**Political Discussion and the Social Transmission of Democratic Knowledge and Values in a New Democracy: The 2002 Kenya National Civic Education Program**

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**Abstract**

How do adults in new democracies develop democratic values and learn about the political system? Using a three-wave panel data set from Kenya spanning the transitional democratic election of 2002, we posit a two-step process of social transmission of democratic knowledge, norms and values. Individuals exposed to democratic messages in the National Civic Education Program became opinion leaders, communicating new knowledge and attitudes to others within their social networks, many of whom had not been directly exposed to the program. Further, individuals who discussed *others'* civic education experiences showed significant growth in political knowledge, participation, tolerance, and national as opposed to tribal identification, in many instances more than individuals in the formal treatment group. Moreover, we find evidence of a "leveling effect" of post-civic education discussion, as discussions have greater impact on those with fewer political resources, i.e., those less integrated into secondary associations, less educated, women, and rural residents.

Regime transitions to democracy bring with them transitions of another sort: rapid changes in the political behaviors, knowledge, and values expected of citizens. Individuals quickly need to learn the basic structure of a new set of institutions and norms, to develop new political loyalties, and to figure out where they fit in—how to participate and which politicians or parties best represent their own interests and values. How can citizens acquire these new civic competencies and attitudes in such a short period of time? Theorists initially posited that the acquisition of democratic regime norms, values and participatory orientations among individuals in new democracies would be a long-term process linked to social modernization and generational replacement (Almond & Verba, 1989; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Lipset, 1959). A spate of more recent research on third wave democracies, however, has established a new truism: that democratic orientations are malleable, in the medium- and even in the short-term. Evidence abounds that democratic attitudes in transition societies respond to the regimes' political and economic performance (Cleary & Stokes, 2006; Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rohrschneider, 2002; Seligson, 2002). Further, mass attitudes such as tolerance and regime support in new democracies have been found to mirror shifts in elite political culture, ideology, and attitudes towards civil liberties (Gibson & Caldeira, 2003; Mishler & Rose, 2007). And democratic values in some post-communist and authoritarian societies developed quickly due to "demonstration effects" (Weil, 1993), whereby Western democracies served as positive role models observed through the international mass media (Dalton, 1994; Klingemann & Hoffebert, 1994; Rohrschneider, 1999; Seligson & Booth, 1993). These findings all suggest that democratic transitions can be accompanied by relatively rapid changes in political orientations, as the new regime demonstrates positive performance, and citizens learn from new leaders, institutions and other democratic systems.

But are there more direct ways to promote democratic norms, values, and participatory orientations? Countries undergoing democratic transitions often face severe economic and political difficulties, making it problematic to rely on regime performance to shape values and behaviors (Huntington, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Moreover, elites in new democracies often exhibit tenuous support for democratic ideals, making it unlikely to see positive "mirroring effects" on the average citizen

from corrupt politicians who themselves do not fully accept the rules of the democratic game (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Hiskey & Seligson, 2003; Seligson, 2002). Given the plethora of new democratic regimes that exhibit either poor performance or outright backsliding toward authoritarianism (Diamond, 1999; Zakaria, 2003), successful transmission of democratic norms and values in the short run would seem to require interventions that are independent of potentially problematic institutions and elites.

Perhaps the most promising direct means for promoting democratic orientations in new democracies is through civic education programs, which teach democratic citizenship to young people in classroom settings or to adults in community workshops, lectures or public fora (Finkel, 2003a; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). Over the past several decades, there has been an explosion of such programs in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, with the vast majority funded by the United States, other OECD donors, or philanthropic organizations seeking to stimulate more democratic political cultures in transition societies (Carothers, 1999; Diamond, 1999; Niemi & Finkel, 2007; Torney-Purta, 2002). These programs range from new primary and secondary school curricula on democracy, to local NGO programs providing instruction about the social and political rights of women, to voter education, to neighborhood problem-solving programs bringing individuals and local authorities together. While it is difficult to estimate the precise number of these programs in developing democracies, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) data suggest that the US alone spent between thirty and fifty million a year on civic education between 1990 and 2005.[1]

Despite the proliferation of civic education programs in new democracies, there has been relatively little research on their effectiveness in changing democratic orientations among students or adults. A number of published studies, however, have emerged in recent years. Most report that civic

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[1] These figures were obtained from official USAID activity data, available at http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html as part of the project "Deepening our Understanding of the Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2004," principal investigators Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Mitchell A. Seligson, and C. Neal Tate. The data show that expenditures in the category "Civic Education, Civil Society and Leadership Training", which includes all civil society activities funded by USAID aside from activities related to labor unions and the support of independent mass media, totaled more than two billion dollars between 1990 and 2005..

education among secondary school students (Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Morduchowicz, Catterberg, Niemi, & Bell, 1996; Slomcyznski & Shabad, 1998; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001) or adults in community-based workshops (Finkel, 2002, , 2003a; Finkel, Sabatini, & Bevis, 2000) significantly impacts political knowledge and participation, as well as, under certain conditions, democratic values and norms such as tolerance, efficacy and institutional trust. Thus, there is some optimism regarding the benefits of donor-sponsored civic education for democratic political cultures in recipient countries.

In this paper, we add to this emerging literature by assessing the impact of a major country-wide civic education initiative in Kenya during the period spanning the transitional democratic election of December 2002 (Finkel, 2003b). In so doing, we address two deficiencies in previous studies. One is theoretical, in that previous research has been limited by a restrictive view of the target population of civic education programs. As opposed to focusing solely on the individuals trained in the programs *per se*, we argue that evaluations of civic education must also examine its *indirect* effects, whereby treated individuals go on to discuss the lessons and ideas in the classes or workshops with untreated members of their social networks. To the extent that civic education stimulates such democratic discussions – and we show below that they occurred in Kenya with great frequency – democracy education may exert even greater impact on democratic political culture than previously recognized, as the "downstream" effects of political discussions amplify the programs' direct effects.

The other deficiency we address is methodological. Knotty problems of selection and control are endemic to the evaluation of civic education in real-world settings. School-based civic education is often mandatory, making it difficult to compare trained students to appropriate control groups, while the voluntary nature of adult civic education leads inexorably to problems of selection bias. Such bias occurs when individuals exposed to training are already more democratic, or already possess attributes that would lead to increases in democratic orientations independent of the training itself. Overcoming these problems is difficult in observational studies, but much more progress can be made with longitudinal designs than with the single-shot cross-sectional designs utilized thus far. A unique three-wave longitudinal data set in Kenya allows us to disentangle the effect of civic education from that of pre-

workshop attitudes, estimating the effects of the treatment while controlling for confounding variables that may be associated with both training and democratic knowledge, values, or behaviors.

The results show strong support for a "two-step" model of the impact of civic education. Individuals exposed to democratic messages in the National Civic Education Program (NCEP) became opinion leaders, communicating new knowledge and attitudes to neighbors, family members, and friends within their social networks who had not been directly exposed to the program. Using fixed effects longitudinal models, we show that individuals with no personal exposure to the program who discussed *others'* civic education experienced significant growth in political knowledge, participation, tolerance, and national as opposed to tribal identification, in many instances more than individuals in the formal treatment group. This study presents perhaps the strongest evidence to date of the full range of civic education's effects, and reinforces its promise for promoting democratic political culture.

Moreover, the organic processes of political talk emanating from civic education allow a novel real-world test of how political discussion and citizen deliberation can transmit knowledge and values in an emerging democracy (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002; Gibson, 2001; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003, , 2006; Mondak & Gearing, 1998; Mutz, 2002b). Both the Kenyan transition to democracy and the NCEP inserted new topics of conversation into the lives of ordinary citizens, creating ripple effects in Kenyan political culture. Consistent with core propositions in deliberative democratic theory (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1989), these discussions among ordinary citizens generated a better-informed, more tolerant, and more *civil* society. However, our evidence suggests that Kenyans did not develop tolerance and national identification through a process of deliberation itself; rather, discussion was a venue in which newly-formed "experts" transmitted democratic information and values in a one-way process to novices in their social networks.

