhat hesitant to see that diluted by the hoi polloi. But I think that bridge had been crossed, as I seem to remember, when I came on the job. Very shortly after we had the Ivy group operating, there was need for a revision and a tightening up of the agreement, and responsibility was given to President [James Bryant] Conant of Harvard and myself to do this on behalf of the group. And we worked together. I went down to his office on a number of occasions and worked out a draft revision. And it was, as I recall, pretty well accepted as it was drafted. I found, incidentally, working with Conant a very satisfactory experience.

[End of Tape 40, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 40, Side B]

… sometimes is said to be present in certain quarters of the Harvard-Yale-Princeton inner group. But working with him was just one of those satisfactory experiences I've had, and we've remained rather close friends ever since.

DANIELL: Is that one of the reasons he retired up here? Or did he always have connections in Hanover?

DICKEY: It may have been a reason. He's never assigned it as such to me. He talked with me about coming here. They were clear that it was not going to be feasible for them to continue to maintain a retirement home and a summer home up in the White Mountains. They were getting to an age and their health was such that that wasn't going to be practical very long. They didn't want to go back to Cambridge for a retirement home for reasons of their own. And they still wanted to be in New England and in touch. And the medical center here, the Hopkins Center, and the opportunity to be in an academic community where they felt they would be at home were the principal factors, so far as they're known to me, that brought them here. Incidentally, he's in very poor health now. He's been stricken with a stroke and so forth.

DANIELL: He's up in the convalescence center.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, this was the beginning of my relationship with the other Ivy presidents. The relationship, unfortunately, or perhaps more accurately, inevitably, began with the one thing that they had in common: athletic rivalry. And the presidents paid more attention to that than I think probably was necessary or even desirable. But they did. And the rivalry between the presidents at their annual meeting to make sure that somebody didn't
do them in was wonderful to behold. It was always conducted in--not always, but usually--in a very amiable way. But underneath the amiability there was a very acute sense of institutional self-interest, which everybody looked out for. Well, I remained active in that. I found that I had to frequently be a little bit more assertive about our interests than was probably thought necessary by some of my counterparts.

To be concrete about it, for example, some of the other Harvard people--not Jim Conant, but some of the other Harvard people--have for a long time (Mr. Hopkins told me about this during his years on the job, and I'm told that there's been an element of it still) have tended to regard Dartmouth as a thorn in their side in respect to athletic victories and in particular in football. And it seemed to me some of them had a view that we just couldn't be doing this on the same high level that--we couldn't be conducting our athletic programs--on the same high level that Harvard was, or we couldn't possibly be doing it as successfully as we were. Now, that's an over-simplification and has an element of partisanship in it. But there was also a very substantial element of truth in it. And I at a very early point began to dig into this on my own, and decided that rather than just sitting there and saying, "Oh, you're crazy!" and a few other epithets, it might be useful to see what the statistics were on some of these things and what the story was.

Well, I dug into the so-called quintile sheets which we were using then, and which our student bodies--or our athletic portions of the student bodies--were broken down into five categories. Then we exchanged these quintile sheets with each other so we could see whether we were playing only, or primarily, students in the bottom fifth of the student body and that sort of thing. Well, without trying to recall the detail, when I really dug into that, Dartmouth came out immensely well. And then the argument shifted on the part of some of the others to, well, of course, you don't have the stiff courses maybe that we have. Well, that didn't stand up very well when I began to look into seeing what some of the halfbacks at Harvard were taking. Not all, of course. But again, we compared--This fellow named [Richard J.] Clasby ['54] at the time, he had been mothballed, as the slang goes, in ways that protected his eligibility, it seemed to some people. Whether that was true or not, I couldn't say. But I was hearing a good bit about this from others. And then one year along about in the late fifties, on admissions, we ran an inventory of the number of individuals playing on the Harvard team who had applied to Dartmouth and been turned down. It would sound rather far-fetched if I told you how it came out. But it was something that I was perfectly certain--

DANIELL: Do you remember the details of which…?
DICKEY: --wouldn't make very pleasant publicity from the Harvard side. All of which is simply to say that in my judgment, we and most of the Ivy group were maintaining a fairly common standard. We had some difficulty early on with Pennsylvania because of their state government scholarships, that they were still using, and the fact that they had a major in physical education, which was looked at askance by the rest of the league. And when Harold Stassen came in as president of the University of Pennsylvania, he ran up a big banner with the slogan: "Victory with honor." And I'll never forget Henry Wriston who was then president of Brown, saying, not in Stassen's presence but a number of us were having a drink: "Well, he'll find he doesn't have either."

This was not a major aspect of my responsibilities, but it was one that we weren't in a position to disregard. At several points we did try to enlarge the agenda of the presidents' meetings and got somewhere. That is, talking more about academic things. But the Harvard and Yale and Pennsylvania and several others had, at that point, a much--of course--a much greater commitment to graduate studies, and their interests were of a university character, as contrasted with the College character, that there wasn't really the foundation for as much educational exchange as there was in the field of intercollegiate athletics where all of us were playing each other.

DANIELL: Yes. That was the question I was going to ask you. It's a different question, but it's built on that same subject: Namely, were there ways in which the fact that Dartmouth was so different from the rest of them, having virtually no graduate programs, did that impede, basically, the expansion of the role of the Ivy League?

DICKEY: Well, I suppose yes and no. But the fact is, as far as I could see, the others that were large and universities primarily rather than colleges, primarily didn't have occasion to make common cause very much. Now, when it came to things such as the ROTC issue at the time of the sixties, we did. We worked together quite closely as a group. Where there was a common established concern, an interest, we did. And our relationships with the NCAA there was a pretty solid Ivy position which has continued to stand up, I believe, quite well. But the tradition among Eastern institutions of higher education has been much more a tradition of going it yourself, than has been true in some of the Middle West--as I understand it--Middle West institutions.

I attended regularly the New England Association of Colleges and Universities meetings, and we made a considerable effort to use that
larger body, which was and is a much more heterogeneous group than the Ivy, for accomplishing some fundamental reforms with respect to the information being sought by all of our institutions for scholarship purposes and things of that sort. And we did make some real headway. But it was limited. It took an awful lot of time. And it was not enthusiastically seized upon as something that all of the institutions rated as important work.

One of the pleasantest and one of the most useful activities of this sort that I participated in was the Pentagonal Conference, which Mr. Hopkins and his counterparts at Williams, Amherst, Wesleyan, and Bowdoin had established while he was still on the job. And when I came on the job, several of the presidents that he'd worked with were still at these institutions: Stanley King at Amherst, Jim Baxter at Williams, the man at Bowdoin--

DANIELL: We talked about him earlier in the context of Don Morrison, I believe.

DICKEY: No. No, I'm talking about the older man. Well... Sills! Sills, Kenneth Sills. And Vic Butterfield all had known and worked with Mr. Hopkins. And had had a pleasant relationship. Well, this relationship continued, and we developed it. We created a group of deans to carry on discussions with respect to matters primarily of concern to the various deans. Although we were here the large man out in this group, which was made up of institutions with 1200 or fewer undergraduates at that time, we still had that commitment to the College purpose, the undergraduate purpose, that gave us a common interest, a common concern, a common sense of purpose, most fundamentally, which was immensely useful and rewarding.

So many of these educational/institutional groups, the American Council on Education, the Association of American Colleges, and so forth, I attended a number of the meetings, and I was appointed to committees, and I just decided very early that obviously most people enjoy these meetings and get something out of them; I neither enjoy them or get very much out of them. And so I ceased attending them. I was misunderstood in this respect by some of them; they thought it was a form of snobbishness on the part of Dartmouth. Well, okay. I did my best to show that that wasn't what was at issue. But they were just not good investments of time as far as I was concerned. And I was getting more--as these others weren't--out of the Pentagonal meetings which were intimate and candid. And, boy, you cannot minimize the importance of candor in a group of this sort. You get into a large group, and you get people putting forward positions for purposes of impressing people and so forth. You get into a group of five presidents such as the Pentagonal Group who knew each other's problems as well as you, almost as you, knew your own.
DANIELL: And you also didn't have the athletics to get in the way, too.

DICKEY: We did not so long as we were in the discussions. But at each one of the Pentagonal meetings, the other four would get together to discuss their highly competitive disagreements, and I would sometimes be called in as sort of a neutral--

DANIELL: Referee.

DICKEY: --mediator. And also they were very much seriously interested in what had been our experience in the Ivy group, and they had respect, by and large, for what the Ivy group had done in respect to standards on admissions and scholarship aid and so forth. But the competition between the Amherst-Williams-Wesleyan-Bowdoin institutions is pretty sharp.

DANIELL: Bowdoin's kind of withdrawn from that group now.

DICKEY: I guess so. I don't know. I'm not--

DANIELL: I always think of the Big Three, Amherst being the little of the three.

DICKEY: I'm not in touch with them really anymore. But this was a very rewarding association, personally and professionally. We took--or I took--a great deal from it, and I've had the satisfaction of having the presidents whom I've associated with be nice about the contribution that we were able to make. So that's the one that from an educational, professional side was a most satisfactory one.

DANIELL: The level on which your discussions would go on, for example, would there be an agenda in which you talked about faculty recruitment, faculty salary scales, that degree of specificity in terms of really going into management problems?

DICKEY: Oh, yes! Oh, yes! Yes, yes. We got very concrete, sometimes confidentially so. But this is where the candor came in. And we knew each other well enough to say: Oh, come on! Get off it! We know that isn't so. You know. Well, as long as you can kid about something like that, you're not in danger of creating enemies over candor. But it was concrete. Well, it dealt with things just such as you've said: faculty salaries, recruitment, recruitment of students, of athletes, because we did compete there to a degree. But we did not have fixed agenda usually. Sometimes we would announce beforehand we're going to try to focus on this. And sometimes we would take several faculty members who were particularly interested in
this, usually from our Committee on Educational Policy, if we were going to be talking about educational policies and curriculum. Almost always had several faculty members with us on these trips. And this tended to keep the atmosphere good also. Because these members could see that this was, well, while it was an amiable meeting, it was concerned with serious things that the faculty--

DANIELL: You met once a quarter, once a year sort of thing?

DICKEY: Well, we had our main meetings once a year, and we would go each time to a different member of the Pentagonal Group. And this was also very useful because you got over there, you got to know their faculty at social occasions. And we would meet for three days usually. And we would get to know their libraries, get to know their art collections, and we'd get to know the institution much better than you do if you sit back here and go once in ten years for an inauguration or something like that. Really, it was very worthwhile. And I'm sorry to gather—or to know—that it hasn't prospered in the current period. I just don't know how much it's kept up, but I've talked with a number of people who say that it's really withered. And you can't keep these things going forever in the same form, so that's that.

Well, in addition to those activities, and I could go on to elaborate them, I felt a very heavy need to be in touch with activities out over the country, and particularly in the East and in New York and in Washington and in Boston, that would keep me professionally active. Not just in the matter of education, but particularly in foreign affairs so that I had a cutting edge of knowing what I was talking about, and wasn't just a person who'd retired from State Department and so forth. This turned out to be of very direct value to—and of interest to—faculty members, the ability to get up here for discussions people such as George Kennan and Dean Acheson and this. This kept Dartmouth in the mainstream of--

DANIELL: And kept you in the mainstream, too.

DICKEY: Yes. It kept me in the mainstream, which was very, very useful. So I did a great deal of that, but always selectively. I followed a policy of not going on any boards that were not related either to my professional or public responsibilities, and that worked out quite well. Very early on I was invited to go on the Rockefeller Foundation board as a trustee. Quite interestingly, in this respect I was following Mr. Hopkins as I had in several other things, which we may mention later, in respect to jobs that I decided I wasn't interested in. But the World Peace Foundation in Boston, I became a trustee of that. And I got quite a bit out of that. I was on the Woodrow
Wilson Foundation board for a period, and was invited to become a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and did that fairly early on.

Well, these were all major foreign affairs agencies or activities that worked both ways: They kept me in the stream of foreign affairs work, and permitted me to bring to the College--both in the Great Issues Course and in more specific ways--people of this sort. Out of this came Lester Pearson's friendship for Dartmouth. And, well, I've mentioned [Archibald] MacLeish--I guess I hadn't mentioned MacLeish--but Acheson and others. These were people that unless you cultivated a relationship that you'd had and kept it up, we would have had considerable difficulty in attracting them on the basis which we did. So I did a lot of that. At times I wondered whether I did too much of it. But it was important, it seemed to me, to the institution, as well as to my professional development.

DANIELL: Were there other ways, concrete ways, other than the individuals whom you could attract to Dartmouth, either for speaking or a three-day staying here, were there other concrete ways in which there were linkages between your activities in these and just the well-being of the College?

DICKEY: Yes. There's no question about that. For example, as a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation--and here I'll speak with some candor off the record--I found that there was a downgrading of Dartmouth as an educational institution on the part of some of the staff, very key staff people: David Stevens in the social sciences; the man in charge of the humanities, whose name is escaping me at the moment. And probably the man in charge of the sciences, Warren Weaver.

Well, I decided that I was going to get to know them, and they were going to get to know me much better, and I made it a point of being in touch with them. And where I felt that we needed help and advice and criticism, I did my best to solicit it on a bark-off basis. And on several occasions they dealt with me very respectfully and very politely. But they at several points told me: You've just got an awful lot of work to do in this area. And they were helpful to me, but they were perhaps most helpful by being candid about things that needed to be done.

DANIELL: I remember when we talked about fundraising, you talked about this in a more general sense. And what I'm really interested in is just a few-- You started talking about the way in which--

DICKEY: Well, the fundraising aspect came out of this aspect. You can't go onto a big foundation board--you'd better be clear about that--and just by reason of your being there pick up a grant for your institution. It just doesn't work
that way. Particularly if you have key staff people who have reservations about your business or your institution. So that it wasn't until I had begun to really establish an intimate--intimate is too strong--a close relationship with these key staff people, and was going to them for criticisms and suggestions and recruitment, and then where to look for--

DANIELL: You kind of used them as consultants almost.

DICKEY: Oh well, I did. Very definitely. Not just almost. And then finally, of course, when we came to the question of what we were going to do with the medical school--Were we going to try to keep it? Were we going to rebuild it? Were we going to a four-year school and so forth?--I was in a position that really made all the difference in the world so far as our decision was concerned of going to Allan Gregg, who was the most knowledgeable man, I suppose, in the world at that point with respect to the strategies of medical education and the position of various institutions. And he had known this institution and had thought quite well of it. And I said to him, "I would like to have the benefit of your friendship as a consultant." Not as an employed consultant because he couldn't do that working for the foundation. "Come up and look us over, and then tell me what you think we ought to do." He came up several times, and I think I've told you the story about sitting down and waiting for the train in Lebanon?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And he said, "Well, now I'm going to tell you what I think." Well, I couldn't have done those things until I had established my credentials as a serious, reasonably competent, responsible person. But this was a great service that I got out of--or self-interest service for the institution and myself--that I got out of the Rockefeller Foundation board. This was very important. Well now, then there were other public service calls.

DANIELL: Just a couple of questions about the Rockefeller Foundation. You had worked, of course, with the Rockefeller Group before in the late thirties in Washington. Nelson Rockefeller was a Dartmouth graduate. President Hopkins had--

DICKEY: Had been on that board.

DANIELL: Had been on that board before. This seems to have been the major connection between Dartmouth and both the foundation, the specific foundation, and a family in which the resources were obviously there. Was this part of a--what I'm really getting here is that--a broader relationship
between the Rockefellers as a whole and Dartmouth as an institution? Or was it just almost the accident of your--?

DICKEY: Well, this is something I'm not too clear about. Although I was close to it for 25 years, and involved in it, you find in a relationship of this sort that you don't know everything. [Sound bad at this point] And I do know that the relationship between Mr. Hopkins and Mr. [John] Rockefeller, Jr. was one of great mutual respect. And that Mr. Rockefeller, Jr. was generous to Dartmouth in connection with the Hopkins Center, largely because of his great admiration for Mr. Hopkins. Things like that.

DANIELL: Excuse me. I just wanted to check here. [Pause]

DICKEY: But you can jump to conclusions which really aren't warranted. For example-- [Pause] [Sound improves after this point]

DANIELL: Okay, go on.

DICKEY: Well, I was giving the example of Nelson Rockefeller's situation. He continued to have a very active interest in Dartmouth, and was a trustee when I came to the job in '45. He had been brought to the board during Mr. Hopkins's years. But he had very little, almost no relationship to the Rockefeller Foundation. And the other trustees, at least the leading trustees, and the president, who was Fosdick at that time and later several others I won't bother to mention unless it becomes important, were very careful not to have the board become a creature of the Rockefeller family. And this was a situation in which very little was said, but you learned that there were certain things that were acceptable; and certain things which were looked upon askance, and one was the family seeking to exert too much influence. At that point there were two Rockefellers on the board: Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who was about to retire for age. I'll never forget one of my second or third meetings of the board, he retired for age at 65, and made a very gracious speech in which he said that this was a hard decision for him to accept retirement at 65 when he felt vigorous and tremendously interested in the work of the foundation and so forth. But that he just felt that this was the right thing to do for the welfare of the foundation. And that if he did it now, it was going to be very difficult for other people later to try to make an exception and so forth. I've never forgotten that.

At that time his oldest son, John III, had come on as a junior member of the board, obviously, to succeed his father as a so-to-speak family representative on the board, and in due course, John III became chairman of the board. At several points in the course of those 25 or so years that I
was on the board, I was made aware--once quite directly by a trustee who came up to Hanover to see me.

DICKEY: ...might, on occasion, be brought under the influence of the family too much in respect to-- For example, on the making of grants to other charities in which members of the family were interested, whether it was David or John III's interest in Lincoln Center, or whatnot, there was an attitude of watchful concern on the part of a number of the trustees. John Foster Dulles was one of them who, with all his suave diplomatic manner, would make it clear that there was a point beyond which he didn't want to see this very important friendship with the family, and so forth, become unduly influential in the affairs of the foundation. Chester Barnard, the president of the New Jersey Tel & Tel, who was on the board, and a very able, shrewd man, a man who'd made a great professional study of administration, wrote the book on the executive, he was the one who came up to see me, and obviously had something on his mind that he came clear up here. It related to who was going to succeed him because he was just in as president temporarily while holding the fort. And also about the chairmanship of the board.

So that one has to be careful that he doesn't over-generalize about family influence here. At the same time, there was great respect for the family. They just didn't want this generation of John, Jr.'s sons to become too actively interested in what the foundation was doing. Now, John III became a chairman, was a very fine trustee. But he had, perhaps, greater sensitivity to some of these situations than maybe certain other members of the family.

DANIELL: I suppose another way of putting this is that the potential linkage between your position in the Rockefeller Foundation and Nelson's linkage to the institution was so apparent to everyone that you had to, if anything, push things and know a way to behave so that you assumed that--

DICKEY: Yes. I'm sure there must have been such thoughts. I cannot recall that they were revealed explicitly to me. But I was aware that there almost inevitably were such thoughts. As a matter of fact, I'm not able to recall now too clearly whether I understood how I happened to go to that board or not. But John III became interested in me. And I don't know that it was through Nelson--I'm not clear now just how it was. But he once asked me, before I came on the board, whether I would write a position paper on how
I regarded the opportunities that an organization such as the Rockefeller Foundation--

DANIELL: Really? That's a testing mechanism.

DICKEY: And I guess it was in part that memorandum which I wrote for him that must have won favor in his eyes. Now, Nelson may well have said to John, when you're looking for a new trustee from the academic world, I've known and worked with John Dickey, and he's somebody you ought to have in mind. But Nelson was not in a position, and had better sense, than to tell John who to nominate for that board. He would not hesitate to go as far as I've just said.

DANIELL: Had you had any contact with John III before this memorandum [inaudible]…

DICKEY: Well, this leads to one of the incidents that we were talking about earlier that I may have something to say on later: Things I didn't do. But while I was in my first year at the law office in Boston--and it would have been in the forties at some point--I had a call one day from a gentleman on the telephone.

DANIELL: Yes. I think you described this earlier.

DICKEY: The call from Packard?

DANIELL: Right. And you were inquiring--

DICKEY: And this turned out to be, eventually, an invitation to me to come down and become associated with Packard, who was John, Jr.'s principal philanthropic advisor.

DANIELL: Okay, that's the linkage there.

DICKEY: That's the linkage. And he had come up to investigate me. [Sound of ringing phone]

DANIELL: Right. You told that story, but I'm not sure that the linkage with John, Jr. was in that. [Pause]

DICKEY: …which doesn't have as rigid a retirement requirement as the Rockefeller board did. The Rockefeller board has a--

DANIELL: What was that?
DICKEY: Oh, Kettering, C. F. Kettering Foundation, which I went on the year I retired from Dartmouth, and will stay on until '82 if my health holds. I was talking with Dick Lombard, the Dartmouth trustee who's very active in that foundation because of his connection, I guess originally, with the Kettering family. That was the original thing. Well, I don't know how much more you want to say about that.

DANIELL: That's all the questions I had about the Rockefeller Foundation.

DICKEY: I guess this is the point at which to speak of one of those things I decided not to do, rather than to recite a list of things. But I'd only been on the Dartmouth job not quite two years--this is coming into '47, I guess, the spring of '47--when Henry Allen Moe, who was a very major figure in the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation at that time, the president of the Guggenheim Foundation, and whom I had not really then got to know as I later did (he and I became intimate friends later, and I've just finished writing the introduction to his papers which are just being published now), came up to Hanover. We were just in the course of launching the Great Issues course. Whether it was the spring of '47 or '48, I'm not sure. I think it was '47.

DANIELL: It sounds like '47.

DICKEY: And I was a little surprised because I hadn't known of any occasion of his coming to Hanover. But there was a little dinner out at the Outing Club House of faculty members that he had ostensibly wanted to see because he was just checking up on institutions and so forth. I was somewhat more naive about such things than I think I subsequently was. In any event, I remember Arthur Wilson was there, and they were talking about, you know, Rhodes Scholars and so forth. And a number of other faculty were there that I was a little surprised to see because I hadn't known of their connection with Moe and so forth. And nothing came up of any great consequence that I could see. We spent a pleasant evening together, and Henry said he had to go back to New York the next day. I had invited him to stay and talk college, and he said, no. He would do that another time, though.

Then in about 48 hours, I got a call: Would I come down to New York for a trustees' conference at the home of John Foster Dulles, who was the chairman of the board? Well, I didn't pay any great attention to that. But I got down there, and John III was there. Henry wasn't there. But one other trustee was there; I forget who it was. Well, the nut of it was they said, "We'd like to proposition you." Immediately he said--Dulles enjoyed a
chuckle when he'd say something like, ha ha ha ha ha. Then, "We want you to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation." Well, I was, to put it mildly, flabbergasted because, as I said, I was just beginning to know my way around here.

I remember that spring I went up fishing at the Grant; it was one of the very early occasions when I went up fishing with Del Ames and Fanny. We really just tramped around, basically. I didn't tell, as I recall, I did not tell Del about that. I don't think I ever told anybody else about this. But I said, "I've had an offer to do something which is immensely attractive. It would be one of the few things that would interest me, as far as I know myself. But I've decided not to do it." Or I've decided that I ought not to do it, or something. I hadn't yet crossed the bridge and so forth. I said, "It seems to me that there are just many reasons why I shouldn't do it at this point." But I didn't talk about the foundation at that time, and I forget now what Del said.

