April - May 2004
G. E. Moore's diatribe against the naturalistic fallacy
in 1903 set the stage for much of twentieth century
moral philosophy. The main protagonists for the
next sixty years were intuitionists and emotivists, both of whom were convinced
by Moore that empirical science is irrelevant to moral philosophy and to common
moral beliefs. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when a wider array of moral theories
entered the scene, few moral philosophers paid much attention to developments
in biology and psychology.
In the 1990s, some moral philosophers began to wonder
about striking developments in cognitive science, brain science, and evolutionary
biology. Cognitive psychologists
question whether the concepts used in moral rules can be defined by necessary
and sufficient conditions, as opposed to prototypes and resemblance relations.
Others uncover psychological heuristics and framing effects that might explain
many basic moral intuitions. Social psychologists question whether people have
stable characters of the kind assumed by moral virtue theories. Evolutionary
psychologists and biologists propose new accounts of the origins of the altruism
which is needed for much moral action. Psychiatrists explore the effects of
psychopathy and autism on moral beliefs. Brain scientists
study how brain lesions affect
moral beliefs and actions (as in the celebrated Vermont case of Phineas Gage).
More recently, fMRI studies have begun to reveal which regions of the brain
are active when people think about various moral issues.
This
new empirical information suggests new approaches
to central questions in moral philosophy, such as whether
(or when) moral intuitions are reliable,
how
moral beliefs depend on emotion or reason, and even which moral beliefs
should
be accepted. Some traditional moral philosophers still vehemently deny
that empirical science does or can teach any revolutionary
lessons about morality
or its status.
However these debates play out, it seems clear that twenty-first century
moral philosophers cannot continue to ignore psychology
and biology.
To assess these developments and their
implications for moral philosophy, Dartmouth College
will host
a Humanities Institute April-May, 2004. This
Institute will bring 10-15 researchers to
campus .
In weekly meetings, we will investigate the psychological
and biological
bases of moral beliefs and the implications of such empirical findings
for moral
philosophy. We plan to hold a conference on these topics while
the
fellows are at Dartmouth and to publish a
volume
of essays by participants in the
conference and the Institute. Applications are encouraged
not only from philosophers but also from psychologists,
biologists, and scholars in other fields.
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