Finally, this study allows us to address unresolved questions regarding whether everyday political conversations ameliorate (Sears & Valentino, 1997; Valentino & Sears, 1998) or exacerbate preexisting inequalities in political resources (McClurg, 2003). Most survey-based research on the effect of political discussion is limited by the fact that conversation content may vary systematically through the population,

such that people with more political resources are exposed to higher quality information through their networks. In the present study, the content of conversation is held constant to a much greater extent, resulting in a more direct test of how discussion affects people with different levels of political resources. We find evidence of interaction effects between post-civic education discussion and prior resources, such that discussions have the greatest impact on Kenyans who "need" it the most: those with less education and less integrated into secondary associations, women, and rural residents.

**Civic Education, Political Discussion, and Democratic Learning: Theoretical Expectations**

A series of recent studies suggests that civic education in new democracies can have significant impact on a variety of democratic orientations. Finkel and Ernst (2005), for example, find that high school students who receive civics instruction on at least a weekly basis are far more likely to identify correctly key South African political leaders and to possess basic knowledge of the South African constitution than students who receive civics instruction less often or not at all. Civic education's impacts on attitudes, values, and orientations towards political participation are typically more modest, though even these orientations appear open to change if classroom environments are "open," and if active, participatory teaching methodologies are employed by credible and likeable instructors (Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001).

Among adult populations, civic education often has rather large effects on political participation, especially at the local level, as well as effects than on democratic attitudes and values. Finkel (2002; Finkel, Sabatini, & Bevis, 2000), for instance, finds that adults in nine programs in the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa are nearly twice as participatory as control group members; effects are largest for community problem-solving and attendance at municipal meetings. Evidently, conducting adult civic education through "advocacy NGOs" and other civil society organizations has beneficial synergies; civics training's appeals to participation appear to augment and amplify normal mobilization processes already taking place within these groups. As with students, adults' democratic attitudes and values are more resistant to change, though training can raise efficacy, political tolerance, and

institutional trust, especially when it is frequent and makes use of participatory teaching methodologies (Bratton, Alderfer, Bowser, & Temba, 1999; Finkel, 2003a; Finkel, Sabatini, & Bevis, 2000).[2]

All of this research, however, has been limited in theoretical scope, in that evaluations have focused on civic education's effects only among *individuals directly exposed to democracy training*. We argue instead that civic education involves a two-step process, whereby trained individuals may go on to discuss the messages and ideas from programs with others in their social networks. The two-step process of message reception and subsequent diffusion through social networks has long been viewed as one of the primary ways that mass media affect political attitudes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948); more recent research has shown a similar effect for campaign mobilization, as individuals contacted by parties and get-out-the-vote efforts in turn mobilize others in their social networks (McClurg, 2004; Nickerson, 2008; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Despite the theoretical importance of these kinds of social diffusion processes, however, they have not been taken into account in any previous study of the effects of civic education.

Secondary effects of civic education may occur in two ways: 1) civic education participants ("trainees") who tell others about their experiences may amplify and reinforce democratic messages in their own minds (Pingree, 2007); and 2) individuals who do not attend civic education activities may absorb democratic messages from trainees with whom they talk. Of course, both processes could occur for trainees who tell others about their own civic education experiences and also hear from discussants who were similarly exposed.

There are several reasons to expect post-civic education political discussions to be relatively widespread. First, nearly all adult civic education in developing democracies is conducted through NGOs or other secondary groups and associations that organize these activities in their local communities. This means that group-based discussion networks are already available to most civic education participants.

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[2] The effects of civic education on political and institutional trust is sometimes negative as well, as such training appears to raise awareness of the deficiencies of less democratic regimes, and increase skepticism regarding the performance of political elites (Finkel, Sabatini, & Bevis, 2000). Moehler (2008) finds a similar pattern in an analysis of the impact of civic participation in constitution-building activities in Uganda.

Hence there will be ample opportunities not only for trainees to engage in post-civic education discussions, but also for others within the network to hear new messages and ideas from individuals who have been trained. Second, civic education programs for adults in new democracies are rarely lecture or classroom-based. Rather, they consist mainly of workshops, seminars, or community problem-solving activities that make extensive use of group-based political discussion as a pedagogical technique. Thus adult civic education and political discussion are intrinsically related: civic education participants are likely to engage in a good deal of political discussion through their training, and they are likely to have access to a relatively large number of individuals within their social networks with whom they may continue discussions after training has ended.

When civic education leads to political discussion among network members, it may then activate the whole range of social network, discussion, and deliberation effects on democratic learning and participation that have been found in previous research (Gibson, 2001; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Mondak & Gearing, 1998). Social networks are a relatively efficient, low-cost and accessible source of political information for network members (Downs, 1957). Moreover, they are venues for potential deliberation about politics and democracy that may affect both partners in political discussions. As Ochs and Capps argue, conversation partners can "provide, elicit, criticize, refute, and draw inferences," helping the trainee make sense of civic lessons by "developing frameworks for understanding events" (Ochs & Capps, 2002). And deliberative theorists since Mill have argued that when discussion partners with different points of view come together, the act of discussion itself can lead both to become more tolerant of political disagreement and more strongly identified with the larger political collective (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Mill, 1975 [1860]).

Consistent with these notions, a host of studies have found that political discussion within networks promotes general political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005; Kwak, Willlams, Wang, & Lee, 2005) and awareness of the reasons behind others' political views (Mutz, 2002b, , 2006; Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). Deliberative discussion also has strong potential to transmit new norms and values. Mutz (2002b) shows that political discussion within

heterogeneous networks promotes tolerance for dissonant views, while Gibson (2001) shows that Russians with more "politically capable" social networks are more likely to support democratic institutions and processes. And a large body of work demonstrates that political discussion stimulates participation by providing network members with information and other participatory resources, reducing ambivalence in political preferences, and promoting trust and social capital, which facilitate collective action (Kenny, 1992; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003, , 2006; Opp & Gern, 1993). These effects should be particularly strong in new democracies, where individuals are "actively trying to learn the new rules of the political game," and where everyday conversations may be "especially effective in transmitting novel information about unfamiliar political institutions" (Gibson, 2001, 54). Indeed, a number of studies show that Kenyan social networks play a major role in conveying information and changing norms on issues such as birth control and disease prevention (Behrman, Kohler, & Watkins, 2002; Kohler, Behrman, & Watkins, 2001; Kremer & Miguel, 2007; Musalia, 2005, , 2006; Rutenberg & Watkins, 1997).

But there are deeper links between civic education, political discussion, and democratic change, beyond the fact that civic education may simply lead to *more* political talk and deliberation. Civic education trainees are likely to be especially effective agents of democratic socialization. For one thing, their participation in civic education activities is likely to make them *de facto* experts on democratic processes within their social networks, in particular ones in emerging democracies characterized by relatively low levels of political information. McClurg (2006, 737) provides strong evidence that more knowledgeable discussants "help people develop confidence in their attitudes….thereby making participation more likely." To the extent that civic education exerts *direct effects* on trainees, they will likely become opinion leaders: the kinds of individuals who raise the network's "social supply of expertise," providing the network with not only with larger quantities of political information, but also information that is higher in quality and more likely to lead to attitudinal and behavioral change (Huckfeldt, 2001; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998).

For another, because trainees are likely to have relatively strong social and emotional bonds with others in their networks, they may be especially effective at transmitting difficult and potentially dissonant ideas to network members (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Walsh, 2004). Civic education trainees who know one other may tailor messages to each others' needs and interests, targeting them more effectively (more effectively, perhaps, than the initial instruction from civic education itself). And these same shared identities and emotional bonds may lead network members on the receiving end of democratic messages to more readily accept new information contradicting old. Given that many social networks in new democracies may be relatively closed, homogenous and not particularly infused with democratic values (Gibson, 2001), the affective bonds that network members share may be valuable in persuading those who were not initially exposed to civic education to accept pro-democracy messages.

For all of these reasons, we hypothesize that civic education training is likely to influence attitudes, values, and participatory orientations in new democracies through a two-step process of democratic diffusion. In the first step, democracy training should influence the knowledge, values, and behaviors of individuals exposed to workshops and other kinds of civics instruction. In the second step, there should be indirect effects on the individuals with whom trainees talk, and on the trained individuals themselves as they discuss their own experiences with others in their social networks. To the extent that previous research has failed to take these secondary or indirect effects into account, civic education's overall impact on democratic change may have been greatly underestimated.

