“Zones of Agreement in an International Climate Change Accord”

Research Proposal to the Dickey Center for International Understanding

Karen Fisher-Vanden and Richard B. Howarth, Environmental Studies

Project Summary

With the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change due to expire in 2012, international negotiations have begun in an attempt to hammer out a new international climate change agreement. An important point of contention in these talks is the current lack of participation of large carbon-emitting countries like the U.S., Australia, China and India. With emissions in the U.S and China together comprising approximately 40% of world carbon emissions, it is crucial that any climate change accord include these key countries. In May 2007, President Bush, prior to the G8 summit in June 2007, announced his intentions to bring together the largest carbon emitting countries in the Fall of 2007 to devise an international strategy to lower greenhouse gas emissions. Although China released a plan on June 5, 2007 to lower energy consumption by 20 percent prior to 2010, Chinese officials have publicly stated their refusal to agree to strict caps on greenhouse gas emissions. With the U.S. unwilling to pursue stringent greenhouse gas reductions without Chinese participation, and China’s unwillingness to commit to reductions that would slow their economic growth, the negotiations seem to be at an impasse.

The purpose of this proposed research is to examine whether there exist “zones of agreement” in an international climate change accord. In particular, we will apply methods of game theory to a global economic model to examine whether, through the use of mechanisms such as wealth transfers or threats of defection, it is possible to devise an agreement that is self-reinforcing—i.e., an agreement that all parties will agree to and that provides a disincentive to defect.