Precautionary Saving and Social Insurance

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Micro data studies of household saving often find a significant group in the population with virtually no wealth, raising concerns about heterogeneity in motives for saving. In particular, this heterogeneity has been interpreted as evidence against the life cycle model of saving. This paper argues that a life cycle model can replicate observed patterns in household wealth accumulation after accounting explicitly for precautionary saving and asset-based, means-tested social insurance. We demonstrate theoretically that social insurance programs with means tests based on assets discourage saving by households with low expected lifetime income. In addition, we evaluate the model using a dynamic programming model with four state variables. Assuming common preference parameters across lifetime income groups, we are able to replicate the empirical pattern that low-income households are more likely than high-income households to hold virtually no wealth. Low wealth accumulation can be explained as a utility-maximizing response to asset-based, means-tested welfare programs.

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I. Introduction

In 1990, Grace Capetillo, a single mother receiving welfare assistance, was charged with fraud by the Milwaukee County Department of Social Services. Her crime: Her saving account balance exceeded $1,000, the allowable asset limit for welfare recipients (Rose 1990). How do programs with asset restrictions, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and food stamps, affect the incentive to accumulate wealth? This paper addresses the interaction of certain social insurance programs and saving, first in simple theoretical models and later in a dynamic programming model with multiple sources of uncertainty. We find that the interaction of a social insurance “safety net” with uncertainty about earnings and out-of-pocket medical expenses implies behavior that contrasts sharply with simplified models that ignore uncertainty or social insurance programs, or focus only on static incentive effects of these programs. The prospect of bad realizations in future earnings or out-of-pocket medical expenses can influence saving behavior even if the individual never actually encounters the downturn or catastrophic medical expense and never receives transfer payments. Hence, the impact of social insurance programs on saving behavior extends to saving behavior of potential, as well as actual, recipients.

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1 More recently, the Connecticut case of Cecilia Mercado and her daughter Sandra Rosado attracted widespread media attention. Sandra saved $4,900 from part-time jobs during high school with the goal of going to college. When officials learned of the accumulated assets, they urged Sandra to spend the money quickly and ordered her mother to repay $9,342 in AFDC benefits that she had received while the money was in the bank (Hays 1992).

2 Strictly speaking, by “social insurance” we mean welfare programs as opposed to such entitlement programs as Social Security or Medicare.
We use a model of consumption and saving subject to uncertainty to address an empirical "puzzle" of wealth accumulation: As we document below, many households accumulate little wealth over their life cycle. For those with low lifetime earnings (represented by educational attainment), wealth accumulation is inconsistent with the orthodox life cycle model; even prior to retirement, during what are normally considered peak years of wealth holding, many families hold little wealth. By contrast, households with higher lifetime earnings exhibit saving behavior that is broadly consistent with the orthodox life cycle model, in the sense that nearly every household in this group has significant wealth accumulation near retirement.

A number of authors have examined the effects of uncertainty on optimal intertemporal consumption and saving decisions.\(^3\) Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992) examine the implications for wealth accumulation in these precautionary saving models and argue that they imply too large an accumulation of wealth. They reconcile the empirical finding that most households accumulate little wealth with the predictions of the life cycle model by assuming that the rate of time preference for most people is high relative to the real interest rate, so that in a certainty model families would prefer to borrow against future income. Earnings uncertainty (and in some cases borrowing constraints) leads individuals to maintain a "buffer stock" or contingency fund against income downturns, but the impatience keeps these buffer stocks small. This approach offers one explanation of why so many families save little throughout their lives.

While the buffer stock model of wealth accumulation can explain low levels of wealth, it encounters difficulty in explaining the saving behavior of those who do accumulate substantial assets. In particular, the buffer stock explanation must assume that these families have lower rates of time preference than families that do not accumulate wealth. We take an alternative approach, assuming that all individuals have the same preferences, and show that the differences in wealth of different groups can be explained by the interaction of uncertainty and social insurance programs with asset-based means testing. We develop simple analytical models to demonstrate the effects on optimal consumption of a social insurance program whose eligibility de-

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pends on current wealth (i.e., one that involves asset-based means testing). While much work has been done examining the effects on economic decisions (e.g., labor supply) of earnings-based means tests, little has been done examining the effects of asset-based means testing.\(^4\)

Under uncertainty, asset-based, means-tested social insurance programs depress saving for two distinct reasons. First, the provision of support in the bad states of the world reduces the uncertainty facing households and therefore decreases precautionary saving (this effect would be present even in the absence of the asset test). Second, the restriction on asset holdings implies an implicit tax of 100 percent on wealth in the event of an earnings downturn or large medical expense. The possibility of facing this implicit tax further reduces optimal saving.

We next show that the nonlinear budget constraint implied by these programs leads to a nonmonotonic relationship between wealth and consumption over certain ranges of wealth, so that an increase in wealth can lead to a decline in consumption; in other words, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wealth can actually be negative over certain ranges. This result is in sharp contrast to that of standard models in which consumption is always increasing in wealth.

In general, the model cannot be solved analytically, so we use the dynamic programming model developed in Hubbard et al. (1994\(b\)) in which households face uncertainty about earnings, out-of-pocket medical expenses, and length of life.\(^5\) We separate the population into three education groups (as a proxy for lifetime income) and use the empirical parameters for earnings and out-of-pocket medical

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\(^4\) Sherraden (1991) is the only analysis we could find that examines asset-based means tests in welfare programs. He argues that the main effects are to reduce participating households' ability to obtain education or training or finance the purchase of a home, which limits the ability of these households to improve their social standing. He also argues that the opportunity to accumulate assets has important effects beyond the consumption that it enables, by creating an orientation toward the future and reducing the isolation of the poor from the economy and society.

There is also some recent work on other types of asset-based means testing. Feldstein (1992) has shown how college financial aid scholarship rules, which depend negatively on existing family assets, create an implicit tax on saving. He finds empirical evidence that such rules have a significant negative impact on wealth accumulation for eligible families. Another example occurs when parents expect to be supported by their children in old age; each additional dollar of wealth accumulated by parents reduces the amount of support given to them by their children (for a theoretical model, see, e.g., O'Connell and Zeldes [1993]).

\(^5\) In that paper, we focus on aggregate saving rather than the distribution of wealth. We find that precautionary saving is large in a realistically parameterized life cycle model; i.e., the precautionary motive plays an important role in determining aggregate saving. We also show that our model better replicates empirical regularities in (1) aggregate wealth and the aggregate saving rate, (2) cross-sectional differences in consumption-age profiles by lifetime income group, and (3) short-run time-series properties of consumption, income, and wealth.
expenditures processes for each group estimated in Hubbard et al. (1994b). After solving numerically for the optimal state-contingent consumption, we draw randomly from the probability distribution of uncertain health and earnings in each year and generate a time series for several thousand simulated families.

We find that the presence of means-tested social insurance has a disproportionate impact on saving behavior of lower-lifetime-income households. For example, suppose that we denote families with total net wealth less than current income as "low-wealth." Our model predicts that, for households with heads aged 50–59, raising the minimum government-guaranteed level of consumption (which we call the consumption "floor") from $1,000 to $7,000 increases the percentage of families with low wealth by 22.9 percent for low-lifetime-income households, but by only 4.4 percent among high-lifetime-income households. That is, social insurance policies designed to maintain consumption have the greatest negative effect on saving for lower-income groups. The reason is that the guaranteed consumption floor of $7,000 (identical for all education groups) represents a significantly larger fraction of lifetime income for the population with low lifetime income. We find that the simulated distributions of wealth by age in many respects match the actual distributions of wealth by age documented in the United States.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present empirical evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on the distribution, by age and education, of U.S. household wealth. Section III presents simple models of consumption in the presence of social insurance and asset-based means testing. Section IV describes our multiperiod dynamic programming model and the empirical specification of the parameters of the model. In Section V, we present the numerical results, and the simulated age-wealth patterns are shown to mimic in certain important ways the empirical wealth patterns discussed in Section II. Section VI concludes the paper.