One final, and potentially less benign, pattern of secondary effects is also possible. Earlier evaluations of adult civic education programs show some evidence that the effects accrue disproportionately to those with higher levels of social integration and other political resources (Finkel, 2002, , 2003a). This pattern may also hold for the impact of post-workshop political discussions, for several reasons. U.S.-based work (McClurg, 2003), for example, finds that the highly educated benefit disproportionately from political discussion, as do those already integrated into community groups, as they are able to make greater use of existing channels to engage the political system (for US-based evidence, see Kwak, Shah, & Holbert, 2004; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004). Moreover,

connections to civil society in Kenya may coincide other forms of privilege such as patronage or clientalistic networks (Orvis, 1997, , 2001a), and one recent study finds that funding from international donors may lead civil society groups to attract *less* participation from their most disadvantaged members (Gugerty & Kremer, 2008).

An opposing theoretical view, however, points to the possibility of a "leveling effect" from civic education and subsequent political discussion through social networks. Valentino and Sears (1998), for example, show that increases in political information flows (in this case, from political campaigns) narrow experience-related gaps between adolescents and adults in terms of political knowledge and attitude formation, and of course a wealth of previous work on political persuasion indicates that, to the extent that individuals receive new information, those with less chronic political awareness or resources are more likely to accept it (Zaller, 1992). Such a process suggests that exposure to new information – either in the civic education training itself or in subsequent social network discussions --- may benefit those who, in important ways, "need it" the most. In the Kenyan case, those in greatest need are not only those with fewer educational resources and existing ties to civil society, but also women and rural residents, as Kenyan social networks and resources are strongly differentiated by gender and by rural versus urban status (Kohler, Behrman, & Watkins, 2001; Musalia, 2005; Orvis, 1997). We assess the extent to which post-civic education network discussion exacerbates, or ameliorates, resource-related disparities in democratic knowledge, values, and participation in the analyses that follow.

**Assessing the 2002 National Civic Education Programme in Kenya: Research Design and Data**

We investigate these processes in the context of an evaluation of the Kenyan National Civic Education Program (NCEP), a countrywide civic education initiative conducted during the run-up to the transitional national elections of December 27, 2002. This election produced a decisive victory for Mwai Kibaki and his NARC party coalition over Uhuru Kenyatta, the candidate of the ruling KANU party and the successor to the incumbent President Daniel Arap Moi. Moi had led the country in corrupt and authoritarian fashion since 1978, stifling opposition following an attempted coup in 1982 and more or less establishing Kenya as a one-party state thereafter. International pressure following the end of the Cold

War in the 1990s resulted in a gradual opening of the country to multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997. Both elections produced KANU victories, though both were widely viewed as flawed, marred by intimidation of the opposition and widespread violence. Nevertheless, some democratic progress continued throughout the late 1990s. Moi promised to step down in 2002 in accordance with the ten year term limit set out in the Kenyan constitution, though until the date of the election was set (and even during the campaign) there was doubt about whether he would follow through on this promise. In 2001, a Constitutional Review Commission was formed with the task of writing a new constitution in time for the 2002 election. An extensive amount of public debate took place on a variety of proposals, among them restricting presidential powers, creating a prime ministerial position, and increasing the powers of local and provincial governments.[3] Though a new constitution was not agreed upon by late 2002, the election campaign proceeded, with the result being the first alteration of political power through the electoral process in Kenyan political history. The election was widely viewed as a democratic breakthrough for the country (Barkan, 2004; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Ndegwa, 2003).

In this context, a consortium of so-called "like-minded donors" from the European Union funded an ambitious civic education program to raise awareness about the 2002 election and the associated constitutional reform process. The program consisted of some 50,000 discrete workshops, lectures, plays and puppet shows, and community meetings conducted by nearly 80 Kenyan NGOs between late 2001 and December 2002. These activities aimed to promote awareness, civic skills, democratic values, and engagement in the democratic regime among ordinary Kenyan citizens—specifically to prepare them for exercising the vote and for providing considered input into the constitutional reform process, and more generally "to contribute to the consolidation of a mature political culture in Kenya" (NCEP Programme Document, cited in Finkel, 2003b).

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID/Nairobi) commissioned Management Systems International, a US-based management consulting firm, to conduct an evaluation of

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[3] For more on the Kenya Constitutional Review Commission (which continues its work in the present day), see http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/Adverts/crck/message.htm

the project's impact on participants in late 2001. The Kenya study followed assessments in the Dominican Republic and Poland in 1997, and South Africa in 1999 (Finkel, 2003a), but had several crucial features allowing substantially more definitive conclusions regarding program impact. Most importantly, the assessment consists of interviews conducted with individuals before and after they have attended civic education workshops, so that changes associated with civic education can be observed directly. In the three previous assessments, interviews were limited to individuals only after they had been trained, making it impossible – despite extensive efforts at statistical control – to rule out completely the hypothesis that individuals were already more "democratic" before they attended civic education activities. This same pre-post design will also provide leverage for assessing the impact of secondary post-civic education discussions.

Second, previous assessments were hampered by the fact that the civic education "treatments" themselves varied widely among the implementing civil society organizations. As some programs addressed voting education, some women's rights, and some local community problem-solving, it has been difficult to determine whether observed effects were due to different content areas, different implementation strategies, or the different conditions under which the programs took place. In Kenya, the treatment itself was standardized to a much greater extent than in other countries. The implementing CSOs in Kenya, in collaboration with donor organizations, outside experts, and consultants, spent nearly two years developing a common curriculum for the overall NCEP initiative. The curriculum was contained in the book *Making Informed Choices: A Handbook for Civic Education*, and in the supplemental teaching manual published by four consortia of participating CSOs. Though it was adapted to some degree for each workshop, the core was designed to be similar for all participants.

The evaluation consisted of pre and post-civic education survey interviews with individuals who attended NCEP workshops and with control group respondents. We interviewed 2,611 individuals between February and April 2002, with half selected at random upon entering one of 181 selected NCEP workshops sponsored by 26 different civil society organizations throughout seven of Kenya's eight

provinces.[4] The other half served as the control group, with respondents selected to match treatment group individuals by age, educational attainment, gender and place of residence.[5] Two follow-up waves of interviews were conducted. In October and November 2002 (Wave 2), between 6 and 9 months after the initial NCEP workshops, we re-interviewed 1,787 individuals (901 workshop attendees and 886 control group members) from the Wave 1 sample.[6] Between late March and early June 2003, we conducted a third wave of interviews with 401 respondents who had also been interviewed in Wave 2 of the study and with 915 "fresh" individuals who had previously been interviewed only in Wave 1.[7] The sample analyzed here thus consists of two waves of panel data for 1,900 individuals (952 from the initial treatment group, and 948 from the initial control group), and three waves of data for an additional 401 respondents (210 from the initial treatment group, and 190 from the initial control group). Our analysis is based only on the 2,301 individuals interviewed in at least two waves. Interviews were predominantly in Kiswahili and English, with 14% conducted at least in part in one of nine local languages (for more information on the survey methods, see Finkel, 2003b). The interviews were conducted by Research International, a respected Nairobi survey firm with extensive experience in carrying out surveys and other types of data collection for international donors as well as for the private sector in Kenya and throughout sub-Saharan Africa (http://www.research-int.com).

*Dependent Variables*

The survey measured a number of dimensions of political culture, including—most importantly for our purposes—political knowledge, participation, tolerance, and the individual's sense of national versus tribal identification. Here, we briefly describe each of these dependent variables. We measured *Political knowledge* through responses to four questions regarding the name of the Vice President, the

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[4] A small number of individuals who participated in workshops with official invitation lists were interviewed several days before the treatment, but over 90% of the treated sample came from what we referred to as "hall interviews."

[5] The sampling strategy that we developed produced a nearly identical "treatment group" (workshop attendees) and "control group" (non-attendees) in terms of the demographic factors that we attempted to match.

[6] Response rates were quite high. Of 2,611 respondents interviewed in the pre-civic education wave, we were able to obtain re-interviews in either the second or third wave with 2,301. There was no bias in reinterview rates related to treatment group status, region, income, education, age, religion, church attendance, or gender. See (Finkel, 2003b), chapter 2.

[7] Budgetary reasons prevented larger wave 2 and 3 samples. The design also allows the assessment of potential decay in the effects of civic education, but this is not a central concern here. See (Finkel, 2003b), pp. 46-50.

