Psychological Entitlement Predicts Failure to Follow Instructions

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Word count: 4975

Abstract

Six studies examined the relationship between psychological entitlement and not following instructions. In Study 1, more entitled individuals were more likely to ignore instructions about how to format their responses. Studies 2–4 investigated possible boundaries on the association between entitlement and ignoring instructions; however, entitled people were more likely to ignore instructions even when following instructions was low-cost for the self, instructions were given in a less controlling way, or punishment was highly likely to result from a failure to follow instructions. To explore another possible explanation for the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions, Study 5 examined whether entitled people were more sensitive to situations potentially unfair to them; indeed, they were more likely to reject offers in an ultimatum game. Building on this finding, in Study 6, more entitled individuals' greater likelihood of ignoring instructions was predicted by their viewing instructions as an unfair demand on them.

Keywords: psychological entitlement, instructions, fairness, compliance

Psychological Entitlement Predicts Failure to Follow Instructions

Well-functioning groups, organizations, and societies depend on people's willingness to follow instructions. An efficient boarding process at the airport requires people to follow gate agents' directives. Many medical procedures hinge on staff's willingness to follow exactly the orders of an attending surgeon. When crossing streets, pedestrians must follow the rules provided by traffic lights to prevent traffic jams and accidents. If people routinely ignored instructions, chaos would ensue in a variety of domains. Thus, it is important to understand what makes people more or less likely to comply with instructions. An abundance of social psychological research has investigated the situational determinants of people's willingness to comply with requests (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Complementing this tradition, in this paper, we argue that an individual difference construct—psychological entitlement—is an important predictor of whether a person will follow instructions.

Psychological entitlement is the feeling that one is more deserving of positive outcomes than other people are (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). Individuals with a higher sense of entitlement (hereafter *entitled people* for brevity; we do not intend a categorical distinction with this phrase) are more likely to believe they are owed valuable resources or benefits (e.g., a higher salary, a better grade, special treatment) regardless of their effort or performance relative to others (Twenge & Campbell, 2009). Past research indicates that entitled people are less likely to demonstrate concern for what is socially acceptable or beneficial for others when deciding what they wish to do. For example, entitled people are more likely to behave opportunistically, be dishonest, and make unethical decisions (Burt, Donnellan, & Tackett, 2012; Greenberger, Lessard, Chen, & Farruggia, 2008; Malhotra & Gino, 2011; Poon, Chen, & DeWall, 2013; Tamborski, Brown, & Chowning, 2012; Vincent & Kouchaki, 2016),

and one study showed that they were more likely to drop out of a parenting class even though

material learned in it could benefit their children (Snow, Kern, & Curlette, 2001). We predict

that they would also be more likely to ignore instructions from other people for several reasons.

First, entitled people are more selfish and lower in agreeableness and empathy, and they

are less likely to enjoy helping others and tend to have self-image goals but not compassionate

goals (Campbell et al., 2004; Moeller, Crocker, & Bushman, 2009; Watson & Morris, 1991;

Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). They also are more likely to think that dull tasks waste

their time (O'Brien, Anastasio, & Bushman, 2011). Thus, while other people might follow

instructions to help the person asking (e.g., Berkowitz, 1972; Burger & Caldwell, 2003), entitled

individuals might not want to expend time and energy doing things that others want them to.

Second, entitled people are more averse to being controlled by others (Rose & Anastasio, 2014).

Thus, because they resent being told what to do, they might refuse to follow instructions to

maintain a sense of autonomy (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Third, entitled people might be more

likely to think they will escape punishment for failing to follow instructions. They have very

high expectations in general (Grubbs & Exline, 2016), and therefore they might think they will

be able to avoid sanctions for ignoring instructions (e.g., through good luck or the ability to talk

themselves out of it). Entitled people are more likely to demand special treatment (Fisk &

Neville, 2011); perhaps they have had success with getting what they want in the past and expect

this to continue. Fourth, entitled people might be more likely to think the instructions that they

have been given are unfair. Because entitled people are more easily offended and more likely to

believe that they are being mistreated by others (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, &

Finkel, 2004; Harvey, Harris, Gillis, & Martinko, 2014; McCullough, Emmons, Kilpatrick, &

Mooney, 2003), instructions that other people accept might be viewed as abusive and unfair by

an entitled person, and people are less likely to comply with rules and requests that they perceive

as unfair or illegitimate (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Degoey, 1995).

      In this paper, we examine whether more entitled people are more likely to ignore

instructions than less entitled people, and if so, possible explanations for this relationship. We

first report a pilot study in which we reanalyzed data from another project to test the predicted

relationship. Then, in Study 1, we examine whether entitled people are more likely to ignore

formatting instructions for a word search. In Studies 2–4, we explore whether entitled people are

less likely to follow instructions due to selfishness, not wanting to be controlled by others, or a

perceived unlikelihood of being punished. We manipulate features of the situation to remove

each potential barrier to entitled individuals' following of instructions and examine whether they

then follow instructions. Finally, in Studies 5–6, we examine whether entitled people are less

likely to follow instructions because they perceive the instructions as unfair. We report all

manipulations and all measures of entitlement and instruction-following that we included in our

studies. Sample size decisions were made a priori with a goal of maximizing power for main

effects, and we did not exclude any data.

Pilot Study: Reanalysis of an Existing Data Set

      As an initial test of our hypothesis, we reanalyzed a dataset from a project on entitlement

and hunger. In the original study, participants ($N = 156$) had been told to complete the study

before or after dinner, and they reported their entitlement on the Psychological Entitlement Scale

(PES; Campbell et al., 2004). We gave them specific instructions about how to complete the

survey and what counted as before or after dinner, but when analyzing the data, we noticed that

many participants ignored the instructions (34.6%). Thus, it was hard to test our original

hypothesis that hunger leads to higher entitlement. However, this problem inspired us to test the

present hypothesis that entitled people would be less likely to follow instructions. Given the

sample size, we would have power of .76 to detect the mean effect size in our field of $r = .21$

(Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). We observed a significant point-biserial correlation

between entitlement and having to be removed from the dataset for not following instructions, r_{pb}

$= .218$, 95% CI [.063, .363], $p = .006$.

Study 1

In an attempted replication of our pilot study using a new method, in Study 1, we

instructed participants about how to format their survey responses. We predicted that individuals

with greater psychological entitlement would be more likely to ignore the instructions.