II. The Distribution of Wealth by Age in the United States

In traditional life cycle models, asset accumulation by the wealthy is essentially a scaled-up version of asset accumulation by the poor. To see this, consider a life cycle model under certainty with time-separable homothetic (constant relative risk aversion) preferences. Let two types of families each begin with zero assets, have the same preferences, face the same interest rates, and face age-earnings profiles that are proportional to one another. Income in any year for the first type of family ("high earnings") is $\alpha > 1$ times as great as it is
for the other type ("low earnings"). Under these assumptions, in every period consumption and accumulated assets of the high-earnings type will be $\alpha$ times as great as those of the low-earnings type; the ratio of assets to income for the high-earnings family will be identical to that of the low-earnings family.

Adding earnings uncertainty to the model above does not necessarily change this result. If the probability distribution for all future incomes is such that every possible realization of income for the high-earnings type is $\alpha$ times as great as that for the low-earnings type (but the corresponding probabilities are identical), then for given realizations of earnings (appropriately scaled by $\alpha$) over the life cycle, both consumption and assets will be $\alpha$ times as great (see Bar-Ilan 1991). In this case, the distribution of the ratio of accumulated assets to income will be the same for the two types of individuals.

Suppose that unobservable lifetime earnings are related to educational attainment. The simple example above assumed that the earnings of groups with high or low levels of educational attainment are proportional to one another at every age and state of the world. In reality, the age-earnings path for college-educated workers is more steeply sloped, and the variance of log earnings differs across education groups, issues we discuss in more detail in Section IV. Still, the implication of the traditional life cycle model is that saving behavior of the poor and the rich should differ only to the extent that the distribution of earnings and the age-earnings profile differ across lifetime earnings groups.

As we show below, the actual pattern of wealth holdings for many households is quite different from that predicted by the life cycle model. Empirically, the wealth accumulation patterns for families with lower education levels are not scaled-down versions of the wealth patterns of families with higher levels of education. The cross-sectional age-wealth patterns for many lower-income families do not exhibit the "hump-shaped" profiles of wealth accumulation predicted by the life cycle model. By contrast, wealth-age profiles for college-educated families display, to a greater extent, the hump-shaped wealth-age profile consistent with life cycle predictions.

We examine wealth holdings using the full sample of the 1984 PSID. We use the 1984 PSID population weights to make the sample representative of the U.S. population. Measured wealth is equal to the sum of assets—including stocks, bonds, checking accounts, and

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6 An alternative source would have been the Federal Reserve Board's 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The PSID survey was not as comprehensive as the SCF because it did not oversample the wealthy. According to Curtin, Juster, and Morgan (1989), however, the PSID was surprisingly close in accuracy to the SCF except among the very wealthy.
other financial assets; real estate equity; and vehicles—minus liabili-
ties that include home mortgages and personal debts. This measure
includes individual retirement accounts but excludes pension and So-
cial Security wealth. Wealth is generally positive, though a small pro-
portion of respondents reported negative wealth.\(^7\) To control for dif-
fferences in lifetime income, the sample was stratified into three
categories of education of the family head: less than 12 years (no
high school diploma), constituting 28 percent of the weighted sample;
between 12 and 15 years (with a high school diploma), constituting
52 percent; and 16 or more years (college degree), constituting the
remaining 20 percent.\(^8\)

Scatter diagrams of the wealth holdings by age for these three
groups, presented in figure 1, emphasize the sharp differences in
wealth accumulation patterns. To adjust for differences in population
weighting, each observation is “jittered” by placing dots (equal in
number to the population weight) randomly around the family's re-
ported wealth.\(^9\) Quintile regressions that estimate the twentieth, forti-
eth, sixtieth, and eightieth percentiles of wealth holdings as a cubic
function of age are superimposed on each of the graphs.

Under the simple homothetic model above, wealth holdings will be
proportional to lifetime income. To evaluate this hypothesis, we have
adjusted the vertical axis in figure 1a–c to correct for differences in
lifetime resources. To do this, we calculated a simple measure of “per-
manent income”: the constant annual real flow of consumption that
the average life cycle household could afford given the education-
specific profile of after-tax earnings, Social Security payments, and
pensions between ages 21 and 85 (assuming a real rate of interest of
3 percent).\(^10\) For those with the lowest educational attainment, the

\(^7\) Negative wealth was truncated at \(-\$20,000\) for three individuals. In a number of
cases, respondents did not reply to questions about wealth holdings of specific assets.
In these cases, the interviewer attempted to bracket the amount of assets by asking
sequential questions: e.g., are your stockholdings \$10,000 or more; if not, are they
\$1,000 or more, etc. We estimated the assets of those who fell within particular brackets
to be equal to the average holdings within the same bracket of those who provided exact
answers. Note that because the sample was linked to earnings data during 1983–87,
we exclude from the sample families who experienced major compositional changes
during this period.

\(^8\) An alternative approach to using education as a proxy for lifetime income would
be to stratify by average earnings during the sample period. Such an approach is
probably less accurate than using education; current earnings may not be a good
predictor of future earnings, nor is information on past earnings always available for
retirees.

\(^9\) For example, an observation with a weight of unity would yield a single dot in the
graph, and an observation with a weight of 10 would result in 10 dots randomly
arrayed around the sample observation. The graphs are produced using the “jitter”
option in STATA.

\(^10\) Equivalently, this number may be viewed as “amortized” lifetime income, since
it has the same present value as actual earnings and retirement income. The esti-
level of “permanent income” is $17,241, for high school graduates, $22,244, and for college graduates, $32,062. Thus lifetime earnings are approximately twice as high for college graduates as for those with no high school diploma. Wealth is plotted as a multiple of this
measure of permanent income. Wealth corresponding to 3.0 among college graduates, for example, is equivalent to $96,186 in net wealth. We truncate the graphed wealth distribution at 13 times the benchmark income level for each education group to promote legibility of the graphs (the truncated values are shown, also jittered, along the top of the respective graphs).\footnote{Thus, as marked in brackets on the vertical axis, the highest level of wealth graphed for those without a high school diploma is $244,120 (13 \times $17,241), whereas the highest level of wealth graphed for those with a college degree is $416,803.}

In figure 1a, the cross-sectional evidence indicates that, over the life cycle, many households in which the head does not have a high school diploma have very little wealth, even during the 10 years prior to retirement that would normally correspond to years in which wealth is highest. The fortieth percentile of net wealth for this group is less than $20,000 at all age groups. High school graduates, in figure 1b, accumulate a moderate amount of wealth. The wealth accumulation pattern of college graduates appears most consistent with the life cycle model; by ages 50 and beyond, very few households hold less than $50,000 in net household wealth. Of course, inferring life cycle patterns from cross-sectional data is speculative, but figure 1 lends support to the notion that typical wealth accumulation patterns differ substantially by lifetime income.\footnote{This result is consistent with the findings of Bernheim and Scholz (1993).}

Detailed wealth holdings by age and by education are shown in table 1, with all averages weighted by the PSID family weights. Median household wealth is shown both inclusive of and exclusive of housing equity (housing equity is calculated as the market value of
the house less the outstanding mortgage balance). Median income measures labor income, transfer income (including food stamps), pension income, and Social Security benefits for the family head and spouse. Simple ratios of median wealth or median nonhousing wealth to median income suggest sharp differences in asset accumulation patterns across educational groups for older age groups. For the lowest-education group at ages 50–59, for example, median nonhousing wealth is only about half of the median income. By contrast, median nonhousing wealth is twice median income for households headed by college graduates.
To examine the wealth distribution further, we calculated the percentage of households with net total wealth less than one year’s income. This is an arbitrary but convenient measure of “low-wealth” households. Table 1 shows that, for younger household heads, those with less net wealth than current income constitute the vast majority of each education group, ranging from three-fourths among college graduates to nearly seven-eighths among those without a high school diploma. For older cohorts, the differences in wealth holdings become more apparent. Virtually all college graduates above age 50 hold wealth greater than or equal to one year’s income. For those without a high school diploma, at least 25 percent of every age group hold net wealth less than current income. An intermediate pattern holds for high school graduates. The percentage of households with nonhousing wealth below one-half of current income (a measure that abstracts from illiquid home ownership) follows much the same pattern, although there are a larger absolute number of households that hold less than half a year’s income in nonhousing wealth.

To summarize, the empirical evidence suggests strongly that wealth accumulation patterns differ by lifetime income. We briefly consider four potential explanations for this differential pattern of wealth accumulation.