Provincial Commissioner, the length of the President's term in office, and the provisions for amending the Kenyan constitution. We summed respondents' correct answers to create a general knowledge scale ranging from 0 to 4. The reliability of the scale in the post-workshop interviews was .83, for the pre-workshop .50.

*(Table 1 here)*

We also measured the respondent's level of democratic *Political participation*, defined as "legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). The survey asked whether the respondent had done any of the following in the past year: worked for a political party or candidate; participated in an organized effort to solve a neighborhood or community problem; attended a meeting of the local council or with other government officials; contacted a local official; contacted a national elected official; taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue; and contacted a local chief or traditional leader about a problem. To prevent double-counting and to ensure that we measured participation subsequent to civic education, follow-up interviews (in waves 2 and 3) explicitly called for respondents to report whether they had taken part in any of these activities *since their previous interview*. We sum these responses to create an overall scale ranging from 0 to 7. The reliability of the scale is .80 in the post-workshop interviews, and .70 in the pre-workshop interviews.

We measured two critical democratic values and norms, political tolerance and the individual's sense of national versus tribal identification. The program aimed to promote a sense of "nationhood," given the often troubling relationships between various ethnic groups that have hampered the country's development (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997; Orvis, 2001b; Posner, 2007). In the wake of the explosion of ethnic political violence following the flawed elections of December 2007, the importance of this variable, as well as levels of political tolerance, for Kenya's democratic political culture became clearer still (Barkan, 2008). To measure *Political tolerance*, we asked four standard questions regarding whether atheists and individuals who want to abolish elections in favor of military rule should be allowed "to speak publicly in your locality" and "to organize a peaceful demonstration to express their point of

view." Answers are on a four-point agree/disagree scale, and we create a tolerance index by averaging responses to the four questions. The reliability of the scale was .90 for the post-workshop interviews and .82 for the pre-workshop interviews. To measure "nationhood" sentiments, we asked individuals "how important is being Kenyan to the way you think of yourself," with responses coded as "3" for "very important," "2" for "somewhat important," and "1" for "not important." The same question was asked for the individual's "tribe or ethnic group." We created a composite *National versus ethnic identity* variable by subtracting the individual's ethnic identity score from their national identity score. The value of this variable ranges from –2 for individuals with a much greater ethnic than national identity, to +2 for individuals with a much greater national than ethnic identity.

*Independent Variables*

*Exposure to civic education.* The primary variable for civic education is derived from a series of questions in Waves 2 and 3. Individuals began the study assigned to either the formal treatment group or the formal control. Though the formal treatment group was comprised of individuals who were entering NCEP workshops, people assigned to the formal control group were of course not prevented from seeking out subsequent workshops on their own. Many did so; of the 1,162 people initially assigned to the formal control group, 349 or 30% received *some* civic education at some point during the study. Moreover, even many treatment group members sought out additional civic education workshops after completing the formal treatment; in Wave 2, 38% of them reported additional civic education, while in Wave 3 30% of them did. We therefore asked a series of questions designed to measure the extent to which *both* formal treatment and formal control group members were exposed to civic education since their previous interview. We asked the formal treatment group whether they had attended other civic education workshops since their previous interview, and whether they had attended organized teachings about democracy and the constitution at their church, mosque, or place of worship. If they had, we asked how many. Individuals in the formal control group received the same questions without reference to an initial workshop. For formal treatment group members in Waves 2, we code *Total workshops* as 1 + the number of additional workshops + the number of church teachings. For formal control group members and

formal treatment group members in Wave 3, *Total workshops* is simply the number of workshops plus church teachings since the last interview.

*Discussion of civic education.* Following the argument above, we measured two types of post-civic education political discussion. First, we code *discussion of own workshops* (*Discuss Own*) based on the number of people a respondent reports speaking to about his or her own civic education experiences. We gave "no discussants" a value of 0, one to two discussants a value of 1, three to five discussants a value of 2, and more than five discussants a value of 3. Individuals who reported receiving no civic education in the time period in question were not asked this question, and received a "0" on this variable. Second, *discussion of others' workshops* (*Discuss Others*) is the number of people who talked to the respondent about their own civic education experiences. Both treatment and control group members received this question, and we coded responses following the same 0 to 3 scheme.

*Other variables.* We also include in the analysis several variables related to political awareness and engagement. First, we measure *Political interest* as the mean of responses to two questions regarding whether the respondent has "a great deal," "some," or "very little interest" in local community affairs, and national politics and affairs. The correlation between the two variables in both the pre and post workshop interviews was moderate at .43. Second, we measure *Media consumption* based on the mean of responses to two questions regarding how often the respondent pays attention to news about politics on the radio and in newspapers. Response categories ranged from "never" to "about every day", and they were moderately correlated at .47. Third, we measure *Group memberships* as a count (from 0 to 11) of the number of types of formal organizations in which the respondent is a member, including churches, burial societies, sports and women's groups, and business associations. Each of these variables has been recoded to a 0 to 1 scale.

In models assessing conditional effects and predicting the extent to which individuals engage in discussion about their own experiences we include a few additional variables. Beyond standard demographic controls, we include a dummy variable measuring whether the individual's workshop took place in a rural or urban area; we interpret this as a proxy for whether the individual lives within the

footprint of an urban market economy.[8] Finally, for individuals who received some civic education exposure, we measured *Subjective program satisfaction*. This variable is a 0 to 1 index (alpha .75) constructed by averaging responses regarding the quality of the instructors and satisfaction with the workshop experience.

## Statistical Methods

Previous evaluations of civic education have been based on cross-sectional designs, with data collected on the treatment and control groups at one point in time, sometimes relatively long after the civic education activities have taken place. As such, a number of potential obstacles exist for successful causal inference. As noted above, the lack of a pre-test means that we cannot rule out the possibility that civic education workshop participants were higher than the control group on democratic orientations such as knowledge, tolerance, or participation *before* the exposure to democracy training. Moreover, because attendance in adult civic education programs is voluntary, it is plausible that the factors that lead individuals to attend such programs are also factors that would lead to gains in democratic orientations in the absence of any civic education treatment whatsoever. At least some of these factors – for example democratic or authoritarian personality, motivation or other idiosyncratic individual attributes – are likely not to be known to the researcher or included in the data set. The result will be a correlation between the treatment and the unobserved error term of the equations predicting democratic orientations, and hence endogeneity in the outcome equations and significant potential bias in the estimation of causal effects.

Similar problems of potential endogeneity and selection biases exist in the analysis of the effects of political discussion on democratic attitudes. The amount of political discussion in which a person engages is likely to be a function of a number of usually unobserved personal traits – extroversion, motivation, and the like – that may also relate to democratic attitudinal and behavioral orientations. Individuals may also seek out congenial discussion networks based on their own prior political attitudes (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002; Duchesne & Haegel, 2007; Mutz, 2002a, , 2006), in which case

[8] Our data set contains two measures of the workshop's urban versus rural status, one coded by the interview team and the other by NGO staff. For each measure, about 20% of cases are coded as urban. Because we define "urban" broadly to include ex-urban areas, we count cases as *Urban* if they have been so coded on either original measure.

political discussion would be the result and not the cause of democratic orientations or behaviors.[9] In the case of post-civic education discussion, individuals in the control group who are most predisposed towards democratic change may be those who seek out others who have more experience with democracy, perhaps through attending civic education workshops. Thus prior democratic attitudes or unobserved individual-level factors related to democracy would render the link between discussion and democratic outcomes spurious. The lack of a pre-test in previous cross-sectional designs exacerbates this problem, since we do not know what the individual's orientations may have been before political discussion took place.