But in any event, I did write Dulles and said, I'm sorry I couldn't do it. I was aware at the time I did that, that this was probably one of two things that I had been prepared to do, other things being equal, and would look forward to doing it. But it was one of the major decisions of my life. Interestingly enough, they came back at me years later in connection with another vacancy in the presidency, when I was asked to serve on the search committee.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: When John III and I were sifting out what turned out to be the last two candidates in his office one day, he put his pen down, and he said, "I want to ask you a very serious question." He's quite a diffident person. He said, "I hesitate to do this because I know the earlier history of what I'm going to ask." And he said, "By any chance, are you ready to change your mind?" And I had the good fortune to say, no.

DANIELL: Immediately? Or did you--?

DICKEY: Immediately. And if there's anything that I learned that I share with this record--and I learned it quite early; I'll tell you about some other things--it is terribly important to your own integrity, your own respect of yourself and the other people, not to play games with an offer. I saw the opposite so often when I was on the president's job here. And it's such a temptation to say, well, let's see if they'll offer it to me, and then we'll go on from there. But if you know with a certainty that you're just not going to do it, I think it's
important to your own sense of playing it straight, as well as to the other party, not to play games. And it's so tempting—so tempting—to do that.

DANIELL: It depends on the person whether it's tempting or not. My experience in this has to do with... For a while because of a really successful job as chairman of our Equal Opportunity Committee, I got on all sorts of people's lists for candidates as dean of the faculty, etc.

DICKEY: Yes. That's what happens.

DANIELL: And I had the other mind, that I want to be a professor. And that I'm quite willing to critique the management of institutions in a short-term way, but that's not how I want to do my living. And I got these six phone calls which were just like that with John D. Rockefeller III. I simply said no. And it kind of baffled them because it's usually--

DICKEY: Well, the first time I turned it down, it did baffle them. I think they were really taken aback, that a young fellow who wasn't really on the horse yet up here should be that clear about it. But, okay. And also it was no mere politeness to say that it was one of the few things in my life that I would have considered seriously and wanted to do if I wasn't here. Well, we'll leave the others. But that one, I guess, should come in at this point. And that was that story.

DANIELL: Okay. You've got three others you mentioned: the World Peace Foundation, the Council of Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson Foundation. Do you have any--?

DICKEY: No. Those were not major responsibilities. The service on the World Peace Foundation board was of interest to me because most of the people on that board were people who had a serious interest in foreign affairs. Harvey Bundy, the father of McGeorge Bundy and Bill Bundy, was chairman of the board during my period on there. And one of the most interesting sessions I ever had in my life at a luncheon was a luncheon and the last time I saw Alger Hiss. He was on that board also, and was in the middle of his cross-examination or examination in the Congress with his Whittaker Chambers troubles. And Harvey Bundy, when luncheon was over, had a practice of asking a member who'd been on a trip somewhere or some assignment whether he'd like to tell the board about it just for their information. And on this occasion he said, "Alger, we know what a miserable experience you've been having, and we don't want to make it more unpleasant for you if you don't want to talk about it. But if you would enjoy telling about it—you're among friends here—please feel free to do so." Hiss responded, saying, "Well, I'd welcome the opportunity." And he
preceded to lay out his impressions of the House committee that he was before, and how many of them didn't seem to know what it was all about. "But there was a young fellow," he said, "that I hadn't know before. But he was very sharp. He knew what he was up to." And Harvey said, "Well, who was that?" Hiss said, "Well, I think his name was Nixon." [Laughter]

No, those three were interesting but relatively minor responsibilities, where I wasn't carrying any great load. Along about that same time I did become involved in a very important venture for the government. And again, I'm not sure just where this recommendation came from. But I was asked by President [Harry S.] Truman to become a member of the first Truman Committee on Civil Rights. I think that was in '47. This was for me a really very rewarding, very important experience in self-education. I had assumed that I knew something about the discrimination problem in this country. But before I was through with that commission, I began to realize that I had known very little about it, and that I was going to have to rethink a good many positions, including situations in the College. It had a very real influence on the development of my thinking in regard to racial matters. That opportunity also coincided with my Dartmouth classmate Bob Carr being made executive secretary of that committee, and making a very major contribution to the whole field as, in effect, the leader of the committee. Charles Wilson, the president of General Electric, was the chairman of the committee. It was quite a mixture of people. But it was an experience that I have always been very glad I had.

DANIELL: Could you make a general observation about the impact that had on your own thinking and the implications for sort of racial policy, if such existed, at Dartmouth?

DICKEY: Well, yes. Up to that point, as far as the job was concerned, the Dartmouth job was concerned, I think my only serious thinking about the problem of discrimination had focused on something that I've already told the story on, the Jewish quota controversy which Mr. [Ernest Martin] Hopkins was involved in his last years, and which I had to face as a problem my first days, my first weeks, on the job. And I had tentatively thought my way through that to the point where I was clear I was not going to accept any specific quotas for admissions. But that I was going to try to stand by the principle of a diversified student body if at any point it came under challenge. As it worked out, as I've already said, this was the position that I was able to maintain.

But the more I looked around the College, as a result of the work on the committee, the more unhappy I became with the fraternity situation when I began to really dig into it, the more unhappy I became with the so-called
deans' marriages in assignment of rooms in the College. And about this
time, I began to be friends with Arthur Sulzberger and his wife, a very
remarkable person--Iphigine Sulzberger. She was Ochs's daughter.

DANIELL: Whose daughter was she?

DICKEY: Adolph Ochs, the former publisher of the *New York Times*.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: And she was very much concerned that these so-called prestige colleges
were not pursuing a more aggressive policy, as it seemed to her, in
respect to discrimination for race and religion, particularly in the
fraternities. And talked with me several times about it, and wanted to know
what I thought about it, and how did I--well, how did I justify it if we weren't
doing much about it? She played a considerable role in stimulating me to
reexamine things that I hadn't really thought adequately about. But it came
at just the time that I was also having to think about these things as a
member of the Truman Committee on Civil Rights. So that both of these
made me much more concerned about these things than I would have
been otherwise. They didn't result in specific positions because I had to
work those out for myself. Basically, as you of course know, after talking it
over with the board and with a great many other people, and talking, and
talking it over with other presidents of the Pentagonal at our Pentagonal
meetings, we came down on the proposition that we would make solider
progress if we could bring the student body to accept a non-discriminatory
policy for fraternities and this sort of thing, rather than imposing an
immediate ban upon these things by the board of trustees.

Amherst followed the opposite policy. And I must say that at times I
thought we'd made a serious mistake in not following that policy of just
putting a ban in effect when we could have done it on the reopening of
College. But as I look back on it with a little more perspective, I think it was
a sound thing for us to sweat our way through those, as it seemed to me,
endless referenda that you saw as an undergraduate and so forth. And
finally to bring this to the point where we got rid of at least the national
discrimination. I decided to make my own personal position clear very
early, which I did in a communication to the student body. And said that I
was utterly opposed to outside agencies, such as the national fraternities,
coming onto this campus and telling our students what they could and
what they couldn't do in respect to their human relationships. But it took us
a long time before we got out of the woods on that one.
DANIELL: Was there any thought of, or discussion given to, the question of particular recruitment of black students that came out of this? And I know the question of numbers was important for the Jewish discrimination problem. You know that just about the time you left the job, then, a different pattern emerged in the country as a whole and at Dartmouth. I'm interested if there was any discussion at all or whether it was even considered.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. I'm trying to think when we first came to grips with that in a meaningful way. But the discussion began fairly early. I'm not sure just when. And eventually it came to a head with our taking the leadership and proposing the ABC Program as a means of creating a larger pool from which to bring people into one of these competitive colleges. And we tried various things: the Bridge Program and so forth.

DANIELL: Yes. That's very distant from your experience with Truman.

DICKEY: Just when that was, I'm not sure. But we had been engaged before that in a recruitment effort, using several blacks and so forth. And it was relatively ineffective. What was wrong with it--I guess there were probably a lot of things wrong with it--but what was basically wrong with it was that we were competing with our other comparable institutions for these nuggets, these highly qualified students. Somebody would always bring up Ralph Bunche or something like that. And there were just not enough of them to go around to produce any great change in the makeup of your student body. So it was only when we began to pursue the quantitative side of this thing more imaginatively and more resourcefully that we hit upon the ABC Program, and then with that, a much more active pursuit of--recruitment in-the black high schools. And we went through a very rigorous reexamination and self-education in that respect. An awful lot of very loose good intentions running around loose.

DANIELL: Yes. That general discussion, that really comes in the late sixties. And that one major unit we'll get at when we get through with this is a lot of problems that come in sort of the latter third of your presidency. So let me hold discussion of that off until we can get to it.

DICKEY: The early years that we're talking about now, in respect to fraternity and Jewish discrimination issues, did not bring up the problem of--or, the question of--the numbers in any acute way, so far as I recall.

DANIELL: So the education, self-education, you got through your experience in the Truman Commission itself and--
DICKEY: Basically in the Truman Commission itself and talking with people such as Mrs. Sulzberger. We had several pretty serious talks.

DANIELL: What other things besides this Truman Civil Rights Commission? Something--you mentioned a Committee on Nuclear Disarmament.

DICKEY: Well, this was almost my last major governmental responsibility, and came several years later when Mr. [Dean] Acheson was Secretary of State. Indeed, during his last year as Secretary of State in 1953 I'd kept in fairly close touch with him. I'd worked for him during the war as a chief of one of the divisions that reported to him, the World Trade Intelligence Division, and running the blacklist. He and I had hit it off, as far as I was concerned, wonderfully well. And his testimony subsequently bears that out. But he then went in-- As a matter of fact, I played a small part in his coming to the department while Cordell Hull was still the secretary, as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Economic Affairs. I was down in Washington for the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1940, which was the last big renewal fight that Hull went through to get the act renewed on the Hill, and they got me to come down on a leave-of-absence from the law firm for about three months or so, I guess it was--three or four months maybe; maybe a month or two longer--to work on that renewal with the people in the State Department.

At about that time, Henry Grady--who had succeeded my first boss in the State Department, Francis Bowes Sayre--Grady was leaving the department, and they wanted to fill that critical spot of Assistant Secretary in charge of Economic Affairs with a strong man. And Acheson was proposed, even though he had resigned to Franklin Roosevelt as Under Secretary of the Treasury back in the early days of the New Deal because he was dissatisfied with the way they were developing policy in the Treasury. Well, Acheson-- Did I ever tell you this?

DANIELL: You told me about your getting the trade agreement renewed, but not about--

DICKEY: Not about this?

DANIELL: No.

DICKEY: Well, this is just apropos of my relationship with Acheson, which leads into the Nuclear Disarmament Committee which he set up later. But in 1940 he was quite doubtful he wanted to come back into the Roosevelt administration. I hadn't met him before. I didn't know him before this meeting. Or I guess I had met him, but I certainly didn't know him well.
And he was wondering how he would get along in economics--economics hadn't been his primary field--and so forth. So Hull turned over the discussions with Mr. Acheson to Harry Hawkins, who was in charge of the trade agreements program and one of my most intimate friends at any time in Washington. And Hawkins-- I was just finishing up working on the renewal of the Act in '40.

So before I went back to the law office, Harry took me aside and said, "The secretary wants to try to get Dean Acheson to come in as Assistant Secretary of State to succeed Henry Grady." He said, "I don't think I'm going to cut any ice with Acheson because I'm not a lawyer, and I don't know this gentleman very well, and so forth. You worked on the legal aspects of the Act back when it was passed." And he used a lot of baloney to get me to come in and help him do this. So I met in Hawkins' office one day with Acheson to talk with him about the job that they were offering him. Which is a little presumptuous that I should tell him whether I thought it was something that he ought to be interested in. In any event, that was the beginning of what became a very close friendship. And then, as I said, I worked for him in that while he was on that job. He became in charge of Economic Warfare for the State Department during the war. And I was chief of one of the divisions, the Division of World Trade Intelligence and handled blacklist work. So I saw a lot of him then. Then when I left the—

[End of Tape 41, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 41, Side B]

--fill in one of the gaps in respect to things that I decided not to do right now. Because I resigned to [James F.] Byrnes in the summer of '45 when we came back from the San Francisco Conference. I had to wait until Byrnes came back from the Paris Conference, which was one of the big things he had to do for the president right there in the summer of--August of--'45 in order to make my resignation to him in person and politely and to thank him for his kindnesses to me. And when I did see him, he said, "Well, I've been thinking about this. I'm sorry to hear you're leaving. Would you consider taking on the job that MacLeish has had as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of these things, international and cultural?" He went right on to say, "If you would, I'm pretty sure the president will accept my recommendation--would accept my recommendation." Well, I had no difficulties with that one. At that point I'd told the Dartmouth people I was coming. So I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, it's mighty nice to leave with that kind of an expression of confidence. But I'm committed to going, and I'm going to go to Dartmouth."
Well, that's apropos of the fact that Acheson had left the department at about that time. Then he came back in as under secretary and then later as secretary under Truman. In '51 when he was under secretary, he and [David E.] Lilienthal put out the Acheson & Lilienthal Report, one of the most far-sighted proposals for bringing nuclear armaments--nuclear power, really--nuclear armaments under international control that we've ever had or probably ever will have for some time to come. But that didn't get anywhere because the Russians vetoed--or wouldn't take it. In 1951--maybe it was in '50--they had gotten the thermonuclear device, the so-called nitrogen bomb to the point where they knew they were going to run a very major test. Probably had the answer and were going to be able to produce a thermonuclear bomb. Which of course I didn't know and nobody else knew except the very highest levels of the government.

Well, Acheson was deeply perplexed about this. Very worried that they hadn't been able to get acceptance of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposals, and [Bernard] Baruch took them to the U.N., you remember. The Russians wouldn't take it. And here he was, the Secretary of State, advising Truman on the most critical things about the future, knowing that they were at a point where they'd be testing a thermonuclear device in relatively short order. And I know this from what he told me. He said, "I've just decided that the outlook for doing anything about control is about as dim as it could be. But that I wouldn't feel right in the future if I hadn't made one more effort to see whether there was anything that we were overlooking that we weren't doing that could conceivably be done to bring this device under control--if and when we got it." As he was sure they would.

So I got a call along in I guess it was '51--just when I don't remember--to come down, and he told me about these things. And said that he would like to set up a committee, that would be responsible simply to him, as an advisory group to see--to take a whole fresh look--at this question of nuclear disarmament and the control of nuclear armaments to see whether there was something that conceivably was worth trying again before we went down the chute with the bomb, with the hydrogen bomb. And he said, "I'm picking out a group of people: [Robert] Oppenheimer; Alan Dulles, who was head of CIA; Joe Johnson, who was head of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the scientist who'd been principal scientist during the war, the MIT man [Vannevar Bush]."
DICKEY: No. No, Teller had played the scientific role of the breakthrough on it. But this was the group to review it. No, the one who headed up the--for Roosevelt--the scientific work. Oh, I know his name better than I know my own, but it's getting away from me. And he said, "I think we could get Mac Bundy to act as a secretary for your group." And there were one or two more people on it. And he said, "I'd like you fellows to take this subject and just take it apart. And come back and tell me whether there's anything that we've overlooked." Well, this was some assignment. I had not been involved in those things at all. We chose Oppenheimer to be chairman of our group. He arranged for us to meet at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton a good part of that summer of '52; we'd been meeting earlier. We went around and talked with [James Bryant] Conant. We went around and talked with the nuclear physicist at Columbia, Rabi. And visited other people. And then stayed together, living together, at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton through Oppenheimer's hospitality the summer of '52.

This was a sterile outcome as far as the decision was concerned. We really came up with-- The best we could do was to say that this is so critical that we ought to fight for time. Because they were coming up to the Eisenhower election. Stevenson was running, and surely there was going to be a change of presidents, and the judgment of all of us was that the change of presidents really shouldn't happen within two weeks of the outgoing president setting off something like this, something of this sort. It would be a more responsible thing if we could get this held over for six months to a year while the new president learned his way into this thing and decided whether there was any way--

DANIELL: Held off the explosion of the bomb?

DICKEY: The explosion--the test--which would determine whether we did have a nitrogen bomb.

DANIELL: Do you mean nitrogen or hydrogen?

DICKEY: Hydrogen...hydrogen. I'm saying nitrogen all the time.

DANIELL: I didn't know whether I'd--

DICKEY: No, the hydrogen bomb.

DANIELL: Okay.
DICKEY: Well, after we'd spent all this time together and were thinking about it, and Oppenheimer describing the science of this device, as we constantly called it, something which I took a negative attitude about, I just felt I didn't need to understand the science. I didn't want to be burdened with knowing it. He kept insisting that we had to know it. So that I just blocked it out of my mind when we would sit and listen to these things, and never could have been of any use to anybody by way of purveying that information. Others on our committee were more interested in it than I was.

Well, in any event, along in September, I guess it was, we'd gone as far as we could go. The election was only two months down the road. And we decided that we'd make an interim report to Mr. Acheson, and I was chosen, as a person who knew him quite well personally, and Oppenheimer, as the chairman of our group, to carry the suggestion to him that the best we could come up with was the postponement. His response to it was, well, thank you very much, gentlemen. You've done what I asked you to do. I am not surprised that you don't come up with something substantive. But it's just out of the question for us to postpone this. Everything is in motion. The president might conceivably have a mutiny on his hands if at this point he was unwilling to go forward with it. So that our recommendation for a holding action was regarded by the secretary as being utterly unrealistic. And that was that.

DANIELL: That's a good abrupt ending to a story. The group never attempted to function--?

DICKEY: No.

DANIELL: No? No. Beyond that. At one--

DICKEY: You see, this was a group set up by Acheson, and in November the election took Truman out of office and--

DANIELL: We want to break very soon. But we're probably near the end. This is a unit. I had down here public governor of the New York Stock exchange, you mentioned last time.

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: Was that while you were president of Dartmouth?

DICKEY: Oh, yes.

DANIELL: Really!
DICKEY: And I've been careless about not getting that into various biographical summaries. When was that? '51? '52? Well, it was in the early fifties, I can tell you that. This was maybe '52 to '54, something like that. Keith Funston was president of the stock exchange. A very young man who was transforming the stock exchange by his leadership. He had been president of Trinity College before that, and I'd gotten to know him there. Apparently he had thought well of me--although we've never become close friends. We met, actually, at these meetings of the New England Association of Colleges and Universities. He and I came onto the job at about the same time in '45. He went to Trinity, and I came to Dartmouth. He was on the Trinity job, I think, actually before I was on the Dartmouth job. Mr. Hopkins took me to the first Trinity meeting--the first meeting at Trinity. Well, he invited me, on behalf of the board of governors, to become one of the public members. They were just beginning this practice of appointing a member who had nothing to do with the investment community or the investment industry to be a totally independent voting member of the board of governors of the stock exchange. I would go down for meetings I think every two weeks.

DANIELL: Really? That frequent?

DICKEY: Very frequent. It worked out that I could do other college business down there. And it was an educational experience and one which gave me a good bit of reassurance concerning the sense of responsibility of the people who were on that board. I don't think it was just because I was there, because I was there for a meeting. But on many matters they were more stringent than I would have thought was necessary. They had their limitations as to what they wanted to do, or would accept. But it was two years of learning to respect a group of financial business people that I had never had any great exposure to.

DANIELL: Well, I should think just in terms of the fundraising capacities or the needs of the College and the need to do a little bit more--

DICKEY: Yes. In that respect it was a public service that had some relevance to those aspects of the College. I don't know if anything directly came out of it. But I had a very pleasant experience. When I left, they were very nice to me. I still have a pair of solid-gold cufflinks that say NYSE on them. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Oh, wow!
DICKEY: And so forth. But I don't think I had any great influence in changing anything during that period. It was essentially another experience in my education.

DANIELL: Well, that, of all the things we mentioned before in terms of outside activity, I've got everything on my list crossed off. Are there others? You probably don't want to go on any longer today, but if there are others, since we have been talking about it, should we cover them?

DICKEY: Well, I guess not especially in this period. When I graduated from law school, I did have a--very shortly after I graduated from law school and went into the Boston law firm--I did have a decision to make which could have been a very fundamental one in taking my life in a different direction than it took.

DANIELL: Massachusetts commissioner?

DICKEY: Yes. Did I tell you about that?

DANIELL: You told me.

DICKEY: Well then, that's on the record. But that was an extension of the experience I'd had while I was in law school, working my way through law school in the Massachusetts Department of Corrections. And my decision not to accept the--

DANIELL: Yes, we went very thoroughly--

DICKEY: --offer of that, to head up the Rehabilitation Institution.

DANIELL: We went very thoroughly over that.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, we've done that. So okay, let's call it quits for a while.

DANIELL: Okay.

**February 9, 1978**


**Pause**

DICKEY: All right. Well....
DANIELL: Or we can wait.

DICKEY: No, let's get them out of the way because it won't take any great length of time. And we had started with references to a number of the things that I either was asked to do, or realized I was about to be asked to do, and pulled the chain on the matter before it reached the point of having to decline to do something that I knew I wasn't going to do anyway. I think the most important thing to say here is that--and I may have said it before--is that I did not come to the Dartmouth presidency with any thought of going on to something else. I really, so far as one can know himself, regarded this as a lifetime commitment if it went well. And above all, I did not fancy myself as being interested in other academic presidencies or that sort of thing.

DANIELL: You didn't say that before, and that's, I think, very important.

DICKEY: My interest was in this institution, the purposes of this institution and its singularity. Not in being an academic administrator. As far as being just a professional administrator is concerned, I would have preferred to have stayed in government or, as I had several opportunities in foundation work, just as far as straight administration is concerned. It was the educational side of the opportunity and the educational side of the opportunity in this particular institution that really attracted me and made it easy for me to decide I wasn't going to do other things. The other things were primarily of three sorts.

I've mentioned earlier, the one before I really got started. I was in penal work and, as a very young man, asked to take on a head of an institution under circumstances that would have been very, very difficult. But I had the good sense, as I see it, to know that that was not something I wanted. Well then, when I went down to the State Department with Francis Bowes Sayre, to be his assistant, I was appointed, at the same time, an assistant to the legal advisor. I don't know why the double appointment except that he did want to use me on legal work, particularly on the legal work related to the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act which he had responsibility for. This led, in the course of the next six years, from '34 when I went down to the State Department to '40, several offers from the legal advisor to come in and make my future with him as a senior member of his staff. And again, that was pretty clear to me that this was not what I wanted. If I was going to practice law, there were other opportunities to practice law that would have been more to my liking. Indeed I left the State Department, my job with Sayre, in 1936, very reluctantly, to go back and reestablish--establish--myself somewhat as a lawyer with the Gaston,
Snow, Hunt, Rice and Boyd law firm that I'd been with in Boston before, simply because I felt a necessity, if I was going to have that alternative available in the future, of establishing myself as a lawyer.

Well, those were some of the things that came up then. Actually, the other area was in the area of college presidencies, deans. I was approached about taking on the deanship of a school of international studies--actually, it was the Tufts -- what's it called? -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy -- at one point as to whether I'd be interested in that while I was in the State Department. And I wasn't at that time. Well, in the area of institutions, I very quickly really decided that I wasn't interested in this sort of thing, and that I wasn't going to permit people to get into what I regarded as the unnecessarily embarrassing position of making an offer and then having it turned down. And this took place with respect to the University of Chicago, which interestingly enough at one time Mr. Hopkins had been approached by; it took place with respect to the University of Denver in telephone conversations.