First, with a bequest motive it is plausible that households with higher lifetime income hold more assets, especially later in life, because they plan to leave bequests. Those with lower lifetime income are more likely to find the bequest motive inoperative since they expect their children to do better economically (Feldstein 1988; Laitner 1990). The absence of “negative bequests” for currently low-income households introduces a corner solution and hence skewness in the distribution of bequests. In addition, individuals with higher levels of educational attainment may receive greater inheritances to the extent that lifetime income is correlated across generations.

The problem with this explanation is that for those with low lifetime income, wealth accumulation is far below even that predicted by traditional (certainty) life cycle models. As we discuss below, the life cycle model predicts at least a modest degree of wealth accumulation to provide for retirement. However, the fact that median nonhousing wealth for the lowest-education group is only one-half of income for households prior to retirement (those aged 50–59) suggests that the simple life cycle model does not fully capture the saving patterns of this group.

Second, wealth accumulation across education groups may also differ because of differences in the shape of the earnings profile, or in the degree to which Social Security, private pensions, and other transfers replace earnings in retirement (as mentioned above). For exam-
ple, since Social Security benefits equal a larger fraction of average earnings for lower-income workers, such families would not need to save as much relative to higher-income workers to ensure adequate consumption during retirement.

As we show below, this explanation alone cannot explain more than a small fraction of the difference in wealth distributions. While lower-income households benefit from the higher earnings replacement rates in Social Security benefits, higher-income families (in our case, college graduates) are more likely to receive private pensions. College graduates should, moreover, save less relative to income in early years in a life cycle model because of their more steeply sloped earnings path.

The third possible explanation for the difference in the wealth distribution is variation in rates of time preference by education group. Lawrance (1991), for example, has estimated that college-educated households have lower rates of time preference than lower-income, non-college-educated households. Hence the difference in wealth accumulation could just be the result of different preferences. The lower-income households save little because of their higher rate of time preference, whereas the higher-income households (or those that are sufficiently patient to attend college) save more.

The Lawrance estimates are based on (food) consumption growth in the PSID during the 1970s and early 1980s. She found that consumption of college-educated households grew faster than that of non-college-educated households, leading her to conclude that college-educated households have lower rates of time preference. However, Dynan (1993) has shown that this faster growth may have been the consequence of the rapid rise of income for college-educated relative to non-college-educated households. Dynan finds little difference across education groups in the estimated rate of time preference once income changes have been accounted for. While we view differences in rates of time preference as a potentially important factor in wealth accumulation, it seems unlikely that variation in preferences alone can explain the large cross-sectional differences in wealth accumulation.

The fourth possible explanation is that, in the presence of signifi-

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13 Fuchs (1982) attempted to discern differences in time preference rates by direct survey methods, but he did not find any consistent patterns across education groups.

14 There are some additional explanations that we have not fully explored. The first is a more general (nonhomothetic) utility function, such as one that includes a subsistence level of consumption or a varying intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Atkeson and Ogaki 1991). Second, length of life or age of retirement may differ across education groups. Third, attainable rates of return may be higher for high-education or high-income groups (Yitzhaki 1987). For further discussion, see Masson (1988).
cant uncertainty about earnings and medical expenditures, lower-income households may rationally accumulate proportionately less than higher-income households because of the existence of an asset-based, means-tested social insurance "safety net." This approach follows two strands in the previous literature. Kotlikoff (1989) used simulations to show that a Medicaid program reduced precautionary saving against uncertain medical expenses, and Levin (1990) focused on the impact of Medicaid on the demand for health insurance depending on initial wealth or income. Our work builds on these two insights in a general dynamic programming model of uncertainty, and we pursue it below.

III. Optimal Consumption with Transfer Programs

We begin this section by presenting our general multiperiod model with multiple sources of uncertainty. We then examine simplified versions including a two-period model under certainty and under uncertainty. In these examples, we show how the existence of a minimum level of consumption guaranteed by (asset-based) means-tested social insurance programs affects the optimal consumption choice. Later in the paper, we use numerical methods to examine optimal consumption and wealth accumulation in the general multiperiod model.

A. The Consumer's Optimization Problem

We assume that the household maximizes expected lifetime utility, given all the relevant constraints. At each age $t$, a level of consumption is chosen that maximizes

$$E_t \sum_{s=1}^{T} \frac{D_s U(C_s)}{(1+\delta)^{s-t}}$$

subject to the transition equation

$$A_s = A_{s-1}(1+r) + E_s + TR_s - M_s - C_s$$

plus the additional constraints that

$$A_s \geq 0 \quad \forall s.$$
Equation (1) indicates that consumption excluding medical spending $C_s$ is chosen to maximize expected lifetime utility ($E_t$ is the expectations operator conditional on information at time $t$), discounted on the basis of a rate of time preference $\delta$. To account for random date of death, $D_s$ is a state variable that is equal to one if the individual is alive and zero otherwise, and $T$ is the maximum possible length of life. The family begins period $s$ with assets from the previous period plus accumulated interest, $A_{s-1}(1 + r)$, where $r$ is the nonstochastic real after-tax rate of interest. It then receives exogenous earnings $E_s$, pays out exogenous necessary medical expenses $M_s$, and receives government transfers $TR_s$. It is left with

$$X_s = A_{s-1}(1 + r) + E_s - M_s + TR_s,$$

which, following Deaton (1991), we denote as "cash on hand."

Given $X_s$, consumption is chosen, and what remains equals end-of-period assets, $A_s$. We assume that no utility is derived per se from medical expenditures; the costs are required only to offset the damage brought on by poor health.\(^{16}\) The borrowing and terminal constraints in equation (3) prevent negative assets in any period.\(^{17}\)

Transfers received depend on financial assets, earnings, and medical expenses:

$$TR_s = TR(E_s, M_s, A_{s-1}(1 + r)).$$

This general form allows transfer programs to include earnings-based and wealth-based means testing, as well as payments tied to medical expenses. For simplicity, we consider the following parameterization:

$$TR_s = \max\{0, (\bar{C} + M_s) - [A_{s-1}(1 + r) + E_s]\}.$$  

We define $\bar{C}$ as the minimum level of consumption guaranteed by the government and shall refer to this as the consumption "floor." Transfers equal this consumption floor $\bar{C}$ plus medical expenses minus all available resources, if that amount is positive, and zero otherwise. In other words, transfer payments, if made, guarantee a minimum standard of living $\bar{C}$ after medical expenses are paid. However, transfer payments are reduced one for one for every dollar of either

\(^{16}\) Kotlikoff (1989) considers alternative models of health expenditures.

\(^{17}\) In the parameterizations of our model under uncertainty, the maximum realization of medical expenses is always greater than the minimum possible earnings realization; i.e., the minimum net earnings draw in any period is negative. In the case in which $\bar{C}$ is set to zero and the utility function is such that $U'(0) = \infty$, individuals choose never to borrow, and the liquidity constraint is never binding (see the related discussion in Zeldes [1989]). Therefore, in the uncertainty model, we are, in effect, preventing borrowing against the future guaranteed consumption floor.
assets or current earnings. The transfer function captures, in a simplified way, the penalty on saving behavior of asset-based, means-tested programs such as Medicaid, AFDC, and food stamps. Because eligibility is conditional on assets less than a given level, such programs place an implicit tax rate of 100 percent on wealth above that limit. While in the model we restrict social insurance to those with no assets at all, in practice, asset limits range between $1,000 and $3,000.18

Before we examine the effects of uncertainty and social insurance programs on wealth accumulation in the general model, we present some two-period models to provide intuition. Consider first a two-period certainty model, with all medical expenses as well as initial assets set equal to zero. Suppose that $E_1 > C$, so that the household is not eligible for transfers in the first period, but that $E_2 < C$, so that it is at least potentially eligible for transfers in the second period. To see the effect of the consumption floor, consider the expression for second-period consumption:

$$C_2 = (E_1 - C_1)(1 + r) + E_2 + TR_2. \quad (7)$$

Substituting in the expression for transfers in (6) yields

$$C_2 = \text{max}\{C, (E_1 - C_1)(1 + r) + E_2\}. \quad (8)$$

Differentiating equation (7) or (8) with respect to $C_1$ gives

$$\frac{dC_2}{dC_1} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } TR_2 > 0 \\ -(1 + r) & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

Thus consuming one fewer unit today yields $1 + r$ extra units tomorrow if the household is not participating in the transfer program tomorrow (the usual intertemporal trade-off), but zero extra units if it is.