The longitudinal design implemented in the Kenya NCEP evaluation allows us to make some progress in overcoming these difficulties. We observe some democratic orientations ($Y_{it}$) for a given individual *i* at several *t* points in time, and we also observe the individual's (self-selected) exposure to civic education ($X_1$) and subsequent political discussion ($X_2$) that takes place between any two given time periods of observation. Following Allison's (1994) terminology, the task is to estimate the effect of the two civic education-related "events" that may have taken place between time points *t-1* and *t* on the individual's democratic orientations at time *t*. For two-wave data, a basic model may be written as:

$$\text{(1)} \quad \begin{aligned} &\text{(a)} \quad Y_{i1} = \alpha_1 + \beta_3 Z_{i1} + (U_i + \varepsilon_{i1}) \\ &\text{(b)} \quad Y_{i2} = \alpha_2 + \beta_1 X_{1i2} + \beta_2 X_{2i2} + \beta_3 Z_{i2} + (U_i + \varepsilon_{i2}) \end{aligned}$$

where the $Z_{it}$ represent a set of control variables that are observed in the given data, and the unobserved error term at each point in time is comprised of two components: the idiosyncratic component $\varepsilon_{it}$ , which varies across individuals and over time, and the $U_i$ term, which represents all unobserved individual-level factors that are related to Y and that vary across individuals but *do not vary* over time. The absence of $X_{1i1}$ and $X_{2i1}$ in equation (1a) reflects the fact that they are zero for all individuals at time 1, which

[9] Contesting claims such as these, Huckfeldt and Sprague argue that social networks are largely determined by social structures such as workplaces and neighborhoods, and that "political preferences are ancillary to most of the significant life choices…that locate individuals within the social structure" (1987, 1199-1200). However, they acknowledge that "it is not that choice is absent, but rather that associational choice is contingent—a locationally specific response to a particular social mix" (1200). This leaves the door open to selection problems.

represents the "pre-test" before any civic education or post-civic education discussion took place. If we assume that the idiosyncratic errors $\varepsilon_{it}$ are unrelated to the $X_{it}$, to $U_i$, or to one another, we can estimate $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ easily by first subtracting equation (1a) from (1b):

$$(2) \qquad (Y_{i2}-Y_{i1}) = (\alpha_2-\alpha_1) + \beta_1 X_{1i2} + \beta_2 X_{2i2} + \beta_3 (Z_{i2}-Z_{i1}) + (\varepsilon_{i2}-\varepsilon_{i1})$$

and then regressing the change score in Y against the Xs and the change score in Z. The intercept in this estimation will yield the average change in Y for individuals who *never* experienced X, i.e., the pure control group, with $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ representing the additional average change in Y for every unit increase in civic education exposure and post-civic education discussion. Most importantly, equation (2) estimates the causal effects $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ while controlling for the selection biases that may have been produced by the unobserved $U_i$, i.e., by stable personality or other idiosyncratic factors that led individuals to select into civic education and that were also related to the democratic orientation Y.

With multi-wave data, estimates of $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ may be obtained in similar fashion through first-differencing, but a more efficient procedure is to subtract from $Y_{it}$, $X_{it,}$ and $Z_{it}$ their individual-level means averaged across all time periods (Allison, 1994). This results in the "fixed effects" model:

$$(3) \qquad (Y_{it}-\bar{Y}_i) = \alpha_t + \beta_1 (X_{1it}-\bar{X}_{1i}) + \beta_2 (X_{2it}-\bar{X}_{2i}) + \beta_3 (Z_{it}-\bar{Z}_i) + (\varepsilon_{it}-\bar{\varepsilon}_i)$$

which again eliminates the potentially biasing effects of the unobserved $U_i$ term from consideration. The model in (3) also allows the intercept $\alpha$ to vary across time via the inclusion of time-period dummy variables, which provide the "baseline" change in Y over time for individuals who do not change on X (or Z). We utilize this "two-way" fixed effects model in the analyses below.[10]

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[10] The first difference and fixed effects models (2) and (3) yield identical results in the two-wave case. It is important also to note that the two to three wave longitudinal data analyzed here are no panacea for the unbiased estimation of causal effects. Selection biases could also occur if the likelihood of selecting into the treatment is related to the time-specific or transient idiosyncratic error term εit as opposed to the stable component Ui. This kind of endogeneity problem is typically modeled via Heckman two-stage procedures, which involves application of instrumental variable methods such that an exogenous factor (Z) that is related to the likelihood of selecting into the treatment but unrelated to εit is used as a proxy in a two-stage estimation procedure (e.g., Finkel, 2002). These procedures depend critically on strong assumptions about the exogeneity of Z, and they depend on Z being reasonably strongly related to X1 and X2. Variables of this nature are difficult to find, and as a result the two-stage procedures often yield results that are not especially robust. In our data, no such outside instruments were available.

## Results

*The Direct Effects of NCEP Workshop Exposure*

*(Table 1 here)*

In Table 1 we present the results of two-way fixed effects estimation of the direct impact of civic education exposure on our four key dependent variables: *Political knowledge*, *Political participation*, *Political tolerance*, and *National versus tribal identification*. As can be seen, civic education significantly affects each dependent variable. The models control for political interest, media exposure and group memberships, for general time trends in each variable, and perhaps most importantly, for stable factors that could have led individuals to select into civic education and which were also potentially related to the four democratic orientations.[11] This is strong evidence that adult civic education program are able to affect democratic political culture, and that the positive findings from previous research were not produced solely by selection biases inherent in voluntary civic education programs for adults in new democracies.

The effects of civic education, moreover, are generally moderate in substantive terms, and often rival the importance of the other variables in the model. For example, the effect of each civic education workshop on political knowledge is estimated to be approximately .06, comparable to the effect of belonging to one and a half additional secondary associations, attending to political information in the mass media for one extra day per week, or moving close to the full distance on the political interest scale.[12] The relative impact of each additional workshop on political tolerance and especially on national versus tribal identification is even greater. Interest in politics and group memberships, by contrast, actually work to *intensify* identification with one's ethnic group, which is likely due to the politicization

[11] The model statistics show reasonably large values for "rho," which represents the proportion of error variance attributable to stable individual-level characteristics; there are also moderate values estimated for the correlation of these unobserved individual-level factors with the included independent variables (corr U, XB on the table), especially in the knowledge and participation models. As these values increase, the potential bias from the $U_i$ in estimating the effects of the observed variables also increases, hence justifying the fixed effects mean-differencing model specification.

[12] For example, the coefficient of group membership is estimated to be .47, which represents moving from 0 to 1 on a recoded scale that originally ran from 0 to 11 groups. Thus each additional group would be associated with an approximately .04 increase in knowledge, and one and a half groups would be associated with an approximately .06 increase in knowledge, or the same amount of change as is estimated for one additional civic education workshop.

of ethnicity in post-independence Kenya (Barkan, 2008; Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2008; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997; Orvis, 2001b; Posner, 2007). Civic education thus proves to be useful in developing even difficult democratic values such as tolerance, and in counterbalancing the in-group identifications promoted through other forms of political and civil society engagement. Only in the political participation model do more traditional mobilizing factors such as group memberships and political interest far outweigh the substantive impact of civic education.

*The Extent and Effects of Post-Civic Education Discussion*

(Table 2 goes here)

We turn next to the indirect effects of civic education via political discussions within individual social networks. In Table 2, we can see that the potential for indirect effects from the Kenya National Civic Education Program is substantial, given the numbers of individuals who discussed the workshops that either they or others attended. Among treated individuals in wave 2, that is, those who attended one or more workshops during the February-November 2002 period, nearly 70% went on to discuss their workshop experiences with more than five other people. Another quarter discussed their experiences with between one and five other individuals. The figures are roughly comparable in wave 3 of the study. This indicates that the messages from civic education workshops are being spread well beyond the workshops themselves, and that participants in the workshops are repeating at least some of what they have learned numerous times after the initial workshop experience is over.

The bottom half of Table 2 shows, moreover, that these social diffusion processes also led to a substantial number of discussions about *other* individuals' experiences with NCEP workshops. Among individuals in the treatment group in wave 2, that is, individuals who attended at least one NCEP workshop between February and November, over half also discussed the workshop experiences of at least three other individuals, and only one-third engaged in no discussion about other individuals' workshop experiences. The figures in wave 3 are even more striking, indicating that treated individuals were also very likely to discuss the workshop experiences of other treated individuals within their social networks.

The typical NCEP workshop participant thus discussed his or her own experiences with a good number of other people, and also heard about the workshop experiences of a good many other people as well.