Method

Participants ($N = 202$; 105 men, 95 women, 2 other; $M_{age} = 32.4$, $SD_{age} = 10.0$) were

recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and were paid $0.35 (USD).[1] Participants first

completed the PES ($\alpha = .90$; Campbell et al., 2004), the most commonly used measure of the

entitlement disposition. They rated items such as "I honestly feel I'm just more deserving than

others" and "Great things should come to me" (1 = *strong disagreement*, 7 = *strong agreement*).

Then they completed the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann,

2003), indicating whether certain characteristics ("sympathetic and warm") described them. The

TIPI was originally included as a filler, but it allowed us to examine whether any of the Big 5

personality traits accounted for the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions.

Finally, participants were asked to complete a word search according to a set of specific

instructions (find words in a certain orientation, list five total words, find words of at least three

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[1] We set an a priori sample size of 200 for our mTurk studies with one condition and either 300 or 400 for our mTurk studies with two conditions. The final sample size for each study varied slightly from these numbers depending on the number of completed survey responses we received. As mentioned in the General Discussion, our studies were likely underpowered to detect interactions (see Mackinnon, 2013).

letters, find distinct words, type words in all capital letters, put a semicolon and space in between the words, and put a period after the last word). We summed the total number of instructions (out of seven) they ignored.[2]

Results and Discussion

Entitlement ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.20$) was positively correlated with the number of word search instructions participants ignored ($M = 1.25$, $SD = 1.51$), $r = .145$, 95% CI [.007, .277], $p = .040$.[3] Thus, people higher in psychological entitlement were more likely to format their word search responses incorrectly. Further analysis (reported in the online Supplemental Materials) showed that the Big 5 personality characteristics could not account for this relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions.[4]

Study 2

The goal of Study 2 was to explore whether entitled people are more likely to ignore instructions because they do not want to inconvenience themselves (i.e., because they are selfish). Thus, we presented various scenarios to participants and manipulated how personally costly it was to follow instructions in each scenario. We predicted that if entitled people ignore instructions because they want to avoid inconvenience, then the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions should be attenuated when following instructions is not as personally costly.

Method

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[2] When participants partially followed an instruction (e.g., they included a semicolon but no space in between words), they received a .5.

[3] See the Supplemental Materials for a reanalysis of the data from Studies 1 and 3 using a negative binomial regression to account for the non-normal residuals.

[4] See the Supplemental Materials for the TIPI results from all studies.

We offered this study for extra credit in an introductory undergraduate course, and 157 participants signed up (63 men, 94 women, M_{age} = 19.2, SD_{age} = 2.16). Participants first completed the PES and the TIPI. Then participants were presented with 13 brief hypothetical scenarios in which they imagined being given instructions by another person. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which it was either higher or lower cost for them to follow instructions in each scenario. For example, participants imagined that a professor told them to use a different citation style for a paper, and it would take them either a few hours or a few minutes to make the changes. For each scenario, participants rated how likely they would be to not follow instructions (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*), thereby doing what was more convenient for them. We took the mean response across these 13 scenarios as a measure of ignoring instructions.

Results and Discussion

As shown in Tables 1 and 2, ignoring instructions was predicted by both entitlement and condition. Instructions were more likely to be ignored when the recipients of the instructions were more entitled and when following instructions was personally costly. However, there was not a significant interaction between entitlement and condition (more costly vs. less costly) in our multiple regression (see Table 2). Thus, the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions was not weakened when following instructions was described as less costly. In other words, even when following instructions would be only a minor inconvenience, entitled people were still more likely than less entitled people to ignore the instructions. Interestingly, the interaction effect was opposite the predicted direction in this study. Thus, this study did not provide evidence that entitled people's failure to follow instructions is driven by their desire to avoid doing anything that is costly for them.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their 95% confidence intervals, and

Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 2 (*N* = 157)

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3
1. Entitlement	3.49 (1.02)	**.86**		
2. Condition (1 = more costly, -1 = less costly)	.006 (1.00)	-.05 [-.20, .11]	---	
3. Ignoring instructions	2.95 (0.86)	.33* [.19, .46]	.14† [-.02, .29]	**.77**

Note. * = *p* < .05, † = *p* < .1

Table 2. Coefficients from an ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model predicting

the likelihood of ignoring instructions from entitlement (centered), condition (1 = more costly, -1

= less costly), and their interaction (*N* = 157).

	b (se)	*t*	*p*	Partial *r* [95% CI]
Intercept	2.95 (.064)	45.8	.000	
Entitlement	.287 (.063)	4.54	.000	.344 [.197, .476]
Condition	.130 (.064)	2.02	.045	.162 [.004, .312]
Entitlement x condition	-.072 (.063)	-1.13	.259	-.091 [-.245, .068]

Note. R^2 = .140

Study 3

In this study, we examined whether entitled people are less likely to follow instructions

because they are especially averse to being controlled by others. We manipulated whether

following instructions was framed as optional or mandatory, predicting that the relationship

between entitlement and ignoring instructions would be weaker when following instructions was

framed as optional.

Method

Participants ($N = 300$; 165 men, 134 women, 1 other, $M_{age} = 34.3$, $SD_{age} = 10.7$) were

recruited from mTurk and were paid $0.35 (USD). They first completed the PES and TIPI, as in

previous studies. Then participants were told that they would be asked to complete a word search

on the next screen according to specific instructions. They were either told that following

instructions was mandatory (and that they would be punished by losing out on a 10-cent bonus

for failing to follow instructions) or optional (and that they would be rewarded with an additional

10-cent bonus for following instructions). Finally, they were given a word search similar to the

one used in Study 1, but about animals and with slightly different instructions (list words, find

only animal names, find words in a certain orientation and ignore others, list five total words,

type words in all capital letters, indicate the orientation of each word with a symbol, put a

semicolon and space between the words, and put a period after the last word). We summed the

total number of instructions (out of eight) they ignored.