The indifference curves and budget constraints for two different levels of initial resources $E_1$ (including any initial assets) are shown in figure 2.19 For this example, we assume homothetic utility and $r = \delta = E_2 = 0.20$ First consider the case of a lower-wealth household with initial resources of $E_1^*$. The budget constraint when the con-

18 The asset limit for AFDC is $1,000 in almost all states (it is less than $1,000 in a few states). Excluded from the assets subject to this limit are housing equity (up to a certain limit), automobile equity (up to $1,500), and, in some states, burial insurance and plot, farm machinery and livestock, and household furnishings. The limit for food stamps is $2,000 for nonelderly and $3,000 for elderly households, with somewhat more liberal exclusions; for SSI the limits are $2,000 for single individuals and $3,000 for married couples, again with somewhat less stringent exclusions on automobile equity and other types of wealth. Eligibility for SSI or AFDC is usually a necessary precondition to qualify for Medicaid (see U.S. House 1991). For simplicity, we assume that the wealth limit is zero over the entire year.

19 We thank Eric Engen for pointing out this graphical interpretation.

20 The maximization problem and solution are described in the Appendix.
consumption floor equals $\bar{C}$ is given by $mnb^*E^*_1$. An interior solution leads to $a^*$, where $C_1 = C_2$. Because of the nonconvexity of the budget constraint, there exists another possible solution to the problem: the household could consume all income today so that the guaranteed consumption level is received in the second period. This possible solution is indicated by $b^*$. Since $b^*$ is preferred to $a^*$ ($\hat{U}^* > U^*$), the global optimum is $b^*$. Individuals with low initial resources will save nothing and instead rely on the consumption floor in the second period.

At the higher level of income, $E_1^{**}$, however, the budget line is $rsb^{**}E^{**}_1$, and the interior solution $a^{**}$ dominates the alternative of $b^{**}$ since $U^{**} > \hat{U}^{**}$. Thus individuals with somewhat higher initial resources choose not to rely on the consumption floor and therefore must save to finance future desired consumption.

The solution to this two-period model is as follows: For levels of wealth (or earnings) that are low but greater than $\bar{C}$, the slope of the consumption-wealth profile is one: all wealth is consumed. At some critical level of wealth, consumption drops sharply, so that at higher wealth, the consumption function reverts to a straight line through the origin with a slope of 0.5; that is, half the wealth is consumed in the first period and half in the second, just as it would be in the absence of the transfer program.
This example thus has implications for the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. As shown in figure 2, a low level of initial resources $E^*_1$ implies consumption $C^*_1$. A rise in initial resources to $E^*_2$, however, causes consumption to decline to $C^*_2$. That is, over this range of wealth, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth can actually be negative as the household switches from a regime of consuming all income to one in which it saves for the future.\footnote{There is a clear parallel here with the studies of labor supply with nonconvex budget constraints by Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1981), Moffitt (1986), and Moffitt and Rothschild (1987). As they noted, in a static choice model of leisure and market goods, transfer programs often create kinked budget constraints and can generate multiple local maxima.} This is in sharp contrast to standard models in which consumption is always increasing in wealth.

One way to generalize this result is to expand the time horizon to three or more periods.\footnote{Assume that both second- and third-period earnings are less than the consumption floor but first-period earnings exceed the floor. In this case, there are three local optima. The individual can (i) forgo transfer payments altogether and choose the traditional interior solution (so that the MPC out of resources is $\frac{1}{3}$); (ii) receive transfers only in the third period, so that an interior Euler equation solution holds between first- and second-period consumption (so that the MPC out of resources is $\frac{1}{2}$); or (iii) receive transfers in both the second and third periods (so that the MPC out of resources is unity). Finding the global solution to this model involves choosing the one of these three potential solutions that maximizes utility. For the details of this, see the appendix in Hubbard et al. (1994c).} A second way to generalize the two-period model is to add uncertainty about second-period resources $E_2$. For now, think of $E_2$ as earnings less out-of-pocket medical expenses, so the uncertainty may be attributable to either source. Suppose that there were a 50 percent chance of a “good” realization, $E_{2g}$, and a 50 percent chance of a “bad” realization, $E_{2b}$. Continue to assume that $r = \delta = 0$ and that utility is homothetic. Let $E_1 + E_{2b} > 2\overline{C}$, so the individual could save enough to avoid the floor even in the “worst case,” if so desired. The maximization problem with respect to $C_1$ becomes

$$\begin{align*}
\max_{C_1} U(C_1) + \frac{1}{2} U[(E_1 - C_1 + E_{2g})(1 - Q_{2g}) + \overline{C}Q_{2g}] \\
+ \frac{1}{2} U[(E_1 - C_1 + E_{2b})(1 - Q_{2b}) + \overline{C}Q_{2b}] + \mu_1(E_1 - C_1),
\end{align*}$$

(10)

The result that the MPC depends on the effective horizon of the consumer also appears in the model with a borrowing constraint. However, the important difference between the two models is the motivation for consuming all of one's wealth. In a model with borrowing constraints, one saves nothing because of high anticipated future earnings. In this model, one saves nothing because of the low anticipated future earnings relative to the consumption floor.

Including more (and thus shorter) time periods leads to smoother consumption-wealth functions. However, at least in the case of a continuous-time certainty model, one can show that the marginal propensity to consume wealth may still be (smoothly) negative in the presence of means-tested social insurance.
where the first two expressions in brackets are consumption in the 
good state, $C_{2g}$, and consumption in the bad state, $C_{2b}$. The indicator 
values $Q_{2b}$ and $Q_{2g}$ take on the value of one when income transfers 
are received under the bad and good scenario, respectively. The 
first-order condition is

$$U'(C_1) = \frac{1}{2} [U'(C_{2g})(1 - Q_{2g}) + U'(C_{2b})(1 - Q_{2b})] + \mu_1. \tag{11}$$

Under uncertainty, the first-order conditions indicate a trade-off 
between the marginal utility of consuming an extra dollar today and 
the expected marginal benefit of saving the dollar for the future. In 
future states of the world in which the household receives a transfer, 
an extra dollar carried over from the previous period is worthless to 
the household, because it leads to a one-dollar reduction in transfers, 
leaving future consumption unchanged at $\bar{C}$. In the Appendix, we 
describe the solution to this problem and show that there exist three 
local maxima, two of which are interior solutions that satisfy the Euler 
equation. We also show that households with higher initial resources 
are more likely to choose the solution that involves much higher saving 
and a lower probability of receiving transfers. Thus optimal consumption 
can again decline as wealth increases over some ranges. Finally, we show 
that the welfare program affects the saving of those households that have some probability of receiving transfers, even if, 
ex post, they never receive transfers.

Before we proceed, it is worth emphasizing that, if we assume that 
the period utility function has a positive third derivative (which in-
duces precautionary saving in the presence of earnings uncertainty), 
there are two distinct effects of introducing an asset-based, means-
tested social insurance program. One effect comes from the provision 
of the transfer and would be present even if the program involved no 
asset-based means testing. The government is providing a transfer that 
raises income in the bad states of the world. This serves to reduce the 
precautionary motive and causes households (particularly low-lifetime-
income households) to save less. The second effect comes from the asset 
test itself. The government effectively imposes a 100 percent tax on 
assets in the event that the household receives a health expense or earn-
ings shock large enough to make it eligible to receive the transfer. This 
tax further reduces desired saving, again primarily for low-lifetime-
income households. In the model used in this paper, we consider the 
joint effect of these channels on households’ consumption.

IV. Parameterization and Solution of the 
Multiperiod Model

In this section, we begin by describing the utility function and param-
eterization of the model. These are described more fully in Hubbard
et al. (1994b). We then examine the empirical magnitude of the consumption floor and close with a discussion of the numerical solution to the dynamic programming problem.

When we estimate empirical parameters characterizing uncertainty, we are primarily interested in uninsured risk, that is, the risk faced by households conditional on existing insurance coverage. In the model, for example, the effect of uncertainty in life span on saving is conditional on a preexisting pension and Social Security payment that acts as a partial annuity. Similarly, our estimates of uncertainty with respect to health expenses condition on preexisting private insurance and Medicare and are therefore based only on the uninsured out-of-pocket risk.