But the reach of the NCEP program was also great among individuals who themselves did not attend any of the program's workshops. Among individuals in wave 2 with no exposure to civic education workshops of their own -- that is, the "pure" control group – approximately half had some discussion with others in their networks who did attend NCEP activities. In fact, about one-quarter of these ostensibly "control" individuals discussed the workshop experiences of three or more other "treated" individuals. The figures for wave 3 are again comparable, with over 40% of the "control" group nevertheless discussing civic education issues with at least one NCEP participant, and 27% discussing the workshop experiences of three or more other individuals. This indicates categorically that the NCEP reached many more individuals via subsequent political discussions than via formal training. Among this sample of individuals interviewed upon entering NCEP workshops between February and March 2002 and a corresponding control group, approximately 80% either attended their own workshop or discussed the NCEP workshop experiences of at least one other individual. There is thus at least significant *potential* to observe secondary effects of the civic education workshops on participants and their discussion partners.

*(Table 3 here)*

In Table 3, we show the results of two-way fixed effects models predicting the four democratic orientations using direct civic education exposure and two types of political discussion: the number of people with whom respondents discuss their own workshop experiences (*Discuss Own*), and the number of other people who discuss their experiences with the respondent (*Discuss Others*).[13] It can be seen that, in all models except for political knowledge, direct exposure to civic education itself remains statistically significant. These effects are supplemented by significant secondary effects of subsequent political

[13] Of course, *Discuss Own* takes on the value of 0 for all individuals who attended no workshops during the given time interval.

discussion. The impact of discussing others' workshops, in particular, is consistent for all four democratic orientations, while discussing one's own workshops also matters for political knowledge.

Due to the relatively high degree of correlation (.78) between workshop exposure and subsequent discussion of one's own experiences, we hesitate to draw definite conclusions about the relative impact of those two factors. Nevertheless, dropping workshop exposure from the models does *not* appreciably improve the performance of *Discuss Own*; it becomes significant only in the political participation model while retaining its significance in the knowledge model. On the other hand, the results in Table 1 show that workshop exposure by itself is a significant predictor for all four dependent variables; these effects are maintained in models (not shown here) that include *Discuss Others* but drop *Discuss Own*. The evidence thus strongly indicates that both direct effects of civic education workshop exposure *and* indirect effects from post-workshop discussion do exist, and that the key discussion-related factor in producing democratic change is talking about the workshop experiences of others in one's social network. Evidently, only for political knowledge and possibly participation does rehearsing or repeating information or experiences from one's own workshop matter.

*(Figure 1 here)*

We can see both the relative and combined impacts of civic education's direct and indirect effects in Figure 1. We show the effect of civic education exposure on *Political participation*, *Political tolerance*, and *National versus tribal identification* for individuals who engaged in various amounts of discussion of others' workshop experiences, holding discussion of one's own workshops at 0 and all other variables at their means.[14] The figure indicates the clear importance of both variables in producing democratic change. To be sure, the direct effects of civic education exposure outweigh the secondary effects. Attending, for example, three civic education workshops leads to higher levels of participation, tolerance, and national versus tribal identification than does discussing three other individuals' workshop experiences, other things being equal. But at the same time, discussing the workshop experiences of 3 or more other people has a greater effect on political participation, tolerance, and national identification than

[14] Effects are calculated for the second wave.

does attending only one workshop and *not* engaging in any discussion of others' experiences. Thus political discussion about civic education workshops among individuals who were *not* treated often produces more democratic change than formal civic education exposure itself. It appears that the personal nature of discussion networks enables civic education messages to be delivered effectively in those settings, even to individuals who have received no formal workshop instruction.

Two other observations from the figure are also noteworthy. First, the *combined* effect of both direct and indirect civic education effects can be quite substantial. For example, attending five workshops and discussing the workshop experiences of an additional five individuals leads to an approximately .70 increase in the individual's average amount of *Political participation*, an increase of about two-thirds of a point on the four point *Political tolerance* scale, and an increase of half a point on *National versus tribal identification*. Taken together, high "doses" of both formal civic education treatment and subsequent discussion about the treatment of others can be especially effective in producing democratic change.

Second, it is also the case that many more respondents are located towards the high end o*f Discuss Others* than towards the high end of civic education exposure; that is, in this sample more individuals discuss the workshops of other individuals than attend many workshops themselves. In wave 2, for example, only 29% of respondents attended more than one NCEP workshop, while a full 45% discussed the workshop experiences of three or more other people. In Wave 3, only 12% of respondents attended more than one workshop, while more than one-third talked about others' workshop experiences with three or more people. This means that the *average* respondent receives in general a greater boost in democratic orientations from discussing others' workshops than from attending his or her own. This points again to the crucial importance of political discussion in producing democratic change from civic education in emerging democracies.

*Political Resources and the Conditional Effects of Post-Civic Education Discussion*

The effects we have shown thus far indicate much optimism for the potential of post-civic education discussions to instill democratic knowledge, values, and participatory orientations. However, it remains to be seen whether those effects obtain for all individuals, or whether political discussions have

greater impact on some individuals than others. And if post-civic education discussion effects depend on prior levels of political or participatory resources, the benefits of these social network discussions may be concentrated among those who "need" them the least.

We test these possibilities by creating interaction terms between *Discuss Others* and the individual's sex (*Male)*, *Rural* (versus urban) status, and wave 1 levels of *Education*, *Group memberships* and *Political interest*. There were high levels of collinearity between *Discuss Others* and the various product terms, and so we created dichotomous indicators of *Education* (primary schooling or below coded as "0", some secondary education or more as "1"), *Political interest* ("none" to "some" as "0", "very much" as "1"), and *Group memberships* (3 groups or fewer as "0", more than 3 groups as "1").[15] The interaction terms of these dichotomized variables with *Discuss Others* were then entered into fixed effects models predicting the four dependent variables along with *Discuss Others*, the individual's level of civic education exposure, and the time trend and time-varying control variables.[16] The results are shown in Table 4.[17]

*(Table 4 here)*

The results show a clear pattern: to the extent that there are any significant interactions between *Discuss Others* and the resource variables, they all indicate that political discussions are more effective in producing democratic change among individuals with *lower* levels of education, interest and secondary group memberships. The estimated effect of discussing others' workshops on political knowledge, for example, drops from .13 among respondents with few secondary group memberships to only .06 among respondents with many memberships. Similarly, the less educated, women and rural residents all benefit more from discussion in terms of knowledge than do those with higher education, men and urban dwellers. For tolerance, the effects of discussion are strongly concentrated among respondents in rural

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[15] The variables are almost perfectly stable over time when they are dichotomized, so we treat them as fixed individual-level characteristics for purposes of these analyses.
[16] We omit the non-interacted, stable education, interest, and group membership variables, as they are dropped in any case from the fixed effects model through the mean-differencing process.
[17] Despite the dichotomization, fairly high levels of multicollinearity between *Discuss Own* and the interaction terms remain, with correlations running from a low of .67 with *Political interest* to a high of .78 with *Rural*.

areas, while post-workshop discussions also had stronger impact on individuals with fewer secondary group memberships in the model predicting *National versus tribal identification*. The results, then, generally support the "leveling" hypothesis regarding the effects of post-civic education political discussion (Valentino and Sears 1998); in that differences in democratic orientations between the resource-rich and resource-poor are smaller among individuals who engage in more frequent discussion of the civic education experiences of their network partners.

There is, however, another way that political resources may bias the diffusion of civic education messages. Those with higher levels of prior political resources may be more likely to engage in discussions of their own and others' civic education experiences in the first place. Table 5 shows the results of regression models predicting the number of people with whom treated individuals discuss their own workshop experiences (column 1 of the Table), and the number of people with whom treated and control individuals discuss the workshop experiences of others (columns 2 and 3). We choose for illustrative purposes to show the results in wave 2 of the study.[18] For models predicting discussion among treated individuals, we also enter a variable that measures the respondent's subjective assessment of his or her civic education experiences, reasoning that the higher the level of satisfaction with the workshop, the more likely the individual will be to engage in post-workshop discussions.[19]

*(Table 5 here)*

The results in column 1 of Table 5 indicate that individuals with higher levels of prior political resources are more likely to engage in discussion of their own workshop experiences, but that these effects are relatively weak. What matters in stimulating post-workshop discussion for treated individuals, by contrast, is the subjective assessment of workshop quality. Simply stated, individuals who are more

[18] These cross-sectional models preclude the kind of controls for unobservables that are possible with fixed effects models with longitudinal data, but for these analyses we are less interested in making causal claims than in simply testing for the presence of any association between resource variables and exposure to the civic education or discussion "treatments." The focus on a single wave allows us to examine the impact not only of the time-varying resource factors considered thus far, but also such theoretically relevant time-invariant variables as *Education*, *Male*, and *Rural* versus urban status.
[19] Recall that this variable is a composite of the respondent's satisfaction with the workshops and assessment of the quality of the trainers.

satisfied with the workshops and who perceive instructors to be of higher quality are more likely to talk about their own workshop experiences with others in their social networks. Post-civic education discussion of one's own experiences is *not* strongly biased in favor of the resource-rich.