Results and Discussion

As shown in Tables 3 and 4, ignoring instructions was predicted by both entitlement and

condition. Instructions were more likely to be ignored when the recipients of the instructions

were more entitled and when following instructions was framed as optional. However, there was

not a significant interaction between entitlement and condition (mandatory vs. optional) in our

multiple regression (see Table 4). Although there was a weaker relationship between entitlement

and ignoring instructions when following instructions was framed as optional, as we had

predicted, the interaction effect was small and non-significant in this study. Entitled individuals

were similarly more likely to ignore instructions regardless of whether the instructions were

optional or mandatory. Thus, this study did not provide evidence for the hypothesis that entitled

people ignore instructions because of their aversion to being controlled by others' mandatory

rules.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their 95% confidence intervals, and

Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 3 ($N = 300$)

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3
1. Entitlement	3.36 (1.38)	**.93**		
2. Condition (1 = mandatory, -1 = optional)	.007 (1.00)	-.05 [-.16, .06]	---	
3. Instructions ignored	1.16 (1.98)	.18* [.07, .29]	-.16* [-.27, -.05]	---

Note. * = $p < .05$

Table 4. Coefficients from an OLS multiple regression model predicting the number of

instructions ignored from entitlement (centered), condition (1 = mandatory, -1 = optional), and

their interaction ($N = 300$).

	b (se)	*t*	*p*	Partial *r* [95% CI]
Intercept	1.16 (.112)	10.4	.000	
Entitlement	.249 (.081)	3.07	.002	.176 [.064, .284]
Condition	-.295 (.112)	-2.64	.009	-.152 [-.261, -.039]
Entitlement x condition	.049 (.081)	.598	.550	.035 [-.079, .148]

Note. $R^2 = .056$

Study 4

In Study 4, we examined whether entitled people are more likely to ignore instructions

because they think they are unlikely to be punished for doing so. We manipulated the chance of

punishment and asked participants to report how likely they would be to ignore instructions when punishment was either highly unlikely or highly likely. We predicted that the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions would decrease when punishment was described as highly likely, as entitled people would not want to do something that would have a clear and unavoidable negative consequence for them (see Daddis & Brunell, 2015, on entitled individuals' prudential concerns).

Method

Participants ($N = 401$; 204 men, 196 women, 1 other, $M_{age} = 35.3$, $SD_{age} = 11.2$) were recruited from mTurk and were paid $0.45 (USD). As before, they first completed the PES and TIPI. Participants then read five short scenarios that described situations in which they were asked to follow instructions. In each scenario, the following information was mentioned: the benefits to others of their following instructions, the costs to themselves of following instructions, and the punishment for not following instructions (if caught). Participants read scenarios in which punishment for ignoring instructions was either highly unlikely or highly likely. For example, participants imagined that a requester on mTurk wanted them to write out an answer of at least three sentences but that they did not want to generate a response that long. They were told to imagine that they were sure, based on past experiences with the requester, that he or she would or would not actually check to see if the workers followed instructions. Participants rated for each scenario how likely they would be to ignore the instructions (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*), and we took the mean of the five ratings as our dependent variable. Participants also rated how bad it would be for them if they got punished after each scenario (1 = *not at all bad*, 7 = *very bad*), and we took the mean of these ratings as well. After reading all scenarios, participants rated how likely they thought the authority figures would be to enforce the

punishments (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*), as a manipulation check, and how happy they would be if they got away with ignoring instructions across the scenarios (1 = *not at all happy*, 7 = *very happy*).

Results and Discussion

As shown in Tables 5 and 6, ignoring instructions was predicted by both entitlement and condition. Instructions were more likely to be ignored when the recipients of the instructions were more entitled and when punishment was unlikely. However, there was not a significant interaction between entitlement and condition (highly unlikely vs. highly likely) in our multiple regression (see Table 6). Although, as we had predicted, there was a weaker relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions when punishment for not following instructions was described as highly likely, the interaction effect was small and non-significant in this study. Entitled people were more likely to ignore instructions to the same degree regardless of the likelihood of punishment. Thus, this study does not provide evidence for the hypothesis that entitled people ignore instructions simply because they think they can avoid punishment.[5]

Table 5. Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their 95% confidence intervals, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 4 (*N* = 401).

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Entitlement	3.28 (1.25)	**.91**					
2. Condition (1 = unlikely, -1 = likely)	.012 (1.00)	-.02 [-.12, .08]	---				
3. Ignore instructions	2.15 (1.18)	.25* [.15, .34]	.30* [.21, .39]	**.70**			

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[5] See the Supplemental Materials for the results with exclusions based on incorrect responses to the manipulation check.

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Punishment likelihood	4.88 (2.23)	.04 [-.06, .14]	-.65* [-.70,-.59]	-.32* [-.40,-.22]	---		
5. Happiness about escaping punishment	4.04 (1.74)	.21* [.12, .31]	.04 [-.06, .14]	.28* [.19, .37]	-.13* [-.22,-.03]	---	
6. How bad if punished	5.37 (1.13)	.04 [-.06, .13]	-.09 [-.18, .01]	-.32* [-.40,-.23]	.20* [.10, .29]	-.10* [-.20,-.00]	**.77**

Note. * = $p < .05$

Table 6. Coefficients from an OLS multiple regression model predicting the likelihood of ignoring instructions from entitlement (centered), condition (1 = punishment highly unlikely, -1 = punishment highly likely), and their interaction ($N = 401$).

	b (se)	t	p	Partial r [95% CI]
Intercept	2.14 (.054)	39.4	.000	
Entitlement	.238 (.044)	5.48	.000	.265 [.171, .354]
Condition	.362 (.054)	6.65	.000	.317 [.226, .403]
Entitlement x condition	.034 (.044)	.784	.434	.039 [-.059, .137]

Note. $R^2 = .155$

We expected a very high rate of instruction following for all participants when they were told that they "were sure" they would get punished; we were thus initially surprised by the lack of an interaction. To understand why entitled individuals would risk punishment, we ran a follow-up study. In one scenario, participants were asked how likely they would be to ignore a landlord's instructions to have a carpet cleaned. If participants said that they would not follow the landlord's instructions even when this would mean losing their security deposit, we asked them to explain their answer. Instruction-ignoring individuals, especially those high in entitlement, expressed anger at the landlord for asking them to have the carpet cleaned. For example, they commented, "I feel this requirement is above and beyond what should be expected

and is part of the landlord's responsibility" and "I feel it would be unfair to ask me to clean a

carpet that wasn't even dirty!" It seemed that people were willing to risk losing the security

deposit in order to spite the landlord for having an unfair rule. In the next studies, we test

whether this theme emerging from the open-ended responses might explain why entitled people

do not follow instructions.