DANIELL: Denver? Why did they think they could get you there?

DICKEY: Well, I'd been on their Social Science Board out there. And so when they had need to find a--

DANIELL: Was this through [Donald C.] Don McKinlay ['37]?

DICKEY: No, no, no. I didn't know Don at all, or very little, at that point. And they called up and wanted to know whether I'd conceivably be available to them. And I just was—

DANIELL: After you were here?

DICKEY: Yes. After I was here. A trustee of--well, trustees of two Ivy institutions felt me out. And one of them went so far as to say he had hoped I would be available for his institution before I came here. And it's nice to hear. But since nothing in the way of offer, that sort of thing, eventuated, I think I'll just skip those names. But the things which-- And I have already mentioned, I believe, the Rockefeller Foundation presidency. Actually another major foundation, the head of another major foundation, had been interested in the possibility that when I left State Department, I would--

DANIELL: This was Carnegie. I think you mentioned.

DICKEY: Carnegie, Yes. That I would come with them.
That's the one you had mentioned before.

Then I went through a series of decisions involving the State Department. I've mentioned the one that when I left the department in '45 to come here and resigned to Secretary Byrnes, he tried to persuade me, really, to stay. And said that he knew he could get the president to appoint me assistant secretary in charge of this whole area of public affairs and cultural relations and so forth. But that was, again, rather easy. I'd made up my mind I was coming to Dartmouth, and I had to just be clear about that with him.

The first one that I was really sorry that I couldn't be more affirmative in my attitude towards was an approach made to me by Secretary Acheson, when he became secretary of the department, asked me to come down to be assistant secretary for him. Well, I was just at that point really getting things moving here. I had the greatest admiration for Secretary Acheson, and we had been close. I'd worked for him during the war. But I just had to write back and say I just couldn't do this.

This was in the early fifties probably?

Well, this would have to have been before '52, of course. They went out in- - This was probably 1950. No, it may have been '49. But somewhere about there. Interestingly enough, I was offered that particular assistant secretaryship four times by different secretaries, different presidents. And the one--without going back into those details--the one that is of some interest was the one at the time, was the offer that came up, through Dean Rusk when he was going in as Secretary of State for Kennedy. He didn't know before he called me I had turned down Adlai Stevenson, who had wanted me to come down as his number two man at the U.N. where he was just going in as ambassador to the U.N.--an opportunity which would have been very attractive to me. But here again, I was reasonably clear I just couldn't go in and out of this job and do what I was committed to doing. And therefore I just had to say I wasn't able to take that on.

I had one other unusual and interesting offer, which came a little later. John Foster Dulles, when he was Secretary of State, came at me, and got me to come down and spend an evening at his house with Smith, his right-hand man, the former general. Dulles-- I can spot this exactly. This was in 1954-55 when the United Nations Charter required that there should be a review, a ten-year review--I don't know whether you remember the charter?

Yes, yes, yes. I remember.
DICKEY: And Dulles wanted me to take charge of that. Well, this interested me because I'd worked on these things. But here again, we had problems that I wanted to--felt I had to--stay with, and I told him that I couldn't do it. I was also mindful--I think I should say I was also very doubtful that there was anything that could come of a review at that point. And in particular, I was not at all--I didn't share--his confidence that he wouldn't have a big problem on his hands with Henry Cabot Lodge, who was then the U.N. ambassador, and a fellow who was accustomed to having his way about many things. And to have an outsider, so to speak, a junior person, come in and take over the revision of the charter work in the State Department while he was ambassador in the U.N., seemed to me to be an invitation to the kind of trouble I just didn't need. Dulles was very confident that he could take care of that, as he was confident of many things. But I was pleased that Dulles regarded me that way, even though I had to say that it wasn't something I could do.

DANIELL: Did someone else take the position?

DICKEY: No. In due course it became clear that this wasn't--I don't think anybody else took the position. I think it became clear that nothing was going to come of it. The man who took the position that Adlai Stevenson offered to me just as he was going into the job was Francis Plimpton who did become number two to Stevenson. And this would have been an attractive, useful thing. I had served while Acheson was secretary as a consultant to the U.S. Delegation at the U.N. on the collective measures work; and had a continuing, serious interest in the U.N. But none of those fitted into what I felt was the need for a strong continuity of leadership here. I just was clear that moving in and out of these things for six months or for a year was not going to be compatible with what I thought I could do and at least was going to try to do. So that's about the story on the principal things that I had to make a decision about.

DANIELL: You know, the interesting thing about what you've said in those is that the dating of them all, with the exception of the one with Dean Rusk, comes at a time in which from your point of view is premature to even consider leaving Dartmouth.

DICKEY: Well, this was definitely true of the Rockefeller Foundation presidency in '46 or '47; I guess it was '47. Very definitely true. And the Rusk one came, of course, when he was going in with Kennedy. That was in '60, wasn't it?

DANIELL: 'Sixty. That's it.
DICKEY: And that's when Adlai Stevenson went in as U.N. ambassador.

DANIELL: That must have been-- You'd been here 15 years by then.

DICKEY: That would have been a thing that I could have done if I was prepared to just leave Dartmouth.

DANIELL: To leave Dartmouth, right. Yes.

DICKEY: This I wasn't prepared to do. So that was the real crux of the decision. And another thing which, of course, gets into one's thinking about something like that was I was conscious of the fact that I had put the major portion of my career on the line here. That if I was going to retire from anyplace, it had to be from here. Because I wasn't going to retire from the State Department or whatnot. And Chris and I had taken a decision--not a decision but a judgment--that if we made it to Dartmouth's bicentennial in '69, which would be around our 25 years (and I've always paid a silly amount of attention to that kind of round number), that we would blow the whistle. So we had to look forward to what retirement we would have because we just didn't have independent means to provide for our retirement. So that was about it.

DANIELL: I haven't any more questions about that actually. It seems to me that that's--all it reminds me of is the—

[End of Tape 41, Side B]  
[Beginning of Tape 42, Side A]

DANIELL: ...what you had accomplished here at Dartmouth, that it would have been very difficult--

DICKEY: Well, we were moving in a way that gave you confidence that it was worthwhile.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: You weren't fighting battles all the time that you were always losing, or that weren't of any consequence whether you won them or not. No, I look back upon that period as a very satisfying period. And while the Vietnam malaise came onto the country from, oh, '65, '66--from '66 on--and it was a difficult period for anybody in positions of responsibility in higher education, by and large what I had set my sights on doing had been done.
DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And the challenge at that point was to keep your nerve and not get pushed downstream.

DANIELL: You know, that struck me very much. As I said, I went to the indexes this afternoon before I came over here to see what we had talked about and what we hadn't. And you had listed some of the things that you saw as major areas in which the College could be--should adjust to both changing conditions and the opportunity of a new presidency. And those, not one of them had to-- Well, we'll put it the other way around: Every one, it seemed to me, had been accomplished in--

DICKEY: Well, we did. We'd broken the sound barrier on the capital gifts campaign, the '57 campaign. I knew that if I stayed until retirement, there would be another one coming along. And I knew that I could live with that and probably do a reasonably good job from the experience that I'd had on that. But the broad strategies, the purpose, the size of the place, the re-founding of the associated schools, and the decisions on the graduate work, these were the big, strategic, educational decisions that we had to learn our way into.

DANIELL: That is what I thought you'd done earlier, it seems to me, in terms of establishing criteria for admissions, which guaranteed a strong student body.

DICKEY: Yes. We were in a--

DANIELL: And faculty, too.

DICKEY: --strong, reasonably strong, position then. And it was on the up and up. Well, where do we go from here?

DANIELL: Okay. Well, let's go to the concrete questions that I had about having accomplished what was accomplished in the fifties. There were certain transitions in personnel. The decisions you had to make about maintaining the quality of the people in the offices who had worked so well. And I'm thinking in particular of the response to the sudden and tragic death of Don Morrison.

DICKEY: Yes. When was it that Don died? Which year? Do you recall?

DANIELL: I think it was '58 or '59, wasn't it? Or it may have been a year earlier. It'd be easy to pinpoint that, but I'm not exactly sure when it was.
DICKEY: Yes. Well neither am I.

DANIELL: It was the late fifties.

DICKEY: Of course it was a traumatic experience. I'll never forget the morning. I was working in the office, and the call came through from a man down at Princeton on the Princeton faculty whose name is escaping me now. He came onto the telephone-- Or Miss [Dorothy] Cleaveland told me that this man on the Princeton faculty, whom I don't think I knew (I may have just met), was on the telephone. So I picked up the telephone, and he said, "I have very heavy news for you. Don died here last night." And it didn't penetrate who Don was. I knew that he'd gone out on a trip that week, but it just didn't come through to me that it was Don Morrison. I knew a Don down at Princeton, one of my secretaries who was a good friend of mine, and I thought, well, why would they be calling me about that. I really wasn't that close to him. And suddenly [clapping sound] it hit me. My God! He's talking about Don Morrison. And he had died in his sleep at this man's house. One of the hardest things I've ever had to do in my life--and you learn what you can do and what you can't do when moments of this sort arise.

But one of the most difficult things was that it was clearly up to me to go tell Betty. I was the first one to know in Hanover. And I thought for a few moments as to whether there was anybody else who would be more appropriate, better, to go. They were not church people. There was no minister, at least that I was aware of, that could take the responsibility. And I found out--had to call around--to find out where she was. She was over here in the old Clark School gymnasium building where they had a sculpturing class. I don't know whether you remember that period.

DANIELL: Yes, I remember those.

DICKEY: She was upstairs on the second floor in there. I had to hunt all over for her, I remember. I found her, and I went--

DANIELL: I think Dick Wagner was the one who taught those classes.

DICKEY: What's that?

DANIELL: I think Dick Wagner was the one who taught those classes. But anyway that's--
DICKEY: Yes. But I went up the stairs to the second floor where these sculpturing studios were. I went into the room, and obviously my face betrayed something. And she jumped to the conclusion that something awful had happened. She said, "What has happened?" And, well, I said, "Don's died down in Princeton very suddenly." Well, it was a helluva mission.

But to move on from that, I think this came at--I know it came at a time when I had one of these outside things up. But it came at a time when I just wasn't prepared for making a change of leadership in that office. I was very well satisfied with the way it was going. Don had made his way immensely well with the faculty. He was enjoying it as far as I ever knew. He'd had a couple of opportunities for presidencies if he'd wanted them. But that was it. We just had to face the fact that we had to get another leadership in there.

Well, I consulted with quite a few friends on the faculty, talked with some of the trustees about it, talked with people on the outside that I had confidence in who knew our situation, and I was never quite confident that- Well, I guess I more accurately could say I knew that I was going to have to have a different setup than I'd had with Don there. I remember I talked with Jack [John] Wolfenden about it--who was a very savvy, broad-gauged, and a person about as free of malicious interest as any of us. And I'd had my eye upon, and thought very highly of, John Masland and Leonard Rieser who was then over in Physics, and Arthur Jensen who later came in there. And a number of others. I was reasonably clear that I just didn't want to take a chance on somebody from the outside none of us knew at that point. So I thought probably I should stay inside. And John Masland was, I think, at all points a front runner among the people who had a good bit of maturity and had good standing in the academic world and so forth.

So I decided to divide the thing up a bit with John taking on the dean of faculty's job and Leonard going in as deputy handling the science side. Partly to really leave a little leeway for adjusting these jobs and trying out people. Now, Leonard has remained in the administration, but the fact was he'd had no administrative background, really, up to that point. And I can remember when I told Jack Wolfenden what I was thinking about--and I asked Jack, let me say this--I said, "Is this something that you would want to take on for a while? And I know it's not the sort of thing you'd wanted to make a career of." He said, "No. It's not something that I would want to even think about."

DANIELL: --probably.
DICKEY: But I remember his saying, he said, "Well, I guess--" I asked him to confer with me from time to time while I was trying to make up my mind on these things. And at one point he said, "I'm sure John Masland would make a good provost--be the [Dean of] Faculty"--I forget which title we were using then.

DANIELL: It was provost.

DICKEY: He said, "I'm sure he would make a good one." He said, "I'm inclined to think that your suggestion that you begin to bring Leonard along into the administrative side of things is a brilliant thought." He said, "It never occurred to me. But the more I think about it, it could be really a very brilliant move. Try it out and see how it goes with him and with the job." Well, these things went quite well. We brought in shortly after that, I guess--I'm not clear just on the sequence--but Arthur Jensen came in. I'd known Arthur through the Great Issues Course when he'd been a director of the Great Issues Course for several years. Had the highest regard for his integrity and decency and fundamental commitment to the institution. I think what was evident to me then was some misgivings about his appropriateness for the job turned out to be true. He was a little quick on his judgments, anxious to produce. But so willing and so anxious that frequently he would--as I once said to him--tended to skid on the corners. But that was something we could take care of.

John Masland took on a very major responsibility. He was a very satisfactory person. He did not have the imaginative penetration, I would guess, on administrative problems of Don. But he had a steady style, unquestioned integrity. People who dealt with him never, so far as I knew, felt they were dealing with a slippery person or anything of that sort.

DANIELL: Arthur, I think, said he didn't get along as well. Or people found it more difficult to work with John Masland than they had with Don Morrison. I tended to read from that a more clashing of personalities than-- Again, I don't know. Arthur is, as you say, so quick he's--

DICKEY: I wouldn't be surprised if this was so. But they were very different people. Don Morrison and John had different strengths. So that what we were involved in--what I was involved in--was trying out different organizations, different personalities, to see what combination we could put together with Don's passing. Then we went through--and John Masland had borne a considerable amount of the burden of this--the controversy in the medical school between the microbiologists and the clinicians. Or, the people who were primarily interested in medical education and the people who were primarily interested in biologic research. This was an annoying experience.
It was annoying mainly to my mind because the people on both sides were mainly able people. But I also had the experience of learning how rigid certain scientists, certain scientific types, can get when it comes to administrative judgments, where you've got to make a fit between imperfect pieces.

In this area, in this medical school side of things, I really decided I just had to take this right on myself, and told John Masland that. And we made a mistake--no question about it--I made a mistake in my judgment (in that I had a lot of company) in respect to [Gil]Bert Mudge as an administrator. Assistant dean at Johns Hopkins Medical School, recommended to me as a person and as a very desirable recruit by two men I respected as much as any two men in medicine--Dr. Barry Woods of Johns Hopkins and Dr. Robert Loeb of P&S, both trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, both sophisticated medical men.

DANIELL: Both wrong.

DICKEY: And both said he'd be-- Well, Bert was a strong-minded character who hadn't, I think I'd have to say, the minimum requirements for administrative adaptability. He went through-- Well, it was our fault. We made the mistake. We brought him here, convinced him to come. We went through an awful experience with some of these characters in the medical school. Some of them were, in my judgment, just utterly unsuited to the kind of non-scientific judgments that they were involved in making. And I had to say to them that as far as I was concerned, we had reached the point where I was sure the amount of federal grant money that was going to be available was coming into a plateau, and it may well be that it was going to be less rather than even in the foreseeable future, and that we had to be very, very careful that we didn't get caught out with less money than we needed to operate. We were operating on a very thin margin, of course.

Well, this became sufficiently irreparable that we just had no alternative but to do what should have been done probably earlier, to recognize that putting together a group of microbiologists who--molecular biologists as they prefer to be called--who had very little commitment to medical education, was a fundamental strategic mistake. This was the bet that [Stephen] Marsh Tenney made when we brought him on as dean, that we could move our quality up fast and relate to the science side of the College with these molecular biologists. And this would be strength for a two-year school. And for a period it was. And it did all of the things that Marsh thought it would do. But what he hadn't foreseen--and God knows I didn't foresee--was that in due course these people were going to just be
incapable of accepting the professional commitment necessary to a professional school.

DANIELL: Did John Masland get caught in the middle on this?

DICKEY: Oh, he got caught right in the middle on this. He knew that Bert was not going to be able to handle these things. Leonard was in the middle, too. I don't want to give the impression of being Jack the Giant-Killer here, but neither of these men was capable of resolving this.

DANIELL: A few people cheered on the sides--myself included--that you would be Jack the Giant-Killer, as we saw what these difficulties--

DICKEY: No. Leonard was caught with the scientists.

DANIELL: That's right.

DICKEY: Who were working on him. And I had to be careful that I didn't turn my judgment over to him. I had confidence in him, but I knew that he was being worked on by that side. And John just didn't know where this could come out, and wasn't really prepared to face the fact that some heads had to roll. And this was the decision that I ultimately decided we had to live with. And the threat of the molecular biologists resigning was too bad, but it was necessary. And as it turned out, it was. And it worked out very well.

DANIELL: Yes. I got that personally from Lou Morton who I think was probably quite close to John during this, and he liked to talk to a lot of people about a lot of things.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: And I suspect he would have been in the same position, fundamentally, as John Masland, in seeing both negative and positive things in--

DICKEY: Well, they were vulnerable to friendship and faculty attitudes more than I was.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I wasn't as vulnerable to that. But of course this was very rough. Bert Mudge, of course, has never forgiven me for not being willing to just back him to doomsday. But okay. I at one point finally had to say to Bert, "Bert, we've made a mistake. And I've just got to ask you to put this job down. Your professorship is secure. But there's no possibility of a way we can
"put this together." Now I had been coming to this judgment on my own for some time. But the thing which really nailed it down and clinched it was when the people on his side of the argument came to me and said, "Bert can never lead us out of this wilderness." So when he lost his own troops--I don't know whether he ever knew that--I decided that was it.

DANIELL:  His side is the side toward the molecular biologists? Or...?

DICKEY:  No, his group were the M.D.'s.

DANIELL:  Yes. Okay.

DICKEY:  They were the M.D.'s. He was an M.D. He'd been brought up in the discipline of Johns Hopkins where the M.D.'s were top dogs.

DANIELL:  Yes, yes, yes. That's exactly what I wanted to get on the record because it's parallel to [inaudible].

DICKEY:  And in this sense his commitment was to the M.D. side of the school. But he had no flexibility for purposes of administrative accommodation. I don't know whether anybody could have, to be quite honest about it. I'm not at all sure if there was anybody that could've taken that oil and water and put it together.

DANIELL:  Yes, yes, yes. Did you in the process of this--? And again, coming at it from someone who at that point was a junior member of the faculty, finding the Dartmouth that I had come back to as a faculty member was, from a professional point of view as a professional academician, a much more attractive place as a group of faculty people than what it might have been 15 years earlier, I know one of the concerns of people like Lou Morton was that the president of the institution may be taking a step backwards here in the direction of a commitment to a professionally prestigious and--

DICKEY:  Well, that's right. What you had to reckon with--and what I had to make a judgment about, and then there are some things I look back on and know I was wrong about and some that I'm not sure where I came out. On this one I have no question at all--I'm just as comfortable as a clam deep down in the sand. These molecular people were internationally known people. This appealed to people in the sciences. They liked, of course, this kind of college. This had attracted a lot of attention and this sort of thing. And Marsh Tenney, who brought these people here and had backed them, had lost complete confidence in their ability to fit into a medical school. Which was a factor in this. Kurt Benershke, who was a pretty quiet, savvy fellow, said, "These people will never walk the same route as the other people."
They're good. Some of them are brilliant and so forth. But they won't make a primary commitment to medical education.

So then this bunch began to go after guys like Lou Morton and Stocky [Walter Stockmayer] and people like this. And all this would fall to pieces and so forth. And then they went after this fellow down at Harvard, the Nobel Laureate, very well known fellow, scientist, biologist. Well, no matter. But he then tried to get at me through a friend of mine, Jerry Swope, and told me that we were losing these great fellows and so forth. Well, at that point I decided that if this was the way this game was going to be played, okay. We were going to liquidate this thing.

DANIELL: A lot easier if you knew--

DICKEY: So I became, in this respect, clear-- Indeed, part of my clarity came through an opportunity I had to go around the world with the Rockefeller Foundation's doctors. We went to New Zealand and visited universities, and went to India and visited medical schools primarily, and Thailand and so forth. And everywhere I went, I found that where this issue had gotten into especially into biochemistry, the only way they thought they could solve it was to set up two departments of biochemistry: one in the medical school and one in the university. Well, the moment that I began to hear and see this, I just decided that we'd better come to terms with what had to be done.

DANIELL: Was John Masland's position--resignation--a decision to leave Dartmouth? Do you see it as connected with the difficulties encountered in trying to weigh various commitments?

DICKEY: No, I don't think so. John-- Insofar as anything I know. If there was something behind it, I wasn't privy to it; that would be something else. But John had talked with me earlier about the fact that he didn't want to spend his whole career in academic administration, that he wanted to have a go at international affairs. John also was not a strong person physically, as we found out, of course. And he had been candid with me about this, that he'd had a continuing heart-- And something that I guess something Mary had never known about, as far as I know. But he had told me that he had a situation that he just didn't want to push too far.

DANIELL: Oh, really? That's the first time that that story had--.

DICKEY: I had been told--I've never asked Mary about this--but I had been told that Mary didn't know this.
DANIELL: I haven't talked with her, so I don't know. But, you know, Ralph Hunter was apparently very close to John Masland and knew him very well. And he was, of course, the best man at Ralph's wedding. And he said that--John Masland said--that he had a frame of life that he wanted to work ten years, or roughly ten years, and he was going to go do something else.

DICKEY: This is what he told me. That's what he told me. He said, "I feel very strongly that I don't want to retire from academic administration and academic teaching. I want to go on to--" And of course he'd had a taste of this in the State Department. And I think he was successful and enjoyed his Ford Foundation assignment very much.

DANIELL: I suppose at that point, then, Leonard was the obvious person, basically, to take over those responsibilities--or to continue to do them. There was always a--

DICKEY: Yes, that's right. By this time Leonard had made up his mind that he liked academic administration, and that he could succeed in it and wanted to do it. The trying-out period was over. He was clearly the best bet at that point as far as we were concerned. And Leonard had very, very great strengths. He had certain limitations, as we all do. I think one of them which I constantly tried to beef up a bit was his certain tendency to wait--procrastination--for something to decide itself. Which is all right as long as somebody else is out there saying, for God's sake, let's get this settled.

DANIELL: Well, I daresay just exactly what everyone--what Howe [?] and others say they-- He was a tower of strength in many ways, but that's exactly the same observation.

DICKEY: Well, you couldn't miss it. You couldn't miss it. And it on occasion served him well. But it was one of the realities of his makeup that a person in my job had to, at times, press pretty hard.

DANIELL: There was a question I was going to ask. But since you've already answered it and since it's corroborated by everything else that's come in here, that the two decisions after Don Morrison's death, to go to John Masland and Leonard Rieser, were almost-- Having made the decision that they should be internal, they were almost--they were clearly the logical choices.

DICKEY: No, nobody was being pushed by faculty friends for the positions that I recall.

