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Econ81 - Advanced Topics in Microeconomics: The Economics of Information.

(Spring 2006)

This course is designed to provide students with an understanding of "contracts" or "complete contracting", usually known as the the theory of incentives (principal-agent theory). We will be covering the topics of adverse selection, moral hazard, and refer to some topics in the field of signaling and mechanism design. Applications of this theory to corporate finance, industrial economics, procurement and regulation (New Regulatory Theory), and the theory of the managerial firm are planned. Papers and applications will be discussed.

We are using the following textbook: Laffont, J.-J., and David Martimort's "Theory of Incentives" (Princeton 2002).

Other textbooks:

- Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M. (2005) Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 

- Salanié, B. (1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

- Lars Stole’s (2001) Lectures on the Theory of Contracts and Organizations.

Class Meetings: MWF @ 10am in Rockefeller 208 (Frank Smallwood Seminar Room). We start Wed, March 29. 

Course Material

- Syllabus