We also examined the correlations across conditions between entitlement and the other

responses to the scenarios to try to understand better why entitled people failed to follow

instructions (see Table 5). Entitled people were not significantly more likely to believe they

would avoid punishment or to think it would be less bad if they were punished, providing

evidence against these explanations. Entitled people were, however, significantly more likely to

say they would be happy if they escaped punishment for not following instructions. Thus,

perhaps entitled people do not want to follow instructions because they know from past

experiences that they are likely to feel happy if they get away with ignoring unfair requests,

similar to the "cheater's high" people feel when they get away with unethical behavior with no

obvious victim (Ruedy, Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013). We will explore this more in the

subsequent studies.

Study 5

In this study, we took a brief detour to learn whether entitled people are particularly

sensitive to potentially unfair situations and willing to protest the unfairness even in ways that

might hurt themselves. To do this, we asked participants to respond to ultimatum game offers. If

entitled people were more likely to reject offers in the ultimatum game, this would shed light on

the nature of psychological entitlement and might help us understand why entitled people do not

follow instructions.

Method

One hundred ninety-nine mTurk users (103 men, 96 women, M_{age} = 34.5, SD_{age} = 10.2) completed this study for $0.30 (USD). They first completed the PES (α = .92) and TIPI, as in previous studies. Then participants were told to imagine that they were playing a game with another mTurk worker and that the other person was the "proposer" and they were the "responder." Participants read: "The proposer has to come up with an offer to propose to you that states how much of $10 to allocate to himself or herself and how much to give to you. You can either accept the offer, which means that you and your partner will both get the proposed amounts, or you can reject the offer, in which case neither of you gets paid anything." Similar to what has been done in other research (e.g., Koenigs & Tranel, 2007), participants then were presented with a series of hypothetical offers, one at a time in random order, where the proposer suggested the following allocations: $10/$0, $9/$1, $8/$2, $7/3, $6/4, and $5/5. Participants indicated whether they would accept or reject each offer.

Results and Discussion

As shown in Table 6, entitlement (M = 3.33, SD = 1.37) was significantly or marginally correlated with rejecting all offers. Entitled people, who believe they deserve more than others, are more likely to reject potentially unfair offers in an ultimatum game. They seemingly would rather take a loss themselves than agree to an offer that does not reflect their worth. Although we did not expect a correlation between entitlement and rejecting the fair offer of a $5/$5 split, perhaps entitled people think they are special and deserve more than half, such that even this offer feels unfair to them. However, because only three people rejected this offer, we do not want to make too much of this particular result.

The results of this study, which examined the relationship between entitlement and behavior in the ultimatum game for the first time, are consistent with the idea that entitled people do not follow instructions because they would rather take a loss themselves (i.e., get punished) than agree to something unfair.

Table 7. The percentage of people who rejected each ultimatum game offer, the point-biserial correlation between entitlement and rejecting the offer, and the associated 95% confidence interval.

Offer to respondent	Percent rejecting the offer	Correlation with entitlement
$0	89.4%	.14† [-.00, .27]
$1	62.8%	.17* [.04, .31]
$2	55.8%	.16* [.02, .30]
$3	42.7%	.20* [.06, .33]
$4	14.6%	.14† [-.00, .27]
$5	1.5%	.15* [.01, .29]

Note. $* = p < .05$; $† = p < .1$

Study 6

In this study, we examined whether entitled people are less likely to follow instructions because they are more likely to believe the instructions are unfair. We presented participants with scenarios in which they imagined being given instructions. We asked them to rate the instructions' fairness and how likely they would be to ignore them.

Method

Two hundred three mTurk users (95 men, 108 women, $M_{age} = 35.8$, $SD_{age} = 11.1$)

completed this study for $0.45 (USD). They first completed the PES and TIPI. Then they read

five scenarios similar to those in Study 4 but with no mention of the likelihood of punishment.

After each scenario, participants rated how fair it is that they were asked to follow the particular

set of instructions (e.g., a boss asking them to format a report in a certain way; 1 = *very unfair*, 7

= *very fair*) and how likely they would be to ignore the instructions (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very*

likely). We calculated the mean fairness rating and the mean likelihood of ignoring instructions

across the five scenarios. Then, as in Study 4, after reading all the scenarios, participants were

asked to rate overall how likely the authority figures would be to enforce the punishments, how

happy they would be if they escaped punishment for not following instructions, and how bad it

would be for them if they were punished.

Results and Discussion

As shown in Table 8, entitlement was again correlated with ignoring instructions.

Furthermore, entitled people were less likely to think the instructions they were given were fair

and more likely to report that they would be happy if they got away with not following

instructions. In a multiple regression, entitlement and the rating of how bad punishment would be

were not significant predictors of ignoring instructions, but the fairness rating of the instructions,

the anticipated happiness about escaping punishment, and the perceived likelihood of

punishment were (see Table 8).[6] Moreover, as predicted, the indirect effect from entitlement to

ignoring instructions though fairness, as calculated using the PROCESS bootstrapping procedure

with 10,000 iterations (Hayes, 2013), was significant, 95% CI [.011, .116]. This provides some

[6] One person in this study skipped the punishment likelihood question. The mean score on this question was inputted
for this participant to avoid having to exclude him from the regression analysis. The results were the same regardless
of whether this data point was included or excluded.

evidence that the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions may be explained by

fairness perceptions. And consistent with Study 4, the indirect effect through happiness about

escaping punishment was significant as well, 95% CI [.012, .107]. Thus, although this cross-

sectional study cannot establish causality, this pattern of results is consistent with the suggestion

that entitled people fail to follow instructions because they are more likely to think the

instructions are unfair and would be happier if they could get away with not following them.

Table 8. Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their associated 95% confidence

intervals, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 6 ($N = 203$).

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Entitlement	3.19 (1.18)	**.91**					
2. Ignore instructions	2.41 (1.20)	.21* [.07, .33]	**.58**				
3. Fairness of instructions	4.20 (0.96)	-.23* [-.35,-.09]	-.36* [-.47,-.23]	**.66**			
4. Punishment likelihood	5.41 (1.28)	-.04 [-.17, .10]	-.26* [-.38,-.12]	.20* [.07, .33]	---		
5. Happiness about escaping punishment	4.52 (1.72)	.22* [.08, .34]	.32* [.19, .44]	-.33* [-.45,-.21]	-.06 [-.20, .08]	---	
6. How bad if punished	5.03 (1.52)	-.03 [-.17, .11]	-.21* [-.34,-.08]	.16* [.03, .29]	.39* [.27, .50]	-.08 [-.21, .06]	---