[End of Tape 42, Side A]
...the jarring appointment that Don Morrison's was, because much of what Morrison had been appointed for had in fact already been accomplished.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, once we got the medical school relatively settled, once we made clear that there was a point beyond which we wouldn't go with the molecular biologists in turning this thing over to him--which it just became just about that--then things began to fall into place. We had to replace a dean. I took that one on myself. And as I say, it was not pleasant, but that was it. That's the way mistakes, personnel, sometimes are. And then we recruited Carl Chapman. We looked all over the lot. I guess I've told you about a very unpleasant experience I had in Chapman's recruitment.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. We went over the medical school stuff in the unit on...

DICKEY: Well, let's not go back over that.

DANIELL: No, there's no need for that. This is in this context it was the relationship to Masland that I was particularly interested in. You've already discussed that.

DICKEY: Well, I can only sum up by saying I had the highest respect for John Masland. I never regretted the decision that I made about putting John in that job. There were limits, limits of strength almost, that he had to take into account and which I had to take into account. And it wasn't entirely just physical strength. He's a man of character, but he was not given to taking on unpleasant things.

DANIELL: Yes, difficult decisions and so forth.

DICKEY: He was a good counselor and so forth. So that's--

DANIELL: Okay. The other major error in this is really the dean of students. Now, Joe McDonald had come on up to the period for his retirement. You made what seemed to me a very dramatic decision in going out for Thad Seymour for his replacement.

DICKEY: Well, Joe was just right--just right--for what I wanted at that time. There had been very real problems and differences of approach--and most especially differences of style--between Pudge and a number of close associates, including myself. I've never worked with a more loyal, committed colleague than Pudge. But once again, there was a quickness about his judgments that frequently, it seemed to me, landed him into
positions that it was very difficult to sustain. And without drawing other people into it, this was something that I was privy to from Mr. Hopkins's day. They'd been personally very close, but there'd been problems of this sort. So when Pudge put the job down, and I think undoubtedly in part because he was aware that we just had a different style about these things--

DANIELL: He said the same thing.

DICKEY: I decided that I wanted to get somebody in there that was not too fast on the draw, but who was really a very stable, solid person who had faculty experience, and had the kind of personality that well you might characterize as that of an old-fashioned, old-time dean. Well, I looked around, again, over dozens of people, and conferred with quite a few. I remember one man I conferred with, and I said much to him as I did to Jack Wolfenden about the dean of faculty's job, I said, "Is this the sort of thing you would be interested in yourself?" It was Fergie [Leslie Ferguson] Murch. And he said, "There are lots of things I'm not interested in, but this is very high on the list." [Laughter] So I said, "Well, the man that I'd like to consider seriously, and I'd like to know what you'd think about it, is Joe McDonald." He said, "You couldn't get a better man. You couldn't get a better man."

DANIELL: I think you took Joe so by surprise that he had to accept it.

DICKEY: So we went to Joe, and I've always been immensely thankful for it, because, well, you just knew where you were all the time with Joe. A man couldn't have given more concern to students than Joe gave to the students that he dealt with. And yet he knew the difference between a phoney and a person that was playing straight.

DANIELL: Yes. That's why the big jump from McDonald to Seymour is a big jump in one sense.

DICKEY: Well, yes. It was a big jump. At this point I felt we were ready for another type of person, a person who was closer to the undergraduates in age, who had enjoyed romping with them as a crew coach, and so forth. And Thad was full of beans, full of energy that found expression in the job. And did a perfectly fine job. The one thing that I would say that you have to be a little careful about with Thad is that Thad's an operator. He always was and, I think, always will be. He caught a little bit of the gambler, of the carnival spirit—he worked in carnivals, you know—about him. And he believes in the finesse within administration. Well, sometimes finesse gets a little close to the line of being too smart by half. And the only problems
that I ever saw with Thad, that I had with Thad, was that occasionally I realized that I had to be careful that Thad didn't just say, well, what the president doesn't know won't hurt him, and take something into his own hands that he really shouldn't, mainly in the area of policy formulation. Thad, as a man to work with individuals, was immensely good. He enjoyed working with individuals. When it came to policies, he was always a little bit inclined to think, well, we can manage that. Well, you can up to a point. But when you're in an institution as big as this, with as many different constituencies, I think you have to possibly be a little bit more sensitive to policy formulation than simply personal relations. But--

DANIELL: Yes, parallel to a variety of things he said when I was interviewing him as to what he saw as his limitations.

DICKEY: Well, I said this to his trustees when they came asking about taking him on. I said, "If you've got your policy lines established now--" One of the questions was, would he press for coeducation? Because they didn't want that. And I said, "In my view, you must be just utterly candid and clear with him as to where you stand on this because I don't know where he would come out personally. But I do know that he's given to wanting to run the ends occasionally on these things. And he enjoys it. It's almost a game occasionally with him. He gets a kick out of it. And," I said, "this could make for some difficulty--I don't think it would be a major difficulty--but some difficulty in the administrative relationships if you have too much of that." I said, "I think also his forte is dealing with human situations. He's warm, he's outgoing. I would bet on him in an institution such as yours for the presidency. I'm not sure that I would bet on him in an institution the size of a Yale or a Dartmouth or whatnot where you've got to be reckoning with policy considerations that go beyond individuals because he just doesn't believe in policy in this sense." So I never regretted the fact that we made the move on Thad. I thought the time had come for Thad when he was going to want something else. And now he's looking around and, interestingly, I guess you've probably heard he's looking in the area of college presidencies again.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: I thought he had resigned from Wabash.

DICKEY: Oh, he did resign from Wabash. And I had a call the other day from the trustees in Rollins College who said, "He's interested in coming here."
DANIELL: Rollins?

DICKEY: Why he'd be interested in going to Rollins, I can't--

DANIELL: The playboy in Thad must be coming out even more.

DICKEY: --I can't imagine. But they told me that he was. And once again, I gave him a thoroughly positive-- I said, "From everything I know, it would be a positive thing, particularly in the right kind of institution.

DANIELL: Yes. I don't know enough about Rollins to--

DICKEY: Well....

DANIELL: And then you went to--after Thad left--you went to Carroll [Brewster].

DICKEY: That's right. This was a story all on its own. It was one of these cases where the possibility of getting Carroll came in over the transom through MIT and the people down there, who knew that we were looking for a dean and mentioned this man who'd had remarkable experience over in the Sudan and so forth. A man who's about as well qualified to be a dean as you can possibly imagine. In my judgment he's got what Thad had also, an instinct for relating to individuals. So that was that.

DANIELL: I think probably--

DICKEY: Of course the other thing which we should say as we talk about deans here: One of the wisest men that we had in this whole setup was Al[bert Inskip] Dickerson.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: He's not here to speak for himself, and I should only want to say that I've never had a colleague that I felt more at ease with. If we saw things differently, I knew he had his reasons. But he was a gem. And just in the right position, too. This may interest you in this connection. When I put him in as dean of freshmen and relieved him at his request of any further turmoil in the admissions office, I was pretty sure he'd be right. Well, he was just perfect in working with parents, working with students. He provided that transition from a schoolboy to a college student for the freshmen beautifully. When we came to putting somebody in after Joe, I talked with Al about it. And I said, "You've been around here and know this place well enough. If this is something that would interest you, as far as I'm concerned, that's it." I wasn't confident that Al would be as perfect a fit
in that job as I was pretty confident he would be as dean of freshmen. But I thought he'd earned the right to have a shot at it if he wanted it. And he knew himself, and had the kind of honesty that he said, "I appreciate your being willing to go with me if I want to, but I'm not the man to do that."

DANIELL: What did he see as the nature of the differences between the offices of the one he was perfect in and one he didn't want to do.

DICKEY: Well, he said-- I remember that there's an opportunity in the freshman office for a more of a direct counseling operation with the freshman. The dean's office, you took each case waiting pretty fast, and you might refer them to the counseling office and whatnot. And in the freshman office, he got to know the freshmen. He got to know the relationships with all their families, almost. It was a transition office--a transition responsibility--between the parental almost responsibilities for a schoolboy to the freer life of the college student.

DANIELL: Less policing...

DICKEY: But he said, "What you're going to want in that dean's office now is somebody that'll really romp with the boys to a degree, and can be tough, too.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. You know, as I look at the administration during these last ten years you were in office, roughly the 1960s, the thing that's really striking is how fundamentally stable it was in terms of individuals. Was there any point at which you attempted to go outside the institution for a--

DICKEY: For what?

DANIELL: Go outside the institution for a major--?

DICKEY: Oh yes, I looked outside for a dean of faculty before I went for Don Morrison.

DANIELL: In the latter years? I know you did in the earlier ones.

DICKEY: Well, I did with Carroll Brewster finally.

DANIELL: Right, finally.

DICKEY: Because we looked over this situation here. The people that seemed to me to be right for it didn't want it. So we did look around. Even so, it was not a systematic search that turned up Carroll Brewster. It was Bob
Greenleaf, in whom I had great confidence as an AT&T staff personnel man, who was in touch with the MIT people and heard about this unusual person that they wanted to bring to our attention. Well, we went outside--Another appointment that was a mistake and it wasn't a mistake. It was [Arthur] Upgren as dean of the Tuck School when Karl Hill was down there, and we ran up against a very bad situation with [Herluf Vagn] Olsen who had been in there as dean for a long time, and, to put it right on the line, had become an alcoholic. And very few people knew it. Indeed, I don't think I would have known it for some time if it hadn't been that one of the overseers of the Thayer School was a good friend of Olsen's and said, "I've got to tell you this. Sorry that I've got to be the bearer of it, but it is a fact." And it turned out to be a fact. We had to move Olsen out of the deanship.

Well, at that point we were really hitting bottom in the Tuck School as far as any scholarly vigor was concerned. We had some very able teachers: Al Frye and half a dozen others, all were fellows there who were dedicated teachers, good teachers, very valuable in that respect. But who were not active in a scholarly way. And if we were going to recruit faculty that was strong in both scholarship and teaching, we had to have some examples of this. Well, this was not the easiest thing to do. We looked around and didn't get one or two men that we'd aspired to. I was working with Don at this point. And I forget who brought Arthur Upgren to our attention. Now, Upgren had had quite an interesting career as an economist. I first knew him in the State Department when he was Alan Hansen's man, and I decided he had to be pretty good to be Alan Hansen's principal assistant in economics. And he'd been out in the Twin Cities with the Federal Reserve Board and so forth. A fellow that I'd kept in touch with since, I had to pull the throttle or the chain on him.

DANIELL: He shook the place, as I understand.

DICKEY: He shook it up. More importantly, he encouraged people to--Write something, he said. Don't wait until you're ready to retire to publish something. Write something. We want to begin to get this churning a bit. Well, Arthur was a churner. He had a syndrome of wanting to travel all the time, which upset some of the more staid people in the faculty. But he was right for that particular moment. Because we couldn't attract quite what we were looking for at that point. For a considerable period I was able to get Karl Hill to keep the thing from blowing apart while Arthur promoted some fairly elementary research. So that that worked out. But then I had to say to Arthur at one point, "Arthur, you're just never going to be a monumental success as a dean. Your professorship is here for you if you want to use it.
But we're going to have to get a different kind of administrative leadership here before too long." But we've kept in close touch.

Then we did have--I had one unhappy one. Karl Hill during this period, as you may recall, was going through a serious illness--diverticulitis I guess you call it. Surgery and all. In and out. And I became increasingly unhappy with what it seemed to me to be an unduly rigid notion that the Tuck and Thayer Schools couldn't collaborate.

DANIELL: Yes. Jack Dodd has told me a good deal about that.

DICKEY: I just couldn't believe this was something that was ordained by God Almighty that they had to--that was the only way they could do it. Karl believed that was so. And in due course he decided that he and I were never going to see eye to eye on this, and he pulled out.

DANIELL: The only other trailing edge I have in terms of administration--and that's probably why we should stop for the day--is the internal organization in your own office.

DICKEY: Well, I can deal with that pretty quickly. I didn't change that very much from Mr. Hopkins's period. I changed some of the reporting responsibility. I kept admissions reporting to the president. I kept inter-collegiate athletics reporting to the president. I haven't any doubt about the importance of that. I told John Kemeny that, and I guess he's discovered it for himself. And the associated school deans. But I had a provost in there acting as liaison with them while that was the thing to do. When we got a strong man such as Carleton Chapman, we put him in direct relationship with the president's office. Internally in the office, we had the great good fortune to have--I started off with--one of the marvelous servants of this College, Dorothy Cleaveland, then Mr. Hopkins's secretary. Just a stellar person, a North Country character if ever there was one, from Littleton--not Littleton, not Whitefield. Well, no matter, up there. And she knew this place. She was savvy too--She knew the phonies and the people that would try to--

DANIELL: Her name was Cleaveland?

DICKEY: Cleaveland, Dorothy Cleaveland.

DANIELL: Do you know what…?

DICKEY: No, no, no. Up north there.

DANIELL: Lisbon?
DICKEY: Lisbon? No, no, not Lisbon.

DANIELL: Lancaster?

DICKEY: Lancaster. Lancaster.

DANIELL: I know them all. Okay.

DICKEY: Her father was a Dartmouth man. And she was a bright, educated person. She was a jewel, and was very helpful to me during the first years. Then she was stricken with a malignancy and died young. Not a young woman, but a person who ought to have had another 15, 20 years ahead of her. Then I went through a series of secretaries, and this was a difficult period because I got a few people in who were very anxious to please and to help, but just weren't in the same league with Dorothy Cleaveland. Mary Shaw came along and was a person of comparable quality, intellectually. She, as Tom Macaulay used to say, was a loner. She went her own way, but she knew the score, and was quick and deft. Really what you'd call a first-rate secretary, and that makes all the difference in the world. I think Gil[bert Tanis] had had Ruth LaBombard in his office. And when the last person left—the last one, I forget which one it was—we moved Ruth LaBombard over, and she handled that very, very skillfully.

But I did not want a lot of assistants running around, getting in the hair of deans and faculty and so forth. So that I took on an assistant at times—Tom O'Connell, Frank Smallwood, and Bill Meck (not the John Meck family, a different Meck)—and these worked out quite satisfactorily. They were younger fellows who were learning their way into administration. And I enjoyed them and would use them quite broadly. But they never got in the way, to my knowledge at least, of other people exercising their responsibilities. Then I guess when it was Frank or Tom—it would've been Frank, wouldn't it?—left to go to grad school and get his Ph.D. and make his faculty career, I decided that the time had come when I would enjoy a little more stability in the president's office rather than this constant turnover. And it was at this point, after the capital gifts campaign, that Gil Tanis was over in the development office and had made his way there as a very reliable officer. And he came into the president's office and was just a very, very comfortable associate. He had about as much commitment as you could pack inside a human skin. And I had a fine relationship with Gil. That was about the way that worked out.

DANIELL: Okay. I don't have any questions on that one. The tape's about done. So I'll turn it off.
DANIELL: ...Emeritus Dickey took place in the afternoon of February 15th, again in his office in Baker Library….listening in introduction, is that the last time after we talked about the nature of the administrative appointments in the last ten years of your presidency, you were making some general observations about both the advantages and the limitations—but more about the advantages—of the kind of freedom you had in selecting from this…. I thought that was a useful set of observations.

DICKEY: Well, this is essentially a comparative view of the freedom I had in respect to administrative appointments, indeed, of all appointments, as compared with the situation that has prevailed in the country and particularly in our institutions of higher education since the adoption of the so-called affirmative action programs by the government. Without passing on the substantive merits, which I applaud, of these programs, they do involve even at the remote distance from which I observe them today very real limitations on freedom of choice by an administrative group or appointing official as compared with the 25 years of administration that I knew here at the College. And this has implications for the institution, the way an institution takes itself, the way its people take themselves, for the way they take the institution, the way they regard the institution, their sense of relationship to its historic purposes.

I always felt really not necessarily a responsibility—God knows, that was present without anybody saying anything about it—but I regarded every appointment that I made as an opportunity, an opportunity maybe in the area of the faculty to really push the thing ahead. In the case of administrative officers, the opportunity to have colleagues and associates in key positions frequently who shared the fundamental convictions that seem to me to have been an important part of what I've since purposely called the Dartmouth experience in a book of my papers. This is not, I think, a loose, fanciful sentimentality. My own view of it was that these appointments built a contemporary, reaffirmation of the purpose of the place, the character of the place, the personality of the place into Dartmouth life.

I've had occasion to think since we talked about some of the individuals who personified what I'm saying. Al Dickerson, when he moved in to be director of admissions during a period of great difficulty in admissions, when the problem of interpreting the College to the alumni was really an exceedingly difficult thing because we were at the point where there was
no alternative really but to disappoint alumni frequently with respect to the admissions of their sons, even though we maintained an alumni preference. When Al moved over from being director of admissions later to being dean of freshmen, once again, I sought to get the benefit of his deep understanding of the College, both historically and in the contemporary institution.

Similarly, when I was seeking a replacement for the treasurer, Halsey Edgerton, I didn't want just a good financial man. I felt it was important to have somebody who really felt an identification with the history of the place and with its fundamental character and purposes in the appointment of John Meck. This was true, they didn't have to be Dartmouth graduates. Joe McDonald, graduate of the University of Indiana, whom we brought out of the economics department was probably….personified this as much as any other appointment that I made, and did it without making rah-rah speeches or that sort of thing. And I could go on. I found the same thing in Don Morrison, graduate of the University of West Virginia.

But without carrying the concrete examples too far, this was…Well, it’s not too much to say it was just a precious privilege to be able to choose your associates that way. And I forbear speaking about the pluses and minuses of it in respect to today’s conditions with the government requirements and all of that. But I will put on the record that it cannot help but be a different institution, for better and for worse, in my view.

DANIELL: I agree absolutely with that, and I think we can spell it out in lots and lots of ways just in terms of what kinds of individuals are available. It’s more difficult to have an institutional loyalty rather than a career loyalty.

DICKEY: That’s right.

DANIELL: Which I think is another way of getting at what you’re saying.

DICKEY: That’s part of it. Part of it very definitely. And you…well, I could give you an example of appointments where the opposite was to some extent true, as a matter of institutional strength. And I was instructed in this, so to speak, by my predecessor, President Hopkins, with whom I talked quite early on about what we ought to be looking for basically as distinguished from specific qualifications in trustees. I’ve mentioned earlier many of the individual trustees that we selected—or that were selected—both by the board when they were nominated for the so-called life trusteeship spots and also by the Alumni Council, with whom I was frequently in close touch about the people that they were going to nominate. But Mr. Hopkins very early on said, “Well, the one thing I would be as careful as you possibly
can be is that you don't get a board that's just top-heavy with so-called good Dartmouth men.”

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: He said this is a very natural, normal, strong human instinct, men who've served the College in many capacities, in various capacities loyally and well. But he said, “What I learned over the years, and sometimes the hard way, was that what was really essential to help you have the kind of strength you'll need in the board was to look for people, in addition to a specific qualification which you may be seeking, to seek people out who are not being rewarded for what they've done, but are being appointed for what they presumably can do in bringing strength to the College. And quite frequently these will not be people who have been as close to the College as many of the other Dartmouth servants in the alumni body.” And he said, “This will be very hard sometimes.” And it was very hard from time to time: People were passed over, and people couldn't understand why So-and-so was appointed, when So-and-so, who'd been laboring for the College for 25, 50 years, wasn’t appointed…or wasn’t selected, wasn't nominated.

DANIELL: Very good. These are the kinds of general observations I said I thought it was useful to get as part of the record that we made after the tape was over last time. I don't know whether you have anything more you want to add in terms of administration or appointments.

DICKEY: No, I don’t think I do. If you have questions, I would try to respond. But nothing comes to mind right now.

DANIELL: I think the one major area we still have to discuss is basically, well, the period of just before…you’ve already explained that you had decided really that you were going to retire at the end of the 25th year. The last five years must have, I should think, have been quite different in content in terms of the daily problems that you had had in some ways than the previous 20, in that a great deal happened both external to the institution and in some ways internal within the institution that produced kind of a student rebellion and….

DICKEY: Well, I think that's a fair observation. Chris and I had an understanding which we shared that we were going to make our careers here after we came to the job. I've already spoken to that. And each time something came up that might have taken us away and we were clear we didn’t want to consider it, it became a stronger decision. So that the real question in our minds was when would be an optimum time to put it down. We had already made the decision that we weren’t of that frame of mind which
says that at eight years or ten years I've done all that I can do and so forth. That may be true, and I'm sure it is true with a lot of people. It wasn't true with us. I can honestly say that at ten years I, to a considerable extent, was just seeing the kind of opportunity that I wanted. We were just on the threshold of.

DANIELL: Particularly I date that from '45 to '55, it was really just about '55 when the process of really beefing up the faculty....

DICKEY: That's right. And seeing the bets that I wanted to make: the Hopkins Center as it was unfolding in concept and things like that. And then the first capital gifts campaign which I've spoken of before, which was an early landmark effort which we'd never attempted—Dartmouth had never attempted before. Things like that. So that we weren't thinking of pulling out if all went reasonably well until we were really at a point for genuine retirement.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Genuine retirement. I think it was about after we were here 20 years. It was along about '60...well, '60 to '65, but around '65, that Chris and I began to talk about it as to how, well, when would be the best time to aim at. She was ready to blow the whistle, to speak personally and of course at this point privately, she was quite ready to blow the whistle then.

DANIELL: Yes. All very understandable.

DICKEY: Yes. She was essentially a private person, not a person that sought out an active social life or an active public life. She was about as conscientious as I think a person could be about the entertainment responsibilities that of course went with the job. But she was someone who enjoyed the family. She'd come from a tightly-knit academic family. Her father had been a classicist at Exeter. She'd seen academic life from a small child up through, and she was very deeply committed to her own interests in needlework and plants; her African violet collection was quite a nice one here in Hanover. Things like that she'd give what spare time she had from the running of the house and the entertainment.

But she was not somebody who was seeking more exposure. Indeed, what she wanted was less exposure to these outside responsibilities during the latter part of our life. And all I can say is I had no hesitation in feeling that she'd earned it.
So that from, oh, I would say from early 1960, after our son graduated in ’63, and the children were out of the house, out of the home, we were thinking increasingly about when would be the right time. And I’ll just sum up, as far as she was concerned, by saying that she said, “Anytime now is the right time.” Well, as I had mentioned to you earlier, I have one of these silly tendencies to do things in round numbers.

DANIELL: I smiled when you said that last time.

DICKEY: But that’s been the case.

DANIELL: That’s about the only whimsy you allowed yourself in life.

DICKEY: A number of times I have allowed myself that. So we said, well…. I remember the first time we said this we were driving back together from some alumni affair; I think it was in Boston. We got to talking about this, and I said, “Well, I’d like to see the bicentennial celebration through, which would be coming to ’69. And that would round out ’70 to 25 years on the job. If we make it to that, why wouldn’t that be a good time?” Well, we didn’t take a firm decision, but we said, well, that sounds all right.

Well, that was just, of course, when the campus turmoil, so-called, in the country was beginning to build up a bit. We’d had a…I had been, of course, aware of the fact that your undergraduate body was developing attitudes and concerns that were going to be different from what they’d been ten years before. The Vietnam War had not peaked as an issue yet, but it was at the point where you were having students and faculty engaged in quiet demonstrations. You must remember standing in line on the campus at noontime.

DANIELL: Yes, I just came up here just about the time this all started. I came here in the fall of ’64 and it was just the very beginning….  

DICKEY: Just about that time…that would be just about the time that I would place the beginning of these concerns which focused primarily on the beginning of Vietnam and that sort of thing. And then of course the bombing of Vietnam which came the next year raised this level of concern and protest to a higher level. But I don’t recall that we had any serious problems with student behavior and protest at that time.