A. Parameterization of the Model

The utility function.—We assume that the period utility function in (1) is isoelastic:

\[ U(C_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma}. \quad (12) \]

We assume a value for \( \gamma \) of three, which is consistent with many empirical studies. The rate of time preference \( \delta \) is assumed to be 3 percent per year for all education groups, and the real after-tax rate of interest is assumed to be 3 percent per year.

Life span uncertainty.—We use mortality probabilities based on mortality data (from 1980) as a function of sex and age from the National Center for Health Statistics and the Social Security Administration (Faber 1982). Calculating mortality probabilities for a representative family is problematic, given the mixture of married couples and single individuals. We use the mortality probabilities for women. They capture both the expectations of life for single women and the expectation of life for a currently married couple in which the husband dies first. The maximum possible age in the model is set to 100; since we assume that economic life begins at age 21, there are at most 80 periods in the model.

Earnings process.—Time-series patterns of earnings and wages have been the subject of many studies (see, e.g., Lillard and Willis 1978;
MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989). Our measures of earnings risk differ in two general respects. First, we include unemployment insurance and subtract taxes in our measure of “earnings”; these adjustments are likely to reduce earnings variability. Second, we separate our sample into three educational categories.

Earnings during working years are uncertain and correlated over time and follow:

\[ y_{it} = Z_{it} \beta + u_{it} + v_{it}, \]
\[ u_{it} = \rho u_{it-1} + e_{it}, \]

where \( y_{it} \) is the log of earnings, \( Z_{it} \) is a cubic polynomial in age and year dummy variables (included to control for cohort productivity growth), and \( \beta \) is a vector of coefficients. The error term \( u_{it} \) follows an AR(1) process, where \( e_{it} \) is a white-noise innovation. The variable \( v_{it} \) is a combination of independently and identically distributed transitory variation in earnings and measurement error. To simplify the dynamic programming model, we assume that \( v_{it} \) is entirely measurement error and ignore it in our parameterization of the model. Hence our measure of earnings uncertainty is conservative because it excludes all transitory variation in earnings. We assume in the model that the head of the household retires at age 65, at which point the family receives Social Security, pensions, and other nonasset income with certainty.

Estimates of the uncertainty parameters are summarized in panel A of table 2. The results imply substantial persistence in shocks to earnings, a result that is consistent with many of the studies cited above. In addition, the log of labor income is more variable for non-high-school graduates than it is for the two other educational groups.

Out-of-pocket medical expenses.—We use data from a merged sample of observations from the 1977 National Health Care Expenditure Survey and the 1977 National Nursing Home Survey to calculate a cross-sectional distribution of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Our measure of medical costs includes expenses paid by Medicaid, because Medicaid payments are determined endogenously in our model as the difference between total medical costs and available financial resources of the family.

25 Carroll (1992) also included transfer payments in his measure of earnings for the same reason. In our model, means-tested transfers such as AFDC and food stamps are excluded from the definition of earnings because they are received only if assets are sufficiently low. Instead, they are included in the consumption floor.

26 When we estimate the uncertainty parameters (\( \sigma^2, \rho, \) and \( \sigma^2 \)), we exclude households with very low earnings realizations. When we estimate the mean age-earnings profile, we estimate the equations in levels rather than logs and include all households. Details of the estimation approach are given in Hubbard et al. (1994b).
TABLE 2
PARAMETERS FOR UNCERTAIN EARNINGS AND UNCERTAIN MEDICAL EXPENSES FOR THE
DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No High School</th>
<th>High School Plus</th>
<th>College Plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Earnings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(1) coefficient ((p))</td>
<td>.955</td>
<td>.946</td>
<td>.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance of the innovation (e)</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance of combined measurement error and transitory shock (v)</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total medical expenses (including Medicaid)</td>
<td>$2,023</td>
<td>$1,974</td>
<td>$2,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(1) coefficient ((p_m))</td>
<td>.901</td>
<td>.901</td>
<td>.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance of the innovation (e)</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE.—See eq. (12) for the time-series model of earnings and eq. (13) for the time-series model of out-of-pocket medical expenses.


We assume a model of medical spending of the following form:

\[
m_{it} = G_{it} \Gamma + \mu_{it} + \omega_{it},
\]

\[
\mu_{it} = \rho_m \mu_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it},
\]

where \(m\) is the log of medical expenses; \(\omega_{it}\) is the purely transitory component, assumed to be entirely measurement error; \(\mu_{it}\) follows an AR\(1\) process (where \(\epsilon_{it}\) is a white-noise innovation); and \(G_{it}\) is a quadratic in age and an individual fixed effect. We estimate (14) separately for elderly individuals aged 65 years and over and the nonelderly. The estimates are presented in panel B of table 2. The merged cross-section data set enables us to estimate more accurately the cross-sectional distribution of medical spending by education group and by age, but not the time-series properties of medical expenses. Instead, we use estimates of \(\rho_m\) from Feenberg and Skinner (1994), who use a quadrivariate Tobit procedure with a panel of tax data for 1968–73 to measure the time-series pattern of declared medical spending (in excess of 3 percent of adjusted gross income). There is surprisingly little difference in the overall level of medical spending by education group, implying that average medical expenses are a larger fraction of lifetime income for low-education groups, in part because of the much higher Medicaid spending for the lower-education groups.
Consumption floor.—Finally, the consumption floor is defined as the level of consumption guaranteed by the government above and beyond medical expenses. Measuring the means-tested consumption floor is difficult, since potential payments from social insurance programs differ dramatically according to the number of children, marital status, age, and even the recipient’s state or city. Nevertheless, we make a first approximation by calculating separate consumption floors for “representative” families both under age 65 and over 65. Details of the calculation are in appendix A of Hubbard et al. (1994b) and are largely based on figures in U.S. House (1991).

We include in our estimate of the floor only means-tested transfer payments such as AFDC, food stamps, and Section 8 housing assistance for those under age 65 and SSI, food stamps, and Section 8 housing assistance for those over age 65. Unemployment insurance is not included in these transfers because it is not means-tested; instead, it is included in net earnings. Medicaid is also not included as part of the floor because it is used exclusively to pay for medical expenses.

We distinguish between entitlement and nonentitlement programs. Under entitlement programs, everyone who is eligible may sign up. Despite the fact that many who are eligible do not take advantage of the program, the money is at least potentially available to them. Housing subsidies are not entitlements, since there are often waiting lists. In such cases, we include the expected value of benefits—that is, the probability of receiving the benefits times the dollar amount—in our estimate of the floor.

For the nonelderly, the median AFDC and food stamp transfers to a female-headed family in 1984 with two children and no outside earnings or assets were $5,764. The representative family is assumed to include a single parent with children; if the father were present in the household or were married to the mother, then benefits would be reduced in some states of residence. We assume that housing subsidies are received entirely from the Section 8 housing program, which provides housing vouchers for existing rental property. The mean housing subsidy paid is multiplied by .35 to adjust for the fact that only 35 percent of the eligible population actually receive the Section 8 housing subsidy. Hence the net (expected) housing subsidy is $1,173. Summing AFDC and housing subsidies yields a combined “safety net” for the nonelderly of $6,937.

27 We assume that these benefits are valued by recipients at their dollar cost. Moffitt (1989) estimates that food stamps can largely be valued as cash, and Section 8 housing subsidies are unlikely to distort consumption behavior given that the vouchers are given generally for an amount less than market rent.
For the elderly, a weighted average of single and married families implies that combined SSI and food stamp annual payments in 1984 were $5,400, inclusive of median state supplements. Adding Section 8 housing benefits for elderly families yields a net total safety net of $6,893. Because the measures for the elderly and nonelderly are close to $7,000, we adopt a common value for both groups of $7,000 for the consumption floor, $\bar{C}$.

For a number of reasons, this estimate should be treated with caution. Calculating the consumption floor for individuals in nursing homes, for whom SSI is reduced to only $30 per month for spending money, is difficult because it involves valuing the room and board provided by the nursing home. The safety net for a couple in their fifties with grown children, before they are eligible to receive SSI, is likely to be much less than the $7,000 floor assumed above. Furthermore, in using expected values of housing subsidies, we ignore the more complicated problem of uncertainty about the value of the consumption floor faced by potential recipients.