In columns 2 and 3, we show the results of models predicting *Discuss Others*, or talking with others about *their* civic education experiences. The model in column 2 is limited to those who received civics training, while the model in column 3 predicts discussion of others' workshops among the "pure" control group, or people who did not attend workshops of their own during the February to November 2002 period. The results suggest that several resource-related variables are significantly related to discussion of *others'* civic education workshops, with more powerful effects than were seen for the discussion of one's own civic education experiences. Treated individuals (in column 2) belonging to multiple secondary associations, and those who attend to politics in the mass media on a daily basis are those who engage in the most frequent discussion of others' civic education workshops, with these effects registering well over 1 point on the 4 point *Discuss Others* scale. This suggests that treated individuals who are most politically and socially engaged are most likely to be "talked to" about civic education. Subjective assessments of one's own civic education experiences are also relevant for predicting *Discuss Others*, such that satisfaction with one's own civic education enhances the willingness to engage in discussion of others' experiences as well. Finally, in urban areas men have slightly higher levels of discussion, while in rural areas they have somewhat lower levels of discussion.

For the "pure" control group, i.e., those with no civic education experiences of their own, only one resource-related variable – the number of secondary group associations – affects discussion of others' workshops. The results confirm the notion that discussion of civic education activities takes place more often among the socially engaged, as these individuals are more likely to come into contact with individuals trained in civic education workshops. Taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show that the secondary effects of civic education are somewhat more powerful among those who are more socially isolated and lacking in political resources, but somewhat less *available* as well. That is, the kinds of individuals who appear to benefit the most from civic education-related political discussions are those

who are less likely to be part of treated individuals' social networks, and hence less likely to be reached via social diffusion processes.

## Conclusions

The analysis of the impact of the 2002 National Kenyan Civic Education Program yields several important findings with significant implications for theories of civic education, democratic learning, and the effects of political discussion and social networks. First, we have provided the most conclusive evidence to date that exposure to adult civic education training can matter for the development of democratic knowledge, values, and participatory orientations. Unlike previous civic education evaluations, the design implemented here included a pre-test, a matched group of "control" respondents, and statistical controls (via fixed effects models) for possible selection effects due to stable unobservable variables. The results indicate that adults trained in NCEP workshops showed significant increase in political knowledge and participation, and in such critical democratic values as political tolerance and a heightened sense of national (Kenyan) versus tribal identification. Civic education *can* work, and it can have direct and immediate effects on strengthening democratic attitudes and heightening political awareness among adults in new and transition democracies. On a theoretical level, these findings reinforce the message that democratic norms, values, and behaviors can change over fairly short time periods. On a policy level, they should encourage donors seeking to promote positive change in democratic political culture in recipient countries.

Second, the analysis has shown for the first time compelling evidence of widespread *indirect* or secondary effects of civic education training through post-workshop political discussions. Individuals who were trained in NCEP workshops went on to talk about their experiences with many others in their social networks, leading to large numbers of Kenyans – even those not directly trained in NCEP activities – being exposed to civic education messages via discussions with network partners. Moreover, these discussions had a significant and substantial positive impact on each of the democratic orientations we examined. Again, these effects obtained from statistical models that control for possible endogeneity due to stable individual characteristics related both to the likelihood of engaging in post-workshop political

discussions and to democratic attitudes, knowledge and participation. The results thus provide strong support for a two-step process of social diffusion of democratic messages through civic education.

Taken together, the findings suggest that the potential impact of adult civic education on strengthening democratic political culture in transition societies is far beyond what has previously been estimated. The National Civic Education Programme in Kenya was an extensive, country-wide effort consisting of over 50,000 activities coordinated by dozens of implementing NGOs over a fourteen month period in 2001-2002. These workshops trained about 16% of the Kenyan population, according to estimates from a national survey conducted after the program was completed and according to the official figures of the NCEP Technical Assistance Team (Finkel, 2003b). But the reach of the program from secondary effects was far greater. Our data suggest that some 40% of "control" individuals nevertheless discussed the workshop experiences of others, a slightly higher figure than was reported in the 2003 national survey.[20] This means that somewhere between 42% and 50% of all Kenyans were exposed in some way to civic education messages during the run-up to the 2002 election, the vast majority of which consisted of discussions between friends, family members and others in the trainees' social networks. And given the significant effects estimated here from both direct and indirect exposure, it is clear that the NCEP had a non-trivial impact on the aggregate level of Kenyan democratic political culture.

The results also have a number of implications for the burgeoning literature on political discussion and deliberation effects in new democracies. In contrast to some previous research, we find a "leveling effect," such that the effects of political discussion on democratic orientations are greater among those with *fewer* social and political resources. To the extent that any conditional effects exist, they show more powerful impact of post-civic education discussions among individuals who are less socially integrated, less educated, who are women, and who are less likely to live in urban areas. This is a promising result, tempered only by the finding that the *amount* of post-civic education discussion is

[20] The fact that we found a slightly higher level of discussion of others' workshops in the evaluation than in the national survey may be due to the fact that the evaluation matched formal control group members to formal treatment members on their demographics and place of residence. Control group members in the evaluation were thus probably slightly more tied into the social networks of treated people than was the average untreated Kenyan.

greater among those belonging to more secondary associations. Still, pro-democratic messages are much more likely to reach individuals lower in social and political resources through political discussion than through direct exposure to civic education activities, and the pattern of results thus suggests that discussion and political talk can be particularly important mechanisms for the development of democratic values among the resource poor in new democracies.

For theories of deliberative democracy, the results are mixed. As these theories would predict, political discussion boosted tolerance, identification with the larger nation, participation, and knowledge of politics. These discussions, to some degree, could be characterized as a self-reinforcing, virtuous cycle of learning. When people who had attended civic education programs repeated new political information to family members, neighbors, or friends, not only did those who had not attended training learn important facts and norms but the speakers themselves were reinforced in their newfound knowledge.

However, we find little evidence of this "virtuous" cycle in the transmission of other norms and values, with no evidence whatsoever in the case of tolerance and national versus tribal identification. Effects on these values resulted entirely from discussing others' workshops rather than one's own experiences. If true deliberation had occurred, we would have seen discussion effects for both participants in the discussion dyad. Rather, the pattern of results suggests that, instead of deliberating about the issues raised in the civic education workshops; those who were newly trained became "experts" who imparted the information to democratic "novices" in their social networks. Whether this is a general characteristic of network discussions in new democracies, or whether truly deliberative effects of discussion may be observed under different conditions, should be subjects for future research.

Finally, the results have clear implications for the implementation of future civic education programs in transition societies. Most obviously, there is strong support for the enterprise of adult civic education itself, given the reach and impact of organized and coordinated efforts such as the Kenyan NCEP. The fact that so much of the overall impact of civic education stems from post-training discussions also implies that programs should encourage participants to talk about their experiences after the fact. This may be done in many ways, ranging from role-playing exercises during the training to

providing trainees with pamphlets, books or other materials which they can share with family, friends or others in their social networks. And the strong impact we found of subjective workshop satisfaction on subsequent discussion reinforces the critical importance of staff recruitment, teacher quality and training to the civic education process. Finally, the more that individuals are encouraged to speak to others outside of their immediate social networks, in particular to those with lower levels of political or organizational involvement, the more likely it is that programs will extend their overall reach and exert secondary effects on individuals who themselves did not participate in any training. The fact that discussion effects are stronger among individuals with fewer connections to existing civil society organizations indicates that the gains from doing so in terms of democratic change can be high.