But what we did see, and something that I wouldn’t have seen except for something that was said to me at a Rockefeller Foundation meeting just about that time or a year or two beforehand, that just, oh, I would guess about ’64, by Clark Kerr, who was then president of the University of
California. And he and I were standing at a social occasion at this Rockefeller Foundation annual meeting, trustees’ annual meeting, in Williamsburg, and he had been having a bad time out there in California with the Free Speech – I think they called it – Movement or something of that sort.

DANIELL: That’s right.

DICKEY: And we’re talking about it and I said, “Well, my God, we haven’t seen anything of this sort in the East, certainly not at Dartmouth.” And he said, “Well, just wait, you will as soon as you begin to get some of our graduate students.” He said…and he didn’t mean just California. But he said as soon as you begin to get graduate students who’ve been exposed to this sort of thing at places such as the University of California, you’ll begin to feel it. And he was right.

As a matter of fact, I remember Leonard Rieser, I think said later, a little later on when we were in the midst of more difficulties, he said, “One of the most difficult aspects of this kind of campus turmoil was manifested for me today by a young assistant professor who came in the office and said, ‘You know I really don’t know whether I feel that I’m a faculty member or a student.’” Well, this is a very revealing thing. These fellows that were just coming into the campus weren’t sure whether to identify with the students or identify with the faculty.

DANIELL: I’ve often in my own mind linked that very much to simply the fact that in the early fifties everyone, virtually, every adult male in the society assumed—had a military obligation. They had a three-year interim—I’m a perfect example of it—between college and going to graduate school. They went to graduate school when they were 25 or 26 years old rather than 23 or 22. They went assuming a career, rather than having a continuity between their undergraduate and their graduate experience with everything kind of flowing together. What happened to me is I was 30 or 31 when I came here or any other place as an assistant professor rather than 25 or 26. That’s a big difference then when you’ve had a gap.

DICKEY: Yes. I never thought about it in those terms because of course I didn’t have the personal experience that you’ve had, and I don’t think I was ever focused down on that fact. That’s a very interesting observation on this.

DANIELL: Just as a sidelight, again, it’s a way of explaining basically….

DICKEY: But whatever, this was not just a problem of student attitudes. We had gotten and were bringing in more and more a younger-type faculty person,
and quite a few of them were coming from these large state universities, Wisconsin, California, where there had been some really rough very early difficulties. And these people just not only couldn’t be relied upon to try to keep a student body from blowing the place apart; they, in several instances, were provocative agents. I think I won’t go back and regurgitate the names of some faculty members; I don’t believe it’s necessary to do so. Most of them aren’t here anymore. But most of the really acute problems that we had, I can identify two or three young faculty members who just devoted themselves—just devoted themselves—to causing as much trouble as they possibly could with the students, using the students.

I would have to say that I had nothing but contempt…quietly, I didn’t express it. But that somebody would accept the responsibility of teaching and being a member of the faculty and towards the institution, and then would use students. I had no difficulties with the faculty member who wanted to stand up and say, I think Vietnam stinks. And if he wanted to say Dartmouth College stinks, well, that was okay, so far as I was concerned. I’d learned long since to live with the thought that I hated. But what I had not learned and did not accept was that they should use students to perpetrate….

DANIELL: Yes. What do you mean consciously by the "use students" term?

DICKEY: Oh, they would go out and get them together and help them organize protests and so forth that they wouldn’t do by themselves or just by making their own positions clear. They would go out and get a student group to be the front-line soldiers. And indeed a couple of the people I’m speaking of were smart enough that whenever the group got in trouble, they were never there at that time. Indeed, this was very true of later when we had the overnight or the evening occupation of Parkhurst Hall. Some of the individuals who’d been in there had gotten out, knew that it was coming. They had encouraged the students to go in there. And then they didn’t seek to encourage them to get out. The students got in, and they were the ones that got caught when the court invoked a sanction because of the contempt of court difficulties.

Well, I would say that were just two aspects of the faculty behavior that during this last five years I found it difficult to bear. The first, I’ve just mentioned, was something that was not more than a deep annoyance.

DANIELL: [inaudible]

DICKEY: Yes. This was something I could live with. I’d lived with much worse annoyances in the past. But the deepest concern and the deepest
disappointment was what seemed to me to be the inability of the faculty to retain its sense of deep interest in the maintenance of a free marketplace of ideas, and of not permitting their self-righteousness with respect to some causes to get in the way of free speech in the classroom, free speech in meetings, and free speech on the campus by people for whose views they had no respect at all. And here I saw this in a way that subsequently cropped up at Princeton, cropped up at Harvard, cropped up at Yale, cropped up at Columbia, these so-called bastions of higher education, higher educational freedoms, where we were supposed to be setting the pace in this respect for the public institutions which were supposed to be more vulnerable to this. We just—some of these institutions and their faculty just simply got swept out of the game. You'll recall when that biologist….

DANIELL: Shockley.

DICKEY: Shockley came to the campus, and two faculty members really right in the classroom where the blacks would not let him speak just, well, not only accepted it but subsequently wrote a brief—not a legal brief but an announcement, statement—justifying it as a form of…that he was engaged in group libel. And therefore anything of this sort was fair.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: This was the deepest disappointment of my entire Dartmouth experience, deepest disappointment. I had steeled myself over the years that by God, if there was anything we were going to stand forthrightly on, it was going to be with respect to, as Holmes put it, freedom for the thought that we hate.

When I saw this happening by men, at least one or two men I respected, but who just simply saw this thing totally differently. They just said freedom of speech isn’t relevant to this. I just felt that something was failing. It must be myself, it must be the country, it must be…. I didn’t know what it was. But it was a deep, deep disappointment. And today, as far as I can judge, it’s one of the things that people who went through it look back on and don’t feel very good about.

DANIELL: Well, the key phrase you used in that, it seems to me, is that you had steeled yourself. You had the experience directly of the McCarthy period.

DICKEY: Oh, yes.
DANIELL: At a time in which you had a level of institutional responsibility that none of the people you’re talking about in the abstract just hadn’t [inaudible], that tempering process at all.

DICKEY: Well, this is very true. And I’ll use an example of one name—well, I think I’ll use two names because they’re very different in my estimation. Their roles in these troubles were very different. [W.] Henry Ehrmann [AM '62], a very respected scholar, indeed a man that we were very proud to have recruited into the government department. We did and who did a good job. Henry’s background was European. Henry had been through the Hitler period, and Henry had an outlook on these things which was, I’m now convinced from what other friends of his have told me, more European than really was Anglo-Saxon freedom. Henry was one of those who was involved in this—he and his wife, both of them—out of a personal compulsion in these matters. Another fellow who was not in there but for whom I could not have the same respect was the Chinese student….

DANIELL: Mirsky.

DICKEY: Mirsky.

DANIELL: Jonathan Mirsky.

DICKEY: I found Mirsky engaging in practices and misstatements and wanting to know how far he could get—how close he could get to the fire without getting singed in ways that just didn’t make me comfortable.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. In some ways, though, I suppose the Ehrmanns were more difficult to accept because of the personal respect for the other things in his life. Whereas the Mirskys were, in a sense, different in a completely… a different generation. Well, I don’t know….

DICKEY: Well, in any event, I use those two examples: Henry Ehrmann, a man with whom I continued to maintain very amiable, generally friendly relations. We keep in touch now, and I’ve always had great respect for him as a scholar. But I was deeply disappointed when he teamed up with Mirsky on this group slander justification for moving away from freedom of speech on the campus and academic freedom.

Well, having said that, I’ve said, I think, one of the important things now, when you come over to the student body and the student body’s behavior, this was not a clear-cut thing ever for me in any single way—in any single respect. There were specifics that I was clear about. For example, let me give you one: Whenever it was—it would have been in ’66 or ’67, about
then—when Vietnam was heated up, and that valedictorian made his strong valedictory speech at commencement; I forget his name.

DANIELL: I forget his name, too.

DICKEY: Which is a fortunate thing and of itself not unimportant. I knew the name at the time, but I've never retained the name, never retained the slightest ill feeling about him at all. Well, I found it quite possible to just say, well, this is part of the roughage of this period. If we believe in freedom of speech, this fellow's going to have his say, as far as I'm concerned, and I am not going to get up and knock him down afterwards. I had to make that decision during the commencement proceedings as to whether I would answer him. And I had people who thought I'd made a great mistake in not stopping him and not censuring him afterwards and so forth. I don't think so. But this was the kind of specific happening...

[End of Tape 43, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 43, Side B]

DICKEY: I am not – I am sure you understand – saying that I applauded what he did or anything of that sort, but I just felt this was one of these occasions when you are tested as to what you mean by academic freedom and the freedom of people within an enterprise of this sort to have their say, embarrassing as it was to you. I had several good friends come up to me at the house immediately that day and the next day and tell me they were going to write these condemnations to the alumni magazine, and wouldn't I really disavow this young man? And so forth.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: This was not pleasant, but this was something that I could understand. I knew where I had to stand, or thought I did, and did stand. At the same time, I found myself deeply perplexed about how to deal with something such as the organized Students for Democratic Action agitation on the campus. I made it a point of finding—getting to know quite a few of these fellows personally. One or two of them were real psychopaths, and one of them, I daresay, was on the edge of being psychotic. Subsequently got himself arrested for shoplifting and things like that. But along with a few, oh, eccentric, let's say, individuals of that sort who were leading there, there was a following of idealistic, concerned young men who just didn't know where they stood. I remember one fellow fell in step with me walking back to the gym one night, and it turned out he was a freshman who was being proselytized by Students for Democratic Action and wanted to know what I thought about his joining [laughter] and so forth. And a lad that I
liked very much. I couldn’t tell you now whether he joined or didn’t join. But I had them over to the house one night. I don’t know whether you’ve ever heard about that.

DANIELL: It’s the kind of episode I think it would be useful just as a word of background on this. One thing I’ve been struck in doing interviews with the trustees is Jack Dodd and Charlie Zimmerman and others is how extraordinarily responsive in a direct, personal way they were to the students who were, for whatever mix of reasons, alienated from the institution and society. And special trips up here and details about people in positions of responsibility in the institution responded to the....

DICKEY: Well, I think they did.

DANIELL: [inaudible]

DICKEY: Well, I think they did try. Well, this was one that probably was rather unusual: I just decided, okay, we have student government groups in here, we have fraternity groups in here, let’s have the....

DANIELL: The SDS it was.

DICKEY: SDS, Students for a Democratic Society.

DANIELL: That must be right.

DICKEY: That was it. Come over to the house.

Well, Alex Fanelli had just come on the job. So he said, “I think it would be a good idea for somebody to be at the house to bear witness as to what’s said and what’s done and so forth.” So Alex came over. Didn’t play any role other than just sitting quietly in the room. We got them in the big room downstairs. And I said, “Do you want to tell me how you feel, what you think should be done here and elsewhere? And I’ll be glad to respond, and I’ll try to tell you what I think about things.” And we had this give-and-take.

We had the experience of, after we’d been going for a while, and there was pretty strident conversation back and forth though some of it was fairly moderate in tone but hard-hitting. a fellow got up in one of the far corners of the big room, in the back, and he said, “Oh, this is a lot of bullshit!” I think was his phrase or horseshit or something. In any event, he obviously wanted to attract attention by saying something that he thought would shock me. “Well,” I said, “that may be. But the occasion is to have a rational, as far as it can be, discussion of our differences on these things.
And you as a Dartmouth student, I should think, would think that this was worthwhile, that we should have such an exchange." He said, “Hell, I’m not a Dartmouth student.” He said, “I’m just here to protest.”

Well, this was another problem that I hadn’t really known about or reckoned with. This SDS had picked up a considerable—well, more than a few—fellows who were just here to really raise hell as a place that lent itself to that kind of demonstration.” And he was really very rough and crude in his observations, and didn’t reveal himself as a non-Dartmouth student until he and I got going.

Well, to show you that there was a certain maliciousness about this thing, we had gotten ice cream and soft drinks out in the kitchen adjoining the big room for the group when we broke up. And they started going out to—I told them there were these things out there. Well, they just committed vandalism, just senseless, mean, mean kid kinds of destruction and throwing the stuff up the walls and so forth.

Then back in the big room one of them, one of the leaders, said, “Well…” I said, “Do you think we have gone as far in this discussion as you want to go?” And one of them said, “Well, I don’t know whether we’ve gone as far as we’re going to go, but we’re going to stay here.” And I said, “Well, this is a surprise to me.” Well, this is the one point where we picked up a few tricks. Because at this point, several of the fellows who had come to me, SDS fellows, earlier in setting up the thing got up and said, “Well, we’re not staying here as far as we’re concerned. We have been treated decently.” It was really a very heartening thing. “We have been treated decently. We’ve been invited in here. We’ve accepted the invitation. And as far as we’re concerned...” – And this was about two or three of them that got up and spoke – “…as far as we’re concerned, there’s no sit-in, and we’ve accomplished our purpose. We’ve had a discussion, and we’re leaving.”

Well, the other guys pulled in their horns and left. But this was quite revealing. That you had an element in that group that were prepared to go as far as they needed to go in respect to protesting and stating their position, but weren’t prepared to really engage in malicious behavior or in fundamentally unfair behavior of using a social occasion that they had accepted an invitation to to mount a sit-in.

Well, after that I decided that there wasn’t anything I was going to be able to do or anybody was going to be able to do, as far as I was concerned, by way of coming to an understanding with the SDS. That this was going to just have to play its hand out and see what happened.
We had some incidents related to recruitment. When the ROTC officers would come up and that sort of thing, people would gather around. These affairs would be in the range of a dozen to three dozen students and faculty.

DANIELL: Incidentally, how many showed up at your invitation for the SDS...?

DICKEY: Oh, I would suppose the big room was filled, and I would think, oh, 40?

DANIELL: Yes. I know that room. A good sized room.

DICKEY: In that range. There might have been 50, there might have been 35.

Well, every week or so when there would be a recruitment officer on the campus, there would be a small protest, and they would not let him through and so forth and that sort of thing. Actually, as you look back on it, while we had embarrassing occasions when they had the ROTC review and things like that, it was that kind of—I don’t know what you’d call it—polite disruption or embarrassing disruptions rather than the exercise of any overt violence that was mainly the form that the demonstrations took.

I’ve spoken now about the mostly specifics, I should say, on the occupation of Parkhurst Hall, that this was one which we did everything I could think of by way of being prepared. One of the important things to say is this was not a sudden thing. They’d occupied Parkhurst Hall two previous times on the stairways and the sit-ins, you know. In the afternoons we held the CAP meetings over in Leonard’s office across the way simply because we couldn’t hold them in Parkhurst Hall without having a really disruptive thing. But we had said, well, let them play it out. And we would...if they wanted to have me appear and talk with them, I would do that. But we had to conduct...our view was we had to continue to conduct the business of the College as best we could. And we talked out in CAP to some extent, but mainly in faculty executive committee meetings—and sometimes in full faculty meetings—but mainly in faculty executive committee meetings what was going to be our position with respect to various disciplinary steps in the event of occupations, or what would be our response. Not necessarily disciplinary, but what would be our response? And we had a couple of committees that were, from time to time, functioning on the question. But increasingly we kept getting these messages—some of them were public announcements in the Daily Dartmouth and so forth—that there would be an occupation of Parkhurst Hall or something unless the College agreed immediately to terminate ROTC and so forth. And the fact that there were, it seemed to me, very
serious considerations that made such arbitrary, instantaneous behavior unwise if not illegal under our contracts with the government. It seemed to me the larger question was how did we deal with this thing?

Well, you were probably present at the faculty meeting in Dartmouth—two faculty meetings—in Dartmouth Hall?

DANIELL: I remember those quite vividly.

DICKEY: And before those meetings I had canvassed the various alternatives with my administrative associates with the key faculty people that we were in touch with, some of the CAP people. And we decided that—and I had read up as much as I could about how these things had gone at other places—and we got our lawyers in. Jack Stebbins’s firm and his young associate, Bradley.

DANIELL: Right, [David H.] Dave Bradley ['58 TU '59].

DICKEY: And spent hours talking about what were the pros and cons of different behaviors. The one thing that I was quite clear about was I didn’t want to become involved in bringing in the local police and to put this thing through a criminal action instituted by the College if we did get an occupation. And I was certainly utterly opposed to a test of physical strength unless this was precipitated and there was nothing else that could be done about it. I’d taken a look at the other occurrences around the country, and I just didn’t see anything that was attractive in that way of handling these disruptions. But I increasingly became intrigued by the possibility that you could have a civil injunction issued by a court that would shift the defiance from defiance of the College and the police authority to a defiance of the court. There was only one other institution that had, as far as I know, had experimented with this, and it caught my eye, and I’d done some consulting about it. And the more I thought about it, and the more I conferred about it, the better it looked as a way, if we were faced with an out-and-out takeover.

Well, we decided to go that route if there was an out-and-out takeover. The route of going to a court and asking for an injunction.

DANIELL: Who is the we that’s doing the deciding then?

DICKEY: I was deciding that these were decisions that I had to make. I conferred by telephone from time to time, fairly constantly, with key trustees: Dudley Orr, Harvey Hood, people like that. And at one point we had a conference call with the board of trustees on the telephone just simply to make sure
that they were informed as to what we were…. I was by no means clear we were going to be faced with this. But if we were, I felt we had a very heavy responsibility to be just as ready and know what we were going to do and not just take quick, impetuous decisions.

So in those two faculty meetings, if you remember, I laid out the various alternatives before the faculty, as we saw them. It could be a criminal action: the police could come in and arrest people for criminal trespass, and this had been the common practice of other campuses. And then I laid out—most of the faculty had never heard of a civil proceeding, an injunction. I described that, and they wanted to know how is that enforced. Well, I said, “If it’s defied, the defiance is by the people who are defying the court that issued the injunction. And the issue will be between those people and the court. At that point the College is not a party to that if the defiance is of the court’s order. We had quite a discussion of this in the faculty, and the vote of the faculty, as you remember, was that the faculty had confidence that the matter could be left to the president. [Laughter]

DANIELL: [Laughter] The standard faculty position! I’d forgotten that.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: It was the other part that I remember more vividly.

DICKEY: That the matter could be left to the president and trustees to handle it. [Laughter] But it had resulted in an exposure of possibilities. And I said if people are determined to defy the court and go to jail, most judges will regard that kind of defiance as warranting their going to jail. So this sobered up quite a few faculty people about this.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, I was just about to…. The reason I’m interfering now, it’s almost three o’clock.

DICKEY: Well, we’ll just take a few minutes more, and then I will finish with this. If you want to do more, we’ll do that another time.

But I remember I came out of that meeting basically satisfied that we had done about everything that I could think of to do. We had looked at other situations. We had talked with those students who could be talked with. We had conferred in depth with the lawyers as to this procedure; they had taken counsel with the judge who would’ve been the judge that would have been involved. And he was prepared to receive an injunction or a petition for an injunction—he had to pass on that—if we found ourselves confronted with this, and we knew where we could reach him if we had to.
We didn't know that we would. Jack Stebbins’s office prepared a petition. And I participated in the drafting of the petition.

DANIELL: Your lawyer background stood you in good stead there.

DICKEY: I wanted to be sure that it was something that I was prepared to stand on if we had to stand on it.

Well, of course, we went into the next day. Then about three-thirty in the afternoon, it was clear that they were mounting a march on Parkhurst Hall. They gathered down at College Hall. And Thad Seymour told me that there was no question at all that they were going to try to occupy the place and stay in.

The one thing that we had agreed upon in the staff session—and we talked about these things in the staff meetings—was if at all possible, we weren’t going to have one of these long, drawn-out sieges on the campus with this thing going night after night and day after day and food being taken in and so forth. All the advice I got from the trustees was if at all possible, avoid that kind of situation because that sometimes just degenerates into a real brawl. So Thad was very anxious that we shouldn’t go through the night. This was his dividing line between an occupation that we could take and one that we shouldn’t tolerate, one that went through the night.

Well, we set up an arrangement whereby if we were occupied, I would go down to the lawyer’s office so that I could think and act and confer without being under klieg lights and so forth. We went down to Jack Stebbins’s office, and nobody ever found us down there. [Laughter] We set up a telephone communication with Crosby Hall, got a young mathematics assistant professor, [Edward Martin] Brown, who had been sympathetic with the student groups but who also was concerned about this kind of behavior, a forceful occupation. And this, of course, was one of the great ambivalences of this whole thing: That here they were protesting against the use of violence by the nation in Vietnam, and, let’s be clear about it, there was a considerable amount of violence exercised by these people, carrying Thad Seymour out, and they wanted to make a show of it. [John G.] Spritzler ['68], who was the wildest of all of them, tried to roughhouse me as I left my office. And things like that.

Well, we had this set up and they came into the occupation, oh, about 3:30, 3:45, and trapped Thad in his office. And Spritzler came up and tried to hold me in my office. And I said, “Get out of the way. I’m going out.” And he stepped forward. And I said, “Get out of the way!” And he realized that
we either were going to have a physical showdown or he’d better get out of the way. [Laughter] And he did. But very, very crude kind of talk. And he was the guy that subsequently got himself arrested, and God knows what’s happened to Spritzler since. I don’t know. But he was a wild guy.

Well, I went out. I had an appointment at the doctor’s office at four o’clock. Kept that appointment. Went home and told Chris we had an occupation, and that I wanted her to get out of the President’s House because I didn’t know whether they’d be coming there or not. And she went up to Fanny Ames and stayed there that night. I said, “I’ll be down at Jack Stebbins’s office if you want me until we find out where we are in this thing.”

Well, from that point on, I think there were by count five, and there may have been seven, formal occasions in which we notified this group that we had applied for an injunction. We had applied for an injunction and then that we’d gotten the injunction. And that the court had issued a separate subsequent cease and desist order to the group to cease the occupation. In other words, there was no precipitant action. It was step, by step, by step defiance. And when we got the final word back from the sheriff that he had gone up to the door and said that the court had instructed him that if the defiance continued for another—I forget what it was—an hour or something.

DANIELL: Two hours, something like that.

DICKEY: Something like that. It was plenty of time to stop. The court would regard them as being in defiance of the court, and the police would be brought in.

We then had to take a very fundamental decision as to whether we would send the police in. At this point another step in our preparations paid off immensely, and also we had the good luck of having a sensible person as governor.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: [Governor] Peterson, we had agreed that he would come up and we would rendezvous and confer, if that step seemed to be necessary, at the office of Stebbins. Walter Peterson came up, and, again, we were able to have a quiet discussion as to what was the thing to do. Well, I said that as far as I was concerned, peaceable arrest would be much preferred, especially in the night. Indeed, I was opposed and I would not authorize, insofar as my authority was at all valid—because at this point we were shifting over to the court—I would not approve or support a forceful occupation by the authorities at night because I was afraid that somebody would do
something silly under cover of darkness, and then we’d be off to the races. And we talked with Brown who was down here negotiating with them. And in due course, after, oh, quite a few exchanges, he came back and said, “I think this thing can be negotiated for a peaceable arrest.” These people wanted to be arrested.

DANIELL: Yes, oh, yes.