Note. * = $p < .05$

Table 9. Coefficients from an OLS multiple regression model predicting the likelihood of

ignoring instructions from ratings of entitlement, the fairness of the instructions, the likelihood of

punishment, anticipated happiness about escaping punishment, and how bad it would be if they

got punished ($N = 203$).

	b (se)	t	p	Partial r [95% CI]
Intercept	3.74 (.596)	6.27	.000	
Entitlement	.106 (.066)	1.60	.112	.113 [-.027, .248]
Fairness of instructions	-.270 (.087)	-3.12	.002	-.217 [-.346, -.080]
Punishment likelihood	-.148 (.065)	-2.30	.023	-.161 [-.294, -.022]
Happiness about escaping punishment	.144 (.047)	3.06	.003	.213 [.076, .342]
How bad if punished	-.075 (.054)	-1.39	.167	-.098 [-.234, .042]

Note. R^2 = .224

General Discussion

As shown in our studies, more entitled people are less likely to follow instructions. They are more likely to ignore instructions from the researcher (Pilot Study, Study 1, and Study 3) and to say they will ignore instructions from others in hypothetical scenarios (Studies 2, 4, and 6). Our studies suggest that the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions may be due to entitled individuals' greater likelihood of regarding instructions as an unfair imposition on them. It seems that entitled individuals would rather incur a personal cost than agree to something unfair (Studies 5 and 6), and they would be happy to escape punishment for not following instructions (Studies 4 and 6).

We did not find evidence that entitled people fail to follow instructions because they want to avoid a personal cost, because they do not like being controlled, or because they think they can avoid punishment. However, it is still possible that these factors contribute to entitled individuals' disinclination to follow instructions. Studies 2–4 were underpowered to detect an average-sized interaction in our field (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005) and may not have

manipulated the constructs in the best way. Future research should further explore why entitled people fail to follow instructions.

Entitlement, compared to other individual difference constructs, may be particularly relevant to ignoring instructions because entitled people are unlikely to want to do something that is worse than what they believe they deserve (such as follow instructions), and entitled individuals are especially likely to believe they are being treated unfairly (Harvey et al., 2014; McCullough et al., 2003). Nonetheless, future research should examine the specificity of our results to entitlement. We did not find evidence that the Big 5 traits could account for the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions, but it is possible that other individual differences correlated with entitlement might do so. Another artefactual explanation might also be considered—perhaps lower concerns about social desirability predict both more endorsement of psychological entitlement and more ignoring of instructions—but the limited empirical evidence indicates that any relationship between PES scores and social desirability is weak to nonexistent (e.g., Campbell et al., 2004; Grubbs, Exline, & Twenge, 2014), and thus not likely a full explanation for why entitled people ignore instructions.

We hoped to learn from this series of studies how entitled individuals might be made to follow instructions to the same degree as less entitled people. Organizations and societies run more smoothly when people are willing to follow instructions, and entitled people themselves could also benefit from following instructions, as this would help them to avoid punishments. Indeed, when entitled people's failure to follow instructions results in their being punished, they are likely to perceive the punishment as unjust suffering, which in turn may intensify their sense of entitlement to behave selfishly and ignore inconvenient social demands in the future (Zitek et al., 2010; see also Grubbs and Exline, 2016). Thus, it is plausible that increasing entitled

people's compliance with instructions might actually help to stem a cycle that feeds their entitled

attitudes and behaviors.

Although we were not able to eliminate the relationship between entitlement and failure

to follow instructions in our studies, the results of Study 6 suggest that making instructions seem

fairer may encourage entitled individuals to follow them. Unfortunately, this may be difficult to

accomplish, insofar as all of the instructions/rules described in the scenarios were things that

people are regularly asked to do in everyday life (e.g., how to format a report, where to cross the

road, etc.), yet the entitled individuals still thought them unfair. Future research should identify

conditions under which entitled individuals might regard instructions as fair. One possibility is to

alter whom the instructions come from. Entitled people do not like outgroup members (Anastasio

& Rose, 2014); if the instructions come from an ingroup member such as a peer instead of from

an authority figure, perhaps entitled individuals would be more likely to view the instructions as

fair and therefore follow them. Identifying a way to increase entitled people's instruction-

following could have important practical implications in schools, the workplace, and anywhere

else where we count on people to follow instructions.

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Psychological Entitlement Predicts Failure to Follow Instructions

Supplemental Materials

Study 1

Table S1 presents a correlation matrix including the results from the TIPI. People who were more extraverted, less conscientious, and less open to experience were more likely to ignore instructions. When a multiple regression was used to predict the number of instructions followed from the Big 5 traits and entitlement, the results were similar to those of the zero-order correlations (see Table S2), and the new model predicted ignoring instructions significantly better than did the model with entitlement as the only predictor, $\Delta R^2 = .146$, $F(5, 195) = 6.85$, $p < .001$. Entitlement was a marginally significant predictor in the multiple regression ($c' = .150$, $p = .075$), but its coefficient did not drop significantly as compared to what it was in a simple regression ($c = .181$, $p = .040$), as demonstrated by the non-significant confidence interval computed by the PROCESS macro, 95% CI for $c - c'$ [-.040, .117]. Thus, the Big 5 traits do not appear to account for the relationship between entitlement and not following instructions.

Table S1. Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 1 ($N = 202$).

Measure	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Entitlement	3.21 (1.20)	**.90**						
2. Extraversion	3.17 (1.61)	.09	**.79**					
3. Agreeableness	5.29 (1.24)	-.12	.12	**.47**				
4. Conscientiousness	5.29 (1.29)	.04	.15*	.46*	**.64**			
5. Emotional stability	4.74 (1.61)	.04	.16*	.41*	.49*	**.84**		

6. Openness to experience	4.85 (1.33)	-.02	.34*	.34*	.17*	.25*	**.50**
7. Number of instructions ignored	1.25 (1.51)	.15*	.18*	-.14	-.16*	-.07	-.23*	---

Note. * = p < .05

Table S2. Regression coefficients for a model predicting ignoring instructions from entitlement and the Big 5 personality traits ($N = 202$).

	b [95% CI]	Partial r	t	p
Intercept	2.50 [1.29, 3.71]		4.06	.000
Entitlement	.150 [-.015, .314]	.127	1.79	.075
Extraversion	.273 [.144, .403]	.285	4.15	.000
Agreeableness	.022 [-.169, .213]	.016	.228	.820
Conscientiousness	-.218 [-.401, -.034]	-.165	-2.34	.020
Emotional stability	.036 [-.109, .182]	.035	.492	.623
Openness	-.358 [-.523, -.192]	-.291	-4.25	.000

Note. R^2 = .167

Our dependent variable was the number of instructions ignored, and it was positively skewed (with the modal response being 0). This caused the residuals from our ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to not be normally distributed. To check the robustness of the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions, we reanalyzed our data using a negative binomial regression model in R. Because negative binomial models require integer outcome variables, we examined the total number of instructions ignored without giving "half credit" for instructions that were partially followed. As shown in Table S3, in this model, entitlement was still a significant predictor of ignoring instructions.