B. Numerical Solution of the Dynamic Model

Because we cannot solve the household's multiperiod problem analytically, we use numerical stochastic dynamic programming techniques to approximate closely the solution. Using these methods, we calculate explicit decision rules for optimal consumption as well as the value function.

As noted above, earnings and medical expenditures are assumed to follow first-order autoregressive processes around a deterministic trend. The deviation from the trend is discretized into nine discrete nodes, with a maximum and minimum equal to plus and minus 2.5 standard deviations of the unconditional distribution. Hence earnings and health deviations from trend are first-order Markov processes, with the probability of realizing a given discrete outcome in period $t + 1$ a function of the current outcome in period $t$. We divide the maximum feasible range for cash on hand ($X$) in each period into 61 "nodes." The nodes are evenly spaced on the basis of the log of cash on hand, in order to get finer intervals at lower absolute levels of cash on hand, where nonlinearities in the consumption function are most likely.

The dynamic program therefore has three state variables in addition to age: cash on hand, earnings, and medical expenses. The problem is solved by starting in the last possible period of life ($T$)
and solving backward. In period \( T \), \( C_T = X_T \). In periods prior to \( T \), we calculate optimal consumption for each possible combination of nodes, using stored information about the subsequent period's optimal consumption and value function. We do not discretize consumption, but allow it to be a continuous variable. Because of possible multiple local maxima, we use information about both the value function and expected marginal utility in our search for optimal consumption. Optimal consumption is calculated by searching for levels of consumption that maximize the value function and (with the exception of corner solutions) equate the marginal utility of consumption at \( t \) to the (appropriately discounted) expected marginal utility of consumption in period \( t + 1 \). Solving the household's problem numerically involves extensive computation.\(^{29}\)

Once we determine the optimal consumption function for all possible nodes, we simulate a history for each of 16,000 families. For each family, we use the following procedure. In any period, we begin with the level of assets from the previous period and multiply by \( 1 + r \). We draw random realizations for earnings and medical expenses from the appropriate distributions.\(^{30}\) We then add the realized earnings and subtract the realized medical expenses, resulting in a value for cash on hand. Since realized cash on hand will not generally be equal to one of the nodes for cash on hand, we interpolate the optimal consumption function, using the two nearest nodes for cash on hand, for the given levels of earnings and medical expenses. This gives us the realized value for consumption. Subtracting this consumption from cash on hand gives us end-of-period assets. We then follow each family over time, recording the realized levels of earnings, consumption, and assets for each period.

V. Simulated Distributions of Age-Wealth Profiles

We begin by presenting the wealth accumulation pattern of a model in which the mean values of medical expenditures and earnings are

\(^{29}\) In total, optimal consumption is calculated at more than 230,000 individual wealth-health-earnings-age nodes. Each optimal consumption calculation involves searching over a large number of consumption choices, and the expected marginal utility and value function must be calculated for each of these possible choices. All computer work was performed using the vectorizing capabilities of the Cornell National Supercomputer Facility, a resource of the Cornell Theory Center, funded by the National Science Foundation, International Business Machines Corp., the State of New York, and members of the Corporate Research Institute.

\(^{30}\) We draw a starting value for earnings and medical expenses for period 1 from a lognormal distribution with variance equal to the unconditional variance of the distributions. Subsequent draws for medical expenses and for earnings (through retirement) are drawn from the conditional distributions.
anticipated with certainty, and life span is also certain. In this cer-
tainty benchmark, consumption and wealth paths differ across educa-
tion groups but are identical within each educational group. We ex-
amine whether differences in the age profile of medical expenses,
earnings, and retirement income can explain the observed (average)
differences in wealth accumulation.

The earnings, health, consumption, and wealth profiles for the
lowest and highest education groups are shown in figure 3a and b. Again, the graphs are scaled to adjust for differences in lifetime in-
come across education groups. Consider first the lowest-education
group. The household’s consumption is limited by borrowing con-
straints until its head reaches age 33. After that point, it accumulates
wealth, arriving at a level of wealth at retirement of about five times
peak earnings, and then gradually spends down accumulated wealth.
Next consider the highest-education group. The wealth-age path is
very similar to that for the lowest-education group. That is, differ-
ences in the profile of earnings and retirement income cannot explain
the differences in mean wealth/income ratios between the lowest-
and highest-education groups. While households with lower levels of
income may experience higher replacement rates from Social Secu-
rity benefits (and hence less need to save for retirement), they are
also less likely to receive pension income. On balance, pension plus
Social Security income yield a similar fraction of preretirement earn-
ings for the two education groups, leading to similar wealth-income
profiles.

In order to analyze not just mean wealth profiles but the distribution
of wealth for different groups (given our assumption of homoge-
nous preferences), we need to examine a model with uncertainty.
Therefore, we next examine the predictions of the dynamic program-
ming model subject to income, health, and life span uncertainty, but
with a minimal guaranteed consumption floor of $1,000. In this
case, there is little difference in the wealth accumulation patterns of
the lowest- and the highest-lifetime-income groups. Tabulations in
table 3 compare the fraction of families with wealth less than income
in the PSID (col. 1) and the simulated data (col. 2). For the simulated
data based on a $1,000 consumption floor, each educational group

31 In this version of the model, accidental bequests arising from life span uncertainty
are effectively confiscated, since no other generation receives them. Experiments in
which the average (education group-specific) bequest was given to members of the
next generation at the beginning of their working lives yielded higher steady-state
asset/income ratios. However, this approach provides younger generations with an
unrealistically large initial stock of assets. An alternative approach would have younger
generations face uncertain future inheritances. This more general model is a topic for
future research.
Fig. 3.—Consumption, earnings, and wealth by age: a, no high school diploma, everything certain; b, college degree, everything certain.
TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WITH WEALTH LESS THAN INCOME,
ACTUAL AND SIMULATED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and Education</th>
<th>Actual (PSID)</th>
<th>Simulated $1,000 Consumption Floor</th>
<th>Simulated $7,000 Consumption Floor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 30:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–69:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–80:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source.—Data are taken from the 1984 PSID and authors’ calculations.

has virtually the same small fraction of older low-wealth households. Furthermore, this precautionary saving model dramatically underpredicts the proportion of low-wealth households, especially for those whose heads do not have college degrees.³²

Finally, we consider the most realistic specification: a social insurance program that guarantees a $7,000 consumption floor.³³ Figure 4a and b depicts the predicted wealth accumulation patterns for the two educational categories. These wealth profiles are taken from 16,000 households simulated for each education group and are drawn to the same scale, and with the same quintile regressions, as the graphs in figure 1.³⁴ Consider first the graph for college graduates, figure 4b. The quintile regressions for the simulated age-wealth

³² Similarly, Carroll and Samwick (1992) have shown that wealth accumulation in the conventional precautionary saving model is implausibly high for individuals with low time preference rates.

³³ Note that we are varying the minimum guaranteed level of consumption (the consumption floor). In this paper, we do not consider changes in the asset limit, which for simplicity is assumed to be zero in our model.

³⁴ Although we have calculated the entire lifetime wealth profile for each of these households, we chose only one randomly selected wealth-age combination per household to replicate a cross-sectional sample.
profiles match closely the actual wealth profiles in figure 1c for all the quintiles. Note in particular that in both the actual data and the

35 We have used cubic polynomials in age to summarize the quantile distributions. These cubic approximations, however, may be inadequate in summarizing wealth distributions for given age groups, which may be better revealed using nonparametric approaches (see Hubbard et al. 1994c). These more detailed comparisons suggest that at the ages of peak wealth, the simulation model tends to overpredict wealth accumula-
data simulated by the model, there is substantial wealth accumulation for the bottom quintile. For example, simple tabulations show that the twentieth-percentile level of wealth among those aged 50–59 is 2.4 years of (permanent) income in the PSID and 2.8 years in the simulated data. In general, this model with uncertainty about earnings, medical expenses, and length of life does a good job of explaining the distribution of wealth for this group.