DICKEY: They wanted to have pictures taken and so forth. Peaceful arrest. Well, I said, “If we can be assured of that, we’re ready to go.” And Peterson went over to armory where the state police were and laid it right on the line. He said, “This is an order. No weapons whatsoever to be taken into that hall.” And he said, “We want this to be a peaceful arrest. If it can’t be a peaceful arrest, then we want to confer further. But if it can be a peaceful arrest, bring them out, and they should be brought over here to the armory, and arraigned.”

Well, we had something of a little disagreement about this. Thad came down at this point, and Thad was at this point really ready to go. He said, “I think the police ought to go in and take them out.” Well, I said, “I just am clear I’m not going to have that—I’m not going to exercise that authority as far as I’m concerned at this point. If we can have a peaceful arrest, that’s fine. But we’re not going in as far as my authority is concerned in the night and forcibly bring them out.”

It turned out the negotiation for a peaceful arrest worked out. Even so, you had people saying that somebody had had tear gas and, you know, all this kind of crap. Well, there was none of that at all. The officers were unarmed. They were under rigid personal instructions from the governor. And we were lucky. And I think probably our plans paid off.

DANIELL: Yes, as an external observer at that point in time, I can only say that I was just extraordinarily impressed with the process. I had no idea about the details of Ed Brown or the connections with Walter Peterson, etc. But I think probably more than anything else, the way Dartmouth handled that provided a model for the country as a whole.

DICKEY: Yes, it did.

DANIELL: And these are some of the things I want to get at.

DICKEY: But we were lucky, too. You can plan a thing like that, and then some hothead does some crazy thing, he pulls a canister of gas or something,
and people get frightened that there’s a hand grenade loose. So we didn’t have that, and we were lucky on it.

Well, shall we break?

DANIELL: Yes, let’s break now.

[End of Tape 43, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 44, Side A]

DANIELL: …in the last statement you, President Dickey, went through and described the events surrounding the seizure of Parkhurst and the faculty rebellion of the late sixties. These are a series of somewhat random questions that I have, to get into a bit more detail on this. One thing that intrigued me as I listened to your description of your role in this was basically the degree to which you felt obliged to or in fact kept very, very—the faculty as a whole—very closely informed as to what you were going to do in terms of the injunction, what the potential consequences of this…. Can you recollect basically why, for example, at the faculty meeting you chose to spell it out right at the very beginning of it? Where did you see from the faculty’s role potentially in helping the institution through this problem?

DICKEY: Well, I’ve never had occasion to spell that out to myself or to anyone else. But my basic view of the matter was that this was the sort of problem that concerned all the constituencies of the College. I certainly didn’t spend more time on the faculty than I spent talking with student groups from time to time, not necessarily about the specific prospect of dealing with an occupation of our halls or offices, but talking with them about my views, the responsibilities that the College had to meet, so that my approach to these problems of that period was to be as effective, indeed as insistent, as I could be that the student body, which had a very natural and proper concern, that the faculty which had a responsibility in my eyes should have an opportunity both to know and to contribute anything that they had to contribute, to meeting responsibilities of the official College. I was in close touch with the trustees and certainly with the key trustees about such matters. I conferred pretty constantly with my close associates, the deans and the lawyers here in town toward the end when we were preparing a specific plan for dealing with an occupation of our buildings, which I believed I mentioned in the last recording.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: But what I am seeking to say first in response to your question is that this was not…my efforts were not directed solely at the faculty. But I should
think probably primarily after the trustees, the faculty was the body of the official College that had a direct concern with what we did and how we did it and when we did it. So that I was dealing with executive committees of the faculty or whatever the executive body was, it escapes me now….

DANIELL: It changes so often I can’t remember what it was called.

DICKEY: Yes, that we dealt with. We talked the matters over in the Committee Advisory to the President. They’ve changed the name of that today. I don’t know….

DANIELL: I think it’s the same.

DICKEY: It’s still the same name? And, for example, I remember one meeting of the Committee Advisory to the President, which I think I mentioned in the last session, which we held over in Dean Rieser’s office in Wentworth Hall, we could look out across the campus and see a group of students occupying the downstairs of Parkhurst Hall, which as far as I was concerned was within the bounds of toleration. But that was a day or two before the occupation of the hall itself.

So there was no thought that I can recall in my mind that the faculty was going to bear the full responsibility for this affair. The faculty, as always is the case, had points of view in it that ranged all the way from one end of the spectrum to the other end of the spectrum. And the faculty, to put it right on the line, just is not organized as a body to take decisions of that sort and carry them out and adjust the decision almost hourly to circumstances. So that there was no thought that I can recall of expecting the faculty to pass a vote that we did this or we did that. But I was anxious to have the faculty as fully informed as they could be so that the amount of response, critical response, would be at a minimum, and at least people would feel that they’d had an opportunity to make any suggestions that they wanted to about how to deal with these problems. And I think it’s fair to say that this was the case. I can’t remember a single protest that I received from any faculty member to the effect that there’d been a failure to keep them informed. Indeed, quite the contrary. I had quite a few individuals who were very pro-protest, but who felt that they had been kept posted; that what was done was well within the bounds of reasonable action even though it might not have been the action they would’ve taken.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: That’s about the best I can do with that question unless you can sharpen it up a bit.
DANIELL: No, no. I think you’ve…. What I was interested in is first you’ve covered by saying you really…there’s no way the faculty could take concrete action, and this was done primarily to keep the faculty informed as a way of potentially, well, diluting or forestalling any potential way in which the faculty could complain about sort of the handling of this.

DICKEY: The thing which I guess I would have disliked more than anything else would have been to have had a negative action by the faculty.

DANIELL: Right.

DICKEY: That we shouldn’t do this or we shouldn’t do that. And then wondering, well, what in the world do we do? And we didn’t have that. We simply had a spectrum of views in the faculty in the two meetings that I remember that were right before the occupation of Parkhurst. And when it finally came to a close, my memory, insofar as it serves me well, was that the faculty simply said they were prepared to leave this matter in the hands of the—

DANIELL: The disciplining of students and the concrete voting of the faculty….

DICKEY: --president and other officers of the College.

DANIELL: Yes. The concrete vote of the faculty, I believe, if my memory is correct on this, that led to the seizure of Parkhurst was the faculty’s unwillingness for immediate termination—or recommend immediate termination—of ROTC, but rather a commitment to those students who were presently enrolled, which was unsatisfactory to the radical leaders and….

DICKEY: Yes, I remember that that was a…

DANIELL: That was kind of the….

DICKEY: …an issue. I don’t recall what the timing on it was precisely. But I do recall saying at the faculty meeting that as far as the trustees were concerned, I was reasonably certain they were going to insist that the College should meet its obligations—its contract obligations—with the government. [Phone ringing]

[Pause]

This question of the College’s position with regard to meeting its contract obligations was definitively decided before the faculty meetings or not. But I have a fairly distinct memory that I did say at the faculty meetings that either I was clear from what had been said to me by trustees or by my
knowledge of the board that whatever was done, the College would feel that it had no alternative but to meet its obligations.

That being done, I also said, I remember I took this position some time before, that the trustees would welcome knowing what was the considered judgment of the faculty on these matters. Now you see we'd been looking at this thing, oh, mercy, for over a year. Lou Morton had chaired a—I think it was Lou Morton, maybe it was somebody else, but Lou was on the committee—chaired a committee of the faculty to study the ROTC question. And they had brought in a recommendation which—I forget what it was, but it wasn't a very clear-cut, definitive recommendation, that I don't think it pleased either end of the spectrum in that respect. So that the ROTC question had been under review.

I never, so far as I can recall, made a public statement to this effect, but I don't mind in this recording to say that one of the things that disturbed me most about this ROTC question was that ROTC was not being dealt with as an educational issue, which was a perfectly proper issue and one on which you could come down in a negative position very easily as far as I was concerned. On balance, I was prepared to come down on a have-it-here basis for many reasons, all of which have been recited: the interest of the individual students in having that opportunity and so forth. But what I was not prepared to regard as really very honorable behavior was using the ROTC issue as a way of getting at the government's Vietnam policy.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: It just seemed to me this was not quite worthy of the academic...well, the position of academicians in our society, that they professed one reason for doing a thing when really there was another reason that's the primary purpose. So that I never made any secret of my feeling in discussions with various people that I thought that we would be in a much better position to deal with the Vietnam issue right straight out and not to try to get around the Vietnam issue by going after the termination of ROTC.

Well, again, that was an issue on which there was a sharp difference of opinion. Many faculty people were so outraged by Vietnam, understandably as far as I'm concerned, that they in effect said it didn't matter how you got at it, just so you stopped it or made it more difficult for the government to carry on the Vietnam War. This was the principal concern that I had, that we should not put ourselves in a false position with respect to the ROTC issue and the Vietnam issue.
The contract question was a simple one. It didn’t really bother me very much. I was perfectly clear that as far as I had any influence, we weren’t going to walk out on a contract obligation for a phony reason.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Was there any external circumstance which would have potentially resulted in the termination of ROTC about this time if it hadn’t been for Vietnam? Was this a point of natural review…?

DICKEY: No, not that I recall. And indeed, quite the contrary. It should not be lost sight of that a number of us—other presidents in the Ivy and other presidents elsewhere but primarily in the Ivy, and I was one of them—Jim Perkins of Cornell, Bob Gohene of Princeton, and one other, went down to the Pentagon to the War Department before these protests took the form of occupation of buildings and so forth, at least before any such performance here, and spoke very directly and very emphatically to top officers of the Pentagon. A man named Kelly who was an assistant secretary in charge of manpower. Packard came in who was, I think, number two. The number one man, Secretary Laird, met with us and we laid out our view that there were deficiencies in ROTC that could be met with respect to the educational concerns of the College such as, for example, putting the drill and exercises of that sort into the summer period rather than this. We got a very courteous hearing. But before we were permitted to negotiate any further, these protests took place.

I had reported on these discussions to the faculty and said that while I was not in a position to say what, if anything, was going to develop out of these discussions; I felt that they should know that they were taking place. That we were receiving a very courteous hearing.

I remember one thing in particular: One of the relatively junior officers—I, I don’t know what he was, captain or somebody, in these meetings—and there were a lot of us there saying something about that if the presidents wanted to stop this kind of behavior, of course they could. And Packard, who is a very conservative man, I gather from his utterances and so forth, however, stepped up to this one, and he said, “Well, now, listen.” I think he said, “I am” or “I have been,” I guess “I have been a trustee of Stanford University, and I can just tell you that the ability of the president to dictate a line of behavior on matters of this sort is very, very limited and much more limited than I ever imagined. So let’s not proceed on an unrealistic assumption here such as that, that this is something you just tell the presidents they can go back and make it happen.”

But there was also a feeling that ROTC had a positive prospect in it. This interested me, and I took it up with—mentioned it—to the faculty. And that
was that we were going to be in a period when we got the heat and the bitterness and the utter folly of Vietnam behind us, of trying to develop a more effective, collective security system in the world, particularly in respect to situations that were not nuclear in their potential. And when that happened, nations such as the United States were going to be looked to for—or might well be looked to—for forces that could carry out, at least in my hopes, UN responsibilities. And that I would much sooner have men who'd had a liberal arts background doing that in the armed forces than I would officers who had no such background. And that I thought there was, therefore, down the road a ways a potential in ROTC which we would be very well advised to stay with and which might permit us to have a somewhat greater influence on the collective security which was going to be necessary in the longer run to keep the peace.

Well, I was listened to politely, but that was all. The die had been cast, Jere, that they were going to get at ROTC and were going to get at Vietnam willy-nilly.

DANIELL: Yes. I've often thought in retrospect that given what you've just described, probably the least destructive way this might have been done to the institution, one of the least destructive, would be through an external instrument in the ROTC.

DICKEY: Through a what?

DANIELL: An external instrument in the ROTC. Given the possibilities that that was going to be done, to go after laboratories that maybe were partly financed by government grants or [inaudible] much, much more dangerous [inaudible].

DICKEY: Oh, yes. Well, we were very fortunate in this respect, much more fortunate than Princeton, much more fortunate than many of the big state universities. We just didn’t have the same targets...

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: …for that kind of trouble that they had at Wisconsin, that they had at Princeton, that they had at a number of other universities which were doing big governmental contracts or research projects that had a bearing upon armed conflict. No, we were very fortunate in that respect. And probably that brought ROTC to the fore as a potential target, although by this time ROTC had become a target around the country. So it wasn’t essentially or even especially Dartmouth.
DANIELL: Okay. There’s another set of questions that have to do with it and we didn’t have time for last time, and that has to do with really the response to the fact that, well, the seizure has occurred, there are some faculty involved in…the whole nature of institutional discipline apart from the court discipline through the injunction. I don’t know how much you personally had to do with the decisions in this or whether this was something that…it must have been an almost equally difficult set of decisions to know how to respond to what in fact had happened, as well as the earlier decision...

DICKEY: Well, that’s correct. But there were some things that were reasonably clear. First, it was clear that once the court had decided that this was defiance, that the occupation was defiance of the court, and it had taken over the responsibility for having the parties arrested on the court’s order, we were in a very definitely subordinate position in respect to discipline or anything of that sort. And I was reasonably clear that at that point we had gone the second mile in respect to saying what was going to happen. We had gone the third and fourth and fifth mile in respect to asking the students and faculty directly involved to cease and desist, as the court order said, their occupation. I think there were five different stages of notification and request after they had occupied the building.

DANIELL: You remember that very carefully….

DICKEY: Oh, right. Because this was very important in my eyes. We shouldn’t act precipitately. So that once they had decided that they wanted and were going to have come hell or high water, so to speak, an arrest, my determination was it should be a peaceful arrest, there should be no use of force. And after that they were going to have to reckon with the authority of the court.

The one thing I was perfectly clear is that I was not going to get the College involved in the court’s decision. At this point the responsibility was between the people who’d done the occupying and the court. And this was the way—this was the line that we hewed to in that respect. Through Dean Dickerson and Dean Seymour, we sought to be as helpful as we could to some students who found themselves in jail without necessary toilet articles or things of that sort. And Dickerson visited them, and I talked with, oh, I don’t know how many, maybe a dozen different parents by telephone explaining the situation to them. And to that extent we tried to at least do what we could properly do without getting into the act with the court.

The situation on the campus was of course tense with many students really not understanding what had taken place and thinking that the College had arrested the parties or had them arrested and so forth. So
that there was the opportunity for a great deal of explaining, and we put on what I frequently characterize as a major clambake down in the gymnasium in which we got trustees, and I spoke, and the individuals involved in the protest spoke to a large open meeting of the College faculty, students, and so forth, explaining our position.

That was the main activity following the occupation; that is, attempting to explain what the situation was. The injunction remained in effect, and it had a very salutary effect as far as I was concerned. Boy, when some of these others who had been in the occupation but had gotten out before the arrests and others found that when they got into the hands of the court that was acting on its own authority with respect to the disobedience of its orders, that it was not quite like going before the Committee on Discipline in the dean’s office and so forth. That the College was really out of the act.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: And things quieted down, and I began to get correspondence from very well-intentioned students saying that wouldn’t we please see that the injunction was raised, that it was humiliating to be engaged in higher education with an injunction hanging over their heads. And so forth. Well, I must say I wasn’t terribly swayed by that because some of these people were people who’d not been very much worried about the other side of the thing before it happened.

Probably your questions would sharpen up things that I should speak to, but I think that the big public meeting which we had permitted an airing of emotions and views that was useful. And we in due course sent word to our lawyer, as far as we were concerned, the campus was in a normal condition as far as threats of violence were concerned. And that therefore we would withdraw our petition in respect to the future, a petition for cease-and-desist order. And at that point the court pulled back—tore its order off the active list. But it was clear that if we had further trouble of that sort, we were in a position to go in and petition for its reapplication.

DANIELL: You may or may not be able to clarify this for me. I should know, but my memory is confused. It has to do with the relationship between the hearings and trials, or whatever they were called, of a couple of the faculty members and also some...

DICKEY: Well, those were carried on later, and they were under the auspices of the CAP with [Paul R.] Dick Shafer acting as chairman. He did what seemed to me to have been a very responsible, conscientious job of holding the
hearings. The faculty members involved, a mathematician, [Dona P.] Strauss—is that the name? A woman.

**DANIELL:** A woman named Strauss and a chemist.

**DICKEY:** A chemist named I don’t know, I forget who.

**DANIELL:** I can’t remember his name.

**DICKEY:** Both of them fairly junior faculty members. And whether there were others involved or not, I don’t know. I was prepared to appear if anybody wanted me to appear, but I was not requested either by the College officers or by the defendants to appear as a witness, which I much preferred not to do simply because I was also a party at interest in the affair. They carried on a series of hearings which were conducted… Well, the tone of the hearings was set by what’s his name?

**DANIELL:** Kunstler.

**DICKEY:** What’s the name?

**DANIELL:** William Kunstler, you mean, the lawyer?

**DICKEY:** Yes, what’s his name?

**DANIELL:** Kunstler.

**DICKEY:** Kunstler…K-U-N-T-Z-L-E-R I think it was or something like that. Well, he was a man who was engaged in representing this kind of defendant or person—they weren’t defendants in a court of law at that stage, I guess—over the country, a very…well, a very committed person and didn’t much care how he prevailed as long as he got across his point of view. And he solicited some support from a few pretty far-out alumni. There weren’t many. Most alumni, of course, were on the other end of the spectrum wondering why we’d dealt with this as mild as we had. But there was one fellow from out on the West Coast, I think—I’ve forgotten his name, whether it was McDonald or McConnell or something like that—who came on and aided and abetted Kunstler. But Dick Shafer and the others, I’ve forgotten who they were, conducted very responsible hearings as far as I could learn. And in due course the recommendations of the group were conveyed to the trustees.

**DANIELL:** The hearing was basically on violation of contract…?
DICKEY: Well, no, you see this is very important. There’d been a faculty vote establishing the responsibility of faculty members not to participate in certain types of behavior. I forget now what the wording was. So there was a faculty issue as to whether the individuals had disregarded the rules as laid down by the…

DANIELL: That’s the essential piece that I had missing in my own mind. Why I’m pushing here…

DICKEY: No. No. No, I don’t remember the exact wording of it but the trustees had adopted….

[End of Tape 44, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 44, Side B]

DICKEY: … the policies for faculty behavior laid down by the faculty and by the trustees.

DANIELL: That explains why it’s both the CAP which is a faculty committee advisory to the president and probably the only available body for self-discipline…

DICKEY: I think that was our judgment, that this was appropriate.

DANIELL: And the way in which—and this seems to be a critical element just from my own thinking about this—because it’s a way in which you fundamentally are relieved of what seemed to me would have been horrendous responsibility if this had been an advocacy relationship between the administration of the College and the faculty on the other hand.

DICKEY: Well, this is one of the reasons that I much preferred not to be called as a witness if it could be avoided. If it couldn’t be avoided, why, I would’ve had to go forward with it. But obviously for his own purposes Kunstler didn’t want it.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Or he would have called me and so forth. So that was about the story. I never had any confrontation with these individuals directly that I recall.

DANIELL: That actually addresses to the final question I had, the tendency of these kinds of things to go through a brief period of frenzy then kind of evaporates like the crisis in a disease. Do you have any specific
recollection when you were pretty sure it was over and that the... I don’t know what I mean by it.

DICKEY: Well, I distrust my memory as to what I felt in all these areas. There is one thing it’s important to say: We were not dealing with tenure cases.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: The one individual, I think the chemist, his term was up anyway.

DANIELL: Yes, I remember that.

DICKEY: It was a question of reappointment. And I’m not sure whether Strauss was in the same position or not. But in any event, there was no removal. I think if there was a term still to be given, that there was a leave-of-absence granted so that we took the easiest course in respect to enforcing the…. We just weren’t going to have them back on the campus. This was, let me say insofar as my feelings were concerned, something that was essential. We just couldn’t get back to a normal way of doing things if we had somebody who had led this thing from the faculty.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Back just constantly agitating and defying faculty committees, trustees, and the administration. So I think there was, in one of the cases, a leave-of-absence granted. And certainly in the other case there just was not a reappointment.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. That’s the way I remember it, too.

DICKEY: Pardon?

DANIELL: I say that’s the way I remember it, too.

DICKEY: As to how I felt about it? I felt that we were over the hump in the sense that there was no question in my mind at all that there was a considerable relief that a line had been drawn that was not talked about in public meetings or that sort of thing very much. But I was picking up a great deal of this from faculty colleagues who were reasonably glad that at least they knew where we stood now. And that the institution was not going to just play games with an occupation, and that the court was prepared to enforce its injunction.
There was a period of, as I said, of considerable tenseness. Students were disturbed because they’d never been through anything like this before, and seeing some of their colleagues in jail and realizing that the College was keeping hands off of the judicial process, were a little shaken up. This was quite an educational experience for several of the faculty who called—or several of the parents—who called me up and said, “Well, we didn’t pay tuition [Laughter] for this education…. But I’m afraid I’ve got to say it may be the most valuable thing that my lad has learned at Dartmouth, that there are certain limits to the way you manifest your views.”

DANIELL: The kind of a call that makes you feel good.

DICKEY: Yes. Actually I didn’t have a single protest.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: From a parent. I don’t know what I’d had…well, I must have had, oh, five or so that wanted information, what was going to happen and so forth. And insofar as we could say, we said it. And several of them, oh, I suppose, two or three of them at least, volunteered the fact that they were just darned sorry that their son had been involved in this thing. They respected his position about the war, they were proud of it and so forth. But there was a point beyond which they quite recognized the College couldn’t have that sort of thing taking place. No, I don’t think I had a single parent—certainly no one called me.

Now whether there were letters, I don’t recall. But there were a lot of letters, mostly pro from alumni and other places. And we began to receive more attention than I would have preferred, many from other institutions that just wanted to know how we’d managed this and so forth. Because there’d been some very bad happenings on occupations: Harvard and so forth.

So my feeling was that we were probably over the hump, but it was going to be a difficult period that could only be liquidated gradually I remember. I was very sorry that it came just on the threshold of the celebration of our 200th anniversary with Lord and Lady Dartmouth coming over for commencement. Some of the people who’d felt very strongly about the protest and wanting to protest and so forth tried to disrupt commencement with very mild behavior, standing up and turning their backs on the commencement speaker Rockefeller and things like that.
There was a very amusing [laughter] happening that I don’t recall the detail of. I wish I did. But we had to move from being outside to inside. I think we broke the ceremony because of weather. We went inside and I decided to shift the order of things and I don’t recall now exactly what I did it. But in any event, it double-crossed plans that some of these people had had for a demonstration when I spoke. It must have been when I was to address the class; it was the valedictory. I’m just hazy about this. But in any event, it had the result of catching them off guard so that they weren’t able to make the demonstration toward myself. And one of them came up—I was always somewhat amused or pleased about it—one of them came up after, as we were walking out of the commencement exercises, and he said, “Well, let me congratulate you on out-guessing us.”

[Laughter] I thought this showed a commendable sense of proportion and a certain element of humor. So that went off all right.

Lord and Lady Dartmouth were not innocents so far as this kind of behavior in England was concerned. They’d heard it or seen it happen. So they gave no evidence of being unduly disturbed by it. And they were not the subject of any protests that I’m aware of. Lady Dartmouth carried off her own speaking and behavior with great élan.