Table S3. Results from a negative binomial model predicting ignoring instructions from

entitlement (*N* = 202).

	Estimate	Std. error	*Z*	*p*
Intercept	-.252	.244	-1.03	.303
Entitlement	.152	.069	2.21	.027

Study 2

Table S4 presents a correlation matrix including the results from the TIPI. People who

were less agreeable, less conscientious, and less open to experience were more likely to ignore

instructions. When the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression model reported in Table

2 of the main paper, the new model was a significantly better predictor of ignoring instructions,

ΔR^2 = .171, *F*(5, 148) = 7.32, *p* < .001. However, the Big 5 traits did not account for the effect of

entitlement on ignoring instructions. Entitlement was still a significant predictor of ignoring

instructions even when the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression (see Table S5).

Table S4. Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the

diagonal) for Study 2 (*N* = 157).

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Entitlement	3.49 (1.02)	**.86**						
2. Extraversion	4.62 (1.44)	.07	**.73**					
3. Agreeableness	4.96 (1.15)	-.17*	.10	**.47**				
4. Conscientiousness	5.23 (1.26)	-.20	.01	.32*	**.59**			

5. Emotional stability	4.61 (1.43)	-.05	.12	.36*	.24*	**.74**	
6. Openness to experience	5.07 (1.16)	-.15	.39*	.41*	.30*	.28*	**.43**
7. Likelihood of ignoring instructions	2.95 (0.86)	.33*	.05	-.19*	-.45*	.04	-.20*	**.77**

Note. * = p < .05

Table S5. Regression coefficients for a model predicting ignoring instructions from entitlement (centered), condition, their interaction, and the Big 5 personality traits ($N = 157$).

	b [95% CI]	Partial r	t	p
Intercept	4.29 [3.56, 5.03]		11.5	.000
Entitlement	.205 [.086, .323]	.271	3.42	.001
Condition	.100 [-.018, .219]	.136	1.68	.096
Entitlement x condition	-.025 [-.143, .092]	-.035	-.426	.671
Extraversion	.032 [-.059, .122]	.056	.688	.492
Agreeableness	-.045 [-.165, .074]	-.062	-.752	.453
Conscientiousness	-.263 [-.366, -.161]	-.386	-5.09	.000
Emotional stability	.103 [.013, .192]	.184	2.27	.024
Openness	-.072 [-.196, .053]	-.093	-1.14	.258

Note. $R^2 = .311$

The OLS regression provided a good fit to the data in this study, and there was no problem with the normality of the residuals. There was one outlier, however (a residual over 4 *SD* from the mean). One participant in the less costly condition said he would ignore all instructions (a rating of 7 for all items). When this participant's responses were removed and the

regression was run again, the results were very similar. There were effects of entitlement and costliness, but no interaction (see Table S6).

Table S6. Regression coefficients for a model predicting the likelihood of ignoring instructions from entitlement (centered), condition (1 = more costly, -1 = less costly), and their interaction (*N* = 156, outlier removed).

	b [95% CI]	Partial *r*	*t*	*p*
Intercept	2.93 [2.81, 3.05]		48.0	.000
Entitlement	.225 [.103, .346]	.285	3.66	.000
Condition	.150 [.029, .270]	.195	2.46	.015
Entitlement x condition	-.009 [-.131, .112]	-.013	-.155	.877

Note. R^2 = .111

Study 3

Table S7 presents a correlation matrix including the results from the TIPI. People who were less agreeable and less emotionally stable were more likely to ignore instructions. When the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression model reported in Table 4 of the main paper, the new model was a marginally better predictor of ignoring instructions, ΔR^2 = .033, $F(5, 291)$ = 2.11, p = .064. However, the Big 5 traits did not account for the effect of entitlement on ignoring instructions. Entitlement was still a significant predictor of ignoring instructions even when the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression (see Table S8).

Table S7. Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 3 (*N* = 300).

Measure	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Entitlement	3.36 (1.38)	**.93**						
2. Extraversion	3.22 (1.74)	.17*	**.76**					
3. Agreeableness	5.35 (1.32)	-.03	.15*	**.58**				
4. Conscientiousness	5.46 (1.27)	.08	.09	.36*	**.66**			
5. Emotional stability	4.99 (1.58)	.02	.33*	.36*	.44*	**.78**		
6. Openness to experience	5.08 (1.30)	.04	.36*	.19*	.14*	.21*	**.47**	
7. Number of instructions ignored	1.16 (1.98)	.18*	.03	-.13*	-.06	-.14*	-.09	**---**

Note. * = $p < .05$

Table S8. Regression coefficients for a model predicting ignoring instructions from entitlement (centered), condition, their interaction, and the Big 5 personality traits for Study 3 ($N = 300$).

	b [95% CI]	Partial r	t	p
Intercept	2.78 [1.47, 4.09]		4.18	.000
Entitlement	.231 [.069, .393]	.162	2.81	.005
Condition	-.274 [-.494, -.054]	-.142	-2.45	.015
Entitlement x condition	.052 [-.107, .211]	.038	.645	.520
Extraversion	.103 [-.040, .246]	.083	1.42	.155
Agreeableness	-.109 [-.294, .077]	-.068	-1.15	.249
Conscientiousness	.029 [-.170, .228]	.017	.288	.774
Emotional stability	-.151 [-.318, .017]	-.103	-1.77	.078
Openness	-.154 [-.337, .029]	-.096	-1.65	.099

Note. $R^2 = .089$

Our dependent variable was the number of instructions ignored, and it was positively skewed (with the modal response being 0). This caused the residuals from our OLS regression to not be normally distributed. As in Study 1, to check the robustness of the relationship between entitlement and ignoring instructions, we reanalyzed our data using a negative binomial regression model in R (again turning our dependent variable into all integers). As shown in Table S9, in this model, entitlement was still a significant predictor of ignoring instructions.