Next consider the graph for those with no high school diploma, figure 4a. In the simulated data, wealth for the bottom twentieth percentile of this group is bunched near zero for all ages, just as it is in the actual PSID data in figure 1a. For example, the tabulated twentieth-percentile level of wealth among those aged 50–59 is very low: 0.25 years of (permanent) income in the PSID data and 0.35 years in the simulated data. That is, the model is capable of explaining one of the key “puzzles” in the data: unlike the high-lifetime-income group, a significant fraction of the middle-aged, low-lifetime-income group has virtually no wealth.

In column 3 of table 3, we present the fraction of households with wealth less than income in the two education groups for the higher value of the consumption floor. The entries generally correspond closely to figures tabulated from the PSID. For example, the simulated percentages of low-wealth households whose heads are 50–59 are 24.5 percent and 4.9 percent for no-high-school and college-educated households, respectively, compared with the corresponding actual PSID tabulations of 30.0 and 4.6 percent. To summarize, the simulation model replicates well the wide disparity by lifetime income group in the fraction of households with low levels of wealth.

Finally, table 4 documents the fraction of households receiving means-tested transfers, based on 1984 data from the PSID, by age and by education group. The tabulations from the PSID data, in column 1, are contrasted with the simulated percentages given a consumption floor of $1,000 (col. 2) and $7,000 (col. 3). Assuming a consumption floor of $1,000 implies that few households in either education group receive means-tested transfers. By contrast, a $7,000 consumption floor implies that a much larger percentage of households with lower levels of educational attainment receive transfers, with little effect on college-educated households. For example, at ages 50–59, the actual percentage of those without a high school diploma receiving transfers is 12.7. The simulated percentage is 10.7 with a $7,000 floor, but only 0.2 percent with a $1,000 floor. Few college-

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For the higher quantiles. For example, the actual sixtieth-percentile level of net wealth (from the PSID) among college graduates aged 50–59 is $216,000, whereas the simulated sixtieth-percentile wealth level for the same age group is $278,000.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES RECEIVING TRANSFER PAYMENTS, ACTUAL AND SIMULATED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and Education</th>
<th>Actual (PSID) (1)</th>
<th>Simulated $1,000 Consumption Floor (2)</th>
<th>Simulated $7,000 Consumption Floor (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 30:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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Source.—Data are taken from the 1984 PSID and authors' calculations.
Note.—"Positive transfers" means that the family received AFDC, SSI, or food stamps.

educated households receive transfers at any age. Overall, the simulated model with a $7,000 floor closely matches age- and education-related patterns of income transfer receipts.

The dynamic programming model with a $7,000 floor generally predicts accurately differences in wealth accumulation patterns across education groups. However, it performs poorly in two respects. First, the model overpredicts the fraction of low-wealth, college-educated households at younger ages (table 3). Because of the more steeply sloped earnings profile for college-educated households, the simulation model predicts that many of these households will possess very little wealth prior to age 40. This contrasts with the actual patterns from the PSID, perhaps because of inter vivos transfers. Second, the simulated sixtieth- and eightieth-percentile age-wealth profiles for households with low education levels are considerably higher than the corresponding actual profiles from the PSID. For example, for ages 50–59, the sixtieth percentile of wealth in the PSID is $59,000, compared to the sixtieth-percentile value in the simulated data of $147,000.

With a conventional utility function and empirically consistent pa-
rameters for earnings and health expenses, our simulation model predicts a large impact on wealth accumulation of means-tested welfare programs. We have presented evidence that our model is consistent with important features of the empirical distribution of wealth. Is there additional direct empirical evidence that can shed light on whether differences in the structure of government-provided assistance programs can predict empirical differences in saving behavior as our model suggests?

A formal statistical test of how government social insurance programs affect saving behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we consider below two types of evidence that may bear on the empirical issue of how social insurance affects wealth accumulation: the first based on historical trends in social insurance policy in the United States and the second based on cross-sectional differences in saving behavior, either by states or by income groups.

In our approach, all else equal, an expansion in the magnitude of means-tested social insurance programs (measured by an increase in $C$) should reduce wealth holdings of low-lifetime-income households, while having little effect on wealth holdings of high-lifetime-income households. The reason is that, because of the increase in $C$, low-lifetime-income households face a greater likelihood of participating in the government consumption-maintenance programs and reduce their saving accordingly.

To examine this prediction, one would need to examine differences in the distribution of assets by lifetime income groups in periods with "low" values of the consumption floor $C$ and periods with "high" values of the consumption floor. One might think that a good natural experiment would be a comparison of the early 1960s with a more recent period such as the 1980s. Detailed wealth data are available in the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC) and the 1983 SCF. The size of means-tested programs expanded substantially between 1962 and 1983, with expenditures more than one and one-half times their 1962 level by 1983. Real spending on means-tested, in-kind transfers (food stamps, housing subsidies, and Medicaid) rose even more dramatically over the 1962–83 period (see Burtless 1986; Ellwood and Summers 1986).

However, there are at least two problems with this as a natural experiment. First, there are a large number of other factors that have changed between the 1960s and the 1980s. Second, the real benefits

36 Factors other than the consumption floor were not constant over the 1962–83 period. For example, average real out-of-pocket medical expenses for the elderly have risen from $962 in 1966 to $1,562 in 1984, which was also likely accompanied by an increase in the variance of such out-of-pocket expenses. (See U.S. Congress, Select
from AFDC and food stamps for a single mother with a family of four rose by only 5.2 percent, from $6,612 to $6,957 (in 1984 dollars), between 1964 and 1984. The increase in total expenditures arose from a rapid growth in enrollment rather than a rapid increase in benefits conditional on receiving them. Unfortunately, in its present form our model does not incorporate the changes in family composition, eligibility requirements, or welfare “stigma” that may account for the rapid rise in enrollment in welfare programs and hence the greater likelihood of receiving welfare payments.

Though they are not reported in detail here, we compared patterns of wealth holdings using the 1962 SFCC and the 1983 SCF. To control for differences in educational attainment between 1962 and 1983, we defined the low-lifetime-income group to be the bottom quintile of educational attainment (in 1983, those who had not completed high school) and the high-lifetime-income group to be the top quartile of educational attainment (in 1983, college graduates). The data did not show large differences in wealth between the two periods. For example, among households with heads aged 46–60, median wealth fell from 3.8 percent of household income in 1962 to 1.9 percent in 1983. For households with heads of the same age with high lifetime income, median wealth as a percentage of income rose from 34.8 percent to 36.3 percent. In sum, changes in median wealth accumulation between 1962 and 1983 were not large.

Preliminary cross-section evidence on how asset-based means testing affects wealth accumulation is more supportive of our model. Powers (1994) used data on female-headed households in the National Longitudinal Survey of Women to exploit cross-sectional (state-level) variation in AFDC policy to identify effects of asset limits on wealth levels. In particular, she finds that, for two otherwise identical

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37 For a description of the 1962 SFCC, see Projector and Weiss (1966); for a description of the 1983 SCF, see Avery et al. (1984).

38 One potential problem with comparing the 1962 and the 1983 surveys is changes in the accuracy of wealth reporting. For example, Wolff (1987) detailed substantial deviations between the aggregates in the 1962 SFCC and the aggregate household balance sheets.
female-headed households that reside in different states, a one-dollar differential in the AFDC asset limit is associated with a 30-cent difference in assets. Moreover, the size of this estimated effect is qualitatively robust to a number of alternative specifications.

Another implication of our analysis is that low wealth holdings are likely to be an "absorbing state" for low-lifetime-income households because of asset-based means testing of welfare programs. In Hubbard et al. (1994a), we compare the persistence of wealth holdings for households in the 1984 and 1989 samples of the PSID. Simulated 5-year transition probabilities from our model with uninsured idiosyncratic risks and a means-tested consumption floor of $7,000 replicate very closely the observed transition probabilities in the PSID. Results of alternative simulations with a high annual rate of time preference (10 percent) and no consumption floor—designed to mimic a "buffer stock" approach—greatly overpredicted the likelihood of a recovery from low levels of wealth.

VI. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research

Empirical studies using micro data often find a significant group in the population with virtually no wealth, raising concerns about heterogeneity in motives for saving. In particular, this heterogeneity has been interpreted as evidence against the life cycle model of saving. This paper argues that a life cycle model can replicate observed patterns in household wealth accumulation once one accounts for precautionary saving motives and social insurance programs. This suggests that a properly specified life cycle model with precautionary saving and social insurance can be useful for analyzing determinants of household saving and particularly for assessing effects of certain social insurance programs on saving.

Our reconciliation of the generalized life cycle model with observed patterns of household wealth accumulation proceeds in two steps. First, we show how social insurance programs with asset-based means testing can discourage saving by households with low expected lifetime incomes. The implicit tax bias against saving in this context is significant relative to other areas of tax and expenditure policy, since saving and wealth are subject to an implicit tax rate of 100 percent in the event of a sufficiently large earnings downturn or medical expense.

Powers includes lagged assets in her model with an estimated coefficient not statistically significantly different from unity. Hence, one might interpret her results as corroborating an important effect of asset limits on saving.
Second, we evaluate this model of saving and social insurance using a large dynamic programming model with four state variables. Assuming common preference parameters across education groups, we are able to replicate along important dimensions actual wealth accumulation patterns for both lower- and higher-lifetime-income families. The results presented here complement those presented in Hubbard et al. (1994b), in which we argue that a life cycle model with precautionary saving motives and social insurance can explain aggregate wealth accumulation and observed comovements of changes in consumption and current income.

In particular, we find that the presence of asset-based means testing of welfare programs can imply that a significant fraction of the group with lower lifetime income will not accumulate wealth. The reason is that saving and wealth are subject to an implicit tax rate of 100 percent in the event of an earnings downturn or medical expense large enough to cause the household to seek welfare support. This effect is much weaker for those with higher lifetime income for two reasons. First, the consumption floor is a much smaller fraction of their lifetime income and normal consumption levels and, hence, represents a less palatable support program. Second, the uninsured risks of medical spending are a smaller fraction of lifetime resources. These results suggest that observed empirical behavior of lower-income groups that might appear inconsistent with the life cycle model (Bernheim and Scholz 1993) may in fact be consistent with optimizing behavior.

We have made a number of simplifying assumptions in the model that may affect the results we present here. First, we do not control for family compositional changes. Children are likely to increase levels of consumption at middle age, which can generate low levels of wealth accumulation independent of means-tested social insurance programs. For example, Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) suggest that household demographics are a significant explanation of the hump-shaped consumption profile commonly observed in cohort and cross-section data. However, their data also suggest that the average number of children in a family peaks past age 35. Hence, households anticipating future child-rearing expenses (and college expenses) might actually save more while young, which would explain why the empirical data indicate more saving at young ages than that implied by our simulation model. Our model also does not account for life cycle changes at older ages, and in particular the role of self-insurance against life span uncertainty by married elderly couples and their children (see, e.g., Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981). Allowing for a richer demographic model of consumption might therefore reduce the predicted level of overall wealth accumulation because of greater de-
mand for consumption while middle-aged and less demand while retired.

Second, we ignore bequests in the model. Allowing for bequests is likely to increase the overall level of wealth accumulation in the simulation model (see, e.g., Hubbard et al. 1994b) and may allow a better explanation of saving behavior of the very wealthy. However, including bequests is unlikely to affect our fundamental conclusions about the nature of wealth accumulation at lower income levels. Most people who are potentially eligible for means-tested welfare programs are unlikely to be leaving substantial bequests.

To conclude, the economically significant role in saving decisions by low-income households played by asset-based means testing of many social insurance programs suggests its relevance for public policy discussions of welfare and social insurance. A model such as this can be particularly helpful in evaluating the effects of welfare reform (such as changing the guaranteed level of consumption or the size of the asset limit) on saving by both current and potential future recipients. More broadly, deliberation of the consequences of introducing asset-based means testing for Social Security should also focus on the incentive effects emphasized here.

Appendix

Illustrating Effects of the “Consumption Floor” on Household Saving

Optimal Consumption in a Two-Period Model with Certain Earnings

The Lagrangian for the basic two-period problem outlined in the text can be written as

$$\mathcal{L} = U(C_1) + \frac{U(C_2)}{1 + \delta} + \lambda \left[ \left( E_1 + \frac{E_2}{1 + r} - C_1 - \frac{C_2}{1 + r} \right) (1 - Q_2) + \left( \bar{C} - C_2 \right) Q_2 \right]$$

(A1)

where $Q_2$ is an indicator variable that equals unity when the individual is receiving a transfer, and zero otherwise; $\lambda$ is the marginal utility of income; and $\mu_1$ is the shadow price of the borrowing constraint in the first period. The first-order conditions are

$$U'(C_1) - \lambda (1 - Q_2) - \mu_1 = 0,$$

(A2)

$$U'(C_2) - \lambda \left( \frac{1 + \delta}{1 + r} \right) = 0,$$

where $U'(C_s)$ is the marginal utility with respect to period $s$ consumption.
Because of the nonconvexity of the budget constraint, there exist two local maxima for the expression in (A.1), one corresponding to \( Q_2 = 1 \) and the other to \( Q_2 = 0 \). Whether \( Q_2 \) is positive is clearly endogenous; to find the global maximum, we find the two local maxima (corresponding to \( Q_2 = 0 \) and \( Q_2 = 1 \)) and then choose the larger.

Begin with \( Q_2 = 0 \). Because we have assumed that \( E_2 < C \), in order to not receive the transfer the household must have saved resources from period 1; that is, \( Q_2 = 0 \) implies \( \mu_1 = 0 \). Thus the first-order conditions have the standard interior solution: \( U'(C_1) = U'(C_2)(1 + r)/(1 + \delta) \). When \( Q_2 = 1 \), so that the household receives a transfer in period 2, the first-order condition is \( U'(C_1) = \mu_1 \). The household will consume all its resources in the first period and rely on the consumption floor in the second period.

**Optimal Consumption in a Two-Period Model with Uncertain Earnings**

Figure A1 offers a graphical description of the effect of uncertain second-period resources and social insurance on consumption. On the horizontal axis is first-period consumption, and on the vertical axis is the marginal utility of consumption. The downward-sloping curve, equal to the left-hand side of equation (11) in the text, measures the marginal utility of \( C_1 \), which is continuous everywhere. The other, initially upward-sloping, curve labeled "opportunity cost" is equal to the right-hand side of equation (11).

The intersections of these curves represent local maxima. Point \( d \) corresponds to the interior solution at which the household saves enough to avoid welfare even in the worst earnings outcome \( (Q_{2g} = Q_{2b} = 0) \). At the point \( C^* \), the amount of saving provides exactly \( C \) in the bad state of the world in

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**Fig. A1.**—Marginal utility and optimal consumption: uncertain earnings
which $E_{2b}$ is realized. This is not an optimal choice, because the household could consume more $C_1$ today and still receive $\bar{C}$ in the bad state of the world, owing to the existence of the consumption floor. Hence, the “opportunity cost” curve drops suddenly, as the value of $Q_{2b}$ switches from zero to one. That is, increasing consumption today by $1.00 causes a reduction in next period’s consumption only if the good outcome is realized, so the opportunity cost of $1.00 consumed today is just the marginal utility of second-period consumption $C_{2g}$, weighted by the probability that the good state occurs.

Point $e$ corresponds to the interior solution at which the household receives the consumption floor in the bad state of the world, but not in the good state of the world. At $C^{**}$, first-period consumption is sufficiently high that in either state of the world, the family will be eligible for the consumption floor. The opportunity cost curve drops to zero, because increasing $C_1$ today by $1.00 does not reduce $C_2$. Finally, at point $f$, the household is consuming all its resources. The optimal consumption choice corresponds to the global utility maximum that corresponds to either point $d$, $e$, or $f$.

Figure A1 can be used to analyze how an increase in resources $E_1$ affects the relative value of points $d$, $e$, and $f$. Because of an envelope condition, the increase in utility conditional on choosing $C_1$ at points $d$, $e$, and $f$ equals (approximately) the shaded areas to the right of and below points $d$, $e$, and $f$, respectively. Clearly, the value of $d$, saving against both outcomes, rises by more than $e$, saving against just the good outcome, and the value of $e$ rises by more than $f$, making it more likely that the individual will save. In other words, households with higher initial resources are more likely to save for future contingencies and hence less likely to rely on the consumption floor. In this case of uncertainty about earnings net of medical expenses, the wealth-consumption profile can again be nonmonotonic.

References


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