**DANIELL:** Final question on all this, and it may be something which you don’t have any comment on at all: if I were a person involved intensively in something which was at least as dramatic as this whole series of episodes and confrontations were, I’d probably spend at least part of my energy trying to explain to myself why I think this was occurring.

**DICKEY:** Why this what?

**DANIELL:** Why the whole thing, the sources of this student rebellion, etc. Obviously it’s the external source of Vietnam that’s part of it. But there’s more than this...

**DICKEY:** Oh, yes, yes.

**DANIELL:** And in your own thinking, I’d be interested in sort of John Dickey the historian.

**DICKEY:** Oh, I did a great deal of what used to be called soul searching, when the soul was the proper object of such attention, long before the occupation of Parkhurst which was sort of a culminating incident. But I was more concerned with the climate of the campus that was developing from, oh, from ’67, ’66 on. And what I was hearing and participating in through discussion about the troubles elsewhere which were much more dramatic.
and serious in a sense. So that I gave a lot of thought to this. Indeed, I gave a talk on it before the Alumni Council over in Thayer Hall probably in ‘68 or ‘67 even.

DANIELL: A talk in which you tried to explain what was happening.

DICKEY: Explain, yes. And I went on—it was one of my better efforts, I think. But I said that I had tried to understand what were the basic factors involved in the troubles that were present in the land. All of us could identify the events, the precipitating events, the assassination of Martin Luther King, the assassination of Robert Kennedy, the Vietnam War. As a matter of fact, I included some of this in my convocation addresses. But I said the first thing I wanted to say was that while I had no doubt whatsoever about these being precipitating factors, and that something was there to be precipitated, the other thing which impressed me was that these troubles such as we were having, these cities being burned, the campus rebellions, the resort to violence and that sort of thing, were not confined to the American college campus. They were not confined to the United States.

If you looked around and began to look at the world and see what was happening in this respect, you found, for example—and I used this as one of my classic examples of what I was talking about—that the most humble, obedient group of human beings that I knew of, namely an order of the Catholic sisters, had made a protest to their bishop, and it had been just more than just a polite may we not have a different kind of dress? It had been a quite outspoken challenge to the authority of the Church. And I said, “You can go back to the papal conference that Pope John convened, and you begin to see some very specific challenges to authority.” And then I said, “If you move into the American scene, and I have been doing a good bit of talking with people in businesses, not just in university and college enterprises, people in laboratories, in the medical profession, most recently,” I said, “to the head of a substantial architectural firm, and all of them say that they are now becoming conscious of a revolt against authority that is really very fundamental. Very fundamental!” And I said, “I’m prepared to believe that when we understand what’s been happening in this country in the past ten years, we’re going to find that Vietnam was not the sole cause of this. But that we were in one of those periods which civilization has known on a number of occasions at least in the past—the challenge to the authority of the church through science and so forth—when civilization grew up so to speak by moving away from the exercise of hereditary, traditional authority, and men took over their destiny in a more free spirit.” I said, “In most of those instances, there were pretty disturbed happenings in respect to both the shucking off of authority and the resisting of that shucking off of authority.” And I said, “You’ll find this in
business. The business world has been telling me for the last few years that there’s no longer any possibility of exercising the kind of proprietary authority that was previously regarded as essential to the running of a business. This partner in charge of the architectural firm said that he was just simply shaken to his bottom of his shoes when a group of his young junior partners came in his office and said, ‘We want more of a voice in running the firm.”

DANIELL: Any particular explanation of why the timing of it [inaudible]?

DICKEY: Well, no, I didn’t presume to say more than that I was sure that there was a fundamental desire that gradually developed, possibly out of the disturbances, I said, of the Depression, the disturbances of World War II, the shaking up of the social structures in all these countries which were bound together with the concept of authority. And that I felt that you were going to trace this back, and I said this in this address, when you came to doing what you’ve just asked, tracing back to some of the causes, the more fundamental causes of this, you were going to find the Depression, World War II, and other happenings that eroded the whole concept of authority. I said, “Just let me give you one reason why I’m reasonably sure that this is not primarily Vietnam. Or certainly not solely Vietnam.”

I said that I had been engaged in some professional work in respect to Canada. (This is where I was able to make good use of my Canadian work.) And I said this has taken me to Canada on a number of occasions and it took me two years ago—it was in ’67 I think it was—to Toronto to make the commencement address at the University of Toronto and to receive a degree. And I was present at one of the most disturbed commencements that I have heard about or seen. A young man, after he received his diploma from the chancellor of the University of Toronto, stood up in front of the convocation, as they call it, where the parents were all there in their finest dress and the whole university was putting on its most formal behavior. And in Canada you’re supposed to, by and large, be willing to be a little more dignified than you’re expected to be in the United States. And I said...remind you that the Vietnam War had not been a primary issue. There’d been some criticism of it, of course, on the university campuses. But by and large it was not a national issue. And this student, graduate student as it was, came up. I was sitting beside the chancellor. And he opened up his gown, and he pulled out from under his gown his diploma which he’d received earlier in the ceremony, turned to the audience, and tore it up in a very dramatic fashion in front of the chancellor. And he said, “This is what I think of the University of Toronto.” [Laughs]
DANIELL: I thought he was going to burn it.

DICKEY: Well, then President Seward got up and tried to calm him down. Got him to leave and so forth. But I said, “When something like that happens in a society such as the Canadian society, it immediately gives you pause about the role of Vietnam in some of the things that we’ve been seeing here.” Without going back to the sisters of the Catholic Church or to all the other evidence that I have cited. Now I, I suppose, am stuck with a hypothesis that I did develop. But I would have to say that I have seen nothing since that makes me feel that there was not a good bit to this hypothesis that is valid.

DANIELL: The thing that strikes me is, as you just explained, is this helps to make sense of—and this is why I can ask the question—your pattern of response to the particular events internally here; namely, that if you really see this, what’s happening, internally as part of a much larger phenomenon, you don’t have the same sense of potential control over it that you might under different circumstances.

DICKEY: You’re speaking very accurately with respect to my state of mind insofar as I can reconstruct it.

Let me just say something else which I don’t want to sound—don’t want to dwell on because it sounds too self-serving: I never became a partisan of Vietnam. At the most, my position was that I had a lot of friends in the foreign service and in the State Department and elsewhere who were performing professional responsibilities in this respect that I was not anxious to go out and run down with my criticisms of it. I was puzzled about what role a college president ought to play in this regard, particularly if he was going to have to play the role of maintaining the integrity of the institution. I was unable to identify with sympathy or really with understanding with the kind of faculty behavior that just simply disregarded all the principles of academic freedom in order to carry out their own form of protest.

I went down—on one occasion I was invited to come down by Dean Rusk, and had an opportunity to make my position known under the most favorable circumstances that could be, something that couldn’t have happened if I had walked out and been engaged in protest, public protest. So that I’ve had no real regrets about that. I’ve had misgivings as to whether it would have been better to have been more openly in protest.

DANIELL: Not your style.
DICKEY: But this was not my style, and I did have opportunities to have my say; where if I had anything to say, it was likely to get more attention than it would through standing out on the campus.

So what you said a moment ago is to a considerable degree buttressed by the fact that while I was not an overt member of the protest, neither was I very...well, I was very unsympathetic in my deepest convictions to Vietnam for reasons that anybody who knows my position on international conflict would understand. And therefore I was basically at ease with myself. I didn’t feel that I was being untrue to myself in some of the things that I felt I had to do.

DANIELL: Therefore you were able internally to deal with the protest and everything as an institutional problem rather than something which your public action in any way would be an index of something...

DICKEY: And as we have not had occasion to bring out, but as probably should be added to what we’ve been saying today, I’d had plenty of occasion to defend myself form the other side. That is, those who were outraged that I didn’t, for example, protest the valedictorian’s speech at the time it was made and disown him. And these people came up to the house that Sunday morning and wanted me to know how they felt, that they were going to engage in a pretty strong criticism of the College and of me in the alumni magazine.

Well, I discovered I could take that. And that I felt I had to take it. So once you begin to take things on one side, it sort of fortifies you—at least it fortified me—in my ability to take it from the other side.

DANIELL: Yes. It was sure advantageous, it seems to me, to have been a college president for this for 15 years—20 years when this came upon you—having gone through many a thing which you inevitably got buffeted from both sides.

DICKEY: It helps you to...Well, it helps you.

DANIELL: Well, look, I don’t on this whole matter of student protest and faculty behavior in the context of Vietnam, I don’t—in the process of this we’ve covered everything and indeed a good deal more.

DICKEY: Of course there’s one thing we haven’t mentioned in this connection, and maybe it should also be mentioned, talking about being helped in keeping your nerve, which is about what it comes down to. I had long since, of course, taken a decision that I was retiring.
DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: And announced it. And that is also a big help. Oh, yes. At that point I thought I’ve done what I can do. I’m going to finish this thing off honorably. But I’m not going to be pushed around because I’m afraid that I’ll be having troubles later with faculty or students or whatnot.

No, in other words, you’ve reached harbor. And psychologically it helps prepare you for what you have to do. You’re not looking over your shoulder—or I wasn’t looking over my shoulder—and saying, well, how is this going to affect things? Am I going to have to resign? See, quite a few people…Jim Perkins at Cornell went through a totally different, ghastly experience of really being forced to resign by the circumstances of their protest.

DANIELL: Were there others than Perkins for whom it was that extreme?

DICKEY: Who pulled out?

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: Oh, yes. I don’t know that I can recall them out of mind. But Clark Kerr out in California.

DANIELL: Yes, I was thinking of immediate….

DICKEY: In the Ivy?

DANIELL: Ivy or eastern private college group.

DICKEY: Well, if I could recall some of them, not a great number. But having had that out of the way and behind me made you free of—or freed me—of the problems of pride that get into a decision in spite of yourself. I was free of that. I just knew I was….

DANIELL: Well, it must have been a kind of, in some ways, a mixed blessing in that in the positive part of it. On the other hand, it must be since one tends to think of working toward retirement in terms of a gentle slope downward, it must have been a disturbing element...

DICKEY: Oh, I was sorry. I was sorry, as I said earlier, that our bicentennial had to be carried out in the circumstances that it did, of bringing over Lord and
Lady Dartmouth and so forth and having these protests. But, okay, there was nothing we could do about that. That was going to happen. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Well, that seems to me a very, very full and useful treatment of it. I think this is probably a good place to break. So I’ll turn the machine off.

[End of Tape 44, Side B]
[Beginning of Tape 45, Side A]

DANIELL: …President Dickey resumed on the afternoon of April 6, 1978, in his office in Baker Library. Make sure it’s going all right.

There are two general areas that I’d like to tie up these series of interviews or just simply the whole question of transition in the presidency and preparation for, you know, what kinds of things...you’ve been in office for 25 years, you’re leaving, you want to leave the ship in as good an order as you can for your successor. This is obviously kind of a political delicacy in some ways -- that whole area. And then I would like to talk probably even more about what you’ve done since you left. If a person’s ever going into these for purposes of writing, say, a biography of John Dickey, how a person “retires.”

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: So those are the two main things.

DICKEY: Well, I think I can touch on the first and cover it very briefly. I had told the trustees—I’m not sure without checking the record just when, but about two years before I retired—that if we made it to the bicentennial, I’d like to be there to come through that, and the 25 years would be enough. Chris had found the requirements of the job on her side increasingly burdensome, and I didn’t want to push—certainly didn’t want to push—her further than she really felt—

DANIELL: Yes. You talked about the timing, the decision, basically, to retire before.

DICKEY: Yes. So that was it. Well, the result was I knew I would—I mention this now because it was important in that I knew that I was going to be retiring, and I said that I wanted it announced early enough so that the faculty could organize their committee and do what they wanted to do to get ready. And the board would also want time to organize its efforts and so forth.
DANIELL: Does that suggest it was almost an assumption that the faculty would have a role in selecting the new president? [Inaudible]

DICKEY: Yes, because I told… Oh, yes, the board asked me about this, about mounting a…. And I said I just thought that the pattern in American higher education, quite unlike the pattern when I came to the job, would involve faculty input. In what form I couldn’t say. They would have to work that out. But I was perfectly certain that they would want to organize some faculty input into it and that I was sure that if they didn’t, the faculty would. So that there was never any -- really never any discussion about that at least in my presence.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: In the board… I had no discussion of it with faculty people; talked with the board people about it. And my memory is simply that it was assumed that this would be done, and the question was how it would be done and with whom.

DANIELL: That’s what Lloyd Brace said exactly, too.

DICKEY: Is that so? Well, that’s about the way it was.

In any event, my decision-making was definite during the last year -- was conditioned, for better and for worse, probably both, by my knowledge that I would be leaving the job. I mentioned, I believe in our last discussion, one problem where I think my realization that I wasn’t going to be going on indefinitely was a plus, and that was in dealing with the problems of student, campus turmoil and so forth, where I wasn’t at all concerned about whether I had to live with a situation or not. I was just much more if not relaxed at least much freer to reach a judgment than I perhaps might have been if I had had to look down the road as to what would be the impact of it two, three, five years.

On the other hand, there’s no question but that one finds himself—and I found myself from time to time—not making personnel moves that I would otherwise have felt I had to make. The only one that I moved in on really after I knew I would—that I would call at least—that I knew I would be retiring was the appointment of Thad Seymour’s successor which we couldn’t let stand open, of course. Incidentally, just had word from Thad that he’s going to Rollins in June.

DANIELL: Well, I hadn’t heard word from him, but I saw Sam.
DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes.

DANIELL: I know Sam pretty well. And Sam told me he was going to Rollins.

DICKEY: Yes. Well, he dropped me a note about it.

Well, on that side of things I think one constantly is a little apprehensive that he’s not maintaining as tight a line as perhaps he should. As I think back, I don’t recall specific situations. I recall only one specific situation that was somewhat perplexing to me as to how to handle it, and that was the question of the future of the medical school in relationship, in particular, to its financing and the governmental participation in the financing. Carleton Chapman was on the job and was very anxious to push forward into what we had committed ourselves to doing: reestablishing the MD degree.

DANIELL: You were probably getting more anxious about the implications of this for faculty salaries and building in a [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Yes. Well, what I was concerned about was the fact that the federal government at that point was pulling in its horns, so to speak, with regard to its support of medical education and medical research. And nobody had any doubt about it, we were going to be running a pretty marginal operation financially under the best of circumstances. And I was very perplexed as to what should—what was the proper position for me to take at that point. And I decided that I was not willing to make a decision that I would be walking away from within six months or so. But that I would wait until, if I possibly could, I could bring my successor into at least a preliminary understanding of the question and to consult with the dean of the school in reaching a decision. Well, I forget just when it was that John Kemeny was appointed, but I guess it was around mid-December, wasn’t it?

DANIELL: I thought it was November or so, but [inaudible]...

DICKEY: Yes. Well, it’s around in there.

DANIELL: Around in there anyway, yes.

DICKEY: And I immediately, of course, told him that I was available to meet with him and all of my associates were available to meet with him at his convenience. And I wanted him to take whatever initiative he thought would be most helpful to him. And I said that I likewise wanted him to be perfectly free to suggest a time for moving in on the job. I said I was
prepared to go as long as he thought would be helpful to him...a matter of months, that is -- but that I didn't think that there was any great plus, as far as I could see, in dragging it out to June or whatnot. And he said he would prefer to come in sometime around March. I think it was the end of March or middle of March or something. In any event, in March. So I said, well, that would suit us fine as far as we were—Chris and I were concerned. And I talked to the trustees. This was their position.

I had maintained quite a close relationship with the board during this period of the search. I think there’s a great deal to be said that they were not really well prepared to conduct a search.

DANIELL: They hadn’t done too many, looking for presidents, in the last 25 years.

DICKEY: No, that’s what I’m saying. They were not really experienced in this regard. They talked with other trustees—trustees in other institutions. And I’m sure they learned a lot. And I think this is a real problem that I’m not going to get into; but which bears some thought that, when you’re exercising an ultimate responsibility such as the board has to exercise in a matter of this sort, you might well wish to have a little bit more experience, a little bit more exposure to it.

Lloyd Brace was as conscientious as a man could be about it. He had not had much experience in this sort of thing. The other trustees who were experienced business executives had had no experience in this sort of thing. I took the position that I was not going to call the shots, even if it was possible. And I would have to say to you that I was pretty well invited to do more than I was prepared to do.

DANIELL: It’s that point in time that they realized the implications of what they had to do [inaudible]… What Mr. Hopkins had done must have been very attractive.

DICKEY: That’s right. And while I never have had any regret about what Mr. Hopkins did because it was an opportunity for me that I wouldn’t have presumably had otherwise, I still was perfectly aware that the atmosphere of faculty participation in these matters was a very different atmosphere from the atmosphere of the academic world when I came on the job. So that I said I’m available for consultation, but I must make clear that I’m going to stop short of trying to anoint anybody with my endorsement.

All I can say about this at this point is that this was a very rocky search. I don’t know that the full story is known, and I don’t think I’m the person to tell it. I think that’s up to the people who conducted the search. But looking
at it from my point of view, two misfires and misfiring in a way that resulted in newspaper stories. Of course Yale did it, too. But this definitely created an impact on the search procedure.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: That I should not want to see happen again, just from the welfare of the place.

DANIELL: You—I mean I know you don’t want to get into questions of individuals....

DICKEY: No, no.

DANIELLL: Inasmuch as you can abstract, make abstract observations about that whole thing, it would be useful...in part because one person, say, from the faculty point of view who is most knowledgeable about it, Lou Morton, of course, is no longer with us. I mean, if you were designing it from the point of view of the organization of it, what kind of steps would you see as could be taken to prevent the things that, as you say...?

DICKEY: Well, I’m not sure that there is any step that could be prescribed with certainty. I think that the relationship of a committee such as that faculty committee and the trustees' committee was a relationship that might well have been thought out a little bit more with respect to procedures, with respect to who was going to do what, than really was the case. There was an agreement that the trustees would have the final responsibility and that the faculty committee would be advising the board. I think I’d have to say that the board was just not manned for the purpose of giving the kind of full-time attention to this that I believe is essential on the part of someone besides faculty, if the board is going to be serious about bearing the ultimate responsibility. I mean you’re engaged in a decision or in a proceeding which at best is going to be complicated, where if there are nuances of approach, somebody has got to be involved in it who’s not just taking it out of his other job. But who is giving it everything he’s got in the way of wisdom and experience and time in consultation with other people.

So that if I had any single suggestion to make, it would be that when you come to that point, maybe—as strongly as I want to put it is maybe—maybe the board should choose one of its members early on, hopefully, who would be prepared to give six months or three months at least full time to the utilization of the board and the faculty committee.

Well, now as it turned out, this wasn’t a feasible thing, I assume. I don’t know if it was ever raised with respect to Jock. But Jock was carrying on
one of the major executive responsibilities in the U.S. banking community. You couldn’t get a more conscientious man, very able, tough-minded, and all of that. But I think he’d be the first to say that when he moved into a responsibility of this sort, he really had need to learn, he had the need to size up his relationship with his faculty committee, to size up the attitudes and the contributions of his colleagues on the board. What I’m simply doing is trying to add a bit of concreteness to my judgment.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. Let me just intrude here a minute because this is quite parallel to something that Lou Morton said to me once. And I want to get this on the tape since Lou is not with us anymore. And he was describing as he was involved in this as a faculty member on the search committee, and he used to kind of talk a lot with faculty members when names came up, and what do you think of X, Y, or Z? If they were internal people in the community, not the external ones. But he said at one point—and he and I had a pretty good, open relationship—that to his surprise he found indeed the faculty group was in a position to control the process of the selection much more than he ever expected it would be because fundamentally the faculty group was playing the role you’re just describing.

DICKEY: This is correct.

DANIELL: They kept the files and….

DICKEY: This is correct.

DANIELL: If there were a function of an executive secretary, in the absence of an executive secretary, it was the faculty group that served that function.

DICKEY: This is correct. This would be my perception of it. And it’s something that somebody else will have to say whether this is desirable or not. I’m sure that many faculty members would say, well, this is just the way it should be. I have, from my experience and my prejudices, I am not at all sure that that, from what I’ve seen elsewhere and what I’ve read and so forth, I’m not at all sure that is the best answer. I know that the theology that believes that there’s no power that a corporate faculty can’t exercise as well or better than another constituency of an institution. But there was constantly the question in my mind, when you were seeking to involve faculty, whether it was the appointment of a dean or some other thing.

And I think I can say without being too apologetic about it that from very early on, I did seek ways to make sure I was getting, as I hoped, the best counsel I could get from individual faculty members and from faculty committees such as Committee Advisory to the President. But a president
and a board of trustees, I think, is dangerously remiss in relationships with the faculty if it doesn’t face the question of, well, who’s going to be answerable for what’s done?

DANIELL: I think you would find a surprisingly large percentage of the faculty agrees with you.

DICKEY: Yes?

DANIELL: Partly because they don’t want the responsibility that it could go wrong.

DICKEY: This is the point at which real perplexity comes into these things: where you lose any chauvinistic desire to take control of everything? But you do come to what in bullfighting they call the moment of truth [Laughter] as to who’s going to take the responsibility for correcting what didn’t go right.

Now how you work that out, I wouldn’t attempt to pontificate in an interview of this sort. If I were involved in trying to make a solid contribution to it, I’d want to think it out, I’d want to write it out. But I do have a hunch, as I said, that if the board is going to assert—and I think all boards think they are asserting this responsibility—going to assert the ultimate responsibility for the appointment, that they should recognize that it just is not possible to do this and to exercise that responsibility in a way that commands the confidence, frankly, of your faculty—just as Lou Morton more or less indicated to you—unless somebody from that board is going to work at leading this effort—and I don’t want to use the word “work”—is going to be able to devote himself—and I don’t think it’s too strong to say full time. And this is not an easy thing for most of these men who are making their living otherwise and who bear responsibilities; that is very difficult to get a leave-of-absence from.

DANIELL: Oh, yes, yes.

DICKEY: But okay, you’re talking about the life of an institution and decisions that make a great deal of difference to a helluva lot of people and probably as much to faculty as to anybody else in the place. So that that would be one of the things, if I were asked to make a suggestion, I would say look at it awfully hard. Now this, of course, assumes that you’re going to have the time to do it, that you’re going to have a year or two to do this. Bill Bundy has talked with me a little bit about the experiences that he had there at Yale. And I would guess he would have some ideas about such things.

DANIELL: Yes, I was going to ask you…that was exactly the next question I was keeping in my mind: Have you either subsequent to your retirement from
the College or in process, in preparation for knowing that you were going to do this and be asked your advice, did you try to make comparisons to how other institutions like … [inaudible]?

DICKEY: Oh, I did, but it was not nearly as systematic as I think I should have done by way of preparation if I had not found myself with the position that I was not going to participate.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I ruled myself out of participating with the committees. I think I had only one meeting with the two, both the faculty and the trustees together. I met with the trustees frequently, at their request always; I never asked to be involved. But I think that I may have carried that position too far. I’ve been told I did.

DANIELL: Carried the position…?

DICKEY: … of ruling myself out.

DANIELL: Out, okay.

DICKEY: I’ve been told that I did.

DANIELL: By…You mean by other educators basically in your position or people who were concerned?

