Projects
War Memory and International Politics
This project has produced a book and several articles (see Publications). Another article, "Regime Type and the Politicization of the Past," focuses on the effects of regime type on how countries remember past violence. Many observers have argued that a country's regime type affects whether or not that country is willing to "put the past behind" with its former adversaries, or will remain embroiled in disputes about history. Some analysts argue that the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations is doomed to be severe because the legitimacy-challenged Chinese Communist Party benefits domestically from fanning the flames of anti-Japanese sentiment. On the other hand, other scholars make the opposite case: that democracies are more likely to be embroiled in history disputes because elected officials will face pressure from constituents to extract apologies and reparations from former adversaries.
This paper initiates a research program to investigate the link between regime type and the politicization of memory between states. I clarify relevant variables, deduce and theoretically develop two competing hypotheses, and bring to bear preliminary data. I argue (1) that it is clear that only democratic states are willing to initiate domestic debates about their past violence. However, (2) democracies are still very likely to become involved in history disputes. First, democracies often remember (or fail to remember) past violence in self-centered or even chauvinist ways that create history disputes with former adversaries. And second, democracies that remember the past in conciliatory ways may still become involved in history disputes because efforts to atone often produce a domestic backlash that angers other states.
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Regime change, anticipated both on the Korean peninsula and in China, has the potential to dramatically change East Asian politics, with many scholars warning that Korean unification or Chinese democratization could destabilize the region. Predictions about North Korea's collapse have intensified since famine there killed upwards of a million people. With North Korea's economy in perilous shape, Western analysts worry about the impact of its collapse on regional stability. As for Chinese democratization, democratic peace theorists expect that Chinese democratization would stabilize China's relationships with its democratic neighbors, as well as stabilize U.S.-China relations. However other scholars warn of the power of Chinese nationalism, and the dangers that in the short term, political liberalization in China would mobilize nationalist sentiment and fuel regional conflicts. In this project, three articles assess different issues related to regime change and East Asian regional stability.
"Democratization and Stability in East Asia"
This article is motivated by two important upcoming political transitions in East Asia: political liberalization in China, and Korean unification under a democratic regime. Although many analysts worry that these future transitions will create regional instability, this article makes the case for optimism. First, international relations theory does not support the prediction that democratizing states initiate war. The most recent scholarship either argues that there is no evidence for this claim, or expects war only in the narrowest of circumstances, which are not present in either China or South Korea. Second, another theory-economic interdependence and peace-expects that China and South Korea's global economic integration will pacify their political transitions. Third, three previous East Asian transitions reinforce optimism: neither South Korea, Taiwan, nor Japan initiated international crises or wars during democratization. Process-tracing reveals no evidence of the mechanisms that lead democratizing states to war; instead, it shows evidence of the palliative effects of economic interdependence. My findings thus suggest optimism for the stability of future East Asian transitions, and support foreign policy strategies of international economic engagement toward China and the Korean peninsula.
"Understanding Regime Stability in North Korea"
This paper (co-authored with Daniel Byman, Georgetown University) examines the topic of regime stability. Today, analysts highlight impending famine as well as threats to the regime's position brought by eroding information control. To understand what has kept Kim Jong Il in power, and how this might be changing over time, this paper outlines several theories of authoritarian control -- a "toolbox" used by leaders to stay in power -- and applies these theories to the North Korean case.
The Kim regime has employed the authoritarian toolbox to protect itself both from popular revolt and internal coups. Its social policies, exploitation of ideas, and use of force prevent the onset of revolution. Through numerous other tools (elite co-optation, manipulation of foreign governments for financial aid, and the "coup-proofing" of domestic institutions) the regime protects itself from coups d'etat. This framework not only helps explain the past resilience of the regime, it suggests that its position is more stable than many recent analyses imply. Our analysis has implications for policy planning about the future of the Korean peninsula, and for negotiations with and coercive strategies toward Pyongyang.
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The third paper in this project is co-authored with Bruce Bennett (RAND). One lesson of the ongoing Iraq campaign is that US military planners and foreign policy makers need to plan carefully for post-combat or post-collapse stability operations. After a government falls, what essential missions must a stability force undertake to restore internal security? What are the requirements for such missions? This paper assesses these questions in the context of the North Korean collapse. This event has the potential to trigger numerous problems such as refugee flows, power contestation between local commanders, and -perhaps most worrisome-"loose nukes." Our paper first outlines the challenges that could result from North Korean collapse, and then assesses the military requirements for these operations. We then compare these requirements against the current capabilities of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of the United States and South Korea, and generate implications for U.S. military policy and diplomacy.
Energy Competition
China, through its national oil companies, has recently attracted a great deal of media and scholarly attention in its effort to negotiate drilling rights and other preferential deals with oil producers. But does such ownership of oil really bring strategic advantages? Clearly Beijing, New Delhi, Seoul, and Tokyo believe that it does; furthermore, U.S. leaders and analysts warn that China's policies will allow it to "lock up" oil supplies around the world. On the other hand, other analysts express skepticism that equity ownership of oil benefits a government in any real way, relative to simply purchasing oil on international spot markets. Indeed, some analysts argue that through its pursuit of oil ownership, China is overpaying for its oil. Who, then is right: the governments expending valuable resources in pursuit of equity oil, or these analysts who shrug that equity oil is inefficient and does not enhance a country's energy security?
After examining this question, this project may also explore a follow-up question: if it is true that equity oil ownership does not confer important strategic advantages, why are governments adopting this policy? One might be tempted to dismiss China as a developing country with inexperience in the oil industry; alternatively, one might argue that its domestic politics leads to organizational or bureaucratic policies that are economically inefficient (for example, top management of China's national oil companies are Communist Party cadres). But this does not explain similar efforts in South Korea, Japan, and India. Are governments pursuing equity oil because of capture by domestic interest groups? Or are their policies the result of misperception or panics (for example, caused by the experience of the OPEC oil crisis as well as other times of shortage)?
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