Table S9. Results from a negative binomial model predicting ignoring instructions from entitlement, condition, and their interaction for Study 3 ($N = 300$).

	Estimate	Std. error	Z	p
Intercept	.150	.097	1.54	.124
Entitlement	.179	.070	2.55	.011
Condition	-.262	.097	-2.69	.007
Entitlement x condition	.058	.070	.821	.412

Study 4

Table S10 presents a correlation matrix including the results from the TIPI. People who were less agreeable, less conscientious, and less open to experience were more likely to ignore instructions. When the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression model reported in Table 6 of the main paper, the new model was a significantly better predictor of ignoring instructions, $\Delta R^2 = .085$, $F(5, 392) = 8.73$, $p < .001$. However, the Big 5 traits did not account for the effect of entitlement on ignoring instructions. Entitlement was still a significant predictor of ignoring instructions even when the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression (see Table S11).

Table S10. Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the

diagonal) for Study 4 (*N* = 401).

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Entitlement	3.28 (1.25)	**.91**									
2. Extraversion	3.40 (1.70)	.17*	**.76**								
3. Agreeableness	5.38 (1.19)	-.11*	.15*	**.44**							
4. Conscientiousness	5.38 (1.26)	.03	.15*	.37*	**.62**						
5. Emotional stability	4.90 (1.56)	.08	.31*	.33*	.48*	**.79**					
6. Openness to experience	5.08 (1.21)	-.02	.30*	.28*	.21*	.32*	**.37**				
7. Ignore instructions	2.15 (1.18)	.25*	.02	-.26*	-.19*	-.07	-.14*	**.70**			
8. Punishment likelihood	4.88 (2.23)	.04	.08	.07	.01	.03	.04	-.32*	---		
9. Happiness about escaping punishment	4.04 (1.74)	.21*	-.06	-.19*	-.12*	-.12*	-.04	.28*	-.13*	---	
10. How bad if punished	5.37 (1.13)	.04	.08	.14*	.08	-.07	.01	-.32*	.20*	-.10*	**.77**

*Note. * = p < .05*

Table S11. Regression coefficients for a model predicting ignoring instructions from entitlement

(centered), condition, their interaction, and the Big 5 personality traits for Study 4 (*N* = 401).

	b [95% CI]	Partial *r*	*t*	*p*
Intercept	4.03 [3.41, 4.65]		12.8	.000
Entitlement	.209 [.125, .294]	.240	4.89	.000
Condition	.378 [.276, .481]	.344	7.26	.000
Entitlement x condition	.024 [-.058, .106]	.029	.568	.570

Extraversion	.035 [-.031, .101]	.053	1.05	.296
Agreeableness	-.172 [-.269, -.075]	-.174	-3.49	.001
Conscientiousness	-.168 [-.263, -.072]	-.171	-3.44	.001
Emotional stability	.059 [-.022, .139]	.072	1.43	.153
Openness	-.092 [-.185, .001]	-.098	-1.95	.052

Note. $R^2 = .240$

The manipulation check confirmed that participants in the highly unlikely condition thought the punishment was less likely to be enforced ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 2.03$) than did participants in the highly likely condition ($M = 6.35$, $SD = 1.26$), $t(399) = 17.1$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.71$, but some ratings deviated from what we expected in each condition. We had originally planned to exclude people who did not answer the manipulation check about the likelihood of punishment in a way consistent with their condition (i.e., people who did not give a rating of 1–3 in the highly unlikely condition or 5–7 in the highly likely condition) or who did not correctly answer an attention check question asking them to mark 7. We preregistered these exclusions (https://aspredicted.org/hp6xi.pdf), but because many more people answered incorrectly than we anticipated (30.2% of our sample), especially in the punishment highly unlikely condition, we did not remove participants from the analyses in the main paper. In Table S12, we show the regression results with these exclusions. We ended up including 107/203 in the punishment highly unlikely condition and 173/198 in the highly likely condition. As shown below, the results were similar when we did follow the preregistered exclusions. Entitlement and condition were still significant predictors of ignoring instructions. The interaction effect became stronger, but it was still not significant. Interestingly, people higher in entitlement were more likely to fall under

our original exclusion criteria, $r_{pb} = .121$, $p = .015$, indicating that they did not follow the

instructions in our study. (We also preregistered that we would explore whether how bad it

would be if they were punished and how happy they would feel about escaping punishment were

alternative explanations for our results. Because we did not find an interaction between

entitlement and condition on ignoring instructions, we did not run the full multiple regression

model with these other variables as the outcome and instead examined the zero-order

correlations, as described in the main paper.)

Table S12. Regression coefficients for a model predicting the likelihood of ignoring instructions

from entitlement (centered), condition (1 = punishment highly unlikely, -1 = punishment highly

likely), and their interaction in Study 4 ($N = 280$, with pre-registered exclusions).

	b [95% CI]	Partial *r*	*t*	*p*
Intercept	2.04 [1.92, 2.16]		34.6	.000
Entitlement	.195 [.102, .287]	.243	4.16	.000
Condition	.444 [.328, .560]	.413	7.54	.000
Entitlement x condition	.068 [-.024, .161]	.088	1.46	.146

Note. $R^2 = .203$

The dependent variable was positively skewed in this study as well. This caused the

residuals from our OLS regression to not be normally distributed (although it was much less of a

violation in this study than in Studies 1 and 3). We performed a natural log transformation of the

dependent variable and then reran the multiple regression from the main paper to check the

robustness of the results. As shown in Table S13, in this model, entitlement was still a significant

predictor of the likelihood of ignoring instructions.

Table S13. Regression coefficients for a model predicting the natural log likelihood of ignoring

instructions from entitlement (centered), condition (1 = punishment highly unlikely, -1 =

punishment highly likely), and their interaction in Study 4 ($N = 401$).

	b [95% CI]	Partial *r*	*t*	*p*
Intercept	.620 [.573, .667]		26.0	.000
Entitlement	.100 [.062, .137]	.254	5.22	.000
Condition	.190 [.143, .237]	.371	7.97	.000
Entitlement x condition	.014 [-.023, .052]	.027	.738	.461

Note. $R^2 = .184$

Study 5

Table S14 presents a correlation matrix including the results from the TIPI. Entitlement

was more consistently correlated with rejecting offers in the ultimatum game than any Big 5 trait

was.

Table S14. Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the

diagonal) for Study 5 ($N = 199$).