DICKEY: No, people who were concerned at what I’d done. I’d just as soon not go into the names.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: But I think that if I can speak critically of my relationship to it, that would be it. While there was a criticism that Mr. Hopkins was too much involved. I think that if there was a criticism of the role I played it may be that I did not make available as much of what I knew or thought or could contribute as perhaps it would have been in order for me to do. But okay.

DANIELL: One person’s order is another person’s interference.

DICKEY: That’s right. But that’s the way it was.

Now I want to come back and say just one word about the only matter on which I postponed decision until my successor could be briefed on it and
have an opportunity to at least make a preliminary judgment, and that was with respect to whether we went right on down the chute with the development of the medical school program for the restoration of the MD degree, or whether we postponed it until he could have an opportunity to take a reading on the institution.

There was a lot of steam up, of course, over at the medical school, and the dean of the medical school, Carleton Chapman, felt that this was just intolerable that this should be delayed at all. The board had given its approval in principle to going forward, and Carleton felt quite confident that the difficulties which we were having with the federal support could be if not solved at least managed in a way that would permit going forward, and that going forward was better than waiting. He was of the opinion that the continuation of the two-year school for even another year or so without complete commitment, public commitment, to restoration of the four-year program, would endanger the school.

So we got John Kemeny to come over to the medical school, and I laid out the picture as I saw it. And I said, Carleton—I wanted him to lay it, I wanted Carleton to lay out the picture as he saw it, which was much more one of "we must go forward immediately." Mine was one of considerably more caution, essentially that of wanting to wait to see a little bit more clearly what was going to be the nature of federal support that we were counting on. And I said to John that I had postponed taking any definitive position on this until my successor was able to at least know that we were at a point of decision on this; and that if he wanted to hold up on it until he was a little more fully informed on it, I was sure that the board would be quite prepared to have that done. It was clear that Carleton would have been quite unhappy and said that his faculty would be unhappy. And John Kemeny said, “Well, I guess I’m sufficiently familiar with the nature of a faculty’s unhappiness in a matter of this sort to say that I favor going ahead.” I said, “If that’s your judgment of this thing, that as far as I’m concerned is the way it should be handled.” And that’s the way it was handled.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: That was the only major commitment that was postponed until there could be a reaction at least.

DANIELL: Yes. This gets on the edge of a question, the next question, the only one you haven’t really answered almost automatically that I was wanting to ask concerning the whole transition which was simply this: Anyone leaving any position of responsibility…. And in talking with your successor, I assume
that there’s a point at which you say that these things seem to be in pretty good order, but here are some problem areas of things that are not resolved. And you’ve already described one right here in the case of the medical school. Were there other things at this point in time in which you … [inaudible]?

DICKEY: Yes, I reviewed with him on a number of occasions over in the office when we were just meeting alone my general judgment and my specific judgment with respect to certain situations. For example, I know I dwelled at some length on the efforts that I had made to bring the Tuck School and the Thayer School into a closer relationship. And the fact that we were at a point where now I thought the building of a common facility would play a useful part in this.

DANIELL: I hadn’t linked that transition to the transition in the presidency. But that’s right, that’s exactly when that came, wasn’t it?

DICKEY: Yes, yes. And this had been a very difficult problem where presidential leadership was just absolutely indispensable if you….

DANIELL: That’s what Jack Dodd told me, too.

DICKEY: Oh! I don’t want to regurgitate that whole thing. But I came to believe very firmly in the importance of the associated schools to the College. I thought they were in the three right areas: health, management, and technology for American society today.

DANIELL: Well spoken, as an ex-lawyer.

DICKEY: Well, I would have to say that they required more I hope it was creative attention than I realized at first. And in particular the relationship of the Tuck and Thayer Schools was a very very difficult aspect of the matter which still is far from in my judgment been well-settled. But I told John what had been the premises on which I had operated, the difficulties that….

[End of Tape 45, Side A]
[Beginning of Tape 45, Side B]

DICKEY: …sessions in the office. The problems were in the medical school, a few years before, in that faculty and I was able to say that it seemed to me that was pretty well behind us. The real question of the medical school was the one which I had him come into a meeting with the dean, Dean Chapman, to discuss and make a judgment. The situation of the faculty,
as far as I was concerned [speaks to his dog], seemed to me to be in good shape, some of it in very good shape. And where there were specific problems, I didn’t feel that they were too serious.

DANIELL: It must have taken a real retrospective satisfaction in changing [inaudible] faculty

DICKEY: Well, I did, I did. And of course having been here himself and having played a major role himself in the rebuilding of the math side of the College and a side of the College that had great relevance to the sciences and the Thayer School and the Tuck School with computer development and so forth, he was himself able to make his own judgments on those things.

There was one situation which again I would want to make sure this was an observation that wouldn’t be utilized by anybody while living… insofar as it involves living people. But when we discussed the finances of the College, I undertook to say where I thought we were and to do a little forecasting. I did not attempt to foresee—indeed I didn’t foresee—the degree to which inflation was going to become a major factor. But I said that I felt that we had run a pretty tight ship on this. And that while we had our problems, I was very grateful to the stewardship that John Meck had exercised in respect to our financial affairs, and that he’d had a very good relationship particularly with Harvey Hood while Harvey was in effect chairman of the board, although he remained, by his preferences, chairman of the executive committee. His relationship with Lloyd Brace had been less easy. There was… Lloyd had a less comfortable relationship with John, not on technical financial policies, but just the personal style.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, I can see that.

DICKEY: And a very unfortunate thing came to the surface in the course of one of these conversations when John Kemeny said, “Well, I guess we’re going to have to get rid of John Meck.” And I was a little taken aback. And I said…I forget just what I said, but I said, “Well, John, if I were you, I’d be pretty careful about that.” Well, he said, “I get this from Lloyd Brace, that he’s used up his usefulness.”

Well, this was a very, very delicate thing because I felt a deep obligation and an admiration and appreciation to John. I’d had about as much exposure as I guess anybody could have to John’s awkwardness in handling human relations. And I had had occasions when I’d had to… And John had the weakness of his strength: his strength being that he was
willing to assume anything—to work at anything that you asked him to work at; and the weakness was that he couldn’t exercise self-restraint about what he got into. He would get into much more than at times he should’ve and that annoyed people, and so forth. But, okay, in my eyes these were blemishes that could be managed and so forth. And I never forgot what Mr. Hopkins said when he would talk with me about Halsey Edgerton in a similar way: He said, “I used to spend 364 days in the year wondering whether it wasn’t possible to run the treasurer’s office somewhat more responsibly. And then he said, “On the 365th day, I was so glad that I had Halsey there as treasurer that I would say the rest is unimportant. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, until you’ve spent your days and nights worrying about how solvent—to use an old-fashioned term—the place is, and realizing how dependent you are upon a knowledgeable, strong character as treasurer, I guess you can’t appreciate how ready you are to say, well, I can stand the blemishes if the major things are there.

Well, I did not in any way challenge this judgment. I knew from personal knowledge that, as I said, that the relationship between John and Lloyd had not been anything like the relationship between John and Harvey Hood, which had been an intimate relationship of mutual confidence that was very great.

DANIELL: And it remained until they….

DICKEY: Oh, right up to the end. Right up to the end John was coming back.

DANIELL: Oh, you were on the phone telling him to get… when you heard that Harvey was in the process of dying.

DICKEY: Right. That’s right.

DANIELL: You were calling….

DICKEY: I was trying to reach John Meck.

DANIELL: That’s when I was here [inaudible]...

DICKEY: And then the word came back that we actually did get the message to him, and that he had sent back word that he was coming back for the services if they would let him know when they were. And bang, he was dead! Well,
I mention this because, well, it reveals the things you can't predict and that you don't quite know how to handle that happen in a transition.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: I had only one other experience of that sort with John Kemeny during this period of transition, and that was quite inconsequential as compared with this. And on this one I could only say, "Well, I understand the relationship has not been an easy one. But I think it’s been one of mutual respect." And I guess I may have said, "I'm just a little surprised to hear that you believe Lloyd Brace would favor getting rid of John." But in any event, my own position was, "I would suggest you wait until you really know the ropes here before you cross that bridge." And that was the end of it. Never said anything more. He never said anything more to me. But I subsequently had all too much awareness of the fact that the relationship of confidence had been destroyed before it had an opportunity to be established.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes.

DICKEY: And it could never be put back together again. And I've got to say to you that it was on both sides. And once that happens on both sides, that’s that.

DANIELL: Oh, yes.

DICKEY: Well....

DANIELL: There inevitably is that in any transition.

DICKEY: Oh, that's what I'm suggesting, that this was no....

DANIELL: But it needn’t be done with that...

DICKEY: It simply indicates one of the areas in a transition that I think requires really careful thought. I was not aware of it, I was not sensitive to it when I came on the job.

DANIELL: That’s parallel. Yours was a much slower [inaudible] to your relationship with Pudge in some kinds of ways.

DICKEY: To a degree, yes, although....

DANIELL: He prejudged it in a sense, though, was ready to prejudge it, John Kemeny, I’m saying in the case of John Meck.
DICKEY: I don’t know about that. But these are things that require time in order to take a fair and wise judgment on. The other one, which again I shouldn’t want to have kicked around while he’s alive, but the only one that John Kemeny took initiative on: he said, “I wish you’d settle it before I come on the job,” and that was Bob Monahan [Robert S. Monahan ’29].

DANIELL: Oh, yes. [Laughs]

DICKEY: I didn’t need any briefing on it because we had pretty well settled the Bob Monahan situation, which was itself a minor tragedy. A fellow that had a lot of promise and got into the political game a little too further than he should have and then this led into alcohol.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But I was able to say that this one is in hand, and it’s been settled. I’m not sure whether there are other things that I’m missing on this during this period. But that’s about the net of it.

DANIELL: You had the disadvantage of having someone coming on the job that after all had been here for 15 years.

DICKEY: That’s right. And had been involved in administrative affairs. He’d been sitting on the Committee Advisory to the President.

DANIELL: That’s right, yes.

DICKEY: So that it was not like an outsider coming to be introduced to the campus and to faculty people. He had his own judgments with respect to faculty people that I did not presume to pass on. So that’s about the picture unless you have questions about that.

DANIELL: No, no, no. This is just about the level. And it seems to me that the particular one I was interested in is what you spent the most time on is your perceptions of, I believe, the difficulties of sort of replacement in terms of just how a board of trustees functions in relationship to the faculty, in relationship to the other inputs into it.

DICKEY: Well, I guess I could summarize that by saying that this is still a baffling problem in the world of higher education.

DANIELL: Yes. Oh, Dudley Orr I found very, very sensitive on this. We spent a good deal of time it must have been three years ago—he was one of the first
people I interviewed—and he probably was more just moved inside of...in the process of describing his response to, not the particular case but the difficulties of selecting a president for a major institution like Dartmouth. And how the organizational structure really isn’t set to do that.

DICKEY: No, no. And I’m not sure that however much time you spend on it you’ll be able to solve it. But you can at least identify some of the perplexities.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. And the major one, which he had put his finger on, was simply the fact that the people who are doing -- held the ultimate responsibility -- are not really from the world to which they’re selecting a person for the job. You get a board of trustees for a utility so you can have all sorts of people who’ve been working in utilities or parallel businesses for a long time; they’re just better equipped by experience to do that.

DICKEY: But you’ve got to have the time.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: Well, now, with what I’ve been doing, of course, one of the nicest things that happened for me and to me was that when it was announced that I would be retiring from the job, the people at the—the president of the Council on Foreign Relations sent word to me that they would like to discuss with me the possibility of my coming there as their senior visiting fellow for a year, which was a wonderful thing in terms of both something to do, some continuity in my professional interest in foreign affairs, an opportunity to tool myself up for some serious academic work, and I accepted that and was very glad for it.

DANIELL: You physically lived....

DICKEY: In New York for a year.

DANIELL: A year. That must have been useful, too, physically disengaged....

DICKEY: This was immensely useful in bringing me in contact with people, bringing me in contact with Canadians who were there in diplomatic positions. And the council was at the point where they wanted to develop their relationship with Canada, in particular their relationship with the counterpart organization, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. And I was given the opportunity to play, I guess it’s fair to say, the leading role in working out with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs some joint programs which hadn’t been part of the council’s program before. And this led to the establishment of this Lester Pearson Memorial Conferences,
which are now held about every year or year and a half in Canada. And they’ve been very worthwhile.

DANIELL: It also would have been very useful in simply…had you remained in Hanover, old habits would have been….

DICKEY: Oh, no, we wanted to break that pattern. The most difficult thing personally about retirement for me initially was the necessity of breaking my daily relationships with colleagues. This was the most difficult of all.

DANIELL: Yes.

DICKEY: And yet I felt I had to do that, or at least I had to be clear that I didn’t take initiatives to keep that up. And this year in New York was very, very helpful in that respect. More fundamentally, in the long run, it gave me an opportunity to prepare myself professionally or retool myself—but also to prepare myself in a way that I’d never had the opportunity to do with respect, for example, to the historical dimension of the U.S.-Canada relationship. It may seem something that ought to be taken for granted. But very few of our people who’ve been experts on Canada, diplomatic people, have the time to do any serious work on the history of the relationship. And yet the history of this relationship is a lively, current, relevant aspect of almost every policy problem you encounter. So that was a major opportunity.

At just about that time that I returned to Hanover, I got a call from George Putnam, the head of the Putnam Mutual Fund group in Boston wanting to know whether I would be available to come onto their board as a disinterested trustee. The Federal Investment Company Act required that these mutual trusts or mutual funds should develop majorities who had no previous relationship to the management company or to the business or to the brokerage world or whatnot. And this was one that I took under advisement, and consulted with a few people around, Brace and others who were more familiar with that world than I was. Some of my old law partner people. And finally decided to give it a whirl. And I’m still doing that.

This had the added advantage that it permitted some supplementing of my retirement income. I made the firm decision that if I did any teaching at the College or anything for the College, I would not accept any remuneration from the College for that activity. And having these fees from the mutual funds helped out on that.

DANIELL: How much kind of time are you talking about?
DICKEY: Well, I’m talking about a minimum of, oh, one day in Boston a month with committee meetings frequently two or three days—not frequently, but from time to time. And an amount of reading of material that is about full time two days a week.

DANIELL: Oh, really!

DICKEY: It’s incredible…

DANIELL: It’s a quarter-time activity.

DICKEY: … the amount of stuff that you get into. I think they make a mistake in sending as much out as they do, but this is a form of self-protection that they kept the trustees informed.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. I mean in this kind of activity you weren’t involved in what kinds of decisions…?

DICKEY: Well, the board, theoretically, has responsibility for everything that happens in the funds, investment policy. But that is delegated to the management company, to the advisory company.

DANIELL: Okay. Right, right.

DICKEY: But then we meet with them each month to hear what they’ve been doing, what they’re reporting, what their perplexities are, what they outlook is, and so forth. But basically during this period, I guess, the job of the trustees has been to keep the ship of state from being shot down by one legal problem after another, suits. When I went in there, they had a fair number of stockholder—shareholder—suits that were endemic in the industry.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: So it has been a combination of trying to exercise some influence with respect to the outlook for the economy or for the nation. I have not tried to play the role of a person who could foresee what was a good investment, what was a bad investment. But I had thought that I had some relevance to the climate of public affairs which is very relevant to the long-run outlook. And I’ve shared that with the board whenever there was occasion for it.
This has been a good experience. I’ve had the good fortune in having a man at the head of that, George Putnam, in whom I have great confidence. And if I hadn’t had great confidence, indeed, I would have gotten out much—quite early—because the whole industry is still shot through with conflict-of-interest problems. And he’s a man in whom I have confidence insofar as his ability to... So far as any man can manage such conflict-of-interest situations, he can. I did that.

Then I was approached.... Well, I had retired from the Rockefeller Foundation Board for age three years after retiring from the College job. And at that point I was invited—well, before that, just, as a matter of fact, during my first year in retirement—I was invited by the C.F. Kettering Foundation to come on their board as a trustee, and I’m still on that board, and I’ve been quite active there as chairman of the executive committee of the board and other things.

DANIELL: It’s a different kind of activity than the Putnam Fund.

DICKEY: Oh, yes, yes. The full board meetings are about twice a year. The committee meetings come every couple of months, and I’m in a fairly close relationship with the president, Bob Coller, of the foundation. This has been, again, a very rewarding, satisfying responsibility. About that time, or a little later, I was asked to become a member of the board of consultants which really operationally is the board of trustees for the Brinkmeyer Foundation, a much smaller foundation in New England that makes grants to 20 New England institutions. And I’m still serving on that. That has been a much less demanding responsibility: a meeting all day once a year going over the applications of 20 institutions which you do beforehand.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: But that has been an interesting and relevant one that’s kept me in touch with a good many academic people.

Well, I continued to be active at the Council on Foreign Relations. Just got back yesterday from chairing a study group down there which we mounted this year on the Quebec crisis. I’ve chaired their delegations to the Pearson Conferences now... every one of them up to now, which has come about once every year or year and a half.

I began down, while I was down at the council, to do some serious writing and professional work. I wrote an article for Foreign Affairs on Canada independent—Canadian nationalism. And this permitted me to get started on the project which I had tentatively agreed to have a go at but did not
commit myself to, namely doing a book for the council, which turned out to be the book entitled *Canada and the American Presence*, which was published by the council and New York University Press in 1975, a study of the American presence, particularly the contemporary American presence, in Canada and the Canadian nationalistic reaction to it.

DANIELL: That’s pretty good. You got it out in five years. It usually takes me about eight or nine I think….

DICKEY: Well, you were doing other things, too.

Then I took on, thanks to the invitation and the wonderfully reassuring faculty gift of a professorship when I retired, as professor of public affairs. And I made myself available if they wanted it done to do a seminar. And I was invited to do it. That has been a particularly satisfying experience for me. It’s gone well. I’ve been able to use it as the necessity for keeping myself abreast of things that I’m sure I wouldn’t otherwise have done. And it has fitted into my council activities in this U.S.-Canadian field wonderfully well.

DANIELL: This is the seminar you’ve [inaudible]. This is not a separate seminar….

DICKEY: No, no. This is the one that I’ve been teaching on history and policy in the U.S.…

DANIELL: Yes, yes. You said professor of public affairs. I wanted to make sure we got it on the tape.

DICKEY: No, this is the seminar.

DANIELL: [Inaudible].

DICKEY: And I guess I started actually discussing that with Lou Morton while Lou was chairman of the department. He said, “What would you like to teach?” And I said, “Well, the one field that I’m working in which I guess we’d better—

DANIELL: Limit it to. [Laughter]

DICKEY: --limit it to is the U.S.-Canada field.” And he said, ‘Well, if you do that, that would help us a lot because we haven’t got anybody who’s going to occupy that for a while at least.” And that came off very well, and I was deeply appreciative of the very generous attitude that Lou took toward that venture.
At about the same time, a little later, I was invited to become a member of the Canada-American Community, which is the principal bi-national business group that meets twice a year and has research staffs in both Canada and the United States. The United States National Planning Association provides the staffing for the American side, and the C.D. Howe Research Institute in Montreal provides the staffing for the Canadian side. This has been a very useful connection, keeping me in touch with the business—in particular with the business and financial side of the relationship, which I wouldn’t otherwise have had the same exposure on. I’m still doing that. And this has been two meetings a year and also a good bit of reading and commenting on some of the research papers.

I did an article for—I was invited to do an article—for the International Journal, which is the comparable scholarly publication in Canada on foreign affairs in the United States.

DANIELL: Oh, okay. Yes.

DICKEY: And I did an article in there on the Merchant Heany report in retrospect, something that I had really worked on in the seminar. So that it fitted into those two things very well. Well, those were the major things. I’ve been involved in some consultations academically.

DANIELL: What do you mean were? They are. Most of them you’re still in.

DICKEY: I was invited to go out to the University of Carnegie-Mellon for a couple of days of consultation about some of their administrative problems or their program problems. Case Western Reserve, I’ve been out there, and I serve on the board of consultants to their law school in the field of Canadian-American legal relations. And I’ve done more public yakking, I guess, in U.S.-Canada matters than I should. But I’ve at least done my share of that and am just beginning to learn that I’ve got to begin to say no on that starting right now. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Right now! Why?

DICKEY: Well, quite aside from energy, one reaches a point where he begins to wonder whether he’s keeping up adequately to justify public exposure.

DANIELL: How about the recreational side of things?
DICKEY: Well, that’s been limited to getting up to Swanton when I could, the grant, once a year now rather than twice a year. I used to get up in the fall for grouse and fishing and at Swanton, out bass fishing. That’s about it.

DANIELL: You’ve taken some trips and things, haven't you?

DICKEY: Oh, we’ve been over in the Mediterranean. Last year we went over on a Swan Cruise to the eastern Mediterranean. I’ve agreed to do an enrichment lectureship on the Viking Cruise up the Inland Waterway.

DANIELL: I saw that. That sounds like it would be fantastic! Up on the west coast of Canada, right?

DICKEY: Yes, yes. Well, this fits into my professional field rather more specifically than you might imagine because one of the principal happenings in the contemporary relationship of the United States and Canada was the controversy over the Alaska boundary award in 1903, and we go right up into that area.

DANIELL: Yes, yes. Well, I was going to say simply that I saw the advertisement for that I think probably in the alumni magazine. I can see the style.

DICKEY: Well, that was a little bit more than I had bargained for, to be perfectly honest with you. [Laughter]

DANIELL: And I said to Elena, “a perfect combination.” Well, I don’t know whether you have additional things you want to...

DICKEY: No, I don’t think so, Jere. I would want to say thank you for the way you handled my rather chaotic memory of these years. No, I can say that I enjoyed genuinely my years on the job. I never for a moment had that, in my view, great misfortune of feeling sorry for yourself on a job. I knew that I was not a prisoner, that any time I wanted to go, nobody would weep and try to hold me in. And I enjoyed it. There were moments, of course, of discouragement that you would have been glad to bypass. But I’d had enough administrative experience, enough experience with the turmoil of administration in the State Department, that I escaped what I’m afraid quite a few faculty members who’ve gone onto these jobs have not escaped; that is, a feeling that, my God, is it really like this? Or is it just that I’m this way? Well, I’d seen enough of the problems of administration and organization in government that I was ready for that side of the job.

The net of it was that for me it was a very satisfying experience. And once I retired from it, I also had the happy experience of not looking back. I had
this experience in the State Department. I never went back to the office in the State Department. Once it had been an immensely important, happy thing for me. But somehow or other I had acquired that self-discipline, and it’s an awfully important point, at least in my life, and I don’t fuss about getting back to Washington or getting back to Parkhurst Hall.

DANIELL: Yes, yes.

DICKEY: So that retirement has been a very happy experience for me. And again, I would have to recognize that there’s been an element of the fortuitous in it and of being able to do things that were satisfying. But whatever the reason for it, it has not been an experience that was one that you were trying to reverse.

DANIELL: Yes, yes, yes. That’s very important.

DICKEY: Yes.

DANIELL: Well, I’ll just say thank you. I don’t know what use these are all going to be put to. Maybe no use at some time.

DICKEY: That’d be all right, too. [Laughter]

DANIELL: Yes. If someone should ever want to write a biography of John Dickey or a history of Dartmouth in the 20th century, the time you’ve been willing to put in on this is just certainly going to be immensely helpful to them.

DICKEY: And I hope I haven’t misled you too far.

[End of Tape 45, Side B]

[End of Interviews with President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey]