ORC Course Description: The course introduces basic concepts in evolutionary game theory, including evolutionarily stable strategies, replicator dynamics, finite populations, and games on networks, along with applications to social evolution, particularly to understanding human cooperation.
Prerequisites: Math 3. The student should be familiar with calculus, and basic concepts in ordinary differential equations and probability. Programing skills helpful, but not required.
Textbook: Sigmund, K. (2010). The calculus of selfishness. Princeton University Press.
Grading Formula: Attendance & Participation (20%) + Homework Problem Sets (40%) + Final Project + 15m Presentation (40%).
Tentative lecture plan which may be subject to further changes.
|13 September 2016||Evolutionary Games: Introduction & Overview||Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2004). Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Science, 303(5659), 793-799.|
|15 September 2016||Stability Concepts: Nash Equilibrium vs. Evolutionarily Stable Strategy|
|20 September 2016||Replicator Equations and Its Connection with Ecological Dynamics|
|22 September 2016||Social Dilemmas of Cooperation||Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology, 183-214.|
|27 September 2016||Rules for Cooperation||Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563.|
|29 September 2016||Repeated Games||Binmore, K. G., & Samuelson, L. (1992). Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. Journal of Economic Theory, 57(2), 278-305.|
|4 October 2016||Spatial Games||Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992). Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature, 359(6398), 826-829.|
|6 October 2016||Adaptive Dynamics||Dieckmann, U., & Law, R. (1996). The dynamical theory of coevolution: a derivation from stochastic ecological processes. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 34(5-6), 579-612.|
|7 October 2016||Final project proposal due|
|11 October 2016||Evolutionary Branching||Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003). Evolutionary game dynamics. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 40(4), 479-519.
Doebeli, M., Hauert, C., & Killingback, T. (2004). The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors. Science, 306(5697), 859-862.
|13 October 2016||Finite Populations I||Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004). Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature, 428(6983), 646-650.
Traulsen, A., Claussen, J. C., & Hauert, C. (2005). Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations. Physical Review Letters, 95(23), 238701.
|18 October 2016||Finite Population II||20 October 2016||Evolutionary Graph Theory||Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2005). Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature, 433(7023), 312-316.
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006). A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature, 441(7092), 502-505.
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010). Coevolutionary games--a mini review. BioSystems, 99(2), 109-125.
|24 October 2016||Final day for dropping a fourth course|
|25 October 2016||Vaccination Dilemma||Bauch, C. T., & Earn, D. J. (2004). Vaccination and the theory of games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(36), 13391-13394.|
|27 October 2016||Integrating Population Genetics (Optional)||Antal, T., Traulsen, A., Ohtsuki, H., Tarnita, C. E., & Nowak, M. A. (2009). Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 258(4), 614-622.|
|31 October 2016||Final day to withdraw from a course|
|1 November 2016||Evolutionary Dynamics of In-group Favoritism||Masuda, N., & Fu, F. (2015). Evolutionary models of in-group favoritism. F1000Prime Reports, 7, 27.|
|3 November 2016||Evolution of Homophily||Fu, F., Nowak, M.A., Christakis, N.A., & Fowler, J.H.(2012) The evolution of homophily. Scientific reports, 2: 845.|
|8 November 2016||Beyond Pairwise Interactions: Multi-Person Games||Hardin, G., (1998) Extensions of "the tragedy of the commons". Science, 280(5364): 682-683.|
|10 November 2016||Final Project Presentations||Day I (Jason, Pritika, Kayvon, Callum & Hyungdon)|
|15 November 2016||Final Project Presentations||Day II (Nicholas, Grant, Brian & Matthew)|
|15 November 2016||Final project report due|
Approximately 4 weeks are given to complete the project. The instructor will suggest project ideas in the third week, but you are allowed to propose your own, which has to be approved by the instructor in the fourth week at the latest. Each project presentation is limited to 15 minutes and preferably in the style of TED talks.
Course projects are listed in the alphabetical order of student names, and will be updated once more progresses are made by the students.
|Grant E. Barker||Nuclear Deterrence of North Korea: Carrots or Sticks?|
|Jason J. Cheal||Survival of Either or Neither: The Volunteer’s Timing Dilemma|
|Kayvon T. Coffey||Group Selection as a Mechanism for the Evolution of Cooperation in Groups: Theory & Experiments|
|Callum A. Hening||Roadblocks in Introducing Self-Driving Cars into Society|
|Matthew G. Jin||Modeling Financial Risk Attitudes: Hawks or Doves?|
|Hyungdon Joo||Evolutionary Game Dynamics of Prebiotic RNA Reproduction|
|Brian H. Li||Rationality Analysis of MLB Big Contracts|
|Nicholas R. Rizik||The Hunting Dilemma: Antlerless or Antlered?|
|Pritika L. Vig||Social Dilemma of Voluntary Health Insurance Participation|