Measure	*M (SD)*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Entitlement	3.33 (1.37)	**.92**										
2. Extraversion	3.25 (1.70)	.26*	**.77**									

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
3. Agreeable-ness	5.21 (1.29)	.05	.15*	**.45**								
4. Conscien-tiousness	5.47 (1.31)	.10	.10	.32*	**.64**							
5. Emotional stability	4.71 (1.67)	.21*	.30*	.30*	.43*	**.80**						
6. Openness to experience	4.85 (1.38)	.12	.37*	.38*	.27*	.20*	**.55**					
7. Reject $0	0.89 (0.31)	.14	.01	.11*	.09	.05	.03	---				
8. Reject $1	0.63 (0.48)	.17*	.12	.09	.03	.00	-.02	.38*	---			
9. Reject $2	0.56 (0.50)	.16*	.09	.09	.06	.01	.02	.35*	.84*	---		
10. Reject $3	0.43 (0.50)	.20*	.21*	.13	.06	.07	.09	.23*	.60*	.71*	---	
11. Reject $4	0.15 (0.35)	.14	.02	-.04	-.06	-.06	-.11	.00	.29*	.31*	.39*	---
12. Reject $5	0.02 (0.12)	.15*	.15*	-.04	-.16*	-.08	-.06	-.23*	.01	-.06	-.02	.30*

Note. The reject variables were coded 1 = reject, 0 = accept.
* = $p < .05$

As seen in the correlation matrix and mentioned in the main paper, entitlement was significantly correlated with rejecting the even $5/$5 split. One other predictor of rejecting the $5/$5 split was the order in which the offers were presented, with the $5/$5 split being presented anywhere from first to sixth. When the $5/$5 offer was presented later in the sequence, it was more likely to be rejected, $r_{pb} = .148$, $p = .037$. This could be due to the fact that after rejecting so many other unfair offers, participants viewed the proposers or game in general as unfair. Of course, because only three people rejected the $5/$5 offer, we do not want to make too much of this result. Furthermore, as shown in Table S15, controlling for order did not diminish the effect of entitlement in a logistic regression predicting a rejection of the $5/$5 split.

Table S15. Results from a binary logistic regression predicting rejecting the $5 offer in the ultimatum game from entitlement and the position of the $5 offer in the sequence ($N = 198$).

	Coefficient	Std. error	Wald (1 df)	p	Odds ratio
Intercept	-15.5	6.11	6.39	.011	.000
Entitlement	1.19	.570	4.33	.038	3.27
Position of offer	1.34	.795	2.84	.092	3.81

Study 6

Table S16 presents a correlation matrix including the results from the TIPI. People who were less agreeable, less conscientious, and less open to experience were more likely to say they would ignore instructions. When ignoring instructions was predicted from entitlement and the Big 5 traits, the new model predicted ignoring instructions significantly better than did the model with entitlement as the only predictor, $\Delta R^2 = .110$, $F(5, 196) = 5.10$, $p < .001$. However, the Big 5 traits did not fully account for the effect of entitlement on ignoring instructions. Entitlement was still a significant predictor of ignoring instructions even when the Big 5 traits were added to the multiple regression (see Table S17).

Table S16. Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and Cronbach's alphas (shown in bold on the diagonal) for Study 6 ($N = 203$).

Measure	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Entitlement	3.19 (1.18)	**.91**									
2. Extraversion	3.19 (1.73)	.14	**.85**								
3. Agreeableness	5.25 (1.25)	-.28*	.08	**.54**							
4. Conscientiousness	5.39 (1.23)	-.01	.10	.32*	**.57**						
5. Emotional stability	4.73 (1.57)	-.02	.23*	.36*	.47*	**.79**					

	Mean (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
6. Openness to experience	4.93 (1.30)	-.01	.27*	.18*	.32*	.22*	**.63**				
7. Ignore instructions	2.41 (1.20)	.21*	-.01	-.21*	-.27*	-.02	-.18*	**.58**			
8. Fairness of instructions	4.20 (0.96)	-.23*	-.10	.04	.16*	.01	-.01	-.36*	**.66**		
9. Punishment likelihood	5.41 (1.28)	-.04	-.13	.13	.18	-.05	.01	-.26*	.20*	---	
10. Happiness about escaping punishment	4.52 (1.72)	.22*	-.08	-.07	-.13	-.19*	.01	.32*	-.33*	-.06	---
11. How bad if punished	5.03 (1.52)	-.03	-.13	.10	.02	-.14*	-.06	-.21*	.16*	.39*	-.08

Note. * = $p < .05$

Table S17. Regression coefficients for a model predicting ignoring instructions from entitlement and the Big 5 personality traits for Study 6 ($N = 203$).

	b [95% CI]	Partial r	t	p
Intercept	3.78 [2.70, 4.85]		6.92	.000
Entitlement	.174 [.035, .313]	.174	2.47	.014
Extraversion	-.003 [-.100, .093]	-.005	-.071	.943
Agreeableness	-.117 [-.259, .024]	-.116	-1.64	.104
Conscientiousness	-.272 [-.422, -.123]	-.248	-3.59	.000
Emotional stability	.138 [.020, .256]	.162	2.31	.022
Openness	-.097 [-.228, .033]	-.104	-1.47	.143

Note. $R^2 = .153$

The dependent variable was somewhat positively skewed in this study as well, again causing the residuals from our OLS regression to not be normally distributed. As in Study 4, we performed a natural log transformation of the dependent variable and then reran the analyses from the main paper to check the robustness of the results. Entitlement and the natural log of

ignoring instructions were still positively correlated, $r = .23$, $p = .001$. And as shown in Table S18, the multiple regression results looked pretty similar to what was reported in the main paper, except that most effects got stronger.

Table S18. Regression coefficients for a model predicting the natural log of the likelihood of ignoring instructions from ratings of entitlement, the fairness of the instructions, the likelihood of punishment, anticipated happiness about escaping punishment, and how bad it would be if they got punished ($N = 203$).

	b [95% CI]	Partial *r*	*t*	*p*
Intercept	1.47 [1.00, 1.94]		6.19	.000
Entitlement	.048 [-.003, .100]	.130	1.84	.067
Fairness of instructions	-.134 [-.203, -.066]	-.267	-3.90	.000
Punishment likelihood	-.068 [-.119, -.018]	-.186	-2.66	.009
Happiness about escaping punishment	.059 [.022, .096]	.220	3.16	.002
How bad if punished	-.040 [-.082, .003]	-.130	-1.84	.067

Note. $R^2 = .283$