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**Table 1**
**Fixed Effect Models: Civic Education and Discussion as Predictors of Democratic Orientations**

| | **Political knowledge** | **Participation** | **Tolerance** | **National v. tribal identification** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Total Workshops* | 0.060** | 0.097** | 0.082** | 0.060** |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| *Media consumption* | 0.572** | 0.502** | 0.266** | 0.067 |
| | (0.08) | (0.14) | (0.09) | (0.06) |
| *Political interest* | 0.067 | 0.556** | 0.065 | -0.061 |
| | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.08) | (0.06) |
| *Group memberships* | 0.470** | 3.008** | 0.128 | -0.164* |
| | (0.10) | (0.18) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| *Wave 2* | 0.384** | -0.660** | -0.175** | 0.142** |
| | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| *Wave 3* | 0.249** | -0.370** | -0.190** | 0.190** |
| | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| *Constant* | 1.674** | 0.992** | 1.734** | 0.269** |
| | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.06) |
| Rho (intra-class correlation) | 0.457 | 0.405 | 0.414 | 0.369 |
| corr (u_i, Xb) | 0.191 | 0.115 | -0.007 | 0.049 |
| Number of observations | 4993 | 4993 | 4983 | 4983 |
| Number of individuals | 2301 | 2301 | 2301 | 2301 |
| R-sq within | 0.156 | 0.156 | 0.016 | 0.061 |

Note: Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01

**Table 2**
**The Number of Individuals With Whom Respondent Discussed Own and Others' Civic Education Workshop Experiences (% of Sample)**

| | No one | 1-2 people | 3-5 people | More than 5 people |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *DISCUSS OWN* | | | | |
| Wave 2 | 2.57% | 4.71% | 23.14% | 69.58% |
| Wave 3 | 2.24% | 8.71% | 24.63% | 64.43% |
| *DISCUSS OTHERS:* | | | | |
| *Treated respondents* | | | | |
| Wave 2 | 31.79% | 12.43% | 23.74% | 32.05% |
| Wave 3 | 26.62% | 16.17% | 27.36% | 29.85% |
| *Untreated respondents* | | | | |
| Wave 2 | 51.13% | 24.03% | 17.58% | 7.26% |
| Wave 3 | 57.89% | 14.81% | 14.04% | 13.26% |

**Table 3**
**Fixed Effect Models: Civic Education and Discussion as Predictors of Democratic Knowledge and Values**

| | Political knowledge | Participation | Tolerance | National v. tribal identification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Total Workshops* | -0.011 | 0.080# | 0.071** | .053** |
| | (0.022) | (0.041) | (0.027) | (0.020) |
| *Discuss Others* | 0.063** | 0.069* | 0.078** | .060** |
| | (0.020) | (0.034) | (0.022) | (0.016) |
| *Discuss Own* | 0.069** | -0.011 | -0.025 | -0.021 |
| | (0.022) | (0.038) | (0.024) | (0.018) |
| *Media consumption* | 0.555** | 0.477** | 0.237** | 0.044 |
| | (0.079) | (0.135) | (0.087) | (0.058) |
| *Political interest* | 0.073 | 0.558** | 0.066 | -0.061 |
| | (0.076) | (0.128) | (0.085) | (0.059) |
| *Group memberships* | 0.445** | 2.976** | 0.091 | -0.192** |
| | (0.100) | (0.177) | (0.104) | (0.074) |
| *Wave 2* | 0.271** | -0.707** | -0.219** | 0.111** |
| | (0.043) | (0.073) | (0.048) | (0.032) |
| *Wave 3* | 0.161** | -0.424** | -0.245** | 0.149* |
| | (0.043) | (0.074) | (0.047) | (0.031) |
| *Constant* | 1.691** | 1.016** | 1.764** | 0.292** |
| | (0.074) | (0.122) | (0.080) | (0.057) |
| R-sq within | 0.163 | 0.157 | 0.021 | 0.067 |
| Rho (intra-class correlation) | 0.457 | 0.405 | 0.413 | 0.369 |
| corr (u_i, Xb) | 0.188 | 0.118 | 0.013 | 0.051 |
| Number of observations | 4993 | 4993 | 4983 | 4983 |
| Number of individuals | 2301 | 2301 | 2301 | 2301 |

Note: Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.

**Figure 1**
**The Effect of Civic Education and *Discuss Others* on Predicted Values of Participation, Tolerance, and National versus Tribal Identity**



**Table 4**
**Fixed Effect Models: The Interaction of Resources and Motivation with Discussion**

| | **Political knowledge** | **Participation** | **Tolerance** | **National v. tribal identification** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Total Workshops* | 0.039* | 0.066* | 0.059** | 0.045** |
| | (0.017) | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.015) |
| *Discuss Others* | 0.126** | 0.038 | -0.008 | 0.084* |
| | (0.040) | (0.068) | (0.045) | (0.033) |
| *Discuss Others* X | | | | |
| *Rural* | .050# | 0.011 | 0.133*** | 0.036 |
| | (0.027) | (0.050) | (0.031) | (0.023) |
| *Education* | -0.045# | -0.074 | -0.022 | -0.004 |
| | (0.026) | (0.047) | (0.030) | (0.021) |
| *Male* | -0.052* | -0.015 | 0.014 | 0.015 |
| | (0.026) | (0.045) | (0.029) | (0.022) |
| *Group memberships* | -0.069* | 0.049 | 0.001 | -0.063** |
| | (0.028) | (0.049) | (0.032) | (0.024) |
| *Political interest* | 0.015 | 0.081 | -0.007 | -0.037 |
| | (0.029) | (0.050) | (0.033) | (0.024) |
| *Media consumption* | 0.569*** | 0.495*** | 0.265** | 0.050 |
| | (0.079) | (0.135) | (0.088) | (0.058) |
| *Political interest* | 0.079 | 0.662*** | 0.062 | -0.112# |
| | (0.083) | (0.142) | (0.094) | (0.064) |
| *Group memberships* | 0.340*** | 3.046*** | 0.081 | -0.279*** |
| | (0.107) | (0.186) | (0.111) | (0.078) |
| *Wave 2* | 0.317*** | -0.719*** | -0.244*** | 0.092** |
| | (0.040) | (0.068) | (0.044) | (0.030) |
| *Wave 3* | 0.176*** | -0.434*** | -0.262*** | 0.138*** |
| | (0.042) | (0.073) | (0.047) | (0.030) |
| *Constant* | 1.715*** | 0.902*** | 1.755*** | 0.360*** |
| | (0.079) | (0.131) | (0.087) | (0.062) |
| R-sq within | 0.166 | 0.159 | 0.028 | 0.072 |
| Rho | 0.469 | 0.403 | 0.415 | 0.372 |
| corr (u_i, Xb) | 0.146 | 0.097 | -0.008 | 0.009 |
| Number of observations | 4993 | 4993 | 4983 | 4983 |
| Number of individuals | 2301 | 2301 | 2301 | 2301 |

Note: Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

**Table 5**

**OLS Models: Resources and Motivation as Predictors of Post-Civic Education Discussion (Wave 2)**

| | *Discuss Own* | *Discuss Others* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Treated | Untreated |
| *Male* | 0.133* | 0.241# | 0.136 |
| | (0.066) | (0.126) | (0.146) |
| *Education* | -0.006 | -0.040# | 0.004 |
| | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.025) |
| *Rural* | 0.063 | 0.101 | -0.081 |
| | (0.061) | (0.116) | (0.130) |
| *Male X Rural* | -0.087 | -0.344* | -0.337* |
| | (0.079) | (0.151) | (0.170) |
| *Media* | 0.357*** | 1.508*** | 0.201 |
| | (0.096) | (0.182) | (0.200) |
| *Political Interest* | 0.220* | 0.076 | 0.158 |
| | (0.105) | (0.200) | (0.199) |
| *Group Memberships* | 0.209* | 1.351*** | 1.231*** |
| | (0.091) | (0.172) | (0.179) |
| *Program Impact* | .878*** | 0.565** | |
| | (0.097) | (0.184) | |
| *Constant* | 1.333*** | -0.425* | 0.239 |
| | (0.129) | (0.245) | (0.210) |
| Number of observations | 1152 | 1152 | 620 |
| F( 6, 1145) | 18.66 | 24.02 | 10.54 |
| Prob > F | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Adj R-squared | 0.109 | 0.138 | 0.097 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.